G.R. No.

182716

June 20, 2012

HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR., namely, ANTONIO

MALIGASO, CARMELO MALIGASO and JOSE
MALIGASO,
JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS and ESPERANZA E.
ENCINAS, Respondents.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the Decision1 dated November 26, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA reversed and
set aside the Decision3 dated April 2, 2001 of Branch 51
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, which affirmed the Decision4 dated August 22,
2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon dismissing the Spouses Simon D. Encinas
and Esperanza E. Encinas (respondents) complaint for
unlawful detainer.
Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517
of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, which has an area
of 2,867 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4773.5 The subject matter
of this controversy is a portion of Lot No. 3517 with an
area of 980 square meters, which the Heirs of Jose
Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite
having received two (2) notices to vacate from the
respondents.
Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 543, which was issued in
the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos (Maria), the
petitioners aunt, on February 7, 1929. Sometime in May
1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia Escurel
(Virginia). Three (3) years later, on April 5, 1968, Virginia
sold Lot No. 3517 to the respondents, resulting to the
cancellation of OCT No. 543 and issuance of TCT No. T4773.6
On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998 or approximately
thirty (30) years from the time they purchased Lot No.
3517, the respondents issued two (2) demand letters to
the petitioners, asking them to vacate the contested area
within thirty (30) days from notice. 7 The petitioners
refused to leave, claiming that the subject area was the
share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr. (Jose, Sr.), in
their grandparents estate. Thus, the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against them with the
MTC, alleging that the petitioners occupation is by mere
tolerance and had become illegal following their refusal
to vacate the property despite being demanded to do so
twice.
The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their
possession of the disputed area was by mere tolerance
and claimed title thereto on the basis of their fathers
successional rights. That the petitioners occupation
remained undisturbed for more than thirty (30) years and
the respondents failure to detail and specify the
petitioners supposedly tolerated possession suggest
that they and their predecessors-in-interest are aware of
their claim over the subject area. The petitioners also
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 1

attacked the validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T4773, alleging that it was thru fraud that Maria was able
to register Lot No. 3517, including the disputed area,
under her name. The petitioners likewise moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the allegations
therein indicate that it was actually an action for
reconveyance. Further, laches had already set in view of
the respondents failure to assail their possession for
more than thirty (30) years.8
In an August 22, 2000 Decision, 9 the dispositive portion
of which is quoted below, the MTC dismissed the
respondents complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises
hereby rendered

considered,

judgment

is

1. Dismissing the instant case;

2. Adjudicating the possessory rights over the
litigated portion to the defendants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds to cause the
annotation of the equitable title of defendants,
who are entitled to their fathers rightful
inheritance which is part of the property in
plaintiffs TCT No. T-4773 as a lien or
encumbrance;
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants the
amount of [P]10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners
possession of the contested area than the respondents
title as the former is founded on Jose Sr.s successional
rights and even held that the registration of Lot No. 3517
in Marias name created a trust in Jose Sr.s favor insofar
as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC also held
that the respondents are barred by laches from pursuing
their cause of action against the petitioners given their
inaction for more than thirty (30) years despite being fully
aware of the petitioners adverse possession and claim
over the subject property.
The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and
affirmed the MTCs Decision dated August 22, 2000. In a
Decision11 dated April 2, 2001, the RTC found the
respondents allegations relative to the petitioners
merely tolerated possession of the subject area to be
wanting. The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that
the petitioners possession is a necessary consequence
of their title as evidenced by their occupation in the
concept of an owner for a significant period of time. The
dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
annotations and the payment of attorney[]s fees as
ordered by the Court a quo be deleted. The instant
appeal is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.12

Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a

petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
This was given due course and the RTCs Decision
dated April 2, 2001 was reversed and set aside. In its
Decision13 dated November 26, 2007, the CA had a
different view and rationalized the grant of possession to
the respondents as follows:
The rule is well-entrenched that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof. In like manner, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in unlawful
detainer cases as the same is only required in forcible
entry cases. Moreover, the allegations in the answer of
[the] defendant as to the nullity of plaintiffs title is
unavailing and has no place in an unlawful detainer suit
since the issue of the validity of a Torrens title can only
be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. This may be gleaned from Spouses Apostol vs.
Court of Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel, where the
Supreme Court held that:
xxx
In the case at bench, petitioners are the registered
owners of Lot No. 3517 and, as a consequence of such,
are entitled to the material and physical possession
thereof. Thus, both the MTC and RTC erred in ruling that
respondents prior physical possession and actual
possession of the 980-square meter disputed portion of
Lot No. 3517 should prevail over petitioners Torrens title
over the said property. Such pronouncement
contravenes the law and settled jurisprudence on the
matter.14 (Citation omitted)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
in its Resolution dated April 28, 2008.15
As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor their
possession of the subject property on their fathers right
thereto as one of his parents heirs. The petitioners insist
on the nullity of the respondents title, TCT No. T-4773,
as the inclusion of the contested area in its coverage
was never intended. The petitioners accuse Maria of
fraud for having registered Lot No. 3517 in her name,
including the portion that their father allegedly inherited
from his parents, thus, reneging on her promise to cause
the registration of such portion in his name. It was their
father who had a legitimate claim over the subject area
and Maria never acquired any right thereto. Therefore,
respondents purchase of Lot No. 3517 did not include
the portion occupied by the petitioners, who succeeded
to Jose Sr.s rights thereto.
On the other hand, the respondents cause of action is
based on their ownership of Lot No. 3517, which is
evidenced by TCT No. T-4773, and on their claim that
they merely tolerated the petitioners occupation thereof.
According to the respondents, their being registered
owners of Lot No. 3517, including the portion possessed
by the petitioners, entitles them to the possession
thereof and their right to recovery can never be barred
by laches. They also maintain that the petitioners cannot
collaterally attack their title to the subject property.
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 2

The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the

right to evict the petitioners from the subject property
and this should be resolved in the respondents favor.
Between the petitioners unsubstantiated self-serving
claim that their father inherited the contested portion of
Lot No. 3517 and the respondents Torrens title, the latter
must prevail. The respondents title over such area is
evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein and that a person who has
a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession
thereof16 are fundamental principles observed in this
jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents title and
that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the
reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no
right over the subject area and that their stay therein was
merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration
that yearns for proof and corroboration. The petitioners
harped that the subject area was their fathers share in
his parents estate but the absence of any evidence that
such property was indeed adjudicated to their father
impresses that their claim of ownership is nothing but a
mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already
registered in Marias name when Jose Sr. built the house
where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is
rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite
Marias failure to cause the registration of the subject
area in his name and would be contented with a
bungalow that is erected on a property that is
supposedly his but registered in anothers name. That
there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria
and Virginia that Jose Sr.s and the petitioners
possession of the subject area would remain
undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the
basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving
that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a right over the
disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their possession
uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of
Maria and the respondents show that the latter merely
tolerated their stay.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to the
possession of the property involved. The avowed
objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in
nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly continuing his possession for a
long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community.17 The said objectives can
only be achieved by according the proceedings a
summary nature. However, its being summary poses a
limitation on the nature of issues that can be determined
and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the
proceedings are concentrated on the issue on
possession. Thus, whether the petitioners have a better
right to the contested area and whether fraud attended
the issuance of Marias title over Lot No. 3517 are issues
that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a trial
court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
This is in addition to the long-standing rule that a Torrens

title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an

ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E.
Concepcion,18 a similar allegation possession of the
property in dispute since time immemorial was met
with rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of
time, cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of
which is presumed and immune to any collateral attack.
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns
the property on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12892, which was "issued in the name of Arsenio E.
Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco." It is a
settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the
registered owner of the subject property, respondent is
preferred to possess it.
The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be
attacked by petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Whether or not petitioner has the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.19 (Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,20 the prohibition against the collateral
attack of a Torrens title was reiterated:
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property
is registered under the Torrens system, the registered
owners title to the property is presumed and cannot be
collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for
unlawful detainer. In this particular action where
petitioners alleged ownership cannot be established,
coupled with the presumption that respondents title to
the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct in
ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to
possession of the subject premises.21 (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to remain in
possession by casting a cloud on the respondents title
cannot prosper.
Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the
petitioners refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the
respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled in
Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association,
Inc.,22 laches does not operate to deprive the registered
owner of a parcel of land of his right to recover
possession thereof:
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a
parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a
long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 3

acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land

involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529).
xxxx
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled
rule by arguing that FETA as well as its
predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are
guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already
precluded from asserting their right as against them,
invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court to the
effect that while a registered land may not be acquired
by prescription, yet, by virtue of the registered owners
inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession
thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners
posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their
submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners
possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance
of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop vs.
Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimants
possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latters right to recover possession is never
barred by laches.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time
as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. 23
(Citations omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches.
Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently
registered the subject area inherited by their father, did
not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543,
which was issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for the
lapse of a substantial period of time and if not for the
respondents demands to vacate, they would not have
bothered to assert their fathers supposed successional
rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary to the posture
taken by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have
supposedly been trampled upon and the pretense of
ignorance does not provide justification or refuge. Maria
was able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as early
as 1929 and respondents acquired title in April 5, 1968
and knowledge of these events is imputed to the
petitioners by the fact of registration.
In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse and
set aside the findings and conclusions of the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED and the Decision dated November 26, 2007
and Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775 are hereby

AFFIRMED.

Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract

of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the
Paraaque City Registry of Deeds.4

SO ORDERED.
The lease contract provided that:
G.R. No. 169380

November 26, 2012

FIORELLO
R.
JOSE,
Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO
ALFUERTO,
ERNESTO
BACAY,
ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY
BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO,
PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA, BERNADETTE
BUENAFE,
ALFREDO
CALAGOS,
ROSAURO
CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA,
CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA
ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS, GORGONIO
ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO
ESTRERA,
EDUARDO
EVARDONE,
ANTONIO
GABALEO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA,
NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ,
RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR.,
FLORANTE
NOLASCO,
REGINA
OPERARIO,
CARDING
ORCULLO,
FELICISIMO
PACATE,
CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE
SANTOS, DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN
DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of
Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, Respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision1 dated
March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80166. The Court of Appeals decision reversed the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 77, by
dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Joses complaint for
ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay,
Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing
Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja,
Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos,
Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo
De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas,
Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera,
Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleo, Arsenia Garing,
Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen
Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante
Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo
Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos,
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar,
John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of
Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City (respondents), on the ground that the
petitioners cause of action was not for unlawful detainer
but for recovery of possession. The appellate court
affirmed this decision in its resolution of August 22,
2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the
name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters,
located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Chua
Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua
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Page 4

That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and
renewable for the same period upon mutual agreement
of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any
occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers
all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in
favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all
expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement
from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the
LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any
and all damages that may be recovered from the
occupants.5 (Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the
property even before the lease contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the
petitioner signed the lease contract, the petitioner
demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly
rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On
October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment case
against the respondents before Branch 77 of the
Paraaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any
proceedings before the barangay. Jose then brought the
dispute before the barangay for conciliation. 8 The
barangay issued a Certification to File Action on March
1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended
complaint, incorporating the proceedings before the
barangay before the summons and copies of the
complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the
petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject property,
he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully
occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their
houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law
whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written
demand, the respondents failed to vacate the property
without legal justification. He prayed that the court order
the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to pay
him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999
until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him
attorneys fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs
of suit.13

In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out

that they have been in possession of the land long
before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and
that the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua
Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The
respondents also presented a Deed of Assignment, 14
dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in
their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of
jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual and
moral damages for the filing of a baseless and malicious
suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other
pieces of evidence were submitted, the MeTC resolved
the case in the petitioners favor. In its decision 15 of
January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the respondents
had no right to possess the land and that their
occupation was merely by the owners tolerance. It
further noted that the respondents could no longer raise
the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been
settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the
annulment/cancellation of Chua Sings title before the
RTC, Branch 260, of Paraaque City, which ruled that
the registered owners title was genuine and valid.
Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of
jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents
assertion of ownership of the property. On these
premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate
the premises and to remove all structures introduced on
the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the date
of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and
to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and
P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the
issue, among others, that no legal basis exists for the
petitioners claim that their occupation was by tolerance,
"where the possession of the defendants was illegal at
the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be
no tolerance."16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27,
2003. It issued its decision17 on October 8, 2003,
reiterating the MeTCs ruling that a case for ejectment
was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file
the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the
land by mere tolerance and their possession became
unlawful upon the petitioners demand to vacate on April
28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint
for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or within
one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It
cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al. 18 and
Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a case for
unlawful detainer was appropriate.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that the
respondents possession of the land was not by the
petitioner or his lessors tolerance. It defined tolerance
not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful
possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 5

entailed permission from the owner by reason of

familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however,
alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the
property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the
property) was not alleged and there could be no case for
unlawful detainer. The respondents allegation that they
had been in possession of the land before the
petitioners lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this
finding. Having been in possession of the land for more
than a year, the respondents should not be evicted
through an ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases
are summary proceedings where the only issue to be
resolved is who has a better right to the physical
possession of a property. The petitioners claim, on the
other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts
his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease
he contracted after the respondents had occupied the
land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257,
Paraaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended
complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 22 which
the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution 23 of August
22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises
before us the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON
RESPONDENTS MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY
WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH
THEIR
DEFENSES
INVOKED
BEFORE
THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY
DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS TO AVOID
CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE.24
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy for the present case.

The key issue in this case is whether an action for

unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery
of possession of real property. This action may be filed
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession
of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However, the
defendants possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful
detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of
facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does
not have jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the
following allegations in support of his unlawful detainer
complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy
Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and registered in the
lessors name, covering the area occupied by the
defendants.
xxxx
6. Plaintiffs lessor had acquired the subject property as
early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered
under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their
houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law
whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.
8. By reason of defendants continued unlawful
occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff referred the
matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal
demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the
premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April
1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and
refused and continues to fail and refuse to vacate the
premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis
ours)

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 6

The petitioners allegations in the amended complaint

run counter to the requirements for unlawful detainer. In
an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal and his possession was
permitted by the owner through an express or implied
contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the
respondents occupancy was unlawful from the start and
was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful
detainer case, the defendants possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant
to vacate the property and the defendants subsequent
refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes
the defendants occupancy as unlawful even before the
formal demand letters were written by the petitioners
counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful
withholding of possession should not be based on the
date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified
date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly
alleged that the respondents occupied the premises by
mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the
complaint nor any supporting evidence on record,
however, shows when the respondents entered the
property or who had granted them permission to enter.
Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 28 the Court cited Prof.
Arturo M. Tolentinos definition and characterizes
"tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely
tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which ones property
can give to another without material injury or prejudice to
the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of
neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do
on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a
horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a
long time, no right will be acquired by prescription."
Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes:
"There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which
are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge
and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is
considered as an authorization, permission or license,
acts of possession are realized or performed. The
question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence
of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position:
tolerance or permission must have been present at the
beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not
be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29

It is not the first time that this Court adjudged

contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful
detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of
Urban,30 the claim that the defendants possession was
merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainants
allegation that the entry to the subject property was
unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled
that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further
deemed suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding
the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged
tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz, 31 the
complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an
action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondents allegedly illegal occupation of the premises
was by mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms
over these averments of fact as they did not contain
anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff
tolerated or permitted the occupation of the property by
the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support,
plaintiffs theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
defendants occupation of the property was unlawful at
its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiffs
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to
be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiffs tolerance of
defendants occupation of the premises has not been
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from
the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the
ejectment case should have been for forcible entry an
action that had already prescribed, however, when the
Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive
period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned
from the date of defendants actual entry into the land,
which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court
considered the owners lack of knowledge of the
defendants entry of the land to be inconsistent with the
allegation that there had been tolerance.
34

In Padre v. Malabanan, the Court not only required

allegations regarding the grant of permission, but proof
as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence
of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful
detainer case because the evidence was "totally wanting
as to when and under what circumstances xxx the
alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondents Answer, the petitioners
were never at all in physical possession of the premises
from the time he started occupying it and continuously
up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely
derived their alleged prior physical possession only on
the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT),
arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 7

having been in possession of the property at one time or

another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases
cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the
owners title. Possession de facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et
al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint which fails to
positively aver any overt act on the plaintiffs part
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for
unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a case
for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely
establish its existence from the start of possession;
otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an
action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed
beyond the required one-year prescription period from
the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed
that such tolerance must be present right from the start
of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a
dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress in the inferior court provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to
lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be
speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring
suit in the inferior court upon plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.
Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the
suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us
to deprive the respondents of possession over a
property that they have held for at least eight years
before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a
summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner
used the word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations
or evidence to support it.
There
was
no
change
respondents
theory
the
appeal
that
would
to
a
deprivation
of
the
right to due process.

