148 H went to work in New York, leaving his wife W in the Philippines.

Six years later, he became

an American citizen, divorced W and married X. After only six months, X divorced H. When he
went home, he found that W had a live in relationship with Z. H then filed a complaint for
adultery against W and Z. Would the complaint prosper?
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies in the case.
NO. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in
his country, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far
as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of W, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to the thing, and (b) In case of a
judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
foreign

divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court

reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just.

149 X filed a complaint against Y before the RTC of Santiago City. The certificate against forum
shopping was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public of Bayombong. In case the
certificate is false, what would be the proper venue for perjury, Santiago City or Bayombong?
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable.
Bayombong is the proper venue for the case. The venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases is
not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. The crime of perjury was committed by Y within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Bayombong. The second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, appear to have been made in Bayombong,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not
true. Thus, Bayombong is the proper venue and RTC Bayombong City is the proper court to
try the perjury case against Y, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Bayombong, not Santiago City.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at
the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all
the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the
crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

150 The XYZ Corporation was beset by problems among its officers. President X filed a petition in
court for issuance of another owners copy of the corporations Transfer Certificate of Title
which was allegedly lost. After the petition was granted, Treasurer Y came to know about it
and filed a complaint against X for perjury because X knew that the TCT was in the possession
of Y but stated under oath that it was lost. After the prosecution filed an information for perjury,
Y intervened through a private prosecutor. X moved to exclude the private lawyer alleging that
perjury was a public crime and did not involve private interests. Should the court allow the
private prosecutor to participate in the case?
Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies in the case.
Yes, the court can allow the private prosecutor to participate in the case. Petitioners
contention lacks merit. The Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the
private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be
respected.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
"[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action." Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to

institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged.
Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. In the
case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party
institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal
proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private
offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.
151 Y issued thirty checks to X as weekly payment of his loan. When all checks bounced, X filed
thirty cases against Y for violation of BP 22. X did not have sufficient funds to pay the filing
fees for all cases, and so he requested the executive judge to give due course to and docket
ten of the cases, with the rest to follow when his means would permit. Should the judge allow
this despite the fact that all cases arose out of the same transaction, and should be tried
jointly?
Section 1 of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court and Section 22 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court applies.
Yes. The consolidation of criminal cases is a matter of judicial discretion, according to
Section 22 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials
of related offenses - Charges of offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series
of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the Court. Similarly,
Section 2 of Rule XII of the SBN Revised Internal Rules reads: Section 2. Consolidation of
Cases. - Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the
lowest docket number is raffled x x x x. The counterpart rule for civil cases is found in Section 1
of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the
consolidation of cases. As held in Caos v. Peralta, joint trial is permissible x x x where the
[actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and
depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction
over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue

advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. x x x. Querubin v.

Palanca has ruled that consolidation is proper in the following instances: x x x where the
offenses charged are similar, related or connected, or are of the same or similar character or
class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences,
transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in
the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their
commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and
admissible or required in their reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required
on each trial. Expediency was the reason for the consolidation as held in Querubin. Joint trial
was deemed necessary to minimize therein appellants expenses in pursuing his appeal. Other
cases were consolidated, as they had sought the same reliefs or involved the same parties and
basically the same issues. Another purpose was to avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions. These reasons are in line with the object of consolidation, which is to avoid
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested
dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessary costs and expense.
We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioners request. Granting petitioners request
would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to
pay in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed. Filing fees, when required,
are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. 15 In criminal actions, these
pleadings refer to the information filed in court.In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40)
counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC.1wphi1 And each of the forty
(40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one
covers.16 Under the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the forty(40) counts is equivalent to
the filing of forty (40) different informations, as each count represents an independent violation
of BP Blg. 22.17 Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for each count
separately.Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioners request, the Executive Judge
further argues that since all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought about by a
single complaint filed before the OCP and are now consolidated before the court, the payment
of their tiling fees should be made for all or none at all. 18That all forty (40) counts of violation of
BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains
that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC
and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal
cases involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. 19 Consolidation does not transform the tiling fees
due for each case consolidated into one indivisible feeThird. Allowing petitioner to pay for the tiling fees of

