AHMAD SHAH AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN INDIA

The attitude of the English East India Company towards Ahmad Shah Durrani
during the years prior to 1760 had been one of uncertainty. They had followed the
policy of Swatch and wait, and had remained almost indifferent to his activities in
India up to the battle of Panipat. When Mir Jaffar Ali Khan of Bengal was deposed
by the Company and his son-in-law Mir Qasim was appointed Nawab Nazim o
Bengal, Behar and Orissa on October 20, 1760 (Rabi-ul- Awwal 10, 1174), Mr.
Vansittart, the successor of Colonel Clive, had communicated the change to His
Afghan Majesty. He Shah, on his part, had desired him and Mir Qasim to be
obedient to the will of (Emperor) Shah Alam on whose behalf they were then
supposed to be acting.
After the battle of Panipat, January 14, 1761, the Shah confirmed Shah Alam EC as
the Emperor of India and issued firmans to the various ruling princes of the country
and to the English to recognize him as such. Mr. Vansittart wrote to the Shah on
March 1, 1761, saying, His Majestys faithful servant (referring to himself) who has
succeeded Sabit Jang (Col. Clive) is obedient to the will of Shah Alam, who has
been brought into the fort of Patna, (and) is ready to accompany him (to Delhi).
In the meantime, Emperor Shah Alam had also issued a farman in February, 1761,
to the Governor of Bengal to have the Khutba read and coins struck in his name.
To this Vansittart replied on March 5: His Majesty can judge from the loyalty of
Major Carnac his feelings, and in fact those of every Englishman towards His
Majesty. They are all his devoted servants. From his farman (the writer, Mr.
Vansittart) understands that he wishes him to have the khutbah read and sikkahs
coined. This matter being of great importance, it would be right first to ask ShahanShah Abdali and the Umara of Delhi to do so lest they should be displeased. If the
addressee acts in this manner, his faithful servants in Behar, Bengal and Orissa will
then read the khutbah and coin sikkahs
The Emperor also discussed the question of the khutba and sikkah with Mir Qasim
when he paid him a visit on March 11, 1761. Qasim made a reference to Mr.
Vansittart on this point to know the wishes of the British Governor who directed him
on March, 19: As soon as a farman from Shahan Shah Abdali arrives informing the
Nawab that sikkahs can be struck and the khutba read, His Excellency should act
accordingly. The gentlemen at the factories will also be told to have the new money
circulated.
In his letter of March 26 to Ahmad Shah, with a copy to Mir Qasim, Mr. Vansittart
re-affirmed his loyalty and obedience to Emperor Shah Alam and assured the Shah
that if it should be Shahan-Shah (Ahmad Shah}s pleasure, he (Shah Alam) will be
escorted by some troops to Delhi. The Governor at the same time raised no
objection to Mir Qasims friendly correspondence with the Shah, telling him on April
17, after the Shahs departure for Afghanistan, that the ^petition to the Shah and
a letter to Shuja-ud-Daulah may be forwarded as they contain nothing but
assurances of friendship.9 But, as it appears, these were all dilly-dally-

ing red-tape tactics of the English diplomat with a view to impressing upon the
Emperor the hollowness of his position in hands other than their own. The Afghan
prime minister, Shah Wali Khan, also saw through the game. In spite of the Shahs
clear instructions to Mir Qasim and Mr. Vansittart to be obedient to the will of the
Emperor and Mr. Vansittarts own professions and assurances, as stated above, of
loyalty, fidelity and obedience to the Emperor, Shah Alams farman regarding
khutba. and sikkah had been disregarded and not acted upon; and a good deal of
time had been wasted in unnecessary technicalities. Writing to Vansittart in the
month, of May, Shah Wali Khan informed him that sikkahs in the name of Shah
Alam have been issued at Delhi and other places, and His Majesty and the
Commanders are displeased because they have not been issued in Bengal. This
served as a warning to the English governor, and he directed Nawab Nazim Mir
Qasim to comply with the Emperors orders to have khutba read and coin struck in
his name.5
For the next six and a half years the English in India were almost free from anxiety
as far as Ahmad Shah was concerned. In 1762 and in 1764-65, he was so much
entangled with the Sikhs in the Panjab that he had no time to turn his attention to
the affairs either of the Emperor Shah Alam or of the Rohillas, the Marathas or the
Jats. In the meantime, Mir Qasim had been deposed by the English in 1763 and the
old Nawab Mir Jafar restored to the Subedari of Bengal, Behar and Orissa.
The battle of Buxar in 1764 and the surrender of Shuja- ud-Daulah laid Oudh at the
feet of the East India Company and brought the Mughal Emperor as a suppliant to
the English camp. Under the fiction of the grant of The Diwani from Emperor Shah
Alam II in 1765, the English merchants became a territorial power in the country,
and their dreams of an empire in India seemed to materialize. They now began to
play an important part in the politics of the country. Their ultimate aim was to take
control of Delhi in some form or the other. The extension of the power of Ahmad
Shah, as also of the Marathas, the Sikhs and the Jats, was therefore, looked upon
by them as interference with their own schemes of expansion.
In 1767, the position was still worse for Ahmad Shah. The Sikhs had become
masters of practically the whole of the country from the Indus to the Jamuna, and
they contested with him for every inch of land over which he set his foot. He then
hardly had any real influence even in the areas under the heels of his army.
But in spite of all this the English were greatly alarmed. They knew that the Shah
had been invited to India by Mir Qasim, their worst enemy. They had also been at
daggers drawn with Emperor Shah Alam who had been recognized and Confirmed
by Ahmad Shah as the rightful Emperor of India, and in spite of all professions of
loyalty and obedience, they had not only defied his authority but had reduced- him
to a mere prisoner at Allahabad. They had- promised as early as March 1, 1761, to
escort him to Delhi. The promise had been repeated year after year. Even Lord
Clive, who had come to India again in 1765 and returned to England in January
1767, had repeated the promise in 1765. But it had not been fulfilled. The Emperor

