City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo: Mik Peneyra - Soriano

RTC: City of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
1.
CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE GRECIA- CUERDO
DOCTRINE:
CA: Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari

ISSUE:
Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. Although there is not
express provision proved for by the RA. 1125 and RA 9282, The Constitution provides it with
such power, hence, they have jurisdiction.
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
FACTS:
YES/AFFIRMATIVE
-
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,

assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against
private respondents
In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to
Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code.
Private respondents paid because the issuance of business permit is a precondition. However their payment was made under protest.
Private respondents contends that:

o
Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative
of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent

portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
The Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the
level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With
respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the
appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among
others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional
Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction,
is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
Although there is no express provision provided for by R.A. 1125 as amended by R.A. 9282
that CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders issued
by the RTC in the local tax cases, the 1987 Constitution nonetheless, provides, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
XXX
Peititioner filed a complaint for Recovery and refund oof the illegally
collected business tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction"
RTC: Granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
1 Mik Peneyra - Soriano
2. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent\
G.R. No. 181416
November 11, 2013
(Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals)
Petitioner and MLHI filed separate motions to dismiss
RTC: GRANTED petitioner and MLHIs motion to dismiss on the reason that,
jurisdiction over the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
DOCTRINE:
CA: REVERSED and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the case to
the RTC for further proceedings. According to them, the controversy is an ordinary
civil action for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
Issues concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium corporation

are not within the jurisdiction of the HLURB. It is with the Regional Trial Courts sitting as a
special commercial court.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
-
Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc.

(MLHI), condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati
Petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga,

demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and
assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Petitioner claimed that respondents
obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI.
Whether or not a dispute between condominium owner and corporation falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB
HELD:
Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously

paying his dues shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and
director of petitioner.
NO, it falls with the ordinary courts sitting as a special commercial court. Pursuant to Section
5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts.
Accordingly plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Meridien, to demand for the

payment of said unpaid association dues and other assessments imposed on
the condominium unit and being claimed by defendant [MPMCC].
Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners
Associations, approved on January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010, empowers
the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association and/or intra-association controversies or
conflicts concerning homeowners associations. However, we cannot apply the same in the
present case as it involves a controversy between a condominium unit owner and a
condominium corporation.
x x x defendant Meridien claimed however, that the obligation does not exist
considering that the matter was already settled and paid by defendant
Meridien to defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the intracorporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB.
Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date however, no
explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC]
XXX
Respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for
during the 2002 election of petitioners Board of Directors.
3. EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN, Respondents.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner and MLHI
G.R. No. 180321
March 20, 2013
DOCTRINE:
MTC the exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
pursuant to RA 7691.
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land. with an
aggregate area of 82,972 square meters.
While on board a jeepney, Elenitas mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a

conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said
property.
Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of
the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her
husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26,
1990, Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong (Lorna)
A few months later, , Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00
(TCT No. 137466)
Respondents (Elenita Dinglasan) were then forced to file a case before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 137466. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her
mother, Anita Padlan.
Respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed
to present evidence ex parte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over cases involving properties
worth less than 20,000 outside MM and not more then 50,000 inside MM
HELD:
FACTS:
Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It was Maura who
defrauded the respondents by selling the property to Lorna without their authority.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default

with Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of
Defendant.5 Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her,
because the summons was not validly served upon her person.
Petitioners claim is meritorious. RA. 7691 has already amended BP blg. 129, thus granting the
MTC exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any
further with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the
above-quoted provisions.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject
property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the
amount of P4,000.00.
RTC:
-
By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. Moreover,
respondents, as plaintiffs( heirs of Santiago) , had failed to present their evidence
The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents had failed to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented their evidence yet.
On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed
defendants "to present their evidence ex-parte." 12
DOCTRINE
If the counterclaim is with defect then it can be dismissed by the court for under such ground.
However, if the counterclaim is with merit, under the amended rules, now unequivocally
protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the order issued in

open court on 27 July 2005, opting however not to seek that their complaint be
reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be
disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte.
MoR of respondents was granted
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC
respondents filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,

wherein they argued that the prevailing jurisprudential rule18 is that "compulsory
counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action,"
and "a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaims."
The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 on a pure question of law
XXX
4. PINGA vs. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO
FACTS:
-
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for
injunction4 filed with Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court
Respndents ( Heirs of Santiago ) alleged in essence that petitioner and co-defendant

Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent,
cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees therein.
petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the properties in

question
o
asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom

defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession
thereof since the 1930s
had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint
for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga.
That respondents application for free patent over the properties was
rejected by the Office of the President in 1971
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim.
HELD:
Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to
which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such
dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he
opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and
reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he
must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiffs
motion to dismiss.These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him
regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.
The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June 13, 1998 at Shangrila Plaza Hotel,
EDSA, Mandaluyong City, Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado represented
themselves to Teruel as the president, vice-president/treasurer, and managing
director, respectively, of VSH Group Corporation;
That they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant

Equipment Package which provides the user easy access to the internet via
television; that they assured him that after he pays the purchase price ofP65,000.00,
they will immediately deliver to him two units of the internet access device; that
relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two units; and that
despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
If the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the
amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on
those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now
unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal
of the complaint.
CONTENTION OF PETITONER
XXX
-
It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. He alleged that they
formed the VSH Group as a corporation "for the principal purpose of pooling the
commissions they will receive as Star Consultant Trainers and then dividing said
commissions among themselves according to their agreement";
That while he admitted that the two units of internet access devices purchased by
herein respondent Teruel were not delivered to him, however, this was not due to
their alleged fraudulent representations since they merely acted as sales agents of
F.O.M. Phils., Inc.;
That they found out too late that the said company could not cope with its
commitment to them as it ran short of supplies of telecommunication products.
5. EDGARDO V. QUESADA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and CLEMENTE TERUEL, Respondents
G.R. No. 150325 August 31, 2006
DOCTRINE
GN: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
must be filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the same Rules.
EXP: Where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to
justify such action.
Office of the Prosecutor

-
Found probable cause hence a comliant for estafa was filed against the petitioner
While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with
this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in
dismissing his Petition for Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
-
Clemente M. Teruel, herein respondent, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Mandaluyong City, an affidavit-complaint charging Edgardo V. Quesada (herein
petitioner), Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo Corgado with the CRIME OF
ESTAFA under Article 315, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
TERUELS CONTENTION
Whether or not an instant petition of certiorari can be filed directly to the Supreme Court
HELD:
PMU-Tacloban Inventory Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated

that petitioner failed to account for equipment of PPA value at P65,542.25 and to
liquidate cash advances amounting to P130,069.61
He was found also to have incurred unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to
July 23, 1984.
Nineteen months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal charge for

Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private Business without permission as required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect
of Duty was filed against petitioner. Based on said charges he was ordered
preventively suspended and has been out of service since then.
Decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC), through its Administrative Action Board, finding
petitioner guilty of Gross Negligence on two counts:
NO, it is in utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.
XXX
6. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the

General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondents.
for his failure to account for the forty-four (44) assorted units
of equipment, among them a Sony Betamax and a TV
Camera;
and for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash

advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of four years.
G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992

-
Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences.
Accordingly, he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the
corresponding accessory penalties.
Petitioner appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of

respondent Civil Service Commission.which rendered a Decision reversing the
Decision of the DOTC.
PPA,through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an

appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the
appeal to respondent CSC
Respondent CSC rendered its now assailed Resolution reversing the decision of
MPSB, ehcih results to the dismissal of Magapale.
(Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari)

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
-
Petitioner started his career in government as an employee in the Presidential

Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in 1975, he
transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre Superintendent. He
was promoted to the position of Port Manager in 1977 of the Port Management Unit
(PMU), General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the same year to PPAPMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged the functions of Port Manager.
ISSUE:
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision;
Whether or not respondent CSC, in issuing its Resolution No. 90-962, gravely abused its
discretion.
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision, unless a petition for the reconsideration is seasonably filed;
and
HELD:
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which
shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal
to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice of
appeal, with its comments, if any.
YES.
After Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, (204 SCRA 965 [1991]), the extent of the
authority of respondent CSC to review the decisions of the MSPB is now a settled matter.
The Court, in said case held:
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of:
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
(Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs,
153 SCRA 318).
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippines Civil

Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But the respondent is exonerated of
said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion on appeal.
While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service Commission that under Section 12
(par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Book V of Executive Order 292, the CSC does have the power
to
Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read together with the other sections of
the same sub-title and book of Executive Order 292, particularly Section 49 which prescribes
the following requisites for the exercise of the power of appeal, to wit:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from
office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former
position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Mendez
v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the MSPB decision
was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
7. NESTOR SANDOVAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DOROTEO CAEBA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch 20, DEPUTY
SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila, Branch 20), and ESTATE DEVELOPERS &
INVESTORS CORPORATION, respondents
G.R. No. 90503 September 27, 1990
FACTS:
August 20, 1987 private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila for the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision
lot, pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest. On January 29, 1988 the trial court
rendered a decision.
It appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so that after receiving the
evidence of private respondent, the trial court rendered its decision on January
19,1988, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint and the
adduced in support therefor, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The sum of P73,867.42 plus interest and other charges
commencing from January 1, 1988 until fully paid;
2. Such sum which shall not be less than P2,000.00 or 25%
of the amount of delinquency whichever is greater, as and for
attorney's fees.
3. Costs against the defendant.
HELD:
NO, ordinary courts has no jurisdiction.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was
given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows:
SEC.1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall haveexclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman;and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis
supplied.)
4. SO ORDERED. 1
-
On September 28, 1988 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce its decision that had become final and executory.
On September 30, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and that its decision is null and void. A motion for reconsideration of the writ
of execution was also filed by petitioner. An opposition to both motions was filed
by private respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner.
On February 17, 1989 the trial court denied the motion to vacate the judgment on
the ground that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments
regarding a subdivision lot.
The language of this section, particularly, the second portion thereof, leaves no room for doubt
that exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested
not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission and thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). 3
Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from petitioner
represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner purchased. Petitioner
alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop
the subdivision pursuant to their agreement.
In Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, 4 the suit which was filed with
the NHA, likewise involved non-payment of installments over a subdivision lot, wherein this
Court held that the NHA has exclusive authority to hear and decide the case.
8. Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent
and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
DOCTRINE:
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims,
third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of
the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
FACTS:
-
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer
within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially
against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses
of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the
body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said
case.
It was later on re-raffled with the exemption of Judge Castro
n December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by

petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of
Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of
this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did
not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the
prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private
respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance
with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the
Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the
Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This
was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning
the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an

additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not
pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
HELD:
YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same
rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of
the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
Difference of Machester versus this case in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due
to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.
XXX
9. Vda. De Murga vs Chan (mali pa yung issue)
Gr. No. L- 24680 ( October 7, 1968)
FACTS:
-
On January 31, 1949, a contract of lease over said two lots was entered into by and
between Jesusa Vda. de Murga as lessor, and Juanito Chan as lessee, the basic terms
of which pertinent to the present case are
o
The period of the lease was ten (10) years from January 31, 1949;
o
The lessee to pay a monthly rent of P500.00 within the first ten days of
every month;
o
With the consent of the lessor, the lessee may introduce improvements
on the land
The lessee introduced improvements on the land consisting of buildings of the total
costs of P70,000.00.
Before the expiration of the ten-year period of the lease, there had been intercourse
of communications between the lessor and the lessee for the renewal of the lease,
but the parties failed to arrive at an agreement; hence, this action by the lessor
against the lessee, and Clause "7" quoted herein below. (Exhibit A.)
7. That upon the termination of the term of Ten (10) years above
expressed, the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall have the option to
purchase the building or buildings belonging to and constructed by the
said Juanito Chan, and the price of said building or buildings shall be
determined by three commissioners, two of whom shall be appointed by
each of the parties, and the remainder commissioner shall be appointed
by both. However, in the event that the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall
not exercise the right granted her for any reason or cause, this contract of
lease shall be automatically renewed but the period for said renewal
shall, however, be fixed and adjusted again by the parties. It is agreed
further that in case of said renewal, the rental shall also be adjusted by
the parties depending on the business condition which shall then at that
time prevail.
Gusto ng lessor 700.00 pero gusto ng lessee 500.oo lang a month. So when they
failed to agree, the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate the premises. However,
the lessee did not heed the demand. Instead the lessee sent a check to the lessor
amounting to php500.00 as payment for the month of February, 1959.
Thereafter, the lessor returned the check and insisted the lessee should vacate
the premises if he/she will not agree with the new amount of rental.
the lessee chose to remain in the possession of the leased premises and insisted that
the contract of lease stipulated an automatic renewal of the lease, and conformably
thereto, he has a right to continue occupying the premises; and as token of his
decision, he sent to the lessor his check for P500.00 in payment of the monthly rent
corresponding to the month of February 1959. The lessor was undoubtedly not
satisfied with the tendered amount of P500.00, because she had demanded P600.00
or P700.00, as new monthly rent as a condition for the renewal of the lease. And
without any further definite demand on the lessee to vacate the premises filed, on
March 10, 1959, a complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal court of
Zamboanga City against the lessee, Juanito Chan, to eject the latter from the leased
premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful
detainer, and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court (now city court) of
Zamboanga City, under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and decisions
interpreting the same, when particularly considered in the light of the contexture of the
pertinent letter of demand to vacate the leased premises
HELD:
MTC has no jurisdiction
In relation to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the case, it is to be
noted that, after the lessor and the lessee had failed to agree on the renewal of the lease which
terminated on January 31, 1959, the lessor, on February 19, 1959, sent the demand letter
hereinabove quoted, Exhibit J. It was, then, as it is now, the contention of the lessee that such
demand is not that kind of demand contemplated in the Rules of Court as complying with the
jurisdictional requirement that demand to vacate is indispensable in order to determine
whether the tenant's possession has become illegal. On this matter, the rulings in the following
cases are pertinent and applicable:
The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or
otherwise to vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court
in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he
thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
said obligation and necessary demand is first made. (Manotok vs. Guinto, L-9540,
April 30, 1957.)
The lessor may, under Article 1569 of the Civil Code, judicially disposses the lessee
for default in the payment of the price agreed upon. But where such default is based
on the fact that the rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an action for
ejectment cannot lie. (Belmonte vs. Martin, 42 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 2146.)
In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter of February 19, 1959, that
the obligation to vacate the leased premises would be dependent on the failure of the
lessee to agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. As the lessee, however, was in the
physical possession of the land by virtue of a prior contract of lease, and the demand was
in the alternative imposing a new rental, even without taking into account the efficacy of
the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease, which shall be discussed hereafter,
in the light of the ruling inBelmonte vs. Martin, supra, without any
subsequent definite demand to vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did
not incur in default which would give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an
action of unlawful detainer.
FACTS:
the rental is P3,000.00 per month;
the leased premises is only for residence;
and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan,
representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein
the rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month. However,
petitioners refused to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children
(two of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the
apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted
in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan

Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the
premises. Since a written consent from the owner is required for such installation,
she requested respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter
(PUNZALAN) declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and
violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for
photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.
Avelina Zamora filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16,
Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita Punzalan
(respondents attorney-in-fact), docketed as Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa:
Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.
During the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner Avelina Zamora declared

that she refused to sign the new lease contract because she is not agreeable with the
conditions specified therein.
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter. informing her that the lease
is being terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate the premises within 30
days from notice.
10. ZAMORA VS HEIRS OF CARMEN

DOCTRINE:
Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the
former leased to the latter one of her apartment units located at 117-B General Luna
Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the following:
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their
dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File
Action dated September 14, 1997.[5]
of the lease and the proposed execution of a written contract relative thereto. It
appears, however, that no settlement was reached despite a total of nine
meetings at the barangay level.
-
MTC:
-
Respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the Metropolitan Trial

Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against petitioners
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss [7] the complaint on the ground that the
controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation stating the following
grounds:
alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action is

fatally defective because it pertains to another dispute.
when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before

the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the Punong
Barangay
(as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration
proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of
Section 410(b), Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay)
[GENERAL PROVISIONS RULE 1, SECTIONS 1 6]

11. MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN,* Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent
G.R. No. 155713
Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-A, Block 2844
located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila.
Lumbuan leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of three years

with a monthly rental of P5,000.
(CONTRACT)
Petitioners contention was not correct