some of the forty ( 40) counts of violation of BP Big. 22 tiled before the MeTC, will concededly result into
the absolute non-payment of the filing fees of the rest. The fate of the cases which filing fees were not paid,
however, is already the concern of the MeTC. G.R. No. 202920
October 2, 2013RICHARD
CHUA, Petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
152 The RTC of Baguio issued a warrant for the arrest of X for homicide with bail fixed at
P100,000. If X is arrested at Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, can the MTC judge of the place
approve the bail posted by him?
Under Section 17 of Rules of Courts. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may
be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with
any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
Applying such in the case he must post his bail in the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Vizcaya. He can only post bail in the municipal trial court of Kayapa if there is no available
judge in any Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya. He cannot directly post bail in MTC
Kayapa unless there is no available judge in RTC in the province where he was arrested.

153 There was no lawyer in the remote town where X was under custodial investigation for
homicide but Y, called attorney by the people, had just graduated from law school, and
reviewing for the bar exams. Y assisted the accused and told him that if he committed the
crime, he should admit it to lessen the penalty. Y passed the bar given that same year. Is the
extrajudicial confession of X admissible in evidence?

No. The right of the accused to have an independent and competent counsel was violated
because the person who assisted the accused was not a lawyer at the tie he made the
admission. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional

requirements. One of his rights is to have an independent and competent counsel
preferably of his own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to
secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have such
counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all
these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against
them in court. In People v. Santos, Court held: A confession is not admissible

unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits
imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.xxx xxx xxx(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
In the case at bar, the confession is inadmissible because it was made with
person who is not yet a lawyer. His right to have a competent and
independent counsel was violated.

154 Since he was hospitalized in Santiago City, accused X could not attend his arraignment in the
RTC Lagawe. He executed a special power of attorney authorizing his brother Y to enter a
plea of not guilty for him. Should the court allow Y to plead for and in behalf of X?
No. Section B of RULE 116 of Rules of Court provides that Section 1. Arraignment and
plea; how made. (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally
enter his plea. It is clear that the attendance of the accused in Arraignment shall only be made
through his personal appearance and cannot be made through representative even though
armed with Special Power of Attorney since the importance of arraignment is to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of accusation. It is important to acquire the jurisdiction of the
person.

155 X was charged with murder. After the prosecution presented its principal witnesses, the
accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide. Would the accused still be
allowed to enter into a plea bargaining agreement?
Yes. Plea Bargaining may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. As pointed out in the case
of Peo. Parahinog, 96 SCRA 373, after the prosecution has rested, the only basis for which the
court could rightfully act in allowing the accused to change his former plea of not guilty could

be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record since the rule was not
and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. The
court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage
or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. Allowing
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
(Daan v. Sandiganbayan).
156 The City Prosecutor of Santiago City filed an information for murder against X before the RTC
which also has territorial jurisdiction over Cordon, Isabela. Among the evidence were pictures
of the scene of the crime clearly showing that it was committed actually in Cordon. Can the
court dismiss the case motu proprio on the ground that the prosecutor had no authority over
crimes committed outside Santiago City?
158 A complaint for estafa involving P20,000 with penalty of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum was filed with the city prosecutor of Manila. Before the case could be
resolved, a law was passed increasing the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial court to 8 years
of imprisonment. Where should the case be filed, the MeTC or RTC?
159 X, an American citizen, hijacked a plane from Japan and diverted it to Malaysia. Later, he fled
to Sulu but was arrested for being an undocumented alien and brought to Manila. Can criminal
charges for hijacking be filed against him before the RTC of Manila?

160 X was charged with estafa for the issuance of BDO check no. 102030 to the damage and
prejudice of Y. During trial, it was proven that the person prejudiced by the dishonor of the
check was Z, and not Y. Could X be convicted despite the mistake in the designation of the
offended party?
161 X was charged with rape. After arraignment, the prosecution sought to amend the information
to allege that by reason of the rape, the victim became insane. Should the amendment be
allowed?