longed to return to his capital in Delhi as that was the main visible symbol of his
sovereignty. His chief confidant and counsellor, Nawab Munir-ud-Daulah, was
favourably inclined towards Ahmad Shah for friendly negotiations and, if possible,
active help for his masters de facto restoration to his ancestors throne in Delhi.
Shuja-ud-Daulah9s attitude was uncertain, although there were fears of his allying
himself completely with the Shah. But there was no uncertainty about Najib-* udDaulah. He was the Shahs own man in this country and he had kept him fully
informed of the state of affairs in India. He was sure to go over to him as soon as
the Shah' crossed over the Sutlej to the south. In Delhi, the heir-apparent and the
regent of the Empire, Prince Jawan-Bakht, and his mother, Malika Zinat Mahal,
were only waiting for the arrival of the Shah, in whom they saw the only hope of
having the Emperor, freed from the hands of. the English and restored to Delhi.
The English saw a complete frustration of their future plans in the Shahs advance
towards Delhi and in the coalition of the Emperor and the Indian chiefs and nobles
with him. All their efforts, therefore, were directed towards keeping back the
Emperor, Munir-ud-Daulah and Shuja- ud-Daulah from meeting Ahmad Shah or
having anything to do with him. Outwardly they kept up the appearances of
devotion and attachment to the Emperor while actually they were working for his
utter ruin and downfall. Writing to him on December 13, 1766, Mr. Harry Verelst
informed him that as Lord Clive is indisposed and Mr. Sumner intends to return to
Europe the management of affairs has been entrusted to the writer. ... His Majesty
knows what valuable service Lord Clive has rendered to the throne. It is hoped that
the writer will be regarded as equally attached thereto. As long as he remains in
this country, he will devote himself to the regulation of the affairs of the Empire and
the happiness and prosperity of the Royal house of Taimur.
By the beginning of January, 1767, the news of Ahmad Shahs arrival in the Panjab
and of the probability of his march towards Hindustan had spread throughout the
country. There was feverish activity both among the English and the Marathas. The
Maratha chief Raghunath Rao made peace with Jawahir Singh, son of Suraj Mall,
the Jat ruler of Bharatpur, and invited other chiefs of Hindustan, including the
Nawab Wazir of Oudh, Shuja a-ud-Daulah, to combine against the Durrani invader.
Raghunath Rao at the same time seems to have suggested to Shuja-ud-Daulah that
the combined forces of the Marathas, Shuja-ud-Daulah and the English should
escort Emperor Shah Alam to Delhi. Mr. "Verelst saw no harm in Shuja-ud-Daulahs
alliance with the Marathas, but he would not agree to lending any English force to
escort the Emperor to Delhi. Writing on January IB, 1767, Verelst told Shuja-udDaulah that he did not see harm la the interview [between Shujah-ud-Daulah and
Raghunath Rao] which may even lead to more cordial relations with the Marathas.
The question rests entirely with the addressee. If he and the Marathas conduct the
King to Shahjahanabad, it is well; but the English forces cannot lend their
assistance in such an expedition. ... As regards Shah Abdali, he may penetrate
towards these parts as far as Shahjahanabad, but his progress will not extend

