EN BANC

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecutions case, albeit a good
measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.[1]
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 2014[2] and August 8, 2014[3] issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that
the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).[4] On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion[5] and Supplemental Opposition,[6] praying, among others, that he be allowed
to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after
the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.[7]
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of
bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law.[8] Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.[9]
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.[10]
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,[11] and his Motion to Fix Bail,[12] both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.[13] In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would
only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of
right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder,
the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua. He anchors this
claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be
found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his
physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court
to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enriles motion for
reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.[15]
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile
may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as

a matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles
guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.[16]
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the
duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception
and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile,
if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof
showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment,[17] the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[18] The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail,[19] and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment
on the accused.[20]
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[21] The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.[22] Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.[23]
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be

provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114[24] of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.[25]
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under
the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.[26] Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.[27]
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.[28]
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;[29] or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e)

That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[30] such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing

with notice to the Prosecution.[31] The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained
in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:[32]
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al.
that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in
this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later,
over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three
policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it
issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who
probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to
be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as the accused to due process.
xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond
in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary
hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to
the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.[33]
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined
in Cortes v. Catral,[34] to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances
that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.[35]
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix
Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it
to state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration
that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is charged with an
offense punishable by. It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense
that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accuseds favor.[36]
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua,[37] simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be
made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.[38]
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.[39]
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.[40] With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should
be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,[41] Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:
a.
b.
c.

Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and

vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex
1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a.
b.

Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,

s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
Alpha thalassemia;
Gait/balance disorder;
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).[42]
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks
to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions;
and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat,
humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.[43]
.

a.
b
c.
d.
e.
f.

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,[44] was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at
the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or
have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of
the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.[45]
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela
Rama v. The Peoples Court:[46]
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;[47] x x x

xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner is
actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis, and that in said institute they have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail; taking into consideration that the petitioners
previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering
from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the
petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs,
was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly
in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied
the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases
against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison
would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.[48]
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of
the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts
can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.[49] The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.[50] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[51]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.
Reyes, J., on sick leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I joint the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action.

DISSENTING OPINION
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required. - Const., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread.
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN, J:
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to
Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his
prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail[1] filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant
of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground
never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should
not be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to find
what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the people they
represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very special treatment is a question
of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This
doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be subjected to both direct and cross-examination so
that he can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his inferences as well as the nature of the
medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented by the prosecution should also be
considered. All this would be proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the
Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on grounds other
than his medical condition.

Furthermore, the majoritys opinionother than the invocation of a general human rights principledoes
not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person
petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with motions
to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without
guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged
with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention,
and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not to the aging or sick detainees in
overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal discretion causing petitions for
certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear
legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of
human compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and the stability of our entire
judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of plunder punishable under
Republic Act No. 7080.[2] Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to
post bail if the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him.[3] On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no warrant of arrest had been issued at that
time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enriles arrest.[4]
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City.[5]
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and voluntary surrender were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.[6] He
also argued that his alleged age and physical condition indicated that he was not a flight risk.[7] His prayer
states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set
the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating
circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to reclusion
temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].[8]

The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail[9] dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed
a Reply[10] dated July 11, 2014.
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital[11] dated July 4, 2014, arguing that his advanced age and frail medical condition[12] merit hospital
arrest in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by the
Sandiganbayan.[13] He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the
Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside medical facility.[14] His
prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him under hospital
confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing authority given to
the hospital head or administrator to exercise his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow
Enrile's immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of
emergency or necessity, secured with appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate medical
treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.[15]
After the prosecutions submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital for medical examination until further orders of the court.[16]
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital is not the subject of this Petition
for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this Order be declared invalid or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution[17] denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature,[18] stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of
right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.[19]
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[20] reiterating that there were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail health proved that he was not a
flight risk.[21] The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8, 2014.[22]Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari was filed.
II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix Bail for
prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
A trial courtin this case, the Sandiganbayanacquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused through
his or her arrest.[23] The consequent detention is to ensure that the accused will appear when required by the
Rules and by order of the court trying the offense.[24] The provisions on bail provide a balance between the
accuseds right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due process rights of the state to be able to
effect the accuseds prosecution on the other hand. That balance is not exclusively judicially determined. The
Constitution frames judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:

Article III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of bail is
ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of
discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other
hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case of Herras Teehankee v.
Rovira[25] where this court ordered the Peoples Court to conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being
charged with a capital offense.[26] This court reasoned that the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the
Peoples Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in
force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail.[27]
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the Peoples Court and gave the following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the
court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of
the bail which it should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutors attitude is not justified, it may ask him
questions to ascertain the strength of the states evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the
answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest,
the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor

General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the
prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not
want to introduceprovided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or
detainee.[28]
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:[29]
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all
persons, whether charged or not yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception
being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail,
the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a
matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the
petitioner fails to object thereto.[30] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.[31] and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.[32]
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this courts instructions on the application of the
constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo[33] outlines these administrative cases promulgated from 1981 to 1996.[34] Unfortunately,
there were still administrative complaints filed against judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after
the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,[35] this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the
accused charged with capital offenses.[36] This court could only lament on the deluge of these administrative
cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on
the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as
it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section
19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study
them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of

cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties
assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration
of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be
charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[37]
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be filed against judges who failed
to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,[38] the accused was charged with murder.[39] Judge Bugtas initially denied the
accuseds petition for bail but granted his motion for reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing.[40] As
a result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00[41] for being grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.][42]
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,[43] the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting bail to
the accused charged with rape without a hearing.[44]
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuo v. Judge Cabebe,[45] Judge Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for granting bail, without
the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of illegal drugs.[46]
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail or the prosecutor already
recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:[47]
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be
held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution
must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court
regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it
was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the
law and the rules.[48]
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that bail be granted without any
hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. During the hearing on
petitioners Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail should be based only on their
failure to establish the strength of the evidence against him.[49] The prosecution had no opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail for
being premature. The denial is neither capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic[50] as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence, and
long-standing rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail.
III

The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical condition
or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent developed their arguments
on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind
of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioners grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed
to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile falls
within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the burden of Enrile to show
entitlement to his right.

The prosecution failed to establish that Enriles case falls within the exception; hence, denial
of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of discretion.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
o

The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law
itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also the penalty next lower in
degree (or reclusion temporal) by consider(ing) the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code.

Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a needless formality.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if ever) is
strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

o Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in issue, in its
Opposition to Enriles motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the light of the
prosecutions continuing muteness to the defenses repeated challenge for the prosecution to
produce any single piece of paper showing that Enrile received even a single peso of
kickback, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted that Enrile must first initiate, and formally
apply for, the formal proceedings (bail hearing) before the prosecution may be called upon
to discharge its duty of proving evidence of guilt is strong.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.

o

The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (shall be bailable) does not become a
prohibition (shall not be bailable). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory right (shall) is a
permissive right (may).

A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence and nondeprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the exception to right-tobail.

Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is demonstrated not
being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.

Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical condition, and
having voluntarily surrendered.

Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight risk.

Other circumstances negating Enriles disposition to become a fugitive from justice are also
present.

The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this stage of the
proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right.[51]

The prayer in his Petition reads:

WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
a.

ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;

b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;

c.

SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and

d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith
GRANT BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.[52]
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this court in and out of formal
deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the discussion was triggered by the submission of the
member in charge of a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal arguments of the Petition
which was centered on this court taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic mitigating
circumstances that would lower the penalty to be imposed even before trial or a hearing for the determination
of whether the evidence of guilt is strong happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela
Perlas-Bernabe and this member submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were
vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common position that there was no
grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail

could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and
this member differed only in the treatment of mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc.
v. Hon. Borja, et al.[53]
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on August 11, 2015, the member
in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to
whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. The member in
charge committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This member expressed that he was
open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition of petitioner was
circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this member responded with a letter addressed to
all the justices, which stated:
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the proposed ponencia that need to be
threshed out thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an accused charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail for humanitarian reasons.
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical interpretations of these legal
texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification of a certain Dr.
Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross examination and not
appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the facts relating to the
medical condition of the accused? Or, are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused to be
brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be treated by the PNP hospital
subject only to reportorial requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayans
decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or, if we are able to hurdle the factual
issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention rather be modified? Do we have
clear judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical condition can be attended to,
should he be returned to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work, does this not nullify the
very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on what to consider when
setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his circumstances, what is our basis for setting this
amount? What evidence have we considered? Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this
discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the accused entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply

his advanced age? What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical conditions that come with advanced age?
Would this apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder? Is he
suffering from a unique debilitating disease which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by our
detention facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to support our
conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an accused in his condition? Or, are we now
reading the general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply specifically to the condition of this
accused? What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal application of very general statements on human
rights?[54]
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member in charge,
however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a
vote, he thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering on
release on bail on humanitarian grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail was a
matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of two
mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only amendment to the
majority opinion accepted by the member in charge was the increase of the proposed amount of bail to
P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the member in charge, emerging as
the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed around a
final copy of the majority opinion which was not the version voted upon during the mornings
deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version
granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioners entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be
made by the trial court.[55] (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of the court at the time that
the case was voted upon. But because the final version for signing was not the version voted upon, this
member had to substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter
of right was no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously
offer her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her filing of a Separate
Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus,
in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. - A Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its
conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a
dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result
of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence in the
result should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion,
but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or

concurring opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the decision for the
signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of the majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started to speculate on the contents
of the majority opinion. This may have created expectations on the part of petitioners friends, family, and
counsel. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that the Decision had as yet not been
promulgated and served, made announcements as to their readiness to receive the cash bond and process the
release of the accused even if August 19, 2015 happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat
of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote and the date of
promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioners arguments, the majority, instead of denying the Petition for
Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a Manifestation
and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is
suffering from numerous debilitating conditions.[56] This certification was submitted as an annex to a
Manifestation[57] before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of the accused not for
the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctors
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination
and authentication of Dr. Gonzales findings on petitioners health in a hearing whose main purpose is to
determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:[58]
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.[59]
Petitioners medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived
of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other
medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for
a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales findings and to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at
present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically
privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the accused,

without the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without
consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held, casts serious
doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical
procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to
be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a petition for bail is filed by the accused.
The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require immediate medical attention,
this court has not established clear guidelines for such releases. The closest that the majority opinion reaches
for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during trial.[60] (Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to their health OR
whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are humanely treated. Under A.M. No.
07-3-02-SC,[61] judges of lower courts are mandated to conduct monthly jail visitations in order to [e]nsure
the promotion and protection of the dignity and well being[62] of detention prisoners. Detention prisoners
may also be released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds if their continuous confinement during
the pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their life.[63]
In many instances, alternative detentionwhether temporary or permanentis granted upon a clear showing
before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the physical condition of the accused, as proven through
evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring medical attention that could not be accommodated
within the current custodial arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that such alternative custodial
arrangements do not take place more than the time necessary to address the medical condition of the accused.
Likewise, the Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the state
and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to
the wealthy or powerful detainees.
On July 9, 2014[64] and July 15, 2014,[65] the Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing accused to
remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital and continue medical examinations until further
orders from the court, subject to reportorial requirements and at accuseds personal expense. In particular,
the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzaless report], the Court will hold in abeyance action on accused Enriles
motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to remain thereat until further
orders from this Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED
AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case

of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to be administered on accused Enrile is not
available at, or cannot be provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE
PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After completion of the medical treatment or
procedure outside Camp Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General
Hospital. The said director or administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such
visit/s of accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day following the said visit/s.[66] (Emphasis
in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly authorized
representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the medical
examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and recommendation to the Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The necessary medical examination/s and/or procedure/s as determined
the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any government hospital, which the medical team may deem
to have the appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus and competent personnel
to undertake the procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE
ENRILE. Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical examination/s and/or procedure/s and
submission of the required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in its
Resolution dated July 9, 2014.

SO ORDERED.[67]
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be brought to any hospital
immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting bail to petitioner, we are, in effect,
declaring that the Sandiganbayans decisions in relation to its supervision of the accuseds detention were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not seem to be suffering from a
unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be provided for by our detention facilities and temporary
hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the majority arrived at a conclusion different from
the Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue become the subject of
intense discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioners incarceration aggravates his medical conditions
or if his medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no
showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is
also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the best care
available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention that is the most significant
factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary, courts do
not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accuseds detention. There is now no clarity as to
when special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical condition is applicable only to
those of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to

whether this is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no guidance in the majoritys opinion as to
whether this is only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:[68]
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit
bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the selective
decarceration of older prisoners based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases.[69]
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special kind of bail. Thus, the
majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee
his appearance in court for the trial.[70]
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This strongly
indicates that the majoritys inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been
too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu propio
or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail should be filed before the
Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitioners case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution
and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary,
and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of
the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian
considerations extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially
tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original
proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal
circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the majority, it was
then increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail.[71] The majority opinion is sparse
on the evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the more prudent course of action
would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release petitioner

given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion,
is a general declaration[72] to uphold the value and dignity of every person.[73] It does not prohibit the arrest of
any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only
implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and humane manner.
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.[74] as basis for
the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.[75] However, Government of Hong Kong does not apply to this case
because the issue was on whether bail could apply to extradition cases. This court stated that because of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles are now embodied in the Constitution, bail applies
to all instances where an accused is detained pending trial, including administrative proceedings such as
extradition. This court, however, does not state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates
that bail must be granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age and frail health.
Petitioners remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that safeguard his fundamental right
to liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail is
available to all persons before conviction except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong[.] Even Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the same document used by the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that
the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded the case to the trial court[76] instead of applying
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these
principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for human dignity and the
protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law,
were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these
rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be
cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the
norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is
suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather, human rights are
best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these
provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight for it and ensure that it
allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider meaningful. This applies to petitioner as
accused. Yet it also applies with equal force to all the individuals in our communities and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective meaningful existence, is put at risk if
justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned
circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us who are elite. Otherwise, we concede
that there are those among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy privileges not shared by all.

This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort with the consequences of the majoritys
position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum
penalty:
(1) Parricide;[77]
(2) Murder;[78]
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;[79]
(4) Robbery with homicide;[80]
(5) Robbery with rape;[81]
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;[82]
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;[83]
(8) Rape;[84]
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;[85]
(10) Sexual assault;[86] and
(11) Incestuous rape.[87]
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum penalty of life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;[88]
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity;[89]
(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of
shabu, 500 grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more of ecstasy;[90]
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu;[91]
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy;[92]
(6) Child prostitution;[93]
(7) Child trafficking;[94]
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of living;[95]
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug trafficking or pushing;[96]
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities;[97] and

(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries of a child under 12 years
old.[98]
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those accused of murder,
trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious
illegal detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities all over our country. We know this because
the members of this court encounter them through cases appealed on a daily basis. Many of them suffer from
diseases that they may have contracted because of the conditions of their jails. But they and their families
cannot afford hospitals better than what government can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because
they may not have the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the creativity of wellnetworked defense counsel. After all, they may have committed acts driven by the twin evils of greed or lust
on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is often brute, banal, and
canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this court has had
no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime charged carries the imposable
penalty of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we have had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result. In my view, it is not right,
just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without clearly articulating why the Sandiganbayans
actions were arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with sufficient compassion. It did not gravely
abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be
tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful public official at the cost of
weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is meant to apply
in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the administration of justice because the
judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these complex and
politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted. Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or favor,
the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the demands of those who have political influence. After all,
in their minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this court may still declare that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the Constitution. Our duty is to
ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult cases. This case does not really present any kind of
legal complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our
own opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should
be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge and experience.