-
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong

Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between
the parties herein.
The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman were held on
January 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27,
1997, August 3, 1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997
wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also the terms
May 5, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9)
times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the
issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease
contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law
which does not require strict adherence thereto
The parties also agreed that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent
for the succeeding two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,4 and;
the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondents

fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioners
prior written consent.5
Ronquillo later used the premises as residence without the petitioners prior
written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent
of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite
repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and
vacate.
HELD:
YES.
Petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement.
On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the respondent an action for
Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 157922-CV. It was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997, the
respondent received the summons and copy of the complaint. On December 24,
1997, he filed his Answer by mail. Before the MeTC could receive the respondents
Answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 7,
1998.7 Acting upon this motion, the MeTC rendered a decision8 on January 15,
1998, ordering the respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased
premises; to pay the petitioner the amount of P46,000 as unpaid rentals with legal
interest until fully paid; and to pay the petitionerP5,000 as attorneys fees plus cost
of the suit.
Respondent filed a Manifestation calling the MeTc that he filed his Answer in time.
However, the MeTC denied his prayer because it was in the nature of a motion for
reconsideration, which is prohibited under the Rules of Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The
RTC directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for
further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties
fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded
to MeTC
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File
Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was
constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for
possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no
agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial
compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the
confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the
precondition for filing the case in court.17 This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section
410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his
mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the
circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the
Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the Local
Government Code.18
It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place before the lower courts where
the parties have been adequately heard, and all the issues have been ventilated. Since the
records of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it is in a better position to fully
adjudicate the rights of the parties.
12. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Hon. Melicor
DOCTRINE:
Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as
the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when
the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been
complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to
the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.
[G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005]
ISSUE:
FACTS:
-
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disimissing the complaint for the alleged
failure of the parties to comply with the MANDATORY mediation and conciliation
proceedings in the barangay level.
On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all
surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession,
Removal of Construction and Damages against Bertuldo Hinog
They alleged that: they own a 1,399- square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo
Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714;
motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party whom he is representing;
(c) collectible fees due the court can be charged as lien on the judgment;
Sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said
property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light
materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00 only, considering the close
relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded
the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon
(d) considering the lapse of time, the motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed
by petitioners.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged
from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to
pay the correct docket fees, nonetheless, held:
Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property.alleging

ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of
private respondents.
Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct examination. However, on June 24, 1998,
Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint
from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground:
The Court can acquire jurisdiction over this case only upon the payment
of the exact prescribed docket/filing fees for the main cause of action,
plus additional docket fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in
the complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same can be
considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. Upon the complete
payment of such fees, the Court may take appropriate action in the light
of the ruling in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.[10]
-
That private respondents failed to specify in the complaint

the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct
docket fees;
and that under Manchester Development Corporation vs.

Court of Appeals,[5] non-payment of the correct docket fee is
jurisdictional
Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee, private
respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case. [11] Petitioners
opposed the reinstatement[12] but on March 22, 1999, the trial court issued the first
assailed Order reinstating the case
ISSUE:
In an amended motion, filed on October 2, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin further alleged

that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main
subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership,
possession and removal of construction.[7]
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
case to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the
trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all
proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private respondents.
Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds:
HELD:
(a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the institution of the case;
NO.
(b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the death of the original defendant requires a substitution of
parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant and the
At the outset, we note the procedural error committed by petitioners in directly

filing the instant petition before this Court for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
trier of facts.
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
[46]
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
13. PEOPLE VS. CAWALING [G.R. NO. 117970, FEB 24, 2009]
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
-
advantage of their superior strength [sic] wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously

attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon
the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death.
-
After due trial,[14] the court a quo[15] rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994,
finding the accused Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC of Romblon has jurisdiction over cases filed against the accusec who are
public officers
HELD:
YES.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the
case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no
application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2)
the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; [30] and PD 1850, as
amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.
Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen

Ernesto Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an
administrative case[4] had been filed before the National Police Commission, in
which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three
of herein appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan [5] with
the killing of his brother Ronie [6] Ilisan. They were later on found guilty of grave
misconduct resulting to their dismissal
Section 4 of PD 1606[31] reads:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxxxxxxx
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander

Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, [10] an
Information for murder[11]against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the
evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine ofP6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxxxxxxxx
However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing
the members of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section
1 of PD 1952,[32] amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads:
SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the
Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members
of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil
courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all
persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit
any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under
the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case
shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial
jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered
408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or
Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation
from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law:
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE,
ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR
CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to
police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards.
both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive
element of said crime, viz.:
The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to
be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance,
the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal
Code.
*Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged
in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of
the crime.
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR PACLEB,1 Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
*On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was
laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.[33]
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell a lot located
in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarias, Cavite with an approximate are of 18,000
square meters to petitioners for P75 per sq.m.
Javier supposedly purchased the lot from one Rebecca del Rosario who, in turn,
acquired it from respondent and his wife. (Title of the property remained in the
named of the respondents)
petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment for the
lot.
At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb,
respondents son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his
*In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted
earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive
and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos
(P6,000).[34] Sanchez vs. Demetriou[35] clarified that murder or homicide may be committed
wife allegedly surrendered possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on,

petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot.
HELD:
NO.
Aside from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the annotation
on TCT No. T-118375. This decision attained finality on April 19, 1995.
Two things are paramount in possession.16 First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or
taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).1
Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open,
public and peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the
early part of September 1995. During this time, respondent was in the United
States.
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to justify a ruling in
their favor in the complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
Upon respondents return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the
property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting
petitioners and their trustee, Ramon.
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face of this
factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of respondent
in 1994 and 1995 established the possession of respondent. 19 The payment of real estate tax is
one of the most persuasive and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess
in concepto de dueo or with claim of ownership
Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry3 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Dasmarias, Cavite on November 23, 1995.
MTC
-
Ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents and other people claiming
ownership over the property to surrender possession over the property
RTC:
-
Affirmed decision
CA:
-
Reversed the decision and ordered the dismissal of the case of forcible entry filed
by the petitioners
Petitioners laters on filed a motion for reconsideration but such was denied
"[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession." 21 In this case, Ramon, as
respondents son, was named caretaker when respondent left for the United States in
1983.22 Due to the eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent
transferred the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his
return in May 1995.23 In other words, the subject land was in the possession of the respondents
sons during the contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them and
Ramon to prove a turnover of possession. They also seek to prove their exercise of rights over
the land through alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as
declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC. These
instruments, however, fail to convince us of petitioners actual occupancy of the subject land.
First, petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land
as tenants of respondent. Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such
document dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the land. Third, there was no clear proof
in the records of the appointment of Ramon as petitioners trustee save their self-serving
statements to this effect. Finally, at the time the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli document was
executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer Ramon but Oscar.24
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellate court erred in finding that respondent had prior physical possession
of the subject property.
Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name of
respondent.25 "As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of ownership."
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing respondents continuing possession of the subject property,
petitioners allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by means of force,
intimidation and threat was clearly untenable.
14. ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the Court
of Appeals in ruling that the respondent has the better right over the subject property and is the
true owner thereof.
FACTS:
Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the owners of
parcel of land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer certificate of
title.
After giving the amount, the spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was tenanted
by Ramon Pacleb, one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then demanded the cancellation
of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.
Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay
Ramon for his disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the spouses YU
proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his
obligations. So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint
for specific performance and damages against Javier to compel Javier to deliver to
them ownership and possession, and the title to the property.
However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default, so, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The decision and its Certificate of
Finality were annotated in the title of the property.
On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered into an agreement
that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights
over the land.
On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale
and other documents arising from it claiming that the deed of sale supposedly executed
between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario was spurious and the signatures were
forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication since
her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which
was granted by the trial court.
On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against the
respondent with the MTC. They contend that they had prior physical possession over the
property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the respondent ousted them in September
1995. The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set
aside the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decided that it was the respondent who had
prior physical possession of the property which was shown by his payment of real estate taxes
thereon.
On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title with
damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife could not have been
executed on the date appearing thereon. He claimed that he was residing in the US at that time
and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.
On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died, hence, he was
substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his children.
On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the petitioners were
held to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for
specific performance against Javier was already final, and the trial court also ordered the
respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under them to surrender the possession of the
property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against Javier is not
merely an action in personam, but an action in rem, and is thus, conclusive and binding upon
respondent even if he was not a party thereto since it involves a question of possession and
ownership of real property.
HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to
compel him to perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price,
and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The
obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the
complaint filed by the petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action
cannot bind the respondent since he was not a party therein and considering the fact that his
signature and that of his late first wife were forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is
denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent having a better right
over the property as the true owner thereof.
15. FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.

