SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA.

LUISA VEROY, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial Court at Davao
City; and BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-Criminal
Investigation Service, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court: certiorari, to review the Order of the respondent Judge dated October 2, 1990 denying herein
petitioner's Motion for Hospital Confinement; mandamus, to compel respondent Judge to resolve
petitioners' long pending motion for bail; and prohibition, to enjoin further proceedings on the ground
that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline
Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the
position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his
family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing.
The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia
and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would
occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses
for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key
to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her
access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the
keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor
the caretakers could enter the house.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a
directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein
petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of
rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the
house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa
was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to
search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center
of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the
search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto
Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The
authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered
that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was
given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in
Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy.
The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon,

they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of George
Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt.
Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt.
Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black
clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of
RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes "H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo, pp. 4955) were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area
revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong
and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A.,
one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future
Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted
medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was
instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house
(Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of the
caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over the articles
to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo
Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of
Justice through Department Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990,
Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of
Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 71). Hence, on August 8, 1990. an Information for the
said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of
the Petition, Rollo, p. 70). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.
The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was received by the
petitioners on August 13, 1990. On the same day, the latter filed a Motion for Bail before herein
respondent Judge Layague which was denied on August 17, 1990 for being premature since at that
time, petitioners had not yet been arrested. Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have
not yet been served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen.
Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the
latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their
warrants of arrest.
In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for
various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the
criminal complaint. On August 17, 1990, Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be
allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt. Benjamin de los Santos, made its
return to the trial court informing the latter of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the
fact that they were under hospital confinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. In
an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 74), the hearing for the Motion
for Ball was set for August 31, 1990 to enable the prosecution to present evidence it opposition to
said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition (Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on

August 28, 1990, arguing that the evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafter presented
its evidence.
On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein
petitioners on October 1, 1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 76). Upon their
arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion for Hospital
Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the Petition Rollo, p. 77) which was denied by the court in its Order
dated October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 80). It likewise ordered their commitment
at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-a, Davao City pending trial on the merits. Herein
petitioners argued orally a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the prosecution. At the
conclusion thereof, the court a quo issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83)
denying then motion for reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion for
hospital confinement, set the continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. It was further ordered that
the petitioners shall remain under the custody of the PC-CIS pending resolution of the case.
Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition
remained erratic. On or about October 18, 1990, herein petitioners were informed that Brig. Gen.
Dumlao had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the
basis of the October 2, 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83). Petitioners made
representations that the tenor of the court order warranted maintenance of the status quo, i.e., they
were to continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig, Gen. Dumlao informed them that unless
otherwise restrained by the court, they would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the
trial court.
Hence, this petition on October 25, 1990 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering: (a) respondent Hon. William
L. Layague to refrain from further proceeding with petitioners' "Motion for Hospital Confinement" in
Criminal Case No. 20595-90 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma. Luisa
Veroy"; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao to refrain from transferring petitioners from
the St. Luke's Hospital (Rollo, pp. 84-A to 84-C).
On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' Motion for Bail (Annex
"A" of the Second Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 133). Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on
November 7, 1990 (Rollo, P. 105) and a Second Supplemental Petition on November 16, 1990
(Rollo, p. 120) which sought to review the order of the trial court dated November 2, 1990 denying
their petition for bail.
Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into consideration several factors
such as: a) that the possibility that they will flee or evade the processes of the court is fairly remote;
b) their poor medical condition; and c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially
since the prosecution's evidence refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms in Davao
City through the two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived in Manila since 1988, this Court, on
November 20, 1990, granted petitioners' provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each
(Rollo, p. 141). Petitioners posted a cash bond in the said amount on November 23, 1990 (Rollo, pp.
143-145).
The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211). Respondents adopted their
Comment dated December 28, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 182-191) as their Memorandum while, petitioners
filed their Memorandum on September 9, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 218-269).

As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the petition for mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail, and the petition for certiorari to review the
order of respondent judge initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement, were rendered
moot and academic by the resolutions of this Court dated November 20, 1990 and October 25,
1990, respectively. What remains to be resolved is the petition for prohibition where petitioners
raised the following issues:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof,
is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution;
2. Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968;
3. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were
clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case
of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a
double jeopardy.
Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866
is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No.
34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal of the aforementioned laws would reveal that the
legislature provided for two (2) distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d' etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968;
evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others.
But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or
vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various
interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes
"constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied.
Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in
Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items
were found belongs to them (Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 242-244).
Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in Skyline Village, there was no other
evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners possessed or had in their control the items seized (Ibid.,
pp. 248-250). Neither was it shown that they had the intention to possess the Firearms or to further
rebellion (Ibid., P. 252).

In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in appellant's store and the question arouse
whether he had possession or custody of it within the meaning of the law.
This Court held that:
The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited drug
was found on the premises of the accused and the same rule is applicable to the
possession of firearms. The appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of the
revolver, and the Government's principal witness stated that there were a number of
employees in the store. The only testimony which tends to show that the appellant
had the possession or custody of this revolver is the inference drawn from the fact
that it was found in his store, but we think that this inference is overcome by the
positive testimony of the appellant, when considered with the fact that there were a
number of employees in the store, who, of course, could have placed the revolver in
the secret place where it was found without the knowledge of the appellant. At least
there is a very serious doubt whether he knew of the existence of this revolver. In
such case the doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant. (U.S. v. Jose and Tan
Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])
But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to
break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the
presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a
room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against
them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an
arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho
Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein
petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.
While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not
have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the
need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the
Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to
enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is
undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R.
No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151
SCRA 279]), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search
had every opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal

searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the
accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715, October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow
that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]).
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no
need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for
illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS, Appellants.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo
City, Branch 75, with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic
Act No. 64252 as amended.
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise
charged3 with the same crime, before the same court.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges. 4 As the evidence in
the cases was common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases were
consolidated. After a joint trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 dated 4 April 2002,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine
of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing
regulations.
SO ORDERED.6
To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there is
need to recall the factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar
B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking
along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received information that a
certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper
right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried
leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic
bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas
and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas
answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray
dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an
associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a
plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue
cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons
would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. 7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City,
which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located.
From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing
themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed
that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." 8 After confiscating the items, Fami and
Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper
documentation.9Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling
and that a field test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise
physically examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates were issued. The
corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami stated that he and
Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the accused and the confiscation
of the items.10
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all
three (3) accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who
escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all three to the Fiscals
office where the latter were informed of the charges against them. 11
Cabling corroborated Famis testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had introduced
themselves as police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried
leaves.12
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Famis
informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under
surveillance. Fami then relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily

submitted the plastic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of
law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts. 14 When
Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of Nuevass cohorts, they chanced upon Din
and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking into its
contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was holding to the police
officers.16
For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking along
Perimeter Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas
approached Fami, who was then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami
poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room where Fami handcuffed Nuevass
hands, got Nuevass wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it in his (Famis) wallet. Fami then confronted
Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before leaving the house with Nuevas,
Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red owner
type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he
did not know Din or Inocencio.17
Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 oclock in the morning of 27 September 1997, while
his compare Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman. The two
(2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed.
They were not informed of the reason for their arrest and were told that the reason will be explained
to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan precinct where the investigator asked for
their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to stand up and be
photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they had their fingerprints
taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table. 18
Inocencio testified that he went to his compadre Dins house in the morning of 27 September 1997
to sell his fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his drivers license. While there, he and Din
were arrested by two persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other searched the
house for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct
and then to Station B where he first came to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing
marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he only saw such evidence on the day he
gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was taken of the three of them, he and
Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the photograph was taken, they were not
assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards,
they were brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the police what they did wrong, the
police replied that they will just explain it in court. 19
All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw
appeal.20 The Court granted Nuevass withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and
terminated as to him, in a Resolution21dated 25 August 2003.
In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42,23 the cases were
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.24
Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1) in
finding them guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and
(2) n not finding that their constitutional rights have been violated.25

The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.27
The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the
trial courts assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted
with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. The
appellate court found Fami and Cablings version of how appellants were apprehended to be
categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was seen holding a plastic bag containing
marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencios possession of the marijuana leaves was
established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the plastic bag carried by Din. 28
With respect to appellants claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate
court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial
warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the
bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the
exclusionary rule does not apply.29
Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued
before the Court of Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief) 30 dated 22
March 2006, appellants stated that all the arguments necessary to support their acquittal have
already been discussed in the brief they had submitted before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a
supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of the arguments discussed in said brief. 31 The Office
of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief. 32
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure
made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.
In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:
While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was without a
search warrant, it was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received informations [sic]
from an asset that on that day, a male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver marijuana
at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t]., Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal
drugs. They went to the said area upon that information. Their waiting was fruitful because not long
afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle carrying a bag and after
confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves. With
respect to the confiscation of 2 kilos of marijuana and the apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din
and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued operation by the team which this time was led
by accused Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the
apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of
Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and the recovery from them [of] 2 kilos of dried marijuana
leaves. The propriety of this conclusion is necessity [sic] because of the impossibility of getting first a
warrant in so short a time with such cumbersome requirements before one can be issued. Before

getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are not distant to
the case of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that
expediency and practicality are some of the justification[s] in the warrantless arrest. 33 [Emphasis
supplied]
Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection of
the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time. 34
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 35 The constitutional proscription, however, is not
absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured.37
The courts below anchor appellants conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure
conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as
Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing
marijuana to the police officers.38
We differ.