But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation of the fundamental
document written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text of the Constitution will provide us with
a stable anchor despite the potential political controversies that swirl over the legal questions that we need to
decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as the final
bastion and the ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from whom all other courts
like the Sandiganbayanshould find inspiration and courage, we should apply the law squarely and without
fear or favor. We should have collectively carried the burden of doing justice properly and denied this
Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion should never replace justice.
There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort, conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing
the Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate, and conscious analysis of the issues
raised by the parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we want with ambiguous and unclear
standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It also fails us in our own
humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847, July 12, 2016
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman, have filed their Motion for Reconsideration to assail the decision promulgated on August 18, 2015
granting the petition for certiorari of the petitioner, and disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNUL[L]ING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The People rely on the following grounds for the reversal of the decision of August 18, 2015, to wit:
I.

THE DECISION GRANTING BAIL TO PETITIONER WAS PREMISED ON A

FACTUAL FINDING THAT HE IS NOT A FLIGHT RISK, ON A
DETERMINATION THAT HE SUFFERS FROM A FRAGILE STATE OF HEALTH
AND ON OTHER UNSUPPORTED GROUNDS UNIQUE AND PERSONAL TO
HIM. IN GRANTING BAIL TO PETITIONER ON THE FOREGOING GROUNDS,
THE DECISION UNDULY AND RADICALLY MODIFIED CONSTITUTIONAL
AND PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BAIL WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL AND JURIS PRUDENTIAL BASIS.

A.

THE DECISION OPENLY IGNORED AND ABANDONED THE

CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A PERSON ACCUSED OF A CRIME PUNISHABLE
BY RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT SUCH AS
PLUNDER CAN BE GRANTED BAIL.

B.

THE DECISION ALSO DISREGARDED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

AND RELEVANT COURT PROCEDURES WHEN IT GRANTED
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR BAIL ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS
NOT A FLIGHT RISK, PREMISED ON A LOOSE FINDING THAT THE
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF BAIL IS MERELY TO SECURE THE
APPEARANCE OF AN ACCUSED DURING TRIAL.

C.

CONTRARY TO THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER OF GRANTING BAIL TO PERSONS
ACCUSED OF CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA OR
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, THE DECISION ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED BAIL BECAUSE OF HIS FRAGILE
STATE OF HEALTH, AND BECAUSE OF OTHER UNSUPPORTED AND
DEBATABLE GROUNDS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PURELY PERSONAL
AND PECULIAR TO HIM, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE STRENGTH
OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.

II.

THE DECISION VIOLATES THE PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS OF LAW SINCE IT WAS BASED ON GROUNDS NOT RAISED IN
THE PETITION AND THEREFORE NEVER REFUTED OR CONTESTED.

III.

THE DECISION GAVE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND UNDUE FAVOR TO

PETITIONER IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.[2]

The People argue that the decision is inconsonant with deeply-embedded constitutional principles on the
right to bail; that the express and unambiguous intent of the 1987 Constitution is to place persons accused of
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua on a different plane, and make their availment of bail a matter of judicial
discretion, not a matter of right, only upon a showing that evidence of their guilt is not strong; and that the
Court should have proceeded from the general proposition that the petitioner had no right to bail because he
does not stand on equal footing with those accused of less grave crimes.
The People contend that the grant of provisional liberty to a person charged with a grave crime cannot be
predicated solely on the assurance that he will appear in court, but should also consider whether he will
endanger other important interests of the State, the probability of him repeating the crime committed, and
how his temporary liberty can affect the prosecution of his case; that the petitioner's fragile state of health
does not present a compelling justification for his admission to bail; that age and health considerations are
relevant only in fixing the amount of bail; and that even so, his age and health condition were never raised or
litigated in the Sandiganbayan because he had merely filed thereat a Motion to Fix Bail and did not thereby
actually apply for bail.
Lastly, the People observe that the decision specially accommodated the petitioner, and thus accorded him
preferential treatment that is not ordinarily enjoyed by persons similarly situated.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds no compelling or good reason to reverse its decision of August 18, 2015.
To start with, the People were not kept in the dark on the health condition of the petitioner. Through
his Omnibus Motion dated June 10, 2014 and his Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014, he manifested to the
Sandiganbayan his currently frail health, and presented medical certificates to show that his physical condition
required constant medical attention.[3] The Omnibus Motion and his Supplemental Opposition dated June 16, 2014
were both heard by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Prosecution of its Consolidated
Opposition.[4] Through his Motion for Reconsideration, he incorporated the findings of the government physicians
to establish the present state of his health. On its part, the Sandiganbayan, to satisfy itself of the health
circumstances of the petitioner, solicited the medical opinions of the relevant doctors from the Philippine

General Hospital.[5] The medical opinions and findings were also included in the petition for certiorari and now
form part of the records of the case.
Clearly, the People were not denied the reasonable opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations about his
advanced age and the instability of his health even if the allegations had not been directly made in connection
with his Motion to Fix Bail.
Secondly, the imputation of "preferential treatment" in "undue favor" of the petitioner is absolutely bereft of
basis.[6] A reading of the decision of August 18, 2015 indicates that the Court did not grant his provisional
liberty because he was a sitting Senator of the Republic. It did so because there were proper bases - legal as
well as factual - for the favorable consideration and treatment of his plea for provisional liberty on bail. By its
decision, the Court has recognized his right to bail by emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if
the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. In our view, however, the records demonstrated that
the risks of flight were low, or even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other circumstances, such as
his advanced age and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect for the legal processes, the
length of his public service, and his individual public and private reputation.[7] There was really no reasonable
way for the Court to deny bail to him simply because his situation of being 92 years of age when he was first
charged for the very serious crime in court was quite unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and
unstable health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the basis alone of the judicial discretion to deny
bail would be probably unjust. To equate his situation with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly
serious offense would be inherently wrong when other conditions significantly differentiating his situation
from that of the latter's unquestionably existed.[8]
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to
"appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing
supports this purpose. Thus, in Villaseor v. Abao,[9] the Court has pronounced that "the principal factor
considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which most factors are directed, is the probability of the
appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."[10] The Court has given due regard to the
primary but limited purpose of granting bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his
trial and would continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges levelled
against him.[11]
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly
restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. It does not
perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to
punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to
bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them
a trial. The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards
has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the individuals wrongly
accused could be punished by the period of imprisonment they undergo while awaiting trial, and even
handicap them in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a
defense.[12] Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial
liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial.[13]
Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight.[14] This is the reason precisely why
the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting
or denying bail, even in capital cases. The exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in
direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official and
social standing and his other personal circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending to render his
flight improbable.[15]
The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he would not be a flight risk. For one, his

advanced age and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood that he would make himself scarce and
escape from the jurisdiction of our courts. The testimony of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, Director of the Philippine
General Hospital, showed that the petitioner was a geriatric patient suffering from various medical
conditions,[16] which, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to his life. The medical findings and
opinions have been uncontested by the Prosecution even in their present Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., I join J. Leonen's dissent.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Leonen.
Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Reyes, J., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join J. Leonen's dissent.
Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part.
Caguioa, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on July 12, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 28, 2016
at 1:40 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court

[1]

Rollo, pp. 624-625.

