DE LEON VS.

ESGUERRA
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo
M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received
a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum,
antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M.
Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to replace them and
to designate their successors.
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25, 1986.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace
petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended
on February 25, 1987.
HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year
deadline under the Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed
to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading:
This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied
on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated
February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer
have any legal force and effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The
canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in
adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the
Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995
only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per

share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28

September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article

XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in
the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution
does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against
constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in
a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section
10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting
of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters
involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen
over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation,
the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share
of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the
necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the

necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be

necessary for the purpose.
Francisco vs House of Representatives GR No 160261 10 November
2003
11
Facts: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide
and seven Asociate Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was
dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative
Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions
against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of one year. Senator Aquilino
Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the
sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provision of Article XI of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be
invoked to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint
pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
Decision: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3 (5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut magis valeat
quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and form
and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the
Constitution. Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the
government. The courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as its officers , this is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967)
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first,
proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The
second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general
elections. And the third, proposing that the same Constitution be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing
that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people,

at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of

the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously
San Beda College of Law
propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?
HELD:
YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power
to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making
power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention
to propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people
as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to
make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same,
it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution
they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they
do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC
35 SCRA 28 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both
interested in running as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning
the constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights
as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No.2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to
propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said
resolution, restating entirely the provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing
that xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the
Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation xxx
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
4914.
ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132
to implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
Assembly?
HELD:
YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a
Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power
to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does
not exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its
comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly)

may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of
the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and
compensation of its member.
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 are as follows:
1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose
constitutional amendments or call a convention for the
purpose by votes of each house in joint session
assembled but voting separately.
2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power by necessary
implication.
3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress
not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise
of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses
all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from
4. the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and
5. 4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as
a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the
amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far
beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them,
what was done was to revise and not to amend.
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both
members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is
the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March
12, 1981.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is already in effect.
Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to
propose amendments.
Whether or not the three resolutions are valid.
HELD:
1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability
of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did
so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect."
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with
the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court
says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor
for instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts
of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized
as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this
character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present
Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of
the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
2.Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is
quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have
the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the Members thereof." One of such powers is

precisely that of proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the

1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.
When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do
so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.
3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute
amendments or revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v.
Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose
an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be
submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign
people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the
law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the
entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.
TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the
delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue
of resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act
6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending
section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to
lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Section
3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification
for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or
on other portions of the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No.
1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently
approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far
as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution.
Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot
be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all
of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention.
ISSUE:
Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention constitutional?
HELD:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as
well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith
are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the
questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the
whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1,
Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We
are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of
the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention.
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the
questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is

provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications

that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of
suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to
vote intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one knows what
changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the
Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not
have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of
any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the
verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost
every part and aspect of the existing social and political order
enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting
age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is
improper submission.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73
SCRA 333 (1976)
FACTS:
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(Barangay) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers.
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by
declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of
voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued,
declaring therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will
be submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his
(President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a
plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction,
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting said
Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise
the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution,
hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the
power to propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during
the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National
Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and
Salapantan arguing that:
1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution,
2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973,
3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity,
4. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum, and
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of
the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent
COMELEC, maintains that:
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance
of the court
3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President
has the authority to exercise constituent power
4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUES:
Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees
991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial?
2. Does the President possess the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and

3.

prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the

absence of an interim National Assembly?
Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient and proper
submission?

HELD:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory
that the expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose
of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds.
2. It is a judicial question.
3. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason
why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say
that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the
Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of
absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act
as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away
from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process
would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create
in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the
President now, are mere agents of the people.
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the
specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states
that it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of
such amendment or revision. The period from September 21 to
October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The
issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the
people have been living with
5. them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The
referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial
law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments.
G.R. No. 183591
October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic
of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the
MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No.
8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of
the respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority
by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court
grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened
into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not
negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations
as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that
the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as
to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum
for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with

the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go

beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating
it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to

conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated
in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution.
Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of
the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people,
in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No.
8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright
of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu

archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their

descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand
of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as traditionally understood
even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to
refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does
not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code
of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD
is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic
Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which
the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess
of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies
that the same is on its way to independence.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art.
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this
proposition to the peopleDo you approve the lifting of the term limits
of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of
Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine
Constitution? The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication
of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents
COMELEC and Delfins Petition to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:

1.