First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 39 Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where
the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search. 40
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the
plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone
is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." 41
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass case,
the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. 43 In Dins
case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and
wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have justified
mere seizure of the articles without further search.45
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his
consent. In Dins case, there was none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the

nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given.46
In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating
bag to the police officers. Fami testified in this wise:
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your part, what did you do?
A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according to him, he acted arrogantly,
sir.
Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you confronted him did he resist?
A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are policeman[?]"
Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?
A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.
xxxx
Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?
A "Sir Famir[sic], dont charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to Leyte. I was just earning
enough money for my fare, sir."
xxxx
Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do if you did anything?
A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are the other staffs[sic] sir. 48
xxxx
Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification, sir.49
Cabling likewise testified as follows:
Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he got?
A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.

Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?

A Nobody ordered it, sir.50
There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the
incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate
himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag and
even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with
the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost of
others lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his
appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. Fami testified as follows:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the plastic bag?
A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the said plastic bag.
Q When you took this plastic bag from Din.
Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?
A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.
Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag belongs to him?
A I did not react, sir.
Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with it?
A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped
therein, sir.51[Emphasis supplied.]
Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in your earlier testimony,
what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and pinpointed by Nuevas as
the ones who kept suspected prohibited drugs, sir.
Q After you approached these two people, what happened?

A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily surrendered to Fami those
marijuana dry leaves, sir.52
The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got
hold of the bag. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Dins submission of the
plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 53
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into
surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Famis and Cablings testimonies do not show
that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on Dins
composurewhether he felt surprised or frightened at the timewhich fact we find necessary to
provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by the
police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched.
And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.55
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Dins conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest
not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. 56 As such, Din deserves
an acquittal.
1awphi1.net

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecutions insistence that the appellants have
effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in
the trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves
cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically, as they were seized
during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 57
Turning to Inocencios case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime
charged. Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown
through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. 58 Taking a look at an object,
more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking possession
thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish
illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution

failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he
conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony
that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Courts dated but nevertheless current
exhortation:
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary
people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.59
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
75, in Criminal Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din
y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau
of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they
are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y
CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo
(Jingabo) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, with Violations
of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, paragraphs (e-l), (f), (m), and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The
accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confed erating together and helping one another, not being authorized by law to sell,
deliver, transport or give away to another any prohibited drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and

knowingly sell, or offer for sale, deliver or transport marijuana dried flowering tops with total weight of
thirty two thousand nine hundred ninety five (32,995) grams which is a prohibited drug. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-177383. Upon arraignment, all accused-appellants
entered a plea of not guilty.2
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Police Officer (PO) 3 Wilfredo Masanggue (Masanggue),
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Anthony Blanco (Blanco), PO3 Eduardo Pama (Pama), and Forensic
Chemist George de Lara (De Lara). The RTC summarized the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as follows:
Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he
and SPO1 Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief Inspector Romulo Sapitula to
proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where, according to the
report given by the informant, three persons a male and two female[s] would be coming from
Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana. In no time, they arrived at the designated
place and parked their mobile patrol car along Juan Luna Street, facing the northern direction just
near the corner of Raxabago Street.
At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of
the pier. At a certain point along Raxabago Street, about a hundred meters away from the position of
their patrol car the taxi stopped. From it emerged three passengers a man and two women each
one of them carrying a black travelling bag. As the trio fitted the descriptions given to them by
Inspector Sapitula, they intently watched and monitored their movements.
About one or two minutes later, as the trio started walking towards the western portion of Raxabago
St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its
presence. She started walking in a more hurried pace ("parang walkathon") as if she wanted to run
away ("parang patakbo"). SPO1 Blanco alighted from the car and chased [Dequina] while PO3
Masanggue, who was behind the wheels also alighted and restrained [Jundoc] and [Jingabo]. While
thus trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the
bag gave way. Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags case into view.
Suspecting the stuffs to be marijuana, they further inspected the other two bags in the possession of
[Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found out that they had the same contents. They boarded the three
accused, along with their bags in their patrol car and proceeded to the hospital for physical
examination before bringing them to their headquarters. While in transit, [Dequina] pleaded to them
to allow her to make a call but they did not heed the request as the car was still in motion.
At the western Police District Headquarters at United Nations Avenue, they turned over the three
accused together with the bags to PO3 Eduardo Pama, a police investigator of the district AntiNarcotics Unit for investigation. During the investigation, it was discovered that each of the three
black travelling bags confiscated from the three accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana. In
connection with the incident, he and SPO1 Blanco executed the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension
dated September 30, 1999 (Exhs, "A" and submarkings).
SPO1 Anthony Blanco testified that in the early morning of September 29, 1999, together with PO3
Wilfredo Masanggue, he was dispatched by their superior to the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago
Sts., Tondo, Manila, where it was reported that shipment of marijuana would take place. They were

further informed that the drug couriers were composed of a man and two women and that each of
them were carrying a travelling bag.
After they arrived at the designated area, they parked their vehicle along Juan Luna near Raxabago
Street. Then they waited. Suddenly, they noticed the arrival of a taxicab from where three persons
a man and two women alighted. Each of them was carrying a bag. The trio fitted the descriptions
given to them. As the suspects walked away, they drove and trailed them. As they got close behind
them, accused Nelida Dequina noticed the presence of the mobile car. She dropped the black bag
she was carrying and the same was unzipped. The contents thereof consisting of dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags came into view. They arrested the three suspects later
identified as the accused herein and boarded them into their car. While on board the vehicle,
[Dequina] and [Jundoc] confessed that the contents of the other two bags confiscated from them
were also marijuana.
At the WPD Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, the three accused were turned over to
the Office of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit where they were investigated by PO3 Wilfredo Pama. It
was there where the other two bags confiscated from [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] were re-opened and
confirmed to contain marijuana.
In the course of his cross-examination, SPO1 Blanco admitted that the three of them Inspector
Sapitula, PO3 Masanggue and himself, along with the three accused, were photographed, at what
appeared to be a "sari-sari" store as their background. The same appeared in the clipping of
"Tonight" September 20, 1999 issue.
PO3 Eduardo Pama, an investigator from the District Anti-Narcotics Unit of the WPD was the one
who investigated the case. He placed the corresponding markings on the packs of marijuana
confiscated from the three accused after the same were turned over to him by SPO1 Blanco and
PO3 Masanggue. He marked the bag recovered from [Dequina] "NDD" and the contents thereof
"NDD-1" to "NDD-11". He marked the bag taken from [Jundoc] "JJJ" and the contents thereof " JJJ1" to "JJJ-11". Finally, he marked the bag recovered from [Jingabo] "NCJ" and the contents thereof
"NCJ-1" to "NCJ-11". In connection with his investigation, he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Reports of the three accused (Exhs. "F". "G" and "H") as well as the Referral Letter to the City
Prosecutors Office (Exh. "I"). Afterwards, he brought the three bags of suspected marijuana together
with the letter-request to the National Bureau of Investigation [(NBI)] Chemistry Division, for the
laboratory examinations. The same were received thereat on September 29, 1999 at 10:12 in the
evening. The following day, September 30, 1999, at 10:38 p.m., certifications, corresponding to each
and every set of items recovered from the three accused were released to PO3 Pama.
George De Lara, Forensic Chemist, Forensic Chemistry Division, NBI, Manila testified that he
conducted the laboratory examinations of the subject specimens based on the letter-request from
DANU Police Superintendent Miguel de Mayo Laurel (Exh. "B" and submarkings). From the black
bag (Exh. "K") allegedly recovered from [Dequina], he counted a total of eleven bricks of dried
leaves suspected to be marijuana which had a total weight of 10,915.0 grams. The results of the
chemical, microscopic and chromatographic examinations he conducted show that the said
specimens were positive for the presence of chemical found only in marijuana.
With regard to the bag allegedly confiscated from [Jundoc] (Exh. "O"), witness counted eleven bricks
of dried leaves believed to be marijuana. The specimens had a total weight of 11,010.0 grams. When

subjected to be same type of laboratory examinations, the specimens yielded positive result for
marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Anent the bag (Exh. "R") with masking tape having the mark "DDM-99-110" allegedly recovered from
[Jingabo], witness also found eleven bricks of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana which
when weighed yielded a total weight of 11,070.0 grams. The results of similar types of examinations
conducted confirmed the specimens to be marijuana.
He prepared separate certifications for the results of the examinations he conducted on the
specimens contained in three separate bags allegedly confiscated from accused Dequina, Jundoc
and Jingabo (Exhs. "C", "D" and "E", respectively). He also prepared NBI Forensic Chemistry
Division Report No. DDM-99-108 dated October 1, 1999 (Exh. "L" and submarkings). 3
For the defense, only the accused-appellants took the witness stand. The RTC recapitulated the
testimonies of the accused-appellants, thus:
Accused Nelida Dequina testified that she became an orphan at a tender age. With the help of her
aunt, she was able to pursue her studies. She was a consistent scholar from elementary until
college. While in the third year of her Accountancy course, she encountered severe financial
difficulties. She stopped schooling and worked instead. Soon, she had a relationship with a man with
whom she begot a child. The relationship did not last. Not long after, she had a relationship with
another man. This time she begot her second child named Samantha.
In May 1999, while the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) members were having a parade in Iloilo City, she
met a certain Salvacion Pearedondo, a member of the group. She calls her Sally. Sally convinced
her to join the movement. Since she used to watch similar group activities while in college, she
manifested her desire to join the movement by nodding her head. From then on, Sally frequently
visited her at home. For a living, she was engaged in selling ready-to-wear dresses, frozen meat and
relief goods which Sally supplied to her.
On September 27, 1999, Sally told her that the movement had decided to send her to a mission
which would determine if she was really qualified to join the group. She was advised to bring alone
two friends, preferably a woman and a gay. As at time Sally saw them in her company, she chose
Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc to be her companions. Sally did not elaborate the real nature of
such mission. She did not press to know more about the venture either. Before they parted that day,
Sally instructed her to fetch her two friends and meet her (Sally) early in the morning of the following
day, September 28, 1999 near the entrance of the Gaisano Mall, the largest department store in
Iloilo. She dropped by the public market and told Nora and Joselito about the plan to meet Sally the
following morning.
As agreed upon, they met Sally at the designated place and time. Sally secretly told her that the
three of them would be going to Manila for a still undisclosed mission. She was briefed that the three
of them will temporarily stay in the house of her [Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further
instructed that they will go to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be met by
members of their group who will also monitor their movements. Afterwards, they will proceed to Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga where they will pick-up some bags. Thereat, somebody will meet and give
them instructions. From Dau, they will return to Manila. They will alight at the first ShoeMart
Department Store which they will see along the way. A waiting tricycle would bring them to a store