Yes. As held in the case of Peo. V. Damago, an amendment after arraignment to allege
that the victim of rape became insane by reason of or on occasion of the rape merely raiss the
penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original information. Moreover, the insanity may be
considered a supervening event. Unlike other qualifying circumstances, insanity may not be
readily discerned and could easily be mistaken as a mere initial reaction to the incident.
162 The city prosecutor dismissed the complaint against X for the death of Y but the Secretary of
Justice reversed him, stating that there was probable cause to file an information against X for
murder. X appealed to the Court of Appeals and filed a motion before the RTC to suspend the
implementation of the warrant of arrest.
A) Can the court act on the motion even if X has not been arrested?
B) If the Court of Appeals sustains the Secretary of Justice, could the RTC still dismiss the
case for lack of probable cause?
163 X, president of ABC Corp. issued a check to Y in payment of a corporate debt. When the
check bounced, a BP 22 case was filed against X. Can Y file a civil case against ABC Corp. on
the dishonored check?
164 Municipal engineer X purchased a Toyota pick up for P1.5M as evidence by the documents he
sumitted. Later, Toyota documents showed that the actual price was P1.4M. The LGU filed a
complaint against X for violation of RA 3019. After investigation, the provincial prosecutor filed
an action against X for falsification of public documents. X filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that since another case was filed, another preliminary investigation for falsification.
A) Is the ground relied upon by X proper?
B) Is a new preliminary investigation necessary?
165 X left her 2 year old son Y with Z while she went to work. Later, Z texted X that Y had fallen
down the stairs, and was brought to the hospital. Two days later Y died of multiple injuries. X
complained to the police that Y must have beaten by Z. Based on this information, the police
arrested Z in his house for murder. When he was searched, the police found shabu. In court, X
pleaded not guilty to the charges of murder and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. During
the trial, he questioned the validity of his arrest and subsequent search. The prosecution
opposed the move and claimed that X could no longer question the arrest and search after

pleading

to

the

charge.

Is

the

prosecution

correct?

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal
arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters his
plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. There must
be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right to
question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible.
166 Because the accused was absent during trial despite due notice, the prosecutor moved for his
arrest and confiscation of bond. The defense counsel opposed the motion, arguing that the
accused was waiving his right to be present in court. Should the motion of the prosecution be
granted?
It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in
absentia of the accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice
simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among
others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same
effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the
prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes
of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of
a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the
bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but not his
duty or obligation to the court. ELIAS CARREDO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, VICTORIA CATOSTOS, and HON. GENEROSO A. JUABAN (Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch VII)
167 The RTC convicted X of estafa, imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal, and ordered him to
pay the Y, the offended party P5M, the amount of the fraud, plus legal interest. X immediately
appealed and prayed that he remain out on bail. Would it proper to fix bail at P5M?

168 The accused and the offended party were absent during pre-trial despite due notice. Could the
court proceed with the pre-trial despite their absence?
Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private
complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of the
accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is
represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the parties appeared for the pre-trial, the
same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State and the
accused maybe represented by his lawyer during pre-trial. In the case of Peo. V. Tac-an the
Court held that the presence of the complainant or even the accused is not absolutely
necessary.
169 Atty. X was charged with violation of RA 8262. On the date set for his arraignment, he filed a
motion stating that he could not attend since he had a case in another court, that as a lawyer,
he was well informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, and that he was
waiving the reading of the information. Atty. X then prayed that a plea of not guilty be entered
for him. Is the prayer meritorious?
No. Under Rule 116 Section 1 of Rules of Court. Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The
accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty xxx.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. xxx
Arraignment is one of the stage of criminal proceeding which requires the personal appearance
of the accused. It cannot be waived as a matter of public policy because it formally informs the
accused regarding the nature and cause of accusation against him.
170 Circumstantial evidence pointed to X, Y and Z as the ones who raped and killed AB. During the
police investigation, Z confessed that during a drinking spree, X concocted a plan to kidnap AB
using the car of Y. Z also admitted that after X and Y raped AB, he also raped her. During trial,
Z offered to be a state witness. X and Y opposed the motion since Z admittedly raped AB. Is Z
qualified to be a state witness?

171 A collision between the truck driven by X and a taxi resulted in the death of taxi driver Y, slight
injuries to passenger Z and total damage to the taxi. Upon complaint of Z, X was charged with
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physically injuries. X pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly. Later, X was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide for the death
of Y. Can X successfully move to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy?
Yes. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offense. The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The doctrine that reckless
imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the

Double

Jeopardy

Clause.(JASON

IVLER

AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO.)