The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the

Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the
effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to
govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulation
for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
4. The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the
term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the
power of the peoples initiative.
5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples
initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department,
agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the
purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and
granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors
DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision?
2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the
said constitutional provision?
3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an
amendment to the Constitution?
HELD:
NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on
congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with
the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory
implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although
said Act intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover
that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required
for proposing Constitutional changes.
2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void, as expressed
in the Latin maxim Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In
every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the
delegation itself is valid.
3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not
academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local
and national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not
a revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is
permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation
of the system.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"),
with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for
an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and

(c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral- Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters'
ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the

proposed amendments.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and
effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the
legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
2. The interim Parliament can continue
to function indefinitely until its members, who are
almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of
their
own term of office;
3. Within 45 from
days
the
ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative.
HELD:
NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is
void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance
that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign
on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino
Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition
x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not
present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the

These three specific amendments are not stated or even

indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who
signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing
these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these
proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents
of the signature sheets.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom
of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know
the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is
first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. vs.

Drillon GR 81958, June 30, 1988
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a
domestic corporation engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female for overseas employment. PASEI seeks to
challenge the constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1 series of
1998 of the Department of Labor. Said order prohibited and suspended
the overseas deployment of Filipina Domestic and household workers.
Their main contention is that the order is invalid for the DOLE
erroneously exercised police power, which is an adjunct on the powers
of congress, and not executive in character. Moreover, it alleged that
there was a violation of the equal protection clause for it only sought to
suspend the deployment of Filipina workers, thus there was
discrimination.
Issue:
clause?

Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection

Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the classification madeN - the
preference for female workers - rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even
rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is
called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the
Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first
place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. The
petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act
similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior
to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter
of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated

abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or

arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and
evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to
justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as
classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this
case is justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
germane to the purpose behind the measure . Unquestionably, it is
the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers." 17 This Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers
have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL. 1155
FACTS:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for a
prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country.
Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties
which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
principle of international law, should be observed by the Court in good
faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
accepted principles of international law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the
Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through
the medium of a treaty or a contract.
The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free the citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its
security and future.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the state, through which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due process of the law
clause; because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact
it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary - and that in any
case such matter falls within the prerogative of the legislature, with
whose power and discretion the judicial department of the Government
may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislature of the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot
be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because
no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, G.R.
No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, J.B L., J.

Facts: Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the respondent alleging that
such is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support
of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a
public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The
action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the
plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is a
valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose , to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of
the police power. The protection of a large industry constituting one of
the great sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or
indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of
the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be
within the police power of the sovereign.The decision appealed from is
affirmed.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., et. al
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J.
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation. The respondent invokes the
police power of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a
valid exercise of police power or of the power of eminent domain.
Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases
present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there
is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the
Court holds the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
FLORENTINA A.

LOZANO vs. HONORABLE

MARTINEZ, et.al

ANTONIO

M.

G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.

Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known
as the Bouncing Check Law punishes a person "who makes or draws
and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment." Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that
it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt
and it contravenes the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of
police power.
Held: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally

impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for nonpayment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se
are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in
se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it
can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum.
The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. There is
no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer
of the check, but not the payee. Wherefore, the decision rendered by
the respondent judge is hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one- third of
the entire money supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists of
currency in circulation. These demand deposits in the banks constitute
the funds against which, among others, commercial papers like
checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply
justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of
the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like
pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of
the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.

