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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS ELECTION LAWS LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

CASE DIGESTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW

ATTY. ANDY NACHURA


2E AY 2015-2016

AGRUPIS BALLADARES BAUTISTA BUEMIO BURGOS CAISIP CAPISTRANO CARUNGAY DE LEON


DEL ROSARIO ENCILA FAVOREAL GEMORA GERNALE HOJILLA MADERA MANGUERA
PAGCALIWANGAN ROXAS SANTOS SARMIENTO SOLIMAN TAN UDARBE UJANO VASQUEZ
VIERNES ZAPANTA

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[CONTINUATION]
I.

CHAPTER 3 A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS

PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION vs. DE


JESUS
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic
Education Act 2001, became a law on 11 August 2001 in accordance with
Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution, intended to highlight shared
governance in the different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish
authority, accountability, and responsibility for achieving higher learning
outcomes. To this end, the position of Schools District Supervisor was
severely limited in power in that it was stripped of administrative,
management, control or supervisory functions over the schools and
learning centers within their respective districts; a power which was
instead vested with the DepEd Secretary under the law.
Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90)
days after the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of shared
governance shall be fully implemented within two (2) years after such
approval. However, before the DepEd could issue the appropriate
implementing rules and regulations, petitioner sought the legal assistance
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National Committee on
Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the administrative
issue regarding the restoration of the previous powers enjoyed by
Schools District Supervisors.
After consultation with the DepEd Secretary and the Supervisors, the
DepEd issued its IRR including them; however, its IRR had them mainly
primarily perform staff functions and shall not exercise administrative
supervision over school principals unless specifically authorized by the
proper authorities. In sum, the main focus of the position is the
instructional and curricula supervision aimed at raising academic
standards at the school level.
To this end, the petitioners jointly filed an instant petition for prohibition
and mandamus assailing the validity of the IRR regulations as they
unduly modified the provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Petitioners assert that
under the IRR, the schools district supervisors primarily perform staff
functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision over school
principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. Thus,
under the IRR, the exercise of administrative supervision over school
principals was made discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices
of the proper authorities. As such, the administrative supervisory powers
can be withdrawn from a district supervisor without any reason at all, a
provision which allegedly has no basis in the enabling law.
ISSUE:
WON the IRR violates the law?
HELD:
No, it is not. Administrative officials have the power to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the
power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature; however,
administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate
legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling
in the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the
objectives and purposes of the law and that the regulation does not
contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law.
Upon reading the provisions of the IRR, the Court found that they merely
reiterated and implement the related provisions of RA 9155. In fact, a
plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors
have no administrative supervision over the school heads; their
responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(d) of RA 9155.
The same conclusion is supported by the deliberations conducted over
the passing of the law when it was still Senate Bill 2191.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Note: Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
GR 110526 10 February 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner challenges the validity of Board Resolution No. 018-93, dated
March 24, 1993, of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in which the
latter declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in
coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for
engaging in such business. While PCA continues the registration of
coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the
"monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards.
Petitioner maintains that the resolution in question is null and void for
being an undue exercise of legislative power.
PCA was created in 1973. In the 1982, in view of overproduction in the
coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat competition, underselling
and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of
the export performance of coconut-based commodities, the government
temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut processing plants,
phased out some of the existing ones and provided that the
establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon determination
by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the
approval of the President of the Philippines.
The resolution in question reduces the task of PCA to merely monitoring
volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards of
coconut processing plants.
ISSUE:
WON the PCA can renounce its power to regulate implicit in the law
creating it
HELD:
No. Under Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No.
1468), the role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program
of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its
aspects." By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring
volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards" of
coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves
it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will
develop. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left
the field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of
cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982
required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to
save the industry.
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative
department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up
by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle
it.
ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR 132601 October 12, 1998
FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of hiscommon-law spouse and
the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed
an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for
rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had
seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177.

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The convict filed a Petition for Prohibition from carrying out the
lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel,
degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent
Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection
as a ground.
ISSUES:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177
fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection,
the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in
administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time
of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and
(3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering
the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not
a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
2. NO. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights.
3. NO. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the
legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the
public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far
as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence
during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take
steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to
cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also
mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The
Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring
greater detail.
The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently
definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials
concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin
with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing
rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was
supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution
procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing
for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A.
No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. YES. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is
unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid
exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a
woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or
while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of
age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to
legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without
an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one
(1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty
while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section
17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following
delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds
a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while
the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not
override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it
seeks to apply and implement.
LUPANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRC
GR L-77372 April 29, 1988
FACTS:
Respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
The resolution provided that "No examine shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any handout, review materials, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official
or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during
the three days immediately preceding every examination day including
the examination day." The petitioners, all reviewees, filed with the RTC of
Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. PRC
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin its resolution. The lower court ruled in
favor of the petitioners. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC filed
with the CA a petition for the nullification of the Order of the lower court.
Said petition was granted by the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON PRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of
the licensure examinations." However, it's good aim cannot be a cloak to
conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen
that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college, university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions xxx.

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The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught


committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred
from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to
have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days
before the examination period.

two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of


such certificate of public convenience.

It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should


not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the insurance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

1. WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi
operators were violated (NO)
2. WON their equal protection rights were violated (NO)

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA,


INC vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION
1982
FACTS:
On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that
aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe
comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by
metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the
commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and safety.
6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits.
No car beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi.
Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 and
applying the same system to succeeding years by just adding one year to
both dates. They had to surrender the expired taxis plates to the BOT for
turnover to Land Transpo Commission.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of
Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated
August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and
other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out
of the taxis and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances..
On January 27, 1981, a petition filed for "Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order"
was filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo
Cabigao and Ace Transportation with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to
allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of
the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not
be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the
following queries were posed for consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due
process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of
Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of
Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are

ISSUES:
The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with
the ff issues

HELD:
Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed,
and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency
to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in
the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along
the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion,
may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of
Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway
Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government
office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in
the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position
papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other
persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or
employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not
asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding the
assailed circular.
SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will
choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE
REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID the board has the
choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.
PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set oppressive they
want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was
still safe and roadworthy despite age.
Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can
open the door to multiple standards and corruption
Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on
experience and based on cost and fair returns on the units
Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair
Equal Protection of the Law:
PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry =
violation of their equal protection rights
Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in
other cities like Cebu and is also in the process of conducting the same
studies and policy formulations in other cities.
Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more
constant use of the taxis in MM.
SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION the traffic conditions in the various
cities
CONCLUSIONS:

Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila
are more heavily used and more likely to deteriorate.

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The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in


their public commute.
The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid
nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that it
passed.
Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is
deemed valid.

DE JESUS
vs.
COMMISSION
AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN
GR 109023 August 12, 1998

ON

AUDIT

FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing
A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law
provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation
into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations,
however,
were
exempted
from
consolidation.Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated m
embers of the LWUA BoardSecretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee. To implement RA 6758,the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
(DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective
November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of
basic salary. Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as
corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to
the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the
validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that
theCircular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it
is supposed toimplement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force an
d effect because it was notpublished in the Official Gazette.COA upheld
the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the
case to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General supported the
petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being
inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to
implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question
are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are
not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.
ISSUE:
WON DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of
publication in the Official Gazette
HELD:
No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA
446), publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the
nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or
implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and
enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative
or
internal
regulation.
Before
the
said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their i
ncome, thegovernment officials and employees concerned should be appr
ised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to
the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter.
This
approach
is
more
in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transp
arency. Theineffectiveness of the Circular makes resolution of the other
issues at bar unnecessary. Petition is granted.
PEOPLE vs. MACEREN
DOCTRINE:
A statute is superior to an administrative directive and the former cannot
be repealed nor amended by the latter. Administrative issuances seeking
to carry into effect and Act of Congress must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law; they cannot modify nor supplant the same.

FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in
all Philippine waters.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative
Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water
fisheries
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin
Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint.
The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed
the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this
Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because
electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as
contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a
substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not
clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful.
ISSUE:
WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his
authority in prohibiting electrofishing through administrative orders nos.
84 and 84-1
HELD:
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act
No. 3512.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and
administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the
Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing
electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the
law making body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority


by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations,
of course, the law itself cannot be extended.. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the


mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
CIR vs. CA
FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune Tobacco), engaged in the
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, registered "Champion,"

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"Hope," and "More" cigarettes. BIR classified them as foreign brands


since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to
foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to
'Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said
brands from the foreign brand category.

(2)
Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess
of the ceiling, provided that the total schools fees will not exceed
P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary
levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the
collegiate level.

A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic


Act ("RA") No. 7654 was enacted - 55% for locally manufactured foreign
brand while 45% for locally manufactured brands. 2 days before the
effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC
37-93"), was issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the
real owner/s are of Champion, Hope and More, it follows that the same
shall be considered locally manufactured foreign brand for purposes of
determining the ad valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via telefax a copy of
RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco addressed to no one in particular. Then
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of
RMC 37-93. CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00.

The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of
the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to
20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force.

ISSUE:
WON it was necessary for BIR to follow the legal requirements when it
issued its RMC
HELD:
YES. CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative powers which publication, filing, and prior hearing.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
BUT when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases
the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to those
directly affected, a chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law.
RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed simply as construing Section 142(c)(1) of
the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made
in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within
the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654 which subjects
mentioned brands to 55% the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily,
it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of
the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not
have been then ignored.
PHILIPPINE
CONSUMERS
FOUNDATION,
INC
vs. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
PARTIES: Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a nonstock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines.
Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking
cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.
FACTS:
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education
created by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for
Tuition and Other School Fees" which favorably recommended to the
DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's
policy on increases in school fees for the school year 1987 to 1988
(1)
Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees
by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent without the need for
the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school
fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the
DECS;

The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on


the ground that the increases were too high.
Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10,
1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower
ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly.
Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases.
On April 23, 1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the
President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation
of Department Order No. 37.
No response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the
President.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the
public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned
Department Order unconstitutional due to the following reasons:
1. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued
without any legal basis because while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate
does not always include the power to increase school fees.
2. The questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution in as much as the petitioner was not
given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was
issued. The students and parents are interested parties that should be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased.
The petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial
of substantive and procedural due process of law.
The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other
school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department
Order is not arbitrary in character.
ISSUE:
WON Department Order No. 37 was issued by the DECS in the exercise
of its legislative function
HELD:
Yes. The court finds the arguments of the petitioner untenable. The
function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the
grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process.
It is within the DECS exercise of legislative power. The assailed
Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for school year 1987 to
1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of its issuance.
It would be reasonable to assume that the report of the Task Force
created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an increase
in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the
petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced
the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly.
Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, the court cannot consider
the assailed Department Order arbitrary.

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Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed. In the absence of proof to the contrary, that
presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the party
assailing the regularity of official proceedings. Petitioner must establish
that respondent acted without or in excess of her jurisdiction; or with
grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not
successfully disputed the presumption. We commend the petitioner for
taking the cudgels for the public, especially the parents and the students
of the country.
The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to
an outrageous exercise of government authority and power. In such an
eventuality, this Court will not hesitate to exercise the power of judicial
review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution.
The petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the buying and selling of
copra in Misamis Oriental. Under the NIRC, agricultural food products in
their original state are exempt from VAT at all stages of production or
distribution. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
issued RMC-47-91 declaring copra exempted from VAT only if the sale is
made by the primary producer. Prior to the passing of RMC-47-91, copra
was exempt from VAT at all stages of production, regardless of who
the seller is.
Petitioner contends that it is the Bureau of Food and Drug of the
Department of Health, not the BIR, is the competent government agency
to determine proper classification of food products.
Petitioner also contends that it was denied due process of law since it
was not heard before a ruling was made.
ISSUES:
1. WON the BIR had competent authority to re-classify copra
2. WON the petitioner was denied due process
HELD:
1. Yes. The BIR is the government agency charged with the enforcement
of tax laws, thus, the opinion of the CIR, in the absence of any
showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. The ruling
made by the CIR was in exercise of its power given by the NIRC.
No. RMC-47-91 is in the nature of a mere interpretative rule, not a
legislative rule. Interpretative rules are designed to provide guideless to
the law, which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Moreover, that previous Commissioners considered copra as an
agricultural food product is not reason for holding that the present
interpretation is wrong. The CIR is not bound by the ruling of his
predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in
the interpretation of laws. In interpretative rules, the court may go to the
opposite extreme and substitute its judgment.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Said OIC realized that one of the subscribed investors of the JVA, Mr. Yim
Kam Shing, was a Hongkong Chinese national staying in the country on a
mere tourist visa, hence, the former revoked the authorizations
previously issued to the latter.
Respondent Yim Kam Shing filed an action for damages against the
Commission and OIC Saludo questioning the aforesaid revocation of the
authorization as signatory.
Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss with opposition on the ground
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the
subject of the case
ISSUES:
1. WON regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the petitioner
Presidential Commission on Good Government and;
2. WON said regional trial courts may interfere with and restrain or set
aside the orders and actions of the Commission.
HELD:
Supreme Court sustains petitioner's stand and holds that regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals for that matter have no jurisdiction over
the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its
powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section
26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain
or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission.
As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and
functions and the power and authority of the Commission, it exercises
quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the
Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other."
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 has expressly accorded the
Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that:
"No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof
for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated
by this order."
The said case is clearly barred by the aforequoted immunity provision of
Executive Order No. 1, as buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which
further provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance."
HON. ISIDRO CARINO vs. CHR
GR 96681 December 2, 1991

B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS

FACTS:
On Sept. 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, 800 public school
teachers, among them Manila Public School Teachers Assoc (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted
actions to highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances they had brought to the latters
attention. These mass concerted actions were made after the protest
rally staged at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate the granting of demands and elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education.

FACTS:
Commission (Presidential Commission on Good Governance) issued an
order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export
garment manufacturing firms denominated as American Inter Fashion
Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation.

The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes and
gathering in peaceable assemblies. The Secretary of Education served
them an order to return to work in 24 hours of face dismissal and a
memorandum directing DECS officials to initiate dismissal proceeds to
those who do not comply. The mass actions continued into the week.
Among those who took part in the mass actions were the 8 private
respondents (Budoy, et al) who taught at the Ramon Magsaysay High
School.

PCGG vs. PEA


GR 77663

Said firms had both been organized by joint venture agreement to which
the Commission appointed Ms. Noemi Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)
of the said corporations with full authority to operate and manage the
same.

Budoy, et al were administratively charged, preventively suspended for


90 days and temporarily replaced. Their motion for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by the SC was denied
which led them staging a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings. On Dec. 17, Secretary Casino decreed dismissal from

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

the service of Esber and suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS


GR 103595 April 18, 1997

MPSTA filed a petition before the RTC against Carino which was
dismissed. MPSTA and ACT when to the SC on the ground that the
striking teachers right to due process and peaceful assembly was
violated.

FACTS:
Private Respondent CCM Gas Corp. is a customer of Petitioner MERALCO.
On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272,684.81 for electric consumption for
the period April 22, 1984 - May 22, 1984 due on May 29, 1984. CCM Gas
withheld payment until its question concerning the purchased power
adjustment was answered. MERALCO gave CCM Gas notice of
disconnection if its account was not paid on or before June 5, 1984. CCM
Gas protested and made partial payment of P52,684.81. Receiving no
explanation from MERALCO, CCM Gas brought the case before RTC,
Malabon to restrain MERALCO from disconnecting CCM Gas electric
supply. MERALCO contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction.
Later, RTC dismissed the case and lifted the injunction issued for lack of
jurisdiction and holding the matter was cognizable by the Board of
Energy. Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction
because CCM Gas was seeking for MERALCO to show how it arrived at
the purchased power adjustment. It did not involve an exercise of the
Board of Energys power to regulate and fix power rates imposed by
electric companies.

In the meantime, on Sept. 27, the striking teachers (Budoy et al)


complained to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of
their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons unknown to them. The CHR scheduled a
dialogue wherein it heard teachers counsel and enjoined Casino to
appear. Otherwise, the CHR will resolve the complaint solely on the basis
of teachers evidence.
Carino filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that CHR had no
jurisdiction over the case. CHR denied the motion and made an Order
requiring him to submit their counter-affidavits to resolve the case.
Carino commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition to
invalidate said Order. CHR intends to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e. exercise jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
If a subject matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions
(Secretary of Education), may the CHR take cognizance of the same
subject matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
HELD:
NO. The CHR has no power to try and decide or hear and determine
cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact- finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function.
The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office.
Its functions include the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights.
Investigate means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
Adjudicate means "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties
to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in the Striking Teachers Case.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction
of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals
have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission.
Petition is granted.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction
HELD:
Yes. It is clear from the complaint of CCM Gas that it is not questioning
the power of MERALCO to collect the amount but the matter to which the
amount was arrived at. It merely demanded for details of the electric bill
when MERALCO disregarded such request. Clearly, CCM Gas was not
invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the
power rates to be charged by electric companies, but the regular courts
power to adjudicate involving violation of rights legally demandable and
enforceable. The right of CCM Gas to be informed concerning an item in
its electric bill is undoubted.
BOISER vs. CA
GR L-61438 June 24, 1983
FACTS:
Petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and
other municipalities in the province of Bohol. Sometime in August, 1965,
the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide
Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the
PLDT relay station. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in
Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from
any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on
the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities
provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and
qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards
in the operation of facilities under the agreement.
Without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a
"circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees
Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's
relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the
province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation
of the aforecited " Interconnecting Agreement. Petitioner instituted a
civil case with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional
Trial Court, for injunction and damages. The Court of First Instance of
Cebu issued a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT and
directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties. Private
respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Three
(3) years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary
restraining order, the private respondents elevated the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals. Petition filed with the Court of Appeals had
for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining order on the
following ground:
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING
ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE
COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED PROPERLY

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DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR
COURTS.
Respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution which reads:
Respondents are restrained from enforcing the Order of March 2, 1979
(TRO by CFI), until further orders from Us.
Petitioner countered by filing this petition on the following grounds:
That the respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction or has
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications
Commission is the body with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies
arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of
communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance.
Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the petition before this
Court that the CFI of Cebu acted within its jurisdiction and there being no
grave abuse of discretion, the challenge to its interlocutory order should
not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WON NTC has jurisdiction
HELD:
NO, the NTC has no jurisdiction.
The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of
contract. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it
to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and
exemplary damages. What the petitioner is questioning is an order which
does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a
telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect
rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.
ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
GR L-45081 July 15, 1936
FACTS:
Jose A. Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas. In the said election, Jose
Angara emerged as the member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most number of votes. On December
3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which declared
the finality of Agaras victory.
On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of
protest against the election of Angara. Thereafter, Electoral Commission
passed a resolution declaring that Dec 9 shall be the last day for the filing
of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
Jose A. Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging among others that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period.
The Electoral Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's
protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
1. WON the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy; YES

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


2. WON The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. NO
HELD:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual
and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution
went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to
have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

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Therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs. AGRAVA
GR L-12426 16 February 1959
FACTS:
Respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled
for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical
training are qualified to take the said examination.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that a
member of the Philippine Bar is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office. In other words, they do not need to take the
examination to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office. Petitioner contends that the circular is in excess of the
respondents jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
Respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training; that the
action taken by the respondent is in accordance with R.A. 165 (Patent
Law of the Philippines), which similar to the United States Patent Law.
ISSUE:
WON members of the Philippine Bar need to pass an examination before
being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office
HELD. No. It is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all
such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
As regards the U.S. Patent Law, while it authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise
and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form
of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point.
PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
GR 25018 May 26, 1969
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against
the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial
hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that
it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right
against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for
an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that
the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative
hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not
be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the
party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice.
Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
ISSUE:
Is compelling the petitioner to be the witness of the complainants in
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without
his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not
only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he
could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as
well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the
right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise
of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other
rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go
unpunished
and
that
the
truth
must
be
revealed,
such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means
or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the
most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
CABAL vs. KAPUNAN, JR.
GR L-19052
FACTS:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a
letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of
the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other
equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a
committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The
Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in
the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela,
in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner
objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the
witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer
such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner
respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness
stand.
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such
action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of
the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to
the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent
Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


ISSUE:
WON the proceeding before the Committee is civil or criminal in character
HELD:
The Court ruled that although the said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems
that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a
penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are
applicable thereto.
GUEVARA vs. COMELEC
GR L-12596 July 31, 1958
FACTS:
The Comelec, on 4 May 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the
National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg.
Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the
contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and
11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On
8 May 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Comelec
the corresponding contracts thereon. On 13 May 1957, the Comelec
cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the
contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the
ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the
ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on 16 May
1957. A series of petitions (3) were filed by ACME for the reconsideration
of the resolution of the Commission of 13 May 1957. The third was filed
on 20 May 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged
therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Comelec
resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the
NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. On 28 May
1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the
hearing, and on 4 June 1957, the Commission issued its resolution
denying the third motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, an article signed by Jose Guevara was published on the 2
June 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nationwide
circulation. Guevara was ordered by the Comelec to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt for having published an article
entitled Ballot Boxes Contract Hit, which tended to interfere with and
influence the Comelec and its members in the adjudication of a
controversy then pending investigation and determination before said
body arising from the third petition for reconsideration of 20 May 1957
and the supplementary petition thereof of 1 June 1957 filed by ACME;
and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and
undermine the exclusive constitutional function of the Comelec and its
Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the
administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
Guevara, answering the summons issued to him by the Comelec,
appeared and filed a motion to quash. The Comelec, after hearing,
denied the motion to quash but granted Guevara a period of 15 days
within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the
issue raised by him assailing the jurisdiction of the Commission to
investigate and punish Guevara for contempt in connection with the
alleged publication as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the
Commission granted a power to so punish the same. Hence the petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court granted
the petition, and enjoined the Comelec from proceeding with the
contempt case set forth in its resolution of 20 June 1957. The preliminary
injunction issued by the Supreme Court was made permanent.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against Guevara in connection with the publication of an
article

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


HELD:
NO.
1. Commission on Elections; Powers defined in the Constitution The
Comelecs powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials (Section 2, Article X).
2. Commission on Elections; Supplemental powers embodied in
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code The Revised Election Code
supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission.
Among these powers are those embodied in Section 5 of said Code. It
provides, the Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof
shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending
before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise
take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and
delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the
Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within
fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise
to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members
thereof shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule
sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory
decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of
the Commission. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on
Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in
accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
3. Comelecs power to enforce election laws and power to try
hear and decide election controversies The Comelec not only has
the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may
be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of
this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein.
4. Quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec; Difficulty in determining
demarcation between administrative duty and justiciable function The
Comelec, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the
meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an
independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85
Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law
come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this
category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code
specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its
jurisdiction, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number
and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors
and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions
may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come
under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and
must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line
between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a
function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial
action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that
may intervene when a controversy should arise.
5. Comelec has no power to punish for contempt if the
Commission is merely discharging ministerial duty The
controversy merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of
elections ordained by the Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it
only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
6. Power to punish for contempt inherent in courts The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement
of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.,
271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In
Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been
regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins
vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has
been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
(People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid.
DUMARPA vs. DIMAPORO, COMELEC
GR 87014-16 September 13, 1989
FACTS:
On February 3,1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board
of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. The annulment of
the proclamation and the canvass on which it was based was sought in
two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates. While
these petitions were pending, the Secretary of Local Governments issued
on May 1-.9, 1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director,
Region XII of the Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis
Balt "Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur
vice Abdullah Imam." The petitions seeking annulment of Datu
Dimaporo's proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the First Division
of the COMELEC. Motions for reconsideration thereof were seasonably
presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the
Commission en banc for resolution.
Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as
mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of
July 11, 1988. Under date of July 18, 1988, his counsel, Mangurun
Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen
B. Pangarungan, "transmitting .. the 'RESOLUTION' of the Honorable First
Division of the Commission on Elections ..," and praying "that
communications and other official matters involving the affairs of the
Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL
DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was aimed by the
Commission on Elections as aforestated." This letter, and other related
documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were later referred to
the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur. The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly
on the request. The opinion sought was communicated to the Vice
Governor. It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C.
Danganan, with the conformity ("conforme") of Provincial Fiscal Salic B.
Dumarpa. The indorsement reads as follows:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Vice Governor-OIC Governor, with
the legal opinion that Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of the
Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Sec. 3, paragraph
C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for
reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on
Elections shall be decided En Banc by the Commission. Considering that a
injunction for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC 8 the decision
of the Division is not final and executory. The decision of the Commission
En Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no
restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the
COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as
well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. In its Resolution of October
28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the Commission en
banc condemned the fiscal's conception of "the First Division's jurisdiction
of the pre- proclamation controversy" as a "distortion of the law and
jurisprudence." Stressing that under the law "it is solely the Commission
that can suspend or annul any proclamation made," the Resolution
pointed out that the respondents Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in
effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong, to
prevent him from discharging the duties of his office, and pave the way
for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-in-Charge,
who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions' which are
acts constituting 'unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers that
pertain exclusively to the Commission, an unlawful interference with its
processes and proceedings, and improper conduct that tends directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in
this case."
ISSUE:
WON COMELECs conviction of petitioners for contempt is valid?
HELD:
No. It appears that the Fiscals are being sanctioned for rendering an
opinion that in the view of the COMELEC en banc was "a distortion of law
and jurisprudence." That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry
of the Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the judgment by
the First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the
Board of Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the
duly designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt,
could still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. The inquiry had
been made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty
then being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict
had to be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by arms
and bloodshed. Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting
the lawyers of the province as to the effects of a judgment on the
authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials, or the fiscals
for advising him on such matters. The power to hold in contempt, it has
time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but
on the preservative principle. In a word, petitioners have been found in
contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the
Commission and failed to conform to its own views. All things
considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the
preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms
of the allegedly contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led
to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent
Commission or erode the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or
other actuations.
ANG TIBAY vs. CIR AND NLU
DOCTRINE:
Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance
of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them.
Nevertheless, It is essential that due process must be observed for the
requirements of fair play are not applicable to judicial proceedings only.
FACTS:
Toribio Teodoro is the manager and owner of Ang Tibay, a leather
company which has a contract with the Philippine Army. On September
26, 1938 he temporarily laid off members of the National Labor Union
Inc., working in his company due to a shortage of leather soles which
resulted in the delay in the fulfilment of his contract with the Army.
The Court of Industrial Relations forwarded a motion for reconsideration
with the Supreme Court.
The NLU in pursuit of a retrial in the CIR averred that:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the
breach of obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of American
industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


The petitioner Ang Tibay has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
ISSUE:
WON special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due
process.
HELD:
Yes
RATIO:
The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and
quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations
between employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration
for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the
president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes
a departure from the separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal
procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the
dispute. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
The SC outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not
strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. In the interest of justice
the case is remanded to the CIR due to substantial new evidence, only
recently discovered and completely inaccessible at the time, which if
presented would greatly affect the outcome of the case.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


CORONA vs. CA
FACTS:
On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative
Order No. 25 creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and
Accountability, Sec. 1 of which declares as a policy that:
"The Department Secretary shall be directly responsible to the President
in eradicating graft and corruption in his Department and the offices,
agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations attached to or
under his Department. The Department Secretary shall likewise be
responsible to the President for the implementation of policies and
programs to minimize or prevent graft and corruption and to promote the
ethical standards of public service."
Pursuant to the mandate of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio
Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating the Administrative Action
Board (AAB) "to act, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate
measures on cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts
and acts of corruption in the Department."
Two Philippine Ports Authority police officers filed a complaint with the
Administrative Action Board against Leopoldo Bungubung, District
Manager of the Port of Manila for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. Subsequently, the PPA General Manager,
Rogelio A. Dayan, filed another "formal charge" against Bungubung and
one Mario Tan for dishonesty, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, willful violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Then, DOTC Secretary Reyes and PPA General Manager Dayan
also filed their respective complaints with the AAB against Cristeto
Dinopol, then Manager of the Port of Davao, for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law. Bungubung and Dinopol asserted that the
PPA General Manager, not the AAB, had jurisdiction to initiate and
conduct an administrative investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to
initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel whose rank
are below that of an assistant general manager
HELD:
Petitioners contention, therefore, that the DOTC Secretary, acting as
alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA personnel like the
private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC
Secretarys jurisdiction is circumscribed by the provisions of the PPA
Charter and the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving personnel below that of
Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to initiate
proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall
witness the absurd spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acting as
complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him
to review.
What is prescribed by the law and the Beja case is that all complaints
against a PPA official or employee below the rank of Assistant General
Manager shall be filed before the PPA General Manager by the proper
officials, such as the PPA police or any aggrieved party. The aggrieved
party should not, however, be one and the same official upon whose lap
the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest
esse simul actor et judex. No man can be at once a litigant and judge.
Unless, of course, in an exceptional case, such official inhibits himself or
expresses his willingness at the outset to waive his right to review the
case on appeal.
The transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB
was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable
penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was
discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to
the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take
jurisdiction of the case.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL vs. CA
FACTS:
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was
established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine
officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine Engineering (A.M.E.) and a
four-year course in Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). In 1978 it
established a branch in Talon, Las Pias, Metro Manila. But we are here
concerned only with the main school in Manila.
For several times prior to 1985 respondent Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal
permit/recognition. However, on 11 March 1986 the DECS issued
petitioner a renewal permit for SY 1985-1986. Later, petitioner applied
for a summer permit for 1986 which the DECS favorably indorsed to the
Minister of Education in consideration of the graduating students for
summer. Thereafter the application was returned to Director Modesta
Boquiren of the DECS for evaluation and decision pursuant to the
authority delegated to the Regions under Department Order No. 22,
series of 1975. Director Boquiren issued petitioner the summer permit for
1986 based on the previously stated humanitarian reason but subject to
the condition that petitioner should not enroll students for the first
semester of SY 1986-1987 until a permit therefor was granted and that
the enrollment list for the summer term be submitted immediately.
Despite lack of permit, petitioner continued to enroll students and offer
courses in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation for SY 19871988. This prompted the DECS through Director Hernando Dizon to write
petitioner on 4 August 1988 directing it not to operate without permit
and inviting its attention to the provisions of the Private School Law 1 as
reiterated in the Education Act of 1982 2 which prohibits operation of
unauthorized schools/courses.
Subsequent inspection of petitioner's premises by the Bureau of Higher
Education-DECS Technical Panel for Maritime Education (TPME) found
petitioner deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in
DECS Order No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies and
standards for Maritime Education Plan.
In a letter dated 11 July 1989 the DECS through Secretary Quisumbing
informed petitioner that it had received reports that petitioner enrolled
freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out
effective SY 1989-1990 per letter of Director Rosas dated 25 May 1989;
called petitioner's attention to the provision of Sec. 1, Rule 1, Part V, of
the Implementing Rules of the Education Act of 1982 which makes it
punishable and subject to penalties the operation of a school through the
conduct or offering of Educational Programs or Courses of
Studies/Training, without prior government authorization and/or in
violation of any of the terms and conditions of said permit or recognition;
directed that in accordance with the phase-out order, petitioner's Manila
campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of the
authorized maritime programs which shall be gradually phased out; and,
required petitioner to comment on the reported unauthorized enrollment.
In its letter to the DECS dated 26 July 1989, petitioner moved for
reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied with the
minimum requirements was due to the following: that as early as 21 June
1989 it filed a letter requesting reconsideration of the letter dated 25 May
1989 of Director Rosas; that since there was no reply it believed that the
25 May 1989 order was reconsidered sub-silencio and that petitioner was
allowed to enroll 1st year students for SY 1989-1990; and, that it had
undertaken improvements in all of its facilities in compliance with DECS
requirements. In this regard, it requested another inspection of its
premises.
Accordingly, in a letter dated 25 September 1989 the DECS through
Secretary Quisumbing ordered petitioner to discontinue its Maritime
program in the Manila campus effective school year 1990-1991 and
suggested that efforts be made towards the development of PMMS, Las
Pias, which has a great potential of being a good Maritime School.
Subsequently, petitioner moved to reconsider the phase-out order in its
letter of 21 May 1990.
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal the DECS thru

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Secretary Cario issued a Closure Order dated 27 August 1991. In a
Letter dated 24 August 1992 petitioner sought reconsideration of the 27
August 1991 Closure Order and at the same time requested that special
orders be issued to its graduates for SY 1991-1992.
On 10 November 1992 the Office of the President through respondent
Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante rendered a Resolution dismissing
petitioner's appeal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded
to the DECS for another ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged
improved facilities. Thus the motion was denied in the Resolution dated
12 January 1993 through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary
Renato Corona.
Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before
respondent Court of Appeals by way ofcertiorari. It alleged that the
resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of due process
because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders
was not sufficiently disclosed. Furthermore, its letters dated 2 and 3
October 1992 which presented incontrovertible proof that it had
introduced substantial improvements on its facilities for the past two and
a half years while its appeal was pending were not taken into account,
thereby gravely abusing its discretion.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
phase-out and closure of petitioner PMMS?
HELD:
NO. The Office of the President properly ignored (in the sense that it did
not find worthy of consideration) the alleged supervening events, i.e.,
substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities during the
pendency of the case before said Office because the improvements
should have been undertaken starting 1986. Moreover, the phase-out
and closure orders were based not only on petitioner's deficiencies as a
maritime institute but also on its continued operation without the
requisite authorization from the DECS and acceptance of freshman
students in blatant violation of the latter's orders and/or persistent
warnings not to do so. Verily, there are sufficient grounds to uphold the
phase-out and closure orders of the DECS which were issued
conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education Act of 1982.
By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
departments over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a
better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that
regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. In the
case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor any other court for
that matter
. . . to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of
whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards
required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On
this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its
opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that
any Court would have the competence to do so.
There being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents
representing the Office of the President in issuing the Resolutions of 10
November 1992 and 12 January 1993, respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in sustaining the resolutions in question.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1993, as well as its Resolution of 26
November 1993, is AFFIRMED.
GLOBE TELECOMS INC vs. NTC
FACTS:
Smart filed a complaint with NTC praying that the latter order the
immediate interconnect of Smart and Globes GSM networks for texting
services. Smart alleged that Globe, with bad faith and malice, refused to
grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS, in violation of RA
7925, EO No. 39, and their Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). In
a subsequent Order, NTC held that the implementation of SMS
interconnection is mandatory pursuant to EO No. 59, and that Smart and

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Globe have been providing SMS with authority from it, in violation of MC
No. 8-9-95.
Globe filed a Petition for Ceritorary and Prohibition with the CA to nullify
the NTC Order alleging that the latter acted without jurisdiction, and that
the said Order imposed an administrative penalty upon it nor Smart for
an offense, which the latter was not sufficiently charged nor heard, in
violation of the right to due process.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


On Luzviminda's appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified
Acting Mayor Kho's resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and accordingly modifying
the penalty to suspension of one year.
CA: Reversed the CSC decision stating that CSC, in partially sustaining
the findings of Acting Mayor Kho of Infanta, acted arbitrarily, carelessly
and unreasonably. Its only bases are the Fraud Audit Report conducted.

ISSUE:
WON the Order of the NTC is valid

CA: No evidence to show that Luzviminda opted to borrow from the


public funds.

HELD:
No. There are cardinal primary rights, which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights, which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does
not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

ISSUE:
WON there is substantial evidence to hold Luzviminda guilty of conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service

In the present case, the NTC Order was not supported by substantial
evidence nor does it sufficiently explain the reasons for which the
decision was rendered. The very rationale adopted by the NTC in its
Order holding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy. The Court usually
accords great respect to the technical findings of administrative agencies
in the fields of their expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded.
However, the above-quoted "finding" is nothing more than bare
assertions, unsupported by substantial evidence.76 The Order reveals that
no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its
provisioning entails.
Secondly, Smart and Globe were denied an opportunity to present
evidence on the issues relation to the nature of VAS and prior approval.
Moreover, in the assailed Order, Globe and Smart were never informed of
the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an
issue for consideration.
It is essential that there is a need for a hearing before a fine may be
imposed, as it is clearly a punitive measure undertaken by an
administrative agency in exercise of its quasi-judicial function. Inherently,
notice and hearing are indispensible for the valid exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-judicial functions.
CSC vs. CA
GR 161086
FACTS:
The Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 1 in San Fernando
City, La Union ordered the conduct of a fraud audit in response to an
anonymous complaint alleging that certain municipal officials and
employees of the municipal government of Infanta, Pangasinan had
incurred cash shortages and committed graft and corruption.
Fraud Audit Report finding: Municipal Treasurer granted various loans to
municipal officers and employees and depriving the municipality of using
the same to a more productive endeavor for the benefit of the people.
Celso M. Manuel (Manuel), a resident of Barangay Patima, Infanta, later
filed a complaint against Luzviminda before the Office of the Mayor for
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) in connection with the
grant to her of the loan.
The then Acting Mayor Charlito M. Kho, by Resolution found Luzviminda
guilty of Grave Misconduct on the basis of the "Fraud Audit Report" and
dismissed her from the service.

HELD:
Ruling held in favor of the petitioner.
The decision of Acting Mayor Kho, which the CSC affirmed, was based
not only on the Fraud Audit Report, but also on Luzviminda's Answer to
the complaint of Manuel wherein she did not deny having secured a loan,
her only defense being that the loan did not involve public funds, which
defense does not deserve consideration in the absence of any iota of
proof thereof.
CAB vs. PAL
GR L-40245 April 30, 1975
FACTS:
On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio to
Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To
accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating
Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass by Baguio City on its way to
Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying
only 5 passengers.
At the time of the incident, no other airline served Manila and Baguio. No
other airline, therefore, was affected by the aforesaid flagstop
(unscheduled stops on airlines). The expenses incurred by PAL exceeded
the revenue it derived from the passengers it fetched. Only the Chairman
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) filed a formal complaint with CAB.
Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of CAB
before operating the flagstop in violation of R.A. 776, CAB imposed a fine
of P5,000. Upon motion of reconsideration of PAL, CAB reduced the fine
to P2,500.
PAL contended that there is nothing in R.A. 776 (An Act Reorganizing
CAB) in general which expressly empowers CAB to impose a fine. They
also argued that the power and authority to impose fines and penalties
is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and
that such power and authority cannot be delegated to CAB.
ISSUE:
WON CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine
HELD:
YES. CAB is authorized by law (R.A. 776) to impose fines in the nature of
civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations.
Sec. 10. R.A 776: CAB has the power to review, revise, modify or affirm
on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of fine in connection
with the violation of any provision of this Act. It also has the power to
determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, or increase such fines and
civil penalties.
The fine imposed on PAL is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in R.A.
776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in
the RPC, because the fine in this case was imposed by CAB because of
PALs violations of CABs rules on flagstops without previous authority.