where they could buy carton boxes for their bags. Finally, a taxicab will fetch and bring them all the
way to the pier.
[Dequina] received P3,000.00 from Sally for their expenses and plane tickets for the three of them
from Sally. However, she noticed that instead of their true names, the tickets were in the names of
other persons. Her plane ticket was in the name of Sarah Ganje. That of [Jundoc] and [Jingabo]
were in the names of Rowenal Palma and Mary Grace Papa, respectively. Nervous, she thought of
backing out at the last minute but Sally assured her that she had nothing to worry about. Sally
culminated by saying that something will happen to her child if ever she backed out from the plan.
Because of the threat, [Dequina] went on with the plan. Enroute to the Iloilo airport, [Jundoc] and
[Jingabo] expressed their anxieties about the venture but she calmed them down and assured them
that she will take care of everything.
From the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to her aunts place at Pitogo St., Guadalupe,
Makati City where they rested after taking their meal. At around 2:00 p.m., her aunt woke her up and
told her that the two vehicles an owner-type jepney and a passenger jepney with unfamiliar faces
on board were lurking in their vicinity for quite sometime.
At around 5:00 p.m., they left the place on board a taxi to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal at Avenida,
Rizal. While waiting for their schedule, two men approached and handed to her bus tickets. The
same men nosed out to them the vehicle where they were supposed to board. She was further
reminded by the men that members of the movement will also be on board.
They arrived in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga at about 12:30 a.m. of September 29, 1999. While they
were having their snacks, a couple went near and instructed them to cross the road and take the
bags from the three men whom they saw for the first time. The couple also handed over to them bus
tickets. They were instructed to board vehicles bound for Pasay and alight at the first Shoemart (SM)
Department Store that they will see along the way. They took the bags from the three men without
even bothering to know the contents thereof. However, she noticed that the bags were very heavy.
As they boarded the Pasay bound bus, the conductor took the bags from them and loaded the same
in compartment section of the vehicle. With the assistance of the bus conductor, they alighted at SM
North Edsa. They transferred to a waiting tricycle, as per instruction given by Sally. The tricycle
dropped them at a "sari-sari" store where they bought carton boxes where they placed two of the
three bags. From there, the driver lead them to a waiting taxi where they loaded all their baggages.
She and Nora occupied the back seat while Joselito sat beside the driver. She instructed the driver
to take them to the pier for Iloilo bound ships.
As they entered the pier premises, a mobile patrol car came from nowhere and blocked their path.
Two police officers emerged and ordered them to alight. Then, upon the policemens order, the driver
opened the taxis trunk where the three bags were loaded. The police officers forcibly opened one of
the three bags where they saw something wrapped in jute bags and plastic bags. It was learned that
the contents of the bags were marijuana.
They were all herded into the mobile car. While on board the mobile car, the police officers asked
them if they had money. When the policemen learned that they did not have money, they were
brought to a "sari-sari" store where a police officer named Sapitula was waiting. Sapitula asked them

questions. At one point, Sapitula slapped her. They were made to line up and Sapitula summoned
some press reporters who photographed them
They were brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. While being examined, she confided to a nurse that
she was manhandled by Sapitula. They were brought to the office of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit
where corresponding charges were filed against them.
She insisted that the incident took place near the pier and not at the corner of Raxabago and Juan
Luna Sts., Tondo, Manila. Were if not for the threat that something will happen to her daughter, she
could not followed (sic) the orders of Sally.
The combined testimony of accused Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc established the following
facts.
On September 27, 1999, while [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were tending to their fish stall in Iloilo Public
Market, [Dequina], their friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed reason, at
the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following day, September 28, 1999.
As agreed upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally joined them.
They knew Sally to be [Dequinas] supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while, [Dequina]
and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they talked privately.
Soon after Sally left, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] asked [Dequina] what they talked about. Instead of
answering, [Dequina] asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get something.
While a little bit surprised, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] readily agreed as they had never been in the city
before. [Dequina] handed to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were given by
Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the names of other
persons. When they called the attention of [Dequina] about it, the latter simply replied "Anyway that
is free". [Jingabo] noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that time. Nevertheless, the three of
them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28, 1999.
From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of [Dequinas] aunt in
Guadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar vehicles.
Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful about it, they left
Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus Terminal. Thereat, two
male persons approached [Dequina] and handed to her bus tickets. They were pointed to the
particular vehicle where they were to board.
They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999.
While they were having their snacks, a couple approached [Dequina] and they had a talk. Thereafter,
the couple motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the opposite side of the
road. Upon [Dequinas] instruction, they took the bags from the three men. Then, they waited for
their ride back to Manila.
As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment. They alighted at
SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting tricycle. When they
reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they loaded two of the three
bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed [Dequina] to a waiting taxi where they boarded along
with their baggages.

As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car ordered them to stop.
They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the taxis compartment.
One of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the bags. Then, the
policemen told them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The police officers ordered
them to board the mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment of the same car.
They were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they later knew to be
the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated [Dequina] and at one point, he
slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were
brought to the "Hospital ng Bayan" and finally, to the police precinct were they were charged
accordingly.4
The parties dispensed with the testimony of Prose M. Arreola, a representative of Air Philippines,
since they were willing to stipulate on the existence of the passenger manifest, on which appeared
the accused-appellants assumed names, as well as the accused-appellants plane tickets for the
flight from Iloilo to Manila on September 28, 1999 at 7:00 a.m.
The RTC, in a Decision dated October 30, 2000, found the accused-appellants guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NELIDA
DEQUINA y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y CRUZ guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal transport marijuana and sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Each of them is ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.5
The accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but the RTC
denied the same in its Order dated December 27, 2000.
Accused-appellants then filed a notice of appeal on January 25, 2001. Thus, the records of Criminal
Case No. 99-177383 were forwarded to this Court. Pursuant to our decision in People v.
Mateo,6 however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals,7 where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01431.
Accused-appellants made the following assignment of errors in their brief:
I
The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal
transport of marijuana.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized items from the accused-appellants
despite the fact that they were seized in violation of their constitutional rights against illegal search
and seizure.8
In its Decision9 dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused-appellants conviction. It
decreed:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, in
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 99-177393, finding accused-appellants NELIDA DEQUINA y
DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y CRUZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegally transporting 32[,]995 grams of marijuana is hereby AFFIRMED. 10
Hence, accused-appellants appealed to this Court.
In our Resolution dated July 4, 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. Both parties manifested that they no longer
intend to file any supplemental brief considering that they have already raised all the issues and
arguments in their original briefs.
We find no merit in the present appeal.
The accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the offense of illegal transport of
marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
which provides:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal. They were not
doing anything illegal that would have justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless
search of their persons and belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be justified as an
incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful. Accused-appellants insist that the description of
the persons who were transporting marijuana relayed by the Chief of Police to the apprehending
officers, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it could not be sufficient ground for
the apprehension of accused-appellants.
1wphi1

The People counters that accused-appellants arrests were lawful as they were then actually
committing a crime. Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the resulting warrantless
search of their persons and belongings was also valid. In addition, accused-appellants did not refute
that they were indeed transporting prohibited drugs when they were arrested and, instead, alleged
as defenses that Dequina acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo
were merely accommodating a trusted childhood friend.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the judgment of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, was supported by the evidence on record. The People was able to discharge the
burden of proving the accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the
appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge,
who had the first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses
both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony,11 we have no reason to
disregard the findings of the lower court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In this case, Chief Inspector Sapitula, in the early morning of September 29, 1999, received a tip that
a huge amount of marijuana would be transported from Baguio City to the Manila pier, which will
then be loaded on vessels bound for Iloilo. Acting on the information he received, Chief Inspector
Sapitula dispatched PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco to the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna
Streets, where they were supposed to watch out for two females and one male. PO3 Masanggue
and SPO1 Blanco posted their mobile patrol car near said corner. From where they were at, PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco spotted three persons, two females and one male who turned out to
be accused-appellants alighting from a taxi at the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Streets,
each carrying a traveling bag. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco then followed accused-appellants
until one of them, Dequina, dropped her traveling bag. The traveling bag fell open and inside, PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco saw dried leaves in transparent plastic bags. It was only then that the
two police officers apprehended accused-appellants and their persons and belongings searched.
As PO3 Masanggue testified:
Q Now, on September 29, 1999 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning will you please tell us where
you were?
A I reported to Headquarters Office for INSS briefing and information.
Q And while you were there can you recall if there is any unusual incident that happened?
xxxx
WITNESS:
Yes, your Honor.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR.:
After the formation what happen?
xxxx
WITNESS
After our formation we are informed by our chief that he received a telephone call and receive an
information that three persons will be arriving and will deliver marijuana.
Q And what else if any did your chief tell you?
A And we were dispatched by our chief to the place where the marijuana will be dropped at corner
Juan Luna and Raxabago.
Q And did you indeed go there?
A Yes, sir.

