War Programming - The Propaganda Project and The Iraq War Author(s) - David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes

War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War
Author(s): David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 617-643
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121509
Accessed: 16-01-2017 18:32 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121509?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Midwest Sociological Society, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Sociological Quarterly
This content downloaded from 132.174.254.57 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 18:32:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253
WAR PROGRAMMING: The Propaganda

Project and the Iraq War
David L. Altheide*
Jennifer N. Grimes
Arizona State University
The invasion of Iraq was justified to the American people by a sophisticated propaganda campaign
that reflected a think tank's vision for a new foreign policy. One objective of this article is to set forth
a theoretical argument for analyzing modern propaganda campaigns as a feature of mass-mediated

discourse crafted by think tanks and highly organized claims makers. We propose that the current
structure of policy and critique is now institutionalized and formatted as War Programming, which
connects criticism within a narrative sequence, including critiques and reflections about journalis-
tic failings. The scope of the action is so immense that it precludes and preempts its critique. The
second objective is to show how the rationale for the invasion was developed as a "public conspiracy" over a decade by the members of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). The third
aim of this article is to describe and clarify why the PNAC plans for Iraq and an imperialist foreign
policy received very little news media coverage. Qualitative content analysis of news materials suggests that the news sources and media shared a logic and perspective about "timely and entertaining
news." The PNAC plan was not publicized by the major news media because it fell outside the focus
of the Bush administration's propaganda campaign to demonize Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein, who was held to be responsible for attacks on the United States. The implications of such a
well-organized propaganda campaign for future news coverage of war are discussed.
... the success of "Bush's PR War"... was largely dependent on a compliant press
that uncritically repeated almost every fraudulent administration claim about the
threat posed to America by Saddam Hussein. (MacArthur 2003:62)
The 2003 Iraq War challenges sociological theorizing about social change and policy, and
raises fundamental questions about the role of knowledge and critique in social life when
public discourse and agendas are partially shaped and communicated through entertainment-oriented mass media. This article examines the planning, rationale, and organization of misinformation and propaganda that fueled public passion and provided much of
the legitimacy for the Iraq War. We focus on the interaction of the mass media with a
major think tank, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), in order to identify
changes in the process of shaping public opinion, and the daunting implications this has
for a free society and public policy. We address how a discourse of action that incorporates
critique has emerged, and clarify the consequences for establishing a governmentknowledge relationship. We propose that the current structure of policy and critique is
*Direct all correspondence to David L. Altheide, School of Justice and Social Inquiry, Tempe, AZ
85287-0403, Tel: (480) 965-7016, Fax: (480) 965-8187, e-mail: David.Altheide@asu.edu
The Sociological Quarterly 46 (2005) 617-643 ? 2005 Midwest Sociological Society 617
The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes
now institutionalized and, essentially, connects criticism and challenge as part of a War
Program. The scope of the action is so immense that it precludes and preempts its critique. We contend that a new approach is needed to offer critique before the event. This
can be accomplished by theorizing as praxis, or stating, by drawing on previous experi-
ences, how an action's planning, execution, successes, and failures will produce social
consequences.
On March 20, 2003, the United States of America invaded Iraq. President Bush justified this preemptive strike against a sovereign nation by repeatedly claiming through the
national press and several press conferences that Saddam Hussein was implicated in the
9/11 attacks on the United States, had not complied with United Nations (UN) require-
ments about weapons inspections, and still harbored numerous weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) that he planned to use against the United States as well as deliver to
terrorists. Subsequent reports would show that the White House claims about each of
these points were wrong. Counterclaims by others, including U.S. senators, were dismissed by the White House, and received little press or broadcast attention. There was
very little reporting by major news media about contrary views cautioning that this attack
was not necessary at that time, that weapons inspectors had not found such weapons, and
needed more time to work, and that sanctions already in place were working (the search
for WMD officially ended on January 12, 2005). Nor was there much reporting about
other claims that the aftermath of the war would be difficult, could cost billions of dollars
and require U.S. military presence for many years. Eighteen months after President Bush
declared, "Mission accomplished," a large percentage of the American people continued

to accept the basic premises that President Bush outlined for going to war, although pub-
lic opinion was somewhat less supportive of the U.S. position in Iraq (Kull 2004):
Among those who believed that Iraq had WMD 81% thought going to war was the
right decision, and among those who thought it had a major WMD program, 49%
believed it was the right decision. Among those who thought that Iraq only had some
WMD-related activities only 21% thought war was the right decision, and for those
who thought there was no such activity just 8% thought it was the right decision.
(Kull 2004)
We suggest that the Iraq War was presented to the United States and international audiences as a War Program, or a sequence of reports that blends imagery and language of the
current conflict with previous wars, and incorporates critiques of war policy within the
news frame about movement toward war. War Programming refers to the organization
and structure of the discourse of recent reportage about wars, and not mere content. It
encompasses content as well as thematic emphases and dominant frames. Because the
main frame involved the inevitability of war and U.S. preparation for it, critiques that
attempted to question the propaganda campaign propelling the country toward war were
ignored. Mass media audiences in the United States tended to accept this War Program
although foreign audiences, which did not share the ideologically embedded accounts of
previously broadcast U.S. wars, interpreted the visuals and official narratives much differ-
ently (Kull, Ramsey, and Lewis 2002; Kull 2004). While the War Program frame emerged
in news coverage of other conflicts, three considerations made it especially well suited to
618 The Sociological Quarterly 46 (2005) 617-643 ? 2005 Midwest Sociological Society
David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War
the Iraq War: (1) a very well-organized think tank-the PNAC-whose members were
government officials as well as publishers, guided news reports; (2) a compliant press that
relied on access to key administration officials and other institutional news sources, many
of whom were affiliated with the PNAC; (3) a climate of support and mutual concerns by
political leaders and journalists about the 9/11 attacks and broad definitions about working together to protect the United States. We examine how War Programming operates by
describing the role of the PNAC in shaping news and policy.
We argue that the PNAC, working with a compliant news media, developed, sold,
enacted, and justified a war with Iraq that has resulted as of this writing (February 2005)
in more than 10,000 dead or wounded American soldiers, plus numerous contract workers (not including mercenaries), along with an estimated 100,000 dead or wounded Iraqis
(BBC 2004; Cooney and Sinan 2004; Yousef 2004). The work of the PNAC in shaping U.S.
policy toward Iraq received very little news attention. We report on certain features of the
propaganda campaign that contributed to the policy planning and implementation of the
Iraq War, and raise several theoretical questions about a refined approach to the study of
propaganda in a mass-mediated age that has produced War Programming. We conclude

by offering an alternative to the news discourse that contributed to the Iraq War.
NEWS AND PROPAGANDA
Research on news organizations and content documents how news frames can shape th
discourse and language that conveys the dominant message (Iyengar 1987; Weiler and
Pearce 1992). Students of propaganda (Lippman 1925; Doob 1966; Speier 1969; Lasswell
1971; Lasswell, Speier, and Lerner 1979) and American journalism have long noted th
the press capitulates to the government during time of war (Gerth 1992; Kellner 1992
2003; Shapiro 1992; Jackall 1994; Ellenius and Foundation 1998; Jackall 1999; Der Derian
2002; Herman and Chomsky 2002). News frames and dominant thematic emphas
structure the selection, presentation, and emphasis of news reports (Tuchman 1978; Eri
son, Baranek, and Chan 1987; Fowler 1991; Zhondang and Kosicki 1993; Chermak 1995
Lowry 1998; Westfeldt and Wicker 1998; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 2000).
The general public derives most of its understanding of international affairs and for
eign policy from news, and particularly TV news (Douglas 1970; Shaw and McCombs
1977; Adams 1981; 1982; Graber 1984; Edelman 1985; Bennett 1988; Hall 1988; Alali an
Byrd 1994; Aldridge and Hewitt 1994; Jackall 1994; Hertog and Fan 1995; Margolis 1996
Altheide 1997; 2003; Best 1999; Comstock and Scharrer 1999; Hunt 1999; Chiricos et a
2000; Barson and Heller 2001; Doyle 2001; Wasburn 2002). The American public's win-
dow on the world of foreign affairs is framed by what is presented on the nightly newsca
of ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN. This does not mean that the only source of foreign affa
news is TV, but that it is the most consistent and widely used source of information for th
American public. Public understanding of issues, particularly those involving no
Western cultures, is filtered through the daily information and visual images. Moreove
public perceptions are greatly informed by the repetition of certain themes, slogans, a
symbolic representations of problems and issues:
War stories are told with the flourish of explicit moral discourse. Trade stories are told
with the patient repetition of words suggesting, but not directly stating, that the rival
nation is unreasonable and unfair. (Wasburn 2002:125)