(This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
-
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible
entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of
827 square meters.
On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained
entry into the petitioners property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter
constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square
meter portion of her property along the boundary line.
MTC:
o
Declared writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction permanent
o
Ordered the respondents to vacate and desist from entering and
excavating the property
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the
latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the
respondents) brother, Oscar LaynoThe Sheriff left the summons and complaint with
Oscar Layno(brother of respondent), who was then in the respondents house at No.
572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan., who received the same.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
RTC:
o
The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC
of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC, on the
grounds:
that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and

summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC
never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

complaint in Civil Case No. 879 because the petitioner, the
plaintiff therein, failed to show prior possession of the
property.
That the alleged forcible entry was simply based on the result
of the survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Leonardo de
Vera showing that the property of the respondent encroached
on that of the petitioner.
Manifistation filed with RTC
That she left on February 17, 1999; she returned to the

Philippines on July 30, 2000 and learned, only then, of
the complaint against her and the decision of the MTC
in Civil Case No. 879;
That her brother Oscar Layno was not a resident of the

house at Barangay Buenlag;
That she never received the complaint and summons in

said case
That the affidavit[11] of Oscar Layno declaring that

sometime in April 1999, he was in the respondents
house to collect rentals from Eduardo Gonzales; that the
Sheriff arrived and served him with a copy of the
summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879; and
that he never informed the respondent of his receipt of
the said summons and complaint
RTC: ruled in favor of Vivian Jensen(respondent)

CTA: affirmed
The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for
ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that
since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the
summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial
service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court.
concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and
complaint upon the respondent
ISSUE/S:
1
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint in Civil
Case No. 879 on the respondent herein who was the defendant in the said case.
2
Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an action
in personam or quasi in rem.
HELD:
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of
said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated
February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was
filed, the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident
of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent
was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the
summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on
her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court ,
which reads:
1st Issue
There is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found
Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the
respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a
lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect
the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he
was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode,
where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to
return.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant

cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court had the occasion to state:
-
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is

necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the
person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be
acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
2nd Issue
If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,

substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If
he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to:
(1) substituted service set forth in Section 8;
(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only.
o
A proceeding in personam
is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations

brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel
him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court.
The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,

through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on
him.
An action in personam is said to be one which has for its

object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a
judgment against the propriety to determine its state.
It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to

enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person.
As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is wellsettled that it is an injunctive act in personam.
In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that

proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam.
Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.[25]
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the
action.
-
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building in force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against
the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a writ of
preliminary prohibition or mandatory injunction:
Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. The court may grant preliminary
injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to
prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the
complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property

of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as

defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property.
If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for the plaintiff, it shall then render
judgment in his or her favor, thus:
Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or

liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular
parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the
rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
Sec. 17. Judgment. If, after trial, the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or
as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it
shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a

counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum
found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.
-
From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature
and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on
the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, [29] for the latter to vacate the
property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff,
and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property.[30]
As gleaned from the averments of the petitioners complaint in the MTC, she sought
a writ of a preliminary injunction from the MTC and prayed that the said writ be
made permanent. Under its decision, the MTC ordered the defendant therein (the
respondent in this case), to vacate the property and pay a monthly rental
of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff therein (the petitioner in this case).
Nos. 24015, 24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the
name of defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.
-
"Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for
failure to file their respective answer within the reglementary period.
"Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, St. Jude's
Enterprises, Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed
separate answers to the complaint. Defendants Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Sps.
Catalino Santos interposed defenses, among others, that they acquired the lots in
question in good faith from their former owner, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises,
Inc. and for value and that the titles issued to the said defendants were rendered
incontrovetible, conclusive and indefeasible after one year from the date of the
issuance of the titles by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
"On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. Interposed defenses,
among others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that
the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government
is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's
allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters
is without any basis in fact and in law."
16. REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 116111)

FACTS
-
RTC:
Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, being a portion
of Lot 865-B located in Caloocan City containing an area of 40,623 square
meters. For Lot 865-B-1 defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. was issued TCT No.
22660 on July 25, 1966.
Sometime in March 1966 defendant St Judes Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot No.
865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof
issued Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of
defendants St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was]
covered [by] TCT No. 22660 was later found to have expanded and enlarged from
its original area of 40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of
1,421 square meters.
It was later on sold to several purchasers who bought the property in good faith.
On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action
seeking xxx the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
the trial court dismissed the Complaint.[7] While the plaintiff sufficiently
proved the enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed
property, it presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude Enterprises, Inc.
(St. Jude) had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to
the Land Registration Commission (LRC) for approval.
the appellate court affirmed the trial court. It berated petitioner for
bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the
issuance of St. Judes title and the approval of the subdivision plan.
CA:
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved

subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates
of title in question.
2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioners complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity
of the Torrens System.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[15] the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten

wealth, tried to skirt the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific
constitutional provision. The Court countered:
HELD:
The Court further declared that (t)he real office of the

equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supply[ing] deficiency in the
law, but it should not supplant positive law.
YES!!
-
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not
have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden
defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to said lots. Although they
were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private respondentspurchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry beyond the face
of the titles could have satisfied.The rationale for this presumption has been stated
thus;
The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of
title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving
the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Pascua v.
Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons relying on
the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v.
Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606).
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or error
of its officials or agents. [13] However, like all general rules, this is also subject to
exceptions, viz.:[14]
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rate and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate
to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must
be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases
where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must
not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not
play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.
In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St.
Judes titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to
correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged
inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which
means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.[19]
2nd Issue
True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.[30] Consequently, land erroneously included
in a Torrens certificate of title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such
certificate.[31]
But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear
the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the
absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quite title to land to put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.[32] Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner
from questioning private respondents titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was
never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to
the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision. Finally, because
petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been
committed by its agent who had surveyed the property, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions must be respected. Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by
filing this case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.
17. ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ

FACTS:
o
-
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994.
Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18
July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City,
denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying
reconsideration thereof.
CA:
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A.

Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano
and Estrellita with the RTC on the ground that it was bigamous.
They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves

as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract
false and fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita
was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous
marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for noncompliance with publication requirements.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where
there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts,
like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the
Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia court
and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature
of the action.
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction over the case at bar?

HELD:
RTC has jurisdiction
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that
Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a
courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in
a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the
allegations of the complaint.[7] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of
action.
Petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence,
contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under
Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.
She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of
marriage against the other spouse,[1] hence, it was only Tamano who could file an
action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the sharia courts pursuant
to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
RTC:
o
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss of Estrillita and ruled
that the instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance
with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No.
1083[2] or the Code of Muslim Personal laws.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6)
of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
6. More than three (3) months later, or on April 21, 1993, petitioner went directly
to this Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the denial of its motions.
On November 24, 1993, the court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their memorandum. [3] After the parties submitted their respective
memoranda as directed, petitioner filed a manifestation alleging for the first time that it
sold the lot sometime in September, 1992 to Distileria Bago, Inc. a separate entity with
which the former has substantial stockholdings. Based on such admission, private
respondents moved to dismiss the instant petition, arguing that petitioner is no longer a
real party in interest, having sold the lot.
ISSUE:
What is the remedy of an aggrieved party when the lower court denies his motion to dismiss.
18. La tondena distillers vs. Ponferrada

FACTS:
HELD:
1. Several persons[1] (herein referred to as defendants) reneged on their contract to

sell to private respondents a parcel of land[2] located in Bago City;
However, the petition should be dismissed outright for being filed beyond the reasonable
period,[4] the same having been filed only after more than three months from the time petitioner
received a copy of the assailed RTC resolutions.
2. This breach prompted private respondents to file on August 25, 1987 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City an action for specific performance with
damages against defendants. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on the latters title
although the same was cancelled on November 9, 1988 upon defendants filing a bond;
3. Pending the trial before the lower court on November, 1991, petitioner bought
the above lot from defendants. Aggrieved, private respondents amended their complaint
and impleaded petitioner as an additional defendant alleging that petitioner was not a
buyer in good faith;
4. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
two grounds: no cause of action and improper venue. In support of the first ground,
petitioner asserts that it is a buyer in good faith since the notice of lis pendens was
already cancelled when it bought the lot. As for the second ground, petitioner argued
that venue should be in Bago City where the lot is located and not inBacolod City;
5. On October 1, 1992, petitioner received a resolution from the lower court
denying their motion as there was need for the parties to present evidence on the
question of good faith. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in a
resolution they received on January 20, 1993;
Even assuming that the petition was promptly filed, dismissal is still warranted on
account of the following reasons:
First, an order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither
appealable until final judgment,[5] nor could it generally be assailed on certiorari.[6] The remedy
of the aggrieved party is to file an answer pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 16, and interpose as
defenses, the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an
adverse decision, elevate the whole case by appeal in due time. [7]
Second, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if the denial of the
motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[8] In the case at bar, the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in deferring[9] action on the motion. Section 3 of Rule 16 [10] sanctions deferment
of hearing on the motion until the trial if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable.
Clearly respondent judge had doubts on the allegation of petitioners good faith. This is a
question of fact which necessitates presentation of evidence and is certainly far from
indubitable.[11] It is within the discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged does
not appear to be indubitable [12] and that deferment is only deemed a provisional denial of the
motion to dismiss.
19. CABUTHIAN VS. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION (G.R. NO. 146594)