172 After the case was submitted for decision, Judge X of RTC Br. 3, Baguio was appointed judge
of RTC. Branch 50, and Judge Y was designated acting judge of RTC Br. 3, Baguio. Instead of
leaving the case with the court, Judge X brought the records with him and decided the case.
After the decision was promulgated, the accused appealed and claimed that the decision was
void since the Judge Y should have issued an order as the preference of the parties, and if no
choice is made, Judge Y shall decide the case. Is the decision of Judge X void?
173 The prosecution charged X with attempted murder before the RTC. After trial, the evidence
clearly showed that X had no intent to kill the victim, and thus, X could be convicted of slight a

physical injury which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Should the judge dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction?
174 The RTC convicted X of homicide without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and
imposed a penalty of 5 years to 12 years and 1 day. The RTC was clearly in error because the
penalty for homide is reclusion temporal, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum should be within the range of prision mayor, and the maximum within the range of
reclusion temporal medium. Can the prosecution appeal to correct the mistake?
175 X appealed from the decision of the municipal trial court but failed to file a memorandum on
appeal. Can the RTC apply Rule 40, and motu proprio dismiss the appeal for failure to file the
memorandum?
176 In the implementation of a search warrant, the police divided themselves into two teams to
search the house of X. One team was accompanied by X while the other team was
accompanied by the barangay captain and a kagawad. The second team found the items
stated in the search warrant. Would the seized items be admissible in evidence?

177 Armed with a search warrant issued by the RTC, police searched the house of X and found
stolen articles worth P12,000. Thereafter, an information for anti-fencing was filed with the
MTC. If X moves to quash the search warrant, where should he file it?
178 Y borrowed P450,000 from X and promised to pay it on December 1, 2013. Y failed to pay it,
and so, X gave Y a final demand to pay it on January 31, 2014. After barangay proceedings
failed, X prepared a complaint to be filed with the RTC. A day before X was to file the case, the
jurisdiction of the MTC was increased to P500,000. Where the case should be filed, RTC or
MTC?
179 Y filed a case against X for recovery of a parcel of land before the RTC. After Y rested his
case, X presented one witness. On the next hearing, X realized that the RTC had no
jurisdiction and so moved for the dismissal of the case. Y opposed the motion, saying that X

was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. Should the court dismiss the
case?
180 While driving his car, X bumped Y who suffered serious injuries. Y claimed P135,465 as actual
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P200,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 as
attorneys fees. Where should the case be filed?
181 X rushed the filing of a complaint against Y for $200,000 since the action was about to
prescribe. He was shocked to find out the he had to pay a large filing fee. He persuaded the
clerk to accept the complaint with a promise to pay the balance the following day. It took X,
however, more than a week to complete the payment. If the action prescribed after the filing of
the case but before the full payment of docket fees, should the court dismiss the case?
182 X had a pending application with the DENR for issuance of a free patent. When Y learned
about it, he filed a protest with the DENR and entered the property under the claim that it was
his grandfather Z who had originally cleared the land. X filed a case against Z for forcible
entry. Z sought to dismiss the case on the ground that it was the DENR which had jurisdiction
over the case. Is the motion meritorious?
183 The ABC Co., Inc. and the union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement under which
male employees shall retire at age 65 while female employees shall retire at age 63. Some
employees sued the company before the RTC to invalidate the CBA, claiming that it was
invalid under the equal protection clause. Does the court have jurisdiction over this case
between employees and employer?
184 The family home of Major X was in Makati. For the past year, while stationed at PMA, he lived
in a rented house in Baguio City. Y, a resident of Baguio, borrowed money from X, and when
Y failed to pay the debt, X sued him in Makati. Was venue properly laid?
185 X and Y rented adjacent townhouses owned by Z. X and Y were not able to pay their rent
when they were laid off. Can Z properly file a single action against for ejectment X and Y?
186 X referred to Atty. Z his claim for P80,000 against Y. On behalf of X, Atty. Z signed and filed a
complaint against Y with the MTC. Can the court give due course to the action?
187 X filed a case for recovery of a parcel of land against Y before the RTC. After the judgment
against Y became final, a writ of execution was issued. Y then filed an action for P250,000

against X before the MTC as reimbursement of the improvements on the property against X.
Shall the action prosper?