in

the
during
amount
petitioners

The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never

questioned before the MeTC the fact that their

occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the

respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the
property is spurious; (2) the petitioners predecessor is
not the true owner of the property in question; (3) the
petitioners lease contract was not legally enforceable;
(4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5)
the petitioners predecessor never had prior physical
possession of the property; and (6) the respondents
right of possession was based on the "Deed of
Assignment of Real Property" executed by Dulfo. The
respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on
appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes
a change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory
of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be considered by the
reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer
cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of
the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to the
adverse party, who had no opportunity to present
evidence in connection with the new theory; this would
offend the basic rules of due process and fair play.39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on
appeal, this rule is not applicable to the present case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the
petitioners failure to allege and prove the essential
requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo
v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such
a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
(emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents,
the petitioner was required to properly allege and prove
when the respondents entered the property and that it
was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other
persons, who granted the respondents permission to
enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not
the respondents defense that proved fatal to the case
but the petitioners contradictory statements in his
amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other
pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word
"tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always
questioned the existence of the petitioners tolerance. In
their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents
negated the possibility of their possession of the
property under the petitioner and his lessors tolerance
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 8

when the respondents alleged to have occupied the

premises even before the lessor acquired the property in
1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical
possession of his supposed property, as when he
became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property
described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already
been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late
1970. Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already
occupants/possessors of the property from where they
are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed
LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main
thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession
and that the same was lost through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court
to restore possession regardless of title or even
ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO
CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual
physical
possession
of
the
property
where
DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than
ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got
his fake title to the property.42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the
respondents claim that their possession was based on
the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of
the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they
considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to
any of their transactions on the property, and could not
have stayed there upon the latters permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been
directly raised by the respondents before the RTC, the
petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he
belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum 44
before this Court that his lessor had tolerated the
respondents occupancy of the lot, without addressing
the respondents allegation that they had occupied the
lot in 1970, before the petitioners lessor became the
owner of the property in 1991, and without providing any
other details. His pleadings continued to insist on the
existence of tolerance without providing the factual basis
for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the
Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the petitioner
of due process or had unfairly treated him when it
resolved the case based on the issue of tolerance.
The
Court
cannot
treat
case
as
an
accion
accion reivindicatoria.

an
ejectment
publiciana
or

The petitioner argues that assuming this case should

have been filed as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as
requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other
ends than to comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented
before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These
cases are not interchangeable and their differences
constitute far more than mere technicalities.

In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action

for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion
publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We
find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful
detainer case which bears the same relevant
characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry
can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the
negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one
year from the unlawful dispossession of the real
property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second,
forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to
the physical possession of the real property; in accion
publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right
to possession over the real property. Third, an action for
forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a
summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary
action in the RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An
ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court
to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and
forcible entry cases are not processes to determine
actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the
issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of
possession, and is therefore inconclusive.47 Because
they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion
publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are
plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in
summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful,
speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged
illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and
continuing his possession during the long period it would
take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure
or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of
peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party
illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his
hands and seize the property by force and violence. 49 An
ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown
trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession
or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, 50 the Court in
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals 51 describes in detail how
these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person
who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the
status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that
the person who has first acquired possession should
remain in possession pending the decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
petty warfare over the possession of the property which
is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 9

dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social

order.1wphi1 Therefore, where a person supposes
himself to be the owner of a piece of property and
desires to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to
institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor, to place
upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try
the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later
consider them as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file
ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts
would then decide in summary proceedings cases which
the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials.
Because these "summary" proceedings will have to
tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they
would no longer be expeditious and would no longer
serve the purpose for which they were created. Indeed,
we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases,
the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter
lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and
preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the
Court of Appeals' decision dated March 14, 2005 and
resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80116.
SO ORDERED.
POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF
THE PLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully states:
I. PROPERTY INVOLVED.
The property subject matter of the instant ejectment
case is the residential house and lot located at xxx., xxx
Subd., xxx, xxx City, with an area of 240 sq. m. and
covered by TCT No. xxx registered in the name of A,
plaintiff in the instant ejectment case.
Attached as Annex A hereof is a certified true copy of
the said TCT No. xxx to prove the ownership in fee
simple by plaintiff A of the subject property.[1]
II. EJECTMENT COMPLAINT
The verified complaint for ejectment (unlawful
detainer) filed by the herein plaintiff A , thru her former
counsel, Atty. Xxx, prayed for a judgment in favor of the
said plaintiff and against the defendants B, et. al.
directing the latter to (a) Vacate the aforesaid residential
house and lot and to peacefully surrender the same to
herein plaintiff; (b) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of
Forty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 48,000.00) for actual
damages sustained as a result of loss of employment in
Japan and for the monthly rent for the townhouse unit;
(c) Pay the plaintiff in such amounts representing for the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, as this
Honorable Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may
determine; (d) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of
Php25,000.00 and Php2,000.00 per court appearance
as Attorneys fees; and (e) Pay the cost of the suit.

The allegations of the ultimate facts of the instant

ejectment complaint are quoted hereinbelow:
x x x.
1. That plaintiff is of
legal age, Filipino
and a resident of
xxx Street, Unit xxx,
xxx Subdivision, xxx
City where she may
be
served
with
summons and other
processes of this
Honorable Court;
2. That defendants are
all of legal age and
are
presently
unlawfully residing
at xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx II,
xxx City and may
served
with
summons and other
legal
processes
therein
by
this
Honorable Court;
3. Plaintiff is the lawful
owner of a parcel of
land situated in the
Municipality of xxx,
Province of xxx
evidenced
by
Transcript
of
Certificated of Title
No. xxx issued by
the
Register
of
Deeds of xxx City,
Metro Manila and
more
particularly
described as: X x x
x x.
4. It was solely out of the
compassion
and
tolerance
of
the
plaintiff,
A
which
enabled all of the
defendants
to
temporarily reside at
her
paraphernal
property located at
xxx
Avenue,
xxx
Subdivision, xxx City.
As members of the
same
family,
complainant willingly
allowed
the
defendants to briefly
reside
therein
together
with
her
minor child, K and
eldest son, V while
plaintiff continued her
employment at Japan;
5.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

It
was
their
understanding
then
that they were to
reside therein
by
tolerance and rentPage 10

free, but as soon as

the time comes that
the plaintiff would
need a residential unit
for
her
or
her
immediate
familys
need, all of the named
defendants
would
necessarily vacate the
premises
and
surrender
the
peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff;
6. On September 7,
2006, plaintiffs son
got
married.
Necessarily and by
reason of the fact
that they do not
have any other
residential
unit
available,
they
required
the
defendants
to
vacate the premises
and seek another
place
to
stay.
Unfortunately, this
infuriated
the
defendants
most
specifically,
defendant B who
maintained that she
was
allegedly
allowed
to
permanently reside
therein, after having
been allowed by the
plaintiff to allegedly
construct
improvements, and
to allegedly pay the
necessary bills and
dues
of
the
household;
7. That by reason of the
persistence of the
defendants,
they
confronted
the
plaintiffs son and
forcibly asked him
to
vacate
the
residential unit. In
order not to create
any commotion and
by reason of the
delicate condition of
his
wife,
they
provisionally
departed
his
mothers residential
house and lot;
8. All of the defendants
are at present still
occupying
the
residential
house
and lot and refuse
to
vacate
and
surrender
the
peaceful

possession thereof
to the plaintiff who
immediately
left
Japan to console
her
sons
predicaments. She
immediately asked
the defendants to
vacate the premises
upon her return but
(was)
simply
threatened (by the
defendants)
and
was forcibly asked
(by the defendants)
to
leave
her
property;

the Tanggapan ng
Kapitan
ng
Barangay issued a
Certification
(Katibayan Upang
Makadulog
sa
Hukuman)
authorizing
the
plaintiff to file the
appropriate action
unto this Honorable
Court stating that
walang nagawang
pagaayos
o
pagkakasundo sa
mga partido was
reached. x x x.

9. Plaintiff initially made

an attempt to settle
the matter amicably
by
filing
a
Sumbong
(Complaint) before
the
Barangay
Pamplona
Dos
Barangay Council
against
the
defendants
for
unlawfully depriving
her of the peaceful
possession
and
enjoyment of her
residential
house
and lot. She sought
their assistance to
peacefully
lead
away
the
said
defendants and for
the plaintiff to get
back the physical
possession of the
house
and
lot
rightfully belonging
to her. X x x.