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without
impleading the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately
proceeded with the case as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent
of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties
without whom no final determination can be had.[25] At best, they are mere necessary parties
who ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action.[26] The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such party.
She argues that the RTC erred in dismissing her Complaint on the grounds of
(1) improper venue
(2) non-joinder of necessary parties
(3) non-payment of proper docket fees.
HELD:
Petitioner was correct
1. We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer
to the issue of venue.[17] Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other
actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides.
2. We side with petitioner. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion
of any party or on the courts own initiative at any stage of the action. [24] The RTC should have
ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order would have been
ground for dismissal of the action.
3.Petitioner insists that the value of the real property, which was the subject of the contract, has
nothing to do with the determination of the correct docket or filing fees.
The RTC ruled that although the amount of damages sought had not been specified in the body
of the Complaint, one can infer from the assessed value of the disputed land that it would
amount to P50 million. Hence, when compared to this figure, the P210 paid as docket fees
would appear paltry.
We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the
case and to trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the
assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the
filing fees. But the Court has already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for
specific performance,[28] which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
20. CITIZEN SURETY VS. MELENCIO-HERRERA (GR NO. L-32170)

FACTS:
-
Petitioner had filed its complaint in the Court below, alleging that at request of
defendant Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiff Surety Company had issued its Surety
Bonds Nos. 4942 and 4944
The first, in favor of Gregorio Fajardo to guarantee payment of a

P5,000-promissory note executed by said Dacanay, and
The second, in favor of Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co., to guarantee

payment of another promissory note in like amount
that in consideration of said bonds, Santiago and Josefina Dacanay

executed Indemnity Agreements, binding themselves jointly and
severally to indemnify plaintiff for any losses, costs and expenses which
it might sustain in connection with the issuance of the bonds aforesaid,
with interest at 12% per annum;
argument that the summons by publication was sufficient and valid under section 16
of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the plaintiff is an action in personam
that as additional security, the Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff a parcel

of land in Baguio City, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-8116, the
mortgage having been duly recorded;
that the promissory notes were not paid .and as a result, plaintiff Surety
was compelled to pay P5,000.00 to Gregorio Fajardo and P4,081.69 to
the Manufacturers Bank;
that the Dacanays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments,
whereupon the Surety caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage to pay its claim of P12,941.69 representing its payments,
interest and stipulated liquidated damages:
that at the foreclosure sale, the land mortgaged was sold to plaintiff, as
highest bidder, for the sum of P2,000.00 leaving an unsatisfied
balance of P10,491.69, that plaintiff sought to recover from defendants
Dacanay, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees, and the costs.
At petitioners request, respondent Judge caused summons to be made by

publication in the newspaper Philippines Herald. But despite the publication and
deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila post office, defendants did
not appear within the period of 60 days from last publication, as required by the
summons.
Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in default; but :instead, the Judge,
by order of May 16, 1970, asked it to show cause why the action should not be
dismissed, the suit being in personam and defendants not having appeared. Then, on
May 29, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the case, despite plaintiff Suretys
HELD:
-
YES.
We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in
personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing
defendant, absent a personal service of summons within the forum. We have
explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such
personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of
due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice Roberto Concepcion, now
Chief Justice, ruled as follows: . . . "It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law
that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons,
within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In other
words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the
Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.Due process of
law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is
strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional
requirement of due process. . . .Although a state legislature has more control over the
form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in actions in
personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants who are personally within the
state and can be found therein is not "due process of law," and statute allowing it is
unconstitutional. (16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis our)"
21. GO vs. UCPB (G.R. NO. 156187)

FACTS:
-
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark

International, Noahs Ark Sugar Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark
Sugar Repacker, Noahs Ark Sugar Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark
Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.[4]
-
Sometime in August 1996, petitioners applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation

with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine
Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos,[5] and was favorably acted upon by the
latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land located
at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square meters, and registered in the
name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with
an area of 14,271 square meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar
Refinery.
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner

was subsequently cancelled[6] by respondent UCPB.
a co-owner of the property covered by TCT No. 64070, although the title is
registered only in the name of Looyuko; that respondent bank was aware that he is a
co-owner as he was asked to sign two deeds of real estate mortgage covering the
subject property; that the approved omnibus credit line applied for by him and
Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by respondent bank on 21 July
1997, so that the pre-signed real estate mortgages were likewise cancelled; that he
demanded from respondent bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to
him, but respondent bank refused to do so; that despite the cancellation of the
omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had the two deeds of real
estate mortgage dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale
scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real estate
mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him; and
that respondent bank and its officers be ordered to pay him moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
-
As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB the return of the

two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier
executed.
(1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper
filing and docket fees;
UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real
Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the registration thereof
before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.
(2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;

(3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore,
the complaint states no cause of action;
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage[7] covered by TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured
by said mortgage. As a result, the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was
set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its officers,
namely, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C. Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty.
Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G. San Juan and Sheriff
IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67878.
[8]
The complaint was subsequently amended on 22 May 2000. The amended

complaint alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy T. Go is
On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, filed a motion to dismiss [9] based on the
following grounds:
(4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and

(5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and
false certification of non-forum shopping.
-
On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order [10] granting petitioners application
for a writ of preliminary injunction
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real
action for the purpose of determining venue.
HELD:
Real action
-
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,[31] is more particularly instructive.

There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and
foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that affects the title to the
property. Thus, venue of the real action is before the court having jurisdiction over
the territory in which the property lies, which is the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal
action and since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to
make a point by alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of
Lucena.[32]
Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of

Lucena[33] is misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the
mortgagee bank to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the
mortgage. That action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration found in
Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now under Section 1, Rule 4
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots.
It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the
mortgage. The plaintiffs title is not in question. They are in possession of the
mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs personal action is the place where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In the case at
bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner was
primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the
properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation by the said
respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. The prime objective is
to recover said real properties. Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the
ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had already been
foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, respondent
bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for
the timely issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower
court, the same would have already been sold at a public auction.
22. GOCHAN vs. GOCHAN

FACTS:
-
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation
and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation.
Sometime in 1996, respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations
to the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban Gochan, for
and in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000.00.
Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents.
Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute

a promissory note,[5] undertaking not to divulge the actual consideration they paid
for the shares of stock. For this purpose, Crispo Gochan, Jr. drafted a document
entitled promissory note in his own handwriting and had the same signed by Felix
Gochan, III, Louise Gochan and Esteban Gochan, Jr.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the promissory note a

phrase that says, Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale.[6]
On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific

performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan,

on behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of
254 shares in the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of
stock in the Mactan Realty Development Corporation; and that they executed a
Provisional Memorandum of Agreement, wherein they enumerated the following as
consideration for the sale:
1. Pesos: Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is
a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself.[35]An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily
an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which
should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject
property lies.
2. Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan compound,

Mabolo, Lot 4F-2-B
3. Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan

Compound, Mabolo, Cebu
4. Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in

Mactan, Cebu
HELD:
What should be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees
(ASSESED VALUE or ESTIMATED VALUE)
5. Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.[7]
-
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion,[12] this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
We do not agree. It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in

order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of
docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of
an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint
itself, rather than by its title or heading. [13] The caption of the complaint below was
denominated as one for specific performance and damages. The relief sought,
however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution
of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the
provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below
was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing
the fees.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses:

(a) lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct
docket fees;
(b) unenforceability of the obligation to convey real properties due to
lack of a written memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds;
(c) extinguishment of the obligation by payment;
(d) waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent of all their
claims against petitioners; and
(e) non-joinder of indispensable parties.
CA:
Rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition on the ground that
respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the affirmative
defences
23. MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP VS. CA
24. SUN INSURANCE VS. ASCUNCION

ISSUE:
1
Did the respondent paid the correct amount of docket fees (NO)
What is the nature of the action? (REAL ACTION not specific performance)
25. TACOY VS. RTC OF TAGUM (G.R. NO. 88075-77)

FACTS:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three

(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 ) were separately
instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants, docketed as follows:
"without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that

complies with Circular No. 7."
-
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209

2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
The joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had
failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the
Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted the
complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to expunge
the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for "reivindicatoria"
remain for trial" by itself
3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.

