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Syllabi\Synopsis

ENBANC

[G.R.No.107369.August11,1999]

JESULITOA.MANALO,petitioner,vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III,

NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L.
LOGAN,WILFREDOR.REOTUTAR,FELINOC.PACHECO,JR.,RUBEN
J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA,
EVERLINOB.NARTATEZ,ENRIQUET.BULAN,PEDROJ.NAVARRO,
DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and
HONORABLESALVADORM.ENRIQUEZIIInHisCapacityasSecretary
ofBudgetandManagement,respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA,J.:

Thecaseatbarisnotoffirstimpression.Theissueposedconcerningthelimitsofthepowerofthe
Commission on Appointments to confirm appointments issued by the Chief Executive has been put to
restinanumberofcases.Thecourtfindsnobasisfordepartingfromtherulinglaiddowninthosecases.
InthisspecialcivilactionforProhibitionunderRule65oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,petitioners
question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former President
Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were
promotedtotheranksofChiefSuperintendentandDirectorwithouttheirappointmentssubmittedtothe
Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
andRepublicAct6975otherwiseknownastheLocalGovernmentActof1990.Impleadedinthecaseis
theformerSecretaryofBudgetandManagementSalvadorM.EnriquezIII,whoapprovedandeffected
thedisbursementsforthesalariesandotheremolumentsofsubjectpoliceofficers.
Theantecedentsfactsareasfollows:
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local
Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Pertinent provisions of the
saidActread:
Sec.26.Powers,FunctionsandTermofOfficeofthePNPChief.Thecommandanddirectionofthe
PNPshallbevestedintheChiefofthePNPwhoshallhavethepowertodirectandcontroltacticalas
wellasstrategicmovements,deployment,placement,utilizationofthePNPoranyofitsunitsand
personal,includingitsequipment,facilitiesandotherresources.Suchcommandanddirectionofthe
ChiefofthePNPmaybedelegatedtosubordinateofficialswithrespecttotheunitsundertheirrespective
commands,inaccordancewiththerulesandregulationsprescribedbytheCommission.TheChiefofthe
PNPshalalsohavethepowertoissuedetailedimplementingpoliciesandinstructionsregarding
personnel,funds,properties,records,correspondenceandsuchothermattersasmaybenecesaryto
effectivelycarryoutthefunctions,powersanddutiesoftheBureau.TheChiefofthePNPshallbe
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appointedbythePresidentfromamongtheseniorofficersdowntotherankofthechiefsuperintendent,
subjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments:Provided,ThattheChiefofthePNPshall
serveatermofofficenottoexceedfour(4)years:Provided,further,Thatintimesofwarorother
nationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress,thePresidentmayextendsuchtermofoffice.[1](underlining
supplied).
Sec.31.AppointmentofPNPOfficersandMembers.Theappointmentoftheofficersandmembersof
thePNPshallbeeffectedinthefollowingmanner:
(a)PoliceOfficerItoSeniorPoliceOfficerIVAppointedbythePNPregionaldirectorforregional
personnelorbytheChiefofthePNPforthenationalheadquarterspersonnelandattestedbytheCivil
ServiceCommission
(b)InspectortoSuperintendentAppointedbytheChiefofthePNP,asrecommendedbytheir
immediatesuperiors,andattestedbytheCivilServiceCommission
(c)SeniorSuperintendenttoDeputyDirectorGeneralAppointedbythePresidentupon
recommendationoftheChiefofthePNP,withtheproperendorsementbytheChairmanoftheCivil
ServiceCommissionandsubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointmentsand
(d)DirectorGeneralAppointedbythePresidentfromamongtheseniorofficersdowntotherankof
chiefsuperintendentintheservice,subjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments
Provided,ThattheChiefofthePNPshallserveatourofdutynottoexceedfour(4)yearsProvided,
further,That,intimesofwarorothernationalemergencydeclaredbyCongres,thePresidentmayextend
suchtourofduty.(underliningsupplied).
In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then
ExecutiveSecretaryFranklinM.Drilon,promotedthefifteen(15)respondentpoliceofficersherein,by
appointingthemtopositionsinthePhilippineNationalPolicewiththerankofChiefSuperintendentto
Director[2],namely:
ChiefSupt.PEDROG.SISTOZADirector
ChiefSupt.REGINOAROIIIDirector
ChiefSupt.NICASIOMA.CUSTODIODirector
ChiefSupt.GUILLERMODOMONDONDirector
ChiefSupt.RAYMUNDOL.LOGANDirector
SeniorSupt.WILFREDOREOTUTARChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.FELINOC.PACHECO,JR.ChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.RUBENJ.CRUZChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.GERONIMOB.VALDERRAMAChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.MERARDOG.ABAYAChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.EVERLINONARTATEZChiefSuperintendent