further. Should he bend his march this way, all the English forces will unite with the
addressees and inflict upon him an utter defeat?
After his settlement with Jawahir Singh Jat, Raghunath Rao, it seems, had planned
to pounce upon the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaipur, He captured Bhilsa and marched
to Kota.
The Shah in the meantime seems to have heard about the impending coalition of
the Marathas with Nawab Wazir of Oudh and the English, and of the intentions of
Raghunath Rao against his faithful and devoted Rajput Rajas. He wrote from the
Panjab a stem note of warning to Raghunath threatening him with war and rapine,
should he act contrary to the dictates of the victor of Panipat. This unnerved the
Maratha warrior and he quietly disappeared from the scene and moved away to
Indore, leaving all his plans against the Rajputs and the Shah unexecuted. All
efforts of Shuja-ud- Daulah and the English failed to keep him by their side and all
their assurances of armed assistance fell flat upon him.
The Shah had always been favourably disposed towards Shah Alam. His vakil,
Munir-ud-Daulah, was, therefore, anxious to proceed to the Shahs presence and
meet him on his behalf. As Lord Clive had left for England without replying to his
letter on the subject, Munir-ud-Daulah wrote to his successor, Mr. Verelst, on
February 27, 1767, to sound him as to the policy of the East India Company
towards the Shah. "At this time, said Munir-ud-Daulah, "the Vakils of all the
powers in Hindustan had sent arzis to the Shah. Although the writer is perfectly
sure that it will be impracticable for the Shah to reach Delhi or other parts this year
by reason of the opposition of the Sikhs, yet should the powers of Hindustan aid
him ... what attitude will the English adopt? Being uneasy at not receiving replies
to his requests, Munir-ud-Daulah again wrote to Mr. Verelst on March 3: The Shah
lies encamped between the two rivers. All the powers of Hindustan have written
arzis to him. His Majesty [Emperor Shah Alam] alone has been silent, at which the
Shah expressed much surprise. Desirous to know whether the King with propriety
should address the Shah or not.
,
The Governor, Mr. Verelst, in his reply, dated March 7, does not think it advisable
for the King to write to the Shah or for the addressee (Munir-ud-Daulah) to go to
him and opines that many evils would result from it. He does not think, said
Verelst, that Jawahir Singh Jat, Najib-ud- Daulah and other Rohilla Sardars would
go over to the Shah to surrender their territories to him. ... Should the Jats and the
Rohillas combine and offer the Sikhs a little assistance, it is probable that Shah will
suffer defeat and disgrace.
The English, he assured Munir-ud-Daulah, are ready to defend the Empire; five
Brigades of sepoys have been sent to Sheorajpur to remain on the frontiers of Kora.
More troops will be sent to re-inforce them if necessary. Verelst also wrote to
Shuja-ud-Daulah in the same strain on March 25, and further said, "the English
forces were never so large and so ready for war as they are now, so much so that if
the Rohillas and the Jats join the Shah, the English can defeat them. He, however,

told him that as the English forces consist entirely of infantry and those of the
Shah entirely of cavalry, ... it is, therefore, that His Excellency (Shuja-ud-Daulah)'
should raise a formidable body of Cavalry.
A petition was received on March 10 by the Emperor Shah Alam from Najib-udDaulah, written on the eve of his departure for the Shahs camp, requesting him to
send Najib-ud-Daulah, who has a personal influence at. the Shahs court, to
negotiate with him (the Shah). After perusing t, the Emperor enclosed it in a letter
of his own and sent t to the Governor. Munir-ud-Daulah also agreed with Najibs
line of thinking and anxiously wished to have a treaty y alliance brought about
between the Emperor and Ahmad Shah Durrani so that the Shah could be prevailed
upon to aid him in establishing his sovereignty over India. With this end in view* he
appealed to the wisdom of Verelst on March 26 telling him that His Majesty has not
yet had any correspondence or negotiations with the Shah and leaves the
determination of all measures to the Governors counsel and wisdom. ... If, as
Najib-ud-Daulah has represented, the Shah intends to stay two or three years in
Hindustan, and if Ahmad Khan and other Rohilla sardars join him, the consequences
will be very grave and the remedy of them will be very difficult. If the Governor and
the Council out of their wisdom think an alliance with the Shah to be advisable it is
requested that His Excellency may represent the same to His Majesty, and send the
writer instructions that he may act agreeably thereto. P.S. . . . And the time is
short, it is hoped the Governor will send a speedy answer. ... Mir Qasim is
determined to go to the Shah. His Vakil has long Been with the Shah and made
large promises to him. ... If the Governor is in favour of an alliance with the Shah',
the writer is ready to go to him whenever His Majesty and the Governor order him.
By the blessing of God, a firm league and friendship will be duly and happily
entered upon, the counsels and evil views of our enemies frustrated, and the writer
will return loaded with honor. Should this proposal meet with His Excellencys
approbation, he should send the writer an arzi for the Shah, and letter of friendship
for Shah Wali Khan, his Vazir, with expedition.
The Emperor also was of the same opinion and was in favour of deputing Munir-udDaulah to the Shah. In his report of a conversation between himself and Colonel Sir
Robert Barker, he wrote on the same day, March 26, for the information of Mr.
Verelst: 'Letters also have arrived from Shah Wall Khan directing Dundi Khan,
Mulla Sardar, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Faizullah Khan and Ahmad Khan to repair to the
Shahs camp. Mir Qasim, that foul villain, has absolutely determined to go to the
Shah; his vakil has been a long time in the Shahs army with bills to the amount of
10 lakhs and he has made large promises. From his soul, he has a great enmity to
the Nawab Shuja-ud-Daulah. If the Shah moves to Delhi and is joined by the
Rohillas, which God avert, the counsels of evil and foolish men will prevail, and he
in consequence will move this way. The remedy of the evil will then be difficult and
a bloody war will ensue. And if on one side the Shah himself moves towards
Allahabad by the road of Farrukhabad, and on the other the Rohillas attack
Lucknow and Oudh. it will be very difficult to enrage both armies. In this case it