Q What district is that, Mr. Witness?

A District II of Manila.
Q And, then what transpired when you went there?
A We saw three persons alighting from a taxi and each of them carrying a black bag.
Q And what did you do?
A When we saw that the three persons who alighted from the taxi match with the description of the
persons we are looking for we approach them.
Q And what happen when you approach them?
A When we were about to approach them one of them by the name of [Dequina] tried to run away.
xxxx
Q And then what did you do if any when she try to run away?
A We chase her and told her to stop running and she drop the bag she was carrying.
Q You state that we, who else are you referring to?
A SPO1 Anthony Blanco.
Q Now, when she drop the bag from her shoulder what did you do if any?
A When the bag fell the zipper open and we saw dry leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic bag
from the inside.
Q And then what did you do if any?
A Because I was convinced that the person is the one match the person we are looking for and as
our SOP we brought them to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination.
Q You stated you brought them or she only you brought her?
A No, sir. Im referring to the three accused in this case.
xxxx
Q And why did you bring the other two persons when you said that it was only [Dequina] who
dropped the bag?
A Because they were together who alighted from the taxi.

xxxx
Q And what transpired in your office?
A We brought them to our chief and also the bag which contained the dried leaves suspected to be
marijuana and the bag was later turn over to the Anti Narcotic Unit.
xxxx
Q So you mean to say that there were three (3) bags that were recover by you from the three
accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, so in your office you stated that you turn over the said three (3) bags to whom, Mr. Witness?
A To the investigator of DANU.
Q What is DANU?
A District Anti Narcotics Unit.
Q And do you know what they do with the bag if you know to the bag?
A They counted the contains of all the bag sir and found out that each bag contain eleven (11) blocks
of suspected marijuana.12
The positive and categorical testimony of PO3 Masanggue, corroborated by SPO1 Blanco, deserves
weight and credence in light of the presumption of regularity accorded to the performance of their
official duties as police officers, and the lack of motive on their part to falsely testify against accusedappellants.
To discredit PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, accused-appellants claimed that they were blocked
by the police officers at the pier and not at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Streets; and that
PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco did not mention in their testimonies passing by a sari-sari store
to meet up with Chief Inspector Sapitula and presenting accused-appellants to the media. These
details, however, are immaterial, not really departing significantly from the police officers version of
the events surrounding accused-appellants arrest and search, which yielded the marijuana they
were transporting. At any rate, certain parts of the testimonies of PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco
were corroborated by the accused-appellants themselves (i.e., that the police officers, prior to
bringing accused-appellants to the police headquarters, first brought accused-appellants to the
Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination), PO3 Pama (i.e., that each of the three traveling bags
turned over to him by PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco contained 11 bricks of marijuana), and NBI
Forensic Chemist De Lara (i.e., that the dried leaves marked and turned over to him by PO3 Pama
tested positive for marijuana).
There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of
the marijuana were valid and legal.

Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 It further
decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.14
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey from one
place to another."16 The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accusedappellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling
bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine
its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away
and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accusedappellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of their
traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags containing
marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. In
People v. Fernandez,17 we ruled that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he
is precluded from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.18
In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported the
marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim
that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.
We are unconvinced.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does
not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will
is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat.19 Here, Dequinas version of events that culminated with her
and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is
Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of
marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that:
While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called
all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was
with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they
were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear.
At one point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally
while she was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in
Manila and in the court room attending the hearing. Moreover, accused-appellants themselves
picture a very precise and elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana.
With this, it is simply contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would
entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two stooges,
unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport of the marijuana
shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of
[Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe from the time they arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they
had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their purported desire to see Manila.
Clearly, the defense story is riddled with holes.20
1wphi1

Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of
conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.21 Thus, as found by the RTC, conspiracy by and
among accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may be inferred from the following acts of
accused-appellants:
This was shown when by their account, the three accused left Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a
while, left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila thereafter. They were together
when the apprehending police officers pounced on them near the pier premises on their way back to
Iloilo, each of them carrying a travelling bag which contained marijuana. x x x. 22
With the enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, 23 the penalty imposable upon violators
of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more. The quantity of marijuana
involved in this case weighs 32,995 grams, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for the
application of indivisible penalties under Article 6324 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. As

there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the RTC
correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally, considering that the penalty
imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not
be applied.25
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 16, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431, which affirmed the Decision dated October 30, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 99-177383, finding accusedappellants guilty of the crime of illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accusedappellants.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals,
affirming the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) Judgment2 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606,
and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping
for ransom.
Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were
charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:
In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
carry away and detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and
consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which
after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted
jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or
among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 3
In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
carry away and detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and
consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which
after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted
jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or
among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 4
In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
carry away and detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for
the purpose of extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount
of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber
Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage
and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.5
The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.6 Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996.
Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea. This
prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson),
Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt.
Chan), Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of
facts are summarized as follows:
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson
Kirby Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves
(Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue,
Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed
by in front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a
tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted
Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently
with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the
stainless jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who
then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were
brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. 7
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the
secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back
to the car undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and
they were locked inside the comfort room.8

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking
him if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was
dropped off earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she
could not find the car when she roamed around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother
Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at
Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa
called about their whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that
an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of the children and demanded P26
Million.9
Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge.
He asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employers telephone number. She
feigned ignorance of those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new
employee.10 Sarge informed Nimfa that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew
how to go home. Nimfa chose to stay with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the
house and Nimfa again sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being
held up in Merville Subdivision.11
Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (VicePresident Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General
Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered
the police generals to rescue Jepsons sons and arrest the kidnappers. 12
At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million.13 That night,
Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one
of them as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office sometime in the first
week of December 1993.14
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to
negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant
because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a
hundred times during a span of two to four years.15
On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3
Million in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. 16 Appellant asked
Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson
called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off. 17
At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that
they would be released that afternoon.18 At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and
proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray
bag and put it on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him
to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without
turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then
apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon
Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner
of the gas station.19

P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two
other police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the
Maranao Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the
supposed pay-off. He took a total of 24 shots.20He identified Macias together with appellant in
Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom. 21
P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in
Makati on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off. He witnessed the
pay-off and identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the
car trunk of Jepson.22
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force
Habagat and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December
1993 with the primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children and helper. His
group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer
Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information
that the kidnap victims were released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position
in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red
Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it
until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the village.
When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle. 23
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be
appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed
to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a
gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant
was then brought to Camp Crame for questioning. 24
At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and
Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then
saw the bag containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs
were taken and Jepson was asked to identify them.25
A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag. 26 It was found out that a portion of the
ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the
possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias
in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed
him under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went
inside the house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of
the seized property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt. 27
Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were
detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23 December 1993, it came to her
knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort
room was reversed so that it could only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual
because she personally caused the door knob to be installed. 28
The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal
(Dr. Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).

Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in
1989 as the importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights,
police sirens and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling
his security agency in July 1993. He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990
and his total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa
since 1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him
coffee.29
In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to
the house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December
1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial
payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested
appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant
agreed. He actively participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he
successfully negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million.
On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom
money to the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office
that day, to accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait
for further instructions. Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to
appellant once instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked
appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the
latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the
money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepsons car and
put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station. 30 Appellant and Macias did not
see the kidnappers and Jepsons children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to
communicate with him. They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00
p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him because they apparently went to
the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen stationed in the area, which
prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in
Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a
car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the
car and were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms. 31
Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary,
who appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw appellant arrive at the office
with Macias.32
Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented
the medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been
sustained during the scuffle.33
Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between
appellant and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even served as guarantor of
some of the obligations of appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the
bank, Jepson filed a case against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the
latter was eventually acquitted.34

While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is
totally extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. 35
On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of
reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He
should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.
The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan
Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of Corrections,
National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this
court in writing soonest as to when the said official took custody of the accused. 36
The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that
the elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo, 37 this Court
in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.38
On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial
Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in convicting
Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.39
A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
22 December 2006. Hence, this appeal.
On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On
25 October 2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance. Appellee manifested that it is
no longer filing a Supplemental Brief.40 Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorneys Office
as counsel de oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the
arguments in the appellants brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.41
Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based
on the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the disturbing whispers of
doubt replete in the prosecutions theory.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz testimony notwithstanding the
incredibility of her story.
III. The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official functions over
the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused uyboco.
IV. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez notwithstanding his
displayed propensity for untruthfulness.
V. The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented against the
accused-appellant since they were procured in violation of his constitutional rights.
VI. The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by accusedappellant from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where nimfa celiz and her wards
were allegedly detained.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated in the
abduction of jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single evidence on record
supports the same.
VIII. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that abduction, an
important element of the crime, was never established against him.
IX. The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom without
discussing the participation of accused macias considering that the charge was for
conspiracy.42
The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to
resolve this issue in the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 43
We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the
prosecution, thus:

1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;

2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco,
referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private complainant Jepson
Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as
their maid or "yaya" Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of
December 20, 1993. The three victims were on board Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven by
Jepsons driver Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church,
Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white t-shirt and
brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a
general working at the Presidential Security Group. Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The
same man drove the pick-up to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila,
where the victims were illegally detained from December 20 to 23, 1993.
xxxx
3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal. Their
detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private individual whose
mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and
coercion for personal gain;
xxxx
5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the
parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge amount of
money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x.44
These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecutions witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa,
the victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom
ransom was extorted.
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and
detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:
A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.
xxxx
A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2)
children and myself, Sir.
xxxx
A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?