Our argument is that the American news media, and especially network TV news organi-
zations, chose not to present important contextual and background information about
the Middle East, and especially Iraq, because it was not consistent with other news themes
nor was it as entertaining. The dominant "story" since the attacks of 9/11 was the "war on
terrorism." This broad story included U.S. retaliation, the hunt for Al Qaeda leaders (e.g.,
Osama bin Laden), and plans to attack countries and "outlaw regimes" that supported or
harbored terrorists. Implementing these programs involved invading Afghanistan and

expanding the U.S. military presence throughout the world. Other adjustments were
made in foreign policy, military budgets, domestic surveillance, and attacks on civil liber-
ties (Kellner 2003; Johnson 2004). Threats to invade other countries-the "axis of evil"that included Iraq, were part of an effort to "defend" the United States from future attacks.
A key aspect of the framing of the Iraq War was the use of fear. Altheide's (2004) anal-
ysis of numerous news reports pertaining to terrorism shows that citizens' concerns
about victims of 9/11 attacks were joined by politicians and advertisers, who marketed
and framed fear and dread of terrorism as part of a national identity that was commensu-
rate with personal caring and community. Terrorism became a very broad symbol that
encompassed fear, consumption, and international intervention (Kellner 2004). The

meaning of terrorism expanded from a tactic to also mean an idea, a lifestyle, and ultimately, a condition of the world. This transformation was aided by news media providing
entertaining reports to audiences. Specifically: (1) fear supported consumption as a

meaningful way for audiences to sustain an identity of substance and character; (2) con-
sumption and giving were joined symbolically as government and business propaganda
emphasized common themes of spending and buying; (3) the absence of a clear target for
reprisals contributed to the construction of broad symbolic enemies and goals, for exam-
ple, Iraq. News reports contributed to this broad definition of terrorism as a condition
(Altheide 2004).
THE NEWS MEDIA CONTEXT FOR PROPAGANDA
The PNAC was critical in managing information for a compliant U.S. press in order to
its "claims" about Iraq, without making it widely known that a few very influential o
cials had been working to change foreign policy in general, and attack Iraq in particu
for about a decade. Changes in commercial journalism and the competition in coveri
wars over the last two decades helped the PNAC guide news content, yet have little crit
news attention paid to these efforts (Comstock 1991). First, news organizations ha
become more entertainment oriented in order to increase sales, ratings, and revenue.
neglect of these issues reflects major organizational shifts in the production and pre
tation of news. Nowhere is this more apparent than with network TV news (Grossm
1997; Grossberg, Wartella, and Whitney 1998; Westfeldt and Wicker 1998). The infot
ment urge to appeal to the audience in order to gain viewers would soon become t
networks' established way of doing business. Other analyses have documented how the
climate and organization of network news changed over the last two decades (Grossberg
et al. 1998; Tyndall 2003). Changes in technology and marketing approaches helped
"normalize" infotainment, particularly the expansion of the entertainment for network
TV news (Tyndall 2003). Research on network trends shows that between 1977 and 1997
"hard news" declined from 67.3 percent to 41.3 percent while celebrity news tripled, from
2 percent in 1977 to 7 percent in 1997, "soft" lifestyle news doubled during the same time
period from 13.5 percent to nearly 25 percent, or one-fourth of all network news offerings
(Tyndall 2003). Network news time was increasingly devoted to celebrity news, and the
"morning news" shows emphasized more commercial and product advertising to promote the conglomerates which owned them. In June 2001, network morning news programs had become a way of selling things, often lifestyle products, books, movies, TV
shows, cookbooks, products for the home, and the like. Excluding commercials and
inserts for local news, 33 percent of the news time on these programs was devoted to
selling some product (Tyndall 2003).
Second, because of entertainment consideration, the need for access to obtain visuals
of combat, and treating former military personnel as journalists, the relationship

between the military and the news media has changed. The challenge of censorship and
credibility became even more acute after the first Gulf War as military officials joined
news organizations, often as reporters. The first Gulf War (1991) followed "photo op"
combat footage from Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), and bridged the militarymedia divide from the Vietnam debacle. The military expanded their arsenal of savvy
media consciousness. "Today, when you get an opportunity to stand up and represent
your command, you've got to hit a home run," Army Maj. Bob Hastings told the students
in his public affairs course (Vogel 1998:6). This contributed to the expansion of the "mil-
itary-media complex," which refers to the cooperative alliance between the military and
news organizations in sharing personnel (generals and other military spokespersons

become reporters or consultants) to promote public relations campaigns and provide
entertaining coverage of various crises and conflicts (Altheide 1999:1). We continue with
an overview of War Programming.
WAR PROGRAMMING
Sociological theory suggests that social actors' definitions of situations are informed
previous experiences and meanings. This process holds true for audiences, politician
and journalists (Shapiro 1997). Typically, scholars, journalists, and others (Hertsgaar
1988) reflect on the "poor coverage" after a conflict (see Step 4 below). Our intent is d
ferent: While we will discuss the news coverage that was part of the propaganda drive
conduct the Iraq War, we include our critique within a model of media logic and W
Programming (Altheide 1995; Bennett forthcoming). Few critiques are presented un
after the propaganda preparation, and the war is underway. The irony is that each ne
"war situation" is presented by producers as something unique and novel, while the inf
mational and emotional context for relating to it is historically embedded in previo

wars, often experienced mainly through the mass media. Analyses of news media coverage of previous wars indicates that each current war is greatly informed by images, sym-
bols, language, and experience associated with previous wars, including the
demonization of the enemy, the virtues and necessity of waging war, and the social and
political benefits for doing so (Altheide 1995). Thus, we draw on War Programming (Alt-
heide 1995:210-12), an ordered sequence of activities, that was developed from research
on U.S. wars with Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf War, and intervention in Somalia.
War Programming
1. Reportage and visual reports of the most recent war (or two).
2. Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audiences for the impending war,
including "demonizing" certain individual leaders, for example, Noriega or Hussein.
3. Coverage of the subsegments of the current war, using the best visuals available to
capture the basic scenes and themes involving the battle lines, the home front, the
media coverage, the international reaction, and anticipation of the war's aftermath.
4. Following the war, journalists' reaction and reflection on various governmental

restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented).
5. Journalists' and academics' diaries, biographies, exposes, critiques, and studies

about the war, and increasingly the media coverage.
6. Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively
and often lead to the widespread conclusion that perhaps the war was unnecessary,
other options were available, and that the price was too high; all of this will be useful
for the coverage of the next war.
7. For the next war, return to Step 1.
Our aim is to apply this conceptual scheme to the Iraq War in order to enhance our
theoretical capacity to explain modern propaganda.
As War Programming indicates, we suggest that a game-like structure has emerged for
joining action and critique sequentially, but it is not a game of equals. Rather, it is more
like an exhibition game between the "parent team"-in this case the dominant discourse-and the fledgling "minor league" team-the critiques, that contain different
frames and assumptions for a serious dialogue, but seldom develop this way. To continue
with the analogy of a game, it is clear to all in attendance that the parent team is the best,
the most desired, even though the minor league team occasionally wins in the exhibition
game, a game that does not count. Critiques of the push to war are so muted by War
Programming that they are not likely to be included, and if ever, they are not permitted to
develop. The challenge of the Iraq War is that while it officially ended on May 2, 2003, with
Bush's dramatic photo op landing on an aircraft carrier-"major combat operations in