DECS v San Diego

180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J.
Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had
actually taken and failed four times the National Medical Admission
Test from taking it again under its regulation. But the private
respondent contends that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take
a fifth examination based on constitutional grounds: right to academic
freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection. He
filed a petition for mandamus. The respondent judge declared the said
rule invalid and granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held: Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the
subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit
of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say
that he must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to
those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. The decision of the respondent judge is reversed.
Ynot v IAC
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J.
Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which
prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeefs from one province
to another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter
of these animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo where they were confiscated for violation of the said
order. He sued for recovery and challenges the constitutionality of the

said order. The lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos.
He appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
upheld the lower court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of
police power.
Held: No. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is
made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could
be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant,
dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the
police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated
by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas
bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
In the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no such
pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a
lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta
122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of paupers, on the ground that
it is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends that the said
order was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause. The respondent court declared the said order null and void.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power.
Held: No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practice in
the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of
a memorial park cemetery. As defined, police power is 'the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property'. In the instant case, Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person
of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without

compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting

aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the
petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied
powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of
law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The petition for review
is hereby dismissed

subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National

Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

Manila Memorial Park vs. DSWD

GR. 175356

Xxx

Facts:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges: SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior
Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees
charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
xxx
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 0294 was issued
to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 0294 provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax
Credit refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to
a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative to their
utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters,
cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar
places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for valueadded tax or
other percentage tax purposes.
On February 26, 2004, RA 92578 amended certain provisions of RA
7432, to wit:SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:(a) the grant of twenty
percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the
utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g)
and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance

issued RR No. 42006, the pertinent provision of which provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS
AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. Establishments
enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to
senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services specified
thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from gross income
subject to the following conditions:

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance

issued RR No. 42006, the pertinent provision of which provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS
AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. Establishments
enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to
senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services specified
thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from gross income
subject to the following conditions:
Xxx
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the
present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by
RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the
DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these
allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to
senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be
prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of
the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be
reinstated.
Issue:
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY
PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO
SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY
THE
PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS,
ARE
INVALID
AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ruling:
No. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme
does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded
to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a
deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross
income and results in a lower taxable income. Being a tax deduction,
the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but
merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the
treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the
private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have
entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.
The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be

rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.

cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes. The lower
court declared that there was no necessity for the said expropriation.
Hence, this appeal.

A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen
discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just
compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so.

Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of
expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila?

The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the

contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits
and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the
State considers them an integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as
set forth in the law itself.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens
may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept
the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power,
can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on
the support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed
in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to
achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly
related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is
arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from
quashing a legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 553 Phil.
120 (2007).
When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to
prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We
noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to establish the
impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was
presented in order to show that they would be operating at a loss due
to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation of the
law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of
petitioners.
In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical
computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the
petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporationdid.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction
scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Thus, it is
constitutional.
City of Manila v Chinese Community
40 Phil 349, Johnson, J.
Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement into an extension of
Rizal Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to exercise in
fee simple of certain parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand,
contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a public
improvement and that the plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said

Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a

municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some
law must exist conferring the power upon it.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.
The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority
to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by
courts, but the general authority of municipalities or entities must
not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire
into.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must
only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two
conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila:
First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. The authority of the city of Manila to expropriate private lands
for public purposes, is not denied as provided in its Charter. However,
if the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or
that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the
right is being exercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the
record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely
decided that there exists a necessity for expropriation. The decision of
the lower court is affirmed.
Republic v PLDT
26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity
exercising governmental powers through its branches and
instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
While the respondent, Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the
power to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout
the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission
of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and
the telephone systems of other countries. Sometime in 1933, the
defendant and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone
System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to
call private parties. The respondent said that the bureau was violating
the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is
inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities. The petitioner prayed
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with it, through the
Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system.
The lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT
to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were
not in agreement. Both parties appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Telecommunications has the right
to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone
System and the PLDT.
Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a
contract where no agreement was made between them. Freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be
annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles
1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo
has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the

PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic, in the exercise of

the sovereign of eminent domain, may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone
System and that of PLDT, as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to the payment of just compensation.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that condemnation would be for
public use.
People v. Fajardo
GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among
others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense
of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered
in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated
from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the
view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request
for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building
without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly,
their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were
charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected
on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the
view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character.
To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to be heard .
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen
M. vda. de Castellvi from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of
lease , on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of
the succeeding year). The Republic sought to renew the same but
Castellvi refused. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after
the termination of the contract because it would difficult for the army to
vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
established on the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the
Philippine Air
Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain
against the respondents over the 3 parcels of land. In its complaint,
the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of
the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal
for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per
hectare.The court authorizes the Republic to take immediate
possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961, the trial court, rendered its decision in
the ejectment case, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the
action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests.

Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvis property occurred in 1947 or in

1959.
Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property
should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease
agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section
157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of
"taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
"Takingunder the power of eminent domain may be defined generally
as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period,
and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof."
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must
be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance
is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement
the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of
Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but
a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page
596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International
Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to
possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to
mean "a limited period" not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited
lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to
year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not
alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by
consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the
lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the
premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the
property was first occupied by the AFP . It is claimed that the
INTENTION of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently,
as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the
clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be
deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the
terms of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case,
are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake
or fraud the question being not what the intention wag, but what
is expressed in the language used. Moreover, in order to judge the
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code).
If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy
permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease
entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement
renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this
land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it
expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time
as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air
base?" It might really have been the intention of the Republic to
expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly
mere notice much less an implied notice of such intention on the part
of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could
not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must
be actually commenced in court.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as
present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi
property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that
the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present
because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of

the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract
from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the
lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the
beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound
to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until
the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26,
1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place
in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as
lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two
essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that
in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under
the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property
should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the
property is merged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so
much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the
time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". 15 We cannot
accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis
can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal
provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of
Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without
need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that
the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the
premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor
can it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of
lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should
enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of lease", as
expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic
had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's land
if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither can
we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the
absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To
sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby
in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends
to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate
with the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty
years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate,
then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the
expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started
to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value
of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the
lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good
reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease.
This would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme,
which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of
its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation
proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's claim that
it had the "right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it
had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee nowhere
appears in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in
paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor
require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at
the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would
have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it
would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at
the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of
the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the
time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer
to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the
cost of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when
the lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer
to the purchase price, for purchase was never intended by the parties
to the lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that

"However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art.
1372, Civil Code).
(A number of circumstances must be present in the taking
of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator
must enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry
into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
Fourth , the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth , the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered
to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the
contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent,
or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use
the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial
use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the
Castellvi property in 1947.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on
10 August 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.)
Amigable v. Cuenca
GR No. 26400, August 15, 1974
Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of theportion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed tothe Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable
filed in thecourt a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca(Commissioner of Public Highways) for
the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot.
On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding
that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the
recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent, that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government;
and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said
claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and
has been used for road purposes, the only relief available isfor
the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation

for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the
time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's
fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after
hearing.
(NOTE: The owner does not need to file the usual claim for
recovery of just compensation with the Commission on Audit if the
government takes over his property and devotes it to public use
without the benefit of expropriation. He may immediatetly file a
complaint with the proper court for payment of his property as the
arbitrary action of the government shall be deemed a waiver of its
immunity from suit.) Cruz, pg. 74)
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995
Facts:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing
the constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of
news paper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No.
2772, providing for a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of not
less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general
circulation in every province or city.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to declare
Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of print media to donate
Comelec Space?
Held: NO. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec
space" amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use
or purposes. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may
first be appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one
is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to
effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that
the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal
rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated,
that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either
by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought
to be avoided by respondent Commission. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving
free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not,
however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers,
against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate"
"Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to
require prolonged consideration on their part . Firstly, there was no
effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to
show that the police power - essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission.
Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in

the legitimateexercise of the police power of the state, there was

no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the
requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and
without regard the the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to
take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No
attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or
urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the
only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity
available to Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
Sumulong v. Guerrero
GR 48685, Sept 30,1987
Facts: On December 5,1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of
Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes- Balaoing with an area of 6,667
square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought
to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter
adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in
accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was
a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA
deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National
Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 hectares
of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which defines the policy
on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation. On 17 January 1978, Judge
Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in
favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law. This was,
however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the taking of private property for socialized housing,
which would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for
public use.
Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to
certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
(Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized
as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of
public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution.
The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art.
II, sec. 7].
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly
and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment
and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot
be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to
provide housing for all who need it, all at once. Socialized housing
falls within the confines of public use.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the
exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken
into account.
The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land