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To deprive CAB of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its
effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just
disregard with impunity rules and regulations designed to insure public
safety in air transportation. Wherefore, the resolution is modified by
reducing the administrative fine to P100.
SAN LUIS vs. CA
GR L-80160 June 26, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Provincial Governor Felicisimo San Luis of Laguna issued Order
No. 72 transferring Respondent Mariano Berroya, a quarry
superintendent, to the Office of Provincial Engineer. Civil Service
Commission ruled that the transfer was violative of Sec 32, RA 2260 and
ordered that Berroya be reverted back to his position as quarry
superintendent. Instead of complying, Gov. San Luis suspended Berroya
for 1yr for alleging gross discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination.
CSC reiterated its Directive ruling that the suspension illegal. Office of the
President also declared the suspension as improper. Later, Gov. San Luis
issued an order dismissing Berroya for neglect of duty, frequent
unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty
and abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was appealed by
Berroya to CSC. CSC declared the dismissal unjustified, exonerating
Berroya of charges and directing his reinstatement.
Berroya filed a writ of mandamus with the trial court for his
reinstatement. Trial Court ruled that the transfer was sufficiently
warranted. CA ordered the reinstatement of Berroya as quarry
superintendent pursuant to PD 1136.
ISSUE:
WON the decisions of CSC and Office of the President can be reviewed by
the court
HELD:
No. The decisions rendered by the Office of the President and the Merit
Systems Board of CSC had attained finality without petitioners having
taken timely legal course. Berroya, in order to enforce his right to
reinstatement and back salaries pursuant to these final and executor
administrative decisions, instituted a suit for mandamus to compel the
petitioner to comply with such. Berroya had established his clear legal
right to reinstatement, it became a clear ministerial duty on the part of
the petitioner to comply with the orders contained in the decisions.
The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. The principle of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to
the judgements of courts, but it extends to all bodies upon whom judicial
powers had been conferred.
YSMAEL vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 79538 October 18, 1990
FACTS:
In 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited
species within a specified portion of public forest land located in Nueva
Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva
Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural
Resources.
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly
covered by TLA of petitioner was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development
and Reality Corporation, its TLA set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the
other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the
benefit of a formal award or license.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Petitioner requested that TLA issued to private respondent be declared
null and void. The MNR however denied this motion, stating in part in an
order:
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction
and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the
Ministry issued the order banning all logging operations/activities in
Quirino province, among others, where movant's former concession area
is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or
entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87
(TLA of petitioner), now under TLA No. 356 (TLA of private respondent),
would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the
Ministry.
Per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on
November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
WON there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and
executory administrative orders
HELD:
NO. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and
orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the
rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a
court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction.
DELFIN vs. INCIONG
FACTS:
The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent
Atlantic Container Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic
Container Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated with the
Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU).
Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent
Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, petitioners and FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and
FEDLU filed a case in the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR found
Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto guilty of unfair labor practice
and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing the same
and to reinstate complainants striking members. They filed motions to
reconsider the said decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all the
petitioners, but the CIR denied the motions.
The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named
respondents established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic
and which was allegedly organized to engage in the identical business as
Atlantic Container, absorbing all the assets including the facilities and
machineries.
When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which
ordered the reinstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136
petitioners were ordered reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based on
the ground of res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the Minister of Labor
through respondent Deputy Minister Inciong who affirmed the NLRC
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the cause of action was barred by the principle res judicata
HELD:
YES. While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the
union, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case.

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The real party who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case
brought in the name of the union are the union members themselves.
Since the judgment therein had become final and executor, the
subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic for the same
violations committed during its existence, is barred by res judicata. The
bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the
union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of res
judicata.
NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC. vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner as
security guard. In the course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit
boards were stolen. He was implicated in the theft and thereafter placed
under preventive suspension. NALCO then filed an application with the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor for clearance to dismiss
Collado. The application was approved was approved by Officer-inCharge Rey Seneres. The said officer certified the case to the labor
arbiter who, after a perusal of records (position papers submitted by the
parties), returned the case to the Regional Director, who recommended
that the case be elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting Secretary
of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres granting petitioners application
for clearance to dismiss Collado.
Collado then filed a complaint before the District Labor Office for unjust
dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits.NALCO filed a
motion to dismiss upon the ground that the order of the Acting Secretary
had become final and executory, making the issue of illegal dismissal res
judicata. The Labor Arbiter ordered NALCO to reinstate Collado without
backwages. Both Parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the
Labor Arbiters decision adding backwages.
ISSUE:
WON the principle of res judicata applies
HELD:
NO. The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to
legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. The doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to exercise of
administrative powers

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

CHAPTER 6 A. PRIOR RESORT


INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE, INC vs. CA
GR No 88550 April 18, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating
contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development
(BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar.
Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for
another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional
coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the
so-called "Giporlos Area.
In line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal
supply-demand balance, IEI was then advised that the logical coal
operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in
another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas
should be awarded to MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to
MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the
subject of IEI's coal operating contract.
Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then
Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati, alleging that
MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the
Memorandum of Agreement was finalised and approved by BED; that
MMIC discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal
operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and
refused to pay the reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's
loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of Agreement. IEI then
prayed that Energy Minister be ordered to approve return of the coal
operating contract to IEI.
Trial Court- ordered recession of the Memorandum of agreement and
declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favour of
IEI; ordered BED the immediate return to IEI of the operation of the coal
blocks.
Court of Appeals- revered the Trial Courts decision it held that the Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under
Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide
controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of
coal blocks.
ISSUE:
WON the civil court (RTC) has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating
contract over coal blocks
HELD:
NO. The jurisdiction of the BED should be sustained.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur
that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before
a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case


since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed
and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said
areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative
agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter.
The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development
and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an
initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of
the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not
call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until
after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and
determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. NAVARRO
77 SCRA 264 May 31, 1977
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari to nullify order of Respondent Judge Pedro
C. Navarro who issued a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated, the
importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining the Commissioner
of Customs from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable
goods. Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, these fruits
were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as
prohibited importation and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings
by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Commissioner pointed out how violative
was the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an incident
of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which, as held in a
number of decisions, was a matter falling within the exclusive
competence of the customs authorities.
Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring respondents to file an
answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by petitioners to prevent the challenged order of respondent
Judge from being implemented. Instead of preparing an answer, they
just submitted a manifestation stating that "after an intensive and serious
study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon
its interest in the case." The rationale behind such a move was
ostensibly the desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the fact that
"the shipments, being perishable, have already deteriorated."
ISSUE:
WON the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in
the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from
assuming cognizance over such a matter
HELD:
Yes. The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the
first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field
where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal
may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus
devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial
review, but only by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction.
"This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in
an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a
forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon,
and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure
and forfeiture proceedings.The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs."

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


CRUSADERS BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. vs. NTC
G.R. No. 139583. May 31, 2000
FACTS:
Mr. Cesar A. Dumlao, Chairman of Crusaders, sent to the Commission a
letter requesting permission to stop the broadcast of DWCD-FM for
around a month starting July 12, 1994, so as to renovate its 20-year old
Broadcast Booth and the entire facilities of the station. Subsequently,
upon application of Crusaders, NTC renewed Temporary Permit No. BSD0814-94, dated December 14, 1994, covering the period from January 1,
1995 to December 31, 1996. Again, on December 12, 1996, Crusaders
applied for another renewal of its Temporary Permit. Acting on subject
application, the NTC caused the inspection of the radio station of
Crusaders and per report of NTC-National Capital Region, which
conducted such ocular inspection on February 21, 1997, the station of
Crusaders was inoperative. Acting upon such finding, the Broadcast
Service Division of the NTC recommended the cancellation and revocation
of the permit of Crusaders and the recall of its frequency 97.9 Mhz.
Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration, explaining that
Crusaders was not able to resume its operations because of the
institution of Civil Case No. 64739 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 163, by Conamor Broadcasting Corporation against
Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. and of the issuance of an order of
injunction by the said Court enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio
station. On July 14, 1997, the Commission issued a show-cause Order
directing Crusaders to explain: (1) Why its application for renewal of
Temporary Permit for station DWCD-FM should not be denied; (2) Why
its station, DWCD-FM, should not be ordered closed; and (3) Why its
station DWCD-FM assigned frequency should not be recalled. On August
28, 1997, for failure of Crusaders to submit a responsive pleading, the
Commission issued an order declaring Crusaders in default, and,
thereafter, handed down its decision recalling the assigned frequency of
Crusaders. Crusaders filed an "urgent Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration" praying for the lifting of the order of default, setting
aside of the decision, and for the reopening of the case which was
granted. Then, the Commission came out with its assailed decision,

disposing thus: "WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the


Commission believes and so holds that respondents request for renewal
of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM should be, as it is, hereby
DENIED. Crusaders then went to the Court of Appeals which dismissed
the case for lack of merit. According to petitioner the Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the decision of the NTC under the so called doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the NTC
2. WON the findings of the NTC on matters falling within its competence
can be disturbed by the courts
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court upholds the primary jurisdiction exercised by
the NTC and quotes with approval the following opinion of the Court of
Appeals, to wit:

"Moreover, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents this Court from


"arrogating unto itself" the authority to resolve a controversy which falls
under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed of a special competence.
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact."
2. It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E.O) No. 546,
creating the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, the regulation of radio communications is a function
assigned to, and being performed by, the NTC. The findings of the
respondent NTC are supported by substantial evidence. As to whether or
not it should have adopted a policy of leniency is a matter that is
addressed solely to its discretion.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


As in the case of other administrative agencies, the technical matters
involved are entrusted to NTCs expertise. In the matter of issuance of
licenses to operate radio stations, it is in a better position than the courts
to determine to whom such privilege should be granted in order that
public interest will be served. As long as its decisions are supported by
substantial evidence, they are entitled to respect from the courts.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) numbers among
those administrative agencies discharging specialized functions, in this
case, the regulation of the nations airwaves. As in the case of other
administrative tribunals, its findings of fact will be accorded respect, and
on occasion, even finality, by reason of their acquired expertise on
specific matters within their particular jurisdiction.The only requirement is
that its decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, which need
be neither overwhelming nor preponderant.
CABALLES vs. SISON
G.R. No. 131759 March 23, 2004
FACTS:
The Samahan ng mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), through its
President, Charlie L. Ho, filed with the Board of Optometry PRC a LetterAffidavit claiming that Vision Express Philippines, Inc. (VEPI) was
engaged in an illegal practice of optometry being a corporation. In this
respect SOP charged several VEPI employees (petitioners therein) with
unethical and/or unprofessional conduct because the said VEPI
employees had been employed by the corporation specifically having
violated Section 3 (e), Article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists, ".
. . (hold) oneself to the public as an optometrist under the name of any
corporation, company, institution, clinic, association, parlor, or any other
name than the name of the optometrist."
Knowing that the corporation was engaging in activities solely reserved
for optometrists, the said employees allowed themselves to be part of the
corporation's illegal practice of optometry. Petitioners herein filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but
the Board of Optometry dismissed the same. It ruled that a reading of
the complaint-affidavit reveals that there was, indeed, a cause of action,
as the petitioners were charged with alleged violation of Section 6(e) and
(j) of Article III of the Code of Ethics of Optometrists. According to the
Board, that the complaint-affidavit made no mention of the details as to
how the unprofessional or undesirable conduct was committed would not
justify the dismissal of the complaint. The Board stated that rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid or technical sense. CA also
denied the appeal stating that absence of proof to substantiate an
allegation in the complaint does not mean that the complaint is
insufficient, only that it is unsupported by evidence. The appellant court
ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory in
nature cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Thus, the
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals (and respondent Board for that matter) act with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari when it is very clear from the
questioned complaint that it failed to state a cause of action?
HELD:
NO. The Court DISMISSED the complaint since petitioners failed to show
that respondent Board committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
Rep Act # 8050 specifically vests in the Board of Optometry the power to
conduct hearings and investigations to resolve complaints against
practitioners of optometry for malpractice, unethical and unprofessional
conduct, or violation of any of the provisions of the Act or any of its
regulations and authorizes the said Board to render a decision thereon as
long as the vote of three (3) members is obtained. Thus, the Board may,
after giving proper notice and hearing to the party concerned, revoke an
optometrist's certificate of registration or suspend his license to practice
on the foregoing grounds, or upon the conviction of the optometrist of a

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

crime involving moral turpitude. The revocation of a certificate or


suspension of a professional license by the Board shall become final,
unless appealed to the PRC within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
decision.
REGINO vs. PANGASINAN
TECHNOLOGY

COLLEGES

OF

SCIENCE

AND

FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer
science student at the respondent-school, Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology (PCST) where she was enrolled, with a part of
her curriculum being a logic and statistics subjects under the
respondents, Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad. In the second
semester of her school year, PCST held a fund raising activity wherein
the students were indirectly required to purchase tickets for the event for
P100.00, with additional points in their test scores being the incentive.
Those who failed to avail of the tickets, however, would be disallowed
from taking their final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance
parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets, which led
her to be excluded from the rest of her class in taking the final
examinations and outright ejected from their classroom the following day
after publicly naming her and one other classmate as persons who did
not purchase tickets. Despite their pleas, the respondents remained
adamant that they were simply following PCSTs school policy.
Aggrieved, the petitioners went to the trial court and filed, as pauper
litigant, a case against the respondents and the PCST. The trial court,
however, ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the case due to
the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, citing that the question
raised in the case involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of PCST. Hence, the case should have been initiated
before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher
Education (CHED), which has the power of supervision and regulation of
tertiary schools under Section 54 of RA 7722, the Education Act of 1982.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable?
HELD:
No. The respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on
petitioners alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs
academic policy. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply to the present case.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Prior Resort)
states that courts should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
It admits to certain exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is
purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court such as in
the present case at bar.
In this case, Regino is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST
and neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations since she is already enrolled in another educational
institution by the time of this decision. In fact, even if she were to file a
case with CHED, her request involves the awarding of damages; a power
beyond the administrative agency to grant since it is not a court. Since
the petitioner, at this time, is asking for damages, the same calls for the
interpretation of the Civil Code; a function that falls squarely within the
ambit of the courts. As such, the exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot bar the petitioner.

Note: Doctrine of Prior Resort/ Doctrine of Primary Administrative


Jurisdiction states that where there is competence or jurisdiction vested
upon an administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to the courts

may be made before such administrative body shall have acted upon the
matter.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES


INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES vs. HON. DUMA SINSUAT
GR L-29171 April 15, 1988

PAAT v. CA
266 SCRA 167

FACTS:
Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply
Coordination of the Department of General Services. The first called for
eight units of truck for the use of the Bureau of Telecommunications. The
invitation to Bid as well as the requisition itself contained a proviso
limiting the offers to foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of
Manila. The second invitation to Bid announced that both CIF Port of
Manila and FOB Manila quotations would be accepted and made part of
bid requirements.

FACTS:
On May 19, 1989, the truck of Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the DENR
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce
the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Four days later, Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the
truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. The spouses
failed to submit an explanation. Laguyans action of confiscation was
sustained by Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended
by EO 277. The spouses filed a letter of reconsideration but this was later
denied.

Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc (IPSI) and Delta
Motor Corporation (Delta). The bids were deliberated by the Committee
on Awards and was awarded to IPSI. Delta protested the award to IPSI
to the Bureau of Telecommunications claiming that the trucks offered by
IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated in the requisition and invitation
to bid. The Director ruled that the bidding has been made in strict
compliance with technical specifications and requirements stated by the
Bureau of Telecommunications.
Deltas next move was to file with the Office of the Secretary of General
Services (Sinsuat). The latter informed the Acting Director of Supply that
the Department had already approved Deltas price, and categorically
direct him to award to Delta the purchase order of the eight trucks with
the least possible delay. This notice was given notwithstanding all the
Government agencies concerned already agreed on the correctness of
the award to IPSI Bureau of Telecommunications, the Department of
Public Works & Communications to which said Bureau of
Telecommunications pertains, the Bureau of Supply, which had direct
supervision and control of the bidding, and of course, the Committee on
Awards.
IPSI appealed from the Secretarys decision to award the purchase
contract Delta to the Office of the President as well as the Office of the
Auditor General. The appeal notwithstanding, the Letter-Order in favor of
Delta was released. IPSI then filed with the CFI a petition certiorari and
mandamus, with application for preliminary and mandatory injunction.
The verdict wen against IPSI. From the judgment of the CFI, IPSI
appealed to the Court. The plea made in behalf of Secretary Sinsuat
claims that IPSI had gone to Court without first exhausting all
administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
WON there was an exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
HELD:
Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review through the
extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of
administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said actions may be
entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been
exhausted; and second, that the administrative decision may properly be
annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative
official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. 1 There are however exceptions to the
principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being:
(1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act
is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed
approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In view of these doctrines, there is no need for the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in the case at bar because Secretary Sinsuat
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of


DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter that in
case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as
Civil Case 4031, was filed by the spouses against Layugan and Baggayan
with the RTC, Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to private respondents. (Baggayan died during the pendency of the
civil case; he was succeeded in office by Paat.)
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss,
as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration. A petition for certiorari
was filed but the CA sustained the trial court's order, ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question.
Hence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
WON an action for replevin may prosper to recover a movable property
which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court sustained the contention of the petitioners
invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, averring
that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin
because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant
to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The Supreme Court
in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for
reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with
so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case.
(Just in case, this is needed as this was cited in the book)
[The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies] is disregarded:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
CASTRO vs. SECRETARY GLORIA (DECS)
G.R. No. 132174 August 20, 2001
FACTS:
Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct
against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central
School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he had an illicit affair with
Gutangs wife, petitioners co-teacher at the same school. After hearing,
the DECS Regional Office VII rendered a decision declaring petitioner
guilty of the offense. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service. The DECS Central Office affirmed Concillos decision in an
Indorsement.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of resolving the
motion, the DECS Central Office directed the School Division of Cebu to
comment on the motion. The School Division Superintendent
recommended that the motion be resolved favorably. However, the
recommendation was opposed by the DECS Region VII.
Petitioner sent letters spanning 2 years, dated November 5, 1988 and
July 19,1990, asking the incumbent DECS Secretary to resolve his motion
for reconsideration. But his letters remained unheeded, thus, on October
4, 1995, petitioner filed with the DECS Central Office a Motion for Review

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questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies
before such judicial relief can be sought.
In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the
administrative finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. It is settled and final insofar as he is concerned. What
petitioner only impugns is the correctness of the penalty of dismissal
from the service. He is convinced that the proper penalty for the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension from the
service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure question of law. From the
facts, it is clear that the penalty of dismissal from the service was
erroneously imposed upon petitioner.
DE TAN vs. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION
GR L-12944 March 30, 1959
FACTS:
The petitioner is of legal age, widow, and a resident of Tondo, Manila;
that the respondent is a government instrumentality or agency, with
offices in the City of Manila, Philippines, duly vested with authority to
implement the provisions of the Backpay Law, otherwise known as
Republic Act No. 879, further amending Republic Act No. 304.
The petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian
Lay, a Chinese national, and a bona fide member of the 1st Regiment,
United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines.
The United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines is a guerrilla
organization duly recognized by the Army of the United States and
forming part and parcel of the Philippine Army.
Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay died in the service on April 4, 1945 in
the battle at Ipo Dam, Rizal Province, Philippines; he was duly recognized

as a guerrilla veteran and certified to by the Armed Forces of the


Philippines as having rendered meritorious military services during the
Japanese occupation.

Setting Aside/Modifying the Decision of Regional Director of DECS Region


VII. After a comment on the matter, it was ultimately denied by
Secretary Gloria of DECS.

The petitioner as the widow of the said recognized deceased veteran,


filed an application for back pay under the provisions of Republic Act No.
897.

Thereafter, Castro filed a petition for Mandamus with the RTC asking it
to set aside the order of dismissal and reduce it to a one-year
suspension. Trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

The Secretary and the Chief of Office Staff of Veterans Back Pay
Commission sent a letter to General Vicente Lopez of the United StatesChinese Volunteers in the Philippines apprising the latter that the
Commission has reaffirmed its resolution granting the back pay to alien
members.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, has verified and certified that deceased
veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerrilla.

ISSUE:
WON Petitioner failed to exhaust A/R
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort
first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that nonobservance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is
one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The doctrine is not absolute. There are instances when it may be
dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the question raised
is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when
the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for
judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6)when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved;
and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal

The Chief of Finance Service, Camp Murphy, has computed the backpay
due the petitioner and the same was passed in audit by representatives
of the Auditor General.
After due liberation respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled
that aliens are not entitled to back pay.
Upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought
the case direct to this Honorable Court by way of mandamus.
ISSUES:
1. WON a petition for mandamus is proper to correct the acts of the
commission.
2. WON it is necessary in the case at bar that the petitioner should
have exhausted all administrative remedies, i.e. before the
president.
HELD:
1. Yes. The discretion of the Veterans Backpay Commission is limited
to the facts of the case; that is, in evaluating the evidence whether
or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by
the United States Army. It has no power to adjudicate or determine

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


rights after such facts are established. Having been satisfied that

the deceased was an officer or a guerrilla outfit duly recognized by


the United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course
to his widow's application. For this reason, mandamus lies against
the Commission.
2.

No. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on


the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its
resolution, reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive
Department, the Commission declared that The opinions
promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature,
which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the
opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse
thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial
ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

CABADA vs. ALUNAN III


GR 119645 August 22, 1996
FACTS:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against petitioners for Grave
Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed with the Office
of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by private
respondent Mario Valdez. The complaint was referred to the PNP Eight
Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after the conducting its own
investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against
the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a
decision finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special
Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994, was issued ordering, among other
things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
Petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of
the decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof "thru their
own effort and initiative" only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a
copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was
Special Order No.174, petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his
Appeal filed with the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed
or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the said
motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. However, it denied
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners
received a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and
Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their "Appeal" dated 5 February 1995 and
"Petition for Review" dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course
to the petitioners' appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction "it
appearing . . . that both the Decision and the Resolution of the Regional
Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no
showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents' appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty (60) days." In support thereof, the
NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002, which provides that failure of the Regional

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Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the reglementary period shall
render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to
the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government; and Section 5, Rule
III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 maintaining that the
decision of the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case shall
become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within
said period. A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party
from a Decision rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an
appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1)
Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed. Hence the instant petition.
The OSG seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity
because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they
should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the
CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government
personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office.
OSG opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners;
consequently, they should have appealed to the CSC. It also advances
the view that the instant petition should have been filed with the proper
forum, the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners' appeal from and
petition for review of the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) WON this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure
of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.
HELD:
(1) Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB
fails to decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the
appealed decision becomes final and executory without, however,
prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of
the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the availability
of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary
period.
Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees
must then be inquired into considering that in conformity with the
mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and
civilian in character, it is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized
DILG. As such, it falls within the definition of the civil service in Section
2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.
Thus it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty
days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith
appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has
decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be
appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was addressed to "the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government . . . as
Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission," while
De Guzman's petition for review was addressed to "the Honorable

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and
Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila."
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the
Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other.
The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition
for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG
as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them
within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such
jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently
provides that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only
on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel
disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service
imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases
against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. It has
no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the
RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to
issue, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March
1995 decision denying due course to the appeal and petition for review
filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of
jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that the
NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the
RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary
period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is flawed because it would allow a
ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate
jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of 1990.
Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the
NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial bodycomposed of a Chairman and
four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG Act of 1990.
It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration
before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.
(2) The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action
is premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus
untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was
the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of
petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By
then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47,
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987;
and Section 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed
with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to
the Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
DAR vs. APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Apex Investment and Financing Corporation (Apex) owns several lots
located at Barangay Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite which includes the
land subject of this case covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T90476. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) initiated
compulsory acquisition proceedings over these lots and was inviting Apex
to a meeting. Notice of Acquisition and letters were sent to their office in

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Echague Street, Manila but APEX denied having received any such notice
because it was no longer holding office there. Apex only learned of the
compulsory acquisition proceedings in the December 11, 1997 issue of
BALITA.
Apex files a Protest with the PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer)
rejecting DARs offered compensation. Apex holds that the subject land
had already been classified as residential even prior to the effectivity of
the law.
It was only after more than one year before the PARO forwarded to DAR
the said protest together with the records of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings.
Despite the pendency of the protest, the Register of Deeds still cancelled
one of its titles and issued a new one in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under TCT No. CLOA-2473.
Apex filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the
compulsory proceedings be declared null and void and for TCT No. CLOA2473 be cancelled.
DAR opposed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
CA rendered decision in favor of APEX.
DAR moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
(a) WON the respondent corporation violate the principle of exhaustion
of remedies
(b) WON the respondent was deprived of its right to due process
(c) WON the subject parcels of land are residential, hence, not covered
by R.A. No. 6657
RULING:
(a) NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is relative
and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded where,
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention and the administrative action is patently illegal and
amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
PARO did not take immediate action on respondents Protest. It was only
after more than one year, that it was forwarded to DAR. Respondent
found that the PARO had caused the cancellation of its title and that a
new one was issued to an alleged farmer-beneficiary after it had sat on
them for almost a year.
Aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on
their letter-protests before resorting to judicial process. The landowners
had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for
certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their
protests. APEX could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to
resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention.
(b) YES. The court finds that petitioner was deprived of its constitutional
right to due process.
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required:

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

(1) The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to preliminary


conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC,
LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties and

ISSUE:
WON the respondents should have first exhausted administrative
remedies

(2) The Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner. The notices are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due
process. The Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution).

HELD:
No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard
and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this
case, private respondents contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after
their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder,
submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only
to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation.
Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled
private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these
negotiated security contracts.

APEX did not receive the Notice of Acquisition and Notice of


Coverage sent to the their old address. DAR explained that its personnel
could not effect personal service of those notices upon respondent
because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and
Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. There is no
showing that petitioner caused the service of the notices via registered
mail.
DAR claimed that the notices were sent and that there was actual receipt
by respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom lefthand corner of petitioners copies of the notices. But DAR could not
identify the name of APEX representative who allegedly received the
notices. In fact, DAR admitted that the signature thereon is illegible.
It is thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the
compulsory acquisition proceedings. APEX was deprived of its right to
procedural due process.
(c) This factual issue was never determined thus we cannot conclude
that respondents parcels of land are residential. We allow the DAR to
conduct appropriate proceedings to determine whether the subject
parcels of land are indeed residential and are thus outside the
coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
NFA vs. CA
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable
where there is urgency or irreparable damage.
FACTS:
In 1990, through Administrator Gabaldon, the NFA conducted a public
bidding to award security contracts foe the protection of its facilities
nationwide. Among those awarded with a one year contract were the
private respondents Col. Felix Manubay, Masada Security Agency,
Continental Watchman & Security Agency, Alberto Lasala, and Norman
Mapagay. When Romeo G. David became the new administrator on 1992,
he caused the review of all security contracts and created a
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee(PBAC). When the time came
of the bidding came, some bids were disqualified for failure to comply
with documentary requirements including those of respondents. Two of
the applicants who failed to qualify, Lanting Security and Watchman
Agency filed complaints with the RTC to restrain the Administrator from
proceeding with the public bidding. During the pendency of the writ of
preliminary injunction, David terminated the contracts of the security
agencies , citing their expired contracts and that they had lost the
confidence of the NFA, and engaged the services of 7 new agencies.
Respondents filed another complaint to restrain the NFA from terminating
their services. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents.The ca ruled
in the respondent's favor but granted the NFA to terminate expired
contracts. On appeal to the SC the NFA contends that respondents did
not exhaust administrative remedies and hence their complaint is
premature.

ARROW TRANSPORT vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION


DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of Administrative remedies, Exception: When
strong public interest is involved
FACTS:
Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations. Arrow has in his favor a certificate of public convenience
(CPN) to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service
from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the
use of twenty (20) units.
Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a
CPN to operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later,
without the required publication, the Board issued an Order granting it
provisional permit to operate.
After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed
but without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed the present petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction, alleging that the question
involved herein is purely legal and that the issuance of the Order without
the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal
or was performed without jurisdiction.
In their answer, the respondents denied the need for publication before a
provisional permit can be issued, in light of Presidential Decree No. 101,
which authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when
warranted by compelling circumstances and to proceed promptly along
the method of legislative inquiry.
ISSUE:
WON publication is necessary before provisional permits can be granted
HELD:
No. The question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination was likewise argued by the parties. For it is undeniable
that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with the
respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution
should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity
can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress that
certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due process ousted
respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the
premises. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter
settled. As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the
procedure to be followed by respondent Board, it is the policy of the
State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable condition of
vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor
vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
operators, as well as update the standards of those carrying such
business, making it "imperative to provide, among other urgently needed
measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or
modifying the lines and mode of operation of public utility motor vehicles
that now or thereafter, may operate in this country." It is essential then
both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding
public to ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this case and
very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due
process requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes
apparent.
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
255 SCRA 438
FACTS:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents
Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their
sequestration. The petitions were jointly heard by the SANDIGANBAYAN.
After the presentation of evidences and witnesses, the SANDIGANBAYAN
gave the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1, 1993) within which to
submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given
the same period (20 days) from receipt of such written formal offer of
evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or objections
thereto, and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for
resolution. What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal
offer of its evidence as directed by the SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion
To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to
dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally
filed their petitions before this Court on September 16, 1986 and August
26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY's and ALLIED's alleged
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that
SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders
to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking
Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations.
ISSUE:
WON the failure to exhaust the administrative remedies affect the
jurisdiction of the court
HELD:
No. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a
motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the
peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principle
aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly
seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has
already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The
motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal
offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in
Sotto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: Failure
to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this
in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this
rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this
ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case
and try it. PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated
action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has
abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action.
PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect for proper
time cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of
time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be
invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches - or the failure to do
something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a
proper time.
PAGARA vs. CA
FACTS:
In 1967, private respondents (Paderangas) acquired from Santiago
Ceniza parcels of land, each with an average area of five (5) hectares, in
Taguitic, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, evidenced by transfer certificates of
title. Originally, the parcels were part of a large tract of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-9515. The property was later subdivided
into twenty-four (24) sub-lots under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-187203
which was approved by the Land Registration Commission.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through a certain Honorio
Tequero, sent a telegram to private respondent Jorge C. Paderanga
informing him that the several parcels had been placed under the
Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program of the government.
A parcellary map was prepared by the Department of Agrarian Reform in
collaboration with the Bureau of Lands. The parcels were adjudicated to
private petitioners and corresponding OLT certificates were issued to the
petitioner.
Respondents filed their complaint with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
office in Pagadian City and Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, contesting the
issuance of the OLT certificates.
The local agency had failed to act on the protest, so the private
respondents elevated their case to the Minister of Agrarian Reform. The
matter remained pending with the agency.
In 1986, respondents finally decided to file a complaint against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City to:
1. regain possession of the parcels of land
2. seek for the annulment and/or cancellation of the OLT certificates, and
3. recovery of damages.
Private respondents averred that:
1. private petitioners were mere opportunist and/or squatters who took
advantage of the governments operation land transfer program
2. that private petitioners were not qualified under the program with each
of them already owning over four (4) hectares of agricultural land
3. that, not being tenanted, the land was not covered by the land reform
program and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform; and
4. that, even assuming that private petitioners were tenants, the property
should still be deemed excluded from the program since the parcels of
land averaged less than five (5) hectares each.
5.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint due allegedly to the
failure of private respondents to (first) refer the matter to the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
Trial Court and CA rendered judgment in favor of the Paderangas (herein
respondents) and against the defendants (herein petitioner).

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


In this petition, the petitioners assail the exercise of jurisdiction by the
court a quo on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and for failure to secure a referral from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
pursuant to Section 12 of P.D. 946.
ISSUE:
WON the Regional Trial Court has acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the action taken by private respondents against petitioners.
RULING:
YES. The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a
hard and fast rule. It is not applicable:
(1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or
(2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or
(3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or
(4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
Said principle may also be disregarded:
(1) when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(2)
when there is no due process observed, or
(3)
where the protestant has no other recourse
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable in this case
because,

First, the issue of tenancy involves legal questions as tenancy is not


purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenants does
upon the land, but it is also a legal relationship
Second, one of the principal respondents herein is the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform who acts as the alter ego of the President, and whose
act of issuing land transfer certificate is the subject matter of this case.

Third, plaintiffs claims of denial of due process in the issuance of the land
transfer certificates finds merit in this case for it was only after the
certificates were issued that they were able to protest.

Finally, there is an exhaustive presentation of evidence that plaintiffs


availed of the administrative processes, (testimonies where fourteen (14)
years had already elapsed and the Department Secretary had not yet
resolved plaintiffs protest leaving plaintiffs with no other recourse but to
seek the relief of this Court as there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law.
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA vs.
DOMINGUEZ
FACTS:
The KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA
SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC.
(KBMBPM) is a service cooperative organized by and composed of
vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang,
Muntinlupa pursuant to PD No. 175.
The Municipal government of Muntinlupa entered into a contract with
KBMBPM for the management and operation of the new Muntinlupa
public market. It provided for a 25-year term, renewable for the same
period, unless terminated by the mutual agreement of the parties.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Ignacio Bunye, as acting Mayor, ordered a review of the said contract for
being contrary to BP 337 (Local Government Code). The COA and the
Metro Manila Commission urged to take the appropriate steps to rescind
the contract. Thus, subsequently, Bunye and the Municipal Council
approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. Thereafter, Bunye
announced to the stallholders that they should pay their market fees to
the Market Commission and no longer the KBMBPM.
KBMBPM filed a complaint in the RTC of Makati contending that the
Bunyes acted in excess of his authority in illegally taking over the public
market, and thus constitutes a breach of contract and duty as a public
official.
Thereafter, two petitions were filed (but only the first one is connected to
Admin, the second one is about Criminal Law):
FIRST PETITION: G.R. No. 85439
Mayor Bunye and his companions allegedly through force, violence and
intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of petitioners at the second
floor of the KBS Building to serve the Order of the respondent
Secretary of Agriculture, which provides that the KBMBPM is not
operating in accordance with PD No. 23, and thus, shall be placed under
the MANAGEMENT TAKE-OVER of the Department of Agriculture to
preserve the financial interest of its members.
Subsequently, petitioners contend that Respondent Secretary acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order.
1. Petitioners filed a Motion praying that respondent Atty. Rogelio
Madriaga, who had assumed the position of Chairman of the
Management Committee, be ordered to stop and/or cancel the
scheduled elections of the officers of the KBMBPM and desist
from scheduling any election of officers or Members of the
Board of Directors thereof until further orders on the Court. The
elections were, nevertheless, held and a new board of directors
was elected.
2. Bunye denies the allegations and contends that the petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
3. The Office of the Solicitor General asserts the following:
a. The individual petitioners, who were not allegedly elected by the
members or duly designated by the BACOD Director, have no right
or authority to file this case;
b. The assailed Order of the Secretary was valid and was issued
pursuant to P.D. No. 175, which authorizes him "(d) to suspend the
operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative after hearing
and when in its judgment and based on findings, such cooperative is
operating in violation of this Decree, rules and regulations, existing
laws as well as the by-laws of the cooperative itself;"
c. The Order is reasonably necessary to correct serious flaws in the
cooperative and provide interim measures until election of regular
members to the board and officers thereof;
d. The elections conducted are valid; and
e. That the motion to dismiss filed by the new board of directors binds
the cooperative. It prays for the dismissal of the petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners can bring the present action
2. WON petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
3. WON the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


HELD:

1. YES. Respondents challenge the personality of the petitioners to


bring this action, set up the defense of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully and
validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order.
Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning
precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board
of directors; they then pray that this Court restore them to their
prior
stations.

2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply
where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an
alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him.
This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to
the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the
decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be
had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as
when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or
where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such
is the claim of petitioners, which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

3. NO. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


WENSECLAO TAN vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
FACTS:
Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding
a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. This
public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the
former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland,
which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine
Government.
Petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in
due form after paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond
therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline.
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared
as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified
bidder. President Carlos P. Garcia declared a directive to the Director of
Forestry to prepare and submit a draft of a proclamation establishing the
said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales and to
receive bids for the issuance of the timber license in the area during the
public bidding.
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposals, the area was
awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan by the
Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which
were denied by the Director of Forestry.

(implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal
of directors or officers of cooperatives. The procedure was not
followed in this case.

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources and immediately promulgated a
General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to
the Director of Forestry, under
General Memorandum Order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses.

Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of


the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8
of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all
cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect,


Ordinary Timber License, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was
signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
because of the said Memorandum Order.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted


to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These
powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be
inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws
of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and
officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than
to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general
membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of
Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have,
expressly or impliedly.
Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power
includes the power to disband the board of directors and remove the
officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not expressly required in
the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process
to the affected parties, herein petitioners.
In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged
petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well,
not even a semblance of a hearing. The Order was based solely on an
alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was
then a clear denial of due process.