-
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial Court,
presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was assigned to Branch
2, presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are
relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of
property?
HELD:
Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his
ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had
allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having
himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to
vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands had been
refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit.
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by

plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the
typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to
make the entire phrase read, " P5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven. 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common

counsel . 6 Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of
the case.
The defendants in all three (3) actions have filed with this Court a "Joint Petition"
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that
said orders be annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and
nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of
sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature
of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the
nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the
issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an
action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or
the title thereof, 12or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said
real property 13 - in other words, a real action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action
would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
There are, in other words, as already above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real
property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, account
thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or
proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in which
the value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's
competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed
on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case,
the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
*Phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after
the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be specified. The
exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
26. AYALA CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean
that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for
exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of
the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award
thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES.
-
FACTS:
-
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the
prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the
body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18,
1989. Hence this petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount
of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the
assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration.
Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of
exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and
supplemental complaint.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT.
-
HELD:
1.
CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES; ADDITIONAL

FILING FEE CONSTITUTE A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT WHEN DAMAGES
AROSE AFTER THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
The trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein
it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional
In the latest case of Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had
occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in
the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading . . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on
or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is
true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages
is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a
proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that
may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers
from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed
for. As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged
from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may
allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental
complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and
require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
-
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
(also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
-
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June

2006 Order. On 5 January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPAs Motion
for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5 January 2007.
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
ISSUE:.
Whether or not the public respondent CA committed reversible error when it ruled that
there was no substantial compliance with the procedural requirements when petitioner
failed to allege in its verification that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to attach the necessary
documents on its pleadings as required by SECTION 1, RULE 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
HELD:
27. NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION VS. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE

OF NEGROS
FACTS:
-
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with

Damages against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City.
According to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts
denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the
consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able to receive
a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the
products being delivered.
More than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee.
According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact

amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn
molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when
Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the amendment,
said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in
Section 5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading, [11] Section 4 of Rule 7, as

amended, states that the effect of the failure to properly verify a pleading is that the
pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated
as an unsigned pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the

court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the
court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the
Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration
with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court?
The old case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas[12] states that it can, but only in exceptional
cases when there is grave abuse of this discretion or adverse effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial
judges in furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the
litigants, the expedition of business, and in the decision of
interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal
could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of
procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of
the fundamental principles of appellate procedure is that
decisions of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will not

be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or
criminal at law or in equity. the discretion conferred upon
the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and
uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion
which should always be exercised with due regard to the
rights of the parties and the demands of equity and
justice.
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant. NOPAs Petition for Certiorari is seeking the reversal
of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPAs Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of
docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of
Appeals exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket
fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically,
in seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is
ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of
contract from being decided on the merits. Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical rules of
procedure while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in
its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion by the
former. However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on
the part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that such
Petition would still fail.
Campos pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate
intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case
of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be
denied.
CAUSE OF ACTION [RULE 2, SECTION 1 6]
28. JUANA COMPLEX HOMEOWNERS vs. FIL- ESTATE LAND (G.R. 152272)
FACTS:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the decision of the CA granting
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16,
2000 Omnibus Order[4] denying the motion to dismiss.
-
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA),

together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring
subdivisions(collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint[5] for
damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters
and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived
of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, et. al
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin FilEstate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
TRO was issued
RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of a

WPI.
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss[7] arguing that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
RTC issued an Order [10] granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.
RTC:
-
The complaint alleged that

o
JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly

travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba;
That they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known
as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten
(10) years;
That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined

La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass
through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to
make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again;
That JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the
Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road
to make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians;
That the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage,

prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them,
to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow
streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard;
That its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free
and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage
and irreparable injury.
CA:
-
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul
(1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000.
CA partially granted the petition

o
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged

in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than
ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed
and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint
was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were
so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties.
The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove
their clear and present right over La Paz Road.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action;
(2) Whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit;
(3) Whether or not a WPI is warranted.
HELD:
acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover,

the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties
and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna
and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
1ST Issue
Yes, there is a valid cause of action.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[18]
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of
action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action.
First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La
Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation
that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a
right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide
as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe
route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use.
Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al.
when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from
using the same.
3rd Issue
NO. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. [25] The requisites for its issuance are:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[26]For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must
be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive. [27] This means that the
persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in their complaint.[28]
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their
right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no
clear legal right therein.
29. DEL ROSARIO VS. FAR EAST BANK and TRUST COMPANY ( G.R. NO. 150134]
FACTS
-
Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could
have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
2nd Issue
YES. The suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.
As succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of
the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest
to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have
filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to
join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly
situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the
On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and

respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered
into a loan agreement under which
o
PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US $265,000;
o
A peso loan of P2.5 million or a total amount of approximately P4.4
million computed at the then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar
with the peso.
Agreement in the loan
o
DATICOR shall pay:
(1) a service fee of one percent (1%) per annum (later increased to six
percent [6%] per annum) on the outstanding balance of the peso loan;
(2) 12 percent (12%) per annum interest on the peso loan; and
(3) penalty charges of two percent (2%) per month in case of default.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land one
situated in Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in the name of petitioner
Ernesto C. Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental and chattel mortgages
over pieces of machinery and equipment.
Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to interest,
service fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCPs computation, with
an outstanding balance on the principal of more than P10 million as of May 15,
1983.
By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury Law, annulment
of contract and damages.The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-8088, was
dismissed by the CFI.
On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the CFIs dismissal
of the complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the
loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP.
PDCP appealed the IACs decision to this Court where it was docketed as G.R. No.
73198.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from petitioners (the
receivables) to its co-respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under
a Deed of Assignment dated April 10, 1987[5] for a consideration of P5,435,000. The
Deed of Assignment was later amended by two Supplements.
FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 8, 1988 whereby petitioners
agreed to, as they did pay FEBTC[7] the amount of P6.4 million as full settlement of
the receivables.
On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No.
73198[8] affirming in toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after deducting
the P3 million earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP, their remaining balance on the
principal loan was only P1.4 million.
Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint[9] for sum of money against
PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment
which they computed to be P5.3 million[10] P4.335 million from PDCP,
and P965,000 from FEBTC.
The case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a decision[11] in Civil
Case No. 94-1610 ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 million,[12] to
bear interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1994 until fully paid; to execute a
release or cancellation of the mortgages on the five parcels of land in Mati, Davao
Oriental and on the pieces of machinery and equipment and to return the
corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay the costs of the suit.
As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the trial court
dismissed it for lack of cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between
petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 73198,
FEBTC not being a party thereto.
From the trial courts decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50591.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision [13] in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591,
holding that petitioners outstanding obligation, which this Court had determined in
G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million, could not be increased or decreased by any act
of the creditor PDCP.
The CA held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable to it by
DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any
stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the Deed of
Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not bound by its
terms.
Citing Articles 2154[14] and 2163[15] of the Civil Code which embody the principle
of solutio indebiti, the CA held that the party bound to refund the excess payment
of P5 million[16] was FEBTC as it received the overpayment; and that FEBTC could
recover from PDCP the amount of P4.035 million representing its overpayment for
the assigned receivables based on the terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the
general principle of equity.
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the amount
of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief different from
or in excess of that prayed for.
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the payment
of P1.4 million had no basis, DATICORs obligation having already been paid in
full, overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million.
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the

mortgages it was holding over the Mati real properties and the machinery and
equipment, and to return the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners. And it
ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners the amount of P965,000 with legal interest from
the date of the promulgation of its judgment.
FEBTCs motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied, and so was its
subsequent appeal to this Court.
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a

Complaint[17] against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment
of P4.335 million.[18] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540, the
precursor of the present case and raffled to Branch 143 of the RTC.
In its Answer,[19] FEBTC denied responsibility, it submitting that nowhere in the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held liable
to return the whole amount of P5.435 million representing the consideration for the
assignment to it of the receivables, and since petitioners failed to claim the said
whole amount in their original complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1610 as they were
merely claiming the amount of P965,000 from it, they were barred from claiming it.
FEBTC later filed a Third Party Complaint[20] against PDCP praying that the latter
be made to pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged by the CA in favor of
petitioners, as well as theP4.335 million and interests that petitioners were claiming
from it. It posited that PDCP should be held liable because it received a
consideration of P5.435 million when it assigned the receivables.
Answering[21] the Third Party Complaint, PDCP contended that since petitioners
were not seeking the recovery of the amount of P965,000, the same cannot be
recovered via the third party complaint.
PDCP went on to contend that since the final and executory decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 50591 had held that DATICOR has no cause of action
against it for the refund of any part of the excess payment, FEBTC can no longer relitigate the same issue.
Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not privy to the MOA which explicitly
excluded the receivables from the effect of the Supreme Court decision, and that the
amount of P6.4 million paid by petitioners to FEBTC was clearly intended as
consideration for the release and cancellation of the lien on the Otis property.
Replying,[22] FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot deny that it benefited from the
assignment of its rights over the receivables from petitioners. It added that the third
party claim being founded on a valid and justified cause, PDCPs counterclaims
lacked factual and legal basis.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [23] to which FEBTC
filed its opposition.[24]
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment
for lack of merit.[25]
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision dismissing petitioners
complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action. It recalled
that petitioners had filed Civil Case No. 94-1610 to recover the alleged
overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC and to secure the cancellation and
release of their mortgages on real properties, machinery and equipment;that when
said case was appealed, the CA, in its Decision, ordered PDCP to release and cancel
the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest, which Decision became
final and executory on November 23, 1999; and that a Notice of Satisfaction of
Judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted on August 8, 2000,
hence, the issue between them was finally settled under the doctrine of res judicata.
The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC
clearly stated that the pending litigation before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive of the Receivables assigned to

FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not covered by this Agreement. That statement
in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically made only the loan subject to this
Courts Decision in G.R. No. 73198, hence, it was with the parties full knowledge
and consent that petitioners agreed to pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as consideration
for the settlement.The parties cannot thus be allowed to welsh on their contractual
obligations, the trial court concluded.
-
Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the trial court held
that FEBTCs payment of the amount of P1,224,906.67 (P965,000 plus interest) to
petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it could not
entertain such claim because the Complaint filed by petitioners merely sought to
recover from FEBTC the alleged overpayment of P4.335 million and attorneys fees
of P200,000.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] of the July 10, 2001 decision of the trial
court was denied by Order of September 24, 2001.
Hence, the present petition
ISSUE:
HELD:
-
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.[34]
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610
(that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it
dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a consequence of the
denial of FEBTCs motion for reconsideration and appeal.[35]
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on
the merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. [36] To recall, it
was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC was bound to
refund the excess payment but because DATICORs claim against FEBTC was
only P965,000, the court could only grant so much as the relief prayed for; and (3)
PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR because its obligation had
already been paid in full.
Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based upon the same cause of
action.
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, it
cannot be gainsaid that the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by
petitioners to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3 million P965,000 from
FEBTC and P4.335 million from PDCP.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same petitioners, was for the
recovery of P4.335 million which is admittedly part of the P5.3 million earlier
sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. 94-1610. This time, the action was
brought solely against FEBTC which in turn impleaded PDCP as a third party
defendant.
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of

the rule of res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second action would suffice to authorize a recovery in the
first even in cases in which the forms or nature of the two actions are different.
[38]
Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to
the subsequent action.
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.

FACTS:
-
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners)

claimed
to
have
occupied
37.3033
hectares
of
public
land
in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, NegrosOccidental even before the notarized
separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674, [3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in their
respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for
a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and
unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to
the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners
fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by
petitioners.
petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining
Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages against respondent
1)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR
Corporation the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs
Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at
least P300,000.00 each by way of actual damages and such
other amounts as proved during the trial;
(net digest) Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or

indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more
actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split
up or divided so as to be made the subject of two or more different actions.A single
act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as when
the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The
violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. However, if only one
right may be violated by several acts or omissions, there would only be one cause of
action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinct primary rights are violated by
one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should be violated by two
distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each broken
by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of action would result.
Causes of action which are distinct and independent, although arising out of the
same contract, transaction or state of fact may be sued separately, recovery on one
being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.
2)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P100,000.00 each as moral damages;
3)
of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
4)
of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs
with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of
appearance fees.
-
30. CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III,
HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO,
- versus -
In a separate move, petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
alleging the same in the complaint and praying for the following reliefs:
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners complaint for

damages on three
grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.
By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a
complaint for damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the
forcible entry cases has been made.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can
independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from
incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.
and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession.
In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[17] In this case, Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased
premises from the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was
authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly rentals. The lessee filed a
case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. During the pendency of the case, the lessee
filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to
dismiss based on litis pendentia. The RTC denied the motion.
HELD:
-
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are
not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover
his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either
party and award costs as justice requires.
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair
rental value of the property and attorneys fees and costs.
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that the
only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property:
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the
MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the
settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only
issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein
two complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private

respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that
not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the
claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also
that the claim for damagesmoral and exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatoryconstitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this
runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the
second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent

allegations
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of

lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as
Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises)
situated
at
the
corner
of
EDSA
corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon Cit
y, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30
April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical

possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and
now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market
Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual,
continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject
Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is

entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the
Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including
defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest

possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and
maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat,
strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of
men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own
hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff

from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC
and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of
force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned
and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and
policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from

continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the
Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together
with its contents to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing

possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal
and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to
plaintiff for all theaforedescribed damages which plaintiff
incurred as a result thereof.
The amended
complaint
for damages filed
by
private
respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues
as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered
into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or
from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA
corner McArthur
Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the
lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical

possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the
now famous Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC,
without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful
court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40)
armed security guards and policemen under the supervision
of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises
through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on
brute force and in a thunderboltishmanner and against
plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs
men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein
plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the
subject premises. The illegal high-handed manner
of gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is
more particularly described as follows: x x x x
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold
the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million
improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by
plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The
actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation,
seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of
plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public
auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without
lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of
plaintiff and at prices way below the market value
thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from
defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff,
informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an
auction on August 19, 1993 at2:00 p.m. properties of the
plaintiff presently in defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes
a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil
Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful
and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of
the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the
recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code
x x x x[19](Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it
may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.[21]
Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:

o
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one
cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by
petitioner into the leased premises out of which three
(3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes
of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner
herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee,
(b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by
private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable
foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of
the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and,
(c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a
monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of
P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another
P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and
compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing
unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys fees
and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the
leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and
compensatory damages were already prayed for in the
forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this
cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by
reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot
also succeed considering that these sprung from the main
incident being heard before the MeTC. x x x[20] (Italics in
the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the

complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages
have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with
respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other
marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by
petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the
heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that
any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful,
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no
jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorneys fees.[22]
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages,

the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in
the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.[23]
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those

sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their
use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting
of a cause of action.
31. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC. respondents
FACTS:
-
petitioner leased to private, respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of

land with a commercial building thereon located at Aranet Center, Cubao, Quezon
City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989
to 30 April 1998, with a monhtly rental of approximately P600,000.00.
The contract contained, among others, the following pertinent terms and conditions:
EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract shall be
deemed as conditions, as-well as covenants, and that this Contract shall be
automatically terminated and cancelled without resorting to court action should
LESSEE violate any or all said conditions, including the payment of Rent, CUSA
and other charges indicated in the FLP when due within the time herein stipulated
and in any such cases, LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its
authorized agents, employees and/or representatives as his duly authorized attorneyin-fact, even after the termination, expiration or cancellation of this Contract, with
full power and authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence and
otherwise take full and complete physical possession and control of the leased
premises and its contents without resorting to court action and/or to summarily
disconnect electrical and/or water services thereof, and that LESSEE hereby
irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives to take inventory and possession of whatever equipment, furniture,

articles, merchandise, appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE,
consignors and/or to any other persons and to place the same in LESSOR's
warehouse or any other place at LESSOR's discretion for safekeeping; charging
LESSEE the corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case LESSEE fails to
claim-said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage
and simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within seven (7) days from
date of said transfer to LESSOR's warehouse, LESSOR is likewise hereby expressly
authorized and empowered by LESSEE to dispose of said property/properties in a
public sale through a Notary Public of LESSOR's choice and to apply the proceeds
thereof to whatever liability and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR
plus reasonable expenses for the same, including storage fees, and the balance, if
any, shall be turned over to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any
or all acts performed by LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives under the provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any
petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in court, and
that LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives shall
be free from any civil and/or criminal liability or responsibility whatsoever therefor.
Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance

of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the
following:
(a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank in the name of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of
P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals;
(b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood
Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived, at;
(c) petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from
inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables and fish, all properly
receipted for;
(d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to
enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant
equipment; and
TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon-the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may be,
LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver physical possession of the leased
premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and
sanitary condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, devoid of all occupants,.
equipment, furnitures articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to LESSEE or to any
other person except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to
comply with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given the same rights and power to
proceed against LESSEE as expressly granted in the immediately; preceding
section.
-
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. As of