Iraq have ended"-the war has continued nearly two years later, and no plan or timetable
for withdrawal has been offered. Nevertheless, critiques (Steps 4 and 5) are forthcoming.
This model is different than conventional propaganda analyses because War Programming builds in critique as part of the narrative and script of promotion. War Programming provides a loop, so to speak, around the criticism, and thereby provides a syntax of
meaning as well as a temporal point for criticism and dissent to occur, on schedule. Our
622 The Sociological Quarterly 46 (2005) 617-643 O 2005 Midwest Sociological Society
argument is that an alternative format to the current sequence of action-then-research/
critique of social policy, particularly war making, is essential. We will set forth some elements of this approach in the conclusion, but first, the role of think tanks in propaganda
will be addressed.
THINK TANKS AND PROPAGANDA
The dominant frameworks that guided the messages originated with a very conservativ
think tank, the PNAC. The PNAC shaped fundamental foreign policy changes that led u
to the invasion of Iraq. This was accomplished when several of its members joined th
Bush administration as cabinet members or close advisors. This conservative think tank
also contributed heavily to the propaganda campaign to justify the war, as well as worke
with major news media to redirect dissent within War Programming. It is helpful to plac
think tanks in context in order to appreciate the unique contribution of the PNAC in
guiding the United States to war with Iraq.
Claims makers are very important for social policy and change in a mass-mediated
society, and think tanks have become key claims makers (Best 1990; 1995; Berliner and
Biddle 1995). Social science research demonstrates how social problems, issues, an
movements rely on news media attention and discourses compatible with advocates'
interests (Spector and Kitsuse 1987; Best 1995). Think tanks may be defined as "private,
nonprofit research groups that operate on the margins of this nation's formal political
process" (Smith 1991:xiii). There are more than 1,000 think tanks in the United States a
well as in Europe (Stone and Denham 2004), but a few have become far more prominent
Think tanks have become more important during the last two decades in developing an
promoting social policy options by conducting research, holding conferences, publishin
newsletters and other literature, and serving as news sources, or claims makers, for th
news media, often by holding their own press conferences. Yet, there is very little new
attention to the role these think tanks play as gatekeepers in producing news report
Research shows that these organizations, particularly conservative ones, have bee
extremely influential in setting agendas (Covington 1998), managing news and public
information, and ultimately shaping social policy on issues ranging from global warmin
(McCright and Dunlap 2000; 2003) to educational policy ( Berliner and Biddle 1995). An
important study of the role of the Heritage Foundation in shaping debates about the
quality of education in the United States, and promoting legislation to support private
charter schools, demonstrates how focused and organized efforts can shape national
policy:
During 2001, the Heritage Foundation blanketed the United States with its views on
education ... the Heritage Foundation was cited by 81 media sources in 159 news
items. It was cited in the print, television, and radio media on a variety of education
topics in both general news and opinion formats. Excluding news wire services, which
do not publish directly to the public, the Heritage Foundation was present in the
media debate on education on average more than once every three days. (Haas,
Molnar, and Serrano 2002)
Just as the Heritage Foundation dominated education news in the United States and
played a critical role in defining the issues and controlling the language of reform, the
PNAC became a key claims maker or news source for foreign policy, and particularly Iraq
and terrorism.
THE PROJECT FOR A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY
The PNAC was very influential in changing U.S. foreign policy as well as promoting
favorable news coverage about going to war with Iraq following the attacks of 9/11
(http://www.newamericancentury.org/). The Iraq War was informed by these efforts
and the resulting propaganda campaign to convince the American people that attacking
Iraq was tantamount to attacking "terrorists" and others who threatened the United
States (Armstrong 2002). This organization was closely related to several other prominent think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), with its offices
located on the fifth floor of the AEI's Washington building. Many members of the
PNAC joined the Bush administration and became credible claims makers, who constructed the frames for shaping subsequent news reports. Among the members who
signed many of the proclamations laying the foundation for a new American empire
(Kagan and Kristol 2000; Bacevich 2002; Kagan 2003) were former and current governmental officials, including Elliot Abrams, William Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney,
Steve Forbes, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Donald Rumsfeld, and
Paul Wolfowitz. The PNAC emphasized changing American foreign policy to become a
hegemon and police its international interests as a new kind of benevolent American
empire (Bacevich 2002; Barber 2003; Kaplan 2003; Mann 2003; Johnson 2004). This
would include expanding the military, withdrawing from major treaties, as well as
engaging in preemptive strikes against those who would threaten U.S. interests. Those
messages, in turn, were carried by the mass media for months leading up to the invasion
of Iraq. The United States was well on its way to justify attacking Iraq in 1992 when
Dick Cheney and others, who would occupy positions in the Bush administration eight
years later, drafted the Defense Planning Guidance document. An overview and analysis
of the PNAC and its role in shaping U.S. foreign policy was David Armstrong's essay in
Harper's in October 2002:
The plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is unilateralism,
but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its
overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge
it on the world stage. It calls for dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not
that the United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be
absolutely powerful. (Armstrong 2002:76)
Making a pitch for a threatened military budget in 1992, Colin Powell told the House
Armed Services Committee, that the United States:
Required "sufficient power" to "deter any challenger from ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage." To emphasize the point, he cast the United States in the role
of street thug. "I want to be the bully on the block'," he said, implanting in the mind of
potential opponents that "there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of
the United States." (Armstrong 2002:78)

As the above statement by Colin Powell makes clear, the United States was not to be challenged by anyone, nor should the United States take direction from world regulatory bod-
ies, including the UN, because the aim was "to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival"
(Armstrong 2002:78). When the plan was leaked to the press, it went through several
changes, with new drafts suggesting that the United States would act in concert with allies,
when possible. The First Gulf War came and went, President George Bush was not
reelected and many of the coauthors and supporters of the plan left office for think tanks,
businesses, and various publications. The plan, with revisions, was promoted during the
next decade, even though some members were out of office for eight years, and was in full
swing one month before the infamous 9/11 attacks. The election of George W. Bush provided new invitations to join the government and work out the plan. The plan was carried
forth by the group as the PNAC. Ultimately, the plan was oriented to freeing the United
States from several alliances and treaties that limited military and weapons planning and
testing, including the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty, and several nuclear nonprolifera-
tion treaties (Perkovich 2003). Other global and environmental agreements were also
avoided or broken, including those designed to protect the environment and limit pollution, for example, the UN's Kyoto Protocol, ratified or signed by 140 countries. Our anal-
ysis of the role of the PNAC as sources and claims makers as a feature of War
Programming will follow an overview of our methodology.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
One way to study propaganda and the role of news sources is by "tracking discourse
following certain issues, words, themes, and frames over a period of time, across diffe
issues, and across different news media. Tracking discourse is a qualitative docum
analysis technique (also referred to as ethnographic content analysis) that applies an
nographic approach to content analysis to new information bases that are accessib
through computer technology, for example, Lexis/Nexis. As previous publications d
ment (Altheide 1987; 1996; 1997; 2002a,b), qualitative content analysis becomes eth
graphic as the researcher immerses him or herself in numerous documents, reads
interactively-moving from one point in a document to a related point in another d
ment, then searching still another source-until major themes and discourse emer
through constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967). While there are many dif
ences in some of the approaches, all share an assumption that symbolic representat
are enmeshed in a context of other assumptions that are not stated as such (van Dijk
Weiler and Pearce 1992; Wuthnow 1992; Grimshaw and Burke 1994; Altheide 1996
approach blends interpretive, ethnographic, and ethnomethodological approaches
media logic, particularly studies of news organizational culture, information techno
and communication formats. The capacity to examine numerous documents
specific conceptually informed search terms and logic provides a new way of explo
documents, applying natural experimental research designs to the materials, as w

retrieving and analyzing individual documents qualitatively. Moreover, because the tech-
nology permits immediate access to an enormous amount of material, comparative

exploration, conceptual refinement, and data collection and analysis can cover a longer
time period than previous technologies afforded.
Involving 12 steps, tracking discourse entails initial familiarity with a sample of rele-
vant documents, and then drawing a more specific theoretical sample, before drafting a
protocol, which is then checked for reliability and validity with additional documents.
Our theoretical interest directed us to search for news media reports that mentioned the
PNAC and the sources used within the article. For example, there were some 170 articles
that mentioned PNAC and were published before the war began on March 20, 2003, but
most of these were either letters to the editor, or simply an organizational affiliation of
someone, for example, William Kristol, a member of PNAC. We read those reports and
then theoretically selected the 24 articles (before and after the start of the war) that dealt
with PNAC substantively. These articles, along with TV network news reports, informed
the construction of a protocol designed to obtain data about date, location, author, for-
mat, topic, sources, theme, emphasis, and grammatical use of fear (as noun, verb, or
adverb). Occasionally, certain terms or individuals would be identified in a compelling
article, which would lead us to search for more information in Lexis/Nexis or the Internet.
We also sought opinion poll data, interviews with journalists and producers, and reflective pieces by journalists, especially those assigned to cover the fighting and occupation of
Iraq. The materials were placed in an information base and analyzed qualitatively for the-
matic emphasis and key words (e.g., empire, conspiracy, etc.), using Word 7 and
NUD*IST 4, a qualitative data analysis program, as well as quantitatively with a spreadsheet, Excel. We draw on these materials to document trends in news reporting about var-
ious aspects of the Iraq War, particularly the nature, thematic emphases, and tone of
report pertaining to the PNAC's agenda and contributions in moving the United States
toward war.
THE PROPAGANDA WAR
The propaganda campaign in the Iraq War consisted of numerous messages about Ir
stockpile of WMD, Saddam Hussein's support for terrorists, and the likelihood that
terrorists would use such weapons against the United States (Doob 1966; Speier 1969
Lasswell 1971; Kellner 2003; Altheide 2004; Kellner 2004). The PNAC and its affiliate
played a major role in leading the United States to war with Iraq as news sources, cabi
members, presidential advisers, journalists, and publishers. The propaganda campaig
was also aided by what was omitted from presentation to the public, and the way i
which information was managed.
The major theme of the "enemy as terrorist" pervaded news coverage. Administrati
news sources provided a compliant news media with ample material and conjecture
about the claims that linked Iraq and Hussein with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Terroris
became closely linked in news reports with the words "fear and victim" after 9/11/01 (A
heide forthcoming). Other work has shown that the meaning of terrorism changed fr
a method to a condition of the world (Altheide 2004). Prior to the invasion of Iraq, as well
as after the President triumphantly declared from the deck of an aircraft carrier that vic-
tory had been won, the Bush administration insisted that Hussein had supported the terrorists who attacked the United States, and had weapons of WMD that he planned to use.
Even though no one in the administration directly stated that Iraq was involved in the aircraft hijackings of 9/11, a report flourished that Iraqis had worked with the hijackers. The
innuendo, tone, and slant of numerous reports stressed this relationship before, during,
and after the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, it was not until October 2003 that President Bush
acknowledged that Hussein and Iraq were not involved in the 9/11 attacks, but even
then Vice President Cheney was reported to still believe that Hussein was implicated
(Krugman 2003:29).
The false claims about Iraq possessing and preparing to use WMD, as well as supporting the 9/11 attackers, were reiterated as part of the theme that Hussein and Iraq were very
dangerous even though key people in the Bush administration had stated prior to 9/11
that Iraq was not a major threat to the United States. Before 9/11 and prior to the U.S.
invasion of Iraq there were reports by governmental agencies that denied or cast serious
doubt on Iraq's possession of WMD (Editorial 2004). While some reports indicated that
Iraq have been motivated to develop such weapons, there was no evidence of their existence. These sources included the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Energy, the Defense Intelligence, the State
Department, and the Air Force, as well as key White House cabinet members and advisers.
In a press conference on February 4, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Sad-
dam Hussein "has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of
mass destruction" (Editorial 2004). National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stated in
a CNN interview on July 29, 2001:"let's remember that [Saddam's] country is divided, in
effect. He does not control the northern part of this country. We are able to keep arms
from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt .. ." (CNN 2001).
Nevertheless, over time, with much repetition, the theme about Iraq's dangerousness
remained viable even when evidence was produced that neither point was true. Even as
late as October 2004, President Bush continued to argue that Hussein could have been
dangerous if he had time to deliver WMD, and that the world was better off without him.
Public opinion polls continued to show that about half of the American people remained
concerned about Iraq's role in terrorist activities with the United States (Kull 2004). While
this may seem to be a hollow argument without the supporting evidence, nevertheless,
the discourse of fear carried the day: For many American citizens, the War in Iraq was still
a fight against the terrorists who had attacked the United States. Such views were supported by news reports that continued to use the word terrorism to describe the 9/11
hijackers, Saddam Hussein, and the diverse array of fighters in Iraq-the "insurgents." As
one undecided voter explained why he was leaning toward voting for President Bush,
"He's taking the fight to the terrorists .... I love my kids. I want my kids to be safe"
(KNXTV-ABC, October 13, 2004).

