Journal of Political Marketing

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Reason and Choice: A Conceptual Study of

Consumer Decision Making and Electoral Behavior
Dianne Dean & Robin Croft
To cite this article: Dianne Dean & Robin Croft (2009) Reason and Choice: A Conceptual Study
of Consumer Decision Making and Electoral Behavior, Journal of Political Marketing, 8:2,
130-146, DOI: 10.1080/15377850902813386
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377850902813386

Published online: 21 Apr 2009.

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Journal of Political Marketing, 8:130146, 2009

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1537-7857 print=1537-7865 online
DOI: 10.1080/15377850902813386

Reason and Choice: A Conceptual Study

of Consumer Decision Making and
Electoral Behavior
DIANNE DEAN
University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

ROBIN CROFT
University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd, United Kingdom

Rational choice supposes that individuals make their electoral

decision in keeping with their own self-interest, undertaking a
cost-benefit analysis, no different to choosing a product or service.
Rather than reject the concept of rational choice, this paper will
review the notions of rationality and reasoning, which, as Aristotle
argues, are inseparable. We will support Marcus (2002) grievance
that emotional decision making is irrational and thus perceived
negatively, rather than being seen to play an important motivational role in decision making. A framework is proposed that
focuses upon the interplay among rationality, irrationality,
reasoning, and emotion, and we argue that this is far more fluid
than has been previously discussed.
KEYWORDS electoral decision making, emotion, irrationality,
rationality, reasoning

INTRODUCTION
Since Downs (1957) seminal work, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
rational choice has been an influential paradigm in electoral decision making
(Brogan, 2001). Rational choice theory supposes that individuals make their
buying decisions in line with their own self-interest, undertaking cost-benefit

The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their constructive and helpful
comments on this paper.
Address correspondence to Dianne Dean, University of Hull Business School, Cottingham
Road, Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. E-mail: d.m.dean@hull.ac.uk
130

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131

analyses. These notions of rationality have suggested that voters made their
electoral decisions just as if they were buying products or services. But while
many studies in political science have sought to demonstrate and discredit
the efficacy of the rational choice model, the debate in the marketing arena
has sought to question the applicability of one model to explain all consumers (Stone, 1954). And rather than looking purely at the decision making
process, contemporary research looked to try to understand the impact of
consumer choices upon decision making (see, for example, Belk, 1988).
Ferber (1981) argued that as rational choice provided an explanation for
most electoral decision making, it was incumbent on governments and
politicians to improve the amount and quality of the information upon which
voters were able to draw. However, earlier behavioral studies of electoral
behavior did not suggest this; they identified limited knowledge and involvement in electoral decision making (Campbell et al., 1960). Loewenstein
(2001) notes that behavioral approaches have attracted followers in economics, finance, and law as well as marketing. While marketing has questioned
economic rationality in terms of providing an adequate explanation of
consumer choices, doubts have also been raised about the ability of
economic rationality to explain electoral behavior.
We believe that by studying the arguments in political science, we can
usefully add to the body of knowledge in consumer behavior. For while
academic thinking is often compartmentalized by subject specialisms, it
seems clear that consumers rarely make these distinctions: recent research
by Crockett and Wallendorf (2004), for example, demonstrates how the
normative political ideologies of consumers can provide explanations for
behaviors in areas as diverse as shopping and food. Moreover, understanding
the decision making process in voting may help us to uncover truths in other
important fields where theory derived from the exchange process and where
rationality has previously been forced to fit. These may include comparatively neglected areas such as gift giving (see, for example, Sojka, 1986) or
more topical areas such as the take-up of recycling initiatives or charitable
giving. The concept of altruism has long been problematic in rational choice
theory and has tended to be reinterpreted in terms of satisfaction of
psychological needs, yet altruism is at the fore of the debates in the areas
of corporate and social responsibility and cause-related marketing. Can the
thinking of political science throw any useful light on these areas of
consumer behavior?
This conceptual article will argue that, in politics at least, there is no one
model, particularly one as simple as the exchange process, that can explain
why people make their electoral decisions. However, rather than reject the
notion of rational choice outright, this paper will first review the notions of
rationality and reasoning, and these are wide-ranging, encompassing economic rationality through to Habermas (1986) notion of communicative
rationality. Second, it will follow the thinking of Aristotle, who claimed that

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irrationality had some participation with reason (rev. 1976, 90). In line with
this, we support Marcus (2002, 34) grievance that irrationality in the form of
emotional decision making is viewed as an explicit and central detriment
to good citizenship, rather than an important, integral component of
motivation in electoral decision making. Finally, the paper will introduce a
framework that focuses on the interplay among rationality, irrationality,
reasoning, and emotion and argue that this is far more fluid than has been
previously discussed.