12. On an effort to settle

the matter, plaintiff
through
the
undersigned
counsel transmitted
through registered
mail with return
card
a
Final
Demand Letter to
Vacate dated 21
November
2006
addressed to all of
the defendants to
vacate the premises
within
FIFTEEN
(15)
days
from
receipt
of
the
demand letter which
defendants
received
on
23
November 2006. x x
x.

10.

11.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

However,
no
amicable settlement
was reached upon
by the parties. In
fact,
they
disregarded
the
initial notice sent by
the Barangay and
even ignored the
scheduled
meetings/dialogues
before the Lupon.
On a mediation
proceedings on the
matter, defendants
unwaveringly
manifested
their
refusal to vacate the
premises before the
Honorable
Barangay Captain
Romualda Villalon
who mediated the
parties;
Thus, on (17
November
2006),
Page 11

13. On 28 November
2006,
the
undersigned
counsel received a
letter in response to
the demand letter
transmitted to the
defendants. As a
reply, the claimed
counsel
of
the
defendants
with
much
regret
informed
the
undersigned
counsel that his
clients
cannot
comply with the
final demand to
vacate the property
located at No. xxx
Avenue,
xxx
Subdivision,
xxx
City. X x x.
14. By reason of the
defendants
unjustified refusal to
vacate
the
premises,
plaintiff
would be compelled
to stay at the
Philippines for a

period of time and

as a result would
necessarily lose her
employment.
Plaintiff
normally
receives
FORTY
THOUSAND
(Php40,000.00)
a
month as salary
from
her
employment.
Likewise as a result
of
the
unlawful
possession of the
residential
house
and lot, plaintiff was
constrained to rent
a
residential
townhouse unit at
xxx Subdivision for
which the plaintiff is
constrained to pay
at a month rental of
EIGHT THOUSAND
(Php
8,000.00)
pesos a month;
15.

Defendants, who
have
been
unlawfully
possessing
and
occupying
the
subject parcel of
land, and despite
due
notice and
demand to vacate
the
same,
unjustifiably failed
and refused and
continue to fail and
refuse to vacated
the said premises.
Thus,
due
to
defendants wanton
disregard
and
deliberate violation
of the plaintiffs right
to enjoy the rightful
possession of her
property,
herein
plaintiff has suffered
and
continuously
suffers
sleepless
nights,
serious
anxiety and other
similar
sufferings
from which entitle
her to the recovery
of damages in such
amount
as
this
Honorable Court, in
its wise discretion,
may determine;

16. By reason of the

gross and evident
bad faith of the
defendants
when
they
deliberately
refused to vacate
the
aforesaid
premises and by
way of example or
correction for the
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 12

public
good,
in
addition
to
the
moral
damages,
plaintiff herein is
duly entitled for the
payment
of
exemplary
damages in such
amount, as this
Honorable Court, in
its wise discretion,
may determine;
17. Due to defendants
refusal to vacate the
premises,
plaintiff
was constrained to
engage the services
of a legal counsel to
protect her own
rights,
interests,
and
for
whose
services she agreed
to pay the amount
of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(Php25,000.00) as
attorneys fees plus
Php2,000.00
per
court appearance.
X x x. (end of quote)
The herein plaintiff adopts into this position paper, by
incorporation and reference, all of the foregoing
allegations in her verified Answer.
In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, the
defendants B, et. al. raised the defense that plaintiff A
had allegedly sold the property to B, without presenting
any proof of the due execution and authenticity of any
written/documented or oral contract or agreement to
positively prove and substantiate the alleged
transaction.
Further, the defendants B, et. al. in the instant ejectment
case cited the pendency of the case of B vs. A before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx, of xxx City, for
specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. xxx.
In the said RTC-level civil complaint, B (plaintiff in the
said RTC-level case) prayed in her Amended Complaint
as follows:
X x x.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed that after
due hearing judgment be
rendered as to the principal
cause of action:
a)
Ordering
defendant A to
execute
the
deed of sale in
favor of the
plaintiff over the
house and lot

located at No.
xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx
City
and
covered by the
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title No. xxx of
the registry of
Deeds of xxx
City;
b)
Ordering
defendant A to
pay plaintiff the
following
amount:
i) P300,000.00,
as
moral
damages;
ii) P200,000.00,
as
exemplary
damages;
iii)
P100,000.00,
as
attorneys
fees; and
iv) To pay the
costs of suit:
In the alternative, judgment be
rendered:
a)
Ordering
defendant A to
pay plaintiff the
following sums:
i)
P1,351,265.66
representing
reimbursement
to the plaintiff
for
the
expenses of the
renovations and
Improvements,
insurance
premiums, real
property taxes
homeowners
association
dues
and
payment
for
compromise
settlement on
the property in
question, plus
legal
interest
thereof from the
date of the filing
of
the
complaint:
ii) P55,000.00,
representing
the
funeral
expenses
of
defendant
A
minor son, K,
plus
legal
interest thereof
from the filing of
the complaint:
b)
Ordering
defendants
A
and V to pay
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 13

plaintiff jointly
and
severally
the following:
i)
P1,414,928.20,
representing
reimbursement
to the plaintiff
for the payment
of
defendant
Vs
car,
including
the
insurance
thereof, as well
as payment for
the debts and
loans incurred
by defendant A
son,
herein
defendant
V,
plus
legal
interest thereof
from the filing of
the complaint:
ii)
P1,000,000.00
representing
reimbursement
to the plaintiff
for the support
of defendant A
eldest
son,
herein
defendant V:
iii)
P2,105,000.00,
representing
rentals
payments from
August 2001 to
October 2006
for the business
xxx Enterprise,
which was set
up
by
the
plaintiff
for
defendant
V,
plus
legal
interest thereof
from the filing of
the complaint:
iv)
P100,0
00.00,
as
attorne
ys
fees.
Plaintiff prays for such other
relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
X x x. (end of quote).
For the record, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A -Seiwa
(defendant in the said RTC-level case and plaintiff in the
instant ejectment case before this Court) and her
husband K alleged in their original Answer[2] filed thru
their former counsel, Atty. Xxx, the following basic legal
and factual defenses:

Xxx.
1. Defendants deny the allegations
stated in paragraph 6 of the
complaint. The truth of the matter
being that no written nor oral
arrangement was ever reached by
the parties with respect to the sale
or transfer of the paraphernal house
and lot registered under the name of
the Defendant A before she
contracted marriage with defendant
K;
2. Defendants resolutely maintain that
no earnest efforts towards an
amicable
settlement
were
conducted between the parties. She
was surprised to find out that the
instant case was filed by the plaintiff
and
that
inappropriate
and
dishonest
measures
were
undertaken which evidently showed
her ungratefulness and greediness
towards her sister, defendant A.
3. Plaintiff has no legal right over the
property of the defendant. Plaintiff
was permitted by tolerance to stay
at the property of the defendant as a
mere transient. It is solely by reason
of the compassion of the defendant
towards her sister, the plaintiff
herein and her brothers that they
were permitted to stay at her
paraphernal house and lot located
at No. xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx City. Along with them then was
their biological mother, C who had
predeceased this controversy and
her ungrateful children, B, R and C.
Defendants mother stood as the
guardian of V, K1 and K2 as
opposed to the allegation of the
plaintiff that she agreed to the
proposal that she would stand as
the guardian of the children of the
defendant which is self-serving in
nature and cannot be substantiated
by the plaintiff by evidence oral or
documentary;

who at all times have shouldered

the necessary payments for the
obligations enumerated by the
plaintiff upon her return and through
her money transfers from Japan in
order to pay these obligations;
6. This is the primary reason why the
various
receipts
(various
attachments supplied by the plaintiff
in her complaint) are issued under
the name of the defendant and
significantly not under the name of
the plaintiff precisely because these
were in fact paid by the defendant or
by the defendants child, V or by the
plaintiff in a few instances using the
money provided by the defendant;
7. Further, no contract express or
implied would indicate the claimed
allegation of the plaintiff that she
was to permanently reside on the
property of the defendant and
introduce improvements thereon,
pay the legal taxes due, and support
the defendants son, V with his
various obligations;
8.

Significantly, the improvements

introduced by the plaintiff were
constructed without the knowledge
or the express consent or authority
of the defendant who is the
registered owner of the house and
lot as perused from the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. xxx registered
with the Registry of Deeds of xxx
City. X x x.