described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings

are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials
and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax
values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the
valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local
assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at,
much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply
never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency
authorized to do so.
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106440 , 29 January 1996
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land which was later declared as
national landmark due to being ascertained by National Historic
Institute (NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia ni Cristo. On the opinion of Secretary of Justice, he said that the
place must be subjected to the power of eminent domain since places
invested with unusual historical interest is a public use which such
power may be authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of
Solicitor General instituted a complaint for expropriation and filed an
urgent motion for the issuance for an order to permit it to take
immediate possession of the property. The trial court issued an order
authorizing Republic to take over the property once the required sum
would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig,
Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint since
such expropriation would constituted an application of funds directly or
indirectly for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which is
contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2) Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the public use requirement of Eminent Domain
is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492square-meter parcel of land as declared by the NHI as a national
landmark?
Held: Yes.According to Justice Black, term public use means one
which confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not
confined to actual use by public. It may also be said to mean
public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit.
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by
the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting
a public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the
characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and
statutory basis for taking property by eminent
domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is
one which confers same benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is
measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as
long as public has right of use, whether exercised by
one or many members of public, a "public
advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs.
Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the
exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent
domain, means a use concerning the whole community as
distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member
of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally
and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want
or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262
U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to
mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or
restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular
individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot
be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A
"public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the
sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government,

and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in

population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz
v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional
uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use
by the public" has long been discarded.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such
a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is
not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As
just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason
& Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems
the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist
himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged
is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a
public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit?
This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves
little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late
Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived
by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
EPZA vs. Dulay
G.R. No. L-59609, 29 April 1987
Facts: A certain parcel of land was reserved by the President of the
Philippines for petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for
the establishment of an export processing zone. However, not all of the
reserved area was public land. The petitioner made an offer to
purchase the lands registered in the name of the private respondent,
but, the parties failed to have an agreement on the sale of the property.
Thus, the petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession against private respondent on the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge favored the
petition and issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to
take into possession the said property. Having determined the just
compensation as only the issue to be resolved, the respondent judge
issued an order regarding the appointment of certain persons as
commissioners who are tasked to report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
Consequently, commissioners were appointed and, afterwards,
recommended in their report that the amount of P15.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the
properties. Subsequently, petitioners objected to the said order on the
grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule 67
of the Rules of court on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners.
Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533

insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just

compensation is concerned.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the P.D. No. 1533, which
eliminates the courts discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void, since
constitutes an impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail
over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation
G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998
Facts: A complaint for expropriation was filed by the Municipality of
Paraaque against V.M. Realty Corporation involving two parcels of
land located at Paraaque, Metro Manila. The complaint was in
pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993.
The complaint was for the purpose of alleviateing the living conditions
of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project. Previously, an offer for the sale of the
property was made by the petitioner, however, the latter did not accept.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati issued order authorizing the
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit to
the Clerk of Court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value base on its current tax declaration. However, upon the
private respondents motion to dismiss, the trial court nullified its
previous order and dismissed the case. Thus, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. But the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial
courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the power of eminent domain is
valid.
Held:The following essential requisites must concur before an
LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance
is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.( 2) The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.( 3) There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.( 4) A valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no compliance with
the first requisite since the mayor sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution only. Ordinance is not
synonymous to resolution. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general
or permanent character, and makes third reading for its enactment
necessary. On the other hand, a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter,
temporary in nature and its enactment required only the decision of
majority of all the Sanggunian members
Republic vs. Lim
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in
her birth certificate with the regional trial court of Lanao del Norte. Her
maiden name was Chuley Yu and thats how it appears in all her official
records except that in her birth certificate where it appears as Chuley
Yo. She said that it was misspelled. The Republic of the Philippines
through the local city prosecutor raised the issue of citizenship
because it appears that Lims birth certificate shows that she is a
Filipino. The prosecutor contends that Lims father was a Chinese; that
she acquired her fathers citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution
in place when she was born; that she never elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority (she is already 47 years old at
that time); that since she is a Chinese, her birth certificate should be

amended to reflect that she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that she
is an illegitimate child hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD: No. The provision which provides the election of
Filipino citizenship applies only to legitimate children. In the case at
bar, Lims mother was a Filipino. Lims mother never married the
Chinese father of Lim hence Lim did not acquire the Chinese
citizenship of her father. What she acquired is the Filipino citizenship of
her mother. Therefore, she is a natural born Filipino and she does not
need to perform any act to confer on her all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship.
RULE 67
Expropriation
Section 1.The complaint. The right of eminent domain
shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state
with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real
or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants
all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof
or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest
of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that
the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real
owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)
Section 2.Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with
authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint
or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders
of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the
court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be
provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with
service of copies to the parties. (2a)
Section 3.Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no
objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may
file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect,
specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to
be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he
shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking
of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the
summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and
extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and
defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any
subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so
alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments
to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing
thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether
or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may
present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for
his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. (n)

