'fi­

•!»

- -^ '»> V.'
Bt

PO REGI*Tf?

B
FINAL REPORT

THIRD 4RMY

MANEUVERS

• MAY-15»40
s»

HQ.HCORPS

\u25a0(»
J J jr X £ POia

TrJIRD AAjVH

jVjAjN£UV £KS

MAY J940
 FINAL REPORT THIRD ARMY" MANEUVERS

MAY 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

SECTION TITLE PAGES

I ORGANIZATION OF THE IV CORPS

lORPS 1

II CONCENTRATION IN THE SABINE

JINE AREA 2-4

111 THIRD ARMY EXERCISES 5-13

IV EQUIPMENT 14-17

V COMMUNICATIONS 18-20

VI SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS 21-28

VII ADMINISTRATION 29-32

VIII TACTICS 33-39

TV
1a CORPS AND COUPS TROOPS 40-43
X CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF
STAFF 44-46

XI FACTUAL DATA 47-50

XII COMISNTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 51-57

 ANNEXA

TO

FINAL REPORT

THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS

•
MAY 1940

NO. CONTENTS

1. TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS.

2. STATION LIST NO. 2 IV CORPS

3. STATION LIST HO. 3 IV CORPS.

4. ROSTER OF OFFICERS IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS

5. PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS, MOVEMENT TO SABIITE AREA.

6. FIELD ORDER 13 IV CORPS, MOVEMENT TO SADINE AREA.

7. SKETCH-ROUTES AND BIVOUACS, MOVEMENT TO SABINE ARM.

8. MAP
- BASE CALIFS IN SABINE AREA.
9. RECORD OF MOTOR MOVEMENT TO SABINE AREA.

10. MARCH ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

- DIVISION.
11. ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAIN.

12. FIRST PHASE ) EACH CONTAINING:

) SELECTED CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS & MESSAGES,
13. SECOND PEASE) THIRD ARMY
) ALL FIELD ORDERS IV CORPS WITH OPERATIONS
14. THIRD PHASE ) MAPS AND ANNEXA.
) SPECIAL MILITARYMAPS SHOWING SITUATION
15. FOURTH PHASE) AT END OF EXERCISE.

16. POSTAL PL/ill, CIRCULAR NO. 4, IV CORPS

17. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 11, IV CORPS.

18. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 12, 17 CORPS,

19. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE IV CORPS.

20. STANDING OQMIAND POST PROCEDURE IV CORPS,

21. •
TYPICAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE DIVISION.

22. REMARKS OF COMMANDING GENERAL IV CORPS AT CRITIQUE.

 FINAL REPORT

THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS

KAY^IS^O

ORGMiZATION OF TKE IV C^OgFS

1• ORGANIZATION O_P__THE £ORPS .

For the movement to, and concentration of the Corps in the
Sabine Area of Louisiana and the subsequent imnouvers therein,
the basic organization of the Corps remained unchanged. Certain
Third Army organizations vrere attached to the Corps for the move­
ment from Fort Benning, Georgia to tho Sabine Area and for the con
centration phase, as prescribed in Control Instructions No, 6-Blue »
Headquarters Third Army, 1940 (ANNEX NO. l). Further details of
attachment and detachment of Third Army units for the four phases
of the maneuvers are included in Section 111 of this report.

2. STRENGTH OF THE CORPS.

Strength of the Corps at the beginning and near the close of

the exorcises in the Sabine Area are shown on Station Lists Nos.
2 and 3, ANHEXA NO3. 2 and 3.
3, ROSTER OF OFFICERS, HQ IV CORPS.

See ANNEX- NO. 4,

1
 SECTION II

CONCENTRATION IN TEE SABINE AREA

4. DIRECTIVES.

a. Administrative instructions for the movement of the Corps

and~"att ached units'* from base camps at Fort Beniiing, Georgia, and

concentration in bivouacs in the Sabine Area wore contained lar­

gely in Letters of Instructions, Nos. 3 and 9, lieadquar tors,

Fourth Corps Area, 194C.

b. Tactics 1 instructions for the movenent and concentration of

the~~Corps were contained large]. y in Control Instructions, Head­

quarters, Third Army, 19 10. Control Instructions No. 2
-
Blue, Head­
quarters Third Army announcing detaiLed decisions of the Commanding
General, Third Army for planning purposes for the cone or.tr fition of
the IV Corps in the Camp Beauregard Area, is included in ANNEX NO. 5.
Mission of the Corps, routes of march, advance security units, and
general order of inarch wo.ro prescribed therein.

5. PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE AED PLANNING

Preliminary reconnaissances of the two prescribed routes, of

staging areas, and of base camps in the Sabine Area were made by C— 3
and the Corps Engineer. A plan for the movement and concentration of
the
and
Corps based on this reconnaissance
approval announced in Control Instructions No. 4
-
was submitted to Third Army
Blue, Head­
quarters Third Army, 1940. The sth Division then made all final

reconnaissances and secured ell leases of march bivouac areas on the

southern route. One officer from the Ist Division, one from the
6th Division and one fron Corps troops made similar reconnaissances,
and, acting for the Rents and Claims Board, Fourth Corps Area, secured
leases for all march bivouac areas on the northern route. Sketches
of all areas wore prepared and distributed.

6. ORDERS FOR THE MOVEMENT

Control Instructions No. 11

-
Blue, Headquarters Third Army,
1940 gave final instructions for the movenent of the corps. It
stated that information indicated that Rod forces would bo concen­
trated in oast Texas, supposedly for maneuvers, but that they might
cross the border into Bluo territory without warning. It provided
for augmentation of the Bluo frontier garrison at Camp Beaurcgard by
Army troops, to protect the concentration and detrainment of the
corps advance elements (6th Cavalry and 6th Division). It provided
that Third Army vrould furnish an aircraft warning service, pursuit
protection throughout the movement, 'and antiaircraft defense of bridges
at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and at New Orleans, Moriroo, Columbia,
Jonesville and Alexandria, Louisiana. It required that the concen­
tration of the corps in the Sabine Area be completed by dark May 11.
A rail and motor movement table for IV Corps and Third Army Troops
from Fort Banning, Georgia to the Sabine Area was furnished by Third
Army. Pursuant to these orders, Field Order No. 13, Headquarters IV
Corps with its accompanying rail movement and motor movement tables
was issued, and gives the details for the movement of the corps.
It is included in ANNEX NO. 6.

\
(Section 11, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

6. (Cont'd)

A sketch showing the two routes traversed, bivouac areas, dates of

arrival of bivouacs, mileage for each stage, and accumulated mile­
age from Fort Banning, Georgia is included in ANNEX NO. 7. Map
showing initial base camps in the Sabine Area Is included in ANNEX
NO. 8.

7. THE MOVEMENT

a. Hail

Rail movements of heavy baggage and part of the personnel of

certain units proceeded as prescribed in Field Order Ho. 13, Head­
quarters IV Corps, (ANNEX NO. 6). Advance detachments preceded the
6th Cavalry to unload its animals, which were moved by rail. Advance
unloading detachments of other units having rail movements, accomp­
anied the leading march group of the Corps.

b. March Bivouac Areas, Motor Movement.

General locations of bivouac areas ;:.ro shown on sketch, ANNEX

NO. 7. Detailed location sketches wore prepared and distributed by
the advance reconnaissance officers (Paragraph 4 _b, above). It should
be noted that, on the northern route, bivouacs areas were occupied
by successive march groups. In general, bivouac areas were satis­
factory as to size, but lacked cover against aerial observation. For
the entire length of the two march routes, good cover was available
only in low areas, the use of which "c.s prevented "oy the lack of
satisfactory standings for vehicles.

c. Billeting Officers and Billeting, Detachments.

(l) The three officers who made the final reconnaissance of

the northern route and secured the leases for march bivouac areas on
this route, were detailed as Billeting Officers at Montgomery, Ala­
bama, Meridian ana Vieksburg, Mississippi, The sth Division, en the
southern route, was responsible for the preparation of its own bivouac
areas .
(2) Two companies, loth Engineers (c), each with water puri­
fication plant attached, left Fort Bonning on Hay 4. One company

as billeting detachment;-;.
proceeded to Montgomery, Alabama, ana one to lloridian, Mississippi,
Under the supervision of the billeting
officers (subparagraph (j), above), these companies assigned and mar­
ked areas for subordinate units of the successive march groups sche­
duled to occupy that bivouac, prepared entrances and turn arounds,
reinforced bridges, established water distributing points and guided
successive march group unite into their assigned areas. Those tyro
engineer companies remained at Montgomery and Meridian until the
last clement of the Corps had cleared, They then repaired all damages
and the Billeting Officer adjusted all claims. As a result of this
system, damages and claims wore negligible. At Vicksburg, Mississippi
no engineer billeting detachment was necessary as the bivouac area
was in Vicksburg National Military Park and Park officials and a group
of local reserve officers who voluntcrred, did excellent service in
guiding successive march group units to their areas. Units using the
march bivouac area in Chiokas aw State Park, Domopolis, Alabama arranged
for their own advance billeting detachments.

3
(Section 11, L?inal Report, Third Army l.lanouvers)

7.

(o) The 21st Engineers (GS) under Army control proceeded

from Fort Bcnning, Georgia to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana on "May
1. Division and Corps Troop base camps in the Sabino Area (A!INI£
NO. 8) were prepared and marked in advance by this regiment, and
guides provided for each incoming unit.

d. Motor Movement.