9. The allegation that the defendant be

required to sell her house and lot to
the plaintiff by virtue of the
supposed verbal communication
does not have any legal or factual
basis. It is relevant t point out that
under Article 1403of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, among the
following
contracts
that
are
considered unenforceable are:

4. Defendant belies the allegation of the

plaintiff that the former was required
to stay at Japan most of the time
having the resident status therein
and being married to a Japanese
national. To prove the contrary,
defendant
incorporates
her
Philippine Passports issued on
March 1, 2006, February 14, 2001
and February 6, 2006 respectively x
x x.. The annotations therein will
show that defendant was at
constant connections with her
children, her mother, C and her
paraphernal property;

(2) Those that do not

comply with the statute of
frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following
cases
an
agreement
hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action,
unless the same or some
note
or
memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party
charged, or his agent;
evidence, therefore of the
agreement
cannot
be
received without the writing
or as secondary evidence of
its contents:

5. xxx that defendant was never in

default in meeting with her
obligations as well as that of her
children. She was a frequent
vacationer here in the Philippines

(b) A special promise to

answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 14

(e) An agreement for the

leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an
interest therein. X x x.
10. Furthermore, the complaint merely
alleges that defendant is liable to
pay plaintiff for moral and exemplary
damages.
The
operative
or
constructive facts making up the
pleaded cause of action for
damages were not stated in the
complaint for which no credit should
likewise be given thereto; x x x. (end
of quote)
In their same Civil Case No. xxx, A and her spouse K
raised the following counterclaim:
X x x.
By way of COUNTER-CLAIM,
the foregoing paragraphs are
herein
repleaded
and
reproduced insofar as they are
herein relevant, material and
significant;
11. As a result of this present
controversy, defendant was
compelled to stay at the
Philippines for a period of
time and as a result lost her
employment
in
Japan.
Defendant
receives
a
monthly equivalent of Forty
Thousand
Pesos
(Php
40,000.00) a month as
salary from her employment
for which the plaintiff must
be required to pay by way of
actual damages. A copy of
the Certificate of Possible
Salary
Payment,
the
Withholding
Exemption
Certificate
of
earned
Income,
and
the
Incumbency Certificate of
the defendant are herein
attached and made an
integral part of this Answer
with Counter-Claim x x x.

suffered and continuously

suffers sleepless nights,
serious anxiety and other
similar sufferings from which
entitles her to the recovery
of damages in such amount
as this Honorable Court, in
its
wise
and
sound
discretion, may determine;
14. Also, by way of example or
correction for the public
good, in addition to the
moral damages, defendants
herein are duly entitled for
the payment of exemplary
damages in such amount,
as this Honorable Court, in
its wise discretion, may
determine;
15. Lastly and by reason of the
baseless and unfounded
complaint, defendant was
constrained to litigate this
case and in order to protect
their rights and interests
was constrained to engage
the services of counsel
whom she was obligated to
pay the amount of Fifty
Thousand
Pesos
(Php
50,000.00). X x x. (end of
quote)
Further, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A and her
spouse K (defendants therein) prayed for the
following reliefs in their original Answer:
X x x.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it
is most respectfully
prayed
unto
this
Honorable Court to
dismiss
the
instant
complaint, as to the
counter-claim, after due
hearing be ordered to
pay the defendant, B
the following amounts:

12. Likewise and as a result of

the unlawful possession by
the plaintiff of the residential
house and lot of the
defendant, the latter was
constrained to rent a
residential townhouse unit
at xxx Subdivision for which
the
defendant
was
constrained to pay a
monthly rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00)
pesos a month for which
once again the plaintiff must
be compelled to pay by way
of actual damages. X x x.
13. By reason of this baseless
complaint, defendant, A
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 15

Forty Thousand
Pesos
(Php
40,000.00)
respecting the
monthly income
lost
by
the
defendant from
her employment
in Japan;

Monthly rentals of
Eight Thousand
Pesos
(Php
8,000.00)
incurred
and
continually
incurred by the
defendant as a
result of the
refusal of the

plaintiff
to
surrender
the
peaceful
possession of
the defendants
paraphernal
property;

Moral
and
Exemplary
damages
in
such amount as
determined by
this Honorable
Court;

Attorneys fees in
the amount of
Fifty Thousand
Pesos
(Php
50,000.00)
Other reliefs just and
equitable are likewise
prayed for.
X x x. (end of quote)
For the record, the herein plaintiff A hereby adopts into
this Position Paper, by incorporation and reference, all
her foregoing allegations, counterclaims and prayers as
stated in her original Answer in the said Civil Case No.
xxx.
III. EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF
IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE
In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein
plaintiff (TCT No. xxx, marked as Annex A hereof,
supra), the plaintiff respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court the following documentary evidence in support of
her ejectment complaint against the defendants:
1. Annex B - Letter (re: Final Demand Letter To
Vacate), dated November 21, 2006,
addressed to B signed by Atty. Xxx, former
counsel for A.
2. Annex C Letter, dated November 8, 2006,
addressed to B Herrera, et. al., and all
persons claiming possession of the subject
property owned by A, signed by Atty. Xxx.
Tafalla, former counsel for A. It proves the
jurisdictional demand made by the plaintiff to
the defendants to vacate the subject
property under Rule 70 and the earnest
efforts of the plaintiff to exhaust all remedies
before commencing the instant court action.
3. Annex D - Letter dated November 24, 2006,
addressed to Atty. Xxx, former counsel for A,
signed by Atty. Xxx of xxx Law Offices,
counsel for B, et. al., denying and rejecting
the demand of plaintiff B to vacate the
subject property. It proves the recalcitrance
of the defendants in ignoring and rejecting
the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff.
4. Annex E Patawag issued by Barangay
Pamplona II, dated November 13, 2006,
addressed to A and B, et. al.. (Although
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 16

defendant Maria xxx was not named therein,

she had actual and constructive knowledge
thereof, being an actual resident of the
property under the control and subsidy of B;
but Maria xxx chose not to voluntarily
participate therein)
5. Annex F Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman, dated November 17, 2006,
issued by the said Barangay addressed to A
and B, et. Al.. It shows the failure of the
defendants to settle with the plaintiff the
instant
ejectment
controversy,
thus,
compelling the plaintiff to seek judicial
redress.
6. Annex G Engagement Contract, dated
September 26, 2006, addressed to A, signed
by her former Atty. Xxx, showing the
expenses for professional fees incurred by
the plaintiff in hiring the services of Atty. Xxx
to protect her rights against the unjust acts
of the defendants.
7. Annex H Letter, dated April 15, 2007,
addressed to Atty. Xxx, re: Notice of
Termination of Lawyer-Client Relationship
and Legal Services, signed by A and K.
8. Annex I Letter, dated April 3, 2007,
addressed to A and K thru N re: Attorneys
Fees, signed by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.,
current counsel for A.
9. Annex J Legal Retainership Agreement,
dated April 3, 2007, signed by N and the
Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices,
thru Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr., showing
the litigation expenses incurred by A in
hiring the legal services of the said law
firm to protect her rights against the
unjust acts of defendants B, et. al.
10. Annex K Special Power of Attorney in
favor of the Laserna Cueva Mercader Law
Offices acting thru Atty. Manuel J. Laserna
Jr. and/or Atty. Myrna C. Mercader, dated
April 11, 2007, signed by A and K and
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in
Tokyo, Japan.
11. Annex L - Special Power of Attorney in
favor of V dated January 12, 2007, issued
by A and notarized by Atty. Xxx in xxx City.
12. Annex M (with sub-markings)- Appraisal
Report, dated October 27, 2006, on the
subject property, issued by the xxx Co., Inc.,
with supporting documents, showing the fair
marker value of the subject property and the
improvements thereon. It proves the huge
economic opportunity losses the plaintiff and
her children are incurring by reason of the
unjust
act
of
the
defendants
in
dispossessing the plaintiff of her subject
property, which the plaintiff owns in fee
simple as its lawful and registered owner.
13. Annex N - Contract of Lease, dated
September 16, 2006 of the son of the
plaintiff, V, who was harassed by defendants
B, et. al. to move out of the subject property

