Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were
on its way in the middle of the islands of Buang and Bikid in Dutch East
Indies. Six Vintas were handled by 24 Moros. The Moros asked for food
at first but when they boarded the Dutch boats, they wanted to sieze the
entire cago. They attacked majority of the men and violated two women.
All of the people, other than two young women were left on the boat,
where they made holes to leave them to drown.Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
Issue:
FACTS
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats
measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of
the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for
reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at
the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in Daram, where they had dinner
and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention
Held: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear
in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the
narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioners house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is
equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea
travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and
even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic
drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.
Milo V Salanga
Facts:
The father of the complainant M, Lorenzo Oliva was charged and
convicted of rape. The accused filed an appeal, and on it, the
accused quetioned the testimony of his daugter M and further
alleged thatit was not him who had commited the crime, and that
it was his brother in law, Benjamin.
Issue:
WON the testimonies and credibility of the complainant witness
is in doubt and questionable.
Held:
Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault particularly if it constitutes incestuous
rape, because normally no person would be willing to undergo
the humiliation of public trial and to testify on the details of her
ordeal, were it not to condemn an injustice. The gravamen of
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any circumstances
provided by law.
In addition, mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given
any greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a
rape victim.
Wherefore, the decision of the court of appeals dated April 21,
2008, finding the accused-appellant Lorenzo Oliva, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each
crime.
On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners guilty of the crime charged.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioners lack of knowledge of their relationship at the time of the execution of
the public document could exempt them from the criminal liability of falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that falsification of
public documents by a public officer includes making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts. The elements of falsification are: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the afore-cited elements, it
must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in
making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken
advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene
in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of falsification in the case at bar. The
required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship. When a government employee
is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore
qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN and left it blank in
other years if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he
made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal
mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are
sisters). By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN,
Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal
Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article
168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which specifically provides that no person shall be appointed in the local
government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.
The second element of legal obligation to disclose the truth is also present as there is a law
requiring it. Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the
following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business
interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. A similar requirement is imposed by Section
8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos' negative answer reflected in his SALN
is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins
but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed.
The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended
family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure
having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the
1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong whose statement of having no knowledge of their
relationship as cousins is unthinkable being a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. Despite his
knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos
and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding
that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.
By Ongs issuance of the certification that the appointee is not related to him despite the fact
that they are, he was also guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a
narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under
the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.
The petitions were DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED.
GARCIA v. CA
G.R. Nos. L-82282-83. November 24, 1988.
167 SCRA 815
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Chemark Electric Motors, Inc. availed and was granted a credit line by Security Bank and
Trust Company. Subsequently, Chemark defaulted on its payments when they became due and
refused to pay despite repeated demands by SBTC. Antonio Garcia, on the other hand bound
himself jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC and like Chemark has failed and
refused to pay his obligations despite demands made upon him by SBTC. The same is true with
Dynetics and Matrix; they bound themselves jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC
and has failed and refused to do so. In an action to enforce the indemnity agreements executed by
the above parties with SBTC, the latter prayed for a summary judgment which was consequently
granted. In answer Dynetics, Inc., Matrix Management and Trading Corporation and Antonio
Garcia sought a judicial declaration that they were not liable to Security Bank and Trust
Company under said indemnity agreements they executed in favor of Chemark Electric Motors,
Inc. which had been extended a credit accommodation of about 20, 000, 000.00 Php by SBTC.
This was dismissed by the Court of Appeals ordering Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia to pay SBTC.
Hence, the case was elevated to the SC where one of the assigned errors by the plaintiffs
(Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia) to the appellate court's assailed decision is the awards of penalty
charges claiming that such charges are excessive.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the penalty charges awarded were excessive and thus must be reduced.
HELD:
Yes, In the case at bar, the penalty charges are excessive and unconscionable and so the
interest charges are enough punishment for the petitioners' failure to comply with their
obligations.
Penalty interests are in the nature of liquidated damages and may be equitably reduced by
the courts if they are iniquitous and unconscionable. Article 1229 of the New Civil Code states
that "The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly
or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable."
special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the
commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court
can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the
accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of
Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and
killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed
with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and
attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the
same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of
the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the
New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must
be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of
the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the
perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each
pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to
three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the
three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
FACTS:
1.
In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various
2.
