Response to Klaus Klostermaier, "Dharmamegha samdhi: Comments on Yogastra IV.

29"
Author(s): Georg Feuerstein
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 341-342
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398529
Accessed: 16-12-2015 08:39 UTC

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341

GeorgFeuerstein Responseto Klaus Klostermaier,

"Dharmameghasamddhi:Comments
on YogasutraIV. 29"
It was gratifying
to see ProfessorKlostermaier'sbriefbut incisivetreatment
of thekey
samddhi,not least because Classical Yoga is seldom
phenomenonof dharmamegha
featuredin thespecialistliterature.
Whilehisjudicioususe oftheBuddhistsourceshelpsus to arriveat a betterunderstandthereare a fewpoints
ing of thisratherreconditeaspect of the yogicscala spiritualis,
whereI feelclarification
and amplification
seemdesirable.
Thus ProfessorKlostermaier's
claimthatthe"classicalcommentaries
ofVyasa ... and
of Vacaspati Misra ... treatthedharmamegha
samddhias a technicalterm,describinga
conditionwherevivekakhyati
has become permanent"is not altogethertrue.This is
indeedVacaspati's position,but Vyasa (whoeverhe may have been) adopts, as I have
stancewhichI
pointedoutinmybook ThePhilosophy
ofClassical Yoga(p. 99),a different
thinkis morein keepingwiththeapparentintentof the Yogasuitra.
Vyasa advisedlystates that when consciousnessis groundedin the vision of the
distinctionbetweentranscendental
Self (purusa) and the luminousaspect of the mind
(thatis, sattva),then"it tendstowardthecontemplation
[knownas] dharmamegha"
(...
visionby which
bhavati).That is to say, thediscriminative
dharmameghadhydnopagam
transcendental
Selfand sattvaareheldapartis notitselfdharmamegha
samadhi,butwhen
thatvisionis at itspurest,therearisesan inclination
towardthedharmamegha
state,which
is followedby theuprootingof thecauses-of-affliction
(klesa) and of all karman.
The conditionthatis also describedas "elevation"(prasamkhydna)
inthetexts,whichis
theheightened
enstaticawarenessofthedifference
betweentranscendental
Selfand sattva,
mustbe understoodto be a formofsamprajndta
samadhiorcognitiveenstasy.Bycontrast,
samddhiis supracognitive
or asamprajndta.
This pointneedsemphasizing
dharmamegha
becauseProfessorKlostermaiermayinadvertently
have givenriseto theimpressionthat
thisconditionis associatedwithknowledge.
It is in factvivekakhydti
thatis the highesttypeof knowledge.As is clear fromthe
this
state
mustbe renouncedbeforedharmamegha
samddhican
Yogasutra,
knowledge
ensue.The equationof dharmamegha
samddhiwithvivekakhydti
made by SwamiVijfiais clearlywrong.
nasrama,I. K. Taimni,and othermodernand classicalcommentators
Professor
Klostermaier's
statement
that
samddhi
Similarly,
upon enteringdharmamegha
theyogin's"knowledgeis infinitely
If
is
somewhat
enlarged"
misleading. dharmamegha
samddhiis, as he correctlysees, "zero-timeexperience,"it is also "zero-mindexperisamddhiis the
ence"-though theword"experience"is a misnomerhere.Dharmamegha
first
momentoftransition
intoSelfrealization,which,whenthebodyis dropped,becomes
kaivalyaor "aloneness."
to liberationinlife(fjvanmukti)
samddhiis tantamount
Vyasa's idea thatdharmamegha
fortheradicaldualismespousedbyPatanijalidoes
mustbe takenas an overinterpretation,
not readilyallow forthispossibility.It would be morein consonancewithPatafijali's
ontologyto regard the yogin's soteriologicalend state as "disembodiedliberation"
whichis suggestedby thetermkaivalya.
(videhamukti),
Now, Vacaspati Misra does make the nonsensicalclaim thatby devotinghimselfto
at all times.This contradicts
the
samddhi,theyoginattainsto vivekakhydti
dharmamegha

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342

Correspondence

Yogasutraand the Yogabhdsya.Accordingto thelatterscripture

(IV.29), dharmamegha
samddhiis associatedwiththeabsenceof all ideation(pratyaya).It is, as I have already
explained,asamprajnitasamddhi.The enstaticvisionof the distinctionbetweentranscendentalSelfand sattvais, by contradistinction,
stilla creationof theunenlightened
mind.This is preciselywhyitmustbe renouncedbeforedharmamegha
samddhican come
about.
Even if we were to assume,withVyasa, that Patafijaliadheredto the doctrineof
liberationinlife,wecouldcircumvent
thewholeissueoftherebeingknowledgeassociated
withkaivalyabyspeakingof itprimarily
as a permanent
shift-fromthehuman
identity
"elevated"
or
to
the
Self.In thatcase the
transcendental
personality
(however
otherwise)
wholeargumentabout knowledge,causation,personality,
and so forthsimplyno longer
appliesto the"one" who is free.
The "endlessness"of knowledgespokenof in Yogasitra IV.30 mustbe understood
ratherthan literally.This seemsto be hintedat by the proverbin the
metaphorically
man strungiton a cord;a
Yogabhdsya(IV.30): "A blindman pierceda jewel;a fingerless
necklessmanputiton; and a dumbmanpraisedit." Endlessknowledgeis notknowledge
expandedto infinity-itis Selfrealizationbeyondall knowledge.It is ignorance,at least
whenseenfroman unenlightened
pointof view.
Next, ProfessorKlostermaieris not entirelycorrectin claimingthatSankara in his
Vivaranadoes not commenton the Yogabhdsya(IV.29), forwe findthe shortphrase
itisa.mjnd.
kaivalydkhyam
paramdharmamvarsatltidharmamegha
ProfessorKlostermaier
was also wonderingabout references
to dharmamegha
samddhi
in textsotherthan Vidyaranya'sPancadaHs.Accordingto myfiles,the conceptis also
defined(in similarways)intheAdhydtma
Upanisad(38)and thePaihgaldUpanisad(III.5).
One finalcomment:ProfessorKlostermaier'sstatement
thatthe"Yogasuitraseemsto
be interested
in thebenefitof thedharmamegha
samddhiforthesake of theyoginonly"
affords
a good basisforconsidering
thefunction
ofliberationorenlightenment
notonlyin
Classical Yoga, but also in otherschoolsof thought,althoughI willconfinemyselfto
makinga singlepointhere.
The notionofpositiveregard(maitrT)
forotherbeingsis,as ProfessorKlostermaier
will
undoubtedlyknow,not foreignto Patafijali.Moreover,we cannotbe certainthatPatafijali did notconsiderSelfrealization-evenifitwereto coincidewiththeyogin'sphysical
death-as havinga profoundbeneficial
effect
on therestoftheworld(thoughadmittedly
Patafijalicould entertainsuch a view only at odds withhis dualisticmetaphysics;but
inconsistencies
of thiskindare commonamongphilosophers,
East and West).We must
also bear in mindthatwhateverPatafijali'spositionmay have been relativeto this,the
commentators
clearlyfavortheideal ofliberationinlife,and so the"altruistic"motivein
thepursuitof dharmamegha
samddhiand kaivalya,whichis so praiseworthy
about the
Buddhistapproach,could also be consideredan integralpartofClassicalYoga, sincethe
liberatedbeingis recognizedas a majortransformative
forcein India and elsewhere.

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