Motor movements of units of the Corps proceeded as pros

cribod in Field Order No. 13, Headquarter ,b IV Corps (ANIiEX 30. 6).
Tho Corps moved by the two prescribed routes. .Che 6th Cavalry v;ith
attachments preceded the Corps on the northern route with the mis­
sions of securing the bridges over tho Red River at Bovcc and Al­
exandria, count err econnai stance, and covering the concentration
of the corps pending arrival of the 6th Division. The 6th Division,
as the corps advance guard, followed the Cavalry on the northern route
with tho missions of relieving tho Cavalry west of Alexandria se­
curing tho bridges at Boycc and Alexandria and covering the con­
centration of the corps. Tho main body of the Corps (Ist and sth
Divisions) began its movement two days later than tho 3th Division,
the Ist Division by the northern route, the sth Division by the
southern routo. One day later tho Corps Troops began their movement.
Record of Motor Movement showing for each narch group its itinerary
for tho entire movement is included in AKNIIK. i"0. 9.

j3. Aircrcft Wcrning S or vice

Ail aircraft -warning service, employing chiefly civilian

observers, was operated by Third Army during the motor movement
period. Warning messages of the approach of enemy flights in for­
mation of two or noro pianos were broadcast to troops concerned
by radio telegraph, telephone, teletype and friendly planes.
The system operated satisfactorily and was particularly good
for the march as far as the Mississippi River, liarch groups were
usually able to plot the movements of flights promptly and accurate­
ly. In few instances the time element be tireen receipt of warning and
arrival of enemy flights over march columns was not sufficient for
troops to take appropriate counteraction, h'otheds of getting warning
of approaching hostile aircraft to subdivisions of march groups were,
in general unsatisfactory. They varied with each group and wore pre­
dicated on the communications equipment organically available to the
component units of the column. Radio if available, was satisfactory
only to the limit of its range, and was frequently interrupted while
passing near high tension lines. Reports indicate the need of a
powerful vehicular set with each serial for proper and timely warning.
Ground visual methods or methods involving sound (such as sirens)
are unreliable. Warning by friendly plane, when available, was sat­
isfactory. Usual procedure against air attack of columns was for
columns to stop in convoy formation without closing up, and for all
available weapons to go into action at once. Personnel unloaded and
scattered. The Corps Cavalry moved at extended distances between
vehicles so as not to present a profitable target to hostile aviation.
Instructions of a division of the corps as to antiaircraft defense
measures are included in AJtfKEX NO. 10. Hostile air attacks were re­
ported by:
sth Division between Elba and Staploton, Ala
- Hay 8
7 rains, do lay.
- -
6th Division near Monroe, La..
Prov. Tank Brig, at Vicksburg,
Hay 8
Kiss.,
-
Hay 10
-
45 mins. delay.
no delay,
troops in bivouac.

4
 SECTION 111

THIRD ARMY EXERCISES

8. PURPOSE.

a. The announced general purpose of the Third Arm;-- Maneuvers

was*~to train the new type corps, composed of triangular divisions,
in concentrations over long distances against a mobile enemy, and
in maneuver under combat conditions, both alone and coupled with
combat aviation and mechanized forces. Only large scale operations
were intended, combat .training of snr.ll units havtixg already boon
completed.

b. The series of separate and distinct exercises announced in

the~*s chedul c were staged to develop the operations listod below:

(l) The operation of an air warning net covering several

statos.
(2) The uso of various types of movement for large units s
rail and motor.
(3) The functioning of the army and corps organization in
command, administration, supply and maintenance during sustained
action and a determination of the needs in army and corps troops
and in reinforcing elements, if any.
(4) The operations, during periods of rapid movement,
of the "motor transport provided and the handling of large motor
masses.
(5) The use of combat aviation in Ihe preliminary stages of
an advance and against enemy concentrations.
(6) The combined action of combat aviation and mechanized
forces.
(7) The operations of cavalry in combination with and against
mechanized and motorized forces.

9. TERRAIN.

a. The Sabine Area covers the portion of Louisiana and Texas

between the general line of the Rod River on the oast and the
Heches River on the west.

b. The maneuver area proper lay generally between the Sabine

River and the Red River in Louisiana. It had the following
boundaries :

-
-
North: U.S. Route 84, inclusive.
South: State Route 7
East: U.S. Route 165 U.S. Route 71
-
U.S. Route 190, inclusive.
State
Route 26, inclusive.
West: Sabine River.
c. Tactical movements beyond the north and south boundaries
of The maneuver area were not permitted.

d. An estimate of the terrain is included in ANNEX NO. 11.

5
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

10. FIRST PHA.SE.

a. Opposing Forces.
Blue: IV Corps (less sth Div and march attachments; Ist Div
initially and Corps Troops)
2 Bns 68th Inf (LT)
1 Bn 67th Inf (MT) (less 2 Cos).

Red: IX Corps.
Approximate relative total strength:
May 9 May 10 May 11
Blue 11542 11542 22694
Red 17274 17274 17274

b. Situation
- See AItfNEX NO. 12 which includes

Control Instructions No. 14

-

Blue, Headquarters Third Array,

Field Order Ho. 14, IV Corps with operations map, and Special
Military Map, showing situation at close of exorcise.

c. Conduct of the Exercise.

In accordance with FO 13, 30 April 1940 (AMEX NO. 6) the

IV Corps moved by ro.il and motor fron Fort Bohning, Georgia, to
the general vicinity of Alexandria, Louisiana. The movement began
on 5 liny r.nd was completed late 11 Hay.

The Third Amy provided antiaircraft protection for all

vital bridges over the Mississippi during the concentration period.
It also provided initial protection for the concentration area with
the 29th Inf (less 1 bn.).

The 6th Cavalry, with attachments, and lees elements shipped

proceeded to the lino FLATWOODS

-
by rail arrived in the Alexandria area lloon 8 Hay and immediately
GLEMiORA to cover the concentration
of the Corps, pending the arrival of the 6th Div later in the day.

By 6:00 PM 8 May the 6th Div arrived in its area and immediate­

line FIATWOODS
- GLENMOEA and along DEVILS CREEK
-
ly dispatched CT-1 to organize and hold tactical localities along the
CALCASIEU RIVER.

14
-
These dispositions were in accordance with Control Instructions No.
31uo. The remaining two Combat Teams were held in reserve,
pending the developments of enemy action.

The 6th Cavalry moved rapidly forward c.t daylight 9 May

to gain contact with, report the strength, composition and move­
ments of enemy forces encountered, and delay enemy columns. The
Ist Sq (less Tr C) after being relieved by elements of the 6th
Div, moved to a reserve position on the north flank in the vicinity
of FIATWOODS.

Contact was gained with the Rod Forces early in the day by
the 29th Inf in vicinity of NATCHITOCHSS and by the 2d Sq. 6th Cay
in front of the 6th Div. It was apparent that the Red Force was en­
deavoring the break through the. north flank with elements of the 2d
Hod Div. In the afternoon the situation warranted reinforcing of
the 29th Inf, and the 6th Div was ordered to dispatch CT-20, and
2 companies of the 18th Engrs, and the Tank Brigade to dispatch Co
F, 67th Inf (LT), with rifles,, This caused Red tc withdraw and per­
mitted recalling CT-20 to rejoin the 6th Div.

6
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Amy Maneuvers)

10.
c. (Cont'd)
On 10 May the Ist Div, approaching the concentration area
fron the north, was ordered to change direction, cross the RED
RIVER at COUSHATTA and CLARENCE and strike the hostile left and
rear. The crossing was made late in the afternocn--CT-26 at COUSH­
ATTA, CT-16 at CLARENCE, and CT-18 over the ponton bridge at MONT­
GOMERY, which had just been completed by the 18th Engrs.

The Commanding General, Third Amy, released the 7th Cavalry

Brigade, (Hecz) to the IV Corps at midnight 10-11 May, This unit was
ordered to cross the RED RIVER at daylight 11 Hay at COUSHATTA to at­
tack to the south, on the west flank of the Ist Div, to extend
the envelopnont and to destroy the enemy. The count ercf fens ive was
ordered for daylight 11 May, the 6th and Ist Divs and 7th Cavalry
Brig (Mecz) to participate. FO 14 was issued at 9:15 PM 10 May
to coordinate the attack.

Early 11 May the attack on the front of the Ist Div progress­
ed rapidly despite the fact that the 7th Cay Brig (Mecz) was
held up by umpires until 11:00 AM, south of MiNSFIELD. The enemy
began a general withdrawal on the entire front south of HINESTON
as a result of Ist Div pressure. At 9:00 AM, 11 May, the 6th
Cavalry was ordered to HINESTOK to attack in the direction UNION
HILL, the 6th Div to organize a Combat Team pursuit force and the
7th Cay Brig (Mecz) to advance rapidly on LEESVILLE when re­
leased by umpires.

- --
At 11:00 All 11 May, the exercise was terminated. (Situation
-
at this time is shown in ANNEX NO. 12), The Blue forces were order­
-
ed into bivouac east of the line COUSHATT:. RED RIVER NATCHITOCHES
STATE HWY 20 STATE WIY 265 DEVILS CREEK CALCASIEU RIVER. The
7th Cavalry Brig (Mecz) was released to army control.

The sth Div and Corps Troops closed into bivouac the after­
noon of 11 May, completing the concentration of IV Corps,

11, SECOND PHASE.

a. Opposing; forces.

Blue: IV Corps

Prov Tank Brig

Co. "C", 2d Chemical Regt.

29th Infantry

Red: IX Corps

7th Cay Brig Mocz,

Approximate relative total strength:

Blue: 35,570 ;Red: 20,773.

is Situation. See ANNEX NO. 13 which includes:

Maneuver Instructions from Third Army 9:15 AM, 12 May,
Field Orders Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18, with operations maps,
and Special Military Map, showin^. dispositions and situation
at end of exorcise.

7
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

11.
c. Conduct of tho Exercise,

On 13 May IV Corps units were directed to move by infil­

tration, during daylight hours, to assembly positions shown on
Opn Map to FO 15. An Army Truck Co. was secured for the 6th Div
and one for the sth Div. FO 15 was issued 4:00 PM, 12 May, sub­
sequent to receipt of the Corps mission from the Commanding General,
Third Army. It was obvious that Red would attempt to defend his est­
ablished bridgehead east of the SABINE RIVER against superior Blue
Forces. Since the dispositions of the enemy were unknown, the Corps
Commander decided to attack the predominant terrain, rather than
wait to determine the enomys MLR. The IV Corps attack contemplated
envelopment of the enemy left (north) flank to capture the ridge
running north and south through L2ESVTLLE, thus forcing Red to with­
draw wost of the river. It wiil bo noted that the Prov Mocz Brig
organized to operate on the corps right (north) flank consisted of
light and medium tanks, the mccz elemonts of the 6th Cay, the 29th
Inf (mtz), one (l) 3n 75mm guns from the sth Div, a company of
Engrs, and AT guns. The ability of this unit to advance rapidly
and secure areas captured, was amply demonstrated throughout the
exercise. The Ist Sq 6th Cay (horse) was attached to the 6th Div
to assist in protecting the left (south) flank of the Corps. The'
Corps Reserve consisted of the 11th Inf (sth Div), 66th Inf (LT),
and 4th AT Bn (less 2 cos).