A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next?
A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an
alley, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: What?
A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there
was a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.
Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?
A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the
side, sir.
Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?
A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?
xxxx
A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a
turn at Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacaang,
Sir.
xxxx
Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?
A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: Then what followed next?

A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he
was the one who drove, Sir.
xxxx
A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the
passengers side, Sir.
xxxx
Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?
A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went
straight as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.
xxxx
A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.
Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened?
A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.
Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?
A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?
A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.45
Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold
of the money, thus:
A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again
the one continuing the conversation, Sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked
for my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?

A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.
Q: What followed?
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x
x.
xxxx
Q: And after that what followed?
A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.
Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.
Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?
A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.
Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.
Q: How about the other balance?
A: My jewelry, Sir.46
xxxx
Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun
and the bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.
Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?
A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.
Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?
A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the
Magallanes Commercial Center.

Q: Where did you place that bag?

A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake
House.
xxxx
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and
lock the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?
A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car
Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.
Q: And then, what did you do?
A: I followed his instruction.
Q: And what followed next?
A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug
Store already.
Q: And what was your answer?
A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back
towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: And?
A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: Did you comply with that instruction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.

Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form
that Colt Mirage?
A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of
the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.
Q: And what followed thereafter?
A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after
the Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan. 47
Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies,
untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.
Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa
stated that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision
at 4:00 p.m. while appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00
p.m., he saw Macias and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not
properly identify the number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and during the
direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge
had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers
to the safe house because she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say
that two persons, Macias and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism
whenever they hand the phone to her. Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an
operational telephone while in captivity.48 The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these
inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:
The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the
reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of
the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the
decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than
diminish, Celiz testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed.
The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded
or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the crime. Besides, familiarity
with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but
has in fact at times even facilitated its commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone
in the house where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes
or blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view, it may even
be posited that the incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco
and his companions. Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and
pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the
victims.49

Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that
appellant owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million. Appellant
charges Jepson of downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals
and Jepson would address appellant as "Ernie." Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able
to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant.
Finally, appellant claims that Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge
against him boils down to money. Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line
of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate
competition and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and considering his brothers close
association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson crafted and executed a frame up of appellant.
And the Court of Appeals had this to say:
For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to
apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves children is, by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise, the police operatives call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of
any evidence that said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their
performance of official duties and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up.
Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which
evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon the
prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in
the prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had
other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its nonpresentation of other witnesses cannot be taken against the same. 50
Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the
defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted. 51
We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence
to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers.
Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to
discredit them. As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.52 While it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies
of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as
in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. 53
Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecutions theory, thus:
If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M
x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom money using his own
car registered in his sons name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its
contents? Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask
covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to his family residence x x x with the ransom money
still intact in the trunk of his car?

If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were
they not tied x x x?
xxxx
If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the
place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his own
name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree,
much more so an established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease
contract and the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence.
x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x
x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment? Why did they not apply for a
warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he
was the kidnapper?
Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the
kidnappers x x x.54
Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman
negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.
If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these
questions that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced
due to aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom
money because he could not trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the
bag containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as
instructed; that appellant did not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not
recognize him; that appellant went back to his family residence because he never thought that
Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not
blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two
children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to escape; that appellant never thought that the
police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to
first secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be
futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of
kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and
the kidnappers.
However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a
battle of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard
evidence takes precedence. On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence
to prove that kidnapping occurred and that appellant is the author thereof.
Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his
argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated
in the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police
did not try to rescue the kidnap victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies
installing any listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the
interview made by a reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped

conversations of appellants alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that
these taped conversations do exist.
Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the
testimony of P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the
alleged taped conversations. The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the
alleged pay-off, the non-production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody
supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In
the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime
against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the
accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-up.55
Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence
of a warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis
supplied)
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates
two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.56
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the
crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such
knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant
was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does
not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
eyes.57

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is
equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to
such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for
the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest
under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 58 Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so
for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the
abduction of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted. In a related
argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime,
therefore, appellants participation was not sufficiently established.
The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:
The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and
the Dichaves children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said
house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no
evidence to the contrary, Uybocos presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his
possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the
balance of the ransom payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point out that
Uyboco, together with several unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit
kidnapping for ransom.
xxxx
x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep
which waylaid the Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of kidnapping
for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the
victims were kept, is misplaced.
lawph!l

Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the
performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e. possession of the
ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the
details of their nefarious plan.59

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was
not present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained,
oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from
Jepson. The conspiracy was likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with
Macias and other John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant
in the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.60
Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606,
and 93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for
ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) and THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND

INVESTIGATION BUREAU (EIIB), petitioners,
vs.
NELSON OGARIO and MARK MONTELIBANO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to enjoin
forfeiture proceedings in the Bureau of Customs. In accordance with what is now settled law, we
hold it does not.
The facts are as follows: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of
Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention1 of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of
SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto", which was then docketed at
Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported. The report
stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked
"SNOWMAN," Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V
"Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu, docketed as Cebu
Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98.
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his
buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, alleging:
4.) That upon arrival of the herein-mentioned sacks of rice at the PIER 5 of Cebu City,
Philippines on the 7th day of December 1998 all of the defendants rushed to the port with
long arms commanding the plaintiff's laborer[s] to stopped [sic] the unloading of the same

from the vessel named M/V Alberto. The defendants alleged that the herein-mentioned rice
were [sic] smuggled from abroad without even proof that the same were [sic] purchased from
a particularly country.
5.) By the mere suspicion of the defendants that the goods were smuggled from abroad, they
immediately put on hold the release of the goods from the ship and at the same time they
jointly barred unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs' laborers of the hereinmentioned rice.
6.) The plaintiffs then presented all the pertinent and necessary documents to all of the
defendants but the latter refused to believe that the same is from Palawan because their
minds are closed due to some reason or another Civil [while] the plaintiffs believed that the
same is merely an act of harassment. The documents are as follows:
A.) Certification from the National Food Authority that the same is from Palawan. This
is hereto attached Annex A.
B) Bill of Lading issued by ANMA PHILIPPINES Shipping Company. This is hereto
attached as Annex B.
7.) The acts of the defendants in stopping he loading and unloading activities of the plaintiff's
laborers [have] no basis in law and in fact; thus, unlawful and illegal. A mere suspicious
which is not coupled with any proof or evidence to that effect is [a] matter which the law
prohibits.
8.) That for more than three days and despite the repeated plea of the plaintiffs that their
goods should be released to them and the defendants should stop from barring the
unloading and loading activities, the latter blindly refused [to] heed the same.
9.) That the acts of all of the defendants which are greatly unlawful and erroneous would
caused [sic] irreparable damage, injury, and grave injustices to the plaintiffs.
10.) That by way of example or correction for the public good and to deter the defendants
from doing the same acts to other businessmen, defendants should be held liable for
exemplary damages in amount of not less than One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
11.) That the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed in this complaint and the whole or part
of such reliefs consists in restraining perpetually the defendants from holding the hereinmentioned twenty-five thousand sacks of rice. That defendants should be restrained
perpetually from barring the unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs' laborers.
12.) That allowing the defendants to continue their unlawful acts would work grave injustice
to the plaintiffs. Unless a preliminary injunction be granted ex-parte, grave and irreparable
injury and damage would result to the plaintiffs before the latter can be heard on notice.
13.) That if the defendants be not restrained perpetually from their unlawful acts, the hereinmentioned rice will deteriorate and turn into dusts [sic] if not properly disposed.
1wphi1.nt

14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated
December 9, 1998 be quashed because the defendants' act of seizing and detaining the
herein-mentioned sacks of rice are illegal. The continuing act of detaining the hereinmentioned sacks of rice will led to the deterioration of the same. That no public auction sale
of the same should be conducted by the Bureau of Custom[s] or any government agenc[y].
15.) That plaintiffs are ready and willing to file a bond executed to the defendants in an
amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court to the effect that plaintiffs will pay to the
defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if this Honorable
Court should finally decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Premised on the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed before this Honorable Court
that a restraining order or temporary injunction be immediately issued prohibiting the defendants
from holding plaintiffs' above-mentioned goods. That it is further prayed that a restraining order or
temporary injunction be issued prohibiting the defendants from barring the unloading and loading
activities of the plaintiffs' laborers. Further, the plaintiffs prayed that the warrant of seizure and
detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9, 1998 be quashed and no public
auction sale of the same should be conducted by any government agency or authority.
It is further prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Making the restraining order and/or preliminary injunction permanent.
2.) Ordering the defendants jointly to pay exemplary or corrective damages to the plaintiff[s]
in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
Such other relief which are just and demandable under the circumstances are also prayed for.2
In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu3 and the EIIB, as well as
the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were denied. In its resolution, dated January 11, 1999, the
RTC said:
The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot divest this
court of jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as it was anchored merely on
suspicion that the items in question were imported or smuggled. It is very clear that the
defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove that the goods were indeed imported or
smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs have very vigorously protested against the seizure of
cargoes by the defendants. In fact, as revealed by defendants' counsel, the Warrant of
Seizure and Detention was issued merely to shift the burden of proof to the shippers or
owners of the goods to prove that the bags of rice were not imported or smuggled. However,
the court feels this is unfair because the settled rule is that he who alleges must prove the
same. Besides, at this time when our economy is not good, it would be a [dis]service to the
nation to use the strong arm of the law to make things hard or difficult for the businessmen. 4
The 25,000 bags of rice were ordered returned to respondents upon the posting by them of an
P8,000,000.00 bond.