owned by his mother (herein plaintiff) A,

thus, constraining him to lease a property in
xxx City, at P8,000.00/month, where he and
his wife could reside and where his mother
could reside whenever she returns to the
Philippines for vacations.
14. Annex O (with sub-markings) - Various
proofs of payments caused to be
paid/remitted by plaintiff A either directly or
thru her duly authorized representatives,
e.g. his son V, et. al., for the premiums of the
fire insurance policies of the subject
property, the various monthly dues, charges
and fees caused to be paid by the plaintiff to
the
15. xxx Homeowners Association as a member
in good standing of the Association being a
homeowner therein, and the various annual
local real estate taxes caused to be paid by
the plaintiff to the local government of xxx
City, They disprove the claim of B that she
was the one who had spent for all such
expenses.
16. Annex P (with sub-markings) - Employment
records of the plaintiff A as an employee in
Japan,
e.g.,
Incumbency
Certificate,
showing her incomes/salaries and financial
capacity as such, as well as the Japanbased incomes that she had lost/waived for
attending to the litigation of the pending
cases involving her property in the
Philippines.
17. Annex Q (with sub-markings) Proofs of
various dollar remittances the plaintiff A had
made from Japan to her son V and the
defendant B for the support, sustenance,
personal businesses and other expenses
and costs of living of the son of the plaintiff,
V, the burial of another son of the plaintiff, K,
the upkeep and maintenance of the subject
property, and all other related necessary
expenses relative to the children of the
plaintiff and to the subject property. They
disprove the claim of the defendant B that
she was the one financially supporting the
living expenses, education, businesses, etc.
of the children of the plaintiff or that she was
the one spending for the maintenance of the
subject property or that she was the one
who funded the burial of the deceased K.
18. Annex R (with sub-markings) - Various
business records of xxx Enterprise owned
by the son of the plaintiff, V, which the
plaintiff had helped fund and organize. They
show the financial capacity of V to support
himself, his wife, his business-related
transactions, and his costs of living
expenses, contrary to the claim of defendant
B that she was the one who had funded the
same.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 17

19. Annex S - The passports of V showing his

business travels abroad. They show the
financial capacity, personal maturity, and
business acumen of V as a businessman,
contrary to the claim of defendant B that she
was the one who was supporting the
personal
maintenance
and
business
operations of V.
20. Annex T (with sub-markings) - Business
records of xxx Enterprise and yyy Collection
(registered in the names of defendants B
and R), which the plaintiff A, as we wellearning Japan-based employee, had helped
put up and fund at a time when the said B
and R were basically penniless or under
financial straits. Please note that the
business names xxx and yyy were patterned
after the names of the children of the
plaintiff.
21. Annex U (with sub-markings) Records of
the checking account of V in Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank (HSBC), showing that he
had paid his business loans thru his said
account, contrary to the claim of the
defendant B that she was the she who paid
such business loans of V.
22. Annex V (with sub-markings) - Business
and financial records of xxx Management
Inc., re: the purchase and full payment of a
Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle made by the said
corporation, whose major stockholders are
the xxx Clan. The natural father of V
belonged to the said Clan. The said records
show that the amortizations for the said car
were made and paid by the said Corporation
and xxx Clan for the benefit of the latter and
that the payments were made thru the
account of the said corporation in BPI
Family Bank, contrary to the claim of
defendant B that she was the one who had
paid for the said car.
23. Annex W (with sub-markings) Records of
the amicable settlement of Civil Case No.
xxx (RTC Branch xxx, xxx City), entitled
Sps. N v. A (represented by her [late]
mother C), involving the subject property.
They prove that plaintiff A had paid for all the
expenses (taxes, registration fees, etc.)
related to the Deed of Exchange, the
Compromise
Agreement,
and
the
registration of the titles involved therein,
contrary to the claim of defendant B that she
was the one who paid for all such expenses.
24. Annex X (with sub-markings) Records of
the amicable settlement of Civil Case xxx
(RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City) which A filed
against the University of Perpetual Help
Hospital and its attending doctors to seek
damages for the death of K, a son of the
plaintiff A. The records show that the
defendant B, as attorney in fact of A,
received P600,000.00 from the University of
Perpetual Help Hospital, et. al. as settlement
money for the death of K (son of A) and
showing that Atty. Xxx, counsel for B in the
instant ejectment case, received 10%
thereof as his fees. The said amount was
used by B to renovate/improve and maintain

the expenses for the subject property and/or

other expenses relative to the children of A
and to defray some of the litigation
expenses of the said civil case. B made it
appear claimed that the funds she used for
the said purposes came from her own
pockets.
25. Annex Y (with sub-markings) Passports
of A and her husband K, showing their
various travels to the Philippines to care for
and supervise As children in Metro Manila
and to monitor their education, good conduct
and businesses. They disprove the claim of
B that A had abandoned her children to her
care.
IV.
APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE

LAWS

AND

A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The alleged contract of sale between the plaintiff
A and the defendant B is unenforceable and
cannot be raised as a valid legal and factual
defense in the instant ejectment case, that is,
assuming that such an agreement actually
existed, an allegation which is vehemently
denied by the plaintiff for being false, untrue and
fabricated.
Under Art. 1403, Civil Code, the following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by
one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Fraud
as set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charge, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within a year from the
making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration
of marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry;
(d) An Agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels or things in action, at a price not
less that five hundred pesos unless the
buyer accept and receive part of such
goods and chattels, or the evidences, or
some of them, of such things in action,
or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is
made by auction and entry is made by
the auctioneer in his sales book, at the
time of the sale, of the amount and kind
of property sold, terms of sale, price,
names of the purchasers and person on
whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 18

sale of real property or of an interest

therein;
(f) A representation as to the
credit of a third person.
The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the
purpose of preventing frauds. Under the Statute of
Frauds, the only formality required is that the contract or
agreement must be in writing and subscribed by party
charged or by his agent. For example, a telegram
advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale
of land had been previously made to come at once in
order to complete the purchase, but which telegram
neither describes the property nor states the purchase
price, and which is not signed by any person having
authority to bind the seller, is not a sufficient
memorandum of sale to satisfy the requirement of the
statue.
Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are
susceptible of ratification. According to Art. 1405 of the
Civil Code, such contracts may be ratified either (1) by
the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence
to prove the same, or (2) by the acceptance of benefits
under them. Art. 1405 provides that contracts infringing
the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403,
are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of
oral evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of
benefits under them while Art. 1406 provides that when
a contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
and a public document is necessary for its registration in
the Registry of Deeds, the parties may avail themselves
of the right under article 1357.
The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent
fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence upon the unassisted
memory of witnesses (Shoemaker vs. La Tondea, 68
Phil. 24). Although the said
provisions simply provides for the form or method by
which contracts coming within its terms may be proved,
nonetheless, the claimant must first prove the existence
and due execution of such a contract, notwithstanding its
formal defects, if any. (Conlu v. Araneta, 15 Phil. 387;
Gallemit v. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241; Kuenzler & Streff v.
Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez v. Salcedo, [26 Phil. 485];
Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471; Magalona v.
Paratcim 59 Phil. 543).
Although the Supreme Court has held in many
cases that no particular form or language or instrument
is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in
writing under the statute of frauds, nonetheless, such
memorandum of note should be in the form of a
document or writing, formal or informal, which had been
written either for the purpose of furnishing evidence of
the contract or for another purpose which satisfies all the
statutes requirements as to contents and signature
would be sufficient.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a
voucher or entry in an accountants book of account
purporting to show payment of a specified amount as
consideration for the sale of leasehold right over a house
was, however, held insufficient where the same was not
signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the
accountant who claimed (without establishing) that he
was the vendors agent (Reyes vs. Lopez, 76 Phil. 568).
The settled rule is that the statute applies only to
executory (Factoran vs. Laban, 81 Phil. 512; Cocjin vs.
Libo, 91 Phil. 777), that is, a contract that has not been

completed or executed yet. Performance, whether total

or partial, takes a contact out of the operation of the
statute. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493; Hernandez v. Adal,
78 Phil. 196; Almirol vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 512; Robles
vs. Lizarraga

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of
real rights over immovable property; sales of real
property or of an interest therein are governed by articles
1403, No. 2, and 1405;

Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387; Diama vs. Macalibo, I74 Phil.

70; Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373; Carbonnel v.
Poncio, 55 O.G. 2415). Performance must be duly
proved.