188 X mortgaged his lot to the PNB and when he failed to pay the debt, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and in the auction sale, PNB was the highest bidder. X failed to redeem the
property, prompting the bank to file a petition for issuance of a writ of possession. The petition
did not include a certificate of non-forum shopping and so X filed a motion to dismiss. Is the
motion meritorious?
Any violation of Circular No. 28-91 and Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guideline shall be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon
motion and after hearing. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that plaintiff
is not guilty of forum shopping. The Circular applies to any complaint, petition, application, or
other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum
shopping. Every party filing a complaint or any other initiatory pleading is required to swear
under oath that he has not committed nor will he commit forum shopping. Otherwise, we would
have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their
actions constitute a violation of said Circular, and compliance therewith would depend on their
belief that they might or might not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the
requirement would defeat the very purpose of Circular 04-94. In the case of Melo vs. CA the
Court is not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her
complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a socalled technical ground. Nonetheless, the Court held that compliance with the certification
requirement on non-forum shopping should not be made subject to a partys afterthought, lest
the policy of the law be undermined.

189 In his complaint for damages arising from a vehicular collision against Y, X alleged in
paragraph 4 that Y was the owner of an Isuzu pick up with plate no. BBY 123. In his answer, Y
alleged that he was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the material averments in par. 4. Is this a sufficient specific denial?
190This doctrine was first established by the Court twenty-six years ago in the case of El
Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, Inc., 6 where this Court, in applying the provisions
on specific denials required of the defendant in Rule 9, section 7 of the then new Rules
of Court, now found in Rule 8, section 10 of the Revised Rules of Court above-quoted,
held that "Defendant's answer wherein it merely 'denies generally and specifically each
and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint,' is but a
general denial. It is not a specific denial under section 7 of Rule 9, because it does not
deal specifically with each material allegation of fact, nor does it set forth the substance
of the matters upon which the defendant relies to support his denial. It does not serve
the purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial, which is to compel him
to specify the matters which he intends to disprove and disclose the matters upon which
he relies to support his denial, thereby limiting the issues and avoiding unnecessary
delays and surprises. Under the old procedure the plaintiff was compelled by defendant's
mere general denial to prove facts alleged in the complaint which the defendant did not
even attempt to dispute. The new procedure does away with that unnecessary burden.
(Moran on the Rules of Court, volume 1, page 93.)" 7 This doctrine has since been
applied uniformly in a long line of cases. 8Time and again, this Court has stressed that
"An unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records, the means of
information concerning which are within the control of the pleader, or are readily
accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. ..." 9 and
that "the form of denial ... adopted by the appellants, although allowed by the Rules of
Court (referring to lack of sufficient knowledge or information) must be availed of with
sincerity and in good faith, certainly neither for the purpose of confusing the adverse
party as to what allegations of the complaint are really put in issue nor for the purpose of
delay

191 In his complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, X alleged that the contract between him
and Y was void ab initio. Y failed to specifically deny the said allegation. Is Y considered to
have admitted that the contract was void?
Y failed to allege in his answer that the claim of X had prescribed. Can Y still pursue the
dismissal of the action on the ground of prescription?
Yes. Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds on which a motion
to dismiss a complaint may be based, and the prescription of an action is included as one of
the grounds under paragraph (f). The defendant may either raise the grounds in a motion to
dismiss or plead them as an affirmative defense in his answer . The failure to raise or plead

the grounds generally amounts to a waiver, except if the ground pertains to (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia , (3) res judicata, or (4) prescription.
Since in the case the ground is prescription of claims, court may consider such ground motu
proprio and accordingly dismiss the complaint provided it is apparent from the pleadings or the
evidence on record. As held in the case of BENJAMIN CUA (CUA UlAN TEK),-versusWALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. and ADVANCE SHIPPING CORPORATION The
Court, therefore, need not resolve the question of whether there have been actually waiver of
defense of prescription; an inquiry into this question is useless, as courts are empowered to
dismiss actions on the basis of prescription even if it is not raised by the defendant so long as
the facts supporting this ground are evident from the records. Hence Y may still move for the
dismissal of the case.
158.