Petitioners BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its
order dated January 25, 1999.5 In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of
respondents' bond to P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the resolution and order
of the RTC were sustained.6
Accordingly, on April 26, 1999, upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in
respondents' possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu (Cebu Seizure
Identification Case No. 17-98), a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the
two (2) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law while the seven (7) trucks
bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are
RELEASED in favor of their respective owners upon proper identification and compliance
with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Since this decision involves the release of some of the articles subject matter of herein case
which is considered adverse to the government, the same is hereby elevated to the
Commissioner of Customs for automatic review pursuant to Republic Act 7651. 7
The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable, and convincing evidence" that the 25,000
bags of rice were smuggled. Said evidence consisted of certifications by the Philippine Coast Guard,
the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Arrastre Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had
never docked in Palawan since November, 1998; a certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo
of the National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature in NFA Grains Permit Control No.
00986, attesting that the 25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan, was forged; and the result of
the laboratory analysis of a sample of the subject rice by the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) stating that the sample "does not compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."
Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the District Collector of
Customs despite due notice sent to his counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the
forfeiture proceedings.8
On April 30, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 15, 1999, upholding the resolution of the RTC denying petitioners'
motions to dismiss. They contend that:
I. SINCE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, AND
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS HAD ALREADY EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE EXERCISE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE BELOW AND IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY
11, 1999 AND ORDER DATED JANUARY 25, 1999 IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-23077.

II. SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIALS OF PETITIONERS' SEPARATE MOTIONS
TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION.9
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon
the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of
Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or
issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are
appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of
Appeals.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive,
not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which
enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we
have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts still retain jurisdiction
"where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of
placing the articles under Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings" 11 They
overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the
seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel
were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the
power to effect customs' searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the
administrative hearings. 12 As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya: 13
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive
authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of
illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It
does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with
competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so.
The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the
1wphi1

Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this
Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues
raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid
of jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of injunction, the Supreme Court
issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled
EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The
circular states in part:
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v.
Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported
by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or
stifle or put it to naught.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
1wphi1.nt

STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.

WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby made permanent.
The decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB23077 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FELICISIMO RIETA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime. It may be proven by the credible
testimonies of witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. In-court identification of the offender
is not essential, as long as the identity of the accused is determined with certainty by relevant

evidence. In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was the same person apprehended
by the authorities and mentioned in the Information. His possession of the smuggled cigarettes
carried the prima facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling. Having failed to rebut this
presumption, he may thus be convicted of the crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
December 22, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 17338. The CA
affirmed with modification the February 18, 1994 Consolidated Judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)4 of Manila (Branch 46) in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-137(79) and CCC-VI-138(79), finding
Felicisimo Rieta guilty of smuggling. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta, Arturo
Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo Manaois GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime charged.
(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre and
Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as recommended by the Solicitor General."5
Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA Resolution,6 which petitioner also assails.
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo
Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco -- were charged in an Information, which reads:
"That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with the evident intent to
defraud the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the legitimate duties accruing to
it from merchandise imported into this country, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and]
fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three
hundred five (305) cases of assorted brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles
valued at P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell, transport or assist and
facilitate the buying, selling and transporting of the above-named foreign articles after
importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law which was found in the
possession of said accused and under their control which articles said accused fully well
knew have not been properly declared and that the duties and specific taxes thereon have
not been paid to the proper authorities in violation of said Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to
Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code." 7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8 presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that
certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and the

smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police
and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following night
along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were to
watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of
it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in the
name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.
"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the
2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the
said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC
stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee
hours of the following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.
"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. TSY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light
brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt.
Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by
radio to his men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col.
Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn
towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost by impulse, Col.
Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was
running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for
less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan
Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and they found several firearms,
particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that
T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car
were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging to
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders.
"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or
untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to
escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police
Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force,
and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and confiscated goods to
Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned
over to the Bureau of Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit of Arrest
together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed
that he was arrested by the MISG after delivering assorted blue seal cigarettes at 185
Sanciangco St., Tonsuya, Malabon."9
Version of the Defense (Petitioner)
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of the blue-seal
cigarettes. He sets forth his version of the facts as follows:

"Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a policeman assigned at Kawit Cavite. In the early
morning of October 15, 1979, he was in Manila together with Boy. He met Boy in 1978 when
the latter figured in a vehicular accident in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After a week, Boy visited him
at the Kawit Police Station and thereafter, met him four to five times. He learned that Boy
was a businessman hauling slippers, fish and vegetables from Divisoria. For several times,
he had accompanied Boy on his business trips when [the latter] hauled fish, vegetables and
slippers from Divisoria to Cavite. He was requested by Boy to accompany him on his various
trips because there were times when policemen on patrol were demanding money from [the
latter]. At other times, other policemen accompanied Boy aside from him, on his trips.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the Kawit Town Hall. He
learned that Boy will haul household appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven
by Boy and they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left him at a gasoline
station, and told him to standby because Boy will get the cargo truck they will use. When Boy
returned, he had companions, who were introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt.
Rimorin, the petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-138 (79). From Cartimar,
the four (4) of them proceeded to Divisoria and they passed under the Del Pan Bridge. While
passing therein, he told Boy that he was hungry, so that when they passed by a small
restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin followed. Boy told them that he and Gonzalo will
proceed to the Port Area and will be back. After thirty to forty five minutes, Boy and Gonzalo
returned, and he and Sgt. Rimorin boarded the truck and proceeded to Roxas Boulevard.
While they were along Roxas Boulevard near the Daily Express Building, two (2) vehicles
intercepted them and ordered them to pull-over. The passengers of the said vehicles
introduced themselves as Metrocom soldiers, and ordered them to alight and to raise their
hands while poking guns at them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly on the
pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The Metrocom soldiers did not find
anything from their bodies. Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by
the Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep. While they were aboard the jeep, he overheard
from the Metrocom soldiers that their driver was able to escape. Likewise, they were also
informed by the Metrocom soldiers that the cargo truck was loaded with blue seal cigarettes.
The cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to
them upon their apprehension. From the time he boarded the cargo truck in Cartimar until he
and Sgt. Rimorin alighted to take their snacks, up to the time they were apprehended by the
Metrocom soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo truck. He did not
notice whether the Metrocom soldiers opened the cargo truck. At Camp Crame, he was
investigated without the benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and signed a
statement because as far as he was concerned he has done nothing wrong. He was
detained at Bicutan for more than a year.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying any firearm because he has
no mission order to do so, and besides Manila was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended
from the service, but was reinstated in January 1981. After he was released from Bicutan, he
looked for Boy so that he could clear the matter, but he [did not find] Boy anymore.
"In corroboration with the testimony of petitioner Rieta, accused Rimorin, a policeman
assigned at Pasay City, testified that the first time he met Boy was in 1978 in the wake and
internment of the Late Police Officer Ricardo Escobal. Thereafter, Boy dropped by on several
occasions at the Pasay Police Station to request for assistance. Prior to October 15, 1979,
Boy again dropped by at the police station and asked him if he had an appointment on the
next day. He told Boy that he had no appointment, and the latter requested to accompany
him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan to get some rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual
conversations, he learned that Boy was a businessman engaged in hauling various
merchandise. He agreed to the request of Boy to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At

Sta. Maria, Bulacan, they proceeded to a warehouse containing bags of rice, and they
hauled several bags into a truck, and thereafter, proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As
compensation Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said transaction was followed by another on
October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of October 14, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the police
station and requested him to accompany him to haul household fixtures. They usually haul
vegetables and rice early in the morning to avoid the traffic and that was the reason why they
met in the early morning of October 15, 1979. He told [Boy] that he will see if he will have
[the] time, but just the same they made arrangements that they will see each other at
Cartimar, Pasay City not later than 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of October 15, 1979. At the
appointed time and place, he met Boy with a companion, who was introduced to him as
Gonzalo Vargas, his co-accused in the instant case. Thereafter, they proceeded to a
gasoline station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the corner of Taylo and Taft Avenue, near
Cartimar, they picked up another person who was later on introduced to him as Felicisimo
Rieta. Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo, Rieta and Rimorin) boarded the cargo truck and
they proceeded to Divisoria. It was Boy who drove the cargo truck, while petitioner was
seated next to Boy while accused Rimorin and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to
Divisoria, along Roxas Boulevard before reaching Del Pan Bridge, Boy turned right under the
bridge. He commented that it was not the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered 'meron lang
ikakarga dito'. On the other hand, Rieta told Boy that he was hungry, and thus, Boy pulledover at a carinderia at Del Pan Bridge near Delgado Bros. When Rieta alighted he followed,
while Boy and Gonzalo proceeded. After less than an hour, Boy and Gonzalo returned. They
then proceeded towards Roxas Boulevard, Bonifacio Drive, and Boy drove straight at the
corner of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard. When he noticed that the truck was not bound for
Divisoria as earlier informed, he asked Boy why they were not taking the route going to
Divisoria. Boy replied 'bukas na lang wala ng espasyo'. Immediately, they were intercepted
by two vehicles and one of the occupants thereof ordered the driver to pull over. The driver
pulled over, and they were ordered to raise their hands and to lay flat on their belly on the
pavement right in front of the truck, and they were bodily frisked but they found nothing. He
asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all about, but the Metrocom soldiers were shouting
'asan ang blue seal'. Then they were ordered to board a jeep owned by the Metrocom
soldiers, and they were brought to Camp Crame. Before they left the area, he did not see the
Metrocom soldiers open the cargo truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame, the soldiers thereat were clapping their hands, thus he
asked 'ano ba talaga ito' and he got an answer from Barrameda, 'yun ang dahilan kung bakit
ka makukulong', pointing to a truck. When he saw the truck, it was not the same truck they
boarded in the early morning of October 15, 1979. The truck they boarded was galvanized
iron pale sheet covered with canvass while the one at Camp Crame was color red and not
covered. He entertained the idea that they were being framed-up. Two days after, he was
interrogated and the alleged blue seal cigarettes were shown to him, and he was informed
by the investigator that the same blue seal cigarettes were the contents of the cargo truck.
When the alleged blue seal cigarettes were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not asked to
be present. He asked for the whereabouts of Boy, but he was informed that the latter
escaped. The more he believed that there was something fishy or wrong in their
apprehension. It was very [conspicuous] that the driver was able to escape because at the
time they were apprehended they were the only people at Bonifacio Drive, and thus the
possibility of escape was very remote, considering that they were unarmed and the
Metrocom soldiers were all fully armed. In both cases at bar, there were about three Pasay
policemen who were apprehended. He was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa for more than a
year. He knew nothing about the charge against him. When he was at Camp Crame he tried
getting in touch with a lawyer and his family, but the MISG did not let him use the telephone."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner and his co-accused had mainly raised
questions of fact, they had nonetheless failed to point out specific errors committed by the trial court
in upholding the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense of denial proffered by
petitioner was considered weak and incapable of overturning the overwhelming testimonial and
documentary evidence of respondent. Further, the appellate court ruled that the non-presentation in
court of the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's cause, since the crime had
sufficiently been established by other competent evidence.
The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was irregular. It ruled that the alleged
defect could not be raised for the first time on appeal, especially in the light of his voluntary
submission to and participation in the proceedings before the trial court.
The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike
petitioner, had not been found to be in possession of blue-seal cigarettes.
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
"1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein petitioner
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.
"2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in evidence because
petitioner and his co-accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and
seizure order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable
Supreme Court."12
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue seal cigarettes was not established,
because the prosecution had not presented them as evidence. He further argues that there was no
crime committed, as the corpus delicti was never proven during the trial.
Corpus Delicti Established
by Other Evidence
We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained.13 It is the fact of the
commission of the crime14 that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses.15 In its legal
sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, 16 to the firearms
in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms,17 to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom,18 or -- in the present case -- to the seized contraband cigarettes.19