(2) The cession, repudiation or enunciation of hereditary

rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains;

Examples of performance include: (a) a sale of

real property which has been consummated by the
delivery of the property to the vendee (Soriano v. Heirs
of Magali, L-15133, July 31, 1963; Diama vs. Macalibo,
supra); (b) or which has been partially executed by
payment of a part of the price to the vendors and the
delivery of the land to the vendees (Almirol vs.
Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387).
In one case, it was held that the transaction is
not taken out of the coverage of the statute of frauds by
the mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession
of the land as a tenant and that he had made substantial
improvements thereon, such allegation being an
insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been
executed or performed. There must be an allegation to
the effect that he had taken possession of the land in
view of a supposed verbal contract he had with the
defendant to purchase it, or that he has made
improvements thereon because and as a consequence
of said supposed contract to sell (Pascual vs. realty
Investment, Inc. 91 Phil. 257).
Partial performance does not of itself exclude
the application of the Statute of Frauds. Firstly, in order
that a contract not to be performed within one year may
be taken out of the operation of the statue, it must
appear clearly that full or complete performance has
been made by one party; nothing less will suffice, and if
anything remains to be done after the expiration of the
year besides the mere payment of money, the statute
would apply (Babao vs. Perez, 54 O.G. 2888).
The doctrine of partial performance cannot be
invoked against the statute where the contract is vague,
ambiguous and uncertain in its terms and as to subject
matter. For, obviously, there can be no partial
performance until there is a definite and complete
agreement between the parties. For the doctrine to be
availed of, the parol agreement relied upon must be
certain, definite, clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal
in this terms and as to subject matter, aside from being
fair, reasonable, and just in this provisions. This is so
because the doctrine is based on equity, and it would be
inequitable to enforce an agreement that does not satisfy
the above requirements (Babao vs. Perez, Babao v.
Perez, 54 OG 2888).

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power

which has for its object an act appearing or which should
appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third
person;
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an
act appearing in a public document.
Although, as a general rule, contracts hall be obligatory,
in whatever from they may have been entered into, yet
there are certain contracts falling within the purview or
scope of this rule which, by reason of their importance,
should be executed in accordance with certain
formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect
the interests of the contracting parties as well as that of
third persons. The Civil Code, recognizing this necessity,
enumerates in Art. 1358 the different classes of
contracts which must appear either in a public or in a
private document, and grants in Art. 1357 a coercive
power to the contracting parties by which they can
reciprocally compel the observance of the required form.

Under Art. 1359, Civil Code, when, there having been a

meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their
true intention is not expressed in the instrument
purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of
the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument
to the end that such true intention may be expressed. If
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has
prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the
proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but
annulment of the contract.
C. EJECTMENT LAW AND CASES
The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with
technical and substantive requirements of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Thus, considering the summary nature of the
instant ejectment suit, the same should be resolved by
the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff
A-Seiwa, regardless of the pendency of the RTC-level
case filed by B.

B. Forms of Contracts
The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had
allegedly sold the subject property to defendant B fails to
meet and comply with the strict procedural and
evidentiary requirements set forth in Articles 1358, et.
seq. of the Civil Code as to the forms or formalities of a
contract or an agreement.
Under Art. 1358, Civil Code, the following must
appear in a public instrument:

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 19

The only issue in forcible entry and detainer

cases is the physical possession of real property
possession de facto and not possession de jure
(Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The subject matter
thereof merely is the material possession or possession
de facto over the real property. The questions to be
resolved simply are these: First, who had actual
possession over the piece of real property? Second, was
the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the
filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy, or
stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his
possession? Any controversy over ownership rights
should be settled after the party who had the prior,

peaceful and actual possession is returned to the

property (Dizon vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897).
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building and that such judgment
shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held
conclusive of the fact therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession.
Section 1, Rule 70 provides that a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.
Section 2, Rule 70 provides that, unless
otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be
commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the
lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand
upon the person found on the premises, or by posting
such notice on the premises if no person be found
thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the
case of buildings.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a
summary procedure, and that all actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall
be governed by the summary procedure hereunder
provided.
Under Sec. 16 of Rule 70, when the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. Under Sec. 18 of the Rule, the judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall
be conclusive with respect to the possession only and
shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building.
Sec. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the
court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true,
it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears
of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If
it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render
judgment

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 20

for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim

is established, the court shall render judgment for the
sum found in arrears from either party and award costs
as justice requires.
In view of the summary nature of an ejectment
suit, Sec. 19 of Rule 70 provides that if judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay
the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time
of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or
before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by
the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed. Under Sec. 21 of the Rule, the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom.
The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature
(Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27 SCRA 822; Sarona vs.
Villegas, 22 SCRA 1256). As such, it is inadequate for
the ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of
controverted real property. In an unlawful detainer case
suit, while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of
ownership, it may receive evidence on possession de
jure to determine the nature of possession (Consing vs.
Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1).
It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful
detainer cases that a mere plea of title or ownership
over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used
as a sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of
possession because an action for recovery of
possession can be maintained even against the very
owner of the property (Prado vs. Calpo, et. al., G.R. No.
L-19379, April 30, 1964, cited in Spouses medina and
Bernal vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278).
In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is
possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership or possession de jure that either party may se
forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of
possession de facto, the inferior court can decide the
questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between
the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or
not there is a lease contract between the parties, the
period of such lease contract and whether or not the
lease contract has already expired; (c) the just and
reasonable amount of the rent and the date when it will
take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the
premises against the will of the landlord; and (e) if the
defendant has built on the land a substantial and
valuable building and there is no dispute between the
parties as to the ownership of the land and the building,
their rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants
claim of ownership of the property from which plaintiff
seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the inferior
detainer. (Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357).

An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding

the possession of the land or building against or from a
landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the
expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract express or implied
(Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pharma Industries,
Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100
SCRA 339; Ching Pue vs. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 (1950);
Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil 868 (1956); Teodoro vs. Mirasol,
99 Phil. 150 (1956); Pardo de Tavera vs. Encarnacion,
et. al., 22 SCRA 632 (1968).
An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different
subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title.
What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the
issue of material possession or possession de facto;
whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the
issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for
reconveyance of title over the same property does not
divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try
the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it
preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment
case where the only issue involved is material
possession or possession de facto (Ramirez vs. Bleza,
L-45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187).
This is so because the judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with
respect to the possession only and in no case bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such
judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it
be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of
action not involving possession. The rationale is that
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved (Republic vs.
Guarin, 81 SCRA 269). It does not admit of a delay in
the determination thereof. It is time procedure designed
to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121
SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore obviated
and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property
should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial
justice (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So
much so that judgment must be executed immediately
when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent
further damages arising from loss of possession
(Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167).
Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be
divested of its jurisdiction over ejectment cases simply
because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership
over the litigated property (Alilaya vs. Espaola, 107
SCRA 564; Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81 SCRA 543;
Castro vs. delos Reyes, 109 Phil. 64). Even where
defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to
the property in his answer, it is declared in a great
number of cases that the trial court will not be divested
of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone (Savinada v.
Tuason, et. al., G.R. No. L-2132, May 30, 1949; Loo Soo
v. Osorio, R.G. No. L-1364, May 30, 1951; Cruz v.
Lunsang, G.R. No. L-2332, October 4, 1959; De Los
Rey7es v. Elepanio, et al., G.R. No. L-3466, October 13,
1950; Mediran V. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).
Where the possession of defendant is by tolerance on
the part of the plaintiff, or his predecessor, the
possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time
that there is a demand to vacate (Amis vs. Aragon, L4684, April 28, 1951). It is not necessary that there be a
formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful
detainer suit may be filed against a possessor by
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 21

tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession of the

property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43
SCRA 136; Pharma Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, 100
SCRA 339). When consent is withdrawn and owner
demands tenants to leave the property, the owners right
of possession is deemed asserted. (Philippine National
Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lease
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to vacate
(Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146; Canaynay vs.
Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36; Robles vs. San Jose, 52 O.G.
6193; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257, citing
Montelibano vs. Hingaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil.
797, 802-803).
D. RECENT EJECTMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The plaintiff A further cites the following recent
ejectment-related jurisprudence in support of her
complaint.
In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, et.
al. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ, Respondents, G.
R. No. 107036, February 9, 1993, it was held ha on the
issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that a
municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases even if the question of the
ownership of the property is raised by the defendant.
The exception is where the question of title is so
involved in the ejectment case that it cannot be decided
unless the title to the property is first ascertained.
In the case of CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, et.
al. vs. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent [G.R. No.
138377. February 28, 2000], it was held as a general
rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended
by the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of
another action raising ownership of the property as an
issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer
actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of
petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of
the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. Thus:
X x x.
Unlawful detainer and forcible
entry suits under Rule 70 are
designed to summarily restore
physical possession of a piece
of land or building to one who
has been illegally or forcibly
deprived
thereof,
without
prejudice to the settlement of
the parties' opposing claims of
juridical
possession
in
appropriate proceedings. It has
been held that these actions
"are intended to avoid disruption
of public order by those who
would take the law in their
hands purportedly to enforce
their
claimed
right
of
possession." [Vda [de Legaspi
v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135,
September 27, 1977, per
Barredo, J.] In these cases, the