RATIONAL CHOICE
Rational choice theory has been claimed to be the prevailing view in political science today (Brogan, 2001). While this could be true of some of
the U.S. political science literature, in the main, the literature in both the
United States and United Kingdom additionally uses behaviorist and sociopsychological models to explain electoral turnout and voting decisions.
Much the same argument could be made about the study of consumer behavior: a scan of the articles of professional practitioners in marketing and a
study of the content of many of the mainstream textbooks in the area would
tend to highlight the continuing prevalence of black box approaches to the
subject. Although as early as 1988 Belk was arguing that constructs of much
greater subtlety and complexity needed to be considered, rational choice
models continued to dominate parts of the discipline (see also Rogers,
1987). Williamson (2002) notes how the commercial sector continues to offer
complex predictive models to its clients: models only loosely adapted from
the earlier rational choice frameworks of the 1970s and 1980s (see also
Nelson, 2002).
Rational choice in politics has perhaps an even longer pedigree: Downs
(1957) classic study on economic rationality argued that rationality is measured by how the electorate strives for what they desire, or at least act as
if they were pursuing some end (Brams, 1985). There is no room for emotion or other variables that could affect the instrumental processing of the
information. Downs cited a number of examples in which rational behavior
could be clouded by secondary emotional factors but claimed that he was
only looking from a political rather than a psychological perspective (Downs,
1957, 7). Curiously, though, rationality also appears to be discussed independently of ends, as if the voter merely seeks to selfishly satisfy his own needs.
This type of explanation is mirrored in the wider consumer research literature: Sojka (1986), for example, argued that gift giving could be explained
in terms of reciprocity, itself based on a satisfaction of psychological needs.
Does this mean that there is no morality in voting? It would appear that
this is the case if one accepts the notion of economic rationality. The voters
simply weigh the benefits and costs associated with their own individual

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gains. The model presented by Downs clearly explained one notion of the
process of voting; however, it did not provide an adequate explanation of
why people actually vote. Furthermore, when one considers this self-interest
notion of pocketbook voting, there is little empirical evidence to support
this (Udehn, 1996, 79). The theory suggests that pocketbook voting occurs
among less knowledgeable voters (Carpini and Keeter, 1993, 1996; Lau
and Redlawsk, 1997). However, Gomez and Wilson (2001), who explored
levels of sophistication in economic voting, not only found heterogeneity
among voters but also argued that the accepted view of pocketbook voting
was undermined. They proposed that higher sophisticates were more likely
to vote according to pocketbook rather than sociotropic considerations.
Moreover, how does one decide what issues motivate voters when deciding
what is in their self-interest? As Udehn noted, it is clear that other considerations are at work also and may even be more decisive (1996, 79).
Within rational choice theory, altruism is also inadequately explained
since according to instrumental rationality theory, it is not rational to look
at others interests unless they are of direct or indirect benefit to the individual making the decision. These issues are not satisfactorily accounted for
within rational choice theory, which does not provide a consistent explanation of why people vote and how they come to their final decision (Green
and Shapiro, 1994; Blais, 2000). Similar problems apply to consumer decisions such as charitable giving or participation in recycling schemes; Titmuss
(1987) identified how paying people to donate blood actually appeared to
reduce contributions. Loewenstein (2001) explains this by arguing that introducing money payments into what are considered to be socially desirable
actions can transform them into market transactions, which paradoxically
are less attractive than the original social motivations to participate. Economic rationality, Downs acknowledged, reduces the voter to an artificial
man in a theoretical model (1957, 8): predictable and accurate, but impossible to prove empirically as man lives and works in a much more complex
environment than Downs equation was able to hypothesize.
Within the later rational choice literature, these anomalies were
addressed, although adding potentially illuminating variables to the model
seemed to reduce its efficacy. For instance, Riker and Ordeshook (1968)
and Blais and Young (1999) explored the concept of duty as a component
of voting. While Aldrich (1993) argued that there are other smaller variables
to consider, small changes in costs and benefits alter the turnout decision for
many voters and that for the majority of voters, costs are usually low in a
standard election. However, in a closely fought election, this alters the
stakes and then introduces the notion of the strategic politician (Aldrich,
1993), who focuses more on marginal seats where there is a greater propensity for the voter to turn out. Jackman (1993) suggests that Aldrichs study
restores political considerations to the analysis in turnout. This would support the view of Negrine (1994, 145) who argued that politicians . . . seek to