Our argument is that the lack of reporting about PNAC's success at planning the Iraq
War illustrates propaganda as a feature of institutionalized news sources and media

formats (Bennett forthcoming).These points are examined more below, but it must be
stressed that the news and editorial comments were well managed. While there were
detractors in editorial pages, the Internet, and of course, the foreign news media, the
major TV networks were tightly aligned with the war scenario. We wish to stress the crit-
ical contribution of news formats and the emerging common definition of the situation-that the nation had to act, that audiences supported action against enemies, and
that simplistic emotionally tinged messages would carry the day. Key to the Bush administration's success was journalists' penchant to get on the "war" band wagon, not only for
patriotic purposes, but also because that was what "people were interested in," and that is
"where the story was."
Most of the Gulf war coverage originated from the White House and the federal gov-
ernment. Journalists acknowledged that they did not cover many aspects of the
impending War with Iraq. A veteran producer for a major network TV news program
indicated that the story was about the preparation for war. In his words, things were
set in motion for over a year and the "rock was rolling down hill," that's where the
story was. (Interview notes)
That other network news producers must have surely agreed with this position is suggested by a dearth of network TV news coverage of virtually any congressional opposition
to the impending war. TV network viewers did not learn about Senator Robert Byrd's
impassioned speech on the floor of the Senate on February 12, 2003, just weeks before
Baghdad was bombed, in which he referred to the drastic changes in foreign policy. While
there was some discussion in newspaper editorial pages, Senator Byrd noted, there has
been little in the Senate:
We stand passively mute in the United States Senate, paralyzed by our own uncertainty, seemingly stunned by the sheer turmoil of events. ... This nation is about to
embark upon the first test of a revolutionary doctrine applied in an extraordinary way
at an unfortunate time. The doctrine of preemption-the idea that the United States
or any other nation can legitimately attack a nation that is not imminently threatening but may be threatening in the future-is a radical new twist on the traditional idea
of self defense. It appears to be in contravention of international law and the UN

Charter. (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 23, 2003:E2)
Network news shows were quite consistent with guests who supported the war. An analy-
sis by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) of network news interviewees one week
before and a week after Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations
about Iraq's alleged possession of WMD, found that two thirds of the guests were from the
United States, with 75 percent of these being current or former government or military
officials, while only one-Senator Kennedy-expressed skepticism or opposition to the

impending war with Iraq (FAIR 2003).
Journalists did not present this very important story for various reasons. Studies of
news rules and values support Robert Snow's (1983) observations that the news media,
like much of popular culture, tend to support and reflect "ideal norms," or preferred ways
of living, feeling, and behaving. Likewise, research on "news decision making" suggests
that commercial news organizations' tend to select items and events for news reporting
that can be told in narratives that express ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsi-
ble capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and

national leadership (Gans 1979; Wasburn 2002). In other words, reports are favored that
sustain news audiences' worldviews about social order and legitimacy. This includes the
conduct of their leaders. Thus, reports will be less favorable or "sensible" to audiences if
they suggest that the institution of government has failed, that the process of selecting
leaders is corrupt, and that decisions about life and death, such as declaring war, are made
with neither the national interest in mind, or with the well-being of citizens as a priority.
Network TV news relied on the administration for news (Cunningham 2003:24).

Still another factor was that critical reporting would not be popular with administra-
tion officials and the ever-dominant PNAC news sources, who were closely tied to the
Bush administration. One example was the snubbing of veteran United Press International (UPI) correspondent, Helen Thomas, whose critical reports resulted in President
Bush breaking decades of tradition by not permitting her to ask the first-or any-ques-
tion during a news conference (Baifang 2003). Bush administration officials had their
way with the major TV networks, offering their interpretations, plans, and rationales for
domestic and international policies that would follow. The FOX network was so closely
aligned with the Bush administration policies that its news readers openly avowed their
patriotism and support of the Iraq War. Its coverage reflected the bias. A study of public
opinion and knowledge by viewers of the major networks found that FOX viewers were
the least informed about basic facts of the Iraq War, including that world opinion tended
to not support the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Kull et al. 2002). Major network TV journalists,
wearing American flag pins in lapels, occasionally crying on camera, and offering constant moral support to an expanding network audience, offered very little perspective and
understanding of the infamous 9/11 events, seldom asked the most basic questions of
administration officials, who were pushing draconian legislation to limit civil rights
through Congress while military appropriations were increasing drastically in pursuit of
an emerging ambiguous war plan to attack Iraq. Clearly the pressure was on journalists to
conform and not rock the boat, to not challenge those who were protecting us against evil
and terror. CBS anchorman Dan Rather told a British journalist several months into the
war preparation to attack Iraq:
It is an obscene comparison ... but you know there was a time in South Africa that
people would put flaming tyres around people's necks if they dissented. And in some
ways the fear is that you will be necklaced here, you will have a flaming tyre of lack of
patriotism put around your neck," he said. "Now it is that fear that keeps journalists
from asking the toughest of the tough questions....

And one finds oneself saying: "I know the right question, but you know what? This
is not exactly the right time to ask it." ... And I am sorry to say that, up to and includ-
ing the moment of this interview, that overwhelmingly it has been accepted by the
American people. And the current administration revels in that, they relish that, and
they take refuge in that. (Engel 2002:4)
The hundreds of hours of combat visuals by heavily censored "embedded reporters" carried the war to a worldwide TV audience. Audiences enjoyed the visuals of combat in real
time, hearing interviews with soldiers riding in tanks, and seeing sand fly in the
background. Charles Davis, Director of the Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, stated that watching the war visuals in real time
from "embedded cameras" was like viewing it through a straw: A few specific snippets of
action, but no context or understanding of what was going on and how the limited view
was connected to a bigger picture. Davis argued that most of the journalistic interviewing
that occurred consisted of reporters talking with other reporters, "insiders talking to
insiders," but that is hardly the purpose of journalistic interviewing (Davis 2003).
Worldwide audiences saw different visuals of the results of combat. There were no
dead people in most American scenes, but mainly tanks and other equipment racing
across the Iraqi plains. Indeed, American audiences were not permitted to view dead
American soldiers' at Dover Air Force base in order to "respect the soldiers and their fam-
ilies." Much of the world turned to the Arab Al Jazeera network and its Web site, where
they saw images of war that were not presented to American audiences: dead bodies,
smoldering buildings, burned and mutilated children, grieving parents, and angry civilians. U.S. citizens saw very little of this, except for those who checked alternative Internet
Web sites. Opinion in the Muslim world was markedly anti-American, with sizable proportions of the populations of Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, and even pro-U.S. Turkey, stat-
ing that suicide bombings are justified in order to throw out the Americans, who are
perceived by many Muslims as trying to control oil (Pew Research Center 2004).
War Programming suggests that focus on the justification for war, and the conduct of
the war itself-as presented through embedded reporters' visuals and commentswould dominate most of the coverage. Critical thinking and analysis by journalists did
not find its way to most American audiences until later in the War Program, when the
President, clad in aviator attire, announced the victory on an aircraft carrier. More atten-
tion shifted to the major claims about Iraq's support of the 9/11 attacks and the elusive
WMD. News coverage of the occupation of Iraq included visuals of Iraqis rioting, resisting U.S. rule, and a collapsed infrastructure that was difficult to get running again so that
the new regime could govern. The stronger criticism, associated with stages 4 and 5, had
begun. Thus, criticism is included within the overall discourse of War Programming; it
has a place, but not larger than is warranted by a script that has emerged through numer-
ous interactions between journalists and politicians over several wars.