[2]

Id. at 686-687.

[3]

Id. at 152, 160-162, 253.

[4]

Id. at 611.

[5]

Id. at 309-311.

[6]

Id. at 712.

[7]

Id. at 620.

E.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 ("Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.
The traditional standards, as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are to be applied in each
case to each defendant.").
[8]

In his concurring opinion in Stack v. Boyle, Justice Jackson reminded:

It is complained that the District Court fixed a uniform blanket bail chiefly by consideration of the nature of
the accusation, and did not take into account the difference in circumstances between different defendants. If
this occurred, it is a clear violation of Rule 46(c). Each defendant stands before the bar of justice as an
individual. Even on a conspiracy charge, defendants do not lose their separate-ness or identity. While
it might be possible that these defendants are identical in financial ability, character, and relation to the charge
elements Congress has directed to be regarded in fixing bail I think it violates the law of probabilities.
Each accused is entitled to any benefits due to his good record, and misdeeds or a bad record should
prejudice only those who are guilty of them. The question when application for bail is made relates to each
one's trustworthiness to appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appearance.
(Bold emphasis supplied.)
[9] L-23599, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 312.
[10]

Id. at 317.

[11]

See Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997, 269 SCRA 220, 224.

[12]

Stack v. Boyle, supra note 8.

[13]

Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.

[14]

See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Stack v. Boyle, supra note 8.

[15]

See Montana v. Ocampo, L-6352, January 29, 1953, 49 O.G. 1855.

[16]

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;

(2) Diffure atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

a. Previous history of cercbrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease;
b. Heavy coronary artery classifications;
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial classifications.
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring;
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/clyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I write this Separate Opinion to reflect my view and explain my vote on the deliberations of the Court En
Banc on August 18, 2015 on the issue of the provisional release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from
detention. I also explain in this Opinion why I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration filed by the
People of the Philippines.
On August 18, 2015, the Court, voting 8-4, granted the petition for certiorari filed by Enrile to assail and annul
the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238. The dispositive portion of this decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, moved to reconsider this decision, and claimed that
the grant of bail to Enrile "unduly and radically modified constitutional and procedural principles governing
bail without sufficient constitutional, legal and jurisprudential basis."[1] It argued that since Enrile was charged
with a grave crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he cannot be admitted to bail as a matter of right
unless it had been determined that evidence of his guilt was not strong.
The People further alleged that the ponencia erred in granting Enrile provisional liberty on the erroneous
premise that the principal purpose of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during trial. It
maintained that the grant of provisional liberty must be counter-balanced with the legitimate interests of the
State to continue placing the accused under preventive detention when circumstances warrant.
The People further claimed that there is no obligation on the part of the State to allow Enrile to post bail even
under international law since the latter's detention was an incident of a lawful criminal prosecution. It added
that age and health are not relevant in the determination of whether the evidence of guilt against Enrile is
strong; and that "there is no provision in the 1987 Constitution, in any statute or in the Rules of Court"[2] that
allows the grant of bail for humanitarian considerations.
The People likewise claimed that its constitutional right to due process had been violated since the Court
granted provisional liberty to Enrile based on grounds that were not raised by Enrile in connection with his
bail request.

Finally, the People alleged that the ponencia violated the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution when
it "gave preferential treatment and undue favor"[3] to Enrile.
My Position:
I reiterate that Enrile should be admitted to bail. I likewise vote to deny the motion for reconsideration filed
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
The Right to Bail and the Court's Equity Jurisdiction
Our Constitution zealously guards every person's right to life and liberty against unwarranted state intrusion;
indeed, no state action is permitted to invade this sacred zone except upon observance of due process of law.
Like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail provides complete substance to the guarantee
of liberty under the Constitution; without it, the right to liberty would not be meaningful, while due process
would almost be an empty slogan.[4] A related right is the right to be presumed innocent from where, the
right to bail also draws its strength.
Bail is accorded to a person under the custody of the law who, before conviction and while he enjoys the
presumption of innocence, may be allowed provisional liberty upon the filing of a bond to secure his appearance
before any court, as required under specified conditions.[5] State interest is recognized through the submitted
bond and by the guarantee that the accused would appear before any court as required under the terms of the
bail.
In Leviste v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained the nature of bail in the following manner:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing
question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval,"
often years long, between arrest and final adjudication. Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring the accused's presence at trial.
The constitutional mandate is that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x."[7]
Under this provision, bail is clearly a demandable constitutional right; it only ceases to be so recognized when
evidence of guilt of the person - charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death - is found to be strong. From the perspective of innocence, this degree of evidence
apparently renders less certain the presumption of innocence that the accused enjoys before conviction.
But while bail is separately treated for those charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
higher, the Constitution does not expressly and absolutely prohibit the grant of bail even for the
accused who are so charged.
If the evidence of guilt is not strong, as the courts may determine in their discretion, then the accused may be
demanded still as of right.
If the evidence of guilt, on the other hand, is strong, this preliminary evaluation, made prior to conviction,
may render the presumption of innocence lighter in its effects, but does not totally negate it; constitutionally, the
presumption of innocence that the accused enjoys still exists as only final conviction erases it.
Hand in hand with these thoughts, I have considered the judicial power that the courts have been granted

under the Constitution. This power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. It likewise encompasses the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, through promulgated rules that also cover pleading, practice and procedure.[8]
I hold the view that judicial power, by its express terms, is inclusive rather than exclusive: the specific powers
mentioned in the Constitution do not. constitute the totality of the judicial power that the Constitution grants
the courts. Time and again, the Supreme Court has given this constitutional reality due recognition by acting,
not only within the clearly defined parameters of the law, but also within that penumbral area not definitively
defined by the law but not excluded from the Court's authority by the Constitution and the law.
The Court has particularly recognized its authority to so act if sufficiently compelling reasons exist that would
serve the ends of the Constitution - the higher interests of justice, in this case, the protection and recognition
of the right to liberty based on the special circumstances of the accused.
A prime example of an analogous Court action would be in the case of Leo Echagaray where the Court issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to postpone the execution of Echegaray and asserted its authority to act
even in the face of the clear authority of the President to implement the death penalty.
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[9] the public respondents (Secretary of Justice, et al.) questioned the Court's
resolution dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of Leo Echegaray and argued, among
others, that the decision had already become final and executory, and that the grant of reprieve encroaches
into the exclusive authority of the executive department to grant reprieve.
In ruling that it had jurisdiction to issue the disputed TRO, the Court essentially held that an [a]ccused who
has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. We further reasoned out that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life.[10]
While Echegaray did not involve the right to bail, it nonetheless shows that the Court will not hesitate to
invoke its jurisdiction to effectively safeguard constitutional rights and liberties.
In Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion,[11] the Court applied what it termed as "rules of fair play" so as not to deny
due process to Mark Jimenez during the evaluation process of an extradition proceeding.
In this case, the United States Government requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs forwarded this request to the Department of
Justice. Pending the evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, Jimenez requested for copies of the
official extradition request and all pertinent documents, and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings.
When the DOJ denied his request for being premature, Jimenez filed an action for mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila. The RTC issued an order directing the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the NBI to maintain the status quo by refraining from
conducting proceedings in connection with the extradition request of the US Government. The Secretary of
Justice questioned the RTC's order before this Court.
In dismissing this petition, the Court ruled that although the Extradition Law does not specifically indicate
whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding, the evaluation process understood as the extradition proceedings proper - belongs to a class by itself; it is sui generis. The Court thus
characterized the evaluation process to be similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases so
that certain constitutional rights are available to the prospective extraditee. Accordingly, the Court ordered
the Secretary of Justice to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and lo