Atty. X was the counsel on record of plaintiff Y. Later, Atty. Z entered his appearance as

counsel of Y and filed a motion for reconsideration of an order of the court. Would service on
Atty X of the order denying reconsideration be effective?
159.

X sold a parcel of land to Y on instalment. After Y failed to pay the balance of P1M, X filed

a collection case to recover the balance. Could a notice of lis pendens be properly filed?
No. In the present case, the annotation of the lis pendens was improper because the case filed
by X against Y was purely a personal action. It has been held that the doctrine of lis
pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a
money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property may be affected. It is
essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief sought in the action or suit
includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between
conflicting claims of title, possession, or right of possession to specific property, or requiring its
transfer or sale.
To be sure, in Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation, the Court have
previously explained that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in
which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of
possession to property be incidentally affected. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis

pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns
out to be a purely personal action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus
officio.
160.

X filed a collection case against Y who was now in Canada upon petition of his son.

Summons was served upon the caretaker of Y. When informed about it, Y contacted his friend
Atty. Z who filed a motion for extension of time to file answer. One week later, Atty. Z filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over Y.
A) Could the court entertain the motion for extension even if it did not contain a notice of hearing? Sections
4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights
of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.
Section 4 lays the general rule that all written motions shall be set for hearing by the movant, except the
non-litigated motions or those which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party. These ex parte motions include a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, 3 motion for
extension of time to file an answer,4 and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal.
Further, it has been held that a motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where
notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties
to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties. As
a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought
by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard. It has been said that ex parte motions are frequently permissible in
procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an
exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay
might tend to defeat the objective of the motion. [

B) Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Y? Yes. SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at the
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons
most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is
accomplished.35 The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to
the defendant himself.36
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over
substituted service.37 Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an
extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit
even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could only
presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. 38
In action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the Court to validly try
and decide the case. If the respondent is already residing abroad, the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over his person by service of summons, unless he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
Court. In the case the service of summon through his caretaker is not effective to acquire jurisdiction over Y.
However Y voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he seek for the legal services of
a lawyer and even filed a motion for extension to file an answer. September 17, 2009
ALEXANDER TAM WONG, Petitioner,
vs.
CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA,

SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily
out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under
the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.)The preceding section referred to states:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant
has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case
a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem

sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

161.

X filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment. The court summarily denied the

motion. Is the order valid even if it does not state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
upon which it was based?
While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the
fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course
to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.
Section 14 of which states that No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition
for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. It would be an exercise in redundancy for the
Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that
the CA reached. With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the
instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution
or minute resolution. Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the
Court denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the
absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the
court
below.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was

reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning.
162.

X filed a motion for reconsideration which did not contain a notice of hearing stating the

date and time when it would be submitted for resolution of the court. The clerk of court refused
to accept the motion, stating that it was a mere scrap of paper. Is the clerk of court correct?
Yes. Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice
of hearing as a mere scrap of paper. In the classic formulation of Manakil v. Revilla, such a
motion was condemned as: x x x nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court. The court
had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of Rules of Court. It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply
with the rules of the court. It did not become a motion until x x x the petitioners herein fixed a
time for hearing of said alleged motion. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure applies in the case. Section 4 lays the general rule that all written motions shall be
set for hearing by the movant, except the non-litigated motions or those which may be acted
upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. These ex parte motions
include a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, motion for extension of time to file an
answer, and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal.
In Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction and Company, the Court ruled
that a notice of time and place of hearing is mandatory for motions for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, as in this case. The Court have reiterated this doctrine in National
Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. Court of Appeals, the rule that the requirement of notice
under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 is mandatory and the lack thereof is fatal to a motion for
reconsideration.
163.

The RTC rendered judgment in favour of plaintiff X, ordering defendant Y to pay plaintiff

P100K as moral damages, and P100K as attorneys fees. Y immediately filed notice of appeal
upon receipt of the judgment. Two days later, X received a copy of the judgment. X then filed

a motion for execution pending appeal on the ground that he was already 70 years old and
sickly, and he needed the money for his medical expenses.
A. Can the court still consider the motion for execution since Y had already perfected his
appeal?
B. Assuming that the court can still consider the motion, are there good reasons to grant
it?