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SeniorSupt.ENRIQUET.BULANChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.PEDROJ.NAVARROChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.DOMINADORMANGUBATChiefSuperintendent
SeniorSupt.RODOLFOM.GARCIAChiefSuperintendent
The appointments of respondent police officers were in a permanent capacity. Their letters of
appointmentstatedinpart:
Byvirtuehereof,theymayqualifyandenterupontheperformanceofthedutiesoftheoffice,furnishing
thisofficeandtheCivilServiceCommissionwithcopiesoftheiroathofoffice.[3]
WithouttheirnamessubmittedtotheCommissiononAppointmentsforconfirmation,thesaidpolice
officers took their oath of office and assumed theirrespective positions.Thereafter, the Department of
BudgetandManagement,underthethenSecretarySalvadorM.EnriquezIII,authorizeddisbursements
fortheirsalariesandotheremoluments.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original petition for
prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made
therefor.
Petitionercontendsthat:
I.Respondentofficers,inassumingtheirofficesanddischargingthefunctionsattachedthereto,despite
theirinvalidappointments,inviewofthefailuretosecuretherequiredconfirmationoftheCommission
onAppointmentsasrequiredbytheConstitutionandthelaw,areactingwithoutorinexcessoftheir
jurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,consideringthat:
A.RepublicAct6975isavalidlawthatdulyrequiresconfirmationoftheappointmentsofofficersfrom
therankofseniorsuperintendentandhigherbytheCommissiononAppointments
B.ThePhilippineNationalPoliceisakintotheArmedForceswheretheConstitutionspecifically
requiresconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
II.RespondentSecretaryinallowingand/oreffectingdisbursementsinfavorofrespondentofficers
despitetheunconstitutionalityandillegalityoftheirappointmentsisactingwithoutorinexcessofhis
jurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Thepetitionmustfail.Itisnotimpressedwithmerit.
Petitioner theorizes that Republic Act 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and that
everystatute passedby Congressis presumed to havebeencarefully studied and consideredbeforeits
enactment.Hemaintainsthattherespectaccordedtoeachdepartmentofthegovernmentrequiresthatthe
courtshouldavoid,asmuchaspossible,decidingconstitutionalquestions.
TheCourtagreeswithpetitioner.However,itisequallydemandedfromthecourts,asguardiansof
the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the organic law.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends
thelimitdelineatedbythefundamentallaw.[4]Whenitdoes,thecourtswillnothesitatetostrikedown
suchunconstitutionallaw.
ThepowertomakeappointmentsisvestedintheChiefExecutivebySection16,ArticleVIIofthe
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Constitution,whichprovides:
Section16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,
appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,or
officersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose
appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution.Heshallalsoappointallotherofficersofthe
Governmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybe
authorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerin
rankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissions,or
boards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whether
voluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbythe
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.
TheaforecitedprovisionoftheConstitutionhasbeenthesubjectofseveralcasesontheissueofthe
restrictive function of the Commission on Appointments with respect to the appointing power of the
President.ThiscourttoucheduponthehistoricalantecedentofthesaidprovisioninthecaseofSarmiento
IIIvs.Mison[5]inwhichitwasratiocinateduponthatSection16ofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of certain appointments issued by the
Presidentcontemplatesasystemofchecksandbalancesbetweentheexecutiveandlegislativebranches
ofgovernment.Experienceshowedthatwhenalmostallpresidentialappointmentsrequiredtheconsent
of the Commission on Appointments, as was the case under the 1935 Constitution, the commission
becameavenueofhorsetradingandsimilarmalpractices.[6]Ontheotherhand,placingabsolutepower
tomakeappointmentsinthePresidentwithhardlyanycheckbythelegislature,aswhathappenedunder
1973 Constitution, leads to abuse of such power. Thus was perceived the need to establish a middle
ground between the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it