The coverage of the war was clearly influenced by such pressure, along with the avail-
ability of "visuals" that permitted "live" shots of advancing tanks, marines, gunfire, and
explosions. Other journalists covering the Iraq war reported censorship and intimidation.
The Iraq War, like Grenada, Panama, and the first Gulf War, was very oriented to news
management. The management of the Coalition Media Center at the Saliyah military base
in Doha, Qatar, which "handled" the press requests and assigned the more than 500
"embedded journalists" who rotated through various units, kept a tight grip on informa-
tion and questioning decorum by journalists. Massing (2003) suggests that veterans of
this campaign likened the information control to the infamous "Five O'Clock Follies" of
the Vietnam War, a briefing scenario that became a ludicrous joke by all respected journalists covering that war. The information control extended to news organizations as well.
THE PROPAGANDA SAGA
The most important think tank for directing changes in U.S. foreign policy that led to th
Iraq War received very little news coverage. The PNAC documents and plans to topp
Iraq were known about but were not widely covered by the major news media for t
decade preceding the Iraq invasion, nor were they covered by network TV in the mont
preceding the Iraq War (see Table 1). Publicizing these materials for the American peo
may have made a difference in public support for the Iraq War and an emerging forei
policy that included "preemptive strikes" and bypassing the UN and international agr
ments about aggression. A revealing magazine article (Armstrong 2002) was read into t
Congressional Record on October 8, 2002, as part of the Spratt-Moran resolution to su
port UN guidelines, some six months before the "official" bombing began. Yet, not a sing
TABLE 1. A Partial Chronology of News Reports about the Project for a New American Centu
and Plans to Invade Iraq
Date Chronology of press reports about the PNAC

January 26, 1998 NPR, All Things Considered
August 4, 2001 NPR, Weekend Edition Saturday
August 11, 2001 NYT, (Jane Perlez) Bombing Iraq and mission change
August 21, 2001 WPOST, (Thomas Ricks) Empire or Not: A Quiet Debate Over U.S. Role
September 10, 2001 NPR, Talk of the Nation
September 23, 2001 NBC, Meet the Press (Powell) PNAC letter to President mentioned
December 3,2001 NYT, excerpts from 1998 PNAC letter to Clinton
December 9,2001 NYT, article about PNAC position

September 10, 2002 NPR, Talk of the Nation
October, 2002 Harper's Magazine, David Armstrong, "Dick Cheney's Song of America"
January 12, 2003 LA Times, Chalmers Johnson, about Rumsfeld and urge to attack Iraq
February 1, 2003 NYT, Todd Purdum, the "brains" behind Bush's foreign policy (on same
day Bush says that he no longer supports containment)
March 4, 2003 Soviet journalist, monitored by BBC

March 5, 2003 ABC Nightline
March 11, 2003 NYT, David Carr, article about PNAC and Kristol's Weekly Standard
influence on Bush and foreign policy
March 16, 2003 CBS Sunday Morning

March 16, 2003 Guardian Newspaper (others, Toronto)
March 20, 2003 War with Iraq begins
March 23, 2003 NBC, Meet the Press (Rumsfeld)
March 23, 2003 LA Times, Gary Schmidt PNAC writes article

March 23, 2003 NYT, Steven R. Weisman, article about history of PNAC influence
April 6, 2003 Chicago Sun-Times (Lynn Sweet) refers to Wolfowitz denial (see Senate
meeting)
April 21, 2003 NPR, Talk of the Nation

May 9, 2003 NPR, All Things Considered
June 5, 2003 NPR, All Things Considered
regular evening network newscast mentioned this think tank prior to the start of the
war, even though PNAC was well known around Washington, D.C. Indeed, Robert
McGovern, a veteran CIA analyst of 27 years, who represented a group of former
intelligence officers (Veteran Intelligence Officers for Sanity-VIPS) noted that Hitler's
hegemonic horrors were set forth in his book, Mein Kampf. McGovern told CNN's
Jonathan Mann that the PNAC provided Bush's imperialistic game plan:
Well, all you need do is look at "Mein Kampf." The U.S. "Mein Kampf". You probably
remember that "Mein Kampf" laid down the framework for Hitler's campaigns and
for his strategy. Well, there's a "Mein Kampf" for the U.S. scene, and it's called the
"Project for a New American Century". Download it from its Web site and you'll see
the documents going back to 1992, which outline everything that is intended by this
crew that's running Iraqi policy. (Mann and Rodgers 2003)

Indeed, two prominent members of the Bush administration, Paul H. O'Neil and Richard
A. Clarke, claimed that war with Iraq was a foregone conclusion. The Bush administra-
tion's willingness to carry out the PNAC commitment to attack Iraq without further
provocation was made clear several months after the war began. Paul H. O'Neil, longtime
Republican stalwart and President Bush's former Treasury Secretary, stated in an interview on CBS's 60 Minutes:
From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go. (New York Times, January 12, 2004, A11)
There was an important context for defining this situation as war worthy and consistent
with War Programming. The PNAC members, who were now part of the Bush administration, set terrorism within a broader discourse of fear, or the pervasive communication,
symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of everyday
life. A British journalist, John Pilger, documented an early discussion about using the
9/11 attacks as a pretext for invading Iraq:
On the morning of September 12, 2001, without any evidence of who the
hijackers were, Rumsfeld demanded that the U.S. attack Iraq. According to Woodward, Rumsfeld told a cabinet meeting that Iraq should be "a principal target of the
first round in the war against terrorism." Iraq was temporarily spared only because
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell persuaded Bush that "public opinion has to bepre-
pared before a move against Iraq is possible. .. ." (Pilger 2002) (Our emphasis)
According to Pilger, several advisers in the administration-including those who were

associated with PNAC-had been seeking a catastrophic event, a new"Pearl Harbor," that
could be used as a catalyst to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy: The attacks of September 11, 2001, provided the "new Pearl Harbor," described as "the opportunity of ages"
(Pilger 2002). The next 18 months were spent preparing public opinion for the invasion
of Iraq on March 20, 2003. This preparation included the freedom to define and use
terrorism in a very broad and general way.
The PNAC received very little news media coverage prior to the invasion of Iraq even
though it was part of the "public record" in government documents, and had been briefly
mentioned in several newspaper and radio reports in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Only a
few newspaper articles dealt with PNAC six months before the United States attacked Iraq
on March 20. No reports appeared on the major TV networks' regular evening newscast
during this time, although Nightline did examine the "conspiracy claims" and interviewed William Kristol on March 5. Reporter Ted Koppel dismissed the conspiratorial
charges by several foreign newspapers:
They did what former government officials and politicians frequently do when
they're out of power, they began formulating a strategy, in this case, a foreign policy
strategy, that might bring influence to bear on the Administration then in power,
headed by President Clinton. Or failing that, on a new Administration that might

someday come to power. They were pushing for the elimination of Saddam Hussein.
And proposing the establishment of a strong U.S. military presence in the Persian
Gulf, linked to a willingness to use force to protect vital American interests in the
Gulf.... Hardly a conspiracy, the proposal was out there for anyone to see. But certainly an interesting case study of how columnists, commentators, and think-tank
intellectuals can, with time and the election of a sympathetic president, change the
course of American foreign policy. (ABC News 2003)
Both newspaper and electronic media paid more attention to the PNAC and its role in
shaping the Bush foreign policy after the war began (see Table 1). This was particularly
true of the foreign press, which tended to be far more critical of the PNAC and American
foreign policy. This is partly because of the fact that the United States is the most covered
country in the world (Wu 2000).

The major news agencies in the United States, and particularly the TV networks, lim-
ited their coverage of the role the PNAC played in shaping the Iraq War. These propaganda efforts occurred as the various PNAC members served as routine news sources,
primarily in TV network news accounts oriented to infotainment. News organizations
editorialize explicitly and implicitly through their use of news sources for certain issues
(Epstein 1973; Ericson et al. 1987; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1991; Chermak 1995; Baer
and Chambliss 1997; Bailey and Hale 1998; Surette 1998; Westfeldt 1998).
Our analysis of Iraq War coverage by the New York Times and other news organs
revealed that several individuals were closely associated with PNAC over the last decade:
Thomas Donnelly, Andrew Bacevich, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Marc Gerecht, Gary
Schmitt, and Robert Kagan. Other individuals, for example, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald
Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney, were heavily involved with supporting ("Pro") PNAC, but
they and other PNAC supporters who were in the Bush administrations were not
included in this analysis. We compared the coverage they received in the New York Times
as news sources six months before and after 9/11. We did the same with four individuals
that our review of news reports identified as critics ("Anti") of the PNAC proposal and
plans to invade Iraq.
The results are very clear. The pro-PNAC sources were used 72 times before 9/11 and
133 times within six months after 9/11, an increase of 85 percent. Only five references
appear for the anti-PNAC sources (four refer to Joseph Nye), and eight appear after 9/11
(seven refer to Joseph Nye). The PNAC sources were used quite often by the New York
Times prior to 9/11. This is particularly noteworthy for William Kristol (N = 42), former
chief of staff for Vice President Dan Quayle and publisher of the very conservative the
Weekly Standard, and Richard Perle (N = 21), former Assistant Secretary of Defense and
member of the Defense Policy Board that advises Donald Rumsfeld. These are prominent
Washington sources that are called upon to discuss a range of foreign and domestic policy
issues (Carr 2003). We turn to an overview of how public opinion is influenced by news
reports.
MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion surveys provide one way to assess how public support could be influenc
by information about Iraq. Several opinion polls tracked public perceptions of admini
tration claims, especially after the invasion of Iraq. The results suggest that when the pu
lic has more information about critical issues, they are less supportive, and moreover
actually prefer, when asked, for more information from the administration. On Apr
2003, 58 percent of those polled were "somewhat or very concerned that U.S. troops h
not yet found any weapons of mass destruction." Two months later (June) the Harris P
reported that, while the majority of Americans continued to believe that Iraq had WM
40 percent also believed that the "U.S. government deliberately exaggerated the reports
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in order to increase support for war."
The doubts about the Bush administration's justification for the war with Iraq hav
gradually increased over time, as more press information has been forthcoming about
elusive WMD as well as much stronger evidence that Hussein was not directly involve
with those who drove planes into U.S. buildings on 9/11/01. The strongest data for t
chipping away of credibility are provided by a Newsweek report in October 2003 on
gradual, but consistent erosion of support by a public that is better informed abou
the information management of the war. Citizens were asked the following questio
"Before the Iraq War, the Bush Administration said it had intelligence reports indicat
that Iraq was hiding banned chemical or biological weapons from United Nations weap
ons inspectors. So far, however, no such banned weapons have been found in Iraq. Do y
think the Bush Administration misinterpreted or misanalyzed the intelligence report
they said indicated Iraq had banned weapons?" (see Table 2).
More recent data indicate an even stronger erosion of public faith in the government'
truthfulness regarding Iraq and its alleged WMD. A comparison of Harris Poll surve
TABLE 2. Newsweek Survey Report in October 2003
Date Yes (%) No (%) Do not know (%)