issue is pure physical or de

facto
possession,
and
pronouncements
made
on
questions of ownership are
provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a
pending civil action involving
ownership of the same property
does not justify the suspension
of ejectment proceedings. "The
underlying reasons for the
above ruling were that the
actions in the Regional Trial
Court did not involve physical or
de facto possession, and, on not
a few occasions, that the case
in the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay
disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues
presented in the former could
quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action
and there resolved." [Wilson
Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April
10, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ. In
this case, the Court also held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in
the RTC by defendants in
ejectment
actions
in
the
municipal trial courts or other
courts of the first level (Nacorda
v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966))
do not abate the latter; and
neither do proceedings on
consignation of rentals (Lim Si
v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956),
citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87
Phil. 81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does
not suspend an ejectment suit
against the plaintiff in the former
(Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA
187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case"
where ownership is concededly
the principal issue before the
Regional Trial Court does not
preclude nor bar the execution
of the judgment in an unlawful
detainer suit where the only
issue involved is the material
possession or possession de
facto of the premises (Heirs of
F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et al.; etc.,
168 SCRA 518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title
to property is not a bar to an
ejectment suit involving the
same property (Quimpo v. de la
Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance
with damages do not affect
ejectment actions (e.g., to
compel renewal of a lease
contract)
(Desamito
v.
Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184
(1966); Pardo de Tavera v.
Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632
(1968); Rosales v. CFI, 154
SCRA 153 (1987); Commander
Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA
264 (1988)).
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 22

6. An action for reformation of

instrument (e.g., from deed of
absolute sale to one of sale with
pacto de retro) does not
suspend an ejectment suit
between the same parties
(Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA
600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of
property
or
"accion
reivindicatoria" also has no
effect on ejectment suits
regarding the same property
(Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8
SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la
Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA 520
(1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149
SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v.
Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 (1987);
Philippine Feeds Milling Co.,
Inc. v. CA, 174 SCRA 108;
Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517
(1989);
Guzman
v.
CA
(annulment
of
sale
and
reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604
(1989); Demamay v. CA, 186
SCRA 608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy
v. CA et al., (annulment of sale
and reconveyance), GR No.
95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8.
Neither do
suits
for
annulment of sale, or title, or
document affecting property
operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same
property (Salinas v. Navarro,
126 SCRA 167 (1983) annulment of deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and/or
to declare the same an
equitable mortgage; Ang Ping v.
RTC , 154 SCRA 153 (1987) annulment of sale and title;
Caparros v. CA, 170 SCRA 758
(1989) - annulment of title;
Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 annulment
of
sale
with
damages; Galgala v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. , 177 SCRA
288 (1989) - annulment of
document).
In the case of Tala Realty Services Corporation
v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank [G.R. No.
129887. February 17, 2000], it was held that nothing is
more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely
concerned with the issue of physical or material
possession of the subject land or building. However, if
the issue of possession depends on the resolution of the
issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the
complaint, the municipal trial court may resolve the latter
[Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347,366 (1996)]
although the resulting judgment would be conclusive
only with respect to the possession but not the
ownership of the property [Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure].
In the caser of Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No.
134651. September 18, 2000], it was held that the rule is
settled that although a question of jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, even on appeal, the same must not
result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play, such as
where the issue was raised by petitioners for the first
time only in a Petition for Review and only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals;

and where petitioners participated actively in the

proceedings before the MeTC [Refugia v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 347,
citing Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29
August 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Navoa v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 59255, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA 545.]
and invoked its jurisdiction with the filing of their answer,
in seeking affirmative relief from it, in subsequently filing
a notice of appeal before the RTC, and later, a Petition
for Review with the Court of Appeals. Thus:
X x x. Be that as it may,
we find no error in the MeTC
assuming jurisdiction over the
subject matter. A complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful without
necessarily
employing
the
terminology
of
the
law.
[Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994,
232 SCRA 372; Pangilinan v.
Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31
January 1972, 43 SCRA 136].
As correctly found by the
appellate court, to which we
agree, the allegations in the
complaint sufficiently
established a cause of action for
unlawful detainer. The complaint
clearly stated how entry was
effected and how and when
dispossession
started
petitioners were able to enter
the
subject
premises
as
sublessees of Purisima Salazar
who, despite the termination of
her lease with respondent,
continued to occupy the subject
premises without any contract
with it; thus, their stay was by
tolerance of respondent.
X x x.
The status of petitioner spouses
is akin to that of a lessee or a
tenant whose term of lease has
expired but whose occupancy
has continued by tolerance of
the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at
the latter's forbearance or
permission without any contract
between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand
failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. [Vda. De
Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L31985, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA
172,
citing
Calubayan
v.
Pascual, No. L-22645, 18
September 1967, 21 SCRA 146;
Yu v. de Lara, No. L-16084, 30
November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.].
X x x.
In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT
ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR and TESS TABERNA and
MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 23

COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO

AND ZENAIDA ANZURES, respondents, [G.R. No.
106214. September 5, 1997], it was held that the oneyear reglamentary period under Section 1, Rule 70 for
filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time
of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession.
And such right legally expires or terminates upon receipt
of the last demand to vacate [Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia and
Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]. Thus:
X x x. In this case, although
possession by petitioners (other
than Villaluz) lasted beyond
March 31, 1988 (the date they
were supposed to vacate the
premises in accordance with the
agreement between petitioner
Villaluz
and
private
respondents), nevertheless their
continued possession from April
1, 1988 up to the time they
received the demand to vacate
on February 23, 1989, is
considered as possession by
tolerance. Said petitioners are
not lessees but their status is
analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has
expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the
owner. Their right of possession
of the said property stems from
their being employees of
petitioner Villaluz who only
allowed them to occupy the
premises for a certain period. As
such, their possession depends
upon
the
possession
of
petitioner
Villaluz.
Having
merely stepped into the shoes
of the latter, said petitioners
cannot acquire superior rights
than that of petitioner Villaluz. It
has been ruled, that "the person
who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance
or permission, without any
contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate the
same upon demand," otherwise
the remedy of ejectment may be
availed of to oust him from the
premises. [ Refugia v. CA, 258
SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De
Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]. In
such case, the one year
prescriptive period for filing the
appropriate action to remedy the
unlawful
withholding
of
possession is to be counted
from the date of receipt of the
last
demand
to
vacate
[Calubayan v. Pascual, 215
SCRA 146] because it is only
from that time that possession
becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda.
de Prieto v. Reyes, 14 SCRA
430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79
Phil. 36]. Accordingly, since the
complaint for ejectment was
instituted on July 12, 1989, or a

mere four (4) months from the

time of the last demand to
vacate, the same was timely
filed within the prescriptive
period. X x x.
In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth
Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., respondents [G.R.
No. 128743. November 29, 1999], it was held that a
judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon
the defendants in the suit but also against those not
made parties thereto, if they are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of
the
defendant
fraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate
the
judgment;
b) guests or other occupants of the
premises with the permission of the
defendant;
c)

transferees

pendente

d)
e)

lite;

sublessee;
co-lessee;

or

f) members of the family, relatives and

other privies of the defendant.
[I Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 793 (1997)]

UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

Page 24

The above doctrine expressly and properly applies to codefendant MARIA xxx, who is an aunt of the defendants
B, et. al. and who lives with them, who is under their
direction, control, supervision, subsidy and assistance,
and who had actual and constructive knowledge of the
existence of the mandated Barangay conciliation and
mediation proceedings but nonetheless impliedly waived
her appearance thereto by not voluntarily appearing and
participating therein despite such knowledge. The
foregoing facts were not denied (in fact, admitted sub
silencio) by the other defendants in their past pleadings
in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
It is an established principle in law that one who
comes in equity must come with clean hands. (Tala
Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 137533, 22 November
2002, 392 SCRA 506). One who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. He or she who has done inequity shall not
have equity. The courts may deny equitable relief on the
ground that the conduct and actions of a party are
inequitable, unfair, dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
(Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 149615, 29 August 2006;
Abacus Security vs. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27
February 2006, 483 SCRA 315.)
VI. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that instant ejectment suit be decided in favor of
the plaintiff A and against all of the defendants, ordering
the defendants to VACATE and SURRENDER the de
facto/material possession of the subject property to the
plaintiff or her duly authorized legal representative/s,
with awards of damages, litigation expenses, and costs
of suit, as duly proved by the various documentary
evidence attached to this Position Paper.