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influence by shaping the perceptions of events or by defining the nature of

reality.
Yet, voters have to take notice of politicians and collect information to
make reasonable decisions based on their own self-interest, and information
searching is a costly affair. Downs (1957) attempts to justify how a lack of
involvement in the political process can be perceived as rational in terms
of the belief that the voter has made a conscious decision that he or she
has enough information to make a voting, or nonvoting, decision. He argues
that there are a number of ways that information can be gained with little
effort. For instance, ideology is a form of political shorthand (Udehn, 1996,
18), and heuristic devices are useful for making uninvolved decisions.
Nevertheless, party identification is declining in many mature democracies,
including Britain and the United States (see, for instance, Wattenberg, 1994;
Crewe, 1992; Sarlvic et al., 1986; Budge, Crewe, and Fairlie, 1983).

INFORMATION PROCESSING
If party identification is declining, how does the voter evaluate the mass of
information that bombards them from the many different media? A wealth
of studies have identified the modern phenomenon of advertising avoidance:
Speck and Elliott (1997) compared the effect across different media and several demographic groups, highlighting age and income as the best predictors
for avoidance behaviors. Keane (1984) had earlier focused on the phenomenon among the elderly; more recently, Chang-Hoan and Choen (2004) have
pursued the same theme in Internet advertising avoidance.
In political science, this type of problem has been identified in Lanes
(1972) study, in which he questioned the decline of ideology in the wake
of the knowledge society. In this scenario, information searching is costly,
and as Lane suggests there is more information than ever available to the
voter, even more so during election time. But it is irrational for voters to
examine all the information that comes their way on a daily basis, as Miller,
Brickman, and Bolen (1986) noted. How voters search and order available
information has been the focus of a number of studies (see, for instance,
Zaller, 1992). More specifically, Granberg (1982) examined how perceptions
of issues affected voting intentions, while Carpini and Keeter (1993, 1996)
and Gomez and Wilson (2001) explored the concept of sophistication and
how the level of political sophistication can impact the search and evaluation
aspect of processing that leads to the voting decision. Zaller (1992) argues
that voters with high and low levels of awareness of political issues are
unlikely to be swayed from their decision to vote or abstain, as it is members
of the electorate with moderate levels of political awareness who are more
likely to be influenced by campaign messages. Therefore, some voters are
processing more information, as Lane would suggest, in the knowledge

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society, but this is only a partial explanation, as others are avoiding media
coverage of politics. As the message sources increase in an attempt to reach
the voter from every possible angle, other voters are switching off the traditional methods of communication. They are using heuristic devices, signs,
symbols, and other forms of cognitive shortcuts that can reduce the costs
of information searching. This would support the view of Gomez and Wilson
(2001), who claim that there is far greater heterogeneity in electoral behavior
than the literature suggests.
It is important to note, also, that wider studies of advertising avoidance are far from unanimous. In recent research reported from Britain,
Nanayakkara (2004) suggests that consumers are less concerned with information overload than advertisers believe, while Gurau and Tinson (2003)
argue that consumers have evolved a series of strategies for coping with
overload, with an implicit recognition of the use of heuristic devices identified by Gomez and Wilson (2001) and cited earlier. However, Aronowitz
(1987) claimed that the use of heuristic devices erodes the democratic decision making process, encouraging an impoverished form of discourse that
has little bearing on reasoning or rationality.
The reluctance of political parties to debate issues in any real depth only
serves to exacerbate the remoteness of the electorate from the process of
government (Habermas, 1992, 218). For Habermas (1992, 220), this leads
to the tendency of political parties and candidates to manipulate the message
and prevent the formation of coherent public opinion.
So if political shorthand is undermined by the steady decline in party
identification and information searching has been reduced to image, signs,
and symbols, does this undermine the democratic decision making process?
Habermas (1992, 219) argued that this is the case and would be more in
keeping with an authoritarian regime, where voters have no opportunity to
listen to debate and political discourse. This leads to a standardized response
to issues. So Habermas (1992) argued that voters can be manipulated through
political communications focusing upon anxieties and insecurities, which
would suggest levels of irrationality and thereby take the opposite stance
to rational choice.

RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES
At this stage in the discussion, it may be useful to introduce other less constrictive notions of rationality and evaluate how they may serve to examine
electoral behavior more effectively. The concept of rationality as used in philosophical and sociological analysis differs from the meaning assigned to it in
rational choice theory. For Wedgewood (1999), rationality was just a matter
of some sort of internal justification or coherence. This perspective follows
the Weberian concept of rationality in which, as Habermas (1986, 12) noted,

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goal seeking is closely aligned to problem solving, a teleological rationality.

Rational choice is a narrow economic interpretation of teleological rationality, albeit means-rather than goal-focused. Downs (1957, 6) concedes this,
while sociologists and philosophers advance a rather more elaborate
perspective of the concept of rationality.
However, there are a number of areas in which philosophy concurs with
economic theory. First, rational choice suggests a logical progression. If a person makes a decision, he or she would evaluate alternatives and progress
through a series of steps toward the final decision. Second, rational thought is
consistent; if a person were faced with the same alternatives at a later period,
he or she would follow the same pattern and reach the same decision. However, this is where concepts of rationality diverge from instrumental rationality.
Simon (1982) introduces the notion of bounded rationality, whereby all
people are rational in that they have reasons to behave in a rational way,
although they do not always have the ability to be information-processing
maximizers. This has received some criticism over time due to claims of
misinterpretation and other criticisms upon the puzzle of finding where
the boundaries actually lie (Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin, 2000). Bounded
rationality has also played its part in consumer research and has been
subject to the same sorts of criticism (see, for example, the discussion in
Loewenstein, 2001).
Habermas (1986) articulated four types of rationality, outlining a hierarchy indicating the different characteristics that distinguish the various levels.
Habermas recognized that rationality is complex and gradually built an argument for communicative rationality. As he progressed his discussion, he
considered each level of rationality and evaluated how each component contributed toward communicative rationality. The important factor is that there
are different levels of rationality, and these are interchangeable, given the
situation; this highlights the complexity of the whole process. First, each
situation is different; the way the individual interprets the situation can determine the level of rationality, and the capability of the individual determines
the extent of reasoning. Further, the complexity and intelligibility of the
message also have an impact on how the message is understood and processed. However, rational decision making suggests that if a person were
faced with the same alternatives at a later period, he or she would follow
the same pattern and reach the same decision. However, this is the point
at which concepts of rationality diverge from instrumental rationality.
Habermas postulated his notion of a holistic, complex rationality that is
systemic (1986). Communicative action combines all other modes of rationality while augmenting these with the notion of communication. The communication aspect is pragmatic in that it is used to create understanding
between other actors within the lifeworld. Through communication, they
are able to interpret, react, and reflect on other actors communications.
Therefore, communicative action is not action with communication, it is

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communication between actors, which then leads to their actions, and it is a

teleological process. Thus, Habermas argues that these utterances will be
contested, debated, and elaborated, a process that hones the attitudes and
behaviors of all individuals taking part. The key component of communicative rationality is the dimension of critical reasoning: an opinion can be
formulated through communication with their normative group and media
to which they are exposed. Alternative viewpoints are considered based
on the same critical reasoning that the attitudes were developed so that
the original opinion can be defended against criticism or amended in the
light of new information.
This is a dialectic and reflective representation of rationality, which is
the furthest removed from the Downsian model and possibly the most utopian of all the notions of rationality. Likewise, this type of rationality presupposes that the individual has the ability to reason and elaborate on political
communications and also the motivation to become involved in the debate
and deliberation process. Interestingly, Klein and Yadav (1989) found consumers (rather than voters) undertaking a form of dialectic by simplifying
choice sets in complex decision contexts; at the same time, consumers felt
less need to undertake this simplification where there were more dominated
alternatives, something particularly relevant in the context of the electoral
process. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argued that the ability to reason and elaborate are important components in the elaboration process and that not all
people have the same levels of ability and motivation. Therefore, processing
is different for different groups of people. One has only to venture into areas
in which sociolinguistics consider gender to note this. Tannen (1998)
observed how women learn and decide differently than men (she stresses
moving from debate to dialogue). It has to be noted, though, that the corollary is that men tend not to engage in this way. Tannen implicitly encouraged males also to adopt this dualism (what we term dialectic). Similarly,
Stewart and Logan (1998) observed how women generally use communication as a primary way to establish and maintain relationships with others,
whereas men generally talk to exert control, preserve independence, and
enhance status. Stewart and Logan further undermined notions of the universality of dialectic approaches to decision making when they highlighted
how women emphasize equality, support, attention to the relationship,
inclusivity, . . . and a preference for collaborative meaning-making. Mens
discourse, by contrast, functions to exhibit knowledge or skill, accomplish
goals, assert dominance, . . . and minimize relationship responsiveness.
However, consumption decisions can be economic, social, and political.
Holt (2002) argues that postmodern consumers use a dialectic process in the
pursuit of personal sovereignty, with brands being used as authentic cultural
resources. The political dimensions of this relate to the growing phenomenon of anti-branding and anti-corporatism within the political and social
environment.