The IV Corps jumped off at 4:30 AM, 14 May, quickly contact­

ing tho enemy on the front of the sth Div 8 mi south-west of FIAT­

-
WOODS, on the front of the Ist Div near ROBELINE, and on the front
-
of the 6th Div 7 mi south-west of HINESTON. The Rod MLR was'even­
tually developed along the line SLAGLE KURTHIYOOD PBASON. The
advance was rapid on all fronts. However, all major units were
frequently held up due to enemy destruction of bridges over the
numerous small streams of the maneuver area. At 8:50 AM the sth

SIMPSON, to tho direction SLAGLE

-

Div was ordered to change its direction of attack after capturing

LEESVILLE. At 9:35 AM the 2 Bns
66th Inf (LT) in Corps Reserve wore moved to the vicinity of CYPRESS »
to be available to the Ist or sth Divs on call. One of those Tank
Bns was released to the sth Div to assist in tho capture of SIMPSON,
which was accomplished late in the afternoon. With the enemy fully
developed it was apparent' that he would make a determined defence
along the LEESVILLE RIDGE. Consequently, the Corps Commander decided
to make a coordinated attack against this position early 15 May. FO
16 was issued at 6:30 HI14 May directing a double envelopment of
the enemy flanks •

At daylight 15 Apr the coordinated attack of the oorps

was launched with the Prov Mecz Brig on the west flank, assist­
ing the Ist Div in the capture of LEESVILLE. The sth Div on the
left of the lstDiv directed its efforts to the capture of SLAGLE,
then LEESVILLE. The 6th Div assisted by the 11th Inf, Ist Bn 66th
Inf (LT), 1 bn 17th FA, Ist Sq 6th Cay, and 1 AT Co, made the
envelopment of the south flank and assisted in the capture of
LEESVILLE. The attack proceeded satisfactorily on all fronts. The '
Prov Mecz Brig quickly secured HORNBECK and proceeded to LSESVILLE,
surprising and capturing in toto the headquarters of the Red Ist Cay
Div. The Ist Div by 10:00 AH had passed KURTHV/OOD, the sth Div had
secured SLAGLE, and in the 6th Div, CT-20 had advanced to LEESVILLE
where it was set back by control ruling.

8
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

11.
c. (Cont fd)
A Red Mecz Regt that had broken through on the front of the
6th Div in the vicinity of LA CAMP was successfully prevented from
advancing north across the CALCASIEU RIVER ,• by road blocks which
were quickly established by elements of the 6th and sth Divs. This
Red unit although surrounded was permitted by the umpires to with­
draw. By 11:30 "All elements of all major units of the Corps were
near LEESVILLE.

AT 2:00 PM, 15 May PO 17 was issued for the pursuit of the

enemy. Tho 6th Div was to organize an encircling force consisting
of a'roinforced combat toam, to move across the SABINE RIVER at "MERRY.
- -
VILLE to seize tho NEWTON BURKEVILLE WIERGATE aroa in Texas. 'The
Prov Mecz Brig on the north-west flank was to push strong reconn­
aissance elements across the river at FERRY and connect with the
6th Div. The balance of the Corps was to continue present miss*
ions to clear up the situation in the vicinity of LEESVILLE. How­
ever B Red resistance continued longer than expected and the 6th Div
encircling force was somewhat delayed due to the gassing of vehicles
and collection of reinforcing units, thus preventing its starting
before 5:10 PM. The congestion of Red and Blue forces around LEES­
VILLE late in the afternoon necessitated control prohibiting tact­
ical" action in that town until Red forces could withdraw to the
west.

AT 7:15 PM, 15 Hay, FO 18 was issued to insure night

protection of front and flanks against mechanized raids; it also
directed resumption of the pursuit at daylight 16 May.

At 8:30 PM, 'l5 May, a teletype message was received from the
Commanding General, Third Army announcing completion of the 2d
phase of tho maneuvers. For situation at this time see ANNEX NO, 13.
All units were directed to bivouac in tho vicinity of their present
locations. Later in the evening instructions wore received to nove
- -
units of IV Corps to bivouac areas, to be designated by the Command­
ing General, IV Corps, east of the lino DERRY DEVILS CREEK
HINESTON. Two army truck companies were allotted to assist in tho .
move.
At 1:00 AM, 16 May Corps instructions for movement of units
to selected bivouac areas were issued. At daylight return movement
began, all attachments being released to parent organizations. The
Prov Tank Brig (less 2 Bns 66th Inf (LT) and 1 Bn 67th Inf (MT) )
plus the 29th Inf were turned over to the Red IX Corps. The 3d
Radio Intelligence Co was transferred to the Blue IV Corps, Allunits
closed in base bivouacs by late afternoon 16 May.

12. THIRD PEASE.

a. Opposin" forces.

Blue: IV Corps

Co. "C", 2d Chemical Regiment

3d Radio Intelligence Co,

Red: IX Corps.
29th Inf. (less 1 Co,)

7th Cay Brig Mecz with 6th Inf atchd.

Prov Tank Brig (loss 2 Bns 68th Inf (LT) and

1 Bn 67th Inf LIT)

Approximate relative total strength

Blue: 30,830 ;Red: 23,489.

9
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
12.
b». Situation. See ANNEX NO. 14, which includes
Maneuver Instructions from Commanding General Third Armjr
dated May 19, 1940, as changed by message 5:30 PM May 19, 1940,
Field Order s' Nos. 19, 20 and 21, with operations maps, Special
Military map, showing dispositions and the, situation at end of
exercise 3:00 PM 21 May.

c. Conduct of the Exercise,

The Third Army directive (ANNEX NO. 14) assigned the IV

- -
Corns the mission of advancing, from march bivouacs west of the
RED* RIVER and east of lino DERRY DEVILS CREEK HINESTON, early
-
20 Ifey, to seize the high ground 20 miles to the west in the vicinity
of LEESVILLE HORNBECK, to block the enemy advance to the north­
west. This mission was subsequently changed (See army message 5:30
PM, 19 May), upon advice that the enemy advance had ceased and a de­
fensive position, generally north east of LEESVILLE, was being organ­
ized. The new mission directed the IV Corps to advance at daylight
20 May, as planned and develop that position preparatory to a
general attack. FO 19, which had been issued at 11:00 AH 19 May,
had to bo revoked and FO 20, issued at 12:05 AM 20 May which
coordinated the attack of the Corps against the cnemys organized
defensive position.
The Corps plan as contained in FO 19 provided for a pene­
tration by the Ist and sth Divisions on 21st May, to be fol­
lowed by a night attack on the night of 21-22 May, if necessary.
This plan was the only one considored feasible, by the Corps
Commander, in a situation whore the enemy had superior mechanized
units to smash any attempted flanking maneuver, Tho Third Army
directed the elimination of contemplated plans for a night attack,
and after considering verbal objections of the Corps Commander,
issued the message of 5:30 PM 19 May, changing the mission as out­
lined above, in order to obviate the necessity for a night attack.
Strong reconnaissance
connaissance line (DERRY
- -

units were moved to the limiting re­

GORIJM LA CAMP) after dark 19 May. At
4:05 AM 20 May, these units crossed the line and major units began
truGk infiltration from their bivouacs to attack positions assigned
by FO 20.

The Third Army furnished protection for all crossings over

the RED RIVER, The 21st Engineers and AT units were employed in
establishing and maintaining road blocks on the north and south
flanks. The Corps was disposed with the Ist Div on the north'flank,
the 6th Div on the south flank and the sth Div in the center.

The reconnaissance elements

pushed forward vigorously after
early contact with Red reconnaissance elements. Each division was
directed to employ only one battalion Inf,'one battalion 75 *s and
one battalion of 155mm howitzers initially, from but two of their
combat teams. Later in the day when tho locations of major enemy
units had boen determined, the divisions were authorized to employ
all means at their disposal to develop fully the main defensive
position before dark. After overcoming stubborn resistance through­
general line BELLWOOD -*KURTIWOOD
-

out the day,- the IV Corps went into bivouac for the night along the
SLAGLE'- CRAVENS, approximately
15 miles west of tho morning jump off lino.

10
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

12.
o, (Cont'd)

The enemy position being sufficiently developed for a coord­

inated" attack the following morning, FO 21, was issued at 11:00 PM
20 Hay. To assist in the attack the Third Army had released to
the IV Corps the Ist and 2d Bns 68th Inf (LT) and 2d Bn 67th Inf (MI).
The Light Tank Battalions wore attached to the 6th and sth Divs,
respectively and the Medium Battalion was retained in Corps Reserve,
because of the refusal of Army to release them early enough to per­
mit their use on the south flank at daylight. The Corps scheme
of maneuver was to penetrate the hostile defensive position bet­
ween LBESVILLE and HORNBBCK to drive him west of the SABINE RIVER,
The Ist Div was to capture the high ground south east of PEASON
and HORNBECK, the sth Div to capture~ANACOCO, and the 6th Division
to capture L3ESVILLE. The preponderence of tanks on the Red side,
about 274 to Blues 108, precluded the possibility of successful
envelopment of the enemys flanks. Reliable information indicated
that the weight of enemy mechanization would bo on the south flank.
Consequently, the 6th Cavalry (less 1 troop) was moved during the
night from the north flank to the south flank whore it had been
planned to form a Prov Mecz Brig under the 6th Division to assist
that unit in the capture of LEESVILLE. However, the Army did not
release the tank battalions until 3:00 AM, at SILTSON, a time and
place which prevented the carrying out of this plan.

The attack on the Red defensive position jumped off at 4:00

AM 21 May after a twenty minute artillery preparation. Stiff res­
istance was encountered all along the front. However the Ist Div­
ision had early success in securing PEA SON and the high ground south­
east thereof, then shifted its attack to the south-west against
KORNBECK. The sth Division succoded in capturing SLAGLE and pushing
about 4 miles beyond. The 6th Division *ad the 6th Cay attached « Two
CT f s of this division successfully resisted the Red 7th Cay Brig
(Mccz), and finally captured CRAVENS. The Ist CT was making a
determined drive toward LESSVILLE with the assistance of Corps
Artillery when the Commanding General, Third Army announced 'the

- -
end of "the Third Phase at 3:00 PM 21 May. See situation map, ANNEX
NO. 14, The IV Corps was directed to hold the important road net '
just gained in the KORTRWOOD SLAGLE
- -
SIMPSON area to facilitate
Blue operations in the next phase. In accordance with Army instructions
the Corps went into bivouac east of the lino KISATCHIE KURTHWOOD
SIAGLE and immediately began preparations of plans for organisation
and defense of the area hold, against Red "reinforcements reported
approaching from west of the SABINE RIVER.

13. FOURTH PHASE.

a. Opposing forces.
Blue: IV Corps (less 18th Engineers)
3d"Radib Intelligence
Co."

Co. "C", 2d Chemical Regt.

Red: IX Corps.

7th Cay Brig (Mecz) with 6th Inf atchd.

29th Inf

34th Inf

Prov Tank Brigade

Combat Aviation

Approximate relative total strength:

Blue: 30,148 ; Red: 25,344.