seems best and most advisable ... to avert the coming danger by an alliance and
friendship with the Shah. But, if the latter does not agree to amicable terms and
peace, the best thing both for His Majesty and the English would be not to engage
him in the Allahabad and Faizabad country but to fall back upon Patna.
The Governor wrote back in reply to the Emperor on March 27: His Majesty need
not feel anxious concerning the Shah's expedition. ... If he is not coming this way,
negotiation is unnecessary, but if he is, he will not be satisfied until he sets a
peshkash; and to offer gold to a man who wrongfully invades this country is equally
dishonorable for His Majesty and his faithful allies, the English. Let His Majestys
heart rest-perfectly at ease concerning the future. The troops that are stationed at
Patna have been ordered to March to Lucknow in order to convince all Hindustan of
the firmness of the allegiance of the English to His Majesty and of their
determination to punish his enemies, and also in order to be in readiness for
whatever may happen.
This was the trend of correspondence that went on for some time between the
Emperor and the English. There was a dash of interests between the two. The
Emperor felt that a treaty of alliance with the Shah would help him in establishing
his sovereignty and authority over the country. But he was helpless in the hands of
the English; he had no independent means and he depended for his wherewithal on
their pleasure. As such, he could not act independently against their wishes. The
English, on the other hand, could not agree to a proposal that had in it the
possibilities of strengthening the position and power of the Emperor. This was
against their own interests. Shu j a-ud-Daulah, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, played a
double game. He had his own reasons for not condescending to encourage the
Emperor to enter into an alliance with the Shah who could not have treated him
(Shu j ah) more liberally than the English. Moreover, he was trying to persuade the
English to help him in his designs against the Rohillas. But he could not openly
disagree with the Emperor nor could he displease the English by agreeing with him.
Writing to the Emperor on April 1, he said, 'In the writers opinion, the proposal is
founded on wisdom, but then it is expedient that the consent of the English sardars
should be obtained.
At one stage there appeared to be an open rupture between the Emperor and the
English. When Muqm Beg, who had carried the letters of Shah and his prime
minister Shah Wali Khan for Shah Alam, delivered the dispatches to the Emperor,
probably in the last week of April, 1767, the Emperor said: Had the Shah marched
to Shahjahanabad, I had even now repaired thither, and at this time were the Shah
only to send a body of 20,000 horse, thither I would go. I am steadfast. Constraint
has placed me here.
But the situation was saved by the Shahs retreat northward to grapple with the
Sikhs. The obstruction caused by them to his advance and their well-directed
attacks on his flanks and rear made it impossible for him to move towards Delhi
without leaving his communications with his base depots and his line of retreat

entirely into their hands. In fact, the Sikhs had already re-occupied the territories
lying to the north of the Sutlej when he had crossed that river to the south. As
such, it became absolutely necessary for him to march back before his passage to
his country should be entirely blocked against him.
This was the last occasion when Ahmad Shah caused any great anxiety to the
English in India. They were now gradually growing in political importance and were
laying the foundations of the British power in India on the ruins of the Mughal
empire.