Section 4.Order of expropriation. If the objections to and

the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property
are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be
permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)
Section 5.Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners
to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate
the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the
commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be
submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties.
Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be
filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have
received copies of the objections. (5a)
Section 6.Proceedings by commissioners. Before
entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall
take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties
as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other
proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party
before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on
hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties
consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view
and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party
may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall
assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and
deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits
to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the
property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed
exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)
Section 7.Report by commissioners and judgment
thereupon. The court may order the commissioners to report when
any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon
by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct
the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent
portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time
to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full
and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such
proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted
their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their
recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court,
such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the
commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be
extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report,
the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested
parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to
file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)
Section 8.Action upon commissioners' report. Upon the
expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding
section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the

interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their

statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept
the report and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause
shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further
report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part
and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure
to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
so taken. (8a)
Section 9.Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting
claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for
the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be
entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum
or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)
Section 10.
Rights of plaintiff after judgment and
payment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from
the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of
the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have
the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it
for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it
should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the
provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent
themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered,
the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit
shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant
or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Section 11.
Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of
reversal. The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the
defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not
be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court
determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be
rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the
restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and to
determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may
recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
Section 12.
Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the
commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings.
All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be
paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the
property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the
appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Section 13.
Recording judgment, and its effect.
The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state
definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest
therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for
which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified
copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in
the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use
or purpose. (13a)
Section 14.
Power of guardian in such proceedings.
The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person
judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the
court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or
thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property
belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be
incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be
incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or
competent. (14a)
Sison v Ancheta G.R. No. L-59431. July 25, 1984.
C. J. Fernando
Declaratory Relief

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended
Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977,
which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable
compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and
other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other
monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and
similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in
the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his
income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which
are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He
characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to class
legislation, oppressive and capricious in character.

It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly

on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looks
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the
noble concept of approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being
available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.

The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of

The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is

not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the
equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions.
They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of
policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of
specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does
not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same.

Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable

net income derived from business or profession than on compensation
is constitutionally infirm.

Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state

be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection

and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule
requiring uniformity in taxation)

Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine

Trust Company- The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect
uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable

For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the

equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as
of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
merit.

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The need for more revenues is rationalized by the
government's role to fill the gap not done by public enterprise in order
to meet the needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for
the public welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed
of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of
the bulk of public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the
strongest power of the government. There are restrictions, however,
diversely affecting as it does property rights, both the due process and
equal protection clauses may properly be invoked, as petitioner does,
to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were
otherwise, taxation would be a destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to
the Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis without a factual
foundation. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that
where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to
such a conclusion.

Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable

articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal
protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation"
There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base.
There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the
applicable tax rate.
The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of
the income to the application of generalized rules removing all
deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of
reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. As there is practically no
overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make
deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same
situation more or less.
Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are
set apart as a class.

It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked

where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount
to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power.

On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the

practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the
costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be
just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero
deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates
on the basis of gross income.

It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is
beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in
case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject
to attack on due process grounds.

There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of

doctrines on due process and equal protection, and he reasonableness
of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessmen not being a dubious classification.

For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine

whether this was denied in the exercise of police power or eminent
domain was the presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable
discrimination.

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

Art. 6 29 (1)

Case;

Appeal by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from the

decision of the CFI of Rizal, dismissing the case and dissolving the writ
of preliminary injunction.
Facts:

Pascual as a governor of Rizal instituted an action

of declaratory relief, w/ injuction on R.A. 920 an act appropriating
funds for public works, w/c contains an item of P85,000, for the
construction, repair, extension and movement of the Pasig feeder
roads terminals, w/n the Antonio subdivision at Pasig Rizal.