11
(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers )
13.
b. Situation. See ANNEX NO. 15 for

Three messages fron C.G. Third Amy outlining now enemy

situation and defensive mission for IV Corps; FO 22, and operation
nap issued 5:00 PM 21 May; Messago from Commanding Gonoral Third
Army, and accompanying sketch, prescribing details of positions
for divisions and OPLR and MLR linos, (Received IV Corps 5:10 PM);
Letter Commanding Goneral IV Corps to Commanding General Third Army
dated May 21, 1940, protesting Army direction of positions;
Message from Commanding Goneral Third Amy to Commanding General IV
Corps 9:25 AM 22 May, permitting defensive procedure' rooocnondod
by Commanding Gonoral IV Corps; Special Military Map; showing dis­
positions and situation at end of exercise, 11:00 AM, 24 May.
c. Conduct of the Exorcise.

The Blue IV Corps secured the ground held at the close of

the Third Phase on 21 May, in order to protect the advance of the

- -
balance of the Third Army which was assembling in tho Beaurogard
Area. The mission given the Corps was to prevent the enemy" from
advancing east of tho line, KISA2CEIE KURTIWOOD SLA.GLE.
FO 22, 5:00 PM, 21 May was prepared to coordinate tho defense
of the area. In general the defensive plan assigned tho Ist Division
to the 'north flank which included tho high ground in vicinity of
PEASON, tho center and most vulnerable area of KURTHI7OOD to the sth
Division, and the loss vulnerable area on the south to the 6th
Division. In this situation the IV Corps' was opposed to a Red force
which had been given all available tanks, some 382, and what was
reported to be 400 combat planes, leaving none to tho Blue side.
To combat this powerful mechanized force, the Commanding General
IV Corps decided to dolay on tho first position with two battalions
of Infantry, a battalion of 75 *s and a battalion of 155 f s from each
division. The action between the first and second positions was
to bo road blocking and barrage to destroy a part of the mechanized
force, to break up his formation, to give an opportunity to det­

- - -
ermine his principal effort, and to move forces to meet it. The
plan involved fighting a delaying action back to the 2d
position along tho IHHK HUTTON SIMPSON
JHfIBBB
HINESTON lino, rather
than a withdrawal. This lino was more suited for defense than any
other in the area. Here the flanks were protected by streams that

- - -
were serious obstacles, which converged toward the center, thus
canalizing the attack along a 6 mile fronts in the center of the
KISATCHIE KURTHWOOD MINK HUTTON area. On this front, almost
perfect fields of fire existed, and the innumerable stumps would
slow down any tank attack. Subsequent to the preparation of FO
22, 5:00 PM, 21 May, a message was received at Corps Headquarters
(TEMPLE SPUR) at 5:10 PM prescribing that only two divisons be used
in defense of a line, shown on an attached sketch, and one division
to be held in reserve (ANNEX NO. 15), The Commanding General IV
Corps immediately protested, in writing, the Army's action in
designating a defensive lino which would loavo the Corps flanks
wide open against the enemy's mechanized forces, and prevent the
oxecution of the dofonsivo maneuver outlined above. The request of
tho Corps Commander was approved as indicated by Army message 9:25
AM, 22 May and the defensive scheme contained in FO 22 was adopted
for the operation.

12
(Section 111, Final Import, Third Army Maneuvers)

13.
c, (Cont'd)
FO 22 was augmented by special instructions contained in a
corps memorandum issued at 11:00 AM 22 May (ANNFX 110. 15). The
memorandum outlined in detail "what was to be don© in organization
of the ground, coordination of fires, camouflage and cover, with­
drawal plans, and restriction of use of transporation except for
supply and reserves.

The attack of the Red forces was launched early 24 May.

It was evident that the heavy rain during the night had materially
slowed up the speed of the initial blow. However, by 8:00 AM it
-
was obvious that the bulk of the Rod horse and mechanized forces
were concentrated in front of the sth Division in the SLAG-LE
lOJRTHWOOD area. The 10th Infantry strongly resisted in the SLAGLE
sector and, with the help of a 35 minute heavy smoke screen, slowed
down the attack. Activity on the fronts of the Ist and 6th Divisions
was less marked, these units being able to hold their positions with
their reinforced battalions for several hours. By 11:00 AM the
penetration on' the sth Division front had reached a point 4 mis.es
west of SLAGLE, Plans for a" possible counterattack were formulated;
tho Corps Reserve rc£ir.cnts» 16th Infantry and Ist Infantry, wex*e
moved to positions north-east and south-east of HUTTON, respectively^
The Ist Division was directed to prepare plans for a counterattack
in the sth Division Zone with CT-18 and the aid of the Corps Re­
serve and Corps Artillory. However, the Red threat never "became
sufficiently acute to warrant the execution of this plan. That'
afternoon the sth Division was able to hold out during the day,
and by nightfall all elements had withdrawn to tho 2d position.
Likewise on the north flank tho Ist Division pulled back to the
2d position. However, on the south flank the 6th Division was still
holding the major portion of its MLR.

On the morning of 24 May it was known that the enemy

-
was concentrating his 382 tanks and supporting forces for a major
push through the KISATCHIB HUTTON line. Instructions which had
been given the Ist Division for counterattack in the sth Division
area were still in effect to meet this threat. In addition to the
potential force of 4 Infantry Regiments (less 1 bn 2d Inf) plans had
*
been formulated to bring the full effect of Corps Artillery and
most of the artillery of the Ist and sth Divs on this area. Also,

- mm
120 Antitank weapons (54-37 and 66-, 50 cal MG) were made ready
to meet the heavy mochanizod attack which would be canalized, as
expected, between HUTTON MINK, The positions of the 19th FA were
such that it would have direct fire on tanks penetrating the second
position.

By 9:00 AM the Rod attack was launched in earnest, preceded'

by combat aviation, Howovcr, by 11:00 AM, when the 4th phase ended,
the penetration had only reached tho second position where the full
play of the Blue defensivo weapons were beginning to take effect.
Only 11 tanks penetrated the position. Tho exercise was ended before
the Blue counterattack could be put into effect (ANNEX NO. 15).

At 11:00 AM all IV Corps units began movomont to base

camps designated by the Commanding General Third Army,

13
 SECTION IV

EQUIPMENT

14. GENERAL.
Every possible priority and expedition has been exerted
by the War Department to provide new equipment for the IV Corps.
The new equipment has in general proved highly satisfactory, and
has contributed greatly to the value cf the maneuvers. Field tests
have developed some minor" deficiencies, most of which would appear
to be readily correctable.

15. TRANSPORTATION,

a. Trailers.

Further consideration should be given to the full use

of tht» trailer, which is unquestionably the most economical means
of transportation that can be produced. If necessary for cargo cap­
acity for any given unit, every motor vehicle that is not essen­
tially a prime mover for weapons should bo provided with a trailer,
thus increasing its car go -moving capacity appreciably, and adding
but 5 yards to its road spaco. The trailer has one other largo
advantage-: if its cargo is not needed the trailer can be unhitched
and parked, thus freeing the truck and obviating unnecessary load­
ing and unloading.

10 * SQmi-trailor vans ,(Command Posi)

A considerable amount of time and control may be lost

when a command post of a Corps or Division changes location, largely
due to the necessary disruption of staff and c orrraand facilities.
Semi-trailer vans should be provided, with built-in facilities
such as desks, bunks, nap boards, communications hook-ups, and the
like. Changes of command post locations could then be accomplished
by a simple movement of the van, with a minimum of lost tine and a
maximum of comfort and facilities for command and staff personnel.
These CP vans should be provided as follows:

4 per Corps Hcadouarters

2 per Divisional Headquarters
1 per Combat Team,
c, Passonrcr Sedans.

All now passenger sedans purchased should bo equipped with

sleeping accommodations for at least two persons. One such sedan
is now sold in the commercial market. In mobile opera/tions such a
car would contribute tremendously to the physical well-being and
efficiency of staff personnel.

Camouflage of Transport,

Camouflage cf motor vehicles has become a serious problem,

with the large numbers of vehicles now provided. Natural cover
fortunately has. boon plentiful, but many less fortunate situations
will bo encountered. The provision of light weight nets to be
carried with each vehicle is suggested.

14
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
15.
o. Command-Reconnaissance Cars.

While those vehicles have proved very useful, the sil­

houette is far too high, and insufficient protection, both armor
and armament, is available for personnel.

.
f Motorcycles.

The provision of a raoro serviceable vehicle to replace

the commercial type of motorcycle now in use is recommended. The
present type functions satisfactorily on paved roads at reasonably
high rates of speed, but in convoy at low rates, or on unpaved
roads, breakdowns from a variety of causes are enormous.

16. EQUIPMENT_ USED BY ALL, ARMS AND SERVICES.

a. New Gas Ranee, M1937.
This item of equipment has proved most satisfactory. Due
to its design, however, the use of white p;as is essential, or
habitual clogging of gas food lines and filters will result. As
white gas is difficult to procure in the field, it is believed
that lines and filters should bo redesigned to pernit the use of
leaded gasoline.

The now food containers proved satisfactory and greatly

facilitated the dispensing of hot food to troop elements separated
from their mess.

b. Tentago.
Consideration should be riven to reducing the visibility
of tentago, the use of a darker color (possibly black), and with
impregnation to permit the use of lights without being observed by
enemy aircraft, being suggested as basis for further study. The
painting of tents in irregular designs in the normal camouflage
colors is also worthy of investigation.

c * 2££j£ZlJL Sic epiftj^ Equipment ._

The present officers bedding roll is too heavy and bulky.
The adoption of a simple lightweight sleeping bag, with air mat­
tress, should be investigated.

17. NSW ARMS AND AI^KAMENT.

a. The Garrand Rifle.

This rifle, with its f;roat rapidity of fire and absence of

recoil, is excellent for combat.
b. The 37mm Antitank Gun.

This is an admirable weapon. The only criticism possible

is that it is toe limited in numbers. The substitution of six ad­
ditional antitank guns for tho .50 caliber machine guns in. the in­
fantry regiment would greatly strengthen antitank defense. The
corps antitank battalion should be provided with 64-37mn runs
instead of 36, as covered fully in Section IX of this report.

15
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

17.
c. The 37m Antiaircraft Gun.

The 37mm antiaircraft gun has been present only to the

extent of one battery, but its replacement of the cal. .50 mach­
ine gun is expected in the near future. To bo able tc perform anti­
tank missions in addition to antiaircraft tasks, carriages of those
weapons should be modified so that guns can be depressed for firing
with a -negative an^le of site. The ammunition of those batteries
should include a proportion of armor piercing shell.

d. The 105nr.i Howitzer.

Ono lone example of the now 105 mm howitzer was present with
the Corps Artillery,

c. The New 15 Sum Gun M-l.

.
The Corps Artillery Brigade had only ti-o of these new
weapons during the maneuvers With their effective range of
26,000 yards they have proven invaluable, especially for intor­
diction fires. Their mobility going into or out of position is
surprising. The speed of their prime movers on the read is,
however, only about nine miles per hour. If the Corps is to
be a homogeneous unit, its component parts roust have approximately
the same speed. Hence either an increase in the speed of those
prime movers or a dc- crease in the caliber of this weapon seems in­
dicated.

f. The 81mn Mortar.

The 81mm mortars have been supplied to all organisations

and arc highly efficient weapons when ammunition can be supplied.
The ammunition requirements for these mortars demands the devel­
opment of a low profile motor carrier that can actually be used on
the field of battle. The necessity for such a carrier for machine
j_,uns end ammunition has boon apparent ever since the World War, but
the development of the 81mm mortar has greatly accentuated this need.
To the maximum use of these mortars, proper telephonic equip­
ment should be provided.

ja* Antitank Mines ,j,

j

A supply of this munition should be carried at all times

by Divisional and Corps Engineer units, so as tc be readily avail­
able for road-blocking ?nissicns and antitank operations. The
use of trailers to transport the mines is recommended.

18. SPECIFIC ITEMS.

a. Water Equipment*

Water purification plants issued to Corps and Divisional

1

Engineer units have proved invaluable. Whenever a small stream, of

water is available-, the question of safe potable water is completely
solved by those plants. Consumption has' varied from 3/4 to l|r
gallons per man jper day*

It is recommended that water purification plants be

organically assigned as fellows:

Per Division: Four of the 900 gallon per hour sets.

Per Corps: Four of the 900 gallon per hour sets.

16
(Section IV, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
18.
a, (Cont'd)
This arrangement would pemit the employment of a plant
for oach conbat team of a division, plus one for divisional special
troops, (or all ether divisional troops not a ]:>art of the cor.ibat
teams). The arrangement for Corps Troops would pcrr.iit the simul­
taneous operation of several water DP's with possibly one set in
reserve for replacement purposes.

The snail units should be mounted complete on a trailer of

the 3/4 ton type.
"k # Shower Bath Equipment^,

It is understood that motorized hot water shower units are

now under procurement by the Corps of Engineers. However, in
addition, it is believed that immediate consideration should be
given to the design and production of simple shower attachments to
be operated in conjunction v-rith each water purification unit.

c. Top ogrnphi c C onpariy »

Further study should bo riven to the transportation and

technical equipment to be furnished the newly activated 64th Eng'
ineor Company, Topographical, It is now too cumbersome.

d. Balloons.

The vulnerability of the present C-6 type balloon, and its

replacement cost, could bo materially lessoned by the development
cf a smaller, non-mo tori zed, one-nan balloon. This balloon would
have to be capable of rapid field inflation, and each squadron
should be equipped with several. Experiments should be conducted
in developing a covering material for the separate balloon gas com-*
partments with 0. self-sealing feature for bullet holes or punctures.
A satisfactory system of this nature has already been adopted for
airplane gasoline tanks. The' motorized feature of the balloon is
of doubtful value. If there is serious doubt as to relative value
of balloons versus hcavier-than-air-craft such as autogyros, ex­
tensive tests should be made without delay to arrive at a solution,
in order that production of the selected means could be initiated.

19. DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS.

Detailed recommendations as to quantities and type of equip­

ment, and modifications thereof, are being reported, through channels,
to Chiefs of Branches by the various Arms and Services.

17
 SECTION V

COMMUNICATIONS

20, GENERAL.

a. The maneuvers conclusively demonstrated that present

methods , types
of equipment, and organization of signal units
employed in the signal system are in need of radical changes.
The rapidity of troop movements and the greater distances in­
volved as a result of motorization requires a signal communi­
cation system of far greater size and speed than heretofore
contemplated.

b. It was again found essential that engineer units and

ordnance ammunition control points be provided with additional
signal communication equipment and personnel. The facilities
existing at present are not adequate.

c. Autogyros for use of air messengers should be provided

at Corps Headquarters. Their value has boen successfully
demonstrated for this purpose.

21. IiESSAGE CENTERS.

Message center personnel for the Corps Signal Battalion
should bo increased to include a messenger section as an organic
part, with tho necessary transportation.

22. RADIO COIMJNICATION.

a. Distances between units were often so great that range

of sots wore inadequate. In operations such as those just com­
pleted, vehicular radio sets with ranges of 200 milos and
positive communication for 100 miles, should be furnished corps
and divisions; in lower units, vohiculor sets with ranges of 40
miles. Tho rapid shifting of units from one point on tho front
to another requires constant radio communication. Too much val­
uable time is lost in loading, unloading and setting up present
portable types of radio equipment. Coding of radio messages is
still too slow and cumbersome, even with well trained code clerks.
Prearranged codes with special meanings wore found to be of some
assistance in reducing time. A short simple' code for use betwoen
staff officers should be doviscd. A field mochanical cipher device
is needed to speed up coding and decoding. The use of radio
teletype or facsimile radio equipment should bo investigated as
a possible means of improving communication and increasing speod
in transmission.

b. Tho value of radio intercept and goniomotric service has

again boon demonstrated. There appears to bo a need for further
development in direction finding equipment.

18
(Section V, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

22.
c. A battle reconnaissance radio intelligence unit should be
a part of the Corps Signal Battalion. A signal officer trained
in crypt oanalysis and to act as evaluating officer on radio in­
telligence matters for the Asst. Chief of Staff G-2 seems desir­
able.

d. A special radio set, belonging to the Air Corps, was used

at the Corps CP for the exclusive use of aviation. It is believed
that this necessary additional radio sot should be included in
the equipment of the Corps Signal Battalion. Seldom were tele­
phone communications available and frequently an airplane had to
be called for, and operations conducted, over the same radio not
that was carrying the command load for that unit. The satis­
factory functioning of the corps aviation is absolutely dependent
upon rapid i-jid positive communications, -which arc possible only
if alternate means are provided.

23. WIRE COIMUBICATIOH.

a. The vdrc now issued provides for telephone communication

for only nine miles, or fifteen to eighteen miles when loaded
with coils. This wire should guarantee communication from twenty-
five to thirty miles and y^t be light enough for rapid laying.
Field wire allowance in a corps signal battalion should be in­
creased from 80 miles to 150 miles. A more rapid method of lay­
ing wire should be developed.
opod. The us e_jk£~-a ir-
'"f'.lajag ,s _ for^tho
r]?\u25a0>"[j^°
&-££"-"ilii 1G
emergency laying of fi eldjyrfjifi^
iiTTlmTEetr^treru^nr^ further study. Loading of field wire
lines by using loading coils to increase their transmission range
was found to be of groat value. More loading coils or other
equipment that would increase the transmission range of field
wire lines should bo provided. The exploitation of the commercial
wire net to a much greater degree than heretofore contemplated
was decidedly indicated.

b. Tola type service was found to be most satisfactory end

should be a principal means of communication between divisions
and corps, between corps forward and rear echelons, and between
corps and airdrome. Teletype equipment for communication units
of divisions and corps ahould be standardized. Field teletypes
were operated over a distance of eighteen road miles without
difficulty,utilizing field wire lines.

j3. The arrangement of telephone toll credit cards issued to

certain staff officers proved satisfactory and should be adopted
in future operations. A rapid' procedure for making arrangements
for commercial telephone service, such as connections and leased
circuits, was adopted. This greatly facilitated the use of
commercial communication linos in the military system.

19
 PROPER
"

0" ". S. «„,

(Section V, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

24. FACTUAL DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Mossago Cantors.

During the period Llay 8 to May 24, 1940, inclusive , the

IV Corps message centers at forward and roar echelons and advance
CPs handled the following traffic:

296 Radio messages

4096 teletype messages
39 telegraph messages
2443 messages by messenger
1770 no s sagos by local runner
341 telephone messages
87 dropped messages by airplane
8972 Total.

k» ifo-dio Communication.

Radio communication was more satisfactory during tho Third

Army maneuvers in tho Sabino Area than during tho IV Co*ps nanou*
vors in tho Fort Benning Aroa, tho Sabino Area being moro favorable
for radio reception with much loss local interfcronco. Tho great­
est range at any one time for stations in the Corps radio net was
31 air miles. The groatest air lino distance between CPs of Corps
and tho 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) was 58 miles. No reliable
radio communication was obtained ovor this distance by Corps sots.
c, Wire.

During the four exercises of the Third Army Maneuvers the

51st Signal Battalion laid tho following amounts of field wire linos:
-
Ist Exercise - 17550 miles
2nd Exercise - 225 miles
3rd
4th
Exorcise
Exorcise
- 260 miles
miles

Approximately 197 circuit miles of tho commercial tele­

phone system \7cre used by the IV Corps for telephone and tele­
graph service. Tho longest range of teletype communication was
over 16.3 road miles or 24.5 wire miles, No difference was noted
in tho operation of teletype over this distance using loaded circuits.
Satisfactory telephone communications were obtained ovor this dis­
tance by use of loading coils. This was tho longest distance of
field wire circuits during the Third Army exercises.

20
 SECTION VI

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

25. QUARTERMASTER.
a» Organization,

The organization of the Corps Quartermaster Service

remained the same during the march from Fort Benning to the
Sabine Area and during the Third Army exercises as ithad been
for the IV Corps exercises at Fort Benning.

b. Class ISupplies.

(l) March From Fort Benning to Sabine Area.

(a) Railheads were established and stocked at Mont­

gomery, Alabama, and Meridian and Vicksburg, Mississippi, just
prior to the start of the march. The three overnight halts of the
north column were in the immediate vicinity of these cities.
Fresh meats, fresh vegetables and perishable dairy products were
stocked. Articles were shipped from Fort Benning by rail and
stored in refrigerator cars, A detachment consisting of one
officer and four enlisted men f operated each railhead and had the
subsistence stores ready for issue to each march group upon its
arrival in the overnight bivouac area, .Railhead distribution was
made promptly to all units. The strength of each component of
each march group had been furnished the railhead officer prior to
the start of the march and a breakdown of rations for each reg­
iment or similar organization was made by the railhead detachment
prior to the arrival of the march groups^

(b) Railheads were established at New Orleans and St.

Martinsville, Louisiana, for the sth Division, marching on the
south route. This division subsisted on a nonporishable ration
for the first two days of its march and was provided with fresh
components .for the remainder of the march.

(c) The method of subsisting troops on the march

was most satisfactory and provided normal rations without diff­
iculty, delay or confusion. Upon arrival in the Sabine concen­
tration area all troops were subsisted from the Third Army Quar­
termaster Base in Alexandria, Louisiana,

(d) Elements of to each

Corps troops were attached
march group and it was necessary for the Corps Quartermaster to
divide his service company into a rear and forward echelon. The
rear echelon distributed rations to Corps Troops until tho last
elements departed from Fort Benning and then marched with the
last march group. The forward echelon moved with the first march
group and was pr ©pared to distribute rations to each element of
Corps troops upon arrival in the Sabino Area,

(2) Third Army Exercises,

(a) For the period May 11th to 16th rations were

forwarded by rail from the Third Army Quartermaster Base to
railheads which were operated by personnel from, the Corps and
division Quartermaster service units. There are two railroads
running north from Alexandria, one on each sido of the Red River,

21
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

25.
b. (2), (a) (Cont'd)

Movement of supplies by rail was very satisfactory. From

May 17th, delivery of Class I supplies was by Army motor trains
to division and Corps Troops distributing points. The latter
method of delivery is considered more flexible, provided a good
road not is available, as delivery points and time of delivery
can bo quickly changed in accordance with changes in the tactical
situation. Both methods are subject to unexpected delays. The
use of rail facilities usually has the advantage of providing
good unloading and distributing platforms. Perishable subsistence

.
and ice can bo left in
trucks
refrigerator cars until loaded onto unit

(b) Groat difficulty was exporioncod in obtaining

daily strength returns in time to consolidate into a daily telegram,
due to overtaxed communications and wide dispersion of units.
Itbecame necessary for the Subsistence Officer to o.bandon en­
tirely an attempt to submit a telegram on the basis of a two
day lag, and resort to a throe day lag* A small mobile reserve,
•which at no time exceeded five hundred rations of non-perishable
nature, was sot up in Corps Troops and in each division. This
reserve proved invaluable in meeting emergencies caused by influx
of prisoners, tagged casualties and discrepancies duo to the three
day time lag between submission of daily strength report and the
actual consumption of the ration

(c) The greatest single difficulty experienced in get

ing subsistence to troops was due to sudden attachment or detach­
ment of small units to other tactical organizations, which in a
few cases led to the duplication or omission of rations for the
detached unit. In exercises of this character it is believed to
be necessary to establish a policy, clearly understood through­
out the entire command, that anyj^©n«](itH&ist continue to be
subsisted through the agency of its own regiment or other parent
organization. No other system appears to be feasible whore the
issue of rations is on the basis of one ration per man and where
peace time accountability is superimposod on simulated campaign
conditions.
(d) The "Type "C" Field Ration" was issued to the
divisions for consumption on May 20 and 21. Information obtained
thus far seems to indicate that this is a highly desirable form
of reserve ration but that it should bo packed in rectangular
tins of about ten to twelve ounce capacity for the meat compon­
ent. As issued, the cans were too heavy, too bullqy, and contained
more food than could bo consumed by an individual at one time.
It also appears that troops must be educated in the use of this _^"""
concentrated form of food to prevent indigestion and illness, as
there was noted a tendency to over-eat while over-heated and ex­
hausted as a result of strenuous physical exertion.

(c) Truckhead or railhead delivery of rations was

used throughout the exercise for Corps Troops. Unit delivery
of rations was occasionally resorted to in the divisions.
Sometimes railhead delivery was used for units operating in
close proximity to the railhead while unit delivery was made
to the more distant units. It appears that this combination
of the two standard methods of distribution often may bo ad­
vantageous when units are widely scattered. T-Thcn units are
fairly closely grouped around th<3 rail or truckhead the first
method, i.e., railhead distribution, is considered the more
economical of time and labor.

22
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuver s )

25.
c. Class 111 Supplies (Gasoline and Oil).

( 1) March From Fort Bonning to Sabine Area*

(a) Duo to the large quantities of gasoline required

by the march groups at each bivouac area, advance preparations

were started in March to acquaint the contractors with the re­

quirements. Marches were staged so thdt no refueling was neces­
sary between nightly bivouac areas. Excellent cooperation was

had from the oil companies involved* namely the Standard Oil Com­
pany of Kentucky, Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, Homo Oil

Company, The Texas Company, and the .'Sinclair Oil Company. The

contractors wore furnished with an estimate of gasoline require­

ments and the exact dato and point of delivery. Each dealer moved

in sufficient additional equipment to assure a steady floxv of

gasoline by tank trucks from his bulk distributing plant to the

march group distributing points. Multiple distributing outlets,

improvised at Fort Bonning, were installed in each bivouac area

to transfer gasoline from the commercial tank trucks to the standard

ton gallon drums. Motor vehicles wero rofuolad from the drums at

the rate of about six hundred vehicles per hour or about as fast

as they closed into the bivouac' areas. No undue delays or difficulties

were experienced. „„ -.^

—^asfe,^^ _\u0084,^.,._,...._

(b) The following table shows gasoline consumption of

each march group along the north route:

6th Division -Ist Division

- Corps Troops

Vehicles 1600
- 1575 1666
\
i
t

' i

g^VVfWAd- GASOLINE DISTANCE

Montgomery 23720 18350 19400 108 -Kilos

Meridian 25044 26812 22801 171

"
Vicksburg 23390 22377 19659 150
"
TOTAL 72154 -h 67539 _y 61860 409 Miles^ .
(c) The following data was secured by the sth \ f''
Division on its march along the south route via Now Orleans:

.._--_____ :No. : Vehicle : Gasoline :Miles/Gallon:

tin Div. : Miles .; Consumption : Gasoline t

Cars, Commend : 134 ; 127572 ; 8811 t 14.47 ;

Trucks ,|wT Pickup ; 243 : 195456 ; 13527 ; 14.3 :

Trucks, l^-T
(4x4) T : : \ T

Cargo ; "
420 ; 321223
" : 37184 ; 8.63 :

Trucks, (4x4)
2J-T : : : : :

Cargo : 11 t 8304 : 1111 : 7.46 :

Trucks, lgh-T (4x4) I \ 1 1 T

Dump : 31 : 22474 t 2847 ; 7.9

:

Trucks, 4*T {6x6) : : . :. *

: :

Prime Movers ; 20 : 15063 : 5482 ; 4.3 :

" " "

Average number of" miles of unimproved road traveled:
11
improved
" " 97.4
692.8
" "*" X
*/
<t ,\ PjL.\., 'iu^U /;.'-\u25a0!. i^Aiu 9»©^
23
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
25.

c.
(2) Third Army Exercises,

(a) Gasoline and oil were supplied from commer­

cial tank trucks to Corps and Division distributing points
in the same manner as during the IV Corps Exorcises at Fort
Benning. The Provisional Corps Gasoline Supply Company with
its reserve of twelve hundred drums (ten gallon capacity)
proved to be an extremely valuable organization capable of
rapidly reinforcing a division or other unit with a mobile
reserve of gasoline or of operating as many as four widely
separated distributing points. During the second exercise a
section of this company moved behind a provisional mechanized
brigade from the vicinity of Dry Prong to Natchitoches and
afterward south to Leesvillo, operating gasoline supply points
immediately in the roar of this brigade. At no time was any
organization beyond the reach of gasoline. It is believed that
a gasoline and oil supply platoon should be constituted in each
division and provided with a reserve supply of about throe
hundred drums (ton gallon capacity) to function in the same
manner in tho division as the provisional company did for Corps
Troops.

(b) It is apparent from a study of the War Depart­

ment Table of Organization for the Gasoline Supply Company that
it was intended that it operate from a refilling point such as
railroad tank cars or an Army bulk storage point. This was not
the case during the maneuvers just completed since the method
of supply was by civilian contractor delivery to distributing
points. While such a procedure might be satisfactory for peace­
time maneuvers, it seems unsound in principle to place depend­
ence during national emergency on a civilian agency for adequate
supply. In other words, eithor the Corps or Army echelon must
be equipped with tank trucks of approximately 1500 gallon capacity
divided into two compartments which employ a power pump discharg­
ing gasoline to the ten (10) gallon drums from either four (4)
or eight (8) outlots. Those tank trucks would then either operate
between refilling points and tho various distributing points or
be used to maintain an adequate rolling reserve with tho combat
troops. Assuming, that six (6) of these tank trucks are provided
as organic' equipment of the Gasoline Supply Company it is possible
to furnish in tabular form the remaining equipment required for
proper operation under combat conditions. In this connection see
table of equipment shown below:

Equipment

Item Quantity
Drums, 10-gallon capacity, each 600
Nozzles, flexible for cans 100
Funnels, largo size, (12-inch) 24
Electric Lanterns, Portable Battery Typo 6
Trucks, 2-j- ton (6x6) 16
Cars, Command or Sedan 2
Trucks, -| ton (4x4), Pick-up 4
Trailers, truck 3
Hand Pumping Apparatus, 4-nozzle • 4
Fire Extinguishers, Foamito 12
Tank Trucks, 1500 gallon, 2-compartment 6

24

(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

25.
d. Motor Maintenance.

(1)( 1) March From Fort Banning to Sabino Area.

(a) Regional maintenance was organized and operated

by Third Army maintenance units under supervision of the IV Corps.
A platoon of a light maintenance company was placed in each biv­
ouac area along the north route, moving into position with the
first march group and remaining there until the last troops
cleared through the area. By fixing such a unit in each bivouac
area more time was gained for repair work and salvaging of con­
demned vehicles. This also permitted the organic maintenance units
in each division and in Corps Troops to remain mobile. Vehicles
that could not be repaired by organic maintenance units due to
the nature of the repair, unavailability of parts or lack of time
were turned over to the regional unit. This method of maintaining
and repairing motor vehicles on a long march was highly successful
and is strongly recommended for future use.

("k) Third Army Exercises.

Motor maintenance was conducted in the same
manner as in the IV Corps Exercises, except that on occasions
the maintenance company vrith Corps Troops operated as two platoons
separated by about fifty miles. This was necessitated by the wide
dispersion of Corps Troop units. The only difficulty encountered
by either platoon was due to lack of parts and this was partially
overcome by placing the majority of the parts normally carried
in the company vrith the platoon operating at the greatest distance
from the supply base.

(c ) Transportation.

(l) Increased mobility implies wide sweeping

movements with consequent dispersion of tactical units. The
corollary is increased mobility of supply. The natural inference
is that all Quartermaster Service Units should be fully motor­
ized with the necessary command and control vehicles, organic
cargo transportation and personnel carriers.
.*>'
(2) A minimum of three truck companies (2-g- T)
should be organically a part of the Corps Quartermaster Service.
These trucks would form a reserve for emergency use by tho Corps
Commander for transportation of personnel and would be- available
to facilitate supply under adverse conditions such as a temporary
breakdown of tho supply flow from Army, by transporting adequate
rolling reserves and to accomplish unit distribution to tho more
distant combat units. A further use arises, in that tactical
situations may dictate the sudden removal of railhead or truckhoad
rosorves of rations, gasoline and oil to prevent' their destruction
or falling into the hands of tho enemy. Tho exigencies of campaign
will in addition, dictate many replacements of general supplies
for which truck transportation must necessarily bo provided.

(3) The type Corps of three divisions should

have within it sufficient organic transportation to completely
motorize at least two combat teams for Corps Roserves. It should
also have immediately available sufficient transportation to rein­
force two of the three divisions with ono
company each.
2-J-
ton Quartermaster
Normally two divisions will have missions making it
truck

highly desirable to give thorn additional transportation to reduce

shuttling. Ithas been found that by proper loading, a division
so reinforced can move most of its tactical elements without shuttling.

25
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
25.
d.., (1), (c), (3) Cont'd.

Such mobility should bo afforded two of the divisions to permit

rapid displacement and shifting of units to meet the tactical
situation. The Army is often quito far removed from the front,
and quick communication therewith is frequently lacking or un­
certain. Three Quartermaster truck companies, organically a
part of the Corps, would provide a pool of transportation to
handle the administrative needs of the corps and mako quickly
available to the Corps Commander sufficient transportation to
motorize a powerful striking force of from one to two divisions.

(4) During thoso exercises no truck companies

were available to the Corps. Delays and uncertainties wore ex­
perienced in obtaining transportation from the Army. Lack of
telephone or other rapid moans of communication in a ccmbat zone
will aggravate this condition. It is believed the three truck
companies mentioned above represent the minimum organic transport­
ation essential to the operation of the Corps and that this amount
should suffice under normal conditions.

26. WATER.

Water was supplied to all units by mobile water purification

y.
plants in adequate quantities without difficulty. These puri-
fication plants functioned in a very satisfactory manner. Numer­ ,y

ous small streams wore available in the maneuver area, and it S,,
never became necessary to haul water any great distance.
/'
27. ORDNANCE.

_a. Organization*

Ordnance troops .
There was no change in the organization of the Corps
They functioned in the same manner as in the IV
Corps Exercises at Fort Benning except that each company operated
as a shop under the supervision of a battalion maintenance officer.
This method proved far superior to the method of grouping sections
as was done at Fort Benning.

b . .
Maintenanc e «*

Tho Ordnance Battalion (less the ammunition company)

operated a repair center for Ordnance material during the entire
period of the four exercises in tho Sabino Area. In these ex­
ercises the locations for the shop wore selected at points con­
vonient to the troops and well in the roar of tho Corps. Several
changes in the tactical situation did not cause tho shop to move,
and because of this a maximum of repair service could be rendered.
In the Fort Benning Area the shop was kept so closely in contact
with the rear echelon of the Corps that frequent changes were
necessary. Tho Ordnance Shop should remain stable for as long a
period as possible, even when distances to front line units are
as great as forty to fifty miles, as such distances represent
only two or three hours travel by repair crews or tovdng vehicles.
On the other hand, when the shop moves, a full day may bo lost by
all elements of the shop.

26
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

27.
c. Ammunition Suppl;

(l) There was no change from the plan usod in the IV Corps
Exercises at Fort Bonning,

(2) It is rocommendod that tho ammunition supply plan

entitled "Tho Administrative Handling of Ammunition in the Field"
be adopted in principlo as the standard procoduro for the supply
of ammunition in' the field; but that tho term ammunition control
point be dropped, and a name more descriptive of tho functions of
the Munitions Officers of the Division be used to dosignate his
office It is suggested that tho. simplo torn "Ordnance Office"
be employed.

(3) It is also recommended that the Ordnance Office be

located habitually near the forward echelon of Division Head­
quarters, and that all references to combat trains being required
to pass by or near the ammunition control point or Ordnance Office
be eliminated.

(4) Sufficient blank ammunition should be provided for

exercises of this nature to provide a one to one ratio between
blanks actually fired and the service ammunition represented. No
true picture of the difficulties incident to ammunition supply can
be had otherwise. The expense involved in providing such a
supply of blank ammunition would be more thon justified, A high
ratio of represented service ammunition to blank ammunition actu­
ally stocked, moved and fired, often loads to faulty and erroneous
conclusions on the part of subordinate units.

28. MEDICAL CARS AND EVACUATION.

a, March from Fort Bonning to Sabine Area.

(l) Casualties on the march were evacuated by ambulances

of tho medical battalions and medical regiment to Corps Hospital
Stations which were established at Montgomery, Alabama, on May sth,
7th, and Bth; at Meridian, Mississippi, on May 6th, Bth, and 9th,
and at Vicksburg, Mississippi on May 7th, 9th, and 10th, Casualties
requiring emergency hospitalization were evacuated as far as possible
to Government Hospitals. Whon this was impracticable they were
evacuated to hospitals specified by Letter of Instructions No. 3,
Headquarters Fourth Corps Area. A total of eight (8) casualties
were evacuated from civilian hospitals to Government hospitals.
At the conclusion of tho march a total of thirteen (13) patients
remained in civilian hospitals. In addition one (l) casualty was
evacuated to Station Hospital, Fort Bonning, Georgia; and four (4)
to Station Hospital, Maxwell Field, Alabama; remainder of patients
treated by the Corps Medical Regiment during the march was eighty-
eight (88). The types of patients treated by the Corps Medical
Regiment were Z7% injuries, 29% rospiratory, 17$ intestinal upsets,
and 17% infection*.

27
(Section VI, Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)

28.
a. (Cont'd)
(2) During the march period May 4th to 11th inclusive
there was no prevalence of communicable disoaso and only eight
(8) voncr&l cases, all gonorrhea, wore reported, Thore was a
total of 138 patients admitted to all hospitals as follows:

Civilian Hospital
Ist Evacuation Hospital. ,
IV Corps Clearing Station...
. 21
,108
9
(Immobilized Hospital)
Total 138

Mean strength during the march,, 37,457'

Tho rato per thousand per annum,. 176,64

b. Third Army Exorcise Feriod,

(l) There was no essential difference in the employment

of the Corps Medical Regiment in Third Army Exercises from that
employed in the IV Corps Exercises, The companies of the rein­
forcing battalion wore attached to the divisions making the main
offort in each exercise, tho remainder of the regiment operating
tho Corps Clearing Station.

(2) Camouflage: It is practically impossible to conceal

the hospital ward tents because of their large size. As conceal­
ment is necessary it is felt that saallor tents similar to largo
wall or storage tents should bo used.

29. MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES.

a. Standing Operating Procedure was established and published
during IV Corps Exorcises at Fort Benning. Changes wero made to
provide for a lino of demarcation between division and corps con­
trol of routes of movement and for the establishment of straggler
lines, and prisoner of war enclosures.

_b. lSaintona.no o of order among military personnel in civilian

communities near bivouacs and base camps was the responsibility
of the unit Provost Marshal.

jc. Traffic Control for tho movement to Sabine Are a was

arranged in advance with the Director of Public Safety of each
state traverscdi In every case full and excellent cooperation was
obtained. In the Sabine Area tho cooperation of the Louisiana
State Police was under control of Third Army.

28
 SECTION VII

ADMINISTRATION

30. ROUTINE

During the movement of the Corps from Fort Benning, Georgia,

to the Sabine Area, administrative matters were held to a minimum.
In a few exceptional cases, matters of urgent importance were trans­
mitted to the Rear Echelon of Corps Headquarters, where the files
and records were maintained. The Rear Echelon was two (2) days be­
hind the Forward Echelon in the movement to the Sabine Area. If an
extensive movement from one point to another is made as a Corps move­
ment, it is recommended that the Adjutant General's Section be divid­
ed into two self sustaining echelons, and that the rear echelon not
move from the old station until the forward echelon is actually set
up and functioning at the new station.

In the Sabine Area the Administrative Section of Corps Head­

quarters was located at Dry Prong, La. Administrative and pe>vo_?.nel
affairs wore handled from that place. When the Forward Eohai'-ti of
Corps Headquarters moved from Dry Prong, La., to variovu:
post locations in accordance with tactical situations .

tive matters were sent back to the Roar Echelon at Dry Prong, La.,

by special messenger service for necessary action. Tho operation of

the tactical communications system was never burdened with administra^

tive^business ; tactical traffic was accorded priority at all times.

This, of course, involved some delay in the completion of administra­

tive affairs.

31. PERSONNEL.

.
sx Sco Administrative Instructions Nos. 11 & 12,
AMEXA NOS. 17 k 18.

_b. Discharges and Re enlistments.

A casual center was established at Fort Benning, Georgia
to handle the discharge of those enlisted men of the IV Corps duo
for discharge during the period May 4th to 11th inclusive, who
signified their intention not to roonlist.

Enlisted men duo for discharge during tho movement of tho

IV Corps to tho Sabine Area, who stated their intention to reonlist,
accompanied their organizations and were discharged and reonlistcd
enrouto. Thcso enlisted men were paid final statements by their
Division Finance Officers. In the case of enlisted men who wore
members of Corps Troop organizations, arrangements wero made for
thoir payment by the nearest Division Finance Officer.

In the Sabino Area final statements of the Divisions and

all attached units wero paid by the Division Finance Officers con­
cerned. Final statements of enlisted men of Corps Troops were paid
by the nearost Division Finance Officer.

29
(Section VIIFinal Report Third Army Maneuvers)

c. Sick and Injured.

Thoso onlistod men of tho IV Corps who woro patients in

the Station Hospital, Fort Banning, Georgia, at tho time of de­
parture of units for tho Sabino Area woro divided into four classes.

(1) Thoso who woro ready for full duty in a short time.
(2) Those who woro ready for duty during the period
of maneuvers in the Sabin© Aroa.
(3) Thoso no longor requiring hospitalization and
who were ready for ordinary garrison duty, but who were not yet fit
for active field duty.
(4) Thoso who required prolonged hospitalization, or
transfer to a general hospital.
Those in groups (1) and (2) were returned to duty
with their organizations in tho Sabine Area by tho Commanding General,
Fort Bonning, upon completion of hospitalization. Those in group (3)
wore returned to their home stations on orders issued by Headquarters,
4th Corps Area. Those in group (4) were reported to Headquarters, 4th
Corps Aroa for disposition.

Enroute to the Sabine Aroa, personnel requiring

hospitalization wore, as far as possible, evacuated to Government
Hospitals.

Disposition of Military Offenders.