grant him a reasonable time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
The Court explained that although there was a gap in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
regarding the basic due process rights available to the prospective extradite at. the evaluation stage of the
proceedings, the prospective extraditee faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed
in court, but even during, the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the
treaty and the implementing law. It added that the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due
process rights in a preliminary investigation, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint,
the affidavits and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents, as well as the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
While the Court in Lantion applied the "rules of fair play" and not its equity jurisdiction, the distinction
between the two with respect to this case, to me, is just pure semantics. I note in this case that the Court still
recognized Jimenez's right to examine the extradition request and all other pertinent documents pertaining to
his extradition despite the gap in the law regarding the right to due process of the person being extradited
during the evaluation stage.
Based on these constitutional considerations, on the dictates of equity and the need to serve the higher
interest of justice, I believe that it is within the authority of the Court to inquire if the special circumstances
the accused submitted are sufficiently compelling reasons for the grant of bail to Enrile.
Equity jurisdiction is used to describe the power of the court to resolve issues presented in a case in
accordance with natural rules of fairness and justice in the absence of a clear, positive law governing the resolution of the issues
posed.[12] Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed
or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.[13]
In Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),[14] we further expounded on this concept as follows:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and
not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
I am not unaware that courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply the law and have no discretion to
disregard the law.[15] Equitable principles must always remain subordinate to positive law, and cannot be
allowed to subvert it, nor do these principles give to the Courts authority to make it possible to do
so.[16] Thus, where the law prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot,
by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.[17] As the Court explained
in Mangahas v. Court of Appeals:[18]
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is
described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often
happens, supplement the law. x x x all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules,
which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the
heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force.
Similarly, in Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Judge Arciaga,[19] the Court held [t]hat there are instances, indeed, in
which a court of equity gives a remedy, where the law gives none; but where a particular remedy is given by
the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be very improper for the
court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows.
Where the libertarian intent of the Constitution, however, is beyond dispute; where this same Constitution itself
does not substantively prohibit the grant of provisional liberty even to those charged with crimes punishable
with reclusion perpetua where evidence of guilt is strong; and where exceptional circumstances are present as

compelling reasons for humanitarian considerations, I submit that the Court does not stray from the
parameters of judicial power if it uses equitable considerations in resolving a case.
I note in this regard that together with Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that:
[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. x x x
Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court states that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Thus, seemingly, there exists a law or, to be
exact, a remedial rule, that forecloses the grant of bail to an accused who falls within the exception identified
under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, cannot foreclose the exercise by the Court of a
discretionary grant of bail because the constitutional provision on bail speaks only of bail as a matter of right
and does not prohibit a discretionary grant by the courts, particularly by the Supreme Court which is the
fountainhead of all rules of procedure and which can, when called for, suspend the operation of a rule of
procedure. In hierarchal terms, the constitutional provision on bail occupies a very much higher plane than a
procedural rule.
Notably, Rule 114 directly addresses the grant of a right under the constitutional provision - a situation where
no equitable considerations are taken into account. In this situation, the Court's hands are in fact tied as it
must comply with the direct command of the Constitution.
But when compelling circumstances exist, as has been described above, the situation cannot but change and
shifts into that penumbral area that is not covered by the exact parameters of the express words of the
Constitution yet is not excluded by it. In this domain, when compelling reasons exist to carry into effect the
intent of the Constitution, equity can come into play.
I reiterate that the fundamental consideration in confining an accused before conviction is to assure his
presence at the trial. The denial of bail in capital offense is on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face a verdict in court. Hence, the exception to
the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of the
evasion of the prosecution.[20]
As the ponencia recognized, these circumstances are Enrile's advanced age (91), his state of health (he has been
in and out of hospital before and since his arrest, a condition that is not surprising based on his age alone),
and the almost nil chance that Enrile would evade arrest.
Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the PGH, testified that Enrile underwent clinical and laboratory
examinations, as well as pulmonary evaluation and pulmonary function tests on various dates on August
2014, and was found to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug theraphy;
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:
a.

Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease;

b.

Heavy coronary artery calcifications;

c.

Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.

(3) Atrial and ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heartbeat) documented by Holter monitoring;
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome and postnasal drip syndrome;
(5) Ophthalmology:
a.

Age-related macular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections

b.

S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a.

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b.

High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c.

Alpha thalassemia;

d.

Gait/balance disorder;

e.

Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f.
Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).
In his Manifestation and Compliance, Dr. Gonzales further added that "the following medical conditions of
Senator Enrile pose a significant risk for life-threatening events": (1) fluctuating hypertension, which may lead
to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmias, which may lead to fatal or
nonfatal cardiovascular events; (3) diffuse atherosclerotic vascular disease may indicate a high risk for
cardiovascular events; (4) exacerbations of asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome may be triggered by certain
circumstances (excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which may cause a deterioration in
patients with Asthma or COPD.
During the July 14, 2014 hearing, the witness-cardiologist expounded on the delicate and unpredictable nature
of Enrile's arrhythmia under the following exchange with the court:
AJ MARTIRES:
Q:

So, the holter monitoring was able to record that the accused is suffering from arrhythmia?
What is arrhythmia, Doctor?

CARDIOLOGIST:
A:

Arrhythmia is an irregular heartbeat. We just reviewed the holter of Senator Enrile this morning
again, prior to coming here, and we actually identified the following irregularities:

There were episodes of atrial fibrillation, which is a very common arrhythmia in elderly individuals, predisposing elderly dangers for stroke;
There were episodes of premature ventricular contractions of PVCs; and episodes of QT tachy cardia.
xxxx

Q:

So, what are these different types of arrhythmia?

A:

Okay, Senator Enrile actually has three (3) different types of arrhythmia, at least, based on our
holter.

One is atrial fibrillation. I would say that it is the most common arrhythmia found in our geriatric patients. It
is a very important arrhythmia, because it is a risk factor for stroke, and Senator Enrile actually already has
one documentation of previous stroke based on an MRI study.
Second, he has premature ventricular contractions (PVCs). Again, very normal in patients who are in his age
group; and
Third, is the atrial tachy cardia, which is another form of atrial fibrillation. He has these three types of
irregular heartbeat.
Q:

These three types are all dangerous?

A:

Yes, your Honor. These arrhythmias are dangerous under stressful conditions. There is no way we
can predict when these events occur which can lead to life-threatening events.

x x x x.[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Dr. Gonzales likewise classified Enrile as a patient "under pharmacy medication" owing to the fact that for
arrhythmia alone, he is taking the following medications: cilostazol; telmisartan; amlodipine; Coumadin;
norvasc; rosuvastin; pantoprazole; metformin; glycoside; centrum silver; nitramine and folic acid.
The records further disclosed that: (1) Enrile has "diabetes mellitus, dyslipidemia, essential hypertension,
extensive coronary artery calcification in the right coronary, left anterior descending and left circumflex,
multifocal ventricular premature beats, episodes of bradycardia, colonic diverticulosis, thoracic and lumbar
spondylosis L4-L5, alpha thalassemia and mucular degeneration, chronic lacunar ischemic zones, scattered
small luminal plaques of proximal middle segments of basilar artery, both horizontal and insular opercural
branches of middle cerebral arteries," and that he takes approximately 20 medicines a day; and (2) Enrile
needs to undergo "regular opthlamologic check-up, monitoring and treatment for his sight threatening
condition;" and that since 2008, he has been receiving monthly intravitreal injections to maintain and preserve
his vision.
Notably, when Dr. Gonzales (PGH Medical Director) was asked during the July 14, 2014 hearing on whether
Enrile - based on his observation - was capable of escaping, he replied that Enrile "has a problem with
ambulation;" and that "even in sitting down, he needs to be assisted."
Significantly, the use of humanitarian considerations in the grant of bail on the basis of health is not without
precedent.
In Dela Rama v. People,[22] accused Francisco Dela Rama filed a motion before the People's Court asking for
permission to be confined and treated in a hospital while his bail petition was being considered. The People's
Court ordered that the Dela Rama be temporarily confined and treated at the Quezon Institute. It also
rejected Dela Rama's bail application.
During Dela Rama's stay in the hospital. Dr. Miguel Canizares of the Quezon Institute submitted a report to
the People's Court stating that Dela Rama suffered from a minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic granular pharyngitis. He also recommended that Dela Rama continue his stay in the
sanatorium for purposes of proper management, treatment and regular periodic radiographic check-up up of
his illness.[23]