5/29-30/03
36
54
10
7/10-11/03
45
41
14
7/24-25/03
41
49
10
8/21-22/03
10/9-10/03
10/23-24/03
634
The
44
49
50
47
39
12
39
11
Sociological
Quar
data conducted in June 2003 and September 2004 reveal an exact reversal of public opinion: In June 2003, 55 percent of those polled believed that "what we were told by the gov-
ernment before the Iraq war about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's links to
Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization, was generally accurate," while only 36 percent
believed the government to have been misleading. When the same question was posed in
September 2004, only 36 percent of those polled believed that our government had
provided accurate information, and 55 percent reported that the government had been
misleading.
Polls conducted by CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Pew Research Center, and the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) reveal similar results. In surveys
conducted in March 2003, the month when the United States waged war against Iraq, the
number of people who believed that Iraq was worth going to war over, or that the United
States made the right decision by invading Iraq, were 68 percent and 71 percent, respec-
tively. A Newsweek poll conducted in July 2003 revealed that at that time, 68 percent
believed that taking military action against Iraq was the right thing to do. In September
2004, those numbers decreased to 49 percent, 53 percent, and 55 percent, respectively.
REFLECTIONS ON PROPAGANDA
News coverage of the Iraq War, and particularly the PNAC, reflects how the nature an
timing of journalistic critique and alternative interpretations of official directives lag
behind critical events, but eventually appears as though it is part of a narrative script f
War Programming. The organizational and format limitations of War Programming mis
directed journalists from major topics. Moreover, as War Programming suggests, news
organizations began to reflect on "what went wrong" in their coverage of Iraq, includin
missing the PNAC influence. One observer noted:

Surely it is now time for a fundamental reappraisal of the way the press operated.
Because, like it or not, the media were co-conspirators in America's rush into this ille
gal war. How badly we needed-before the war-solid reporting that explained how
a kitchen cabinet of neoconservatives and their bellicose friends were cooking up a
war that has brought so much bloodshed to Iraq and danger to the world. (Columbia
Journalism Review Staff 2004:46-47)
The New York Times also acknowledged their systematic oversight and reliance on offic
news sources:
Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-exam

new evidence emerged or failed to emerge. The Times also said it
containing alarming claims about Iraq more prominently than f
countered those claims. Many of the stories used information fr
critics of Saddam Hussein. ... (AP in The Arizona Republic, May
Consistent with War Programming, other journalists joined in re

coverage of the Iraq War.
In the rush to war, how manyAmericans even heard about some
[the numerous problems that would follow the war, e.g., interim
The Sociological Quarterly 46 (2005) 617-643 ? 2005 Midwest Socio
and water resources, Halliburton's contract that basically gave it control over the oil]?
Of the 574 stories about Iraq that aired on NBC, ABC, and CBS evening news broadcasts between September 12 (when Bush addressed the UN) and March 7 (a week and
a half before the war began), only twelve dealt primarily with the potential
aftermath.... (Cunningham 2003:24)
CONCLUSION
The planning and selling of the War with Iraq was a successful propaganda campaign.
We have argued that the PNAC as a think tank and as a source of administration
appointees was a significant news sources in defining the situation for the American
public. The American people were not aware of the story behind this push. The War
story was told, but the PNAC story was not told. The dominant discourse and thematic
emphasis was that Hussein was evil, he was involved in the 9/11 attacks that killed U.S.
citizens, that he supported terrorism, and planned to use WMD or give them to terrorists. Thus, there was a clear sense of urgency to intervene. The major news media pre-
sented virtually no strong disclaimers to this scenario; notwithstanding an occasional
voice asking for patience and more information (e.g., Senators Byrd and Kennedy), al
meaningful opposition to these claims was buried within the discursive framework of
the War Program.
Our analysis of the coverage of the Iraq War, and the specific construction of the
PNAC, is consistent with the conceptual framework of War Programming. The news
media did not present much information about the PNAC for several reasons. Organization and planning were very important factors. News agencies, like the military and other
large organizations, must plan ahead. News media plan future coverage with broadly
defined "themes" or "story lines" in order to anticipate staffing and logistical needs. Even
though satellite technology makes "global coverage" more manageable, there are never-
theless complex logistics involved in covering a war halfway around the world. There is
always a "game plan" for future news coverage, although events may alter the plan, for
example, a catastrophe. Moreover, a news organization's planning often follows that of
the relevant organization that will be involved in upcoming and anticipated events. Mili-
tary planning is the key for the conduct of war, but so too is media planning to cover that
war. It is hardly surprising, then, that the news media tend to follow the military's lead in
planning.
Analysis of numerous news reports suggests that key themes dominated much of the
news coverage. The coverage of the Iraq war was shaped by themes of (1) victims and suf-
fering (including heroism and compensation), (2) retaliation, (3) the war on terrorism,
(4) fear, (5) homeland security, (6) surveillance, and (7) the conduct and preparation for
the wars with Afghanistan and Iraq (Altheide 2004). These "forward looking" themes
were future- and action-oriented (except for the constant retrospective about victims of
9/11). The news coverage was presented as a series of unfolding plans and events that
often included scripted language to prepare audiences for future news, for example,
anticipating that the UN and all allies may not support U.S. efforts; laying the foundation
for preemptive strikes as a way to "defend ourselves," and attacking Iraq to prevent it from
harming the United States with alleged WMD.

We have stressed that serious problems with administration claims about WMD were
known about well in advance of March 20, 2003, but these received very little attention
because the story was about the coming war, which was the mantra of organizationally
endowed legitimate claims makers. As expected with the War Programming conception
of war news discourse, criticism and reflection are expected to follow major military
action. This did occur. After the war began, it became more appropriate to raise the trou-
bling, factual questions about PNAC's planning, along with other issues, but these were
largely echoes from foreign publications and did not receive a lot of attention.
The mass media play an integral part in the support of war. The mass media did not
start the war with Iraq, but they shaped the context, the audience expectations, the dis-
course, and the production of symbolic meanings. We live in a postjournalism era, when
there is no longer separation between event makers, event promoters, and event chroniclers (Altheide and Snow 1991). All rely on media logic and the sense about what will look
good to relevant audiences, how to promote appropriate meanings, and above all, how to
market and sell it all as something desirable. We have seen that War Programming is now
a package; propaganda is joined to the news process when journalists and news sources
operate with media logic, share in the construction and emotional performance of events,
and limit the public forums for discussion, especially dissent. Opinion poll data show
how public perceptions are informed by news reports. Public support of the Iraq War and
trust in the Bush administration followed the more critical news reports; as more infor-
mation about the PNAC and the elusive WMD became available, public approval for the
war declined, as did trust in President Bush (Morin and Wilbank 2004). Indeed, another
news theme emerged of "troublesome WMDs," which in turn prompted pursuit of

critical stories consistent with this theme. This change is consistent with Step 5 in War
Programming.
Research and sociological theory suggests that War Programming will continue
unless we break format or revise our methods and media for defining, selecting, organizing, and presenting information. This can occur, but not easily. First, we must revise our
understanding of propaganda and the role communication plays in setting the stage for
conflict, carrying out the conflict, and making that conflict meaningful. Second, it must
be recognized that the way in which modern wars have been covered is quite predictable,
and now is part of the planning for the conduct of war. PNAC claims makers knew that
reframing policy could be easily connected with the tragedy of 9/11 and that messages and
meanings could be easily shaped with exhaustive media support, particularly TV visuals.
Third, social scientists must work with journalists to provide theoretical understand-
ings about how news practices are reflexive of power and War Programming. We have
presented a picture of communication control. This will not be corrected by changing
individual reporters, passing new codes of ethics, or revising journalism curriculum. War
Programming is not unlike other mass media scripts, for example, crime reporting (Baer
and Chambliss 1997; Surette 1998; Westfeldt and Wicker 1998), and frames for present-
ing social reality. These problems are features of an ecology of communication, or the
structure, organization and accessibility of information technology, various forums,