In Rimorin v. People,20 the petitioner therein similarly equated the actual physical evidence -- 305
cases of blue-seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti. The appellate court allegedly erred in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt arising from the non-presentation in court of the confiscated
contraband cigarettes. Holding that corpus delicti could be established by circumstantial evidence,
the Court debunked his argument thus:
"Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence.
"Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
respondent's evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the
Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.
"Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the
blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward. He categorically testified as follows:
Q
Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended the COSAC soldiers on
board the [C]orona car, what did you do thereafter?
A

We took them to the place where the cargo truck was intercepted, Sir.

What did you notice thereat?

A
Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I also
found out that my men were able to apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck
although they reported to me that the driver managed to make good escape, Sir.
Q
Now you stated that a search was made on the truck and you found how many
cases of blue seal cigarettes?
A

Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.

Blue seal cigarettes?

Yes, Sir.

What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?

Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.

Q
Did you find out how many were there on board the truck which was
intercepted by your men per your order?
A

Yes, Sir, [there] were three.

Who?

They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sr.

P/Sgt. Of what department?

Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.

Of that police department?

Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.

Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?

Civilian Sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal Macaraeg:
I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979, which
states: Received from Lt. Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG.
PC METROCOM
(Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (371)
cases of assorted brands of 'Blue Seal' Cigarettes, which were intercepted
and confiscated by elements of the MISG, PC METROCOM on or about
0400 15 October 79 along Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which for [purposes] of
identification we respectfully request that it be marked [on] evidence as
Exhibit 'A'.
COURT:
Mark it Exhibit 'A'.
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q
Will you please do examine Exhibit 'A' and tell us whether this is the same
receipt?
A

This is the same receipt, Sir.

Q
By the way, were photographs taken of the car as well as the vehicle involved
in this case, together with the blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?
A

Yes, Sir.

Do you have copies of these photographs?

The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.

Can you bring those pictures if required next time?

Yes, Sir.

"So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau categorically
testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he
issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.
"We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to the
narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner." 21
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official, was beset with doubt because:
1) it did not state specifically that the blue-seal cigarettes identified therein had been confiscated
from petitioner and turned over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his men; and 2) it mentioned 371
(instead of 305) cases of confiscated blue-seal cigarettes.
We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the Custody Receipt as the same one
issued for the 305 cases of cigarettes found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his coaccused rode, and from which the 66 cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal Case No. CCC-VI138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon, Metro Manila.22This fact (305 plus 66) explains why 371
cases were indicated therein. At any rate, petitioner argues on minor discrepancies that do not affect
the integrity of the Receipt, issued in due course by a customs official who was duty-bound to put the
seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.
The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the possession of petitioner and his
co-accused was duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo.
They had testified in compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law. Their testimonies were rightly
entitled to full faith and credit, especially because there was no showing of any improper motive 23 on
their part to testify falsely against petitioner. Further, the Court accords great respect to the factual
conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in this case. 24
Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was not the officer who had actually
intercepted the cargo truck in which the former rode, the latter's testimony was therefore hearsay.
The testimony of the colonel on his participation in the apprehension of the truck sufficiently rebutted
this contention.
Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding the smuggling activities being
conducted by a syndicated group in that place. He was also informed that smuggled items would be
transported from the 2nd COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to Malabon by a cargo truck with
Plate No. T-SY-167. During the stakeout surveillance on the night of October 14, 1979, he saw -from his post within the vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the identified cargo truck coming
out of the Port Area. While trailing behind, he radioed his men posted along Roxas Boulevard to stop
the truck. Later in court, he described how his men had actually intercepted it. 25
Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a Toyota car and was not among the
officers who had intercepted the truck, could not have seen him as one of the passengers of the
latter vehicle. Notably, however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no more than 5 minutes, and
the colonel's team immediately returned to the subject truck after the chase. 26 Lacson, however,
categorically said that he had seen 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and
that petitioner was one of its passengers.
It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that particular surveillance operation -had full knowledge, control and supervision of the whole process. He had organized the surveillance
teams and given orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the vehicles suspected of carrying

smuggled items. Furthermore, he was present during the surveillance operations until the
apprehension of the cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the matter.
The denial by petitioner that he was among the occupants of the truck is highly self-serving and
riddled with inconsistencies. He had been directly identified as one of its passengers. Besides, he
himself admitted that he had been on board the vehicle when it was intercepted, and that there were
no other person in the area.
Courtroom Identification Unnecessary
Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to ask Colonel Lacson to identify him in open
court. However, the colonel's positive and categorical testimony pointing to him as one of the
passengers of the cargo truck, as well as petitioner's own admission of his presence therein,
dispelled the need for a courtroom identification. In People v. Quezada, the Court said:
"x x x. While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an accused,
it need not always be by means of a physical courtroom identification. As the Court held
in People v. Paglinawan:
'x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the accused in open
court by way of identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so in this case
was because the public prosecutor failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence
such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the truth or weight of her
testimony.'
"In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or doubt on
whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person who is charged in
the information and subject of the trial."27
In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a passenger of the truck, that he was
apprehended by the authorities, and that he was the same individual charged under the Information
in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-137(79).
Prima Facie Proof of
Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient
There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the
nonpayment of the taxes and duties on the confiscated cigarettes. There is an exception to the
general rule requiring the prosecution to prove a criminal charge predicated on a negative allegation,
or a negative averment constituting an essential element of a crime. In People v. Julian-Fernandez,
we held:
"Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more
immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated
otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to
support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. For
example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license x x x, the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiar[ly] within his
knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction."28(Emphasis supplied)

The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes on the cigarettes were not paid
to the proper authorities is fairly indicated by the following circumstances that have been
established: (1) the cargo truck, which carried the contraband cigarettes and some passengers
including petitioner, immediately came from the 2nd COSAC Detachment; (2) the truck was
intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00 a.m.; (3) it fitted the undisclosed informer's earlier description
of it as one that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran away. Hence, it was up to petitioner
to disprove these damning circumstances, simply by presenting the receipts showing payment of the
taxes. But he did not do so; all that he could offer was his bare and self-serving denial.
Knowledge of the Illegal
Nature of Goods
The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and
his co-accused were riding, was properly established. Nonetheless, he insists that his presence
there was not enough to convict him of smuggling, because the element of illegal possession had
not been duly proved. He adds that he had no knowledge that untaxed cigarettes were in the truck.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are
presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.29 The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. To rebut this presumption, it
is not enough for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the
cigarettes. He should have presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the court of his
non-complicity.
In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:
"In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal law
authority explained thus:
'In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation
under the foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise
must have been fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the
defendant, if he is not the importer himself, must have received, concealed, bought,
sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of the
merchandise; and (3) that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge that the
merchandise had been illegally imported. If the defendant, however, is shown to
have had possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without satisfactory
explanation, such possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize
conviction.'"30(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be unacceptable and incredible
by both the RTC and the CA, which said:
"Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat. Rieta of
Kawit Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by 'Boy.' Their claim that they did
not have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not given credence by the
court. They tried to show lack of knowledge by claiming that along the way, 'Boy' and
Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain point for snacks and picked them up later after
the cargo had been loaded. The Court cannot see its way through how two policemen,
joining 'Boy' in the dead of the night, explicitly to give him and his goods some protection,
which service would be paid, yet would not know what they are out to protect. And neither

could the Court see reason in 'Boy's' leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and
load the blue seal cigarettes. 'Boy' knew the risks. He wanted them for protection, so why will
he discard them? How so unnatural and so contrary to reason."31
Being contrary to human experience, his version of the facts is too pat and stereotyped to be
accepted at face value. Evidence, to be believed, not only must proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must also be credible in itself, as when it conforms to common experience and
observation of humankind.32
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was not in accordance with human
nature. The involvement or participation he and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the goods
was confirmed by their lack of proper and reasonable justification for the fact that they had been
found inside the cargo truck, seated in front, when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite his
protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the strange nature of the transaction, and that
he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The evidence presented by the prosecution
established his work of guarding and escorting the contraband to facilitate its transportation from the
Port Area to Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754
was invalid, as the law upon which it was predicated -- General Order No. 60, issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos -- was subsequently declared by the Court, in Taada v. Tuvera,33 to
have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible
in evidence.
We do not agree. In Taada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the
invalidity of various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect
acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court said:
"x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. x x x It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'
xxxx

xx

xxx

"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is 'an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an
all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'" 34
The Chicot doctrine cited in Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the
acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative
or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all
respects.35 The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our
Decision in Taada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed
or simply ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country
in violation of customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions 36 to the
constitutional provision. Such provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined the existence of probable
cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly
obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

TOMAS SALVADOR, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision2 dated
August 9, 2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No.
20186.