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This would concur with the thinking of Fraser (1993) who took
Habermas notion of the public space still further, arguing that different
groups of people exist in multiple public spaces that hold particular normative values and follow specific normative practices. Moreover, these public
spaces do not operate in isolation; they are also interchangeable, and citizens
may be able to access more than one public space at any one time. This type
of consideration finds an echo in the wider consumer research literature.
Ratner and Kahns (2002) work on variety-seeking behavior, for example,
identifies public scrutiny as being a key trigger in decision making: they find
that consumers tend to opt for more variety in their choices where there is
increased likelihood of their public evaluation.
Nevertheless, throughout all the notions of rationality outlined by
Habermas, rationality is goal-driven and involves some degree of reasoning
to a lesser or greater extent, and the drives for reasoning come from a variety
of internal or external sources. For Rescher (1988, 2), rationality could be
defined as a mode of understanding and making decisions based upon an
intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives. Habermas concurred with this,
claiming, well-grounded assertions and efficient actions are certainly a sign
of rationality. In the philosophical literature, rationality has also been used
interchangeably with reason (Wedgewood, 1999, 6). Reasoned argument or
reasoned action is arrived at through logical progression and evaluation of
appropriate alternatives.
While Habermas identified four degrees of rationality, Rescher (1988)
explored what he identified as the constituents of rationality, which could
be viewed as cognitive, pragmatic, and evaluative. Cognitive rationality
defines the information processing aspect of rationality, pragmatic rationality
recognizes the nature of the situation in which individuals find themselves
and identifies solutions that can solve the problem, and evaluative rationality
describes the notion of evaluation of alternatives and preference ordering.
These elements cannot be isolated from one another; they form an enduring
whole in which all three are evident to a varying degree dependent upon circumstance. This holistic interpretation sits well with Habermas and his notion
of communicative rationality, while advocates of economic rationality merely
isolate the evaluative component from their definition of rationality.
Clearly, though, there is a strong economic basis for rationality whereby
the evaluation of alternatives is often driven economically, and at election
time, political communications often focus upon taxation (less) and spending
on social services (more). However, in the philosophical literature, rationality
is portrayed as complex and multifaceted. The sociological and philosophical
literatures recognize the economic component that is prevalent in rational
choice theory, but not to the exclusion of other notions that contribute to
rational thought or reasoning. More recently, however, political scientists
such as Popkin (1991) and Lupia et al. (2000, 7) have taken a broader view
of rationality and suggest that a rational choice is one that is based on

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reasons, irrespective of what these reasons may be (Lupia et al., 2000, 7).
This definition begins to confront some of the difficulties faced by rational
choice theorists: What are these reasons? How are they developed, and most
importantly, do these reasons form a coherent, logical progression toward
their decision? Which is the strongest component of the rational choice paradigm? This in turn leads to the question, are these decisions rational? If not, in
what way are they irrational?

NOTIONS OF IRRATIONALITY
So what constitutes irrationality? Some consumer researchers avoid this question
by attempting to confront the paradoxes of shopping and choice behaviors
under the umbrella of the postmodern consumer culture. We have already highlighted Holts 2002 study of branding and counterculture in this paper, but similar themes are discussed by Thompson and Troester (2002), who draw attention
to how fragmentation contributes to intercultural diversity.
Habermas (1986, 18) identified a number of criteria that demonstrate
irrationality. He argued that rather than defending opinions with critical reasoning, an irrational person would respond inappropriately with stereotypical opinions and little cognitive elaboration. For instance, if a voter rejected
group norms such as institutionalized beliefs accepted within their own
social class or culture without the capacity of critical reasoning, then it could
be argued that the person is behaving irrationally. For instance, if a senior
citizen did not support an increase in pensions, this would be irrational
and against the normative actions of other members of this group. Another
irrational act would be to ignore the validity of the other argument even
though it had been formulated rationally. If a person does not think through
the arguments and just makes dogmatic assertions, through either a lack of
consideration or interest, this is also considered irrational, although many
may base their voting decisions in this way. Finally, deceiving oneself is
clearly irrational.
For Aristotle, however, there were two components of irrationality. First,
a vegetative irrationality, which is stimulated by instincts; these are basic subconscious drives where there is no reasoning. This is closely aligned to the
later work of Freud and classical conditioning. Freuds work uncovered the
irrational and unconscious sector of mans nature . . . which had been
neglected by modern rationalism (Fromm, 1994). And, while not explicitly
highlighting irrationality, Gould (1991), in the mainstream literature of consumer research, identified the potential value of using Jungian personality
types in obtaining a more holistic picture of behavior.
The second component of irrationality, according to Aristotle, is desiderative irrationality. This is more complex, as some reasoning takes place,
but this reasoning is limited to a sense of obedience to authority. This is more

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of a conscious progression, which is influenced by a course of reward and

punishment that can determine the individuals behavior through a learning
process. This leads to persuasion, or change in attitude or behavior. This
desiderative component of irrationality is more closely linked to Skinners
notion (cited in Solomon, Bamossy, and Askegaard, 2002) of operant or
instrumental conditioning. These drives can be manipulated through emotion such as fear or happiness, which leads to a further question of the
nature of emotion and how it can affect electoral decision making. While
remaining outside of the scope of the present study, the exploitation of fear
by politiciansfear of terrorism, nuclear war, political extremists, and so
forthhas once again has become highly topical.

EMOTION
Emotion has not been considered as a component of decision making within
the rational choice paradigm: instead it has been broadly perceived as irrational and therefore irrelevant. Moreover, emotion has been either associated
with weakness of both thinking and action (Evans, 2001, xi) or related to the
notion of subconscious drives and manipulation by the dark arts of marketing and mass communication (Packard, 1991). However, emotion can also
been defined in more positive terms, whereby it can contribute toward a
reasoned understanding leading to more effective electoral decision making.
Indeed, Koziak (1999) argued that emotions are dependent upon belief,
expressing evaluations, and learned through social and political life.
Emotion is an attribute of motivation (Marcus, 2002); for instance, strong
emotions can lead to cognition and learning in respect of a particular issue,
which is then added to the cognitive map that informs decision making.
Although the balance between emotion and reason differs amongst individuals, it is interesting to note how this balance affects decisions. There are
a number of ways in which emotion can affect awareness and cognition.
For instance, enthusiasm or apathy determines the level of motivation and
ultimately political participation or lack of it (Marcus, 2002; Marcus, Neuman,
and Mackuen, 2000). In addition, extreme passionate emotions such as hate,
anger, or fear affect awareness, which leads to cognition and influences
electoral decision making (Devlin, 1986, 1993). But igniting these extreme
emotions can have serious implications for political marketers and the
political environment (Dean, 2004). Moreover, Chernev (2004) shows how
motivation and goal orientation are key triggers in establishing among
consumers their preference for change or for the status quo, for action or
inaction: all of these, of course, are as important for political scientists as they
are for those studying consumer behavior.
Although emotion can be shown to have links with awareness, learning,
and cognition (Marcus, 2002), this paper argues that ability determines the

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extent of the interaction of emotion with reason. Returning to Aristotles

notion of irrationality and its participation with reason (1976, 90), it is clear
that there are levels of participation, just as there are levels of irrationality, levels of rationality, and levels of emotion. These are interrelated
and dynamic.

A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK
The model tentatively proposed in this paper employs a two-dimensional
continuum: the first dimension represents the two components of reasoning
ability and identifies the extremes of rationality (rationality=irrationality) and
security (secure=insecure); the second dimension consists of two components of emotion, passion (enthusiasm=apathy) and depth (volatility=calm).
The rationality dimension combines Habermas notion of communicative
rationality with Aristotles notions of desiderative and vegetative irrationality.
It is proposed that rationality will be evaluated by three factors: first, knowledge of political system and issues; second, level of education, in line with
the ability dimension of Petty and Cacioppos elaboration likelihood model
(1986); and finally, coherence and consistency of the cognitive maps used
to make decisions on political issues. The second component of the reasoning dimensions will be to evaluate the feelings of security that are held. It is
hypothesized that levels of security will be altered depending upon
perceived risk factors. The emotion continuum is defined in terms of levels
of enthusiasm (Marcus, 2002) and volatility, in terms of higher- and lowerorder affective reactions (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). Types of emotion such
as fear, anger, pleasure, happiness, love, and sadness largely determine the
level of enthusiasm or involvement but also determine the type of interaction
with rationality.
This model highlights the complexity of the reasoning process among
voters and the difficulties encountered when attempting to predict electoral
behavior. It emphasizes that different groups have different levels of knowledge, cognitive ability, involvement, and motivation and that these factors
determine the level of involvement in the electoral process. For instance,
there are groups of voters or nonvoters who have a strong capacity for reason and feel passionate about political issues; however, there are others who
also have a strong capacity for reason but are apathetic toward the political
process. There will also be groups at the opposite end of the rationality spectrum who have strong feelings for particular issues but do not have the ability
or level of knowledge to make a reasoned decision. Still others in a similar
position on the rationality continuum are apathetic about politics. This would
explain why some people are highly involved in the political process while
others know little and avoid politics altogether. However, this is not to
suggest that this model provides a coherent response to the problem of
understanding political behavior, but it can provide illumination into how

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FIGURE 1 Quadrants produced by the two-by-two dimensional continuum.

different groups take on political messages and integrate them with their
existing cognitive maps. Although situational factors influence saliency of
political issues, changes in the cognitive maps takes time. Interestingly, existing cognitive maps that are used for one purpose can be used for another,
and this again adds to the complexity. Broadly speaking, however, we can
suggest that the two by two dimensional continuum will produce eight
quadrants (Figure 1).
The model suggests that people in the four exterior (extreme) quadrants
would be more susceptible to emotional messages and react more strongly,
while people exhibiting characteristics in the four internal (moderate) quadrants are calm, with considered responses to emotional messages. However,
this paper posits that there is a dynamic element to each continuum and that
people can move from one quadrant to another, depending on how issues or
messages are internalized.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

As rational choice theory works toward explaining some of the problematic
issues, it is clear that electoral decision making is multifaceted. Although
some individuals do display evidence of economic rationality, many do
not; some get heavily involved in the political process while others avoid it
altogether. Emotion is an integral part of the electoral decision making process and should not be perceived as a negative aspect of electoral decision
making; rather, it should be encouraged to solicit participation. Marcus
(2002) argument is persuasive in that he incorporates the notion of emotion
into electoral decision making, but we need to build a greater understanding
of how an individuals emotion interacts with his or her reasoning ability, as
this interaction is much more dynamic than the literature suggests. However,
political practitioners need to be aware of the issues of unleashing certain
emotions, as they are less likely to motivate reasoned cognition.

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143

Motivation is crucial to levels of involvement, but ability is significant also,

and individuals have different types of motivation and levels of ability. Electoral decision making is complex, as individuals use a combination of rational
and irrational reasoning, use heuristic devices, and are influenced emotionally
by media messages and situational and group dynamics. But the implications
are wider than voter behaviors: understanding the role of motivation and reasoning in politics can help to shape our understanding of the decision making
process in areas nonprofit marketingall areas in which notions of altruism,
identity, duty, fear, and guilt may be more prevalent than economic rationality.
Just as consumer researchers have recently been exploring the impact of the
political ideologies of consumers on their shopping behaviors (Crockett and
Wallendorf, 2004), so it is interesting to see the same sort of debate taking place
in political science as in consumer research.
Perhaps one of the lessons of this paper may be that for consumers, at
least, there is little difference in the process of deciding whether to vote, to
give blood, to give to charity, or to recycle ones household waste. Nevertheless, whatever the process, it seems clear that economic rationality can rarely
provide more than a passing explanation. Moreover, it is worth remembering
that just as the academic debate in political science is often remote from political practice, rational choice theory is alive and well in the market research
industry and in management consultancy (Williamson, 2002). There is still
much to do.

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AUTHOR NOTE
Dianne Dean is a lecturer in Marketing in the University of Hull Business
School. Robin Croft is a principal lecturer at the University of Glamorgan.