On
the
afternoon
of
the
same
day,
several
residential
houses
were
likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, which resulted
to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.
3.
Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with
homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82
other unidentified persons,
confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or caused to be burned several residential houses,
knowing the said houses to be occupied.
4.
Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge,
5.
The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.
6.
Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No.
226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court.
7.
The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative Orders and calling
attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses
for reason of security and personal safety.
8.
The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the
transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative Order only provided for transfer of
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more
expeditious disposalof the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already
pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change
of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have
been done right at the very inception of these cases.
RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the
CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but
nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the
circuit courts.
9.
In view of the lower courts denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal
Court,the
prosecution
resorted
to
the
SC
for
writs
of
certiorari
and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of
transfer and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Secondary Judicial District.
10.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that
the Administrative Order merely authorized the court below, but did not require or
command it.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court.
RULING:
YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs
mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of
Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting
officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second
Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.
This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious
necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to
be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to
be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be
established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent
attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to
make the judiciary an effective institution of government.
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands.
1.
That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not,
authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
2.
That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it
and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the
same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over
the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
3.
That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of
the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court
of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all
the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did
not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his
daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he
previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly
represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not
corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers
testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu
So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that
he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had
he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the
violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an
innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing
the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty,
betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an
illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the
monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received
earlier.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and
credence to their version of the events. Petitioner's conviction
must be affirmed. The act of receiving money was connected with
his duty as a police officer. With regard to the fine, the amount of
the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the
act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less than 3
times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that
petitioner received an aggregate amount of 5800 pesos. He
should, therefore, be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times
its value, which is a fine of 18000 pesos.
Issue:
Held:
R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct
bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A.
3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense
charged and is not included in the offense charged which is
violation
of
R.A.3019
sec.3
(b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not
limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all
kinds
of
transaction
whether
commercial,
civil,
or
administrative in nature.
Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for
around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1,
1982. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of
employees.
A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and
she was terminated on December 31, 1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions
of the regional director of the Administration, however, she continued working.
According to Mrs. Mutia, she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the
least a renewed appointment. When she approached the regional director about
it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the latter refused to attend to her
appointment unless given some money. On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia
reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the
province. The PC officials, who are colleagues of Mrs. Mutias husband, arranged
for an entrapment with marked money bills worth P100 as the entrapment
equipment. On February 29, 1984, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet
at the canteen at 9:00am. Mrs. Mutia then notified the PC authorities, Sergeants
Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong about the arrangement. At the
canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a table and were joined by some
officemates Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano, while the PC officials
occupied separate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera to
document the entrapment. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks
she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right hand to the
petitioner who received the money with her left hand. At that moment, the PC
officials approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money.
Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner
was arrested and was brought to the PC crime where she was found positive for
ultra-violet powder.
The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and
sentenced her to four months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office,
profession or calling, including the right of suffrage, and public censure. The
petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of the Instant Petition
for Review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money.
HELD:
away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstances or act to show such
acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within
their physical custody some gift, money or other property.
If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs.
Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemates Mrs.
Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano to join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see
the alleged passing of the money under the table. What she was sure was that
when they were about to leave the canteen, two men approached petitioner, one
of whom took pictures and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, What are you
trying to do to me? The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty
conscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt
of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or
by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of
the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in
the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his
interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering
that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting
possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve
moral turpitude.
opened. Inside the two bedrooms of the house separated only by a curtain, they
found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other
child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to
the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen
days. Melodys grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had
heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when
appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does
not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Is
the accused guilty of the crime charged? Ruling:
YES. Parricide is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution.
Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual
stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no
one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is
not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can
sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial
evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence
which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.
In the
killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so
sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the
attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected
than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound
asleep and totally defenseless. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LUIS ANTONIO
GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009 Parricide Facts: On appeal is the
21 January 2008 Decision of the Court of affirming the conviction of appellant Luis
Antonio Garchitorena of the crime of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the16th day of [August 2000], in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, being then the legitimate husband of FLORDELIZA
TABLA GARCHITORENA, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
said FLORDELIZA TABL[A] GARCHITORENA, his wife, by then and there shooting
her with a gun, hitting her on the head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and
mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA.