On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador,
then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence
operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted
smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City
with violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 945843. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the
concealment and unlawful importation of the following items:
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00
76 pieces of mens diving watches 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry. 322,000.00
with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency, without authority or permit from proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."3
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, headed by
Major Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola,
Virgilio M. Sindac and Edwin B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila
Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by
certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the second
airplane parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus 300 with tail number
RPC-3001. It arrived at the NAIA at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight
No. PR-311. After its passengers disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL
ground crew and parked at the ramp area of the Domestic Airport terminal.
At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three (3) persons had
boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance.

At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3) persons who earlier
boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an
airplane tow truck with its lights off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the
Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got
off, identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as
Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the
tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing
a girdle. While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape
fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates,
"Positive!" Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who
surrendered without a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing
girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded
five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets
and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 oclock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of
Customs, arrived at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it
contained dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the
accused. She then prepared an inventory of the items seized and listed the weight of the
packets.4 Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs,
Airport Office where their contents were identified and appraised. The Bureau of Customs found 248
pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as follows:

QTY.

UNIT

DESCRIPTION

APPRAISED
VALUE

10

pcs.

Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors

122.8 gms.

pcs.

Bracelet with Charms Tricolors

52.4 gms.

pcs.

Bracelet (Tricolor)

64.2 gms.

pcs.

Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor

155.3 gms.

Babys Bangles with charm

18.2 gms.

L-Bangles with charm

68.5 gms.

L-Bangles

L-Creolla Earrings

TOTAL GRAMS

112.3 gms.

901.56 gms.

+P 299,052.00

1,495 x P200.00/gm.

Assorted Watches

204

pcs.

Citizen M watches with black dial with

gold metal bracelet (-1) x $25

$2,600.00

24

pcs.

Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue dial

with white metal bracelet (-1) x $25

600.00

16

pcs.

Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black dial

with rubberized bracelet (-1) x $50

800.00

pcs.

Seiko 5 Ladies watches with yellow

dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x $25

100.00

pcs.

Citizen L-watches with white dial (4) x

$20

80.00

62

pcs.

Seiko 5 Mens watches with yellow

dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x $25

1,550.00

34

pcs.

Seiko 5 Mens watches with black dial

with gold metal bracelet (1) x $25

850.00

____

pcs.

248

$6,580.00

The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter recommended that
petitioner and his co-accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Accordingly, the Information, mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and directed the accused to
present their evidence.
All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the
military.
Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail
No. RPC-3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then working on said aircraft. He was
conducting a visual check of the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told
one of the junior mechanics that he would take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded the
tow truck. When it was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in civilian attire aboard
approached him. The four pointed their firearms at him and, after searching him for drugs, he was
frisked but nothing was found. He was nonetheless brought by the men to the PAFSECOM Office,
then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol test. Thereafter, he was
brought back to the PAFSECOM Office. There, another military man arrived and brought out a box
containing packets. Then he and his companions were told to put on their mechanics uniforms and
to wear girdles. The packets were placed on their bodies, after which they were photographed. He
further testified that he was asked to sign a certain paper but was not allowed to read it thoroughly.
During the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.
Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items seized from him.
He testified that during the incident in question, he only boarded the tow truck to take a break at the
PAL canteen. He saw a box on the tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he
was made to sign a document under duress.
Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after his arrest, he
was made to sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of which he was not able to read.
He signed it because he was struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and
threatened him with summary execution if he would not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor
given the services of counsel during the investigation.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the offense charged,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo
Santos y Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each
of the accused to an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture of the confiscated articles in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED."5

All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20186.
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision,
thus:
"We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."6
They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001. 7
Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari. He submits for our consideration the following assignments of error:
"I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE
UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND
CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF
THE ACCUSED.
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT
OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF
THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS." 8
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized items are
admissible in evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
PAF operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,9 he maintains that at the time he and his coaccused were stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being
committed. Accordingly, the law enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation
of his Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case
at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search
petitioner and his companions. They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when
there were no other PAL personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and
surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around and made
apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner
and his colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in
connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding
a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila
Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the
petitioner and his companions agreed to the search after one of them was caught with a suspiciouslooking packet. Under these circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are
admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body, personal
effects or residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections
2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
"SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
x x x."
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures
may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches;
(5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 10
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF
operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking
and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search
made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised
police authority under the customs law.11

In Papa vs. Mago12 involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect
the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that
the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law.
They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or
conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to
by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious
malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles
on which the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an
individuals private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which
we have continued to affirm.13
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board
a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in
this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy
to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the
search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. 14 Verily, we rule that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the articles involved in the instant
controversy were validly seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible
in evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining the trial courts
finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible, notwithstanding that their testimonies
contain glaring inconsistencies which tend to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these
inconsistencies create serious doubt which should have been resolved in his favor.
We are not persuaded.
After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that
they do not relate with the elements of the offense charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and
insignificant matters as for instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio;
how the girdles (garters) were removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.
It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members of the special PAF
team who conducted the search positively identified the petitioner and his co-accused as the same
persons who boarded the PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a
manner which stirred suspicion from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an aircraft
tow truck towards Lima Gate where they were caught in flagrante delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and insignificant
details do not destroy their credibility.15 Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather
than diminish the prosecutions case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed, thereby negating any misgivings that the same were perjured. 16
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:
"SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in

any manner facilitate the importation, concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing
the same to have been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling
xxx
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the
article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction,
unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided,
however, That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any
prosecution under this section."
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the
Philippines or assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines any article, contrary to law, or (2)
receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale
of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to
law.17 Importation commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the
Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges due upon the articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has been issued, or where
the articles are duty-free, once the articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs. 18
In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing evidence that
petitioner and his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team from the PAF Special Operations
Squadron, while in the possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The
contraband items were taken by petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from
Hong Kong on the night of June 3, 1994. Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to bring out
these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them inside their uniforms. When confronted by
the PAF team, they were unable to satisfactorily explain why the questioned articles were in their
possession. They could not present any document to prove lawful importation. Thus, their conviction
must necessarily be upheld. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming
the trial courts Decision convicting petitioner and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE
GRACIA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December,
1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government
establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with
their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the
Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters
of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television
station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the
Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose
true names and identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, the following
to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from
the proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives
and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by
common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of
rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking arms against the
duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing
from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor
and several John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1,
1989 in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
acquitted of attempted homicide.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he
is not authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise
stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence
Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting
a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City,
together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of
November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received
by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from
the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the ongoing bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged
themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment,
Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt.
Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters away,
the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate
because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be
caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt.
Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements
of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, Mshells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter
the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A
uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested
appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building.
They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group
was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant
is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November
30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at
the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team
arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut
which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col.
Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the

room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his
possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his
house and made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors
of the building. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when
they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's
involvement in the 1987 coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because
he had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the
marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for
Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata
raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang
bata niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely
executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C.,
the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of
five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the
reason that he did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he
had no intent to possess the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the
ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand
boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual
possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can
be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
of death shall be imposed.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public
order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms,
ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to
property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed
in the country during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon
P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which
seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public
peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the
offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did
intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This
query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, 8 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It
is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent
to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. 11 Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or
felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here
refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is
not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be
found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good
faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot

be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as
the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed
guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the
requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified
that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in
evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he
alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not
constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since
he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent
material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and
knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were
confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to
know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign
ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition.
Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where
such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an
ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a
place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or
indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia
actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this
case. While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of
advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by
the raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be
convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar
building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar
Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles.
The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or

even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for
that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one
of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in
People vs. Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this
Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their
Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of
herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying
with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In
the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by
some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by
an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that

when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and
there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine
check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no
extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification
papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer
that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an
innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To
deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence
of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting
of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of
waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues
cannot be less justified.

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up
to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him
was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person
merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had
been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the
explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower
court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below
as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It
must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from
the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are
two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code
treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal
possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential
Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of
firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, the Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact
that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered
highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the
presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in
furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion.
Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law
while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised
Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its
recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a
jail term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous
importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from
appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly
existing at that time. In the words of the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of
M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by
the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not

without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for
offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano he
went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that
office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday
party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were
present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss,
was still very much at home and constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed
rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat;
(c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the
Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col.
Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some
men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case
was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed
by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous
recommendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its
recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby
DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.