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the
appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick
from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for
reconsideration, O.T.L. No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be
cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular,
anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Main contention: the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64
issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by
the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Decision: Director of
Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in question and shall see to it
that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon
pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick in this case
Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully,
illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by
denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by
depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process
of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts. Director of
Forestry, as a response, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies and
that it is purely administrative and discretionary functions of
administrative officials and may not be interfered with by the courts.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


ISSUE:
WON petitioner had exhausted all administrative remedies
HELD:
Petitioner-appellants contentions are untenable.
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his
administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed,
neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to
continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. He further
alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru
this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondent-appellee
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the
timber license referred.
The Supreme Court cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the
order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation
No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing
it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that
appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must
allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy. In
the case at bar, petitioner-appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an
appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the State
which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


unless the State gives its consent to be sued. Respondents-appellees, in
revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the
scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is
not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law
whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the
courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression". But,
piercing the shard of his contention, The SC found that petitionerappellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing
State exemption from suits. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers
of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging
governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

C. JUDICIAL REVIEW
PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC
POWER & LIGHT CO
GR 127371 April 25, 2002
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the
power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which
provides: The National Power Corporation (NPC) is no longer necessary
in the franchise area of the specific utility or cooperative.
Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum, Cagayan Electric Power and Light,
Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric
power to certain municipalities of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition seeking the discontinuation of all
existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. After due notice and
hearing, the ERB granted the petition and ordered all existing NPC direct
supply of power to industrial consumers within the franchise area of
CEPALCO to be discontinued.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the motion for reconsideration
filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and, therefore, the
assailed decision became final and executory. The SC affirmed the ruling
of the CA.
To implement the decision of ERB, CEPALCO advised Philippine Sinter
Corporation (PSC) of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly
taken from NAPOCOR, disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO.
PSC is an entity operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial
Estate located in Misamis Oriental. The Estate is managed and operated
by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). PSC refused CEPALCOs
request, citing the contract for power supply with NAPOCOR was still
effective for 3 years.
PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO which was
granted by the RTC. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB
HELD:
NO. The SC ruled that an injunction to stay a final and executory decision
is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances
exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a
change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception
exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and
executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly
disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

mining claims. Later, Atlas also registered the location of its Carmen I
Fr. to Carmen V. Fr. with the same Mining Director. After a survey,
Atlas filed an adverse claim against Baquerons mining claims on the
ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims. After
hearing, the Director of Mines ruled that Baqueron is given preferential
right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by
St. Mary Fr. and St. Joseph Fr. Mining claims, except the area covered
thereby in conflict with Atlas Master VII Fr.. On appeal, Minister of
Natural Resources ruled that St. Mary and St. Joseph mining claims of
Baqueron are null and void, and that Carmen I to Carmen V mining
claims of Atlas are valid and that it be given preferential right to posses,
explore, exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby. Deputy
Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of
Natural Resources and ruled in favor of Baqueron. Petitioner would like
the Court to look into the finding of the Director of Mines because of the
open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in
this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant
appellate review
ISSUE:
WON the discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact
best left to the determination of administrative bodies
HELD:
Yes. The Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of
an administrative official is subject to guide posts laid down by many
decided cases. Thus for instance, findings of fact in such decisions should
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is
justified when there has been denial of due process, or mistake of law or
fraud, collision of arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where
the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness
or capriciousness is manifest.
A careful study of the records show that none of the above
circumstances is present at the case at bar, which would justify the
overturning of the findings of fact by the Director of Mines which were
affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance
with the prevailing principle that in reviewing administrative decisions,
the reviewing court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as
if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was
not submitted to the administrative agency concerned, the findings of
fact in this case must be respected. They will not be disturbed as long as
they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
GR L-19337 September 30, 1969

DEVELOPMENT

FACTS:
Petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and
milling of centrifugal sugar for exert, the sugar so produced being placed
in containers known as jute bags. In 1957 it made two importations of
jute bags. The first shipment consisting of 44,800 jute bags and declared
under entry 48 on January 8, 1967, entered free of customs duties and
special import tax upon the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and P2,464.50,
conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from
the date of importation. The second shipment consisting of 75,200 jute
bags and declared under entry 243 on February 8, 1957, likewise entered
free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's filing
of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 in the amounts of
P42,112 and P7,984.44, with the same conditions as stated in bond no.
1.

FACTS:
Atlas Consolidated Mining registered the location of its Master VII Fr.
With the Mining Recorder of Toledo City, while Private Respondent
Asterio Baqueron also registered his St. Mary Fr. And St. Joseph Fr.

Of the 44,800 jute bags declared under entry 48, only 8,647 were
exported within one year from the date of importation as containers of
centrifugal sugar. Of the 75,200 jute bags declared under entry 243, only
25,000 were exported within the said period of one year. In other words,
of the total number of imported jute bags, only 33,647 bags were
exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353

To justify the injuctive relief prayed for, the movant must show:
1. The existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; and
2. The act against which injuction is to be directed is a violation
of such right.
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any clear legal right which
would be violated if the power supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is
disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO. Wherefore, the petition is
denied. Decision of CA is affirmed.
ATLAS
CONSOLIDATED
MINING
CORPORATION vs. FACTORAN
GR 75501 September 15, 1987

AND

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within
three years from their importation.
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension
of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire
the following day.
This request was denied by the Commissioner.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the
balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the
Collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay the amount of P28,629.42
representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon,
which amount the petitioner paid under protest.
Petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground
that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time,
and that its failure to export the jute bags within the required one-year
period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on which they were to
be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line.
Collector of Customs of Iloilo denied the claim for refund.
Appeal was taken to the Commissioner of Customs who upheld the
decision of the Collector.
Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs.
Petitioner imputes three errors to the Court of Tax Appeals, one of which
was:
2. In not declaring that it is within the power of the Collector of Customs
and/or the Commissioner of Customs to extend the period of one (1)
year within which the jute bags should be exported.
ISSUE:
WON the one year period is extendible
HELD:
No. The one-year period prescribed in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff
Act of 1909 is non-extendible and compliance therewith is mandatory.
To implement the said section 23, Customs Administrative Order 389 was
promulgated. And in so far as jute bags as containers are concerned,
Customs Administrative Order 66 was issued.
It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and
the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing
at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned
must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be
extended. It was surely by reason of this silence that the Bureau of
Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66, already adverted to,
to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the
law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider
the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the
subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the
doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction"
would, initially, be in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the
statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to
construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.
The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with
the intention of the legislature to limit the period within which to export
imported containers to one year, without extension, from the date of
importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff and Customs Code to
supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have
amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long-standing
view of the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein
mentioned is not extendible.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs
Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling
weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to
several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle,
as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling
weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental
agencies charged with administration, their competence,
expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact
that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret;
that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and
practical application of the statute presents the agency with
unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored,
and that tax statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, then we are hard
put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it was entitled to an extension of
time within which to export the jute bags and, consequently, to a refund
of the amount it had paid as customs duties.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
II. CHAPTER 1 PUBLIC OFFICE
FERNANDEZ vs. STO. TOMAS
GR 116418 MARCH 7, 1995
CASE: Petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the
validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
(Commission) and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
FACTS:
Petitioners Fernandez and de Lima were serving at the Central Office of
the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While
petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public
respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June
1994. Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that the
Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units within the
Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS,
OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and
Development Office (RDO)." The same Resolution renamed some of the
Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human Resource
Development (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office
(HRDO); the Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed
Management Information Office (MIO). Moreover, the personnel, records,
fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such
functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were
transferred. As such, petitioners had received Office Orders from the
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City
and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga.
During the general assembly of officers and employees of the
Commission, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of
petitioners, expressed the determination of the Commission to implement
Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority. Petitioners
then instituted this Petition
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO
[Research and Development Office; and
(2) WON Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right
to security of tenure
HELD:
(1) Yes, the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO
[Research and Development Office. The Commission was moved by quite
legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in
assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the
Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima
to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
It is also clear to the Court that the changes introduced and formalized
through Resolution No. 94-3710 are precisely the kind of internal
changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code).
(2) No, Resolution No. 94-3710 did not violate petitioners' constitutional
right to security of tenure. The term "public office" is frequently used to
refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710
has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of
public officers. 1. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or
necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public
employment between the Commission and any of its officers and
employees.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not
appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the
position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or
Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II;
and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the
position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or
station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the
same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima
from their previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the
Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment
from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III
had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute
removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment
did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to
security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of
Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary
at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office
of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other
words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
PRECLARO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 111091 AUGUST 21, 1995
DOCTRINE: Public Officer under Sec. 2(b) of RA 3019 (Anti- Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) includes elective and appointive officials and
employee, permanent or temporary, whether in the Career Service and
Non-Career Service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government.
FACTS:
On June 14, 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
a violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or


omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
On October 1, 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial
Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a component of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) employed petitioner
under a written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the
construction of the ITDI-CMD Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan,
Taguig. The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to
the end of the construction period unless sooner terminated.
DOST contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction
Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the companys project
engineer.
In May 1990, Engr. Resoso was evaluating a Change Order for some
electricals in the building when petitioner approached him. Petitioner
made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be charged

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


to the contractor (deductive) instead of to the DOST (additive). Petitioner
intimated that he could forget about the deduction provide he gets P200,
000.00.
Resoso then conveyed the proposal to Jaime sta. Maria Sr., owner of Sta.
Maria Construction Company. Thereafter, Resoso asked the petitioner if
he wanted a particular place for him to receive the money. Petitioner
chose Wendys Restaurant in EDSA cor. Camias St.
On June 7, 1990, Sta. Maria Sr. and Resoso reported the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI suggested an
entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr. agreed.
On June 8, 1990, the meeting between petitioner and Resoso took place
at the agreed place. When petitioner received the two envelopes
containing the money, the NBI agents accosted him.
The Sandiganbayan, after due hearing, convicted the petitioner.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court and argued that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to try the case because petitioner
asserted that he was not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of RA
3019, as amended because he was neither elected nor appointed to a
public office. Petitioner claimed that he was merely a private individual
hired by the ITDI on a contractual basis. He further argued that he was
not issued any appointment paper, was not required to use the bundy
clock, and did not take an oath of office.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction of the case
HELD:
Petitioner misconstrued the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019
which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government. . . ."
The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates
that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or
exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service
which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service
by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission
and by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Non-career service in particular is characterized by
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a

period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the


appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;


(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the

government is in accordance with a special contract to


undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall
exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls


under the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified
or exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019).
The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by
means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became
unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of
law clearly including petitioner within the definition of a public officer.
Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act because his intervention "was not
required by law but in the performance of a contract of services entered
into by him as a private individual contractor," is erroneous. As discussed
above, petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer and as such,
his duties delineated in Annex "B" of the contract of services are
subsumed under the phrase "wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law." Petitioner's allegation, to
borrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere splitting of hairs.
Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the
contractor's accomplishment reports/billings hence, as correctly ruled by
the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to make a
favorable recommendation and act favorably in behalf of the
government," signing acceptance papers and approving deductives and
additives are some examples. All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the AntiGraft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore, present.
LAUREL vs. DESIERTO
GR 145368 APRIL 12, 2002
SUMMARY OF DECISION:
NCC is a public office because it exercises executive functions by
implementing the policies set forth in the Constitution regarding history
and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an important element of public
office: the delegation of sovereign functions.
LAUREL is a public officer because being the chair of NCC it also follows
that he is a public officer. That he did not receive compensation is of no
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is
a mere incident and forms no part of the office.
FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebration. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128,
reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the
National Centennial Commission (NCC). Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel
was appointed to chair. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon
C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. It is also characterized as
an ad-hoc body and shall terminate upon the completion of all activities
related to the Centennial Celebrations. It is also tasked to prepare, a
Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98
Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was among the nine (9)
Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Laurel
was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the
construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project and such
was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate
Committees for investigation. President Joseph Estrada created an ad hoc
committee to investigate the project.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for the prosecution by
the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of
EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award
of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.);
for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence
of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused
by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in
violation of the anti-graft law.
Petitioner Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to
Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground
that he is not a public officer because: (1) Expocorp, the corporation
chaired by petitioner Laurel which undertook the freedom ring project in
connection with which violations of the anti-graft and corrupt practices
were allegedly committed, was a private corporation, not a governmentowned or controlled corporation. (2) The national centennial commission
(NCC) was not a public office. (3) Petitioner, both as chairman of the NCC
and of Expocorp was not a public officer as defined under the anti-graft &
corrupt practices act.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in
the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign
functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being
temporary.
ISSUES:
(1)
WON NCC is a Public Office
(2)
WON Laurel is a Public Officer
HELD:
(1) YES. The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as
protectors of the people, who shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the
awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon
the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,
defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in
jurisprudence is that:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.
The characteristics of a public office, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the
position as an office.
The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining
whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that
some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the
individual is not a public officer.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power
is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an
ad-hoc body make said commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and
certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily
be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a
continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government
and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to
perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any
contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be
changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or
employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from
an officer.
(2) YES. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a
public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary
criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive.
The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a
salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public
good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized
as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of
profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it
is a public office, nonetheless.
A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law
as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence
and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that
the definition is not restrictive. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is
just one of several laws that define public officers. Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent
or subordinate official, of any rank or class. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED.
CHAPTER 2 REQUIREMENTS
TRISTE vs. LEYTE STATE COLLEGE
GR 78623 DECEMBER 17, 1990
FACTS:
The Leyte State College (LSC) became a chartered state college by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 944. Section 4 provides that "the governance
and administration of each College and the exercise of its corporate

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Trustees and in the
President of the College insofar as authorized by said Board".
Two years later, PD 1437 was issued, which defined the powers and
composition of boards of chartered state universities. Accordingly, the
acting chairman of the board issued a document appointing petitioner
Ofelia Triste as vice-president of the LSC. For more than two years,
petitioner discharged her duties and functions as vice-president of the
college.
In February 1986, there was a revamp in the composition of the Board of
Trustees of the LSC. Anticipating moves to replace her as vice-president,
petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper asserting
that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position
was not vacant, the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that
of the recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was
not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board.
Petitioner received a letter assigning her the job of director of the
college's research program. Petitioner received another letter from
stating that Dr. Crescencia V. Chan-Gonzaga was designated as the new
vice-president. The Board Secretary informed petitioner's counsel that
her petition was "noted and discussed" by the Board and the members
arrived at the consensus that the position of vice-president being
"honorific," the incumbent president of the college had the prerogative to
recommend for the vice-presidency the nominee of the executive council.
As a consequence thereof, petitioner's services as vice-president were in
effect terminated.
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Review Committee of the Ministry
of Justice contending that she was terminated and stripped of her rank
and status without legal cause and due process; that the Board's claim
that the position of vice-president is "honorific" is not supported by law;
that said position is not co-terminous with the position of president not
only because the charter is silent on the matter but also because the
charter provides that a vice-president automatically assumes the
presidency when it is vacant. However, the Review Committee dismissed
petitioner's petition.
Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and public respondent Dr. Flores contend
that petitioner was merely "designated" and not "appointed" to the
college vice-presidency. They maintain that petitioner's term of office
being co-terminous with that of the retired college president, petitioner
may not complain that she was illegally dismissed from the vicepresidency. On the other hand, petitioner asserts that she was the duly
appointed vice-president of the college.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was merely designated and not permanently appointed.
HELD:
The petition is granted and the immediate reinstatement of petitioner to
the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is hereby
ordered.
In Borromeo v. Mariano, this Court, through Justice Malcolm, noted that
"(a)ll authorities unite in saying that the term 'appoint' is well-known and
whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to
the nomination or designation of an individual."
In Aparri v. CA, "appointment" was defined as the "act of designation by
the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office."
On the other hand, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the word
"designate," when used by the appointing power in making an
appointment to office, is equivalent to the word "appoint." Common
usage, however, oftentimes puts a distinction between the terms
"appointment" and designation". The reason for this is that the word
"appointment" connotes permanency while "designation" implies
temporariness.
Thus, to "designate" a public officer to another position may mean to
vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his
permanent office. Or, in some cases, a public officer may be "designated"

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


to a position in an acting capacity as when an Undersecretary is
designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the
appointment of a permanent Secretary.
BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO, JR.
188 SCRA 154
FACTS:
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement
to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from
which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of
his security of tenure.
The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed
to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986:
You are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, effective immediately. By virtue hereof, you may qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date.
Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the
composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included
Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager. This
approval was given by the President on the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties
of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and
had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including
the Office of the President.
He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was
demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the following memorandum,
copy furnished Binamira:
It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the
present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was
designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as
amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is
invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in
the said office in a permanent capacity. Please be guided accordingly.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in
accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against
him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was
pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6,
1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation and
should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority.
HELD:
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority,
provides as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. The


General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for
cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as
such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President
of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There
is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the
petitioner has failed to consider.

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested


with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he
is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before
us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the
Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature. Where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.

The respondent President, on May 16, 1990, designated Professor


Macacuna Moslem as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs but the latter
did not accept the designation. On May 28, 1990, the respondent
President issued Special Order No. 158-P designating Professor Corazon
Batara, the other respondent in this case, as Officer-in-Charge of the
OVCAA.

The designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has
been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides
that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as
an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the
petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be
validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to
be a member of the Cabinet.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner was an ad interim appointee

The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing her removal as ViceChancellor by the respondent President.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondents
to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing Special Order
No. 159-P and from interfering and/or preventing the petitioner from
performing her duties as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs of the MSU,
Marawi Campus.
The petitioner filed a motion to cite respondent Alonto for contempt. The
petitioner asserts that her appointment being permanent, she can be
removed only after hearing and for cause.

FACTS:
Dr. Emily Marohombsar was designated as officer-in-charge of the Office
of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of Mindanao State
University in a concurrent capacity with her position then as VicePresident for External Studies.

HELD:
YES. In this case, the intent to make the petitioner serve at the pleasure
of the respondent MSU President is obvious. The petitioner is a career
official of MSU for over 27 years. She was Vice-President for External
Studies since 1982. On March 22, 1988, she was given an additional
assignment as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for
Academic Affairs concurrently with the permanent position as VicePresident for External Studies.
When the Board of Regents confirmed the appointment of the petitioner
on May 16, 1989, it was acting on an ad interim appointment effected by
the President. No other interpretation can be validly made. If it was a
mere designation, it needs no confirmation. The fact that confirmation
was needed shows that it is an ad interim one. An ad interim
appointment is one made during the time when the appointing or
confirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear and
present urgency caused by an impending obstruction or paralyzation of
the functions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made.
When the Vice-Presidency for External Studies was abolished and its
functions were merged with the Vice-Chancellorship for Academic Affairs,
both the security of tenure of the occupant and the needs of the new
office called for the ad interim appointment.
The respondent cannot use the device of an ambiguous designation to go
around the security of tenure principle. Under the MSU Code, a
designation requires a fixed period of not less than one year. The
appointment given to the petitioner was indefinite. She would serve at
the pleasure of the MSU President who is not even the head of the
institution because the head is the Board of Regents.
The respondent President is, nevertheless, admonished for his action.
When this Court issues a restraining order, it must be obeyed. Hence, the
petitioner shall remain as the lawful occupant in a permanent capacity of
the position of Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs of MSU Marawi until
the end of her three-year term or her tenure is otherwise lawfully
terminated.

On January 2, 1989, the Office of the Vice-President for External Studies


was merged with the OVCAA and, as such, the functions of the former
were to be exercised by the latter. The petitioner was appointed acting
Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. The Board of
Regents of the MSU, on May 16, 1989, approved her appointment as
acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs.

Note: A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially


temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such
appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause.
The essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent
appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen.

On May 14, 1990, respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU President, wrote


the petitioner informing her that he has decided to tap the petitioner's
talent for the MSU system as Vice-President for Academic Affairs which
position is under the administrative staff of the respondent MSU
President. The petitioner, on the same date, answered that she cannot
accept the position since she has already started several projects in the
OVCAA which she wants to see through.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA


GR 104639 JULY 14, 1995

Such designation being merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as


in fact it was recalled by the President herself, through the memorandum
she addressed to Secretary Garrucho. With these rulings, the petitioner's
claim of security of tenure must be rejected. His designation being an
unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire
valid title thereunder to the position in question. The designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally
withdrawn at pleasure.
MAROHOMBSAR vs. ALONTO
194 SCRA 391
DOCTRINE:
An ad interim appointment is one made during the time when the
appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is an existing
clear and present urgency caused by an impending obstruction or
paralyzation of the functions assigned to the office if no immediate
appointment is made

FACTS:
Private respondent Tito Dato was extended appointments in 1960 and in
1972, as Private Agent and as Assistant Provincial Warden respectively,
but such appointments were temporary due to the fact that he did not
pass his Civil Service Eligibility Exam. In 1974, Dato claimed that he
passed his civil service exam for supervising security guards and as a

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

result, his request for a change in status from temporary to permanent


appointment was approved. However, this was not acted favorably upon
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because Tito Dato did not possess
the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. As
a result, his appointment remained temporary and no appointments were
later extended to him.

Subsequently, the CA ruled that the department order in so far as it


affects Montesa is null and void.

In 1976, Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended due to criminal charges


filed against him on allegations of connivance with a prison guard
consenting to evasion of sentence of detention prisoners. In the same
year, Rama, the head of CSC Cam Sur unit, informed the governor that
Tito Datos request for a change in status has been approved, having
passed the Civil Service Eligibility for Supervising Security Guard. Such
appointment was made retroactive to 1974, the date of release of such
examination. Tito Dato was subsequently acquitted of all criminal charges
but when he requested for reinstatement, the same was refused by the
Governor.

ISSUE:
WON Montesa can be transferred or reassigned without violating his
constitutionally guaranteed right of security of tenure.

ISSUE:
WON Tito Dato was a permanent employee of Petitioner Province of Cam
Sur at the time of his suspension in 1976
HELD:
NO. At the time of his appointment in 1974 he had not yet qualified in an
appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such
ineligibility made his appointment temporary and entirely dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. His subsequent eligibility did
not ipso facto convert his status from temporary to permanent. Hence, a
new appointment is necessary.
DOCTRINE:
In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that CSC has the
power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not
have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing
authority to change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can
only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if
it finds the person qualified it must so attest.
DE LEON vs. CA
GR 127182 JANUARY 22, 2001
FACTS:
Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer
(CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was appointed as
Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government
(now Department of Interior and Local Government) [hereinafter referred
to as Department], by the then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Montesas
appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission. Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated EO No. 262, reorganizing
the Department. Then Secretary Luis T. Santos designated Nicanor
Patricio in the place of Montesa.
Consequently, Montesa filed before the Court a petition for quo warranto
against the then Secretary Santos and Patricio. Meanwhile, RA 6758
(Salary Standardization Law) took effect, making the position of
Department Service Chiefs, including the Department of Legal Counsel
was reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the
generic position of Director III. Hence, the Court ruled in favor of
Montesa and ordered his reinstatement to his former position as
Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III.
Thereafter, Sectary Rafael Aluman III issued a department order relieving
Montesa of his current duties and reassigned him as Director III
(Assistant Regional Director), Region XI. Montesa, however, did not
report to his new assignment. Montesa then wrote a memorandum
requesting for reconsideration but to no avail. He appealed to the Civil
Service Commission and the latter issued a resolution sustaining the
reassignment to Region XI.
Montesa still did not comply with the reassignment and filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. Meanwhile, President Fidel Ramos
already issued AO No. 235 dropping Montesa from the roster of public
servants for serious neglect of duty and absences without leave.

On appeal, the petitioners contended among others the CA erred in ruling


that Montesas transfer changes his appointment from permanent to
temporary and violates his constitutional right.

HELD:
YES. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV is embraced in the
Career Executive Service. In the case at bar, there is no question that
Montesa does not have the required CES eligibility. Evidently, Montesas
appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the necessary
Career Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he
did not at the time of the appointment end up to the present, possess
the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service.
Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV/
Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary.
Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
RATIO:
Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be
made as follows:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career
Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career
executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall
be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher
ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary
and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President
may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a
Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall
subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and
that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such
examination.
At the initial implementation of this Plan, an incumbent who holds a
permanent appointment to a position embraced in the Career Executive
Service shall continue to hold his position, but may not advance to a
higher class of position in the Career Executive Service unless or until he
qualifies for membership in the Career Executive Service.21
Corollarily, the required Career Executive Service eligibility may be then
acquired in the following manner:
Career Executive Service Eligibility
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a
CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible.
Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a formal Board
Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance in the four
stages of the CES eligibility examinations.22
FELIX vs. BUENASEDA
GR 109704 JULY 17, 1995
FACTS:
(Petitoner, Dr. Alfredo Felix, is a licensed physician, while respondents,
Dr. Brigada Buenaseda and Isabelo Baez, Jr., are the Director of the
National Centre for Mental Health and Administrator of the Civil Service
Commission, respectively.)
After passing the Physician's Licensure Examinations in June of 1979,
petitioner, Dr. Alfredo B. Felix, joined the National Center for Mental
Health (then the National Mental Hospital) on May 26, 1980 as a Resident
Physician. In August of 1983, he was promoted to the position of Senior
Resident Physician a position he held until the Ministry of Health
reorganized the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) in January of
1988, pursuant to Executive Order No. 119.

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Under the reorganization, petitioner was appointed to the position of
Senior Resident Physician in a temporary capacity. In August of 1988,
petitioner was promoted to the position of Medical Specialist I
(Temporary Status), which position was renewed the following year.
In 1988, the Department of Health issued Department Order No. 347
which required board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of
specialist positions in various medical centers, hospitals and agencies of
the said department. Specifically, Department Order No. 347 provided
that specialists working in various hospitals and branches of the
Department of Health be recognized as "Fellows" of their respective
specialty societies. The Order was issued for the purpose of upgrading
the quality of specialties in DOH hospitals by requiring them to pass
rigorous theoretical and clinical (bedside) examinations given by
recognized specialty boards, in keeping up with international standards of
medical practice. Petitioner was one of the hundreds of government
medical specialist who would have been adversely affected by
Department Order No. 347 since he was no yet accredited by the
Psychiatry Specialty Board.
On August 20, 1991, after reviewing petitioner's service record and
performance, the Medical Credentials Committee of the National Center
for Mental Health recommended non-renewal of his appointment as
Medical Specialist I. He was, however, allowed to continue in the service,
and receive his salary, allowances and other benefits even after being
informed of the termination of his appointment.
On November 25, 1991, an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Service
was held to discuss, among other matters, the petitioner's case. In the
said meeting Dr. Vismindo de Grecia, petitioner's immediate supervisor,
pointed out petitioner's poor performance, frequent tardiness and
inflexibility as among the factors responsible for the recommendation not
to renew his appointment. Other department heads present in the
meeting expressed the same opinion, and the overwhelming consensus
was for non-renewal.
The matter was thereafter referred to the Civil Service Commission, and
it ruled that "the temporary appointment of petitioner as Medical
Specialist I can be terminated at any time . . ." and that any renewal of
such appointment is within the discretion of the appointing authority."
Petitioner was then advised by hospital authorities to vacate his cottage.
Petitioner then filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB) complaining about the alleged harassment by respondents and
questioning the non-renewal of his appointment.
Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) - Ruled for the validity of the nonrenewal. It held that, as an apparent incident of the power to appoint,
the renewal of a temporary appointment upon or after its expiration is a
matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. In this case, there is no dispute that Complainant was a
temporary employee and his appointment expired on August 22, 1991;
appointment would be determined solely by the proper appointing
authority who is the Secretary, Department of Health upon the favorable
recommendation of the Chief of Hospital III, NCMH.
The power of appointment is essentially a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
Complainant therefore, has no basis in law to assail the non-renewal of
his expired temporary appointment much less invoke the aid of this
Board cannot substitute its judgment to that of the appointing authority
nor direct the latter to issue an appointment in the complainants favor.
Civil Service Commission - affirmed MSPB and dismissed the appeal of
petitioner
ISSUE:
WON the non-renewal of petitioners appointment valid
HELD:
YES
(1) A residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is
never a permanent one. Residency connotes training and temporary
status. It is the step taken by a physician right after post-graduate
internship (after Medical Licensure Examinations) prior to his recognition

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as a specialist or sub-specialist in a given field. Accredited Psychiatrist
goes through this process in order to be recognized as a fellowof the
Psychiatry Specialty Board. This upward movement from residency to
specialist rank, guarantees minimum standards and skills needed to
exercise such profession. Because Acceptance and promotion
requirements are stringent, competitive, and based on merit, acceptance
to a first year residency program is no guaranty that the physician will
complete the program. Promotion to the next post-graduate year is
based on merit and performance determined by periodic evaluations and
examinations of knowledge, skills and bedside manner. Moreover,
stringent standards and requirements for renewal of specialist-rank
positions or for promotion to the next post-graduate residency year are
necessary because lives are ultimately at stake.
(2) It bears emphasis that at the time of petitioner's promotion to the
position of Medical Specialist I (temporary) in August of 1988, no
objection was raised by him about the change of position or the
temporary nature of designation. The pretense of objecting to the
promotion to specialist rank apparently came only as an afterthought,
three years later, following the non-renewal of his position by the
Department of Health. He is therefore estopped from insisting upon a
right or claim which he had plainly abandoned when he enthusiastically
accepted the promotion. His negligence to assert his claim within a
reasonable time, coupled with his failure to repudiate his promotion to a
temporary position, warrants a presumption, that he either abandoned
his claim or declined to assert it.
There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience which
demand that any claim to any position in the civil service, permanent,
temporary of otherwise, or any claim to a violation of the constitutional
provision on security of tenure be made within a reasonable period of
time. An assurance of some degree of stability in the civil service is
necessary in order to avoid needless disruptions in the conduct of public
business. Delays in the statement of a right to any position are strongly
discouraged. In the same token, the failure to assert a claim or the
voluntary acceptance of another position in government, obviously
without reservation, leads to a presumption that the civil servant has
either given up his claim of has already settled into the new position. This
is the essence of laches which is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
(3) Although, the validity of EO 119 is not the real issue in this case, the
Supreme Court commented on the importance of the reorganization by
saying that the change in designation from permanent resident physician
to temporary resident physician, a change was necessary, overall, to
rectify a ludicrous situation whereby some government resident
physicians were erroneously being classified as permanent resident
physicians in spite of the inherently temporary nature of the designation.
The attempts by the Department of Health not only to streamline these
positions but to make them conform to current standards of specialty
practice is a step in a positive direction.
GLORIA vs. DE GUZMAN, JR
GR 116183 OCTOBER 6, 1995
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari, filed by Hon. Ricardo T.
Gloria, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine State
College of Aeronautics (PSCA). Private respondents were employees of
the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) which was
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1078. Under the said
decree, the Board of Trustees is vested with authority, among others, to
appoint, officials and employees of the college, except the members of
the Board of Trustees themselves and the President of the college. In line
with this authority, the PAFCA Board of Trustees (BOT) issued Resolution
No. 91-026 which declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are
also subject to the required civil service eligibilities". Thus, herein private

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respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the
time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service
eligibilities. The temporary appointments were good & renewable only up
to1992. Private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo, specifically, was issued a
one-year temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of
PAFCA (now PSCA). However, he was relieved as Board Secretary of the
PAFCA in accordance with Board Resolution No. 92-017 by reason of loss
of confidence. Subsequently, however, she was designated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services".
Republic Act No. 7605 was enacted into law. It converted PAFCA into a
state college to be known as the Philippine State College of Aeronautics
(PSCA). The Board of Trustees likewise was the governing body of the
PSCA. The power to make appointments was retained by the Board.
Private respondents were informed that they shall be deemed separated
from the service upon the expiration of their temporary appointments.
After the lapse of their temporary appointments, private respondents
filed a petition for mandamus & reinstatement praying that the DECS
Secretary complete the filling up positions for BOT & order said board to
reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to their respective
positions. In their Answer, the herein petitioners opposed the petition
upon the ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement
because the reappointment prayed for is discretionary on the part of the
appointing power.
ISSUE:
WON a mandamus will lie to compel reinstatement of private respondents
to their positions
HELD:
No. The judgment of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. which
orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of
"Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it finds
no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although
temporarily extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was
dismissed therefrom because of loss of confidence. This dismissal was
neither contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question,
therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been
the subject of the petition for mandamus and reinstatement filed before
respondent Judge.
The fact is that private respondent's assignment as "Coordinator for
Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not being a permanent
appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a
case for reinstatement. At any rate, a mere "designation" does not confer
upon the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he
occupies in an acting capacity only.
The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service
Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no
reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil service
eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment.
We hold that reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an
act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of
mandamus.
The termination of the services of private respondents was proper and
legal, it being the consequence of the Board of Trustees' power to
appoint. The view of respondent Judge, however, is that there was no
termination ordered. Either the employees' contracts lapsed or their
temporary appointments were abrogated by circulars from the Civil
Service Commission. This, as a necessary consequence of the transition
from the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) to the
Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA).

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA vs. IAC
GR L-65439 NOVEMBER 13, 1985
FACTS:
Dr. Esteban has already been a permanent employee in the government
service for twenty-five (25) years and was officially connected with the
Philippine College of Commerce as its Vice-President for Academic Affairs
when he was invited in 1973 by Dr. Consuelo Blanco (Blanco), President
of the Pamantasan to be its ad interim temporary Vice-President for
Administration. Dr. Esteban accepted the offer.
On June 20, 1973, the Board of Regents passed Board's Resolution No.
485 confirming the ad interim appointments of several academic and
non-academic personnel of said university among which was that of Dr.
Esteban "effective May 21, 1973. The appointment started in 1973 and
was supposed to be good only for one year but was extended until 1975.
Dr. Esteban received Notifications of Confirmation of Temporary
Appointment every year to formalize his assignment.
On July 26, 1975, Dr. Esteban discovered that he was not included in the
list of employees recommended for permanent appointments. He
requested Dr. Blanco that his appointment be converted into a
permanent one. It was denied.
On August 7, 1975, Dr. Blanco terminated Dr. Esteban's appointment as
Vice-President for Administration effective July 31, 1975. His appointment
effective until June 30, 1976 was also withdrawn. In lieu thereof, he was
appointed as Professor III and Director of the Institute of Continuing
Education and Community Service.
Dr. Esteban appealed to the Commission for the protection of his tenure
in the Pamantasan. The Commission ruled that his appointment was
temporary in nature. However, upon Dr. Estebans Motion for
Reconsideration, the Commission ruled in favor of him stating that he
was fully qualified for the position of Vice-President for Administration
and certified him "for appointment therein under permanent status.
The Pamantasan asked for the reconsideration of the ruling. The
Commission came out with a statement which confused more than it
clarified. It stated that its certification should not be interpreted as
directing the reinstatement of Dr. Esteban because it was never
intended to be so.
On July 6, 1977, the Commission again modified its earlier resolution. It
ruled that Dr. Blanco, had no authority to extend to Dr. Esteban an ad
interim appointment as Vice President for Administration as only the
Board of Regents was empowered to do that under Article 55 of the
University Charter. However, it ruled that, as a de facto officer, he was
entitled to be paid the salary of that position.
Both the Pamantasan and Dr. Esteban filed Motions for Reconsideration.
The Merits System Board (created by PD 1409) in the Civil Service
Commission required the Pamantasan to submit its complete records on
the appointment and termination of Dr. Esteban as Vice-President for
Administration.
The Pamantasan submitted copies of the notices sent to Dr. Esteban
regarding his appointment as Vice-President for Administration, but not a
copy of the Board's Resolution No. 485. A few months later, the
Pamantasan reiterated that "we cannot find any document showing that
Dr. Esteban was appointed ... in a permanent capacity.
In view of the Pamantasan's failure to produce the minutes of the regular
Board of Regents meeting on June 20, 1973 when Esteban's appointment
was approved, the Commission concluded that there is truth to the claim
of Dr. Esteban that his appointment as Vice-President for Administration
of the Pamantasan was approved as permanent and that the temporary
appointment issued to him did not alter his permanent status as he had
already acquired a vested right as well as the right to security of
tenure.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


The Pamantasan filed a Motion for Reconsideration and submitted for the
first time a copy of Resolution No. 485. The Commission denied the
motion and chided the Pamantasan for having suppressed said piece of
evidence.
The Pamantasan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. CFI ruled in favor of the Pamantasan. The
Intermediate Appellate Court, however, reversed the ruling and upheld
that Dr. Estebans appointment was permanent.
ISSUE:
WON Dr. Esteban held the position (Vice-President for Administration of
PLM) in a permanent capacity as to guarantee his security of tenure
HELD:
Yes. In the usual sense, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a
vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or
temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But such is not the
meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the
manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the
President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of
Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the
power of appointment, is unable to act.
Note, however, that an ad interim appointment must be distinguished
from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until
another permanent appointment is issued.
Not only is the appointment in question an ad interim appointment, but
the same is also a confirmed ad interim appointment. In its Resolution
No. 485, dated June 20, 1973, the Pamantasan Board of Regents verified
respondent Esteban's appointment without condition nor limitation as to
tenure. As of that moment, it became a regular and permanent
appointment.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. It is a prerogative of
the appointing power that may be availed of without liability, provided
however, that it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, and provided further, that such prerogatives are not
exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner,
or out of malice or spite. The general rule is that the power of
appointment must remain unhampered by judicial intervention. However,
when the law is violated or when there is grave abuse of discretion, we
have to step in.
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
GR 79974 DECEMBER 17, 1987
FACTS:
In this case Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs by then President. Such appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both
Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not
valid because the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment for confirmation.
ISSUE:
WON such appointment made by the President without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointment was valid
HELD:
Yes. Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public
minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of
Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in him in this Constitution;

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


2. All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
Only those enumerated in number one requires confirmation of the
Commission of Appointment. It is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. The President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
BAUTISTA vs. SALONGA
GR 86439 (172 SCRA 160) APRIL 19, 1989
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista
as acting chairman and on December 17, 1988 petitioner was appointed
as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
(CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with
several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to
be placed under CoA's review. Consequently, CoA disapproved petitioner
Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the CHR, likewise
CoA denied the motion for reconsideration on the matter.
Bautista filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any
action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee
on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully
extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and
constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of
Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which
provides "The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their tenure in office shall be
at the pleasure of the President" Thus, Bautista may be subsequently
removed as well.
ISSUES:
1. WON Bautista's appointment is subject to COA's confirmation
2. WON Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment
3. WON EO- 163A is valid
HELD:
(1) No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which
provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested
upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she
appoint executive officials without confirmation of COA.
Ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive MAY VOLUNTARILY allow the CoA
to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


vested by the Constitution in the President. Yet, when the President
appointed petitioner Bautista on December 17, 1988 to the position of
Chairman of the CHR with the advice to her that by virtue of such
appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments),
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after
taking her oath of office - the presidential act of appointment to the
position, was then and there, under the Constitution, a complete and
finished act.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its
constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments,
cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone.
(2) No. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not
apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend
only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the
COA, cannot be ad interim appointments.
(3) No. The Court found it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an
office conceived and created by the Constitution to be independent as
the Commission on Human Rights-and vested with the delicate and vital
functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing
responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures
therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when
the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on
the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being
antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the
Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent
thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said
office.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


ISSUE:
WON Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments
HELD:
The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative districts
and those who as provided by law, shall be elected thru a party-list
system. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total
number of representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five
(25) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is reserved for
sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three consecutive
terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Section 5 (1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 5.(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of
sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise
provided by law, as follows:

QUINTOS-DELES vs. COA


GR 83216 SEPTEMBER 4, 1989

SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from
a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for
sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution.

FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral
Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, also dated April
6,1988 the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker
Ramon Mitra.

The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of


sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as follows:

On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were


scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the
Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner
and the three other sectoral representatives- appointees were not able to
take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due
to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be
confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their
oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.
In the May 12,1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by
Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of
petitioner Deles.
Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that
respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to
confirmation process the petitioner's appointment as sectoral
representative for the women's sector and as member of Congress.

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments
to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article
VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as follows:

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated
by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section
16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the
Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no
confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and
his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had
been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the
Constitution.
CALDERON vs. CARALE
GR 91636 APRIL 23, 1992
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending
the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof
as follows:

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other


Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any
vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also
be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations.
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Corazon Aquino appointed the
Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public,
workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the
appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the
places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of
the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines
to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation pursuant to Art.
215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in
its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to
petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may,
by law, require confirmation by the COA of other officers appointed by
the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that
the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in the case at
bar for, here, the President issued permanent appointments to the
respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite

passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the COA
of such appointments.

The OSG, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended
the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the
confirmation
powers
of
the
COA
without
constitutional
basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest, says the Solicitor General,
with the following exposition:
"Confirmation by the COA is required exclusively for the heads of
executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments is required.
OSG maintained that had it been the intention to allow Congress to
expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by
adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the
first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently,
our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
That the original text of Section 16 of Article VII of
present Constitution as embodied in Resolution No. 517 of
Constitutional Commission reads as follows:

the
the

'The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments
and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts or in the head of the
department.
Three points should be noted regarding subsection 3 of Section 10 of
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of Section 16
of Article VII of the present Constitution as proposed in Resolution No.
517.
"First, in both of them, the appointments of head of bureaus were
required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
"Second, in both of them, the appointments of other officers, "whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint" are
expressly made subject to confirmation by the COA. However, in the final
version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 16 of Article VII of
the present Constitution, the appointment of the above mentioned
officers (heads of bureaus; other officers whose appointments are not
provided for by law; and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint) are excluded from the list of those officers whose appointments
are to be confirmed by the COA. This amendment, reflected in Section 16
of Article VII of the Constitution, clearly shows the intent of the framers
to exclude such appointments from the requirement of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


"Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word "nominate" qualifies the
entire Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article VII thereof.
"Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three (3)
stage process of nomination, confirmation and appointment operates.
This is only true of the first group enumerated in Section 16, but the
word nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd and 3rd sentences.
Therefore, the president's appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd
sentences need no confirmation."
ISSUE:
WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the COA of
appointments
extended
by
the
President
to
government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require
confirmation by the COA
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the such
category of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically
under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. To the extent
that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution, imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with
the President.
Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining
their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the
laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the
constitutional infirmity under Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of
the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond
redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of
the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim 'legis interpretado legis
vim obtinent' the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law."
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art.
VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Can legislation expand a
constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it?
'The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term.
'The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional
provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by
a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the
constitutional inhibition.'

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system
embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on
Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all
presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power
of confirmation.
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the COA over
presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of
members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if
indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future
constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent
(constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935
Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the
1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the
Court to apply the 1987Constitution in accordance with what it says and
not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it
interpreted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the COA
of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of
no legal force and effect. So ordered.
LACSON vs. ROMERO
GR L-3081 OCTOBER 14, 1949
FACTS:
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the
Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was
confirmed by the Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He
took his oath of office on August 10, 1946, and thereafter performed the
duties of that office. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice,
on May 17, 1949, the President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post
of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated
for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero.
Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on May 19, 1949. Lacson neither accepted the
appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But respondent
Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) in
Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office
the following day, but Lacson objected. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Lacson is entitled to the position
HELD:
The Court ruled that: The appointment to a government post like that of
provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps. First, comes the
nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and
permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to
confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the
appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination
and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the
Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last
necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective rests
solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the
appointment or nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano,
41 Phil. 327, "there is no Power in this country which can compel a man
to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept
his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him
to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully
removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


TOMALI vs. CSC
GR. 110598 DECEMBER 1, 1994
FACTS:
On 01 July 1990, petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development
Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs
("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director
Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the
office four months later, or on 01 November 1990, at which time, the
appointment had not yet been transmitted to the Civil Service
Commission ("CSC") for approval.
On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman,
revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed
private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in question (DMO
II). Petitioner, on 29 July 1991, sent public respondent OMA a letter
protesting her replacement. On 01 August 1991, the Chief of the Human
Resources Management Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner
the disapproval/expiration of her appointment. Forthwith, private
respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and functions
of DMO II.
On 12 August 1991, petitioner reiterated her protest. The Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision, dated 23
July 1992, dismissing the protest/complaint for lack of merit. MSPB held:
Glaring is the fact that protestant's appointment to the contested position
was not approved by the Civil Service Commission, hence, incomplete. In
this regard, Section 11, Rule V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and
explicit. Said provision reads, thus:
Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission, within thirty
(30) days from the date of issuance, which shall be the date appearing
on the face of the instrument, shall be ineffective.
As applied to the case of the herein protestant, it appears that the latter
has no basis in law to cling to the contested position. Her prior
continuous stay in office was at most by mere tolerance of the appointing
authority. As her appointment is incomplete for lack of the requisite
approval of the Civil Service Commission or its proper Regional or Field
Office, no right to security of tenure as guaranteed by law and the
Constitution attaches thereto or for incumbent to invoke. . . . .
That being so, the proper appointing authority, in this case, the OMA
Executive Director may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cancel or
revoke the said incomplete appointment and appoint another person.
The circumstance showing that the non-approval of protestant's
appointment was due to the belated transmittal thereof to this
Commission is of no consequence nor improve her lot as a holder of an
incomplete appointment. There is no showing that the non-submission
was motivated by bad faith, spite or malice or at least attributable to the
fault of the
newly-installed OMA Executive Director.
Her request for reconsideration having been denied on 27 November
1992, petitioner appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-945, dated
12 March 1993, the Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant recourse to this Court.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was properly appointed.
HELD:
No. We fail to see any merit in the petition. An appointment to a position
in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in
order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified
to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process
of appointment are followed; thus:

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be
submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main,
whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and
whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are
followed; thus:
Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission
shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen,
and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing
authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall
remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should
take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority
for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided,
finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all
officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the
approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it
by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise
the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, among other things,
provides:
Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty
(30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to
the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. . . . .
Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil
service position is essential in order to make it fully effective.Without the
favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such
approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be
permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can
still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an
appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be
precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.
Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed
the position four months after her appointment was issued or months
after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by
operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990,
but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact
which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified
considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her
appointment and the date of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as
to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807.
It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director,
therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not
be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better
qualified for the position.
The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a
discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according
to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on
record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored
private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an
arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.
In sum, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents in their questioned dismissal of petitioner's protest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No special
pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

LOPEZ vs. CSC


194 SCRA 269

eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is


disapproved.

FACTS:
In 1983, petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V.
Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor
Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South
Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively.

On the power of PPA:


The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most
knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the
office.He has a wide latitude of choice as to the person to appoint where
the law does not impose rigid conditions. Section 6, Rep. Act No. 6656 on
government reorganization merely provides that the selection or
placement should be done through the creation of a Placement
Committee the members of which are representatives of the head of the
agency as well as representatives of the employees. The committee's
work is recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding
the mode of choosing from among the candidates. Thus, the
respondents' arguments on the alleged inconsistencies and nonconformity with Rep. Act No. 6656 in rating the contenders are without
merit.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 125, the Ministry (now


Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) was
reorganized. Hence, the reduction of the number of Assistant
Harbor Masters (now designated as Harbor Masters) in the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) from three (3) to two (2). A reevaluation of the qualifications of petitioner Lopez, Luz, and
Abellana was conducted by a placement committee of the PPA to
determine who should assume the two positions. The PPA General
Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, appointed petitioner Lopez as Harbor
Master for the South Harbor after considering the evaluation
conducted by the Placement Committee of the PPA the results of
which reveal that petitioner was the most outstanding among the
three. The evaluation was formally conducted and superseded the
one earlier handled by a task force. It took into account the
following: education and training; experience, physical characteristics
and personality traits; and performance of each candidate. The
records show that respondent Luz rated third.
Luz protested Lopez's appointment after it was approved by the
Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office, Guillermo R.
Silva. The protest/appeal was denied by the PPA General Manager
who explained that Luz was not qualified for any of the two slots
according to the over-all standing of the contenders. Luz then
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which declared the
invalidity of the assessment for having been found defective and not
in accordance with the law and implementing regulations. CSC
ordered for the reassessment which then would become the basis of the
appointments.
Despite this compliance by the PPA, the Commission, on February
14, 1990, found that the reassessment was not in order. Thus, it
directed the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of
the petitioner. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON CSC has the authority to substitute the power of PPA
HELD:
No. The SC emphasizes that CSC has no authority to substitute the power
of PPA when it comes to evaluating the performance, personality, and
accomplishments of candidates who all have the necessary
eligibility and legal qualifications. It is apparent from the records
that the PPA disclosed all the instruments used, the limitations and
the adjustments made to the end that the results would be fair to
all the candidates alike. The hiring of an independent psychiatristconsultant, for instance, proves the inclination of the committee
towards impartiality. In Sec 9 of PD 907, the Commission's power does
not extend to considerations other than those enumerated in the
law such as the belief that there are others more qualified. To go
beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of
the appointing authority and to give to the Commission a task
which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This
does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or
disapproving becomes ministerial. Far from it. Section 9 (h) of the
Civil Service Law permits the exercise by the Commission of its
judgment upon the validity of the appointment by specifying the
criterion for approval of appointments. (Meralco Securities Corp. v.
Savellano, 117 SCRA 804 [1982]) The authority given to the
Commission, therefore, is very far from a mere mechanical act in
which no discretion or exercise of judgment is allowed. The Court
ruled that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to
check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate

In view of the foregoing, the Court is not the least bit convinced by the
contentions of the public and private respondents. It is apparent from the
records that the PPA disclosed all the instruments used, the limitations
and the adjustments made to the end that the results would be fair to all
the candidates alike. The hiring of an independent psychiatristconsultant, for instance, proves the inclination of the committee towards
impartiality.
CORPUZ vs. CA
GR 123989
FACTS:
On 18 July 1986, CORPUZ was appointed as the MTRCBs legal Counsel -Prosecutor and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff
Officer). The appointment was approved by Asst. Regional Director
Benita Santos of the CSC-National Capital Region. Subsequently, CORPUZ
position was designated Attorney V under the Salary Standardization
Law. Sometime in August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution
No. 8-1-91 entitled An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The
Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of This Board As Null And
Void. This undated resolution noted that the past and present Chairmen
of the MTRCB that had failed to submit for approval the appointments of
administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before
forwarding them to the CSC, are void. In the meantime, and in order not
to disrupt the workings and functions of this Board while this body is
awaiting for [sic] the recommendation of the appointments of the old and
or new appointees, the present administrative and subordinate
employees shall hold on [to] their position[s] in an [sic] holdover
capacity. Thereafter, the Committee resolved to recommend to the
MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of CORPUZ and
seven others so CORPUZ and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint with the
CSC requesting a formal investigation and hearing. CORPUZ explicitly
declared that he is no longer seeking reinstatement with respondent
MTRCB but for the continuity of his government service from the time he
was illegally dismissed on 30 June 1993 up to the time he was
permanently employed with the Office of the Ombudsman on 22 August
1994 plus back salaries and other benefits due him if not for the illegal
dismissal. CSC decided in favor of Corpuz but the CA reversed it.
ISSUE:
WON Corpuzs dismissal was valid
HELD:
YES. PD 1986 provides that xxx The Board shall determine its
organizational structure and staffing pattern. It shall have the power to
suspend or dismiss for cause any employee and/or approve or disapprove
the appointment, transfer or detail of employees.
There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB personnel,
other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman
which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper; and (b)
approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the
power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been
determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the
formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at
once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer
or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be
complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either
case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of
the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the
appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of
tenure. Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, since the last act required for the
completion of his appointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself, was
not obtained, his appointment ceased to have effect, and his services
were properly terminated. The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the
proper officials resulting in non-observance of the requirements of law or
rules to complete the appointment does not render the requirements
ineffective and unenforceable. A public official or employee who assumed
office under an incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for
the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably, under
the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer.
COSTIN vs. QUIMBO
120 SCRA 159
FACTS:
Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of
Abuyog, Leyte since Jan 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional
appointment as sergeant of police on Oct 15, 1958. On Nov 25, 1959, the
outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded him another promotional
appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested
and approved as required by law.
On Jan 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and 8 other
policemen and extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent
appointment as Chief of Police. Verras appointment was eventually
approved as permanent in accordance with Sec. 24 (b) of Republic Act
2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
On Jan 19, 1960, Lajer, et al filed an action for mandamus (Civil Case No.
2713) against the mayor, treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog,
contesting their separation from the service.
While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was a change in the
administration as a result of the 1963 local elections. The newly elected
mayor dismissed Verra and appointed petitioner Marcial Costin as chief of
police.
On Dec 29, 1964, Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo warranto with
mandamus against Costin, the mayor, and the treasurer, questioning the
legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed because
he was a civil service eligible and was in possession of a permanent
appointment attested by the CSC.
The mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by Lajer, et al prospered
and was appealed to the CA. On Jan 22, 1966, CA held that Lajer and 2
others were illegally removed from office and are entitled to
reinstatement with payment of the back wages.
Thus, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police on
April 1, 1966.
On Dec 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No.
3606, declaring Verra to be entitled to immediate reinstatement with
back salary.
Petitioners then brought this decision to the SC in a petition for review,
seeking its annulment or reversal.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


office with several other members of the police force. The validity of
Verras appointment, hinges on the legality of Lajers removal.
It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter
how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position, may be appointed
to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a nonvacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his
appointment validly terminated.
The lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been
permanently appointed to the position because no less than the CA had
declared that his predecessor, Lajer, was illegally terminated from office
and must be reinstated.
Verra argues that Lajers appointment was temporary and terminable at
the pleasure of the appointing power as it could not be considered final
or complete, not having been attested by the prov. treasurer in
accordance with Sec. 20 of RA 2260 and not having been certified by the
Commissioner of Civil Service as provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule VI of
the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of RA 2260.
However, said requirements could not be complied with because Lajer
who have been appointed on Nov. 25, 1959 was replaced on Jan 14,
1960 by the new mayor who appointed Verra. Citing Dichoso vs.
Valdepenas, SC stated that the incomingmayor should have awaited the
action of the prov. treasurer and the Commissioner, before appointing his
own protg. Thus, Verra cannot rely on the absence of an attestation
and certification because by the fact of Verras appointment, these
requirements could no longer be fulfilled.
GAYATAO vs. CSC
GR 93064 JUNE 22, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent Bayani Fernandez was holding the position of
Customs Operations Chief I (COC) in the Bureau of Customs in a
permanent capacity, and is assigned to the aircraft Operations Division.
Thereafter, Commissioner Mison reassigned him as Acting Chief of the
Export Division at the NAIA Customhouse. Meanwhile, when Executive
Order 127 was passed implementing the reorganization of Department of
Finance and Bureau of Customs, Commissioner Mison appointed
petitioner Agustina Gayatao, then a Supervising Customs Trade
Examiner, to the position of Customs Operations Chief at the NAIA
Customhouse while designating respondent Fernandez as Customs
Operations Asst. Chief of the Aircraft Operations Division. Aggrieved by
the actions of said commissioner, private respondent filed a letter of
protest on May 18,1988 before the Merit System Protection Board of
respondent CSC questioning the appointment of petitioner as COC and
his demotion to the position of COAC. In assailing the action of the
appointing authority, private respondent alleged in substance that (1) he
was unjustifiably demoted since he had been holding the contested
position prior to the reorganization; and (2) he is more qualified than
herein petitioner. CSC ruled in favor of respondent Fernandez and
revoked petitioners assignment.
Petitioners argument: Public respondent has no authority to revoke her
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified, for
that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in
the appointing authority. It has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.
It will be in excess of its power if it substitutes its will for that of the
appointing authority. The CSC not being the "appointing power" in
contemplation of law, cannot direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice

ISSUE:
WON appointment of respondent Verra appointment in the position of
Chief of Police was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal

ISSUE:
WON respondent commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the appointment of petitioner and ordering the appointment of
private respondent in her place

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that when respondent Verra was appointed chi
ef of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had just been dismissed from

HELD:
NO. The Court DISMISSED the case and AFFIRMED respondents
questioned resolutions since it found no reason to disturb the findings

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


and conclusions of the CSC that respondent Bayani Fernandez was
illegally demoted. As earlier noted, private respondent was holding the
position of Customs Operations Chief in a permanent capacity since 1984.
His non-reappointment to that position amounts to a removal without
cause from an office which has not been abolished nor reorganized.
Although the appointing authority (Mison) is afforded wide latitude in the
selection and appointment of employee(s), such exercise is however not
absolute.
It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of
government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as
the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and
safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due
process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned
resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained therein, is undubitably in
the performance of its constitutional.
LUEGO vs. CSC
143 SCRA 327
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11 in Cebu city. The
appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as
temporary subject to the final decision on the protest filed by private
respondent (Felicula Tuozo), and provided:
1. That there was no pending administrative case against petitioner
2. That no pending protest against the appointment
3. That no decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
appointment
Subsequently, the CSC found private respondent better qualified than
petitioner for the position. Thus, the CSC ordered that private respondent
be appointed as Administrative Officer 11 and that the appointment of
petitioner be revoked.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before
us to question that order and the private respondent's title.
ISSUE:
WON the CSC can disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground
that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on such
basis, order his replacement?
HELD:
No. (1) What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not
the appointment itself. What made the approval temporary was the fact
that it was made to depend on the conditions specified therein and on
the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.
The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the CSC to reverse it and call it
temporary.
The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change
the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as
"Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form.
(2) The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Laws.
The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer.
When the appointee is qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil
Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom,
which only the appointing authority can decide.
The Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all
the required conditions laid down by the law.
All the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved.
In the present case, the CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner and
the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. It
therefore had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for
that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested
solely in the city mayor.
CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ
GR 158737 AUGUST 31, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation
Office, DOTC, was promotionally appointed the position of Chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Annabella A.
Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with
the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her
protest against the promotional appointment of respondent claiming
among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory
requirement for said position. DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a
decision finding the protest without merit.
Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR.
Director of CSC-NCR requested ATO Executive Director Manuel Gilo to
comment on the appeal and to submit to the CSC-NCR the documents
pertinent thereto. But to no avail, hence, CSC-NCR rendered its decision
upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of
respondents appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.
CSC-NCR ruled that: the experience requirements of the approved ATO
Qualification Standards, Mr. dela Cruz work experience prior to his
appointment to the contested position did not concur therewith.
ATO Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the
order recalling respondents appointment. He subsequently filed a
Manifestation with Motion to Admit Addendum with the CSC-NCR.
Director Gilo argued that Calamba had no legal personality to file a
protest because she is not a qualified next-in-rank and that the protest
was filed out of time. He likewise asserted that respondent had fully met
the qualifications required of the position.
CSC-NCR Director Acebedo ruled that there is no cogent reason to disturb
earlier rulings on the matter. He also denied ATO Director Gilos request,
for lack of merit. But strangely, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted
Director Gilos request and affirmed the approval of respondents
appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. When asked by
the Calamba to clarify the conflicting rulings, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo
explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling is unofficial and inexistent.
However, they considered the questioning of Calamba as an appeal and
hence, ruled once again on the matter in favor of Calamba.
Respondent filed a petition for review with CA which granted said petition
and setting aside CSC Resolution and approving respondents
appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent failed to meet the four-year managerial and
supervisory experience required by ATO-DOTC Qualification Standards

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


HELD:
No. Petitioners insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year
managerial and supervisory experience requirement is misplaced. Said
Qualification Standards prescribed and/or four years of experience of
planning, organizing It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction
that the use of the term and/or means that the word and and the
word or are to be used interchangeably. The disjunctive term or in
this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or
that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a
prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify.
The rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory
requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an agencys
discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other
qualifications required by law. Promotions in the Civil Service should
always be made on the basis of qualifications, including occupational
competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and, not least important,
loyalty to the service.
It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to
appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper
authority. The appointment or promotion of employees, the
appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities
but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings
and seminars attended agency examinations and seniority.
Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing
authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should
not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.
AQUINO vs. CSC
GR 92403 APRIL 22, 1992
FACTS:
Victor Aquino was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the
Supply Office performing the duties and responsibilities of the Supply
Officer 1. He subsequently held the position of Clerk II in the Division of
City Schools of San Pablo City. After which, he was designated on July
20, 1984 as the Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office by the
DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.
Leonarda de la Paz was designated as Assistant to the Supply Officer
from 1976-1983. On Sept. 1986, the Division Superintendent City Schools
of San Pablo City issued a promotional appointment to Leonarda as
Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City. She assumed and
performed the duties and functions of the position and received the
compensation and benefits therefor. The Civil Service Regional Officer IV
approved her appointment as permanent provided there is no pending
protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority
that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment.
On Oct 1986, Aquino filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning
the qualification and competence of Leonarda for the position of Supply
Officer I. DECS Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing sustained the protest and
revoked the appointment of Leonarda on the ground that Aquino had an
advantage over Leonarda in terms of education, experience and training.
Leonarda filed her petition for reconsideration of the DECS decision but
was denied by Secretary Quisumbing. Aquino was issued a permanent
appointment as Supply Officer I by the DECS Regional Director and
assumed the duties and functions of the position. Leonarda filed a notice
of appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which upheld the
appointment of Aquino.
Leonarda appealed to the CSC which found merit in the appeal and
revoked the appointment of Aquino, restoring the appointment of
Leonarda. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of CSCs action on
Leonardas appointment.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


ISSUE:
WON CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the
appointment of Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San
Pablo City as it found Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.
HELD:
NO. Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment,
he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is
protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be
taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by
removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. When
the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has accepted the
office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to
the office becomes complete, and he can then be removed only in the
regular way. The appointing power cannot effect his removal indirectly by
rescinding or revoking his appointment after it is complete.
The moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised
and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the
said appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the
ground merely that the protestant is more qualified than the first
appointee. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is
allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.
While a protest is a mode of action that may be availed of by the
aggrieved party to contest the appointment made, the protest must be
"for cause". The concept of for cause would be the reasons which the
law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal,
that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in
the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. The ground relied upon by
Aquino in his protest that he is more qualified than Leonarda in terms of
education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning of
"for cause which would warrant the revocation of the appointment of
Leonarda.
Wherefore, the Secretary of DECS is directed to restore Leonarda to her
previously approved appointment as Supply Officer I.
ESPAOL vs. CSC
GR 85479 MARCH 3, 1992
FACTS:
The position of Regional Manager of the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) in Cauayan, Isabela became vacant. At that time,
Petitioner Perfecto Espaol was Chief of the Engineering Division, while
Private Respondent Orlando Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer. In the
organizational chart of NIA, the position of Chief Design Engineer is
below the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter is considered
next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager. Subsequently, Bulseco
was appointed to the vacant position of Regional Manager pursuant to
Resolution No. 5302-86 passed by Board of Directors, NIA. Petitioner
Espaol filed his protest with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPM)
alleging that petitioner is the employee next-in-rank and that he has
promotional priority over Bulseco. MSPM referred the protest to NIA
Administrator, who dismissed the same for lack of merit and on ground
that after evaluation, Bulseco has advantage over Espaol on the factors
of performance and potential. Petitioner appealed to MSPB, ruling that
Bulseco exceeded the qualifications required however, by virtue of
petitioners ranking in the organizational chart of NIA and pursuant to the
Rules of Promotion of the Civil Service Commission, Espaol should thus
be appointed to the position. Bulseco appealed to CSC, who reversed the
decision of MSPM.
ISSUE:
WON the appointment of Bulseco is valid
HELD:
Yes. Fundamental is the rule that appointment is an essential
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


appointee shall possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. CSC has acknowledged that both parties were
qualified for the position that recognition alone functus officio in the case
and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity
of the appointment made by the head of the office.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that both exceed the qualification
standards for appointment to the position of Regional Manager. It is
likewise not denied that, as originally found by the Administrator, Bulseco
is more qualified. The fact alone that both contestants meet the
minimum qualification required by law should have restrained MSPM from
acting on, much less in granting, the appeal of petitioner except of
course, to affirm the appointment of private respondent. Unfortunately,
MSPM opted to disregard the choice made by the appointing authority
and appointed Espaol instead, invoking the next-in-rank rule under PD
807 and CSC Resolution 83-343. The determination of who among
several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is
vested in the sound discretion of the department authority and not CSC.
Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to
the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the
office are satisfied. CSC cannot substitute its judgement for that of the
head of office in this regard.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC (1st)
174 SCRA 245 (1989)
FACTS:
The petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed the governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, represented by
its President, Salvador Estuye, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen since he had already been naturalized in the United States.
In his answer, the petitioner admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States, but justified his actions only insofar as he sought American
citizenship to protect himself against President Marcos influence. As an
additional point, the petitioner argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, it being a quo warranto petition that should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further added that the
League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and
so could not sue under the said section.
In their comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on 18 January 1988.
Moreover, they clarified that their petition in the Commission on Elections
was not really for quo warranto since they only wanted to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing as governor since his candidacy and election
being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Finally, even if
assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself,
who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity,
could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone as a private person.
ISSUE:
WON Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position as governor of Sorsogon
HELD:
No, he is not, because he was not a Filipino citizen at the time of the
elections. While the Court saw no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship, it cannot
agree to the argument that that as a consequence thereof, he was forced
to abandon his Filipino citizenship. There were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo and some of them subject to
greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary to resort to his
solution.

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Frivaldo likewise contended that he had already been repatriated as a
Filipino by reason of his participation in the elections of the Philippine
government, thereby automatically renouncing his American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. However, such laws do have an
effect on the petitioners citizenship under Philippine laws for it is clear
that the reacquisition of citizenship can only be done by three ways: (1)
direct act of Congress; (2) naturalization; and (3) repatriation. The
alleged forfeiture is between the petitioner and United States as his
adopted country; such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC (2nd)
257 SCRA 727 (1996)
FACTS:
Six years after the events of G.R. No. 87193, the petitioner Frivaldo
returned to the political slate and filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon for the 8 May 1995 elections. Opposed to
this, his opponent, Raul Lee, sought for a cancellation of his COC by
reason of him not being a Filipino citizen. This motion was granted by the
COMELEC, to which the petitioner would later appeal to, the latter citing
the previous case as a basis for its grant. A Motion for Reconsideration
was later filed but went unnoticed and Frivaldo continued his campaign
until he won the election for governor a second time, with the former
only being approved by the COMELEC after the petitioner was slated to
win.
Due to the decision of the COMELEC with regard to Frivaldos case, Raul
Lee demanded that he be proclaimed as governor of Sorsogon for having
garnered the second highest amount of votes next to the petitioner. Lee
was subsequently proclaimed the governor of Sorsogon.
In response to this, the petitioner filed with the Comelec a new petition
praying for the annulment of the 30 June 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation in his place. He alleged that on 30 June 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
in 17 August 1994 had been granted. As such, when the said order of the
COMELEC was released and received by Frivaldo, there was no more
legal impediment to his assumption to office.
ISSUE:
WON Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position as governor of Sorsogon
this time; what about Lees proclamation?
HELD:
Yes, he is. While the Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections, decisions that declare the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality because a person
may subsequently lose or reacquire his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by Philippine law for the purpose. It is due to this
case-to-case nature of citizenship proceedings that such cannot be
considered as res judicata for future cases on citizenship. Thus, at the
time of the elections, the petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen
by reason of his 30 June 1995 repatriation which retroacted to the date
of his filing of his application.
With his eligibility for the gubernatorial position dispensed with, now it is
time to deal with the COMELECs action to place Lee as governor. The
decision is clear: Lees proclamation is void beyond all doubt. Supported
by the cases of Labo v. COMELEC and Aquino v. COMELEC, they state
that a second-place candidate in an election remains just that a second
placer; he cannot become eligible for a position he did not win since the
sovereign will of the majority does not reflect such a conclusion.
Moreover, Lees trust in the case of Labo v. COMELEC is misplaced when
he said that the votes for Frivaldo were wasted votes since he was
ineligible during the election period for the fact that the nullification of
votes applies only if the candidate was known to be notoriously ineligible,
and yet the electorate nonetheless voted for him. This was not the case

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


with Frivaldo who had already become a Filipino citizen at the time of the
election.
MAQUERA vs. BORRA
GR L-24828 SEPTEMBER 7, 1965
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of case G.R. No. L-24761, "Leon G. Maquera vs. Juan
Borra, et al.," and case G.R. No. L-24828, "Felipe N. Aurea and Melecio
Malabanan vs. Commission on Elections," and it appearing:
1. That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to
the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate,
except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes
cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there
being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office;
2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the Commission
on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to require all candidates for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good
reputation, acceptable to the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and
P40,000.00, for President and Vice-President, respectively, and
P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of Representatives;
3. That, in consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the
aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections, every candidate
has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer
thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the
surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons
willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said
bonding companies;
4. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore, to prevent
or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore, cannot
file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the premium
charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary
for said counter-bond;
5. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of
disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices, persons
who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by law therefor,
cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the property essential for
the aforementioned counter-bond;
6. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the effect of
imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a
public office and that the people could validly vote for him;
7. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and
that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office; and
8. That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation
of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain
expenses or of compensating services given in connection with elections,
and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an extended
decision, to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional

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and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as
well as their representatives and agents, from enforcing and/or
implementing said constitutional enactment.
FLORES vs. DRILON
GR 104732 JUNE 22, 1993
CASE: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by
way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office.
FACTS:
Petitioners as taxpayers argue that Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions:
(1) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that no

elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any


capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure because the
City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices

(2) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the
President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to
the subject posts; and
(3) Sec. 261, par. (g) of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits the
appointment of new employees during the period of 45 days following a
regular election for the reason that the appointment of respondent
Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on
3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May
1992 Elections. The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches
upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts
HELD:
Yes, it violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.The section expresses the
policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person,
so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication
and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee,
like the head of an executive department described should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental duties or employment.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an
elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that
subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved
by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex
officio. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive of SBMA. His appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void. He may be considered a de facto officer.

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Petitioner then wrote the Calbayog City treasurer and requested that she
be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF),
which ruled that petitioner might be reinstated to her former position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon.

ADDITIONAL: Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on


the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests
in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under
the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. As may be defined,
an appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or persons
having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust.
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises discretion. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart
of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion
of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment
papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component of the appointing power.

Not fully satisfied with the MF decision, petitioner wrote the Ministry for a
reconsideration contending that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension on August 1, 1982.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint
an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. Consequently, when one individual can only meet
the qualifications prescribed by Congress, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled
with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing
authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.
Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such
supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is
no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

ISSUE:
WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment

Therefore, the appointment of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent


Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID and Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227 which states Provided, however, That for the first year

of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority is declared unconstitutional.
MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 FEBRUARY 9, 1989

DOCTRINE: Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to


public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
FACTS:
On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P3, 500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4, 892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of
the Sandiganbayan. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while
said motion was pending, on December 17, 1984, President Marcos
extended to her absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21,
1984.

The MF however referred petitioners letter to the Office of the President


through Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran who ruled that Salvacion A.
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of
the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her
former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is
liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

HELD:
In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned
her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
Full pardon relives the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the
finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however,
that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime
and the criminal. We do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he
should be treated as if he were innocent.
We are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon
does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense
of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardon.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
GR L-52245 JANUARY 22, 1980
SUMMARY OF DECISION:
Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages
are not so compulsorily retirable. But, in the case of a 65-year old
elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides that any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which
he has retired. Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed
insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners assail the validity of 7 of BP 51 which
mentioned that all local elective officials shall hold office for a term of six
(6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980 and
Sec 4 stating that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to
the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of
the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact.
ISSUE:
WON Dumlao is disqualified from running for the position of Governor
HELD:
YES. The SC ruled that the provision barring persons charged for crimes
may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against
them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office as null and void. Since it does not follow that an accusation
against them is tantamount to guilt thus justifying the disqualification.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard
of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class
can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes
of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be
that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local
officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service
may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials.
For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees,
aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

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But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, where Dumlao
falls, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that
inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither
does it permit of such denial similarly situated are similarly treated.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA
GR 156982 SEPTEMBER 8, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency
created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through
Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review
amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson,
three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries
of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex
officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the
three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994.
However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed
on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to
P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant
to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE:
WON representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio
members
HELD:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of
a new appointment, but by mere designation from the ex officio
members who were themselves also designated as such. The
representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were
not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore,
they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited
from receiving.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given
office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon
the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317
FACTS:
Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No.
284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in
addition to their primary positions.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations and receive corresponding
compensation thereof.
Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2)
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its
provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be
appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The
Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.
ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned
admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted
anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
HELD:
We rule in the negative. But what is indeed significant is the fact that
although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold
other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:
"They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other
words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only
to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the
broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive
Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government
and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


CHAPTERS III DE FACTO OFFICERS
MONROY vs. CA
20 SCRA 620
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections
was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on
September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate
of candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per resolution,1 approved the
withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario,
then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal
mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his
filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, held in the suit for
injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former
had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of
candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario
became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on
September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages,
the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September
21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner
must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages which was
eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing a
motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the
ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
had done what they had no jurisdiction to do review a resolution of
the Commission on Elections.
Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise
erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay
respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was
allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of
petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this he relies
solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who
had been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in
an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office
of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the
successful protestant. Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's
finding that he was a de facto officer when he continued occupying the
office of mayor after September 15, 1961.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner is de facto officer who can retain his salaries
and not pay Del Rosario
2. WON lower court and CA can review a resolution of Comelec
HELD:
That the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an
officer de factothe salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and
under color of title"that applies in the present case. The resulting
hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer
who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection
of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful
officers.7 The question of compensation involves different principles and
concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is
decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his
risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever
amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention
of the public office.

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The only interest and for that matter, jurisdiction, of the Commission on
Elections in this regard is to know who are the running candidates for the
forthcoming elections, for that affects the conduct of election. So when
petitioner withdrew the certificate announcing his candidacy for
Congressman, as far as the Commission could be concerned, petitioner
was no longer interested in running for that seat. The matter of his
having forfeited his present position and the possible legal effect thereon
by the withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the picture.
Hence, that purely legal question properly fell within the cognizance of
the courts.
TUANDA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
249 SCRA 342
FACTS:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of
Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension
of their arraignment.
Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were
designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural
labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of
office on February 16 and 17, 1989.
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for
review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined
Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and
Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental
for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.
The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda
and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully
causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.
Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the
Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC
rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations
issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian
itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the
city/municipality to warrant representation.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the
private respondents have rendered such services and the said
appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the
private respondents were entitled to the salaries attached to their office.
Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would
still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives
has made them de facto officers.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of
the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied
along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan
required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they
should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in
court today for the arraignment.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where
petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and
rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners
to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents
are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due
process.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


ISSUES:
1. WON private respondents are de facto officers
2. WON t the designation as sectoral representatives is legal
HELD:
We find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in
the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared
invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to
compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1.
2.
3.