The petitioner alleged that, the appropriation was

illegal, because the property which was used for the construction of the
roads, was a private property owned by Jose Zulueta, a senator at that
time.

Jose Zulueta, after the enactment of the said

statute, executed a deed of donation.

The court of first instance ruled in favor of the

respondent. Hence, the appeal to the SC
Issue:

The validity of the appropriation of P85,000 for the

construction of the feeder roads.
Held:

It is a general rule that the legislature is without

power to appropriate revenue tax fro anything but a public purpose.

The rule is set forth in the corpus juris secumdum:

Taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only. Money
raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not
for the advantage of public individuals.

The test of constitutionality of a senate requiring

the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote
public interest as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.

The legality of the appropriation depended on

whether the said roads were public or private at the time the bill was
passed by congress. However, the land to constructed belonged then
to respondent Zulueta, the result of the appropriation thereof sought a
private purpose, and hence, null and void.

The donation made by Zulueta was irrelevant to

the validity of the appropriation. The validity of the statute depends
upon the powers of congress at the time of its passage or approval, not
upon the events occurring, or acts performed subsequently thereto.
Decision:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
instance against respondent Jose Zulueta.

tax ordinance (section 18 of the Manila Charter) in express terms also

empowers the Municipal Board "to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine or
six months" imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a
single offense." Hence, the pronouncement below that the ordinance in
question is illegal and void because it imposes a penalty not authorized
by law is clearly without basis.
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of
plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they
respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this
municipal occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in
its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for
taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley on
Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393-3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that
while the law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax,
it has withheld that authority from other chartered cities, not to mention
municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what
particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to
impose occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the
National Government. That matter is peculiarly within the domain
of the political departments and the courts would do well not to
encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National
Government and with a population and volume of trade many
times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no
doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the
professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila
be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the
provinces.
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because
they say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders who
have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein are not
subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not found in the
ordinance. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person
"exercising" or "pursuing" in the City of Manila naturally any one
of the occupations named, but does not say that such person must
have his office in Manila. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a
profession in the city is a matter of judicial determination. The
argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on
Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that there is
nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees
or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling
or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of Manila

G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954
Facts: An ordinance was approved by the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila which imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment
of the tax by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than six months or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The ordinance was in
pursuance to paragraph (1) Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to
impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on
persons engaged in the various professions above referred to the
plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, now being required to
pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid
the said tax under protest. The lower court declared the validity of the
law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance, but declared the
latter illegal and void since its penalty provided for the non-payment of
tax was not legally authorized.
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class
legislation, are unjust and oppressive, and authorize what amounts to
double taxation?
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we find that the lower
court was in error in saying that the imposition of the penalty provided
for in the ordinance was without the authority of law. The last
paragraph (kk) of the very section that authorizes the enactment of this

Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total samount
was actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB
Estate filed the donors gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as assessment for donees
gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of
which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00
including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration
presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The
petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the
CTA affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
except the imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a donees gift tax may be assessed against the
Catholic Church.

Held: Yes. The phrase exempt from taxation, as employed in the

Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all
kinds of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property
tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the property themeselves. It
does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use
made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving
the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purposes does not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and
institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948.
On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar
Bosque and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of
Seizure upon the petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q -83)
for the satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon
the petitioner a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on
the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued,
Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public auction involving the
sale of the college lot and building. The certificate of sale was
correspondingly issued to him.
The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court
a quo to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice
of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31.
On 12 April 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted
and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial

court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the
building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that
the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a
commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing
said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue:

Whether the College is exempt from taxes.

Held: Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educational
purposes, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. While the
second floors use, as residence of the director, is incidental to
education; the lease of the first floor cannot by any stretch of
imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. The
test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constititution.
Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the judge had read the 1973
Constitution, he should have known the difference between the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution and he could not have summarily dismissed
the case. There is a substantial distinction between the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution the requirement for
exemption for real property taxes is exclusively , while the 1973
Constitution requires actually, directly & exclusively. The SC
remanded to the Court of Origin for further hearing. (excerpts from
Sababan Notes)