imperative to subject certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of the
CommissiononAppointmentsandtoallowotherpositionswithintheexclusiveappointingpowerofthe
President.
Conformably,asconsistentlyinterpretedandruledintheleadingcaseofSarmientoIIIvs.Mison[7],
andinthesubsequentcasesofBautistavs.Salonga[8],QuintosDelesvs.ConstitutionalCommission[9],
andCalderonvs.Carale[10]underSection16,ArticleVII,oftheConstitution,therearefourgroupsof
officersofthegovernmenttobeappointedbythePresident:
First,theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersof
thearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsare
vestedinhiminthisConstitution
Second,allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw
Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint
Fourth,officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentstheCongressmaybylawvestinthePresidentalone.
It is wellsettled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.Theappointmentsofrespondentofficerswhoarenot
withinthefirstcategory,neednotbeconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments.Asheldinthecase
ofTarrosavs.Singson[11],CongresscannotbylawexpandthepowerofconfirmationoftheCommission
onAppointmentsandrequireconfirmationofappointmentsofothergovernmentofficialsnotmentioned
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inthefirstsentenceofSection16ofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections
notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is wellsettled that when provisions of law
declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
wouldnotaffectthevalidityandenforceabilityoftheotherprovisions,thestatuteremainsvalidwithout
itsvoidedsections.[12]
It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippinesandtherefore,theappointmentsofpoliceofficerswhoserankisequaltothatofcolonelor
navalcaptainrequireconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
Thiscontentionisequallyuntenable.ThePhilippineNationalPoliceisseparateanddistinctfromthe
ArmedForcesofthePhilippines.TheConstitution,noless,setsforththedistinction.UnderSection4of
ArticleXVIofthe1987Constitution,
TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbecomposedofacitizenarmedforcewhichshallundergo
militarytrainingandservice,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Itshallkeeparegularforcenecessaryforthe
securityoftheState.
Ontheotherhand,Section6ofthesameArticleoftheConstitutionordainsthat:
TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenationalinscopeandcivilianin
charactertobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.Theauthorityoflocal
executivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.
Tosodistinguishthepoliceforcefromthearmedforces,CongressenactedRepublicAct6975which
statesinpart:
Section2.DeclarationofpolicyItisherebydeclaredtobethepolicyoftheStatetopromotepeaceand
order,ensurepublicsafetyandfurtherstrengthenlocalgovernmentcapabilityaimedtowardsthe
effectivedeliveryofthebasicservicestothecitizenrythroughtheestablishmentofahighlyefficientand
competentpoliceforcethatisnationalinscopeandcivilianincharacter.xxx
Thepolicyforceshallbeorganized,trainedandequippedprimarilyfortheperformanceofpolice
functions.Itsnationalscopeandciviliancharactershallbeparamount.Noelementofthepoliceforce
shallbemilitarynorshallanypositionthereofbeoccupiedbyactivemembersoftheArmedForcesof
thePhilippines.
Thereunder,thepoliceforceisdifferentfromandindependentofthearmedforcesandtheranksin
the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
categoryofpresidentialappointeesrequiringtheconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
Inviewoftheforegoingdisquisitionandconclusion,therespondentformerSecretarySalvadorM.
EnriquezIIIoftheDepartmentofBudgetandManagement,didnotactwithgraveabuseofdiscretionin
authorizingandeffectingdisbursementsforthesalariesandotheremolumentsoftherespondentpolice
officerswhoseappointmentsarevalid.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncementastocosts.
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SOORDERED.
Davide,C.J.,Bellosillo,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,Panganiban,Quisumbing,Pardo,
Buena,GonzagaReyes,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
[1]RepublicAct6975,otherwiseknownastheDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernmentActof1990
[2]Rollo,p.15
[3]Ibid.
[4]Tatadvs.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnergy,282SCRA337
[5]156SCRA549
[6]Ibid.,p.556.
[7]Ibid.
[8]172SCRA160
[9]177SCRA259
[10]208SCRA254
[11]232SCRA553
[12]Tatadvs.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnergy,282SCRA337

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