media, and channels of information (Altheide 1995). This approach to news and public
information has emerged from information technology, cultural context, and communication formats.
One option is to retreat from the position that the news media can be reformed in
ways that will eliminate War Programming. A fourth step in breaking format, then, is
to remove it and replace it with an alternative model, which, in time, may also have to
be replaced or substituted for alternative media, including the Internet and more accessible outlets, albeit perhaps less reliable. It is time to consider advocating partisan news
media and programs that take political and social positions on the big questions of the
day. War Programming reflects the co-optation of news organs avowedly "objective"
and impartial, but as we have seen repeatedly, the actual practice of news work and
reporting sustains powerful institutional actors like the PNAC and other key claims
makers. A dominant discourse, War Programming, emerged and now, essentially,

guides journalistic coverage of war in the United States. It was because of the success of
this discourse that it failed so miserably to provide the important context, and particularly clear statements about the think tank that pushed for war so strongly, altered U.S.
foreign policy, and challenged basic civil liberties. These were not relevant, until later,
after commencement of the war, and then they would be taken up, on schedule, as part
of War Programming.
This article must become what it is not: This article falls into Step 5 of War Program-
ming (studies and critiques about the media coverage); if our argument remains in this
framework, our reflections will simply reify the conceptual model that we have described.
Media framing and formats must change if future wars, aided by propaganda, are to be
avoided: Journalists cannot wait for events to occur before trying to cover and analyze or
critique them, because the news process (e.g., creating news sources, creating, and developing visuals, etc.) will have taken place, and the script written for the social construction
of another episode of War Programming. This article is one small step toward creating an
alternative news discourse.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
A draft of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Socio
Association, August 14-17, 2004, San Francisco, CA. We acknowledge the helpful s
tions from the editor and reviewers.
REFERENCES
ABC News. 2003. "Nightline: The Plan." March 5, 2003.
Adams, William C. 1981. Television Coverage of the Middle East. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
. 1982. Television Coverage of International Affairs. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Alali, A. Odasuo and Gary W. Byrd. 1994. Terrorism and the News Media: A Selected, Annotated
Bibliography. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Aldridge, Meryl and Nicholas Hewitt, eds. 1994. Controlling Broadcasting: Access Policy and
Practice in North America and Europe. Manchester, England: Manchester University

Press.
Altheide, David. forthcoming. "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear." Cultural Studies -4 Critical
Methodologies.
Altheide, David L. 1987. "Ethnographic Content Analysis." Qualitative Sociology 10: 1065-77.
1. 1995. An Ecology of Communication: Cultural Formats of Control. Hawthorne, New York:
Aldine de Gruyter.
. 1996. Qualitative Media Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
. 1997. "The News Media, The Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear." Sociological
Quarterly 38: 646-68.
. 1999. "The Military-Media Complex." Newsletter of the Sociology of Culture 13: 1ff.
. 2002a. Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
. 2002b. "Tracking Discourse." Pp. 172-86 in Culture in Mind, edited by K. A. Cerulo. New
York: Routledge.
- . 2003. "The Mass Media as a Social Institution." Pp. 657-84 in Handbook of Symbolic
Interactionism, edited by T. Larry and N. J. Herman Reynolds. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira
Press.
-. 2004. "Consuming Terrorism." Symbolic Interaction 27: 289-308.

Altheide, David L. and Robert P. Snow. 1991. Media Worlds in the Postjournalism Era. Hawthorne,
NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Armstrong, David. 2002. "Dick Cheney's Song of America: Drafting a Plan for Global Dominance."
Harper's Magazine October: 76-83.

Bacevich, A. J. 2002. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baer, Justin and William J. Chambliss. 1997. "Generating Fear: The Politics of Crime Reporting."
Crime, Law and Social Change 27: 87-107.
Baifang, Liu. 2003. "Civil Liberties, Dissing Dissent: In White House Actions, a Troubling Echo of
Life in Communist China." Los Angeles Times. October 26, p. M6.
Bailey, Frankie Y. and Donna C. Hale. 1998. Popular Culture, Crime, and Justice. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Barber, Benjamin R. 2003. Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy. New York: W. W.
Norton.
Barson, Michael and Steven Heller. 2001. Red Scared! The Commie Menace in Propaganda and Popular Culture. San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books.
BBC. 2004. "Iraq Death Toll'Soared Post-War'." BBC Newscast, October 29, 2004.
Bennett, W. Lance. 1988. News: The Politics ofIllusion. New York: Longman.
-. Forthcoming. "News as Reality TV: Election Coverage and the Democratization of Truth."
Critical Studies in Media Communication.
Berliner, D. C. and B. J. Biddle. 1995. The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, and the Attack on
America's Public Schools. New York: Addison-Wesley.
Best, Joel. 1990. Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern About Child-Victims. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
-. 1999. Random Violence: How We Talk about New Crimes and New Victims. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Best, Joel, ed. 1995. Images oflssues. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Carr, David. 2003. "White House Listens When Weekly Speaks." The New York Times, March 11,
p. El.
Chermak, Steven. 1995. Victims in the News: Crime and the American News Media. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Chiricos, Ted, Kathy Padgett, and Marc Gertz. 2000. "Fear, TV News, and the Reality of Crime."
Criminology 38: 755-85.
CNN. 2001. "CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer." July 29, 2001.
Columbia Journalism Review Staff. 2004. "Brits vs Yanks: Who Does Journalism Right." Columbia
Journalism Review May/June: 44-9.
Comstock, George A. 1991. Television in America. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage.

Comstock, George A. and Erica Scharrer. 1999. Television: What's On, Who's Watching, and What It
Means. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Cooney, Daniel and Omar Sinan. 2004. "More than 5,500 Iraqis Killed during 1 Year." The Arizona
Republic, May 24, p. A4.
Covington, Sally. 1998. "How Conservative Philanthropies and Think Tanks Transform US Policy."
CovertAction Quarterly. http://mediafilter.org/CAQ/caq63/caq63thinktank.html
Cunningham, Brent. 2003. "Re-Thinking Objectivity." Columbia Journalism Review July/August:

24-32.
Davis, Charles. 2003, February 5. "Duct Tape, Plastic, and Bio-Terrorism: What Reporters Don't
Ask about Can Kill All of Us." In University of Missouri Symposium: Understanding Crises: Media
Coverage and Statistics on War and Terror, University of Missouri.
Der Derian, James. 2002. "The War of Networks." Theory and Event 5:4. http://muse.jhu.edu/
journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html
van Dijk, Teun A. 1988. News as Discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.
Doob, Leonard. 1966. Public Opinion and Propaganda. Hamdon, CT: Archon Books.
Douglas, Jack D. 1970. Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings. New
York: Basic Books.
Doyle, Aaron. 2001."How Television Influences Social Institutions: The Case of Policing and Criminal Justice." Ph.D. dissertation Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, Van-
couver, Canada.
Edelman, Murray J. 1985. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Editorial. 2004. "Spread the War Blame: The CIA Made Some Big Mistakes about Iraq, but It
Should Not Be Made a Scapegoat for the Invasion." The Atlanta Journal Constitution, July 14,
p. 10A.
Ellenius, Allan and European Science Foundation. 1998. Iconography, Propaganda, and Legitimation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Engel, Matthew. 2002. "War on Afghanistan: American Media Cowed by Patriotic Fever, Says
Network News Veteran." The Guardian, May 17, p. 4.
Epstein, Edward J. 1973. News from Nowhere. New York: Random House.
Ericson, Richard V., Patricia M. Baranek, and Janet B. L. Chan. 1991. Representing Order: Crime,
Law and Justice in the News Media. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Ericson, Richard Victor, Patricia M. Baranek, and Janet B. L. Chan. 1987. Visualizing Deviance: A
Study of News Organization. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). 2003, March 18. "In Iraq Crisis, Networks are Megaphones for Official Views." http://www.fair.org/reports/iraq-sources.html
Fowler, Roger. 1991. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the British Press. London:
Routledge.
Gans, Herbert J. 1979. Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News,
Newsweek, and Time. New York: Pantheon Books.
Gerth, Hans H. 1992. "Crisis Management of Social Structures: Planning, Propaganda and Societal
Morale." International Journal ofPolitics, Culture and Society 5: 337-59.
Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L. Strauss. 1967. Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Quali-
tative Research. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Graber, Doris S. 1984. Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide. New York: Longmans.
Grimshaw, Allen Day and Peter J. Burke. 1994. What's Going on Here? Compl
Professional Talk. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Grossberg, Lawrence, Ellen Wartella, and D. Charles Whitney. 1998. Mediamak
a Popular Culture. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Grossman, Lawrence K. 1997. "Why Local TV News Is so Awful." Columbia Jour

Dec: 21.
Haas, Eric, Alex Molnar, and Rafael Serrano. 2002. "Media Impact of Think Tank Education Publi-
cations." 2001 Research Report, Education Policy Research Unit, Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ.
Hall, Peter. 1988. "Asymmetry, Information Control, and Information Technology." Pp. 341-56
in Communication and Social Structure, edited by D. Maines and C. J. Couch. Springfield, IL:
Thomas.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 2002. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of
the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Hertog, James K. and David P. Fan. 1995. "The Impact of Press Coverage on Social Beliefs: The Case
of HIV Transmission." Communication Research 22: 545-77.
Hertsgaard, Mark. 1988. On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency. New York: Farrar
Straus Giroux.
Hunt, Darnell M. 1999. O.J. Simpson Facts and Fictions: News Rituals in the Construction of Reality.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Iyengar, Shanto and Donald M. Kinder. 1987. News that Matters. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Jackall, Robert, ed. 1994. Propaganda. New York: New York University Press.
Jackall, Robert and Janice M. Hirota. 1999. Experts with Symbols: Advertising, Public Relations, and
the Ethics ofAdvocacy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

Johnson, Chalmers A. 2004. The Sorrows ofEmpire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic.
New York: Metropolitan Books.