There must be a de jure office;


There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and
There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified,


they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We
disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records,
from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a
petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were
received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight days
after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that
they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not
been established.
TAYKO vs. CAPISTRANO
53 PHIL 866
FACTS:
The petitioners allege that the respondent judge was appointed judge of
the CFI of Oriental Negros, to hold office during good behavior and until
he should reach the age of 65 years; that he now has reached that age
and, therefore, under the provisions of Sec. 148 of the Administrative
Code as amended, is disqualified from acting as a judge of the CFI.
The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests
and criminal cases for violation of the election law filed in the said court
arising from the election of June 5, 1928, the Hon. Sixto de la Costa was
duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge of the Province of Oriental
Negros. There was an understanding that de la Costa would hear and
take cognizance of all the election protests and criminal actions then
pending or to be filed arising from the said last general election, and that
Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary cases pending.
Notwithstanding the understanding, Capistrano tried and is still trying to
take cognizance of the election protests and criminal actions in said
court; declared in open court that he will try the criminal cases for the
reason that de la Costa refused to try the same on the ground that the
preliminary investigations were held before him, when, in truth and in
fact, de la Costa did not make the statement imputed to him and was
and is still willing to try the election protests and criminal cases for
violation of the election law pending in the court.
Petitioners allege that Capistrano is neither a judge de jure nor de facto,
but that he continues to hold the office of judge and pretends to be duly
qualified and acting judge of the said province; and that he has tried, and
continues to try, to act as such judge. Hence this petition is filed to
restrain him by order of the higher court.
ISSUE:
WON Capistrano is a de facto judge.
HELD:
YES. A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office
under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the
other hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without
any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure who is in
all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has
not expired.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Aside from the constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there
seems to be a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold
over after the conclusion of his term until the election and qualification of
a successor. When a judge in good faith remains in office after his title
has ended, he is a de facto officer.
Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before
us, we cannot escape the conclusion that, on the assumption that said
facts are true, Capistrano must be considered a judge de facto. His term
of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed,
and as such, good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding
over in good faith. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners that
the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered a regular
judge seems obviously erroneous.
In these circumstances, the remedy prayed for cannot be granted. The
rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial
function, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, nor by any
other, excepting in the form especially provided by law. A judge de facto
assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the
legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power
alone. Accordingly, it is well established principle, dating from the earliest
period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions that
the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
RODRIGUEZ vs. TAN
91 PHIL 724
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. claims that on December 30, 1947,
defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that
date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries,
emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to
P18,400; that protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment
declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that by
reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of
P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.
Plaintiff claims that, as defendant was found and by final judgment not to
have been entitled to the office of Senator, and, as such, he was during
the time he discharged that office a mere de facto officer, he should
reimbursed to the plaintiff the salaries and emoluments he has received
on the following grounds; (1) because the salaries and emoluments
follow and are inseparable from legal title to the office and do not
depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not; and (2)
because such a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the danger
and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into the office.
Defendant, Carlos Tan, was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in
the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those
who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he
took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of
the duties of the position.
He contends that the rule invoked by plaintiff runs counter to the
principle and rule long observed in this jurisdiction to the effect that one
who has been elected to an office, and has been proclaimed by the
corresponding authority, has a right to assume the office and discharge
its functions notwithstanding the protest filed against his election, and as
a necessary consequence he has likewise the right to collect and received
the salaries and emoluments thereunto appertaining as a compensation
for the salaries he has rendered. Also, that plaintiff already attempted to
seek the reimbursement of the salaries and emoluments in the protest he
filed against him Senate Electoral Tribunal constitutes a bar to his right to
collect the same in the present case.
ISSUE:
WON defendant, who had been ousted through an election protest a de
facto officer; WON the defendant can be ordered to reimburse the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to the
plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
HELD:
There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during
the time he held the office of Senator. A senator who had been
proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a result
of an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the
office of senator, and is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and
allowances which our Constitution provides for the position. This is simple
justice. The emolument must go to the person who rendered service
unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint
that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the
policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction
in connection with the provisions held by persons who had been elected
thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right
of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has
always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the
contrary rule has been upheld.
Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of the
plaintiff is the principle of res judicata. It appears that plaintiff had
already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the defendant
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on
the merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. In our opinion,
this silence may be interpreted as a denial of the relief. This is a matter
which can be considered as an incident to the power and authority given
to the Electoral Tribunal by our Constitution, whose jurisdiction over
election cases is ample and unlimited, and when the Tribunal chose to
pass sub silentio, or ignore altogether, this important claim, the clear
implication is that it deemed it unjustified.
REGALA vs. CFI of BULACAN
77 PHIL 684
FACTS:
Ceferino Regala was charged with murder. After plea, the fiscal
presented an amended information wherein two other persons were
included as co-accused. There was further allegation that the accused
and his co-defendants had conspired and confederated together and
mutually aided one another to commit the offense charged. The
amended information was admitted, following which the fiscal sought the
discharge of the two other co-defendants in order to utilize them as
prosecution witnesses. The court granted the discharge. His appeal
having been denied as well as his motion for reconsideration, Regala filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari. It was alleged that the admission of the
amendment was an abuse of discretion. He claims that the judge's order
of denying the motion for reconsideration is null and void because the
trial judge acted without jurisdiction, since his appointment has not been
approved by the Commission on Appointments (as published in a
newspaper).
ISSUE: WON the denial of motion for reconsideration by the judge is
valid
HELD:
Yes. All official actions of respondent judge as judge de facto, are valid
for all legal purposes and for all kinds. A de facto officer is one who is in
possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election
or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is
not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed to an office is subsequently
declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give
him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer
LINO LUNA vs. RODRIGUEZ
37 PHIL 136
FACTS:
These proceedings grew out of an election contest for the office of
governor of the Province of Rizal. [At said election, Lino Luna, Rodriguez

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


and de los Angeles were candidates for said office.]
remember:

Four dates to

October 5, 1916 the trial of the election contest terminated;


January 14, 1917 the decision was signed by Judge Alberto Barretto;
January 15, 1917 Barretto took oath of office as Secretary of
Finance;
January 17, 1917 the decision was received and file by the clerk of
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On January 20, 1917, the protestee (herein appellant) filed a motion to
declare null and void the said judgment. He asserted that the judge who
wrote the opinion was not judge of CFI of the Province of Rizal at the
time said opinion was filed with the clerk; that he had theretofore
vacated his office as judge of said court and had become Secretary of
Finance, in the executive department of the Government. These are the
facts which constituted the basis of the motion for a new trial presented
by the appellant in the court below and the facts which he desired an
opportunity to prove.
A copy of said motion was delivered to the attorney for the appellee on
the same day (January 20), and the same was denied by the Honorable
Manuel Vivencio del Rosario, auxiliary judge, on January 22, and notice of
said order was given to the respective parties on January 23. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the opinion of Barretto, which he signed on [January 14],
became the decision of the court on [January 17], the date on which it
was filed with the clerk of court; and whether or not [he] was either a
judge de jure or de facto at the time the [opinion] was promulgated as
the decision of the court
HELD:
No. Barretto was neither a judge de facto or de jure at the time the
opinion was promulgated.
In order that a court may promulgate a legal decision or judgment, two
things are essential and necessary: (a) There must be a court legally
organized or constituted; and (b) there must be a judge, or judges,
legally appointed or elected and actually acting, either de jure or de
facto. If either of these essentials is absent, then the judgment
promulgated is a nullity.
It is essential element to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that
he is actually acting under some color of right. If he has ceased to be
judge by actually accepting and entering into some other office and has
actually entered upon the performance of the duties of the other office, it
is difficult to understand how he can still be considered as actually
occupying and performing the duties of the office which he had
abandoned and vacated. An abandonment and a vacation of an office is
inconsistent and repugnant to the idea of actually continuing to perform
the duties of such office.
A judge de jure is one who is exercising the office of a judge as a matter
of right. He is an officer of a court which has been duly and legally
elected or appointed.
A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the
powers and duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of
judge under some color of right.
A judge de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer,
the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of
the office were exercised:
(a) Without a known appointment or election, but under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated
to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his
action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be;
(b) under color of a known or valid appointment or election, where
the officer has failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition, for example, a failure to take the
oath or give a bond, or similar defect;

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


(c)

under color of a known election or appointment, void because


the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public; and
(d) under color of an election, or appointment, by the same is
adjudged to be such.
From the foregoing definitions it will be seen that both de jure and de
facto officers must be in the actual exercise of the functions of the office
of judge, either by an absolute right or under a color of right. If at the
time the opinion is promulgated as a decision he is not acting either
under an absolute right or under a color of right, then he is acting neither
as a judge de jure nor de facto. In the present case it is charged and not
denied that the judge had ceased to be judge and was, at the time his
opinion was promulgated, actually in the exercise of another office,
outside of the judicial department, which he had accepted and upon the
performance of the duties of which he had duly entered.
For all of the foregoing reasons the judgment of the lower court is hereby
revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the record be
returned to the lower court with direction that it proceed with a new trial.
Additional info, just in case:
From G.R. No. L-13744,November 29, 1918, same petitioner and
respondents:
As a result of the count of the ballots, cast in the various municipalities
by the provincial board of inspectors, Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321
votes, Jose Lino Luna received 4,157 votes and Servando de los Angeles
received 3,576 votes. Servando de los Angeles did not protest the
election. From all of the foregoing, the total votes of Eulogio Rodriguez
must be reduced by 50 votes, leaving him a total of 4,271 only, or a clear
majority of 114 votes.
GARCHITORENA vs. CRESCINI
37 PHIL 675
CASE: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Ambos Camarines in an election contest.
FACTS:
An election was held in Ambos Camarines for governor, and other
provincial and municipal officers on July 6, 1916. Andres Garchitorena,
Manuel Crescini, Engracio Imperial, and Francisco Botor were candidates
for the office of governor. Immediately upon notice of proclamation of
winners, Andres Garchitorena presented a protest against said election,
alleging that many frauds and irregularities had been committed in
various municipalities of said province. Said protest was filed in the Court
of First Instance in the said province. After trial, Judge Mina filed a
decision with the clerk of court on April 27, 1917.
Appellant Crescini contended that at the time the said decision was filed
with the clerk, Judge Mina, the judge who prepared and filed it was not a
judge of the court, neither de jure nor de facto. Crescini said that the
judge who filed the decision was one of the auxiliary judges of the Court
of First Instance but on January 27, 1917, he was appointed as Director
of the Bureau of Lands, took the oath of such office and began to draw
his salary as such on March 28, 1917. Crescini added that since a certain
Candelario Borja, having been appointed auxiliary judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ambo Camarines on March 16, 1917, the decision of the
former judge should be considered null and void because the judge
cannot be considered a judge de jure/de facto.
ISSUE:
WON the judge who filed the decision can be considered a judge de
jure/de facto
HELD:
No, the judge who filed the decision cannot be considered a judge de
jure/de facto. The said judge had ceased to be auxiliary judge of said
province on March 28, 1917 when he took his oath of office for the

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position of Director of Lands. He cannot be considered a judge de jure
for the reason that another judge was actually acting in his place and
stead and had been for nearly a month prior to promulgation of the
decision in question on April 27, 1917. Neither can he be considered a
judge de facto for the reason that there was a de jure judge actually
discharging the functions of the office in question. THERE CANNOT BE A
DE FACTO JUDGE WHEN THERE IS A DE JURE JUDGE IN THE ACTUAL
PERFORMANCE of the duties of the office. In order to be a de facto
judge, he must still be acting under some color of right. He cannot be
actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased to be judge
and has actually vacated office by the acceptance of another office.
SC: The decision of the judge was revoked. The records of the case
returned to the court
SOLIS vs. CA
38 SCRA 53
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Solis and several other co-accused were indicted,
tried and found guilty of malversation of public funds. All the accused
were summoned to appear for promulgation of the judgment on 19 June
1954, but no court proceeding was had on that day, as the President of
the Philippines had declared it a special public holiday.
On 20 June 1954, Republic Act No. 1186, which abolished all existing
positions of Judges-at-Large, took effect without Executive approval.
On 21 June 1954, the defendants appeared before the court; this time,
the court was presided over by Honorable Perfecto R. Palacio, judge of
another sala of the court. Judge Palacio promulgated the judgment of
Judge Leuterio, against the objections of herein petitioner.
Petitioner Solis appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals and he
raised in issue and attacked the validity of the promulgation of the
judgment of the lower court, for having been made by another judge
after the incumbency of the judge who rendered it had ceased.
The Solicitor-General's brief, in the Court of Appeals, agreed that the
promulgation was illegal and void. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision.
ISSUE:
WON the decision by Judge Palacio on the case held by judge Leuterio is
valid.
HELD:
Judgment of trial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated one (1) day
after his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished by Republic Act 1186.
The judgment is, therefore, void sincethe decision is promulgated after
the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judge of the
court where he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had
been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and
accepted another office; or when the term of office of the judge has
ended; or when he has left the Bench; or after the judge had vacated his
post in view of the abolition of his position as Judge-at-Large under
Republic Act 1186; or after the cessation or termination of his
incumbency as such judge.
Rules of Court, allowing the dispensing with the presence of the judge in
the reading of a sentence, applies only to the physical absence of the
judge, being construed to mean that the decision of the judge may be
promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of
that court.
A sentence has been set aside where the judge who presided in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had been extended an ad interim
appointment to the Court of First Instance of Manila, to which position he
qualified before the judgment was filed with the Clerk of the former
court. Nullity likewise attached to a dismissal order when the temporary
assignment of the judge that rendered it had been terminated before the
order was issued, because a new judge for the same court qualified.

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The Court of Appeals erred in considering that the contested judgment of
the Court of First Instance to be valid is that "since the approval of
Republic Act 1186, effective 20 June 1954, was not yet publicly or
generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered
as a judge de facto of said court and the promulgation of his appealed
decision on said date is valid and legally effective.
In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, a judge de facto was defined as one
who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is
not a good officer in point of law because there exists some defect in his
appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular
timebut it is "essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that
he is actually acting under some color of right".
In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or
exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated as he
had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another
presiding judge. It follows that the Court of Appeals' decision can not
stand, there being no validly promulgated judgment of the trial court
from which an appeal could be taken. Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur are hereby voided and set aside. The record of the criminal cases are
hereby ordered returned to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
for new adjudication by the judge presiding therein, in accordance with
the evidence already introduced, and for further proceeding conformable
to law.
TOMALI vs. CSC
GR 110598 DECEMBER 1, 1994
FACTS:
On 01 July 1990, petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development
Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs
("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director
Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the
office four months later, or on 01 November 1990, at which time, the
appointment had not yet been transmitted to the Civil Service
Commission ("CSC") for approval.
On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman,
revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed
private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in question (DMO
II). Petitioner, on 29 July 1991, sent public respondent OMA a letter
protesting her replacement. On 01 August 1991, the Chief of the Human
Resources Management Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner
the disapproval/expiration of her appointment. Forthwith, private
respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and functions
of DMO II.
On 12 August 1991, petitioner reiterated her protest. The Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision, dated 23
July 1992, dismissing the protest/complaint for lack of merit. MSPB held:
Glaring is the fact that protestant's appointment to the contested position
was not approved by the Civil Service Commission, hence, incomplete. In
this regard, Section 11, Rule V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and
explicit. Said provision reads, thus:

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That being so, the proper appointing authority, in this case, the OMA
Executive Director may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cancel or
revoke the said incomplete appointment and appoint another person.
The circumstance showing that the non-approval of protestant's
appointment was due to the belated transmittal thereof to this
Commission is of no consequence nor improve her lot as a holder of an
incomplete appointment. There is no showing that the non-submission
was motivated by bad faith, spite or malice or at least attributable to the
fault of the
newly-installed OMA Executive Director.
Her request for reconsideration having been denied on 27 November
1992, petitioner appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-945, dated
12 March 1993, the Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant recourse to this Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner was properly appointed
2. WON Petitioner was a De Facto Officer
HELD:
1. No. We fail to see any merit in the petition. An appointment to a
position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for
approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed
appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules
pertinent to the process of appointment are followed; thus:
An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be
submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main,
whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and
whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are
followed; thus:
Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission
shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen,
and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing
authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall
remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should
take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority
for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided,
finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all
officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the
approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it
by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise
the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, among other things,
provides:

Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission, within thirty


(30) days from the date of issuance, which shall be the date appearing
on the face of the instrument, shall be ineffective.

Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty


(30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to
the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. . . . .

As applied to the case of the herein protestant, it appears that the latter
has no basis in law to cling to the contested position. Her prior
continuous stay in office was at most by mere tolerance of the appointing
authority. As her appointment is incomplete for lack of the requisite
approval of the Civil Service Commission or its proper Regional or Field
Office, no right to security of tenure as guaranteed by law and the
Constitution attaches thereto or for incumbent to invoke. . . . .

Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil


service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the
favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such
approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be
permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can
still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an
appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be
precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.

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Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed
the position four months after her appointment was issued or months
after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by
operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990,
but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact
which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified
considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her
appointment and the date of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as
to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807.
It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director,
therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not
be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better
qualified for the position.
The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a
discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according
to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on
record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored
private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an
arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.
In sum, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents in their questioned dismissal of petitioner's protest.
2. Yes. Petitioner faults public respondents for their failure to have her
appointment properly attended to and timely acted upon and for, in
effect, allowing her in the meanwhile to assume the office in question.
In Favis vs. Rupisan, (17 SCRA 190, 191) this Court has said: "The
tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in
the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not
render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval of the
Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective and
unenforceable. The employee, whose appointment was not approved,
may only be considered as a de facto officer."
Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed
the position four months after her appointment was issued or months
after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by
operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990,
but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact
which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified
considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her
appointment and the date of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as
to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807. When private respondent Lucman was thus
appointed DMO II on 16 July 1991, petitioner could not be said to have
theretofore earned a valid tenure to the same position.
FLORES vs. DRILON
GR 104732 JUNE 22, 1993
CASE: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by
way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office.
FACTS:
Petitioners as taxpayers argue that Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions:
(1) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that no

elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any


capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure because the
City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices

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(2) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the
President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to
the subject posts; and
(3) Sec. 261, par. (g) of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits the
appointment of new employees during the period of 45 days following a
regular election for the reason that the appointment of respondent
Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on
3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May
1992 Elections. The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches
upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts
HELD:
Yes, it violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.The section expresses the
policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person,
so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication
and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee,
like the head of an executive department described should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental duties or employment.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an
elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that
subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved
by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with
the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex
officio. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive of SBMA. His appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void. He may be considered a de facto officer.
ADDITIONAL: Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on
the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests
in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under
the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. As may be defined,
an appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or persons
having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust.
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises discretion. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart
of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion
of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment
papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint
an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. Consequently, when one individual can only meet
the qualifications prescribed by Congress, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled
with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing
authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.
Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such
supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is
no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
ON BEING OFFICER DE FACTO:
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective
official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other
government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor
remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary,
since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view
of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be
confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the
sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only
after they have been appointed to another government office, while
other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they
can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well
as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that
ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. "
. . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that
a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a
provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from
accepting or holding a second office and to render his election or
appointment to the latter office void.
"Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one
office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office,
either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to
incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that
any attempt to hold the second is void.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official
are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto
officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office
were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being
unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or

appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the


same is adjudged to be such.

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which may have been received

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be retained by
him.
The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident,
other matters affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well as
the appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no
longer be discussed.
In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen.
Sotero Laurel which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648,
precursor of R.A. 7227, when he articulated
". . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of Olongapo
City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are creating; (much)
as I, myself, would like to because I known the capacity, integrity,
industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we would like to
give him this terrific, burdensome and heavy responsibility, we cannot do
it because of the constitutional prohibition which is very clear. It says:
'No elective official shall be appointed or designated to another position
in any capacity.'"
For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain
amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the
waves." 30 One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence,
i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by
legitimate needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or
occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities . . . .
Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political
expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change."
Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no
choice.
Therefore, the appointment of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent
Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID and Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227 which states Provided, however, That for the first year

of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority is declared unconstitutional.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by


respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in
the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby
UPHELD.
MENZON vs. PETILLA
197 SCRA 317
DOCTRINE: Even granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the
petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to
compensation. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto
doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly
iniquitous to now deny petitioner the salary due him for the services he
actually rendered.
FACTS:
On February 16, 1988, the Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of
Local Government (DLG) designated the Vice Governor, Leopoldo Petilla,
as the Acting Governor of Leyte because no Governor yet has been
proclaimed in Leyte. On March 25, 1988, petitioner Aurelio Menzon, a
senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), was also
designated by Secretary Santos as the Acting Vice Governor of the same
province. Menzon took his oath of office before Senator Romulo on March
29, 1988.
The Provincial Administrator then inquired from Undersecretary Jacinto
Rubillar of DLG about the legality of the appointment of petitioner as VG
of Leyte. The Usec in his reply said that B.P 337 has no provision as
regards succession in the Office of the VG in case of a temporary
vacancy; hence, the appointment of petitioner as VG is not necessary.
Consequently, the SP, in a special session, issued Resolution No. 505,
which invalidated the appointment of petitioner Menzon as VG of Leyte.

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Petitioner Menzon then asked the opinion of DLG Usec Rubillar who again
mentioned BP 337 as regards succession but said that the designation is
merely an imposition of additional duties to be performed by the
designee in addition to the official functions attached to his office.
Furthermore, the necessity of designating an official to temporarily
perform the functions of a particular public office, would depend on the
discretion of the appointing authority (in this case the Secretary of DLG)
and the prevailing circumstances in a given area and by taking into
consideration the best interest of public service. On the basis of the
foregoing and considering that the law is silent in case of temporary
vacancy, in the Office of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the
peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral
controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls
for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor
temporarily.
As a result of the pronouncement of Usec Rubillar, the Regional Director
of Region 8 wrote Acting Governor Petilla asking the latter that
Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified
accordingly by recognizing the validity of the designation of Acting VG
Menzon, including the payment of the latters salary, if ever he was
deprived of such.
Acting Governor Petilla did not heed the directive of the Regional
Director. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of
Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of
the province of Leyte.
During the pendency of the petition, on May 16, 1990, the provincial
treasurer of Leyte allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as
acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17, 710.00, for the
actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor.
On September 6, 1990, respondent Petilla, by virtue of the above
resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay
back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation
which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Menzon is a de facto officer, hence, entitled for
compensation during the time he was the Acting VG
HELD:
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of
succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed
in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was
a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes.
The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary
appointment.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary
attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The
compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, following
the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double
compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his
existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
Office of the Vice-Governor.
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint
the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto
officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the ViceGovernor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the
records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the
President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his
oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents
themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and
dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No.
505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the Acting
Vice-Governor that the validity of his appointment was made an issue
and the recognition withdrawn.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to
the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people
of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto
doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be
highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the
services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the
province of Leyte.
SAMPAYAN vs. DAZA
213 SCRA 807
FACTS:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional
District of Northern Samar, filed the instant Petition for Prohibition
seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman
of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder
and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16,
1974. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration,
renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 [Omnibus Election Code] and Section 18,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. On April 10, 1992, respondent
Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is a
permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded
a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 an evidenced by a
letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived his status when he
returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. According to respondents
Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, Mr.
Jose Mari Tuao, an OIC of the General Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda
G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and
Commission on Audit, if indeed Congressman Daza is a greencard holder
and a permanent resident of the United States of America, then he
should be removed from his position as Congressman. However, they
opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct
status as a greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the petition,
petitioners' prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the
House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
2. WON a de facto officer is entitled to receive emoluments
HELD:
1. First, this case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the
manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to
unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of
his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of
its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the
election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within
ten days after Daza's proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no
longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A
writ or prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already
consummated.Fourth, as a de factopublic officer, respondent cannot be
made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his
acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


2. YES as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered
GENERAL MANAGER, PPA vs. MONSERATE
GR 129616 APRIL 17, 2002
FACTS:
Julieta Monserate, respondent, was a Finance Officer in 1980. In the
early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization,
respondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II of the
Resource Management Division. Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General
Manager of the PPA, appointed respondent to the position. On even date,
respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. On July
8, 1988, the CSC approved her appointment.
Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked
second to respondent, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals
Board, protesting against respondent's appointment. The PPA Appeals
Board, in a Resolution dated August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and
rendered ineffective respondent's appointment on the basis of
unexplained grounds. On October 11, 1988 Anino was appointed to the
position.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an
appeal/request for clarification. This PPA Order officially reassigned her to
the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner
Anino's former position and was lower than her previous position as
Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division Manager.
Respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally protesting against
petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning the
propriety of the Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. This appeal
remained pending with the CSC for more than six (6) years despite
respondent's requests for early resolution. In the meantime, she assumed
the position of Administrative Officer. Eventually, the CSC dismissed
respondent's appeal.
Respondent appealed before the Court of Appeals which nullified the twin
Resolutions of the CSC. It ruled that the August 11, 1988 Resolution of
the PPA Appeals Board was not supported by evidence and that the same
was irregularly issued due to lack of proper notice to respondent with
respect to the Board's proceedings. It concluded that her reassignment f
was a demotion violative of her constitutional right to security of tenure
and due process.
Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on August
14, 1997 the present petition. On November 30, 1997, petitioner Anino
retired from the government service.
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Anino was valid
RULING: NO.The Supreme Court cannot hold the validity to the August
11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which "upholds the
appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resource Management Division
Manager." But how can it uphold his appointment when he was not yet
appointed then? It bears stressing that he was appointed on a much later
date - October 21, 1988, or more than two (2) months after August 11,
1998 when the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was issued. Stated
differently, the PPA Appeals Board could not uphold an appointment
which was not yet existing.
Equally questionable are the grounds for respondent's demotion stated in
the August 11, 1998 Resolution: "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2)
CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service
Eligibility." These grounds are incomprehensible for lack of discussion or
explanation by the Board to enable respondent to know the reason for
her demotion. Likewise, the SC upholds the CA' finding that the August
11, 1998 PPA Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of evidence and
proper notice to respondent.
Respondents demotion, was tantamount to a revocation of her
appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional
rights to security of tenure and due process. Her position as Manager
II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction,
"an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and
void ab initio."
NOTE: De Facto Officer Backwages

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


While petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested position is void, he
is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his
incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office
and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or
election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, the SC ruled that a rightful incumbent of
a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though the de
facto officer occupied the office in good faith and under color of title.
A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk
and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he
received during the period of his wrongful tenure.
In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, the Court
allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services
rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus in cases where
there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto,
is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office."
This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in
view of its peculiar circumstances. This matter becomes controversial
because respondent assumed the lower position of Administrative Officer
during the pendency of her protest against petitioner Anino's
appointment to the contested position. Also, petitioner Anino retired from
the service on November 30, 1997.
Respondent has been receiving the emoluments, salary and other
compensation attached to her current. While her assumption to said
lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments
cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful
office, she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was
unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay
differentials or the difference between the salary rates for the positions
of Manager II and Administrative Officer.
The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time
he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his
retirement.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317
FACTS:
Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No.
284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in
addition to their primary positions.
Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations and receive corresponding
compensation thereof.
Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2)
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its
provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be
appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The
Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.
ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned
admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted
anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
HELD:
We rule in the negative. But what is indeed significant is the fact that
although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold
other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:
"They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do
so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other
words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only
to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the
broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive
Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government
and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court
hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government Luis
Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of
Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo
Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as
herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other
named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as
they are no longer occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is
no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto,
is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations
attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by
the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to
pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
MALALUAN vs. COMELEC
GR 120193, MARCH 6, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were
both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May
11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. But, on May
22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The
trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluan's protest expenses but
also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On February
3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the
COMELEC. Just a day thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order,
dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of
P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, and exercised the powers and functions
of said office. The First Division of the COMELEC ordered Malaluan to
vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private
respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality.
Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence.
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected
in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus,
has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioners right to
the mayoralty seat in this municipality because expiration of the term of
office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the
same moot and academic. However, question as to damages is ripe for

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


adjudication. Claimed as part of the damages to which Evangelista is
allegedly entitled to is the salary that would have accrued to him had
there been no execution of the RTCs decision pending appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Malaluan is a de facto officer.
HELD:
Yes. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his
subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official
who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral
contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the
duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and
allowances legally provided for the position. We ratiocinated in the case
of Rodriguez vs. Tan that:
This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of
events. This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who
rendered the service unless the contrary is provided. There is no
averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating
his election.This is the policy and the rule that has been followed
consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with positions held by
persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result
of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation
during their incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot recall of
any precedent wherein the contrary rule has been upheld.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, however, Justice Padilla
equally stressed that, while the general rule is that the ousted elective
official is not obliged to reimburse the emoluments of office that he had
received before his ouster, he would be liable for damages in case he
would be found responsible for any unlawful or tortious acts in relation to
his proclamation. We quote the pertinent portion of that opinion for
emphasis:
Nevertheless, if the defendant, directly or indirectly, had committed
unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his proclamation as
senator-elect, when in truth and in fact he was not so elected, he would
be answerable for damages. In that event the salary, fees and
emoluments received by or paid to him during his illegal incumbency
would be a proper item of recoverable damage.
We deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper
and lacking legal sanction. Respondent COMELEC ruled that inapplicable
in the instant case is the ruling in Rodriguez vs. Tan because while in that
case the official ousted was the one proclaimed by the COMELEC, in the
instant case, petitioner was proclaimed winner only by the trial court and
assumed office by virtue of an order granting execution pending
appeal. Again, respondent COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying
the award of damages, that since petitioner was adjudged the winner in
the elections only by the trial court and assumed the functions of the
office on the strength merely of an order granting execution pending
appeal, the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a
usurper.
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is
one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the
petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election
thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC
that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages
of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in
electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize
this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less
a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of
Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are
undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be
a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and
had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled
to the emoluments of the office.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


I.

ELECTION LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK

MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC


GR 157013 July 10, 2003
DOCTRINE:
1. For election purposes, residence means the domicile of the person.
2. Domicile refers to the place where one has the intention to return
to
3. Residence refers to two qualifications: residence in the Philippines;
residence in the locality where he will vote
4. Immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for the purposes
of voting

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


(2) Sec. 18.5.
Yes. The phrase in the provision proclamation of winning candidates
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the
presidency and vice-presidency. The assailed provision appears to be
repugnant to Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution only insofar as it
disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the President and Vice-President. It
also clashes with the said constitutional provision, which provides that
the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be
certified by the Board of Canvassers to Congress. Sec. 18.5 allows
COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to the Congress
to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and proclaim the
winners for the said positions. However, with respect to the authority
given to the COMELE to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators
and party-list representatives, constitutionality is upheld.

FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo Macalintal, a lawyer, filed an action for the declaration
of three (3) provisions of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) as unconstitutional. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of
Section 5(d) of the said Act, allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere
act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, as violating the residency requirement in Sec. 1 Art. V of
the Constitution. The said constitutional provision requires voters to be
a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where
he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election.

(3) Sec. 19 & 25.


Yes. The Congress, by vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, revise the IRR for RA 9189, went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority and trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of COMELEC. Moreover, Sec. 17 of the said Act, requires
the review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve
or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed. Sec.
17 was also declared unconstitutional by the Court.

The petitioner also assailed the validity of Sec. 18.5 RA 9189 which
empowers the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives including the President and VicePresident as it violates the constitutional mandate under Sec 4, Art VII
of the Constitution that the winning candidates for the President and
Vice President shall be proclaimed by Congress.

DOCTRINE: The pilot-testing of the PCOS (Precinct Count Optical Scan)


in the 2007 national elections, in the areas specified in RA 8436, is not an
absolute must for the machine's use in the 2010 national elections, it
being sufficient that the capability of the chosen AES (Automated Election
System) has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a foreign
jurisdiction. COMELEC has adopted a rigid tehnical evaluation mechanism
to ensure compliance of the PCOS with the minimum capabilities
standards cited in Sec. 7, RA 8436, as amended, and its determination in
this regard must be respected absent proof of grave abuse of discretion.

The last provisions assailed were Sec. 19 & 25 of RA 9189, both of


which allow Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. IX-A of the Constitution,
which grants COMELEC independence. Petitioner submit that the creation
of the said Committee and granting it the aforementioned powers
intrudes into the independence of COMELEC which is independent from
the Executive and Legislative branches of the government; that only
COMELE may promulgate rules which may be revised or modified by
majority of its members; and should such rules violate any law, only the
Court has the power to review the same. COMELEC agreed with the
petitioners and assailed Sec 17 of the said law as well as it allows the
Commission to authorize voting by mail subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee, under certain conditions.
ISSUES:
WON the assailed provisions of RA 9189 are unconstitutional
HELD:
(1) Section 5(d).
No. Section 2, Art. V of the Constitution mandates the Congress to
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Sec. 5 of RA
9189 and Sec. 1, Art V of the Constitution must be harmonized with
Section 2, Art. V. Under our election laws and in Ong vs Republic, the
court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals permanent
residence. Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
Residence in Sec. 5(d) refers to two qualifications: residence in the
Philippines and residence where he will vote. The vote of the person
who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the
place of his domicile.

ROQUE vs. COMELEC


GR 188456 September 10, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and
concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelecs award of the
2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint
venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic), and to permanently
prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or
implementing the corresponding contract-award.
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436
authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the
national and local elections. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA
9369 was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. However,
the AES was never utilized. In early March 2009, the Comelec released
the Request
for
Proposal (RFP), also
known
as Terms
of
Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting, counting,
transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010
Synchronized National and Local Elections. To address the possibility of
systems failure, the RFP required interested bidders to submit, among
other things: a continuity plan and a back-up plan. Each participating
bidder shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope. Among the
submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and
Smartmatic. Said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation
project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. The bid of
the JV of TIM-Smartmatic was declared as the single complying
calculated bid. In the post-qualification screening, the demo systems
presented passed all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in
the [RFP] with 100% accuracy rating. Comelec authorized the issuance of
the notice of award and notice to proceed in favor of the winning joint
venture. On July 10, 2009, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as
provider, executed a contract for the lease of goods and services under
the contract for the amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48. On July 9, 2009,
petitioners interposed the instant recourse.

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According to petitioners, no pilot test of the PCOS technology
Smartmatic-TIM offered has been undertaken; hence, the Comelec
cannot conduct a nationwide automation of the 2010 polls using the
machines thus offered. Hence, the contract award to Smartmatic-TIM
with their untested PCOS machines violated RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, which mandates that with respect to the May 2010 elections and
onwards, the system procured must have been piloted in at least 12
areas referred to in Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as amended. What is more,
petitioners assert, private respondents PCOS machines do not satisfy the
minimum system capabilities set by the same law envisaged to ensure
transparent and credible voting, counting and canvassing of votes
ISSUES:
1. WON pilot testing is required
2. WON PCOS Meets Minimum Capabilities Standards
3. WON there is abdication of Comelecs Mandate and Responsibilty
HELD:
1. NO. The AES to be used in the 2010 elections need not have been
used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its capability
need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the
success and capability of the PCOS may be in an electoral exercise in a
foreign jurisdiction. As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system
had been successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in
foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada; and New York, USA, albeit
Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA
9369 does not call for the winning bidder of the 2010 automation
project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign electoral
exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law
incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic
country or with a topography or a voting population similar to or
approximating that of the Philippines. At any event, any lingering
doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010
regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES
should be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of RA 9525, in
which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010
elections. In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional
polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The
2008 ARMM elections may be treated as substantial compliance with
the "pilot test" requirement.
2. YES. Petitioners suggest that the PCOS system offered and accepted
lacks the features that would assure accuracy in the recording and
reading of votes, as well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing,
electronic transmission, storage results and accurate ballot counting.
The Court is fairly satisfied that the Comelec has adopted a rigid technical
evaluation mechanism, a set of 26-item/check list criteria, to ensure
compliance with the above minimum systems capabilities. (**See full text
if interested with the list.) TIM/Smartmatics proposed systems and
machines PASSED all the end-to-end demo tests using the
aforementioned 26-item criteria, inclusive of the accuracy rating test of at
least 99.955%.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


should the bidder be a joint venture. The RFP also provides that the
automation project shall be under COMELEC supervision and control. The
entire processes of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and
canvassing of votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and
officials, and their performance, completion and final results according to
specifications and within the specified periods shall be the shared
responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER.
BANAT vs. COMELEC
GR 177508 August 7, 2009
DOCTRINE: Every election statute is deemed constitutional and the
presumption always favors the validity of the statute assailed. Those who
assail the validity of the statute should prove a clear and unequivocal
breach andnot merely a speculative or argumentative one; otherwise the
petition must necessarily fail.
FACTS:
The petitioner, the BANAT party-list, assails some provisions of RA 9369
and asks for a temporary restraining order to be issued against COMELEC
to prevent it from implementing the statute. In their petition, they posit
that the statute is unconstitutional since the statute itself contains
provisions which are not germane RA 9369 since it speaks of poll
automation, yet Sec. 34, 37, 38, and 43 speak of devices and methods
for manual canvassing of election returns matters which it claims are
not embraced within the title of the statute itself.
In addition to the abovementioned reason, BANAT additionally argues
that Sections 37 and 38 impairs the powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal since under the amended
provisions, Congress, in the case of the election of a President and VicePresident; and the COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, may exercise the functions of the PET and SET, respectively,
when they are given the power to entertain pre-proclamation cases.
Since they undermine and encroach upon the independence and
jurisdiction of the PET and SEC, the law must be declared
unconstitutional.
Likewise, BANAT argues that Section 43 of the law is unconstitutional
because it gives the different prosecuting arms of the government equal
status as COMELEC in dealing with election-related offenses. Moreover,
Section 34, which fixes the per diem of poll watchers, is unconstitutional
because it violates the freedom of the parties to enter into a contract by
fixing the allowance at PHP 400.00.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9369 is unconstitutional
HELD:
No, it is constitutional. The title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but
with everything related to its purpose encouraging the conduction of
transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.

3. NO(ne). Petitioners would have the Comelec Smartmatic-TIM


Corporation automation contract nullified since, in violation of the
Constitution, it constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll bodys
constitutional mandate for election law enforcement.

On the matter of Sections 37 and 38, Congress and the COMELEC do not
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no
conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en
bancandof the PET and the SET are exercised on different occasions and
for different purposes.

SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater


track record in automated elections, shall be in charge of the
technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and
hardware. SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for
preventing and troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during
the elections. (Emphasis added.)

The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the President or Vice President whilethe SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate. Their jurisdiction can only be
invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial
candidates have been proclaimed.

The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in


charge of the technical aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does
not translate to ceding control of the electoral process to Smartmatic. It
bears to stress that the aforesaid designation of Smartmatic was not
plucked from thin air, as it was in fact an eligibility requirement imposed,

On the other hand, under Section 37 and 38 of RA 9369, Congress and


the COMELEC en banccan determine only the authenticity and due
execution of the Certificates of Canvass and Congress and the COMELEC
en banccan exercise this power only before the proclamation of the
winning presidential, vice-presidential, and senatorial candidates.

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As to the validity of Sections 43, it is valid. The the grant of the exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative
enactment. As such, should the legislature see fit, it can freely amend the
provisions of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the same act
would not violate the Constitution.
Lastly, as to Section 34, the same is valid as well. There is no violation of
the non-impairment clause because such rule is limited in application only
to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging
or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. In fixing the per
diem of poll watchers, there has yet to be a contract which could be
enforced since RA 9369 was enacted three months before any contract
for poll watching was even done.
Even assuming that there already was a contract formed prior to the
election period, the police power is superior to the non-impairment
clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. RA
9369 is an exercise of such power since it promotes the welfare of poll
watchers, a position invested with public interest.
CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE vs.
COMELEC
GR 189546 September 21, 2010
DOCTRINE: Comelec shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political party or groups
which may conduct their own review thereof.
FACTS:
May 26, 2009 Petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance
(CenPEG), an NGO, wrote respondent COMELEC requesting:
1. a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
programs,
2. the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS)
programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional
canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and
3. the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs called Data
Capturing System (DCS) utilities. CenPEG invoked RA 9469, Sec 12.
Comelec granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and CCS,
but denied that for the DCS, since DCS was a system used in processing
the lists of voters which is not part of the voting, counting and
canvassing systems implemented by RA 9369. If the source code of DCS
were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change the program
and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates or parties.
However, Comelec did not release the source code of PCOS and CCS and
so CenPEG asked once more together with other documents, programs
and diagrams related to the Automated Election System (AES). Comelec
replied that the source code CenPEG requested did not yet exist because
: 1) that it had not yet received the baseline source code of the provider,
Smartmatic, since payment to it had been withheld as a result of a
pending suit; 2) its customization of the baseline source code was
targeted for completion in November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of
R.A. 9369, the customized source code still had to be reviewed by an
established international certification entity, which review was expected
to be completed by the end of February 2010; and 4) only then would
the AES be made available for review under a controlled environment.
Rejecting the excuse, CenPEG filed a petition for mandamus to compel
Comelec to make the source codes available. Comelec contended that
CenPEG did not have a clear, certain and well-defined right that was
enforceable by mandamus because Comelecs duty to make the source
code available presupposed that it already had the same. CenPEG claims
that Comelec had already awarded the source code to an international
certification entity and the Comelec had already been field testing its
PCOS and CCS machines. Comelec filed a Manifestation stating that it had
already deposited the source code to be used in the May 10, 2010

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


elections with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, to which CenPEG claim
that such did not constitute compliance with Sec 12, RA 9369 but only
with Sec 11, RA 8436.
ISSUE:
WON Comelec should make the source code available to CenPEG and
other interested parties
HELD:
Yes. It is clear under Sec 12, RA 9369 that once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any interested
political party or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it
and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for
security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had
passed and that reason is already stale.
BAGUMBAYAN VNP vs. COMELEC
GR 222731 March 8, 2016
DOCTRINE: Under R.A. No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy
of the state that the votes reflect the genuine will of the People. A
mechanism that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of candidates
will ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed
election. The voter must know that his or her sovereign will, with respect
to the national and local leadership, was properly recorded by the
vote-counting machines.
FACTS:
In 2010 and 2013, the COMELEC enforced a nationwide automated
election system using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines.
For the 2016 National and Local Elections, COMELEC has opted to use
the Vote-Counting Machine. The vote-counting machine is a paperbased automated election system, which is reported to be 7 times
faster and more powerful than the PCOS because of its updated
processor. Likewise, it is reported to have more memory and security
features and is capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit
Trail (VVPAT). This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt
and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine.
Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by R.A.
No. 9369, there are several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities
to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. According to petitioners, the VVPAT
will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt to alter the results of
the election. Petitioners claim that the COMELEC refuses to implement
the VVPAT function based on fears that the security feature may aid in
vote-buying, and that the voting period may take longer.
COMELEC Chairperson Andres Bautista reasoned out first that politicians
can use the receipts in vote buying; second, it may increase voting time
to 5-7 hours in election precincts.
Petitioners argue that the COMELECs fears are baseless and
speculative. According to petitioners, the inclusion of VVPAT, a
mandatory requirement under the automated elections, has been
flagrantly violated by COMELEC during the 2010 and 2013 Elections.
Petitioners claim that under Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 9369, amending Sec. 35
of R.A. No. 8436, anyone interfering with and impeding the use of
computer counting devices and the processing storage, generation and
transmission of elections results, data or information commits a
felonious act. COMELEC allegedly did so when it refused to implement
VVPAT.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for
Mandamus to compel COMELEC to comply with the provisions of Sec. 6
(e), (f), and (n) of R.A. No. 8436, as amended. Petitioners argue that
mandamus is proper to enforce a public right and compel the
performance of a public duty.

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According to petitioners, the law prescribes the minimum criteria of
adopting VVPAT as one of the security features. The use of the word
must makes it mandatory to have a paper audit separate and distinct
from the ballot.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC may be compelled to enable the VVPAT system
capability feature for the 2016 Elections
HELD:
Yes. Mandamus is the relief sought when any tribunal corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The inaction of the
COMELEC in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines
fails to fulfill the duty required under R.A. No. 8436, as amended.
Art. XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election. One of the laws that COMELEC
must implement is R.A. No. 8436, as amended, which requires the
automated election system to have the capability of providing a voterverified paper audit trail.
Under R.A. No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state
that the votes reflect the genuine will of the People. A mechanism that
allows the voter to verify his or her choice of candidates will ensure a
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed election. The voter
must know that his or her sovereign will, with respect to the national
and local leadership, was properly recorded by the vote-counting
machines.
The law is clear.
A voter verified paper audit trail requires the
following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have
been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum
should be paper based. There appears to be no room for further
interpretation of a voter verified paper audit trail. The paper audit trail
cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may be
instances where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or
the voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot. The required system
capabilities under R.A. 8436 are the minimum safeguard provided by law.
It is true that COMELEC is given ample discretion to administer the
elections, but certainly its constitutional duty is to enforce the law.
COMELEC has the power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to
enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the
constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
There is no legal prohibition for COMELEC to require that after the voter
reads and verifies the receipt, he or she is to leave it in a separate box,
not take it out of the precinct. The availability of all the voters will make
random manual audits more accurate.
II.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD


GR 10013, September 3, 1991
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court said that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Although Monsod was
not a litigation lawyer, his past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received
by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod and on June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office
and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari
and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a
dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and
hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his fathers law office for a short
while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for
about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an
investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive
Officer or Consultant of various companies.
ISSUE: WON Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10
years.
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of
law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of
court.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for
valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

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The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the
interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice
of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work.
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still
a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. At this point,
it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services."
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers. Most lawyers will engage in nonlitigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of
the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the
most prominent is that of prosecutor.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the
Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields
such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of
their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet
them.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance
of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
GAMINDE vs. COA
GR 140335 December 13, 2000
DOCTRINE: In order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by
the Constitution, the rotational plan of COMELEC requires 2 conditions:
1. The terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a common date
2. Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term shall be filled only for the unexpired balance of
the term
FACTS:
June 11, 1993 President Ramos appointed Thelma Gaminde, ad
interim, Commissioner of CSC
June 22, 1993 Gaminde assumed office after taking an oath of office

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Sept. 7, 1993 COA, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment
Her appointment paper stated: Pursuant to the provisions of existing
laws, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, Commissioner, CSC, for a
term expiring Feb. 2, 1999.
Feb. 24, 1998 Gaminde sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In a letter, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term of office would expire on
Feb. 2, 2000 and not on Feb. 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
Gaminde remained in office after Feb. 2, 1999.
Feb. 4. 1999 Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting
opinion on whether or not Commissioner Gaminde and her co-terminous
staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on Feb. 2, 1999.
COA issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment. CSC Auditor
issued a notice of disallowance disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to Gaminde and her co-terminous staff, effective
February 2, 1999.
Gaminde appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc. COA dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that
the issue of Gamindes term of office may be properly addressed by mere
reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on Feb.
2, 1999.
ISSUE:
WON the term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner of CSC expired on
Feb. 2, 1999
HELD:
Yes. The term of office of the Chairman and members of CSC is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 1(2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of 7 years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for 5 years,
and another Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity."
The operation of the rotational plan requires 2 conditions, both
indispensable to its workability:
1. The terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a
common date
2. Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term shall be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term.
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissioners under the 1987 Constitution must start on
a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order than the first
terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2year interval between the expiration of the terms.
In the case at bar, the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of
the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions must be on Feb. 2,
1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. There is no need
to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is
understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its
ratification.
Gaminde replaced Atty. Samilo Barlongay as Commissioner who assumed
office on March 4, 1988. His term ended on Feb. 2, 1992 but served as
de facto Commissioner until March 4, 1993. Gaminde was appointed by

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

the President on June 11, 1993, for a term expiring on Feb. 2, 1999 (7
years after 1992).

WON the COMELEC shall decide a case or matter by a majority of the


vote of all its members

She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring Feb.
2, 1999. The letter stating that her term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000
was in error. What was submitted to COA was a nomination for a term
expiring on Feb. 2, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be
deemed to start on Feb. 2, 1999, and expire on Feb. 2, 2006.

HELD:
Yes. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:

Wherefore, the appointment extended to Gaminde expired on Feb. 2,


1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until Feb. 2,
2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for
actual service rendered. The COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary
and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
Additional notes:
The computation of the terms of the first appointees and their successors
to the CSC are as follows:
First line:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Chairman 7 year term:


Feb. 2, 1987 to Feb. 2, 1994
Feb. 2, 1994 to Feb. 2, 2001
Feb. 2, 2001 to Feb. 2, 2008

Second line: Commissioner 5 year term:


(1) Feb. 2, 1987 to Feb, 2 1992
(2) Feb. 2, 1992 to Feb. 2,1999 (Gamindes term)
(3) Feb. 2, 1999 to Feb. 2, 2006
Third line: Commissioner 3 year term:
(1) Feb. 2, 1987 to Feb. 2, 1990
(2) Feb. 2, 1990 to Feb 2, 1997
(3) Feb. 2, 1997 to Feb. 2, 2004
Thus we see the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years.
ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC
GR 160465, May 27, 2004
DOCTRINE: The decision of the Commission should be based on the
majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and
took part in the deliberations.
FACTS:
Petitioner sought the nullification of a Status Quo Ante Order issued by
the COMELEC. In the issuance of said Order, five (5) out of the seven (7)
incumbent members of the COMELEC participated (Commissioners
Abalos, Javier, Tangcangco, Borra, and Lantion).
Out of the five present, four (4) commissioners voted for the issuance of
the said order (Abaos, Javier, Tangcangco, and Lantion), while the Borra
dissented.
Subsequently, Commissioner Lantion was deemed to not have been fit to
participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving
3 members concurring therewith. The necessary votes of four (4) or
majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained, so it failed to
comply with the votes necessary for the pronouncements of an order, as
required under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.1
Private respondent alleges that 3 votes would have been sufficient to
issue the order since this is the majority of the commissioners present at
the time of the voting.
ISSUE:
1

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members
of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting
business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its


members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority
vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took
part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to
be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states "all of its members," without any
qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC
GR 141952-53 April 20, 2001
DOCTRINE: In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers
and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party
seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate the
COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie
regular, the proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a preproclamation controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates
for the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo when certain election returns for
a series of precincts were protested for inclusion in the canvass before
the Municipal Board of Canvassers by petitioner. Petitioner stated in his
affidavits that certain local baranggay officials were inside the polling
place during the casting and counting of votes, or acted as watcher of
respondent which posed a threat and intimidation driving most of the
watchers of other political parties away; hence voters were coerced to
vote for certain favored candidates especially herein respondent. On the
other hand, respondent Bernal, Jr. in vehemently denying the allegations
of petitioner and the former attested that the incidents alleged by
petitioner's watchers did not happen and that these people were only
inside the polling place to exercise their right of suffrage.
COMELEC Second Division found that the preparations of the contested
election returns are tainted with irregularities and that the Municipal
Board of Canvassers are directed to reconvene and finish the canvass of
the remaining or uncontested returns and proclaim the winning mayoralty
candidate, while private respondent petitioned for a motion for
reconsideration. However, despite the said motion for reconsideration,
after excluding the contested precincts, petitioner was proclaimed winner
of the election by COMELEC Second Division.
Respondent filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
proclamation of the petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and executory. COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision of its Second Division and set aside the
proclamation of petitioner, respondent was proclaimed the newlyconstituted Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly-elected Mayor.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC erred in ordering the inclusion of the contested election
returns in the canvassing of ballots
HELD:
No. Although petitioner's proclamation was undertaken pursuant to the
resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division, it appears plain to us that
the latter grievously erred in ordering the exclusion of the contested
returns. Comelec en banc correctly reversed the Second Division by
holding that petitioner Dumayas failed to justify the exclusion of said

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


returns on the ground of duress, intimidation, threat or coercion. SC
noted that the only evidence submitted by petitioner to prove said
irregularities were self-serving affidavits executed by his watchers and
supporters. Aside from the fact that these allegations were countered by
opposing affidavits made by the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties
and who categorically denied the allegations, the election returns were
also observed to be genuine, clean, signed and/or thumbmarked by the
proper officials and watchers.
In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the
COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns
which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to
raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to
pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the
proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation
controversy. In the present case, petitioner barely alleged that the
preparation of said returns was attended by threats, duress, intimidation
or coercion without offering any proof, other than the affidavits
mentioned above, that these had affected the regularity or genuineness
of the contested returns. COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the ruling of its Second Division.
SEVILLA vs. COMELEC
GR 202833 March 19, 2013
DOCTRINE: Comelec En Bancs resolutions, to have legal effect, must
be decided by majority of the total Commissioners, not just those who
are present. In cases of legal stalemates, a rehearing is required.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sevilla and Respondent So were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay of Brgy Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the Oct 2010
Barangay and SK elections. Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as
winner over a winning margin of 628 votes against So which
subsequently led the latter to file an election protest with the MTC on the
ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities in 20% of the protested precincts. So also prays for manual
revision of the ballots.
MTC dismissed Sos claim leading him to file w/ Comelec a petition for
certiorari faulting MTC for non-observance of the rule that in appreciation
of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific
details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as
written by 1/2 more persons. Comelec 2nd division granted Sos petition
saying MTC committed grave abuse of discretion with Comelec En Banc
reaffirming ruling on a 3-3 vote.
Sevilla now comes to this Court saying Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it entertained Sos petition despite its loss of jurisdiction
through lapse of time. Respondent Comelec meanwhile says that it is
premature since it was not a majority vote 3-3 and that 7th Commissioner
has not yet been appointed by President. Therefore, it has to be
remanded to Comelec for rehearing by a full and complete Commission.
ISSUE:
WON the case prematurely filed with SC given that there was no majority
vote by Comelec En Banc
HELD:
YES. The Court DISMISSED the petition and REMANDED case to Comelec
En Banc for the conduct of the required rehearing under the Comelec
Rules of Procedure for the following reasons:
1. Comelec En Bancs Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority
decision required by the Constitution (Sec. 7, Art IX-A) and by Sec.
5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. A majority vote
requires 4 members in order to decide, irrespective of the number of
Commissioners in attendance.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


2. Sec 8, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure requires a rehearing
when the En Banc is equally divided in opinion, to strengthen anew
their positions and arguments.
IBRAHIM vs. COMELEC
GR 192289 January 14, 2013
DOCTRINE: The COMELEC and not the MBOC has the authority to order
the suspension of a winning candidatess proclamation. Such suspension
can only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or intervenor
relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy pending before the COMELEC, and only
when the evidence of the winning candidates guilt is strong.
FACTS:
Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy
to run as municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas
(Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded
to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of
candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list included
Ibrahims name.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December
22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing
of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was
denied by the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated May 6,
2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued
by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao,
Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected.
On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May
6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest
number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended
Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed resolutions
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or
petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before
the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate
petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering
that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the
purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume
that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter,
which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration,
instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
JARAMILLA vs. COMELEC
GR 155717 October 23, 2003
DOCTRINES:
1. An error in the tabulation of results, which merely requires a clerical
correction without opening the ballot boxes or examining the ballots,
demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the Comelec.
Hence, the Comelec en banc may properly assume jurisdiction.

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2. Thus, the rule that all election cases, including pre-proclamation cases,
should first be heard and decided by the Comelec in division applies
only when the Comelec exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, not when it exercises purely administrative functions.
3. The Comelec has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods
provided by its rules, or the requirement of certificate of non-forum
shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases. The
Comelec is likewise not constrained to dismiss a case before it by
reason of non-payment of filing fees
FACTS:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of
Member
of
the Sangguniang Bayan in
the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning
candidates for eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Name of Candidates Total Votes Obtained
1. RAGUCOS, Ma. Luisa Laxamana 6,324
2. ABAYA, Juan Jr., Andaquig 6,013
3. GINES, Fidel Cudiamat 5,789
4. QUILOP, Renato Avila 5,227
5. BILIGAN, Osias Depdepen 5,130
6. RUIZ, Agustin Turgano 4,972
7. JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno 4,815
8. CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon 4,807
In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that
[respondent Suyat] obtained Four thousand seven hundred seventy nine
(4,779) votes and was ranked no. 9.
Upon review by [respondent Suyat], he discovered that [petitioner] was
credited with fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained. If the
entry were to be corrected, the affected candidates would be ranked as
follows:

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


3. WON COMELEC erred in not dismissing the case for failure to pay the
docket or filing fee on time
HELD:
1. YES. Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be
heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the
commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where
the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not
when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. When the case
demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions, such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of
votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the
COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its
constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.
The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an
erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of
Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which
merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening
ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en
banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
2. A and B NO. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the COMELEC has the
discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice. Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules expressly provides that:

7. CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon 4,807


8. SUYAT, Antonio 4,779
9. JARAMILLA, Alberto 4,765

SEC. 4. Suspension of the Rules In the interest of justice and in order to


obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.

On June 13, 2001, respondent Suyat filed before the COMELEC en


banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the
latter treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error.

The
COMELEC
therefore
has
authority
to
suspend
the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of
certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of
justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it.

On October 24, 2002, COMELEC decided that the Motion/Petition is


hereby GRANTED. The proclamation of Respondent ALBERTO J.
JARAMILLA [herein petitioner] is ANNULLED.
A New Municipal Board of Canvassers is hereby created composed of the
following:
Atty. NELIA AUREUS Chairman
Atty. MICHAEL D. DIONEDA Vice Chairman
Atty. ALLEN FRANCIS F. ABAYA Member
The New Board is hereby directed to immediately convene at the
Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros, Manila. Thereafter, the New Board
shall prepare a corrected Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation on the
basis of the New Statement of Votes and proclaim the Petitioner [herein
private respondent Suyat] as the eighth (8th) Board Member of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur. Mr. Ireneo Habon Cortez shall be declared the
7th Municipal Board Member. The New Board shall use the Comelec
copies of the election returns and Statement of Votes pertaining to the
instant case. Hence, the present recourse by petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction in election cases
2. WON COMELEC erred in not dismissing the case considering that
a. The petition was filed beyond the prescriptive period as set forth in
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
b. The petition lacked a certification against forum-shopping

3. NO. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of nonpayment of filing fees. Section 18, Rule 40 the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure states:
SEC 18. Nonpayment of Prescribed Fees If the fees above prescribed are
not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they
are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
The use of the word may in the aforecited provision readily shows that
the COMELEC is conferred the discretion whether to entertain the petition
or not in case of non-payment of legal fees. And even if it were not
afforded such discretion, as discussed above, it is authorized to suspend
its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. Adherence to technicality that
would put a stamp on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the peoples will, can never be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent COMELEC, its Resolution en banc is AFFIRMED. The petition
is DISMISSED.

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TYPOCO vs. COMELEC
GR 186359 March 5, 2010
DOCTRINE: The SC cannot tabulate the results reflected in the election
returns, otherwise it would convert itself into a board of canvassers.
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and
private respondent vied for the position of Governor in Camarines
Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, petitioner Jesus
O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830 votes, as opposed
to respondent Edgardo A. Tallado's 78,287 votes.
Respondent Tallado filed before the COMELEC a petition for
correction of manifest error, docketed as SPC No. 07-312. He
claimed that, after he reviewed and examined the figures in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP) vis--vis the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes (COC) in the municipalities in the province, he
found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban,
errors were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP
to the COC. Respondent contended that if the errors were
corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner,
79,904 votes; thus, he would be the true winner in the
gubernatorial race in the province.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30,
2008, rendered the assailed Resolution 9 granting respondent
Tallados petition. It ruled that, based on the COMELEC copies (in
the custody of the Election Records and Statistics Division [ERSD]
of the Commission) of the concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes
in Labo, as recorded in the said documents, did not correspond.
Correcting the figures in Labo, while retaining those in the latter
municipality, led to the following results: Tallado, 79,969 votes; and
Typoco, 79,904 votes.
The COMELEC partialLy GRANTED the petition and annulled the
proclamation of private respondent Jesus Typoco as the winning
gubernatorial candidate. Consequently, a New Municipal Board of
Canvassers for the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte and a
New Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Camarines
Norte was constituted.
The petitioner filed, on March 2, 2009, the instant petition for
certiorari to annul the aforesaid resolutions of the COMELEC.
On the same date, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order, 14
appointing the members of a new municipal board of canvassers in
the subject locality and members of a new provincial board of
canvassers for purposes of, respectively, tabulating the votes for
Governor for the municipality of Labo, and proclaiming respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its
issuances ordering:
a. the correction of the manifest error in the pertinent election
documents;
b. the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner; and
c. the subsequent proclamation of the winning gubernatorial
candidate in Camarines Norte.
HELD:
We find that the COMELEC, in ordering the correction of manifest
errors in the SOVP and COC, merely exercised its bounden duty to
ascertain the true will of the electorate of the province. Proven
during the proceedings before it were errors or discrepancies in the
recording or transferring of votes from the SOVP of Labo to the
COC, such that the votes in the latter document did not reflect
the true and correct votes received by the candidates. SOVPs are
the basis of COCs; 27 the two must jibe with each other.
Certainly, an error in transposing the contents of one to the other
only calls for a clerical act of reflecting in the said election
documents the true and correct votes received by the candidates.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


This does not involve the opening of the ballot boxes, examination
and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns. All that is
required is to reconvene the board of canvassers for it to rectify
the error it committed in order that the true will of the voters will
be given effect. The previous proclamation of petitioner will not be
a hindrance to the said correction. The proclamation and
assumption of office of petitioner based on a faulty tabulation is
flawed right from the very beginning, and may, therefore, be
annulled. The appreciation of election documents involves a question of
fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings
of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. The
Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's function, as mandated by
the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it simply erred or has a different
view.
The COMELEC, not the NBI, is the agency that has the
competence to determine the genuineness of election documents.
The Court does not find merit in petitioner's contention that a
recanvass of the election returns (ERs) should be undertaken in
order to truly determine the mandate of the electorate. Let it be
noted that the original petition filed before the COMELEC, one for
correction of manifest errors, was a preproclamation controversy
which, ordinarily, does not involve the opening of ballot boxes or
the examination and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns.
Furthermore, the ERs were never introduced in evidence in the
proceedings below. Evidently, there is no basis for this Court to
conduct a retabulation of ERs. Also, as correctly stated by the
Office of the Solicitor General, "the remedy of recanvass of [ERs]
is patently illegal, as this would take the form of an election
protest, particularly a retabulation of [ERs] under A.M. No. 07-4-15SC." 42 If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the
ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself into a board of canvassers.
This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a
petition for certiorari, cannot perform.
VILLAROSA vs. COMELEC
GR 212953 August 5, 2014
DOCTRINES:
1. A motion for reconsideration with the Commission en banc is
mandatory for the action of certiorari with the Supreme Court to lie.
2. The creation of a special division is allowed for certain situations and
the same will take the cases of the regular division, the only difference
being that the members indisposed are replaced by the COMELEC
chairman.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de
Mesa Festin (Festin) were two of the four rival candidates for the
mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections. On May 15, 2013, private respondent was
proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes, edging out
petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.
With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for
Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging
irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. Specifically,
petitioner brought to the attention of the court the complaints of various
voters who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or that the
ovals appearing on the face of the ballots corresponding to the name of
petitioner were embossed or waxed to prevent them from being shaded.
As a consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities
in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private
respondent, so petitioner claimed, was illegally proclaimed.In his answer,
private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the
precincts, particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner. A
recount of the ballots was consequently conducted.

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of discretion

On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the


proclamation of respondent Festin void, and declaring Villarosa the
winner of the mayoralty. The RTC justified its ruling by deducting 2,050
votes from private respondent that were allegedly pre-marked or
tampered.
Following this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal, which was granted by the RTC on January 15, 2014.3
On January 23, 2014, respondent Festins motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, private respondent Festin elevated the
case to public respondent COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for injunctive relief. Petitioner immediately moved for its dismissal
on the ground that the petitions verification is allegedly defective.
Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC, acting
through its First Division, on February 13, 2014, issued an Order
requiring petitioner to file his answer to the petition. Through the same
Order, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to
enjoin the RTC from implementing its Decision during the pendency of
the case. Without waiving the grounds relied on his motion to dismiss,
petitioner
timely
filed
his
answer
to
the
petition.
To petitioners surprise, on April 10, 2014, public respondent COMELEC
granted private respondents request for a preliminary injunction,
enjoining the RTC Decision for execution pending appeal. What
petitioner considered questionable was that the injunction was
issued by a newly-constituted Special First Division,which was
allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC
commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to
the concerns of the overseas absentee voters abroad. Petitioner
points out that the special division was constituted only on April
8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of only
two members, Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioner Al A. Parreo, with the former presiding.
In response to the issuance of the injunction, petitioner filed an urgent
motion praying for its quashal, which was denied by public respondent
COMELEC First Division through the assailed June 3, 2014 Order. Thus,
the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the formation of the Special First Division and the validity of the
Orders it issued, specifically the April 10, 2014 Order granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are valid
HELD:
The instant petition is DENIED.
Re: Certiorari
Petitioners recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is
procedurally infirm. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the
1987
Constitution,
which
provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof
Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling,or decision of a
COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the
availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for
reconsideration.

Even delving into the merits of the case, it cannot be said that the
issuance of the assailed Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
since public respondents actions find sufficient constitutional basis under
Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission
en
banc.
Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division.
(a) Temporary vacancy. - Whenever a member of a Division is on Leave,
seriously ill, temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is
disqualified from sitting in a case, the Chairman shall substitute him with
another Commissioner,or the Chairman shall sit in place of said member,
and in that event he will preside.
Invoking the rule, as amended, the COMELEC then issued Resolution No.
986813 on April 8, 2014. The Resolution sought to address the temporary
vacancies in both Divisionsof the COMELEC in view of the pressing
matters concerning overseasabsentee voting that required the attention
and presence abroad of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Christian
Robert S. Lim of the COMELEC First Division, and of Commissioner Elias
R. Yusoph of the Second Division.14
No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the
COMELEC when the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of
preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioners claim, it cannot be said
that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct
bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case between
the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate
Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its
Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates that
the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary
capacity or via substitution. The COMELEC First Division exercises
jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before the substitution
was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not
lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division since this
only entailed a change in the Divisions composition of magistrates.
Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If anything, it
was only petitioners naivety that misled him into interpreting the
designation of the division as a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from
the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that the
jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from the
Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the First
Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
HAYUDINI vs. COMELEC
GR 207900 April 22, 2014
DOCTRINE: If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a
registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but
still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78.
FACTS:
Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. Ten days after, Omar filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course or Cancel the certificate of Hayudini, asserting that
Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding
his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared that he is a resident of
the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga
City.
Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was
proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.However, the
COMELEC issued a Resolution granting Omars second petition to cancel

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

Hayudini's Certificate of Candidacy. Thus, Hayudini filed the instant


petition for certiorari and prohibition.

present danger it is then considered a valid restriction of freedom of


speech

ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
Omar as the duly-elected mayor

It further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional


principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured
to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution; and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.

HELD:
No. Petition is dismissed.
Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a
false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies
a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in
both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such
as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status
as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal
requirement which must be reflected in the Certificate of Candidacy. The
reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for
and represent the local government under which he or she is running.
Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the
instant case, that the candidate was qualified.
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC
380 Phil. 780
DOCTRINE: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms
of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally
in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can
be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud.
FACTS:
This is a case involving a Petition for Certiorari assailing Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21,
1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABSCBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the
same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information
from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x
x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation argues that the holding of
exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises
of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant
to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible
and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll
and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press
freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise
thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a
dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the
tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with
the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other
words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process." Having a clear and

ISSUE:
WON the respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other
group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during
the x x x May 11 elections
HELD:
1. As to procedural issue: Solicitor General contends that the issue is
already moot and academic because the May 11, 1998 election has
already been held and done with.
NO. The court held that the issue is not totally moot. While the assailed
Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its
implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic
feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is
tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will
only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
2. As to the main issue of Validity of conducting the Exit Polls: The
Supreme Court decided in favor of the Petitioner, holding that the
above argument of the respondent is purely speculative and
untenable.
First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to
replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has
probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity
of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent
from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit
polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only
part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of
the other.
The total ban by the Comelec is held by the SC to be excessive. Since the
resolution absolutely bans and prevents the collection of exit poll data
and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that
could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey
questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. The Comelec
does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather
the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand,
there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the
Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may
be brought about by exit surveys.
The Court then concludes that the interest of the state in reducing
disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary,
instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly conducted and
publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful
and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud
and other electoral ills.
As to the contention of respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the
sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is of no merit since in exit polls, the
contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


The Court added that narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.
NOTE: What is an exit poll?
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the
probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public,
usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in
the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until
the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC
GR 205720, January 21, 2015
DOCTRINE:
The subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are not electoral campaign
materials, stressing that the mentioning of candidates name in the 2 nd
tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners campaign against the
RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was
just a bill being deliberated in Congress. The subject tarpaulins are
covered by the broader constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression
and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws,
rules, and regulations.
The questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the
Church and constitute serious violations of the principle of separation of
Church and State which the State and its officials, including the herein
respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.
FACTS:
Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is
represented in this petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M.
Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition in his
individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally
directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised
herein are matters of paramount and transcendental importance to the
public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of
the unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as respondents are
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of
Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon.
On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the
front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized
610 feet, with the message Conscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay
(Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names
of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.
In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February
2013 order issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to
remove the supposed oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of
Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued
by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the
immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the
petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he
fails to cause its immediate removal. On March 5, 2013, the Supreme
Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team
Patay Tarpaulin.
ISSUE:
1. WON Respondents orders directives to remove or cause the removal
of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for
infringing on petitioners right to freedom of expression on their own
private property
2. WON Respondents orders/directives to remove or cause the removal
of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


violating the principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in
Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and
that the mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners
right to freedom of expression on their own private property:
the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are not electoral campaign
materials, stressing that the mentioning of candidates name in the
second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners campaign
against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even
when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress;
subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are covered by the broader
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression and of conscience
and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and
regulations;
petitioners have the constitutional right to communicate their views
and beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the
Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of
Bacolod;
the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013
National Elections who supported and who opposed its passage into a
law are matters of public concern and a legitimate subject of general
interest and of discussion;
the content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin
plainly relates to broad issues of interest to the community especially
to the members of the Catholic community and that the subject
tarpaulin simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill
and the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains
relevance in the exercise of the peoples right of suffrage in the
advent of the 2013 polls;
considering the petitioners message, through the Team Patay
Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the message being
conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression to
the public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of
the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution;
there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is
endangered or which will be endangered by the posting of the subject
Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the infringement of the
preferred right of freedom of expression.
2. The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating
the principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of
Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
petitioners petition against the RH Law is not only a matter of
exercise of its freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a
matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty;
the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of
her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the
Catholic Churchs teachings;
in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the
petitioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-morals,
anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the
Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its members
and followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to
support those who are pro-life;
considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill
is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral
teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already
gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of expression and of
conscience, but also of the right and privilege of the Church to
propagate and spread its teachings which should be insulated from
any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State, and
its agencies and officials;

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the


principle of separation of Church and State;
at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life
which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma;
the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when
there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a culture of
life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim the culture of life
for the common good of society;
the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of
the Church and constitute serious violations of the principle of
separation of Church and State which the State and its officials,
including the herein respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and
hold sacred.

COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of


the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by
Cruz-Gonzales. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for mandamus
against the COMELEC.
2. NO. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. However, the mere filing of several cases based on the
same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test
is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also
raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.

LOKIN vs. COMELEC


GR 193808 June 26, 2012

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to
proclaim him as the second nominee of CIBAC. On the other hand, Lokin
has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14,
2007 resolution of the COMELEC. Applying the test for forum shopping,
the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the
actions involved the same parties, because they were based on different
causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner was originally the second nominee for the Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) partylist, but prior to the 2007
elections the first nominee Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane
R. Borje as one of the nominees. Villanueva supported this withdrawal
with a letter containing signatures of 81% of CIBAC confirming the
withdrawal of Lokin.
On June 26, 2007, after the close of the polls, CIBAC sought for the
proclamation of Lokin for its earned second seat. The motion was
opposed by Villanueva and the then second nominee Cruz-Gonzales.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved Villanuevas
petition approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Luis Lokin,
Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees
respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. CruzGonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third
nominee for the party list CIBAC. This was justified by the COMELEC
saying that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such;
that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC
By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the
act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees. As a result,
the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second
nominee of CIBAC.
Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC and through
certiorari assails the validity of approving CIBACs withdrawal of
nominations alleging that Section 13 of the resolution expanded Section 8
of the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby
implement.
ISSUES:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
2. WON Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. WON Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act;
4. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the
nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of
nominees of CIBAC
RULING:
1. YES. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
office. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of
disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The
controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action
for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which
Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Lokin
has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the

3. YES. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is clear. The law deprived the partylist organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the
order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except
when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
However, Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states: A party-list nominee
may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is
withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as
such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these
cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list
of nominees. No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal
after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four
instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the
party." As correctly insisted, COMELEC has gravely abused its discretion
in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a
nominee.
COMELECs explanation that it reworded or rephrased the law is
untenable. To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other
words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form. Both terms
signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground
not found in the text of the provision.
4. YES. Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to the
extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its
substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and
ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the
others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELECs approval of CIBACs
petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBACs substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007
resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
CAGAS vs. COMELEC
GR 209185 October 25, 2013
DOCTRINE: The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling
mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


FACTS:
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of
Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of
the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451
(H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B.
No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No.
10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental. Sections 2 and
7 of R.A. No. 10360 provide for the composition of the new provinces of
Davao Occidental and Davao del Sur. Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360
provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be
created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the
majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360,
the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of
policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and
Local Elections. On 9 July 2013, the COMELEC extended the policy on
suspension of the holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer action on
the holding of all plebiscites until after the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided
to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously
with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses. On 9
October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites
three causes of action:
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION
because it is only CONGRESS who can validly amend, repeal or modify
existing laws, thus COMELEC act in suspending the holding of a
plebiscite is unconstitutional;
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this
coming October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has already
lapsed; and
3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC
from holding the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the
Province of Davao Occidental except through the issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction because
COMELEC had already commenced the preparation for holding of the
Plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental
synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and SK elections this coming
October 28, 2013.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
their comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises the following
arguments:
1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for
the creation of a local government unit;
2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite at a mere two months notice;
3. Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be implemented;
4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and
5. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned
Resolutions.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay
Elections
HELD:
NO. The COMELECs power to administer elections includes the power to
conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct
of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. The

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be
held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of
the legislature in Section 8, Article VI and of the President and VicePresident in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the
power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown
by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as
well as in the election of local government officials. Section 10 of R.A. No.
7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may be held:
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixed another date.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental be held
within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6 April
2013. Cagas claims that R.A. No. 10360 "did not confer express or
implied power to COMELEC to exercise discretion when the plebiscite for
the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental will be held. On the
contrary, said law provides a specific period when the COMELEC should
conduct a plebiscite." Cagas views the period "60 days from the
effectivity" in R.A. No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC
has no legal basis to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The COMELEC has
"exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections." The text and intent of Section 2(1) of
Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections." The tight time frame in the enactment, signing
into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled
with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13
May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the
holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We
also take judicial notice of the COMELECs burden in the accreditation and
registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections.26 The logistic and
financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and
Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force
majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg.
881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it
with the Barangay Elections. To comply with the 60-day period to
conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would have the
COMELEC hold off all of its above tasks. If COMELEC abandoned any of
its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of
these tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the
May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its
attention and concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its
preparation for the May 2013 National and Local Elections, and to ensure
that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites
including that of R.A. No. 10360. Parenthetically, for the COMELEC to
hold the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 within the fixed
period, it would have to reconfigure for said purpose some of the PCOS
machines that were already configured for the May 2013 National and
Local Elections; or in the alternative, conduct the plebiscite manually.
However, conducting the plebiscite manually would require another set of
ballots and other election paraphernalia. Besides, another set of election
materials would also require additional logistics for printing, checking,
packing, and deployment thereof. Lest it be forgotten, that all of these
things should undergo public bidding.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Since the plebiscite would be a separate undertaking, the COMELEC
would have to appoint separate sets of boards of election inspectors,
tellers, and other personnel to canvass the result of the plebiscite all of
which would have entailed further cost for the COMELEC whose budget
had already been overly stretched to cover the May 2013 National and
Local Elections.
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a
special budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC
had to take P11 million from its savings and from the Barangay Elections
budget to finance the plebiscite to ratify R.A. No. 10360 on October 28,
2013.
The COMELECs questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the
plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the
Barangay Elections was not an abuse of its discretion, as alleged, but
simply an exercise of prudence, because as the COMELEC itself noted,
doing so "will entail less expense than holding it separately." In election
law, the right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in
holding elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas insistence that only
Congress can cure the alleged legal infirmity in the date of holding the
plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental fails in
light of the absence of abuse of discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, this
Court finds it unacceptable to utilize more of our taxpayers time and
money by preventing the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite as now
scheduled.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: During the election period, the COMELEC is expressly
authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information.
FACTS:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements.
They argue that Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression amounting to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression only publications of media-based election or political
propaganda.
Further, petitioners contend that Sec.11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign
or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of
the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 is constitutional
HELD:
Yes. he essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act
has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b)
has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation
of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation,
however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution.
For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of
equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the
candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory
mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and
may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal
time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about
themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the
forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other
mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office
shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign
period.
CHAVEZ vs. COMELEC
GR 162777 August 31, 2004
DOCTRINES: All materials showing the picture, image or name of a
person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing
the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall
be immediately removed, otherwise, the person and the radio station,
print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The issuance of the resolution was, likewise, considered as a valid
exercise of the police power.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal
agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. On
August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and
image for 96 North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed
Endorsement
Agreements
with
Konka
International
Plastics
Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the
amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two
agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10,
2003, respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were
set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. One
billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic products of Konka
International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two
showed petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard
was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the
game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a
tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and
Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520,
which contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers
or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or
name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for
public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity
of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print
media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the
COMELEC's Law Department wherein it ordered him to remove or cause
the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC
be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to
declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly
(1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise
of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to
the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
ISSUE:
WON Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional for
the foregoing reasons argued by Petitioner Chavez
HELD:
1. As to invalid exercise of Police Power: This Court takes a contrary
view. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its
primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level
the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesserknown or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former
from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity. The obvious intention of this
provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and
poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue
advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. It is true that when
petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend
his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name
and image assumed partisan political character because the same
indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting
well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent
premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the
situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates
from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity.
5. As to being invalid due to overbreadth: The provision in question
is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows
the continued display of a person's propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before
the start of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements
must also show his name and image. There is no blanket prohibition of
the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the
campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable
limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of
preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of
opportunities among all candidates.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI) vs. COMELEC
244 SCRA 272
DOCTRINE:
1. A written communication officially directing a print media company
to supply free print space, dispatched by COMELEC and signed by its
member presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a
coercive effect upon the company so addressed. The Commission may
not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of,
criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions. The
enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority
itself would be open to serious constitutional objection.
2. There being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or
imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor was the
resolution the only reasonable and calibrated response to such
necessity. [This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, albeit invalid, because the Comelec would not pay for the
space to be given to it by the newspapers.

2. As to non-impairment clause: Neither is Section 32 of Resolution


No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The nonimpairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for
public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may
have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State
has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest

FACTS:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") assailed the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

3. As to ex-post facto law: Section 32, although not penal in nature,


defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of
this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are
favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the
offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up
of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or
name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate
for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the
entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual
who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely
does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private
parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to
his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly
prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.

Sec. 2. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than
one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in
the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,
1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be
obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.

4. As being contrary to Fair Elections Act: According to petitioner


Chavez, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful
election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in
effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election
propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections
Act. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly
points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as

On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, also known


as the Comelec Space, which reads in part:

Sec. 3. "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of


charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper,
magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms
and programs of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination
of vital election information.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution is valid
HELD:
No. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten
publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some
criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the
Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary
donations of print space from publishers. A written communication
officially directing a print media company to supply free print space,
dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is
bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed.
That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the
imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions,
only aggravates the constitutional difficulties in hearing in the present
situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative
authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Similarly, Comelec has been granted the
power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be
shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than
one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for
public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission.
SWS vs. COMELEC
GR 147571 May 5, 2001
DOCTRINE:
1. Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 which provides that surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before
an election, was held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of expression for laying a prior restraint on the freedom
2. The grant of authority to the Comelec to regulate the enjoyment and
utilization of franchises for the operation of media of communications
is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space and the right to
reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use
of such media facilities for public information campaigns for and
among candidates.
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two
days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters
and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar
restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on
newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently,
they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in Sec. 5.4
of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption
of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just
before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication
of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law - the prevention of the
debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys,
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to
meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of
freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, - the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7
days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election
survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


National Press Club v. COMELEC, this Court upheld a total ban on political
advertisements; with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time
during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour.
ISSUE:
WON Section 5.4 of the Fair Elections Act unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes, Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is unconstitutional.
1. It lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the
press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately
preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election.
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. What test should then be employed to
determine the constitutional validity of Sec 5.4? The United States
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States
v. O 'Brien: 1. Government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; 2. if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; 3. if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4. if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression
and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is "not unrelated to the expression of free expression." Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the
law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question. By prohibiting the publication of election survey
results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine
the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators,
armchair theorists, and other opinion takers.
Second, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet the test that that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already
stated, aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates,
and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas."
Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when
such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing
unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such
speech creates the danger of such evils. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, the COMELEC is given the power: to stop any illegal activity, or
confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or
false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
2. Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution, which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of
communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like
5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political
advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Sec.
4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of
such media facilities "public information campaigns and forums among
candidates."
3. Nor can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that
there are other countries which similarly impose restrictions on the
publication of election surveys. At best this survey is inconclusive. It is
note worthy that in the United States no restriction on the publication of
election survey results exists. It cannot be argued that this is because the
United States is a mature democracy. Neither are there laws imposing an
embargo on survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


To summarize then, Sec. 5.4 is unconstitutional because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom
of expression.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 259
DOCTRINE: During the election period, the COMELEC may regulate
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the operation of
media of communication or information, grants, special privileges and
concessions with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor
the candidates. Thus, a resolution prohibiting newspaper columnists from
commenting on the issues involved in the forthcoming plebiscite is null
and void and unconstitutional.
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6766, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region was enacted into law. Pursuant to to the
said law, the City of Baguio and the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao shall take part in a plebiscite
for the ratification of said Organic Act.
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern the conduct of
the plebiscite on the said Organic Act. Petitioner Sanidad who claimed to
be a newspaper columnist of the Overview for the Baguio Midland
Courier, assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 19 of said Resolution, which
provides: During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and
on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time
to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Petitioner alleged that said provision was void and unconstitutional
because it violated the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. He maintained
that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and
reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about
which he writes.
Respondent COMELEC maintained that Resolution No. 2167 was not
violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press. Rather it was a valid implementation of the power of
the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is null and void and
unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was
granted to the COMELEC was the power to supervise and regulate the
use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage
to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) can be construed
to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2167 has no statutory basis.
Moreover, in a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special
political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of
specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked
to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently
make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the
issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
GMA NETWORK vs. COMELEC
GR 205357 September 2, 2014
DOCTRINE: COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical
departure from the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime
limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in
computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of
broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a
per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was
effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which
candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the
air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the
COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of
the COMELEC to do so.
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
(Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press,
impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forth coming elections. The heart of the controversy revolves upon the
proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that
candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided
in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 otherwise known as the Fair
Elections Act. Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN are
owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines,
while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the
national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines
representing operators of radio and television stations and said stations.
They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the
provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held
public hearings. Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued
Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615.
Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and
oppressive, hence, the present petitions. All of the petitioners assail the
following provisions of the Resolution:
a) Section 7 (d), which provides for a penalty of suspension or revocation
of an offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal liability against
broadcasting entities and their officers in the event they sell airtime in
excess of the size, duration, or frequency authorized in the new rules;
b) Section 9 (a), which provides for an "aggregate total" airtime instead
of the previous "per station" airtime for political campaigns or
dvertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates'
television and radio guestings and appearances; and
c) Section 14, which provides for a candidate's "right to reply."
Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate
airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during
elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field
between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those
without much. Moreover, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed
Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution
which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate, during
election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media.
ISSUE:
WON Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, as amended by
Resolution No. 9631, constitutional
HELD:
No. There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally
and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise
its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply
adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right
thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion,
but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the
bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change
the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a
particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same
must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after
it had already promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did not fully
explain or justify the change in computing the airtime allowed candidates
and political parties, except to make reference to the need to "level the
playing field." If the "per station" basis was deemed enough to comply
with that objective in the past, why should it now be suddenly
inadequate? And, the short answer to that from the respondent, in a
manner which smacks of overbearing exercise of discretion, is that it is
within the discretion of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in
adopting "aggregate" basis in the determination of allowable airtime.
The legislative history of R.A. 9006 clearly shows that Congress intended
to impose the per candidate or political party aggregate total airtime
limits on political advertisements and election propaganda. This is
evidenced by the dropping of the "per day per station" language
embodied in both versions of the House of Representatives and Senate
bills in favour of the "each candidate" and "not more than" limitations
now found in Section 6 of R.A. 9006.
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes
against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech
and of the press.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to
communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to
reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for
such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and
broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to
reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard
by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by
which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact.
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to
suffrage fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is
the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice
of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial
importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be
adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


SISON vs. COMELEC
GR 134096 March 3, 1999
DOCTRINE:
There are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely:
a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes;
b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; or
c)
after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other
analogous causes
FACTS:
It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the
Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were
proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a
petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation
in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was
supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code on
the ground of massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto
which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election
returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure
to elect. Petitioner presented allegations to support its action, some of
which include:
that the BOC announced that it would include returns with no
inner seal;
there were precincts missing election returns
highly suspicious persons were sneaking in some election
returns and canvassing areas
there were counting minutes, locks, keys, and metal seals
found in the trash
ballot boxes were never in the custody of COMELEC and
neither parties nor watchers were allowed to enter the
restricted area were the boxes passed through
in Barangay New Era, there was a clear pattern of voting which
showed that the votes were manufactured
While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City,
including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22,
1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the
petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not
supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were
not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 7166.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner has sufficient grounds to file the suit under Sec. 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code
HELD:
No. Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code,
there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. The petitioner
failed to allege that which could support an action for a failure of
elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or
suspended

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


SOLIVA vs. COMELEC
GR 141723 April 20, 2001
DOCTRINE: The COMELEC has the power to declare failure of election
under the 1987 Constitution, the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991,
and the Omnibus Election Code. In the case at bar, while it may be true
that the election did take place, the irregularities that marred the
counting of votes and the canvassing of the election returns resulted in a
failure to elect, and when there is a failure of election, the COMELEC is
empowered to annul the election and to call a special election.
FACTS:
Herein petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in
Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte during the local
elections of May 11, 1998.
On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were
proclaimed as the winning candidates.
On May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander Bacquial filed a petition to
declare a failure of election due to alleged "massive fraud, terrorism,
ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot
boxes by respondent Soliva, his wife and men from several precincts to
the supposed canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in the
precincts or polling places upon instructions of respondent Soliva and
other anomalies or irregularities, not to mention the alleged attempt of
one of Solivas men to assasinate Mr. Bacquial when he was about to cast
his vote.
On February 11, 2000, the COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution
declaring a failure of election in the municipality of RTR and consequently
the proclamation of LAKAS candidates as null and void.
Hence, this petition, imputing to COMELEC GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DECLARED A FAILURE OF ELECTION
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of election
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the COMELEC that
there was a failure of election in the municipality of RTR, as the counting
of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns was clearly
attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and harassment. The counting
of the votes was transferred from the polling places to the multi-purpose
gymnasium without the knowledge and permission of herein private
respondents or their representatives and that the counting of the votes
and the canvassing of the election returns were done without the latters
presence, thus making the election returns and the statements of votes
not worthy of faith and credit and not reliable documents to gauge the
fair and true expression of the popular will. To add, the transfer of the
counting from the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium was
without the authority of the COMELEC as required by law.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with a specific field of
expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and
should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and
specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than
enough expertise in its field that its findings and conclusions are
generally respected and even given finality.
The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad power to
enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections as
well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections
except the question as to the right to vote. Section 4 of Republic Act
7166, or the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, states:

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Section. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and Special Elections.
The postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the calling of
special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a
majority vote of its members. Xxx
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code also provides:
Section. 6. Failure of Election. If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates three instances
when the COMELEC may declare a failure of election and call for the
holding of a special election. First, when the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Second, when the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting. And third, after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect.
BRILLANTES vs. COMELEC
GR 163193 June 15, 2004
DOCTRINE:
COMELEC is the sole body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. However, the duties of the COMELEC under the
Constitution, RA 7166, and other election laws must be carried out, at all
times, in its official capacity.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of
voting, counting of votes and canvassing the results of the national and
local elections. The COMELEC initially intended to implement the
automation during the 1998 presidential elections; however, the failure of
the machines to read some ballots deferred its implementation. Later on,
in 2002, the COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization
program for the 2004 elections and issued an invitation to bid for the
P2.5 Billion poll automation contract.
After a public bidding was conducted, the COMELEC awarded the
contract to Mega Pacific Consortium and correspondingly entered into a
contract with the latter to implement the project. On the same day,
however, the COMELEC likewise entered into a separate contract with
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI) which pertains to the
electronic transmission of results (Phaste III) of the respondents
modernization program.
By reason of the case filed by the Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines (ITFP), the contract between Mega Pacific Consortium and
the COMELEC was nullified and Phase II of the AES shut down. Despite
this, as well as the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES
apparently having encountered problems in its implementation, the
COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES
through an electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the
2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an unofficial quick count.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


In response to this, Senator Franklin Drilon expressed his misgivings
upon the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of
results. To this end, the COMELEC resolved to deliberate upon the points
raised by Senator Drilon and met en banc to discuss it. Nevertheless, on
the following day, the COMELEC issued its assailed Resolution 6712
approving the electronic transmission of results.
When apprised of the said resolution, the National Citizens Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL), and the heads of the major political parties as
petitioners-in-intervention, wrote the COMELEC detailing their respective
concerns. When it went unheeded, they resolved to file an action against
COMELEC.
In assailing the validity of the questioned resolution, the petitioners aver
that there is no provision under RA 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC
to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters
(Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results
(Phase III). Even assuming for the nonce that all the three (3) phases
are duly authorized, they must complement each other as they are not
distinct and separate programs but mere stages of one whole scheme.
Consequently, considering the failed implementation of Phases I and II,
there is no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to still push through
and pursue with Phase III.
In addition, the other petitioners-in-intervention point to several
constitutional infractions occasioned by the assailed resolution. They
advance the view that the assailed resolution effectively preempts the
sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.
Further, as there has been no appropriation by Congress for the
respondent COMELEC to conduct an unofficial electronic transmission of
results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said
purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC Resolution 6712 void
HELD:
Yes, it is; the assailed resolution has no constitutional or statutory basis.
That respondent COMELEC is the sole body tasked to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall and to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections is not questioned. However, the
duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution, RA 7166, and other
election laws are to be carried out, at all times, in its official capacity.
There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent
COMELEC to undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results,
whether manually or electronically, for in conducting such unofficial
tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the
level of a private organization and spends public funds for the purpose.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the AES process is mutually
dependent upon the other; one cannot exist if the others do not. Since
the court has already scrapped the contract for Phase II of the AES, the
COMELEC cannot as of yet implement the Phase III of the program.
On the matters pointed out by the petitioners-in-intervention, the
assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of
election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of
President and Vice-President. The contention of the COMELEC that its
tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and RA 8436
because it is unofficial is unacceptable, for if the COMELEC is proscribed
from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President
and Vice-President, all the more it is prohibited from making an unofficial
canvass of said votes.
In addition, the assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the
constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. By its very terms,
the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results
projected under Resolution No. 6712 is unofficial in character, meaning

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government
or government body. Thus, any disbursement of public funds to
implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution
and RA 9206, the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the
COMELECs savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI,
Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution for the power to augment from
savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this case, no law has,
thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer
savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund
the assailed resolution.
Furthermore, the assailed resolution disregards existing laws which
authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
the accredited citizens arm (NAMFREL) is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an unofficial counting of the
votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity,
including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of
the election returns for purposes of conducting an unofficial count.
However, in contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes
the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the second or third copy
intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced unofficial precinct results. This not only violates
the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an unofficial count, but
also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns,
as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of
custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.
Moreover, Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by
the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not
cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for
unofficial tabulations of votes. In fact, the COMELEC even failed to notify
the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and
electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the
use of such devices. Since Resolution No. 6712 was made effective
immediately a day after its issuance on April 28, 2004, the respondent
COMELEC could not have possibly complied with the thirty-day notice
requirement provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code.
This indubitably violates the constitutional right to due process of the
political parties and candidates.
Lastly, as correctly observed by the petitioner, there is a great possibility
that the unofficial results reflected in the electronic transmission under
the supervision and control of the COMELEC would significantly vary from
the results reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter follows the
procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code, which is markedly
different from the procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution.
Resultantly, the official and unofficial canvass, both to be administered by
the respondent COMELEC, would most likely not tally and, as a
consequence, would most likely undermine the electoral process. The
only intimated utility claimed by the COMELEC for the unofficial electronic
transmission count is to avert the so-called dagdag-bawas, but this
purpose, however, as the petitioner properly characterizes it, is a total
sham.
The Court cannot accept as tenable the COMELECs profession that from
the results of the unofficial count, it would be able to validate the
credibility of the official tabulation. To sanction this process would in
effect allow the COMELEC to preempt or prejudge an election question or
dispute which has not been formally brought before it for quasi-judicial
cognizance and resolutions. Even if this reason were disregarded, the
problem with dagdag-bawas is one which stems from human
intervention.
In the prevailing set up, there is human intervention because the results
are manually tallied, appreciated, and canvassed. On the other hand, the
electronic transmission of results is not entirely devoid of human

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


intervention. The crucial stage of encoding the precinct results in the
computers prior to the transmission requires human intervention. Under
the assailed resolution, encoding is accomplished by employees of the
PMSI; thus, the problem of dagdag-bawas could still occur at this
particular stage of the process. Nothing would have changed regardless if
Phase III were implemented.
Note:
MANUAL COUNTING PROCESS IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Under the Omnibus Election Code, after the votes are cast and the polls
closed, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for each precinct is
enjoined to publicly count the votes and record the same simultaneously
on the tally boards and on two sets of Election Returns.
Each set of the ER is prepared in eight (8) copies. After the ERs are
accomplished, they are forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC), which would canvass all the ERs and proclaim the elected
municipal officials.
All the results in the ERs are transposed to the statements of votes
(SOVs) by precinct. These SOVs are then transferred to the certificates of
canvass (COCs) which are, in turn, brought to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC). Subsequently, the PBC would canvass all the COCs
from various municipalities and proclaim the elected provincial officials,
including those to the House of Representatives.
The PBC would then prepare two sets of Provincial Certificates of Canvass
(PCOCs). One set is forwarded to Congress for its canvassing of the
results for the President and Vice-President. The other set is forwarded to
the COMELEC for its canvassing of the results for Senators.
As the results are transposed from one document to another, and as
each document undergoes the procedure of canvassing by various Boards
of Canvassers, election returns and certificates of canvass are objected to
and at times excluded and/or deferred and not tallied, long after the preproclamation controversies are resolved by the canvass boards and the
COMELEC.
CERAFICA vs. COMELEC
GR 205136 December 2, 2014
DOCTRINE: Substitution should be upheld. Olivia complied with all the
requirements. First, there was withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the
deadline of filing COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to, and is certified by, the
same political party as Kimberlys. Third, Olivia filed her COC not later
than mid-day of the day of the election.
FACTS:
October 1, 2012 Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor,
City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born
October 29, 1992 or that she was 20 years of age on the day of the
elections in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least
23 years of age on the day of elections as stated in in Sec 9, RA 8487
(Charter of the City of Taguig). Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory
hearing due to the age qualification, but instead, Kimberly filed a sworn
Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, December 18, 2012
Olivia filed her COC as a substitute of Kimberly.
Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra of Comelec Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and consequently, the
denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Under Comelec Resolution
9551, it was as if no COC was filed by Kimberly, thus, she cannot be
substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of Comelec, Kimberlys COC
was cancelled and substitution by Olivia was denied as recommended by
Dir. Amora-Ladra. Olivia the filed a Petition for Certiorari
Comelec contended that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as
the latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible
because of her age and that the COC Kimberly filed was invalid on
ground of material representation relating to her eligibility. On the other

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


hand, Olivia contend that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run
because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC
and was an official candidate who may be substituted. There was no
ground to cancel and deny Kimberlys COC on ground of lack of
qualification and material representation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify as councillor and there was no
deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which was precisely why
she withdrew her COC upon learning she was not qualified.
ISSUE:
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in the cancellation of
Kimberlys COC and denial of substitution by Olivia
HELD:
Yes. Under Sec 78, BP 881 Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of COCs. It has no discretion to give or not give
due course to COCs. While it may look into patent defects in the COCs, it
may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility of a candidate is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
Comelec.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the
procedure of substitution of candidates, to wit:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to,
and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election
day of the election.
Olivia complied with all the requirements. First, there was withdrawal of
Kimberlys COC, after the deadline of filing COCs. Second, Olivia belongs
to, and is certified by, the same political party as Kimberlys. Third, Olivia
filed her COC not later than mid-day of the day of the election. In the
case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party, thus,
she can be validly substituted.
Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Dir Amora-Ladra and
absent any petition to deny due course to cancel the COC, the Court finds
Comelec once more gravely abused its discreyion. The Court reminds
Comelec that, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers,
the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division
and, upon motion for reconsideration, by En Banc.
AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC
GR 147066 March 26, 2001
DOCTRINES:
a. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
b. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election.
c.
COMELEC performed its constitutional task to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of
voters
FACTS:
I Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Comelec
to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around 4
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters Only. The rationale for the
additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and
interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent
political events in the country among our youth.
Comm. Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Exec. Dir.
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the
exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the
request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Sec. 8 of
R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of which
reads: Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission
RESOLVED to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino Javier and Mehol Sadain voted to deny the request
while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to
accommodate the students request. With this impasse, the Commission
construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed
before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus which
seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to
declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional since it causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly
situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001
General Elections.
ISSUE:
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing resolution
HELD:
No. Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 8189 provides No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated
to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election that
even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply
performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions
relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC
merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which
squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated
powers.
Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power of
discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly
conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


province of respondent COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the
fundamental law with independence.
GOH vs. COMELEC
GR 212584 November 25, 2014
DOCTRINE:
In connection with its power to enforce and administer laws relative to
the conduct of a recall, COMELEC is not only guaranteed the fiscal
autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment
items in its appropriations from its savings.
FACTS:
On 17 March 2014, Alroben Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall
petition against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence brought
about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and
other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual
dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. It
found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but suspended
the funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the
funding issue.
On 28 April 2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Clarification which prayed for the
dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit.
Goh filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Lift Suspension to
immediately carry out the publication of the recall petition, the
verification process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron.
On 27 May 2014, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882 which
suspends further proceedings on recall because the COMELEC had no
appropriation in the 2014 GAA
The power of recall for loss of confidence is exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs. It is subject to the following limitations
provided for by law: (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence;
and (b) [n]o recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular election. Because of the cost implications involved, the
achievability of pursuing a recall proceeding to its conclusion will depend
on the availability of funds at the disposal of the Commission on
Elections.
Resolution No. 9882 was signed. Goh filed the present Petition on 6 June
2014.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC Resolutions 9864 and 9882 are valid
HELD:
We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line
item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional
mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for
supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power
to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." It
not only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its
head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from
its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC
Chairman.

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Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the
2014 GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of
recall elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides
for a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall
elections. This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget,
which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a "line item for
the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites.'" When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for
its "Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes
expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the
conduct of recall elections.
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that
the COMELEC has "a line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of
elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" This admission of the
COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary
appropriation. To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific
amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be specific
even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same
nature. For example, the purpose can be to '"conduct elections," which
even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall
elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund
elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly
stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.
To afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use
of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of
a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an
item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned.
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in
this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of
the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriation balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; and (iii) from appropriation balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required
or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser
cost.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. There are
three (3) requisites for the valid exercise of the power to augment,
namely: (1) There must be a law authorizing the Chairman to augment;
(2) There must be a deficient existing line item in the general
appropriations law to be augmented; and (3) There must be savings on
the part of the Commission.
Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient funds
from its current line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision
of recall votes to conduct an actual recall election, then there is
therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC
Chairman's power to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the
"Conduct and supervision of recall votes in its budget appropriation.
Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the
COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct ofrecall."
Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient,
then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such
line item appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this
augmentation is expressly authorized ]n the 2014 GAA.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
GR. 192474 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012
DOCTRINE: The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests Comelec of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative, At
this point, the HRET assumes jurisdiction
FACTS:
In May 2007, Romeo Jalosjos, Jr., ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008, he began occupying the house.
After 8 months or on May 6, 2009, Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of
his voter's registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans
Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr., opposed the application. The ERB approved
Jalosjos' application and denied Erasmo's opposition.
Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered
voters of Precinct 0051F before the MCTC. The MCTC rendered judgment
excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question. The
MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan
since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed to
the RTC which affirmed the MCTC decision.
The CA granted the application of Jalojos and enjoined MCTC and RTC
from enforcing their decisions. His name was reinstated in the Barangay
Veterans Village's voters list pending the resolution of the petition.
On Nov. 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his COC for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May
10, 2010 National Elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course to
cancel his COC before the Comelec claiming that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second Division of the COMELEC
dismissed Erasmos petitions.
While Erasmos MR was pending before the Comelec En Banc, the May
10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos' winning the elections.
He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
On June 3, 2010, the Comelec En Banc granted Erasmos MR and
declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative. It held that
Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to
hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
ISSUE:
WON the Comelec En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos
ineligible for the position of Representative for the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay
HELD:
Yes. While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all
questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does
not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the
appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.

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ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010,
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still
passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for
the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay.

Moreover, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be


made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied with.

REYES vs. COMELEC


GR 207261 June 25, 2014

2. It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly


adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings
in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC. Furthermore, there was no denial of
due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity
to argue her case before the COMELEC. Also, in administrative
proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be
given the opportunity or right to be heard.

DOCTRINES:
1. The COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission.
2. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. To be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be
a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Here, the petitioner
cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. Thus, until such
time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to
admit new evidence, since he found an article, which shows that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport. The
COMELEC First Division subsequently ruled against petitioner and
cancelled her COC on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
COMELEC en banc.
Four days after the en banc decision, petitioner was declared winner of
the 2013 elections. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution declaring its decision against petitioner as final and executory.
On the same day, petitioner took her oat of allegiance before the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner asserts that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has jurisdiction over her,
and not the COMELEC. This belief is pursuant to pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner further alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it took cognizance of newly-discovered evidence without the
same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence.
ISSUES:
1. WON COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
2. WON petitioner was denied due process
HELD:
1. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction. First, the HRET does not acquire
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. To be considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office. Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not
yet assumed office. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.

SAHALI vs. COMELEC


GR 201796 June 15, 2013
DOCTRINES:
1. Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election
cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC
only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc,
not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof. This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. (Not
absolute; see ruling for exceptions)
2. The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia does not mean that the
COMELEC First Division is barred from issuing an order for the
conduct. The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the
technical examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases
stems from its exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials.
FACTS:
Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of
the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province
of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman
(Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor wherein the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as
the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the
province. Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with
the COMELEC both of which prayed for the technical examination of the
ballots, Election Day Computerized Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters
Registration Record (VRR), and the Book of Voters in all the protested
precincts of the province of Tawi-Tawi.
COMELEC issued an Order which directed the retrieval and delivery of the
ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested clustered precincts as
well as the election paraphernalia therein. COMELEC First Division
ordered the recount of the contested ballots, directing the creation of five
recount committees for the said purpose. Private respondents Matba and
Usman averred that, instead of recounting the ballots in the pilot
precincts constituting 20% of the protested precincts, the COMELEC First
Division should order the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the subject of both
election protests filed by them.
Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong
Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration arguing
that: (1) COMELEC First Division cannot just order a technical
examination in the absence of published rules on the matter. The First
Division denied the motion for reconsideration ruling that the intention of
respondents to ask for a technical examination of the said election

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documents had always been apparent from the filing of their separate
election protests.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC First Division is authorize to order technical
examinations of the said election paraphernalia despite the lack of
sanction and published rules governing such examination
HELD:
Petition is denied. Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to
review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division
thereof.
Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were
merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the
main case. Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the
decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by
Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the
same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.
Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the
following circumstances are present:
first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the
controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and
consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of
the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc
The Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 1, Rule 18 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct
of technical examination of election paraphernalia. However, it does not
mean that the COMELEC First Division does not have the power to order
the conduct of such technical examination.
The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia does not mean that the
COMELEC First Division is barred from issuing an order for the conduct.
The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical
examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from
its exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city
officials. COMELEC First Division did not commit any abuse of discretion
when it allowed the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia.
GALANG vs. GERONIMO
GR 192793 February 22, 2011
DOCTRINE: In election cases involving an act or an omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively
with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS:
During the May 2010 Automated Elections, petitioner Festo Galang was
proclaimed the winner of the mayoralty race for the Municipality of
Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. Such proclamation was based on the
Certificate of Canvass (COC) and with the approval of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) Chairman but without the official signed
Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). Subsequently, private
respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the
same election, requested COMELEC to conduct a manual reconciliation of
the votes cast to which the latter acceded to by issuing Res# 8923.
During the time manual reconciliation was being done, the 8 winning SB
Members were also proclaimed. As for the COCP for the previously
proclaimed mayoralty and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number of
votes for each of the candidates remained the same even after the

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


manual reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to
read "May 20, 2010" to correspond with the date of the manual
reconciliation
Once respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before
the RTC, the court sheriff went to petitioners residence the next day to
serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of
Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on
petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with
a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence.
With that, petitioner, together with his counsel, Atty. Perez, appeared in
court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election
protest. Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, to which was attached
his Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim. One of his
affirmative defenses was that the electoral protest was filed out of time,
since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the date of proclamation
of the winning candidate.
The trial court then issued an order finding the service of Summons on
petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer as filed out
of time.
On July 12, 2010, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore
Protestee's Standing in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending
Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of the
COMELEC. However, the trial court denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
alleging that respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's Service of Summons on
May 28, 2010 on a person not residing in petitioner's residence.
On the other hand, respondents pointed out that the petition for
certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Geronimo act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding
the service of Summons valid
HELD:
NO, the Court DISMISSED the petition because in election cases involving
an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
The question then is, would taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari
questioning an interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an
electoral protest case be considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of
the COMELEC? The Court finds in the affirmative.
The phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" means that if a case may
be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. A court
may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders
or decisions of the lower court.
Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:
Sec. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of
appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by
counsel.
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an
appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests

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involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to
issue said extraordinary writ.
FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
DOCTRINE: "Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the
municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional
trial court. The decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC."
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as
having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989
elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However,
his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed
second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed
him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two
votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which
affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four
votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or
initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided
equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate
for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by
2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the
ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on
Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to
it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of
fact shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the
COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679
HELD:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and
more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal
or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions
in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the
decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been
appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly,
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of
the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
LLOREN vs. COMELEC
GR 196355 September 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
An election protest must contain a statement of, among others, the total
number of precincts in the municipality.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bienvenido William Lloren (Lloren) and respondent Rogelio
Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the
winning candidate with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682 votes
as
against
Llorens
4,930
votes.
Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in
all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election- related
manipulations, Lloren commenced an election protest before the RTC.
Lloren, however, failed to indicate in his petition the total number of
precincts in the municipality where he ran as vice-mayor. Thus, the RTC
dismissed the election protest for insufficiency in form and substance.
Both the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc dismissed
Llorens appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Llorens election protest should prosper
HELD:
Petitioners election protest lacks merit.
Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently
provides as follows: Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition.
xxxx c. An election protest shall also state: (ii) the total number of
precincts in the municipality.
As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the total
number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The
omission rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content,
and warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, to wit: (b) The petition is
insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10.
NOLLEN vs. COMELEC
GR 187635 January 11, 2011
DOCTRINE:
If the appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower
courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required
to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP
3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200
within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed.
FACTS:
Respondent Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were
candidates for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the
October 29, 2007 barangay elections. Having garnered four hundred and
fifty-six (456) votes as against the four hundred and forty-eight (448)
votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was declared as the punong barangayelect.
Dissatisfied with the result, Caballes instituted an election protest with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sariaya, Quezon. On June 3, 2008, the
MTC rendered a decision declaring protestant Caballes as punong
barangay-elect, having garnered four hundred fifty-six (456) votes, or
five (5) votes more than the four hundred fifty-one (451) votes of Nollen.
Nollen filed an appeal to COMELEC which dismissed Nollens appeal for his
failure to pay the appeal fee of PhP 3,000 prescribed by Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the reglementary
period of five (5) days.
From the above order, Nollen moved for reconsideration, praying for the
liberal interpretation of the rules, but stating in the same breath that his
PhP 1,000 appeal fee payment was sufficient to perfect his appeal.[3] To
still require him to pay the additional amount of PhP 3,000 as appeal fee
and a bailiff fee of PhP 200 on top of what he already paid the MTC,
would amount, so he claimed, to a denial of his right to due process. On
October 6, 2008, Nollen, despite his earlier avowal to pay his deficiency
only if the COMELEC En Banc would reconsider the dismissal order of the
First Division, paid the poll bodys Cash Division the amount of PhP 3,200.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


By Resolution[4] dated April 2, 2009, the COMELEC En Banc denied
Nollens motion for reconsideration on the rationalization that, while he
timely filed his notice of appeal and simultaneously paid the PhP 1,000
appeal fee with the MTC on June 5, 2008, the appeal would be deemed
duly registered and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to
the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELECin first dismissing Nollens appeal from the MTC and
then denying his motion for reconsiderationacted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in
excess, of jurisdiction
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding the payment of
the appeal fee, a discussion of the application of the recent Divinagracia
v. COMELEC to election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia explained the purpose of
Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC issued to
clarify existing rules and address the resulting confusion caused by the
two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC. Divinagracia stressed that
if the appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower
courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required
to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP
3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200
within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed.The
Court went on to state in Divinagracia that Aguilar did not dilute the force
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the
COMELEC-required appeal fees. The resolution, to reiterate, was mainly
issued to clarify the confusion caused by the requirement of payment of
two appeal fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that for
notice of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the
matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in
election cases are no longer excusable.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the warning given in
Divinagracia is inapplicable to the case at bar, since the notice of appeal
in the instant case was filed on June 5, 2008. In the strict legal
viewpoint, Divinagracia contextually finds applicability only in cases
where notices of appeal were filed at least after the promulgation of the
Divinagracia decision on July 27, 2009. Since petitioner paid the appeal
fee of PhP 1,000 simultaneously with his filing of his notice of appeal on
June 5, 2008, the appeal is considered perfected pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 8654, taking it beyond the ambit of Divinagracia. Again,
petitioners failure to pay the remaining PhP 3,200 within the prescribed
period cannot be taken against him, since the COMELEC failed to notify
him regarding the additional appeal fee, as provided by Resolution No.
8654. Although Nollen, following superseded jurisprudence, failed to pay
the filing fee on time, he nonetheless voluntarily paid the remaining PhP
3,200 appeal fee on October 6, 2008. We, thus, credit him for remitting
the amount of PhP 3,200, which, applying extant rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, cannot be considered as having been belatedly paid.
Hence, his petition should be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of
the COMELEC First Division dated September 22, 2008 and the
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated April 2, 2009 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC for its review of
the assailed June 3, 2008 MTC decision.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA
GR 118861 April 27, 1995
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality
of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning
candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election
protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial
court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won
with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered
judgement in favor of the petitioner.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was
later on given a due course by the trial court. The petitioner then filed
with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court
granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the
opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution
was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion
for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The private respondent
then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul
the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC granted the
petition on February 9, 1995, ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is
ordered restored to her position as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that
there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO
GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA
ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases.
ISSUE:
WON the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases
where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
HELD:
(Summary) Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect
but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IXC of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put,
the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
(Detailed)
We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The
repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December
3, 1985), provides:

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Sec. 282.Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise
known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed.

All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby
repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg.

20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook


of
Regions
IX
and
XII.
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.Implied
repeal of statutes is frowned upon
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed
after the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the
provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act
shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa
Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa
which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution. While that
may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for
the particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting
constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be
applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P.
Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial
functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted
by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate
jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court,
Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting
opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in election cases should properly be limited to decisions,
orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the
Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess,
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging
its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court
of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the
determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the
Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under
paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
BALAJONDA vs. COMELEC
GR 166032 February 28, 2005

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Francisco (Francisco) was 420 votes. Thereafter, Francisco filed a petition
for election protest. In response, Balajonda alleged that Franciscos
petition stated no cause of action and that the allegations of electoral
fraud and irregularities were baseless. The MeTC ordered the revision of
ballots in 69 ballot boxes and thus, the ballots in 39 precincts were
revised.
After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest upon a finding that Balajonda still
led Francisco by 418 votes, prompting Francisco to file a motion for
reconsideration. The COMELEC, after due hearing, granted said motion
and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution, ordering Balajonda to
cease and desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman
and to relinquish said office to Francisco. Balajonda then argued that the
COMELEC may order the immediate execution only of the decision of the
trial court but not its own decision.
ISSUE:
WON the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate
execution of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay
chairmanship
HELD:
Petition dismissed.
The Court, in the case of Batul v. Bayron, affirmed a similar order of the
COMELEC directing the immediate execution of its own judgment.
Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the
procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is
no reason to dispute the authority of the COMELEC to do so, considering
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect.
Batul is different from this case in that in Batul the decision subject of the
order of immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, while the decision in this case was
promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no
reason to dispose of this petition in a manner different from Batul. The
public policy underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is
to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined
by either the courts or the COMELEC.
Towards that end, we have consistently employed liberal construction of
procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Balajondas argument is anchored on a simplistic, literalist
reading of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 that barely makes sense, especially in the
light of the COMELECs specialized and expansive role in relation to
election cases.
CAWASA vs. COMELEC
GR 150469 July 3, 2002
DOCTRINES:
1. As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be
the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes
may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the
precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the
COMELEC after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC
which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and
hearing.

DOCTRINE: The judgments which may be executed pending appeal


need not be only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC
as well.

2. Clearly, the BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members,


all of whom are public school teachers. If there are not enough public
school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil
service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be
appointed.

FACTS:
Elenita Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman having won in the barangay elections held the
previous day. Her margin of victory over private respondent Maricel

FACTS:
Cawasa and Manamparan candidates for the office of mayor of
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. Out of the forty precincts in Nunungan, only
thirty-six functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


four precincts. Special elections were set considering that the number of
registered voters in the remaining four precincts would affect the election
results. The special elections for Precincts of Barangay Bangko were
conducted in the Sultan Naga Dimaporo, Lanao del Norte while those of
Barangay Cabasara and Barangay Liangan were conducted in Sapad,
Lanao del Norte. After the canvassing of the election returns, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates on the
basis of the earlier election returns of the regular elections and the
election returns of the 4 precincts subject of the special elections. Prior to
the special elections the lead of Cawasa was eighty six. After the May 30,
2001 special elections, Manamparan overcame the margin with a lead of
297 votes. Cawasa was proclaimed mayor. Manamparan filed an appeal
and petition to annul the proclamation of Cawasa which was later
dismissed by the COMELEC 2nd division. He then filed a petition for the
Annulment of Election Results of the Special Elections and Annulment of
Canvass and Proclamation. The COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution annulling the results of the special elections as well as the
proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the 4
contested precincts affect the standing of candidates.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of Military
Personnel as Members of the Board of Election Inspectors is valid
2. WON the appointment of military personnel as members of the board
of election inspectors is valid
HELD:
1. No. The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling
places but also Sections 153 and 154 of the Election Code. As clearly
provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as
that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be
initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct
or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the
COMELEC after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC
which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and
hearing. The COMELEC has unequivocally stated that nothing in the
records showed that notice was given to the political candidates and
registered voters affected by the transfer. Private respondent
Manamparan has categorically denied petitioners claim that all the
political parties and municipal candidates agreed to the transfer of
venue. Reliance on Balindong vs. COMELEC and Alonto vs. COMELEC is
misplaced. Alonto involved the transfer of the counting and tallying of
the votes after the closing of the polls from the precincts to the PC
camps. On the other hand Balindong held that the mere fact that the
transfer of polling place was not made in accordance with law does not
warrant a declaration of failure of election and the annulment of the
proclamation of the winning candidate, because the number of uncast
votes will not affect the result of the election. In the case at bar, there
is no dispute that the election returns from the 45 precincts will affect
the results of the elections.
2. No. There was absolutely no legal basis for the appointment of military
personnel as members of the BEI. Verily, the appointments were
devoid of any justification other than the bare assertion, again, that
the political parties and municipal candidates agreed on the said
arrangement. Clearly, the BEI shall be composed of a chairman and
two members, all of whom are public school teachers. If there are not
enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees
in the civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence
may be appointed. It was highly irregular to replace the duly
constituted members of the BEI, who were public school teachers.
Nothing in petitioners pleadings would even suggest that the
substitution was made for cause and after hearing.
DUMARPA vs. COMELEC
GR 192249 April 2, 2013
DOCTRINE:
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965, in the exercise of its plenary
powers in the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the COMELECs broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, carries with it
all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
FACTS:
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del
Sur at the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure
of elections in seven (7) municipalities, including the three (3)
Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in
the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of
special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was
originally scheduled for 29 May 2010. On 25 May 2010, COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3
June 2010 because aside from the reported seven (7) municipalities
where there are total failure of elections, there are precincts in eight (8)
other municipalities where there were failure of elections, and the results
of elections in the said municipalities will affect the elections not only in
the provincial level (Congressman, Vice-Governor and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan) but also in the municipal level.
Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed resolution,
Resolution 8965 which provided, among others, the constitution of
Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of
Precincts in Section 12. A day before the scheduled special elections, on
2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition alleging that "both
provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of
SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the
Muncipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to
certain defeat, if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the
Honorable Supreme Court."
The court did not issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, the special elections on 3 June 2010

proceeded as scheduled.

ISSUE:
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Section 4 and
Section 12 in said Resolution No. 8965
HELD:
No. Indeed, the special elections held on 3 June 2010 mooted the issues
posed by Dumarpa. The opponent of Dumarpa, Hussin Pangandaman,
was proclaimed winner in the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur.
We see this as a supervening event which, additionally, mooted the
present petition as the issues raised herein are resolvable in the election
protest. In any event, the petition is unmeritorious. COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8965, in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct
of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no
argument that the COMELECs broad power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, carries with it all necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Dumarpa objects to the re-clustering of precincts, only for the
Municipality of Masiu, because it was undertaken: (1) without notice and
hearing to the candidates affected; (2) in less than thirty days before the
conduct of the special elections; and (3) the polling place was reduced
from 21 to only 3 voting centers which Dumarpas opponent,
Representative Hussin Pangandaman, controls. As regards the
designation of SBEIs, Dumarpa points out that "public school teachers
who are members of the board of election inspectors shall not be relieved
nor disqualified from acting as such members, except for cause and after
due hearing."
Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that
COMELEC Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on reclustering of the precincts and the designation of special board of
election inspectors, was issued precisely because of the total failure of

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur, a
total of fifteen (15) Municipalities where there was a failure of elections.
Notably, the COMELECs declaration of a failure of elections is not being
questioned by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections on the reclustering of precincts, and only as regards the Municipality of Masiu.
Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of
elections in the fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del
Sur that the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 8965. The
COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best
position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make
judgment calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap
judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert
the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be
impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. The COMELEC actually
closely followed Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code by scheduling
the special election not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of
the cause of the failure to elect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Cost against petitioner Salic
Dumarpa.
III.

PARTY-LIST (RA 7941)

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC


GR 190582 April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition
for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral
grounds. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered a nuisance. In
fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its
Article 201.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First
Resolution, stating that the party-list system is a tool for the realization
of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the
nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that. That the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed
this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under
RA 7941
HELD:
YES. Respondent mistakenly opines that the Courts ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general
application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation.
1. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
2. The Court also finds the COMELECs reference to purported violations
of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are
a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a
civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It
hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
3. As such, the Court hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of
the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioners
application for party-list accreditation.
PH GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC vs. COMELEC
GR 190529 April 29, 2010
DOCTRINE: The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language
of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. seeks to nullify Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI
from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941)

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC


may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on
October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups
or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the
votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI
filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through
its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as
a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act.

One of the arguments of petitioner is that The Supreme Courts ruling in


G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also
known as MINERO v. Commission on Elections cannot apply in the instant
controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the
opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 OTHERS similarly
affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement
of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts ruling in Banat v.
COMELEC and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. COMELEC denied the motion
and pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO
failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the
2004 elections.
ISSUE:
WON there is legal basis for delisting PGBI
HELD:
According to the Supreme Court the MINERO doctrine is an erroneous
application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified

complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of

the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a

disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing


from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the
plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of

Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations


clearly show and thus MINERO simply cannot stand. ts basic defect lies in
its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in
an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote.
What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of
the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the
law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for
delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional
terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers
of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in
two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood
and applied.
COCOFED vs. COMELEC
GR 207026 August 6, 2013
DOCTRINE: Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the
election warrants the cancellation of its registration. The law expressly
requires the submission of a list containing at least five qualified
nominees. COCOFEDs failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite
ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable
to the party.
FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party whose membership
comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and
producers. COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the
names of only two nominees Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee)
and Atty. Domingo P. Espina.
COMELEC cancelled COCOFEDs registration and accreditation as a partylist organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of
Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that since
COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with
Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires the party to submit
to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees. COCOFED submitted
the names of Charles R. Avila, in substitution of Atty. Espina, as its
second nominee and Efren V. Villaseor as its third nominee.
COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELECs cancellation
of its registration and accreditation but by reason of the status quo ante
order issued by the Court, COCOFEDs name was included in the printing
of the official ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.
On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc.,
etc., et al. v. Commission on Elections.9The Court remanded all the
petitions to the COMELEC to determine their compliance with the new
parameters and guidelines set by the Court in that case. In Atong
Paglaum, the Court ruled: COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
However, COMELEC maintained its earlier ruling cancelling COCOFEDs
registration and accreditation. The COMELEC noted that all existing partylist groups or organizations were on notice as early as February 8, 2012
(when Resolution No. 9359 was promulgated) that upon submission of
their respective manifestations of intent to participate, they also needed
to submit a list of five nominees. During the hearing on August 23, 2012,
the COMELEC pointed out to COCOFED that it had only two nominees.
ISSUE:
WON COCOFED should be registered and accredited by COMELEC
HELD:
NO. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election
warrants the cancellation of its registration. The law expressly requires
the submission of a list containing at least five qualified nominees.
COCOFEDs failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample
opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to the
party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941. With the date and manner of
submission of the list having been determined by law a condition
precedent for the registration of new party-list groups or for participation
in the party-list elections in case of previously registered party-list
groups, and was in fact reiterated by the COMELEC through its
resolutions COCOFED cannot now claim good faith, much less dictate

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


its own terms of compliance. A party-list groups previous registration
with the COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of its
registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance
status, the party must prove not only its continued possession of the
requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the
basic requirements of the law. The Court had already ruled that the
registration of party-list groups involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative power, particularly its power to enforce and administer all
laws related to elections.
While COCOFED could have complied after the elections (as it in fact
did), it should have, at the very least, submitted an explanation justifying
its inability to comply prior to the elections. However, COCOFED simply
chose to ignore the law; this, to us, is a plain disregard of the
administrative requirement warranting the cancellation of its registration.
Most importantly, the required publication satisfies the peoples
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The need
for submission of the complete list required by law becomes all the more
important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the
individuals behind the party they are voting for. If only to give meaning
to the right of the people to elect their representatives on the basis of an
informed judgment, then the party-list group must submit a complete list
of five nominees because the identity of these five nominees carries
critical bearing on the electorates choice. A post-election completion of
the list of nominees defeats this constitutional purpose.
Even if a party-list group can only have a maximum of three seats, the
requirement of additional two nominees actually addresses the
contingencies that may happen during the term of these party-list
representatives. While the law allows the submission of additional
nominees once the list is exhausted, the exhaustion of the list
presupposes prior compliance with the requirement of Section 8 of RA
No. 7941.
We cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply
with the statutory requirement.1wphi1The party-list system is a
constitutional innovation that would expand opportunities for electoral
participation to those who cannot hope to win in the legislative district
elections, but who may generate votes nationwide equivalent to what a
winner in the legislative district election would garner. In short, the
party-list system operates on the theoretical assumption that a party-list
group has national constituency whose interests, concerns, or ideologies
call for representation in the House of Representatives. We quote with
approval the COMELECs observation:
If the party cannot even come up with a complete list of five names out
of a purported more than one million members, then it is highly doubtful
that COCOFED will meet this expectation to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of legislation that is beneficial for the nation as a whole;
and if it cannot even name at least three more people who belongs to, or
with sufficient advocacy for, the sector sought to be represented then as
a sectoral party or organization, it has already forsaken what it seeks to
represent.
ANAD vs. COMELEC
GR 206987 September 10, 2013
DOCTRINE: Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 (An Act

Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the PartyList System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor) is essential as the said
provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute and replace
its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after
submission of the list to the COMELEC.
Allowing the party-list
organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission
of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency.
FACTS: A petition was filed in Court seeking to compel the COMELEC to
canvass the voted cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy (ANAD) in the 2013 Party-List Elections.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution
canceling petitioners Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on
the following grounds:
1. ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7941
2. ANAD had only three (3) nominees; hence, it failed to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No.
9366.
3. ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
for the 2007 National and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of RA
No. 7166.
On 11 May 2013, the COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as
a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political constituencies, its
disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations,
particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its
failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC decision in disqualifying ANAD in 2103 Party-List
Elections is valid.
HELD: Yes. ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its
qualifications during the summary hearing of 23 August 2012, during
which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to
establish said qualifications. In re-evaluating ANADs qualifications in
accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
COMELEC, the COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing.
The COMELEC could, as in fact it did, readily resort to documents and
other pieces of evidence previously submitted by petitioners in reappraising ANADs qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the
qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the
summary hearing of 23 August2012 continued until election day and
even there after.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only
three nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the
said provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness. Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order
of the nominees, after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec, the Court stated the importance of Sec.8 of R.A.
No. 7941 in the following manner:

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason


on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the
submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list
organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not
the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization,
but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of
the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a partylist system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the
right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization
are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers
of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters
to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the partylist organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission
of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency.
The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the
possibility of such circumvention.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Lastly, the COMELEC also noted ANADs failure to submit a proper
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS vs.
COMELEC
GR 206844-45 July 23, 2013
FACTS:
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS
as a party-list organization. The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed
an agreement in 2010, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the
list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained
an agreement on who among the candidates will serve the terms
according to the power sharing agreement. After the May 10, 2010
elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list
candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives.
The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the
second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). The
split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after
when on November 30, 2010 Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS
by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza. Thenceforth,
the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter
rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership
of the organization.
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter dated December 8, 2011 that
the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his
resignation. By virtue of such resignation and as provided under their
agreement, Rep. Arquiza stated that its fourth nominee shall assume
position since their third nominee, Datol, has been previously expelled in
their party. However, on March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of
SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board
Resolution No. 003-2012, which recalled the acceptance of the
resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and
change of mind, hence allow him to continue his term subject to
conditions stated above. Thereafter the Arquiza Group previously
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was
opposed by the Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.
After hearing of the petition of the Arquiza Group, the COMELEC En Banc
issued a Resolution dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS. The
Comelec ruled that the resignation of Kho, pursuant to the party
nominees term-sharing agreement, cannot be recognized and be given
effect. Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in
writing of the nominee of his nomination is one of the three (3)
exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the
order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC. The COMELEC said that the term of office of
public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private
parties. Second, the COMELEC said that the list and order of nominees,
after submission to this Commission, is meant to be permanent. The
legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3)
enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee
becomes incapacitated. By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered
the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS because it
allegedly failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This
failure is a ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 7941 which states: The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it violates or fails to comply
with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
Hence, the petitions. The Datol Group argues that the public policy
prohibiting term sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively
to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its
retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or
resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the
Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the
2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the
organization's registration and accreditation because the nominees never
actually implemented the agreement. In like manner, the Arquiza Group
vehemently stresses that no term sharing actually transpired between the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior
arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-sharing
agreement, the same did not materialize given that the resignation of
Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of
SENIOR CITIZENS.
ISSUES:
WON respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it concluded that
petitioner violated public policy on term sharing
HELD:
YES, RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON
TERM SHARING.
Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is
entrusted with the function to register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government. In
fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of
registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already registered in
order to ensure the latter's continuous adherence to the requirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their
qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections. The Court
finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is
that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not
implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during
the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M.
No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was
withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho's
replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M.
No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the termsharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The
COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no
indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing
agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group
insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his
term as a member of the House of Representatives. Curiously, the
COMELEC
is
silent
on
this
point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented
by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list
organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the
COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out
their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule,
or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have
no legal leg to stand on.
Therefore, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack
of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but
to strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST vs. COMELEC
GR 206952 October 22, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator
of likely future performance. There is no basis in law and established
jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the partylist system still need to comply with the track record requirement.
Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration
thereunder must submit evidence to show track record as a group.
FACTS:
Abang Lingkod is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of
peasant farmers and fisherfolk. It participated in the May 2010 elections,
but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House
of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, Abang Lingkod manifested before the COMELEC its
intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia, required
previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for
purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC en banc cancelled Abang Lingkods
registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that Abang Lingkod failed
to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented. It further opined that Abang Lingkod failed to show
that its nominees were themselves marginalized and underrepresented or
that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Abang Lingkod then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its
registration under the party-list system. The said petition was
consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other
party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied
registration under the party-list system.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in
screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration
and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
(12) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests
and concerns of their sector x x x
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously
registered party-list groups, including that of Abang Lingkod, to
determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system
pursuant to the new parameters.
Eventually, the COMELEC still affirmed its cancellation of Abang Lingkods
registration under the party-list system. Moreover, the COMELEC took
notice of the photographs Abang Lingkod submitted as evidence of its
track record. The photographs submitted appeared to have been edited
to show in the banners that Abang Lingkod participated in the activities.
Abang Lingkod initially sought a reconsideration but later withdrew the
same and instituted the instant petition for certiorari considering that the
election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the
COMELEC.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
Abang Lingkods registration under the party-list system
HELD:
Yes. Essentially, Abang Lingkods registration was cancelled on the
ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the
party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track
record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions their
constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the
COMELEC.
Contrary to the COMELECs claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such
as Abang Lingkod, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonen, he opines that sectoral
organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and
underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must
show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.
In such case, only sectoral organizations would be required to present a
track record; while national and regional organizations need not present
their track record as they are only required to submit documentary
evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations. There is no logic
in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional
parties or organizations as regards their bid for registration under the
party-list system.
As regards the photographs submitted by Abang Lingkod, considering
that track record is no longer a requirement, a groups misrepresentation
as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its
registrationit is no longer material to its qualification under the partylist system.
Lastly, the fact that two of Abang Lingkods nominees do not actually
belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in
the cancellation of Abang Lingkods registration as a party list group. It
was stated in Atong Paglaum that national, regional and sectoral
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified." At the very least, Abang Lingkod has three (3) other qualified
nominees, being farmers by occupation.
Abang Lingkod, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three
days prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of
260,215 votes out of the 26,722,131 votes that were cast for the partylist, thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives.
BANAT vs. COMELEC
GR 179271April 21, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act,
a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in
the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats;
if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is
pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the
case ofVeterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if
if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency


(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as
the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes
cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory.
If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be
instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of
party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions
the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the
issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate
in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUES:
1. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
2. WON the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
3. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
4. How are party-list seats allocated?
5. WON major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
6. WON the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a
party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that
there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the
80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220
district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio,
there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) =
Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence, (220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20%
of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is
not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of
the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
Supreme Court explained:
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of
the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This
allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer
be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each,
to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation
as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
political parties
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no
one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC
GR 203766; April 2, 2013
DOCTRINES:
(1) Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines/parameters in
qualifying party-lists which abandoned some principles established in the
cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT

(2) Some of these are:

party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties
party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies
Major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing

FACTS:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations
(Atong Paglaum et al) assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
(See full text to know the complete list of disqualified partylist and
grounds for disqualification)
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of
their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations
HELD:
NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. However, since
the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC
in disqualifying petitioners (the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT),
all the present petitions were remanded to the COMELEC for the latter to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and
to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the
new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
I. What is a Party-list System:
The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives. party-list system is intended
to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win
in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
II. New Parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)


national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list
system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.2
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system
"For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include
in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
written in Section 5(1) and 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:3
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not
more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section
5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that
national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1)
national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations;
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Section 5(2), mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for
sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list
seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms.
This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations


do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
Political party - refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
Sectoral party - refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and causeoriented parties from the party-list system.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political
party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not
be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists
of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.
The following provisions from RA No. 7941 provides compelling reasons
that the law does not require sectoral parties (Sec 5) and national or
regional parties (Sec 6) to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily
"marginalized
and
underrepresented."
For
sure,
"professionals"
are
not
by
definition
"marginalized
and
underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth.
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the
registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once
in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy "to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through the party-list system.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized
and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a
track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his
or her sector, is below the middle class.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they


register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition,
major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since
the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major
political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose
members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in
law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and
members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented.
The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list
elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system."

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and


underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent
those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ABC PARTYLIST vs. COMELEC
GR 193256, March 22, 2011
DOCTRINE: According to Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of
registration of national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions. On the other hand, Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
provides for the jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge on the
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. A party-list
group is not elected into the House of Representatives. The party-list
nominee is elected through a party-list system and occupies a seat as
member of the House of Representatives. While the HRET has the
jurisdiction over party-list nominee, the COMELEC has a distinct
jurisdiction over the cancellation on legal grounds of parties' registration.
FACTS:
On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition
with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of
petitioner ABC Party-Liston the ground that petitioner is a front for a
religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list
group under Section 6 (1)of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise
known
as
the
Party-List
System
Act.
On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition. The dismissal on procedural grounds was
grounded on the lack of proper verification of the petition. According to
the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re:
Forum Shopping and Special Power of Attorney was not duly notarized in
accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended.
Sections 1 and 6, Rule II require that the person appearing before a
notary public must be known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity. In this case, the
"Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification did not contain the name
of private respondent who supposedly appeared before the notary public,
and he was not identified by any competent evidence of identity as
required by the rules on notarial practice. The COMELEC, Second Division
also dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found that
ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from
registration.
However, the COMELEC en banc found that the petitions verification page
substantially complied with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and that
the records of the case showed that the Resolution of the Second
Division was issued without any hearing, contrary to RA No. 7941, which
deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to submit evidence in support of his
petition.
In filing this petition, Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no
longer had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of
registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already
proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10,
2010. Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which
states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition, is applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC had jurisdiction over a petition for cancellation of a
party-list group's registration after said group has been voted for and its
nominee has taken oath

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


RULING:
Yes. Section 2 (5), Article IX-Cof the Constitution grants the COMELEC
the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and
the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The
said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET, in
accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, that has
jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the
party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits
as a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, the jurisdiction of
the HRET is over contests related to the qualifications of a party-list
nominee or representative, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over
petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition. In sum, the COMELEC en banc
had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6
(1) of R.A. No. 7941.
IV.

VOTERS AND CANDIDATES

AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC


GR 147066 March 26, 2001
DOCTRINES:
1. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election.
2. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.
3. COMELEC performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia,
questions relating to the registration of voters
FACTS:
I Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Comelec
to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around 4
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters Only. The rationale for the
additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and
interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent
political events in the country among our youth.
Comm. Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Exec. Dir.
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the
exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the
request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Sec. 8 of
R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of which
reads: Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission
RESOLVED to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino Javier and Mehol Sadain voted to deny the request
while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to
accommodate the students request. With this impasse, the Commission
construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed
before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus which

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to


declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional since it causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly
situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001
General Elections.

the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistios appeal of the MeTC decision


on the ground of non-payment of the required docket fees.

ISSUE:
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing resolution

HELD:
Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881)
echoed in Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act
No. 8189) states the qualifications of a voter.

HELD:
No. Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 8189 provides No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated
to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election that
even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply
performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions
relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC
merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which
squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated
powers.
Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power of
discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly
conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the
province of respondent COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the
fundamental law with independence.
ASISTIO vs. TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE
GR 191124 April 27, 2010
DOCTRINE: The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1)
year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place
where the person proposes or intends to vote. (Sec 117, Omnibus
Election Code; Sec. 9, The Voters Registration Act)
FACTS:
Enrico R. Echiverri filed against Luis A. Asistio (both mayoralty candidates
in Caloocan) a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of
Voters of Caloocan City before the MeTC alleging that Asistio is not a
resident of Caloocan City, specifically not in the address stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon
verification by private respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered
voter of Baranggay 15 but his declared address, in truth, falls under
Baranggay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. Trial on the merits
ensued and Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision directing removal of
the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of
Caloocan City.
An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of
his right to vote. Echiverri, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal,
arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the
ground of failure to file the required appeal fees; petitioner having paid
his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 which was not simultaneous
with the filing of his notice of appeal on February 10, 2010. RTC granted

ISSUE:
WON Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of
[Precinct 1811A, Barangay 15] of Caloocan City for failure to comply with
the residency required by law evidenced by the declaration of a false or
non- existent address

From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least


one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in
the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. "Residence," as
used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable
from a persons acts, activities, and utterances
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for
more than 72 years and his family is known to be among the prominent
political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and
2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of
these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has
qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is
no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had
consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He
should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of
Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
As to the payment of docket fees, the Court observes, that while Judge
Aguirre declares in her Order that the appellate docket fees were paid
only on February 11, 2010 , she conveniently omits to mention that the
postal money orders obtained by Asistio for the purpose were purchased
on February 10, 2010. To the court, Asistio, by purchasing the postal
money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on
February 10, 2010, although they were tendered to the MeTC only on
February 11, 2010 already meant substantial compliance with the
procedural requirements in filing his appeal. Blind adherence to a
technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the
constitutionality guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. Three rules that must be borne in mind (re: domicile):
(1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a
person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.35
Requisites for lost of domicile: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with that purpose.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.The fact that he was elected by the people does not excuse
the patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case,


that the candidate was qualified.

LABO vs. COMELEC


176 SCRA 245

FACTS:
The petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed the governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, represented by
its President, Salvador Estuye, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen since he had already been naturalized in the United States.

DOCTRINE: Qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of


them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements
were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place
on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running
as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

In his answer, the petitioner admitted that he was naturalized in the


United States, but justified his actions only insofar as he sought American
citizenship to protect himself against President Marcos influence. As an
additional point, the petitioner argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, it being a quo warranto petition that should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further added that the
League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and
so could not sue under the said section.
In their comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on 18 January 1988.
Moreover, they clarified that their petition in the Commission on Elections
was not really for quo warrantosince they only wantedto prevent Frivaldo
from continuing as governor since his candidacy and election being null
and void ab initio because of his alienage. Finally, even if assuming that
the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing
not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could
nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone as a private person.
ISSUE:
WON Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position as governor of Sorsogon
HELD:
No, he is not, because he was not a Filipino citizen at the time of the
elections. While the Court saw no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship,it cannot
agree to the argument that that as a consequence thereof, he was forced
to abandon his Filipino citizenship.There were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo and some of them subject to
greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary to resort to his
solution.
Frivaldo likewise contended that he had already been repatriated as a
Filipino by reason of his participation in the elections of the Philippine
government, thereby automatically renouncing his American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. However, such laws do have an
effect on the petitioners citizenship under Philippine laws for it is clear
that the reacquisition of citizenship can only be done by three ways:
(1)direct act of Congress; (2) naturalization;and (3) repatriation.The
alleged forfeiture is between the petitioner and United States as his
adopted country; such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact that
he was elected by the people does not excuse the patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon L. Labo, Jr proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on
January 20, 1988. In this petition, he asks this Court to restrain the
Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship
as a qualification saying it is not the issue. The issue is whether or not
the public respondent, has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this
matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was
not filed on time. However, after the court decided favorably for the
petitioner regarding the technicality of filing a quo warranto, still the
Court proceeded and settled the issue on his citizenship as a qualification
for the assumption of Public Office
Labowas married to an Australian national in 1976but was later on
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous. Independent of the marriage, he was also formally naturalized
as a citizen of Australia, formally took the Oath of Allegiance, made the
Affirmation of Allegiance, obtained an Australian passport, and registered
as an alien with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation upon
his return to the Philippines country in 1980.
Coming back to the Philippines in 1980, He later asked for the change of
his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship and cannot
assume office.
HELD:
Yes. Under CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. Also, contrary to the
petitoners assertion that at worst he can only be considered a dual
national, it is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
His divesture of his Australian citizenship also does not concern the court.
That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What must be
considered is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a
foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been
automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to
any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither
has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration.

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The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.
Lastly, even if the petitioner won by 2100 votes over private respondent,
the electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and
voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed
at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such.
However, private respondent, who was 2nd highest in vote for the
mayoralty position, cannot replace the petitioner for that position. In
Geronimo v. Ramosthe Court ruled that The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
GR 191970 April 24, 2012
DOCTRINE: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates
compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is
a question of intention.Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b)
where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at
age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.He acquired
residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in
the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay
Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted
by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then
filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then
appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.On
November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel
said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one
year residency requirement of the local government code.COMELEC ruled
that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
HELD:
Yes. The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the
position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has
laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains
until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile
at a time.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may
be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from
Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile
in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It
is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in
the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the
house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual
physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the
same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover,
Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
SVETLANA JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
GR 193314 FEBRUARY 26, 2013
DOCTRINE: A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. Where there is no such proof of abandonment, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue.
FACTS:
On November 20, 2009, Petitioner Svetlana filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the May
10, 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence
as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.
Asserting otherwise, private respondents, Tumpag and Estrellada filed
against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely
represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact
born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her
previous domicile, Dapitan City. They presented some documents to
support this claim.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said
barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land
there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs.
Lourdes Yap while she (petitioner) was overseeing the construction of her
house. Furthermore, she asserted that the error in her place of birth was
committed by her secretary. She also presented a number of documents
supporting her claim.
The case remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. She was then
proclaimed as the duly elected municipal mayor.
On June 4, 2010, COMELEC Second Division disqualified petitioner from
running for the position of mayor. On August 19, 2010, COMELEC En
Banc denied her Motion for Reconsideration, holding, among others, that
she did not meet the residency requirement, and that the affiants of the
Sworn Statements (some of the documents petitioner submitted) were all
partial, because they either worked for her or were members of
organizations that received financial assistance from her.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner Svetlana failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials
HELD:
Yes. Svetlana was disqualified. When it comes to the qualifications for
running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile. There
are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice
which must be established by clear and positive proof:
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(b) an intention to remain there; and
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Where there is no such proof of abandonment, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical
date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the
elections using the same standard of evidence. (emphasis in the original)
Petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had
resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May
2010 elections. In fact, there were discrepancies in the Affidavits and
documents she submitted. In one instance, the affiants (construction
workers) asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing.
By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May
2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy.
Tugas.
Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her statement of her eligibility to
run for office constitutes a material misrepresentation that warrants its
cancellation.
With this final determination of her ineligibility to run for office, there is
now a permanent vacancy in the office of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence,
the vice-mayor of Baliangao shall become its mayor in accordance with
Section 44 of the Local Government Code.
VIDAL vs. COMELEC
GR 206666 January 21, 2015
CASE: Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-211 for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention filed by Alfredo S. Lim
(Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for
Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former
President Joseph Ejercito Estradas (former President Estrada)
disqualification to run for and hold public office.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October
25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada
where it was explicitly stated that he is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacyfor the position of President but was opposed by
three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases
prospered and Motions for Reconsideration were denied by Comelec En
Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of
votes last May 10, 2010 synchronized national elections. On October 2,
2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local
elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estradas conviction
for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Petitioner-intervenor
Alfredo Lim who garnered the second highest votes intervened and
sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of
Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance
to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that [former President
Estradas] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the
pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this
Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions
of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources."
Hence, the petitions.
ISSUES:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The
arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or were so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon
is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached
to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. While it may be apparent that
the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter
alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position. Therefore, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
CAASI vs. COMELEC
191 SCRA 229
DOCTRINE:
To qualify to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
office."
FACTS:
The case is about the disqualification of Merito Miguel under Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of
January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the United States (US), not of Bolinao.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of
the US. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order
that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and
to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification.of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
The green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the
respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a
RESIDENT ALIEN.
In the Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, Miguels
answer in one of the questions regarding his length of intended stay was
permanently.
Consequently, the COMELEC, except for one Commissioner, dismissed
the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON Miguel is qualified to run for mayor in the local elections on January
18, 1988
HELD:
No. Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the Philippines because he did not go to
the US merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the US
with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on
that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to
public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881), which provides that any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the
law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must
have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run
for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which
proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had
waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor
of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to
find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective
office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code).
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent
resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of
only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status
or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities
before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18,
1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public
office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
MORENO vs. COMELEC
GR 201796 June 15, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local
elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
FACTS:
Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution that disqualified him
from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running
for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final
judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and
Four (4) Months. Moreno filed an answer aver that he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed including the right to vote and be voted for
in the July 15, 2002 elections.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that
Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay. According to
the Comelec en banc, the Local Government Code provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. The grant of probation to Moreno merely
suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office. Moreno argues
that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to
those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because
the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should
allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because
it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
misconduct.
ISSUE:
WON Moreno should be disqualified
HELD:
The resolution of the present controversy being whether Morenos
sentence was in fact served. The accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then that during the
period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running
for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from
public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged. During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that
[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted. Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon
the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including
the right to run for public office.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted
to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.Thus,
the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are
qualified for probation.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable
offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat
probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be
construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the
Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to probationers.
We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC
GR 198742 August 10, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to reacquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."The application
was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18,
2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba,
La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought
elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position
of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May
13, 2010. Private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and
Luis M. Bautista filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility before the RTC. he petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
ISSUE:
WON "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenshipby taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an
abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under the provisions

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On September 18, 2006, or a
year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath. The language of Section
5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or
she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form
of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms
that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. In fine, R.A. No. 9225
categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized
public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule
applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like
petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not.
It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public
office.
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
GR 195649 July 2, 2013
DOCTRINE: By using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
The logic is that by nullifying his Oath of Renunciation, Arnado was still
beholden to his American citizenship, which under the Local Government
Code was a ground for disqualification as the law expressly disqualifies
those who have dual citizenship from running for local office.
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the
10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."
To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in
his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON Arnado qualified to run for public office

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


HELD:
NO. Arnado cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3,
2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.
However, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados
renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his
U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete
and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the
person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man
without a country". On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado
to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado
is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he
also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only
those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If
we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports,
we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby
effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
EJERCITO vs. COMELEC
GR 212398 November 25, 2014
FACTS:
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC),
which affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division granting the petition for disqualification filed by private
respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio
Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against
Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the
incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. He alleged in his Petition
that:
1. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of
Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification
issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and
marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof;
2. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR
ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. The aggregate amount
that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as
follows:
1. For candidates Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate
of candidacy.
2. For other candidates without any political party and without any
support from any political party Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
3. For Political Parties and party-list groups Five pesos (P5.00) for every
voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it
has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis)

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


1. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of
Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to
FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
2. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision
of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign
for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone,
[Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our
partys official monitoring on the following dates: April 28, May 4 &
May 5, 2013.
3. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed
under the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable
expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549;
4. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito]
committed an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:
"Election Offense. Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second
paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to
administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x"
1. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws." (emphasis ours)
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte
Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and
Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of
Possible Proclamation of Respondent. However, these were not acted
upon by the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez
were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the dulyelected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on
the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310
votes compared with San Luis 471,209 votes.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference
on June 4, 2013. The scheduled case conference between the parties on
June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013. In the latter date, all the
documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and the parties agreed to
file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a
Resolution disqualifying Ejercito from holding the office of the Provincial
Governor of Laguna and to cease and desist from performing the
functions of the office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna. The
COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San
Luis petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito.
ISSUE:
WON the Petitioner should be disqualified for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess of what is allowed by the OEC.
HELD:
Yes. Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN
Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by
an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such
contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized
for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his
consent. Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decided by
the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to
support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his
or her rights of speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section
4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He believes that an advertising
contract paid for by a third party without the candidates knowledge and
consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail
against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence.
Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No.
9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes
no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. He also
stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit
set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to
contributions made by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the
legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is
presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
government.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN
Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed
without Ejercitos knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC
First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis
as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow
assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a
must because non-compliance is consideredas an election offense.
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements
donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written
acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case,
advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate
concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political
party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution
No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa
candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the
written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an
official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the
description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in
every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking
orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should
be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their
authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also
unambiguously states thatit shall be unlawful to broadcast any election
propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast
entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate
and unless they bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this
broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and
correct name and address of the donor.
This Court cannot give weight to Ejercitos representation that his
signature on the advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a
belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It
is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the
pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated
for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. It would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to
raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC. While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally truethat
elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly
apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered.
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without
Ejercitos knowledge and consent, and whether his signatures thereto
were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in
a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016

Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses
of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus:

should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said

SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The


aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend
for election campaign shall be as follows:

(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
candidate even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary
to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as
amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy
will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period,
and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of such campaign period.

(a) For candidates Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President;
and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without
support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos
(P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in
cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties
for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be
subject to the payment of any gift tax.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidates
allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free
exercise of the voters rights of speech and of expression under Section
4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the laws
concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement
promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial
resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and
is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental
interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives
set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art.
XIII of the Constitution.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited
expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and
subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.
PENERA vs. COMELEC
GR 181613 November 25, 2009
DOCTRINE: The effective date when partisan political acts become
unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before.
FACTS:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs
decision to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty
candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election
campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since
under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one
is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
ISSUE:
WON Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning
should be reconsidered
HELD:
Yes. Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En
Banc held that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and

Thus, applying said law:


(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to
a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the
campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law,
and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as
amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be
prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the
law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the
start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression
and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the
assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law
that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The
mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means
that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in
Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of
the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that
any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and
logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the
campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on
the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to
preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his
certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15
of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period.
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy
under the early deadline required by the automated election system
would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done
before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be
annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire

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Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
GR 189698 February 22, 2010
DOCTRINE: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or
national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service,
including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy
for
a
barangay
office.
FACTS:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election
laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates
of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678
provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding
a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices
the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions
upon the filing of their CoCs.
ISSUE:
WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of
the equal protection clause
HELD:
Yes. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as unconstitutional.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it
is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied
with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would
be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the
assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of
valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification
must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented
by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any
Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post.
With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the
elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge
of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show
his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
AMORA vs. COMELEC
GR 192280 Jamuary 25, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and
had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of
the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged
that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely
presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty.
Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent
evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and
effect and should be considered as not filed.
Amora countered that:
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due
Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of
Olandria is filed out of time;
2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the
cancellation of the COC;
3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known
to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in
filing the document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been
members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several
years; and

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that
the COC be under oath.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as
an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the
Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the elections laws and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance
to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is
a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would
uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to
disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification."
The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under
the pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the
designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd
interpretation of Olandria, respondent herein, is not controlling; the
COMELEC should have dismissed his petition outright.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016


A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as
ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of
mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the
formal requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is
not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On
the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a CoC
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact
that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada,
before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion
of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that
accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to
an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the
instrument or document.
Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where
the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case
herein.
In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora
complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that
he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just
colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they
consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the
oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned
out to be sufficient in this instance.
The ruling herein does not do away with the formal requirement that a
COC be sworn. In fact, we emphasize that the filing of a COC is
mandatory and must comply with the requirements set forth by law.
TAGOLINO vs. HRET
GR 202202 March 19, 2013
FACTS:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) with COMELEC, seeking congressional office as
Representative for the 4th Legislative District of Leyte. Subsequently, one
of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a
Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that
Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement and thus
should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In
addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or
cancelled.
The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntilla's
petition without any qualification.Aggrieved, Richard moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by theCOMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together
with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party
endorsing her as the party's official substitute candidate vice her
husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En
Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution
allowing the substitution of private respondent.
Pending resolution of Juntilla's motion, the national and local elections
were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections,
Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes
while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner
Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view
of the aforementioned substitution, Richard's votes were credited in favor
of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the dulyelected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition 15 for quo warranto before
the HRET in order to oust private respondent from her congressional
seat, claiming thatshe did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was
void ab initio.
After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed decision which
dismissed the quo warranto petition and upheld the validity of private
respondent's CoC due to petitioner's failure to controvert her claim that
she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC.
ISSUES:
WON the substitution of respondent is valid
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail
a candidate's bid for public office. A