Issue: Is accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES.The elements of the crime of
parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It was
stipulated during the pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24
August 1999. That the appellant killed the victim was proven specifically by
circumstantial evidence.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding that accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fact that accused and
the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the shooting incident
occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument between the spouses, as
narrated by the accused to the police investigator and during trial. Thirdly,
accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In this, the Court finds criminal
purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court of improbability of the deceased
shooting herself.
Tabuena V Sandiganbayan
Facts: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from
Marcos to pay directly to his office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs
liability to PNCC. He then received Presidential Memorandum from Fe
Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals,
no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement although Gimenez issued
a receipt on the third delivery for the entire amount. Tabuena was accused
and convicted of the crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding
the government, taking and misappropriating money when there is no
outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner contended that
he was acting in good faith when the office of the president directed him to
deliver the said amount to his office person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of
departing from that common standard of fairness and impartiality?
Decision: Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and
Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. The majority believes
that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive
that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even
under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is
admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and
to elicit additional relevant evidence.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting
attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law,
he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge
in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of
society.
Tetanngco V Sandiganbayan
AMADEO TETANGCO Vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 156427 January 20, 2006
FACTS: This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order, of public respondent
Ombudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco against private
respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 2 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26,
2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and
P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor
Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial assistance from the City of Manila
when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case and the same case
had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified,
the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit and
accounting.
The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and
merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CHARGE AGAINST RESPONDENT MAYOR
ATIENZA FOR VIOLATION OF ART. 220 OF THE RPC DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIMA
FACIE CASE AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME CHARGED OR, AT THE
VERY LEAST, FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT).
HELD: In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause.
Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. 11 Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for
financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did
not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the
financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.
The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art. 220 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than that for which such fund or property
were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such
misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either
case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5
to 50 percent of the sum misapplied.
The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is an
accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some
public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from
the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for
technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to
any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must
be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law
or ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
Abdulla vs People
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds,
appellant Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Appellants co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant
was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting
the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied,
appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime
charged.
Issue: Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?
Ruling: No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to
all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State
College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees
were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence of any
presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence
that appellants act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the
Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.
Parungao vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The petitioner, Oscar Parungao, a public officer, was charged of malversation of
public funds for allegedly appropriating to his personal use the amount of Php185,
250.00 for the construction of the Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Parungao
admitted that he received the said amount, but was disbursed for the materials to
be used, and the rest was used to pay, upon the insistence of the municipal mayor
of Porac, for the labor of the different barangays in the municipality. Sandiganbayan
acquitted him but convicted him for the crime of illegal use of public funds
(Art.220). Hence, this appeal. Parungao claims that he cannot be convicted of a
crime different and distinct from that charged in the information.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him for on the violation of Art.220.
HELD:
The accused has the constitutional right that he can only be convicted of the crime
with which he is charged, unless they have both have the same essential elements
which are alleged in the information. Whereas, the elements of the crime of
malversation of public funds and illegal use of public funds are distinct. Hence, the
petition was granted. The decision of Sandiganbayan was reversed. And Oscar
Parungao was acquitted.
Legal Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his criminal liability?
2.
Legal Facts
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused
Francisco Abarca went to the bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his
daughter in the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to
catch the trip plus the engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his fathers house, and then
later went home. When he reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of sexual
intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her
wife push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their
room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldiers house to where he got the M16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to
a mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his
different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Kohs instantaneous death. By that time,
Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr.
Amparados one and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious
hospitalization and the latters wife who had slighter physical injuries from the incident. The
RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must
indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
3. Holding
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the
lower court sentencing four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying
Amparado spouses for expenses and damages.
4. Reasoning
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely
without fault. It appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not
enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the Court finds
negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is
less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries
suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in appreciating the crime to
be murder with qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse?
People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08 [October 6, 1995]
FACTS:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered
the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that
late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle
of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? Show
me your I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without
bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why
are you bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at
him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot
me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step
backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun.
Hes going to kill us. Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to
and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on
the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away
from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accuseds car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around the accuseds car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually,
accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to
see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drives away. Leino struggled to
his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not Claudio Teehankee, Jr. is guilty for murder of Roland Champman and
for two frustrated murders of Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman.
HELD:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland
John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000 as moral
damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts:
P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for
loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000
as exemplary damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as
indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.
Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings
of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali.
They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of
the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action
showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is
not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an
accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the
group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian
priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as
long as the person is also Italian priest.