Dela Rama re-applied for bail on the grounds of poor health, but the People Court rejected his petition for
bail was again rejected. Instead, it ordered that Dela Rama be further treated at the Quezon Institute, and that
the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute submit monthly reports on the patient's condition.
Acting on Dela Rama's second petition for certiorari, this Court ruled that the People's Court had acted with
grave abuse of discretion by refusing to release Dela Rama on bail. It reasoned out as follows:
The fact that the denial by the People's Court of the petition for bail is accompanied by the above quoted
order of confinement of the petitioner in the Quezon Institute for treatment without the letter's consent,
does not in any way modify or qualify the denial so as to meet or accomplish the humanitarian purpose or
reason underlying the docfrine adopted by modern trend of courts decision which permit bail to
prisoners, irrespective of the nature and merits of the charge against them, if their continuous
confinement during the pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their
life.
xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is
actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen many similar cases, later progressing into advance
stages when treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner's
previous petition for bail was denied by the People's Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering
from quieseent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People's Court in sending the
petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs,
was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly
in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People's Court has adopted and applied
the well-established doctrine cited in our above quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases
against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold
that the People's Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.
(Emphasis ours).
Contrary to what the People insinuated in its motion, there has been no Court decision expressly
abandoning Dela Rama. That the amendments to Rule 114 did not incorporate the pronouncement in Dela
Rama (that bail may be granted if continued confinement in prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life) did not ipso facto mean that the Court was precluding an accused from citing humanitarian
considerations as a ground for bail.
In United States v. Jones,[24] the United States Circuit Court held that [w]here an application for bail showed that
the prisoner's health was bad, his complaint pulmonary, and that, in the opinion of his physician, confinement
during the summer might so far increase his disorder as to render it ultimately dangerous, x x x [t]he humanity
of our laws, not less than the feelings of the court, favor the liberation of a prisoner upon bail under such
circumstances. According to the court, it is not necessary that the danger which may arise from his
confinement should be either immediate or certain. If, in the opinion of a skillful physician, the nature of his
disorder is such that the confinement must be injurious and may be fatal, the prisoner "ought to be bailed."
I also point out that per the testimony of Dr. Servillano, the facilities of the PNP General Hospital (where
Enrile had been detained) were inadequate to address emergency situations, such as when Enrile's condition
suddenly worsens. Thus, Enrile's continued confinement at this hospital endangered his life.
While it could be argued that Enrile could have been transferred to another, better-equipped, hospital, this
move does not guarantee that his health would improve. The dangers associated with a prolonged hospital

stay were revealed in court by the government's own doctor, Dr. Gonzales. To directly quote from the
records:
AJ QUIROZ:
Q:

Being confined in a hospital is also stressful, right?

DIRECTOR GONZALES:
A:

Yes, your Honor, you can also acquire pneumonia, hospital intensive pneumonia, if you get hospital
acquired pneumonia, these are bacteria or micro organisms that can hit you, such that we don't
usually confine a patient.
If it is not really life threatening, such that it is better to have a community acquired pneumonia,
because you don't have to use sophisticated antibiotics. But if you have a prolonged hospital stay,
definitely, you would get the bacteria in there, which will require a lot of degenerational antibiotics.

x x x x[25]
I therefore reiterate, to the point of repetition, that Enrile is already 91- years old, and his immune system is
expectedly weak. His body might not adjust anymore to another transfer to a different medical facility.
To be sure, Enrile's medical condition was not totally unknown to the prosecution. To recall, Enrile
filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan on
July 4, 2014 and July 7, 2014, respectively. In the former motion, Enrile claimed that that "his advanced age
and frail medical condition" merited hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under
such conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan. He additionally prayed that in the event of a
medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be
allowed to access an outside medical facility. In his motion to fix bail, Enrile argued that his age and voluntary
surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances. The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Fix Bail on July 9, 2014; the prosecution also submitted its Opposition to the Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital. To be sure, the prosecution had not been kept in the dark as regards
the medical condition of Enrile.
I also submit, on the matter of evasion, that we can take judicial notice that Enrile had been criminally
charged in the past and not once did he attempt to evade the jurisdiction of the courts; he submitted himself
to judicial jurisdiction and met the cases against him head-on.[26]
The People's insinuation that Enrile has shown "propensity to take exception to the laws and rules that are
otherwise applicable to all, perhaps out of a false sense of superiority or entitlement" due to his refusal to
enter a plea before the Sandiganbayan; his act of questioning the insufficiency of the details of his indictment;
a motion to fix bail that he filed instead of a petition for bail; and his act of seeking detention in a hospital instead
of in a regular facility, were uncalled for. Enrile was well within his right to avail of those remedies or actions
since they were not prohibited by the Rules.
We are well aware that Enrile, after posting bail, immediately reported for work in the Senate. This
circumstance, however, does not ipso facto mean that he is not suffering from the ailments we enumerated
above (as found and testified to by the physicians).
To be fair, the majority did not hold that Enrile was so weak and ill that he was incapacitated and unable to
perform his duties as Senator; it merely stated that he should be admitted to bail due to his old age and ill
health.
Surely, one may be ill, and yet still opt to report for work. We note that Enrile told the media that he reported

to work "to earn my pay," adding that, "I will perform my duty for as long as I have an ounce of energy."[27] If
Enrile chose to continue reporting for work despite his ailments, that is his prerogative.
Misplaced reliance on the equal protection clause
Contrary to the Ombudsman's claim, the grant of provisional liberty to Enrile did not violate the equal
protection clause under the Constitution.
The guarantee of equal protection of the law is a branch of the right to due process embodied in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution. It is rooted in the same concept of fairness that underlies the due process
clause. In its simplest sense, it requires equal treatment, i.e., the absence of discrimination, for all those under
the same situation.[28]
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[29] the Court explained this concept as follows:
x x x [E]qual protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities. In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.
Hence, any claim of violation of the equal protection clause must convincingly show that there exists a
classification that is blatantly arbitrary or capricious, and that there is no rational basis for the differing
treatment. The present motion for reconsideration had not shown that there were other nonagenarian
charged with a capital offense who are currently behind bars.
We note in this regard that Resolution No. 24-4-10 (Re: Amending and Repealing Certain Rules and Sections
of the Rules on Parole and Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency of the 2006
Revised Manual of the Board of Pardons and Parole) directs the Board to recommend to the President the
grant of executive clemency of, among other, inmates who are seventy (70) years old and above whose
continued imprisonment is inimical to their health as recommended by a physician of the Bureau of
Corrections Hospital and certified under oath by a physician designated by the Department of Health.
If convicted persons (i.e., persons whose guilt have been proven with moral certainty) are allowed to be
released on account of their old age and health, then there is no reason why a mere accused could not be
released on bail based on the same grounds.
The Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman did nor show any direct link of Enrile to the so-called PDAF scam
As the ponente of another Enrile case, I also made a painstaking cross-reference to the 144-page Joint
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dated March 28, 2014 (which became the basis of Enrile's
indictment before the Sandiganbayan), but did not see anything there to show that Enrile received kickbacks
and/or commissions from Napoles or her representatives.
This Joint Resolution contained an enumeration of the amounts of Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
released by the DBM; the projects and activities; the intended beneficiaries/LGUs; the total
projects/activities cost; the implementing agency; the project partners/NGOs; the disbursement vouchers
and their respective amounts and dates; the check numbers; the paying agencies/claimant or payee; the
signatories of the vouchers; and the signatories of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
Notably, Enrile's signature did not appear in any of the documents listed by the prosecution. The sworn
statements of the so-called whistleblowers, namely Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, Merlina Suas, as well as Ruby