Kagan, Robert. 2003. OfParadise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. NewYork:
Knopf.
Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. 2000. Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American
Foreign and Defense Policy. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books.
Kaplan, Robert D. 2003. "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World." The Atlantic
July/August: 66-90.
Kellner, Douglas. 1992. The Persian Gulf TV War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
-. 2003. From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
-. 2004. "Media Propaganda and Spectacle in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting
Networks." Cultural Studies +- Critical Methodologies 4: 3329-38.
Krugman, Paul. 2003. "Who's Accountable?" The New York Times. http://www.bintjbeil.com/
articles/2003/en/0610_krugman.html
Kull, Steven. 2004. "U.S. Public Beliefs and Attitudes about Iraq August 20, 2004." Program on
International Policy Attitudes. http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Report08_20_04.pdf
Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsey, and Evan Lewis. 2002. "Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War."
Political Science Quarterly 118: 569-98.
Lasswell, Harold Dwight. 1971. Propaganda Technique in World War I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lasswell, Harold Dwight, Hans Speier, and Daniel Lerner. 1979. Propaganda and Communication
in World History. Honolulu, HI: Published for the East-West Center by the University Press of
Hawaii.
Lippman, Walter. 1925. The Phantom Public. London: Macmillan.

Lowry, Brian. 1998. "Brave New World for Iraq Coverage, Television: There Are Now Three All-
News Cable Channels, Creating a Difficult Environment for Network News Operations." Los
Angeles Times, December 19, p. Calendar (F) 1.
MacArthur, John R. 2003. "The Lies We Bought: The Unchallenged 'Evidence' for War." Columbia
Journalism Review May/June: 62-3.
Mann, Jonathan and Walter Rodgers. 2003, June 3. "A Look at the Failure to Find Any Weapons of
Mass Destruction in Iraq." Insight: CNN.

Mann, Michael. 2003. Incoherent Empire. New York: Verso.
Margolis, Howard. 1996. Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmen-
tal Issues. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Massing, Michael. 2003. "The Unseen War." The New York Review, May 29, pp. 16-9.
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2000. "Challenging Global Warming as a Social Problem:
An Analysis of the Conservative Movement's Counter-Claims." Social Problems 47: 4499-522.
- . 2003. "Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy." Social Problems 50: 348-73.
Morin, Richard and Dana Wilbank. 2004. "Most Think Truth Was Stretched to Justify Iraq War."
Washington Post, February 13, p. A01.
Perkovich, George. 2003, March/April. "Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation." Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301facomment10334/george-
perkovich/bush-s-nuclear-revolution-a-regime-change-in-nonproliferation.html
Pew Research Center. 2004. "A Year after Iraq War Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher,
Muslim Anger Persists." The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=206
Pilger, John. 2002. "Axis of Evil; John Pilger Exposes the Frightening Agenda in Washington that Is
Behind the United States Threat to World Peace." Morning Star, December 14, p. 19.
Shapiro, Michael J. 1992. Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 1997. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis, MN: University of

Minnesota Press.
Shaw, D. L. and M. E. McCombs. 1977. The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press. St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing.
Smith, James Allen. 1991. The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite. New
York: Free Press.
Snow, Robert P. 1983. Creating Media Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Spector, Malcolm and John I. Kitsuse. 1987. Constructing Social Problems. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Speier, Hans. 1969. Social Order and the Risks of War: Papers in Political Sociology. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Stone, Diane and Andrew Denham. 2004. Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of
Ideas. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
Surette, Ray. 1998. Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities. Belmont, CA: West/
Wadsworth.
Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. Making News. New York: Free Press.
Tyndall, Andrew. 2003. "The War on Terrorism." Journalism.org. http://www.journalism.org/

resources/research/reports/landscape/default.asp
Vogel, Steven. 1998. "Military Trains a Special Corps of Public Relations Troops: 3,500 Journalists a
Year Are Schooled at Brand-New Center at Fort Meade." Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October
25, p. 6.
Wasburn, Philo C. 2002. The Social Construction of International News: We're Talking about Them,
They're Talking about Us. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Weiler, M. and W. B. Pearce. 1992. Reagan and Public Discourse in America. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Westfeldt, Wallace and Tom Wicker. 1998. Indictment: The News Media and the Criminal Justice
System. Nashville: First Amendment Center.
Wu, Denis H. 2000. "Systematic Determinants of International News Coverage: A Comparison of

38 Countries." Journal of Communication 50: 110-30.
Wuthnow, Robert, ed. 1992. Vocabularies of Public Life: Empirical Essays in Symbolic Structure. New
York: Routledge.
Yousef, Nancy A. 2004. "U.S. Kills More Iraqis than Rebel Forces Are." The Arizona Republic, September 25, p. A26.
Zhondang, P. and G. Kosicki. 1993. "Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse." Political
Communication 10: 55-69.

War Programming - The Propaganda Project and The Iraq War Author(s) - David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

War Programming - The Propaganda Project and The Iraq War Author(s) - David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War

Author(s): David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes

The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253

WAR PROGRAMMING: The Propaganda

a theoretical argument for analyzing modern propaganda campaigns as a feature of mass-mediated

can be accomplished by theorizing as praxis, or stating, by drawing on previous experi-

declared, "Mission accomplished," a large percentage of the American people continued

describing the role of the PNAC in shaping news and policy.

propaganda in a mass-mediated age that has produced War Programming. We conclude

NEWS AND PROPAGANDA

American public. Public understanding of issues, particularly those involving no

symbolic representations of problems and issues:

nation is unreasonable and unfair. (Wasburn 2002:125)

harbored terrorists. Implementing these programs involved invading Afghanistan and

encompassed fear, consumption, and international intervention (Kellner 2004). The

entertaining reports to audiences. Specifically: (1) fear supported consumption as a

THE NEWS MEDIA CONTEXT FOR PROPAGANDA

of combat, and treating former military personnel as journalists, the relationship

news organizations in sharing personnel (generals and other military spokespersons

Programming (Altheide 1995; Bennett forthcoming). Few critiques are presented un

mational and emotional context for relating to it is historically embedded in previo

4. Following the war, journalists' reaction and reflection on various governmental

5. Journalists' and academics' diaries, biographies, exposes, critiques, and studies

7. For the next war, return to Step 1.

Bush's dramatic photo op landing on an aircraft carrier-"major combat operations in

THINK TANKS AND PROPAGANDA

promoting social policy options by conducting research, holding conferences, publishin

THE PROJECT FOR A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

absolutely powerful. (Armstrong 2002:76)

the United States." (Armstrong 2002:78)

METHODS AND MATERIALS

analysis technique (also referred to as ethnographic content analysis) that applies an

through computer technology, for example, Lexis/Nexis. As previous publications d

interactively-moving from one point in a document to a related point in another d

approach blends interpretive, ethnographic, and ethnomethodological approaches

media logic, particularly studies of news organizational culture, information techno

and communication formats. The capacity to examine numerous documents

documents, applying natural experimental research designs to the materials, as w

nology permits immediate access to an enormous amount of material, comparative

THE PROPAGANDA WAR

members, presidential advisers, journalists, and publishers. The propaganda campaig

(KNXTV-ABC, October 13, 2004).

War illustrates propaganda as a feature of institutionalized news sources and media

of self defense. It appears to be in contravention of international law and the UN

officials, while only one-Senator Kennedy-expressed skepticism or opposition to the

ble capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and

Network TV news relied on the administration for news (Cunningham 2003:24).

from asking the toughest of the tough questions....

ous interactions between journalists and politicians over several wars.

Congressional Record on October 8, 2002, as part of the Spratt-Moran resolution to su

and Plans to Invade Iraq

Date Chronology of press reports about the PNAC

December 3,2001 NYT, excerpts from 1998 PNAC letter to Clinton

December 9,2001 NYT, article about PNAC position

March 4, 2003 Soviet journalist, monitored by BBC

March 16, 2003 CBS Sunday Morning

March 23, 2003 LA Times, Gary Schmidt PNAC writes article

April 21, 2003 NPR, Talk of the Nation

crew that's running Iraqi policy. (Mann and Rodgers 2003)

According to Pilger, several advisers in the administration-including those who were

headed by President Clinton. Or failing that, on a new Administration that might

country in the world (Wu 2000).

MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION