DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NOR SHALL ANY

PERSON BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

Kinds of Due Process:
a.
substantive due processrequires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to life, liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a
valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class.
b.
Procedural due processone which hears before it condemns as pointed out by Daniel
Webster.
Due process is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE)
1.
a.

Requisites of judicial due process.

BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921

Requisites:
1.

There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and

decide the matter before it;

2.

Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the

property subject of the proceedings;

3.

The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;

4.

Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

a. GALMAN VS. PAMARAN (the 1st case)

b.

IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998

IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998

Purisima, J.
Facts:
1.
On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine
General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00
per month for 25 years;
2.
On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month
to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;

3.

After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and

Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan;
4.
After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal
requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice
Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while
Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;
5.
Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order
No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and
Cipriano del Rosario;
6.
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given
15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice
del Rosario;
7.
On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and
Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;
8.
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed
the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;
9.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Rec