19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, nonpayment of rentals constituted breach of their contract
private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge
Francisco D. Villanueva.
(e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the premises to private
respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the
hearing on the merits of the case shall proceed and the disposition of the amount
deposited representing the rental arrearages shall be left to the. discretion of the
court.
Petitioner filed a motion, to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order
archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for
the reason that "the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants
(petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry." 5 On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages.
Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private respondent filed with the RTC
on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for
the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very
same day, Judge Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b)
admitting private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's
application for a temporary restraining order against petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition on the ground that Judge Santjago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting, the
amended complaint of private respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in
allowing private respondent to engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action;
for damages despite lack of jurisdiction. 6
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a motion
for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993 which, it explained, was a
prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the
elements of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with
the RTC because despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only
damages recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no direct
relation to loss of material possession. It clarified that since the damages prayed for in the
amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-handed manner with
which petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private
respondent's movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
action of damages. 7
Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that
petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for
reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that, the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the action for damages and injunction despite the pendency
of the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not
commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were not
identical with each other.
ISSUE:
May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for forcible entry
with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against the
same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on
the same forcible entry?
HELD:
There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
before resorting tocertiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors
imputed to it 8 this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without
considering the circumstances of the case. 9 The filing of the motion for reconsideration before
availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of
law,10 or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, 11 or the questions raised
on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower
court
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground
that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same parties
involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue
was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the
prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a
pointless exercise. 12
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court
by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another
action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor
before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom
thepossession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, together with damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that
all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court
which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for
damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for
restoration of possession.
This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court which states that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same
cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res adjudicata requires that there must be between
the action sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity
in the two (2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered
on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the
action under
consideration. 13
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a
party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same
Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by
which a party violates a right of another. 14 These premises obtaining, there is no question at all
that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is
the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein,
from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for
actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with the RTC both
arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into the least premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner
before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at
least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the
claim for damages moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory
constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against
multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered, into a contract of lease with
defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood
Market (hereinafter "Subject Premises") situated at the corner of EDSA,
corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a
period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the
Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now
famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in
actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject
Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the
peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the
exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants' resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest
possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain
possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and
intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to
the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants' act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the
Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of
possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and
intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being
contrary; to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with
their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and
restore possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
4.07 Considering that defendants' act of forcibly grabbing possession of
the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void,
defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed
damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same
factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract
of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30,
1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A
copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex "A".
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession
of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous "Seafood
Market Restaurant."
xxx xxx xxx
7 On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the
benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the
aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen
under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject
premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on
brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiff's will,
unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiff's men out of the subject
premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and
natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal, high-handed

manner and gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is
more particularly described as follows: . . .
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject
Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and
equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful
appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent
of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction
and without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the
multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way
below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex "B"
the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff,
informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on
August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in
defendants' possession.
xxx xxx xxx
12. Defendants' unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation
of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the
lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the
present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New
Civil Code. . . .
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the
alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs
(denominated by private respondent as is causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the
lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for
actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of
perishable foodstuff stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises
causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attoney's fees and cost of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a)
moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual
damages of P20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing
unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged
forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages
were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this
cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these
sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that
when a single delict or wrong is committed like the unlawful taking or detention of the
property of the another there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint
as constituting one single cause of action. 15 In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the
physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In
other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means
of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict
or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of
possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action.
For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent
actions, one for recovery of posssession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That
would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action. 16 In David v.
de la Cruz 17we observed
Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their
illegal ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which cause of
action however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies for
reinstatement of damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of
action, they should be alleged in a single complaint.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be
recovered in one case and the rest, in another. 18 In Bacharach v. Icarangal 19 we explained that
the rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations betweent the same parties in regard to the
same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights
should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein included
cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever. 20 If a suit is brought
for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a
second action for the residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not
identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This principle
not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the
parties might have litigated in the case. 21 This is why the legal basis upon which private
respondent anchored its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the
Civil Code, 22 not otherwise raised and cited by private respondent in the forcible entry case,
cannot be used as justification for the second suit for damages. We note, not without some
degree of displeasure, that by filing a second suit for damages, private respondent was not only
able to press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its failure to allege the same
in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was also able to obtain from
the RTC, by way of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an impending
public auction sale of its movables which could not anymore secure from the MeTC before
which the matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was already closed.
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that private respondent
and its counsel in the trial courts committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and
Exchange Commission 23 we ruled
32. LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner

vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO
PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
FACTS:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in

one forum, party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another. The principle applies . . . with respect to suits
filed in the courts . . . in connection with litigations commenced in the
court . . . in anticipation of an unfavorable . . . ruling and a favorable
case where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no
jurisdiction.
This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission 24 that there is forum-shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the
same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping
is obvious. This unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the
manpower and financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial
processes, thereby adversely affecting the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable
conduct has prompted the Court to issue circulars 25 ordering among others that a violation
thereof shall be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged, by private respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum
shopping it pointed out the absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as
well as the second and third amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably
stating that there was no other action pending between the parties involving the same causes of
action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon
City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent
was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the
RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry,
the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second
case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case.
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT
Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan
City to Manila.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on
its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after
paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan.
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards
Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in
the same direction.
At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned
by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent
Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process
of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree.
As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as

owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner
of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended
complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas
as additional alternative defendants.
HELD:
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her codefendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay
petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as
additional alternative defendant.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a
bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio

Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from
liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto
Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their

insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio
Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a

"Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging
that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of
damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable
settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated

Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to
dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in
favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering
that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case,
and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of
claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and
Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in
dismissing the case.
ISSUE:
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is
only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights
that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the
rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only
one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained
a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies
allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action
involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein
were not necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the
other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the
evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is
undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint
clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of
petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued
in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a
procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made
by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to
petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
ISSUE:
HELD:
33. ENRIQUEZ VS. RAMOS (G.R. NO. L-16797)

We find no merit in the appeal.
FACTS:
That on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea
Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11)
parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding
certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down,
P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and
agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance,
the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor
of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her
children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child
Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.
Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage,
this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court
below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the
plaintiffs previously had filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24
February 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the
price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was
already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single
cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action
for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. Upon
opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion to
dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer. After
trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment
against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24 February
1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and
further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within
ninety (90) days.
Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be
dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the
obligation not having fixed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have
set first a date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check
for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action
was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for
P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage
was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure
in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not
apply.
On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation
for P96,000.00 was to be
without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in
case of default it shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum,
clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing
more than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the
ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date.
34. FLORES VS. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS [G.R. NO. L 66620]

FACTS:
ISSUE
HELD:
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in
Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on
the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are
owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the
amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
comparison of former and present rules
Present Rules
Former Rules
Where a plaintiff sues a
Totality of the claims in all the causes of action
Totality of the claims in all the causes of action
defendant on two or
irrespective of whether the COA arose out of the same
irrespective of whether the COA arose out of the same
more separate causes of
or diff transactions. If the total demand exceeds P20K
or diff transactions. If the total demand exceeds P20K
action
If the causes of action are separate and independent,
If the causes of action are separate and independent,
their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of
the demand is 20K or less may be the subject of a
the demand is 20K or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or MTC.
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or MTC.
Two or more plaintiffs
Where the claims or causes of action joined in a single
The causes of action in favor of the two or more
having a separate causes
complaint are separately owned by or due to different
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should
of
parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
arise out of the same transaction or series of
jurisdictional test
transactions and there should be a common question of
action
defendant
against
join
in
single complaint
law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

The former rule applied only to cases of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also
applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties
defendant.
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the
more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The several
total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to
under Section 6 of Rule 3.
be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their
joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties
several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a
may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice
common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section
Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to
6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to
collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal
state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under
parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the
reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither
of which falls within its jurisdiction.

City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo: Mik Peneyra - Soriano

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo: Mik Peneyra - Soriano

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

RTC: City of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied

CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE GRECIA- CUERDO

CA: Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,

Private respondents contends that:

petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent

RTC: Granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

1 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

2. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181416

November 11, 2013

Petitioner and MLHI filed separate motions to dismiss

Issues concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium corporation

Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc.

Petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga,

Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously

Accordingly plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Meridien, to demand for the

3. EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner,

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner and MLHI

G.R. No. 180321

2 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

March 20, 2013

While on board a jeepney, Elenitas mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a

Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default

3 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the order issued in

MoR of respondents was granted

respondents filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,

Respndents ( Heirs of Santiago ) alleged in essence that petitioner and co-defendant

petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the properties in

asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom

4 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

That they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant

5. EDGARDO V. QUESADA, Petitioner,

Office of the Prosecutor

5 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

PMU-Tacloban Inventory Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated

Nineteen months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal charge for

Decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

NO, it is in utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.

6. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the

and for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash

G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992

Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences.

Petitioner appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of

PPA,through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an

(Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari)

Petitioner started his career in government as an employee in the Presidential

6 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippines Civil

c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

7 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

7. NESTOR SANDOVAL, petitioner,

8 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

9 Mik Peneyra - Soriano

On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an

10 Mik Peneyra - Soriano