Tuason's Counter-Affidavit, also did not state that Enrile personally received money, rebates, kickbacks or
commissions. In her affidavit, Tuason also merely presumed that whatever Reyes "was doing was with Senator
Enrile's blessing" since there were occasions when "Senator Enrile would join us for a cup of coffee when he
would pick her up." Luy's records also showed that that the commissions, rebates, or kickbacks amounting to
at least P172,834,500.00 (the amount alleged in the plunder charge) were received by either Reyes or Tuason.
My findings were verified by recent news reports stating that the prosecutors admitted that they had no
evidence indicating that Enrile personally received kickbacks from the multi-billion-peso pork barrel scam
during the oral summation for the petition to post bail of alleged pork scam mastermind Janet Lim-Napoles
before the Sandiganbayan Third Division. These reports also stated that prosecutor Edwin Gomez admitted
that the endorsement letters identifying the Napoles-linked foundations as the beneficiaries of Enrile's PDAF
were not signed by Enrile (Gomez said six of the endorsement letters were signed by Reyes while the rest
were signed by Enrile's other chief of staff, Atty. Jose Antonio Evangelista).[30]
I make it clear that I am not in any way prejudging the case against Enrile before the Sandiganbayan. I am
simply pointing out that based on the records available to me as the ponente of a related Enrile case, there was no
showing that Enrile received kickbacks or commissions relating to his PDAF. Whether Enrile conspired with
his co-accused is a matter that needs to be threshed out by the Anti-Graft Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I vote to DENY the present motion for reconsideration.

DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J:
After his release solely on the basis of his frail health, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile immediately reported for
work at the Senate.[1]
Until the end of his term on June 30, 2016, he actively and publicly participated in the affairs of the
Senate.[2] The majority maintains that his release on humanitarian grounds due to his frail health still
stands.[3] This is a contradiction I cannot accept.
With due respect to my esteemed colleagues, I maintain my dissent.
The reversal of the Sandiganbayan Decision on its actions on the Motion to Fix Bail filed by petitioner is an
unacceptable deviation from clear constitutional norms and procedural precepts. Carving this extraordinary
exception is dangerous. The ponencia opens the opportunity of unbridled discretion of every trial court. It
erases canonical and textually based interpretations of our Constitution. It undermines the judicial system and
weakens our resolve to ensure that we guarantee the rule of law.
I
Fundamental to resolving this Petition for Certiorari is Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution:
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence

of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail is a constitutional right of the accused. It should be correctly read in relation to his fundamental right to
be presumed innocent.[4] However, contrary to the position of the ponencia and of Associate Justice Arturo
Brion in his Separate Opinion, availing of this right is also constrained by the same Constitution.
When the offense charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is automatic. The only discretion of the
court is to determine the amount and kind of bail to be posted.[5] When the crime is not punishable
by reclusion perpetua, there is no need for the court to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Equally fundamental, from the clear and unambiguous text of the provision of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, and our jurisprudence, is that when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail shall be
granted only after a hearing occasioned by a petition for bail. The phrase "except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong" found in the Constitution is a sovereign determination
that qualifies the presumption of innocence and the right to bail of persons detained under custody of law.
There is no room for equity when the provisions of the law are clear.
The Sandiganbayan, in that hearing, provides the prosecution with the opportunity to overcome its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt is strong.
The opportunity granted to the prosecution to prove that evidence of guilt is strong so as to defeat the prayer
of an accused to be released on bail is a mandatory constitutional process.[6] It is part of the prosecution's
right to due process. It is an elementary requirement of fairness required by law and equity. In criminal
prosecutions, it is not only the accused that is involved. The state represents the People. Thus, violating the
prosecution's right to due process of law trivializes the interest of the People in criminal actions.
Thus, when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is regarded as a "matter of discretion."[7]
When bail is a matter of discretion,[8] an application for bail must be filed and a bail hearing must be
mandatorily conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.[9] Absent this, bail can neither be
granted nor denied.
Accused was charged with plunder. Under Republic Act No. 7080,[10] plunder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Accused, through counsel, submitted a Motion to Fix Bail and thereby precluded any
determination on whether the evidence against him was strong. Accused, through counsel, disregarded the
fundamental requirements of the Constitution, the Rules of Court that this Court promulgated, and the
unflinching jurisprudence of this Court.
The strength or weakness of the evidence has not been conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan could not do so because accused's Motion to Fix Bail did not provide the prosecution the
opportunity to present proof of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Rather, the Motion to Fix Bail was
premised on the following grounds:
First, the mitigating circumstances of accused's advanced age and his alleged voluntary surrender.[11] Second,
his allegation that his age and physical condition ensured that he was not a flight risk.[12]
To repeat for purposes of emphasis, the prosecution did not have the opportunity to present evidence of
whether the evidence of guilt was strong. This opportunity was truncated by accused himself when his
counsel filed a Motion to Fix Bail, and not an application or a petition for bail as required by existing rules.
Justice Brion reveals that he has weighed the evidence still being presented before the Sandiganbayan.[13] In

his Separate Opinion, he points to his evaluation of the annexes attached to another Petition filed before this
Court, which had nothing to do with the weight of the evidence or with whether accused is entitled to bail.
Enrile v. People,[14] docketed as G.R. No. 213455, has nothing to do with this case. It cannot even be
consolidated with this case docketed as G.R. No. 213847. That case raised the issue of whether there were
sufficient allegations in the Information to sustain an arraignment.[15] It did not occasion a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong. To sustain the relief of petitioner, there was no need to
examine the admissibility and weight of the evidence.
Documentary annexes attached to the pleadings in G.R. No. 213455 do not appear to have been evidence
presented, admitted, and weighed by the Sandiganbayan in an application for bail. Neither, then, should a
news report[16]hearsay in characterbe accepted by any Justice of the Supreme Court as proof without the
news report having undergone the fair process of presentation and admission during trial or in a proper
hearing before the Sandiganbayan. Not only is it improper; it is unfair to the prosecution, and it is another
extraordinary deviation from our Rules of Court.
II
I am also unable to accept the ponencia's ruling that:
Clearly, the People were not denied the reasonable opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations about his
advanced age and the instability of his health even if the allegations had not been directly made in connection
with his Motion to Fix Bail.[17] (Emphasis in the original)
With all due respect, this conclusion is based on an inaccurate appreciation of what happened before the
Sandiganbayan and the content of the present Petition for Certiorari. To recall:
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of plunder punishable under
Republic Act No. 7080. Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death[.]
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to
post bail if the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him. On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no warrant of arrest had been issued at that
time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile's arrest.
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and voluntary surrender were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal. He
also argued that his alleged age and physical condition indicated that he was not a flight risk. His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set
the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating
circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to
reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a
Reply dated July 11, 2014.
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital dated July 4, 2014, arguing that "his advanced age and frail medical condition" merit hospital arrest

in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by the
Sandiganbayan. He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the
Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside medical facility. His
prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him under hospital
confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing authority given to
the hospital head or administrator to exercise his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow
Enrile's immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of
emergency or necessity, secured with appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate medical
treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.
After the prosecution's submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital for medical examination until further orders of the court.[18]
What is clear is that there were two (2) Motions separately filed, separately heard, and were the subjects of
separate orders issued by the Sandiganbayan.
The Motion to Fix Bail was filed on July 7, 2014.[19] The Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Fix Bail on July 9, 2014.[20] Accused filed his Reply on July 11, 2014.[21] The Sandiganbayan Resolution
denying accused's Motion to Fix Bail for being premature was issued on July 14, 2014.[22]
It is this Resolution dated July 14, 2014only this Resolution, together with the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration of this Resolution, and no otherthat is the subject of the present Petition for Certiorari.
The other motion was a Motion for Detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital dated July
4, 2014. It was in this Motion that accused argued "his advanced age and frail medical condition."[23] The
prosecution submitted an Opposition to this Motion on July 7, 2014.[24] This Motion was orally heard on July
9, 2014.[25] There was a separate Order allowing accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital. This Order was dated July 9, 2014.[26]
The Order dated July 9, 2014, which allowed accused's detention in a hospital, is not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari. Apart from his hospital detention not being the subject of this Petition, accused did
not question the conditions of his detention. The prosecution had conclusive basis to rely on accused's
inaction. While evidence of his advanced age and frail medical condition was presented, accused was satisfied
with hospital arrest and not release.
The basis for the Motion to Fix Bail was not the frail condition of accused. Rather, it was the Motion's
argument that there were two (2) mitigating circumstances: advanced age and voluntary surrender.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan Resolution, the subject of this Petition for Certiorari, states:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of
right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.[27]
Accused, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] based on the same argument, but this was
similarly denied.[29] Accused only raised his frail health in relation to the conclusion that he was not a flight
risk.[30]

Accused did not justify, on the basis of his frail health, his allowance to bail without a hearing on whether the
evidence of guilt was strong. As extensively discussed in the Dissenting Opinion filed with the first resolution
of this case, the majority in this Court granted bail on a ground other than that which was argued or prayed
for in this Petition.
Furthermore, the certification relied upon by the majority was presented not for having accused released on
bail. The hearing relating to this certification was to determine whether accused's detention in a hospital
should continue.[31] It was not for determining whether there were serious reasons for his urgent release.
Dr. Jose C. Gonzales' certification was in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 28, 2014.[32] This
certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation[33] before this Court regarding the remoteness of
the possibility of flight of accused. This certification was not submitted to release accused on bail due to his
ailments.
Finally, we imposed an arbitrary amount of P1,000,000.00 as bail for accused.[34] The prosecution was not
given the opportunity to comment on the amount of bail. The sufficiency of this amount, in relation to the
net worth of accused or his sources of income, has not been presented in evidence. Whether it suffices to
guarantee his appearance in further court proceedings, therefore, is the product of the collective conjecture of
this Court. We are bereft with factual basis. Our rules are designed to have the Sandiganbayan or a trial court
determine these facts. It is not within our competence to receive this type of evidence. Certainly, it is not
within our jurisdiction to go beyond the provisions of the Constitution.
In my view, these observations show a quintessential disrespect for the inherent due process rights of the
prosecution. We have sprung a surprise on the prosecution, and have given an unexpected gift to accused.
This is not fairness as I understand it.
III
Justice Brion further suggests that the prosecution was unable to show any other nonagenarian who is
incarcerated and is in the same position as petitioner in this case.[35]
This certainly is not the point. Again, the point is whether there is basis in our Constitution or in our Rules of
Court to grant exceptional treatment to petitioner. I maintain that there is none.
Even if there were, there are still those whose conditions are worse off than that of petitioner.
Those of us who have prosecuted or defended an accused at various levels in our court system know the
conditions of detention facilities in this country. Many of my colleagues have had the privilege of serving as
judges of both the first- and second-level trial courts. They have more intimate knowledge of the conditions
of our detention because they have supervised detention facilities as executive judges of their various stations.
To say that detention facilities are overcrowded is an understatement. In many places, detention prisoners
have nowhere to get sound sleep. These facilities are populated by those who are under detention for
allegedly selling less than one (1) gram of shabu, for allegedly stealing a cell phone, for allegedly committing
estafa against their employers, and for the countless allegations of crimes committed only by those who do
not have as many opportunities as petitioner in this case. They do not have the resources to hire their own
medical specialists. They do not have the ability to pay for focused legal assistance. Thus, they suffer in
silence. They await the ordinary course of justice required by our law and our Rules of Court. They do not
have the resources to craft exceptions to what is contained in our law.
Indeed, petitioner is a nonagenarian who suffers from some medical ailments. Yet, we should not erase the

privileges he was given.

Petitioner is accused of plunder, which requires a charge that he has defrauded the people of at least
P75,000,000.00 or more and has taken advantage of his public office.[36] He was not accused of stealing bread
because he was driven by the hopelessness of fearing that his children would go hungry.
Petitioner did not share the crowded spaces of the impoverished hordes in detention facilities. He was given
the privilege of being incarcerated in special quarters, and then later, in a government hospital. There was a
constant stream of clothes and food that came to him through his friends, family, and staff.
Upon his release, petitioner would have mansions to go home to, with facilities full of comfort. He would not
need to live in unnumbered shanties that could barely survive the vagaries of our weather systems.
Narrowing our vision and making his privileges invisible will result in unfounded judicial exceptionalism.
Judicial exceptionalism, consciously or unconsciously, favors the rich and powerful. Injustice entrenches
inequality. Inequality assures poverty. Poverty ensures crimes that provide discomfort to the rich. But crimes
are expressions of hopelessness by many, no matter how illegitimate.
There may be no more nonagenarians who suffer in special confinement in government hospitals. Certainly,
there are many more languishing in our ordinary detention centers.
All these should bother our sense of fairness.
IV
A lot of media coverage was given to my statements in Part IV of my Dissenting Opinion of the first
resolution of this case. Many have concluded that my point was to imply that my colleagues who voted for
the majority did not have the opportunity to read and reflect on the final contents of the Decision. Memes
were generated to cast the result of this case as a battle between the Justices of this Court.
That was neither my express nor implied intention. No opinion of this Court should be interpreted in that
manner. Every member of this Court knew the consequences of his or her position.
The purpose of that narrative was to explain why another Associate Justice chose not to write her separate
dissenting opinion[37] and to put in context the "apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote and
the date of promulgation"[38] of the judgment.
A dissenting opinion, in my view, should be read to express the principled view of its author regarding the
facts, issues, legal principles, and interpretative methodologies that should be applied in a case. It is never the
forum to cast doubt on the character of esteemed colleagues.
Dissents, by their very nature, cause a degree of discomfort to those whose views are different. This
discomfort is part of a collegiate court and a vibrant judiciary. It should be appreciated by the public as
reflecting competing points of view on matters of principle, not as a staged and puerile clash of gladiators.
The drama lies on the points raised, not on the personalities that are mediums for these standpoints.
Effective dissents strive to be articulate, but not caustic. An effective dissent is an effort to call attention to
details and principles that may have been overlooked by the majority. It is never a means to undermine the
competence of any member of this Court. It is the result of a constitutional duty to lay down what each of us
views as a more convincing standpoint as well as a more reasoned and just conclusion.
Thus, I maintain my dissent. Justice should always be in accordance with law. Accommodations given to

select accused on very shaky legal foundations weaken the public's faith on our judicial institutions.
I urge that we reconsider.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.