A liberal policy was established in the administration of

military justice to the end. that miner infractors of military discip­
line were not deprived of full participation in tactical training.
In most cases organization commanders obtained the parole of membeis
of their organizations serving garrison sentences and took them on
all tactical exercises. In many instances the unexecuted portions of
confinement were remitted and prisoners restored to duty. Full advan­
tage was taken \vhonover possible of the provisions of the 104th Article
of War.

32. ATTACHMENT OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS.

National Guard Division staffs trained with units as indicated

below:

Ist Division:
38th Division May 13, 14, 15.
- 10 officers.
sth Division:
31st Division May 14, 15, 16.
- 10 officers.

6th Division:
33rd Division May 9, 10, 11.
- 10 officers.
A total of 1267 Reserve officers took part in the training of
the IV Corps in the Sabine Area.

30
(Section VIIFinal Report Third Army Maneuvers)

33. POSTAL SERVICE

a. During movement to the Sabine Area.

Postal service, which was limited to the dolivcry of first-

class mail, was furnished troops onroute from Fort Benning to the
Sabino Area by moans of a woll-plannod and well-executed system' of
flying the mail by Army airplane to each march group at one point
on its route. Sec ANNEX NO. 18. On the northern route mail was
flown and delivered to the 6th Cavalry at Jackson Municipal Air­
port, Jackson, Mississippi, and to the 6th Division, Ist Division,
and Corps Troops march groups at the Key Municipal Airport, Meridian,
Mississippi. On the southern route delivery was made to the sth Div­
ision march group at the Now Orleans State Airport, New Orleans, La.
/in average of 1200 pounds of mail was carried on each of the five
flights.

b. While in tho Sabine Area*

(l) Postal service during tho period the Corps oper­

ated in the Sabine Area (ANNEX NO. 17) was based upon the plan used
at Fort Benning, Georgia (ANNEX NO. 16). The four Army Poet Offices,
one for Corps Troops and one each for the Ist, sth and 6th Divio'.ons,
continued their operations. Tho point of contact between the .in-iy
Post Offices and the United States Post Office service was at Alex­
andria, La. All normal services of a civilian Post Office, except
special delivery, were handled by civilian and military personnel.
(2) Statistics covering the handling of mail by the

several Army Post Offices follow:

Ordinary mail 27,500

INCOMING
No. Piecos No. Pounds
1,140
.
OUTGOING
No« Piocos No Pounds
30,000 932
Official mail 8,936 654
Registered mail 48 2 44 2
Special Delivery 70 4 108 5
Insured mail 92 322 29 108
2d & 3d class mail
and Parcel Post 2,100 1,150 340 450
TOTALS: 29,810 2,618 39,457 2,151
(Figures shown are daily average)
j'm. average of 135 sacks of mail was received per day
by the several APOs. About 30 money orders were issued per day by tho
APOs. This is less than half the daily average at Fort Benning but
this is because there was no pay-day during tho period in the Sabine
Area.
The unclaimed and undelivered mail averaged about
100 pieces per day, which is about 3/lO of \% of all mail handled.

c. Comments and Recommendations.

(1) The success of tho system of flying mail to

troops making a long motor movement of several stages, warrants its
being adopted as normal procedure therefor. It is believed that
daily service should be so provided at each march bivouac.

31
(Section VII Final Report Third Army Maneuvers)

c. Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd)

(2) At concentration areas near an army post such as
Fort Bonning, the system of having United States Post Office personnel
sort the mail to the various Amy Post Offices operates successfully,
duo to the familiarity of the United States Post Office personnel with
the designation of army units and with amy administrative methods.
Whero such familiarity with army methods does not exist, it is re­
commended that the largest army unit concentrated in that area operate
a central post office, and bo responsible for the sorting of mail to
various subordinate Army Post Offices.
(3) The system of requiring locator cards to bo furnish-
Ed the central and subordinate post office is the only satisfactory
method of insuring prompt, efficient delivery of mail. During those
maneuvers this locator card file was found to bo invaluable, not only
for postal use, but as a. locator system for use by tho various unit
Adjutant General Sections.

(4) Duo to the fact that tho personnel of the Army Post
Offices arc required to maintain 24 hours service,' Army Post Offices
should bo established in the vicinity of Corps end Division CPs so
as to be provided with electric lighting.

32
 SECTION VIII

TACTICS

34. TEAM TACTICS

a. Infant ry-Artil
lery.
The combination of an infantry regiment and a battalion of
light artillery as the basic elements of a combat team has become
standard throughout the divisions of the corps. It is the practice
to have them march, bivouac and initiate conbat together. As soon
as the tactical situation warranted, the artillery of combat teams
was brought under centralized control. This procedure has proved
to be entirely sound and desirable.

In many situations it would be highly desirable to have a

battery of 155-mm Howitzers included in the combat team* Its in­
clusion would to some extent obviate the long delay which generally
occurred in getting medium artillery into action, caused by the fact
that" the medium artillery regiment marches with division troops
in rear of the combat teams. It is further believed that the
medium artillery regiment of the division, if both light and medium
artillery are retained, should comprise two battalions, each of
three firing batteries instead of two. Such a composition would
permit placing the batteries of one battalion in combat teams on
the march, and in the initial stages of combat, and of keeping
tho other battalion under divisional control.

t>. Infantry- Air.

Effort ytq.s made to extend the team idea to include tho In­
fantry-Air field by automatically alloting to the using troops,
air units which would be at the disposition of those units habit­
ually. To do this, Standing Procedure proscribed that airplanes
of tho Observation Aviation Group would be habitually at the
disposition of each division, the Corps Cavalry Regiment and the
Corps Artillery Brigade.

There must be close liaison between the infantry division

and the supporting aviation; this can best bo performed by a Divi­
sion Air Officer. There must also be good communications with a
radio available at the Division Command Post for use exclusively
with aviation. It is bolicved that approximately ono squadron of
observation aviation should bo available to support each division.
No new tactics were developed during those maneuvers.

c. Cavalry-Air.

An autogyro worked with tho Corps Cavalry Regiment during

the exercises. It was used chiefly for command and liaison
missions and rendorod excellent service in keeping Regimental
Headquarters informed as to tho location of tho several detached
elements of tho regiment. Italso did excellent work in trans*
mitting important messages from thp regiment to tho Corps and
nearby Divisions. Its characteristics do not permit it to bo used
on rocommaissanco missions due to its vulnerability, but for work
over our own linos it has proved invaluable

33
(Section VIII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers )

34.
c.

The cavalry regiment found it greatly to its advantage

to have observation planes habitually at its disposal to assist
in reconnaissance missions. A flight "was found to bo sufficient.
As in the divisions this regiment found it of groat advantage
always to have the same flight assigned with the same liaison
officer at cavalry hoadquartors.

d. Combat Aviation.

Because of the non-availability of combat aviation, no

opportunity was afforded to tost any team tactics botweon it and
the infantry or cavalry. In this connection it is believed that
great harm can bo done to ground troops by not having worth while
amounts of combat aviation operating with them and against them;
without it thoy cannot have a proper conception of its use and
the stops they must take to make its use most effective or to
minimize the effect of hostile combat aviation.

c. Antitank-Air .
A need exists for combined training of observation aviation

and antitank units. No such opportunity was available during

these maneuvers.

£. Infantry-Cavalry.

In these exercises there was no regular toaming-up of

corps cavalry units with the infantry divisions. It was found,
however, that better results" were obtained after dldSosufcS of the
corps cavalry had been associated with a particular division fur
several days.

.
jz;. Infantry- Tank

There was little opportunity to carry out the team idea as

the tank brigade was only released to the corps for certain periods.
Teamwork can be fostered, however, and was during the corps
exercises, by maintaining the same liaison officer v.dth a partic­
ular division.

When tanks wero available to the Corps in offensive ope­

rations, it was normal to attach at least a battalion of tanks to
a division and for the division in turn to attach this battalion
to one of its regiments or combat teams. This procedure is be­
lieved to be most desirable in order to obtain the maximum results
from the tanks and to insure close liaison between them and the
infantry with which they are associated.

h. Provisional Mechanized Brigade.

In the Second Phase three (3) battalions of the Provisional

Tank Brigade wore employed in tho abovo manner, while the Brigade
(loss these three battalions) was used to form a Provisional
Mechanized Brigade which contained in addition to tho tanks, one
regiment of infantry (less 1 battalion), one battalion of light
artillery, the Corps Cavalry Regiment (loss animal elements), one
engineer company, one antitank company, and a flight of observation
aviation.

34
(Section VIII,Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)

34.
h.

Although this brigado, which operated as two columns, was hand­

icappcd by insufficient staff and communications, it executed
its mission successfully. Further action as a team and better
equipment for communication would undoubtedly have greatly en­
hanced its utility. It is believed that such a force can read­
ily bo formed from the elements within or attached to the Corps,
and that in many situations it could bo profitably employed.

.
J: Engineers.

Throughout the exercises engineer units have performed

various missions bringing them into close association with the
divisions and corps troops. Each combat team includos a de­
signated platoon of divisional engineers. Corps engineers
wore used to install a 660-foot ponton bridge over the Red River,
to establish and protect road blocks in cooperation with elements
of the antitank battalion, to lay out defensive positions, to
assist in providing protection for bridges, and to repair roads
and bridges. On several occasions certain elements of corps
engineers wero assembled in corps reserve as combat troops after
completion of enginocr missions. V/hile they wero kept extremely
busy on these tasks, the Corps Enginocr units wore unable to
obtain experience comparable to xrar conditions on road repair
and maintenance, demolitions, field fortifications and the supply
of engineer equipment. It is unfortunate that private and public
property restrictions in maneuver areas so limit our maneuvers
that a false idea is evolved of the nature, amount, seriousness,
and especially the tine element involved in such engineer work.

35. ANTIMECHANIZED AND ANTIAIRCRAFT TACTICS.

a. Antinechani zod .The measures taken to provide anti-

mechanized defense varied considerably in the sevoral_ phases of
the Army lianeuvors. In general it developed into two classes:

(l) Defense against tanks massed for an attack within a

sector which canalised their operations;

(2) Defense against potential attacks or harassing action

against either flank by mechanized cavalry detachments, tanks, or
both. The antimechanized defense measures were further influenced
by the degree of protection afforded by streams and other obstacles
such as donso woods and stump-covered aroas. It was standing
procedure for divisions to protect their own front and immediate
flanks. The Corps, employing Enginocr troops and elements of the
Corps Antitank Battalion, provided protection for the extreme
flanks of the Corps and its roar. Maximum, use was made of road
blocks at stream, crossings. Each of these blocks was covered
by a small •detachment. At the more critical crossings the cover­
ing detachment included an antitank gun, machine gun and several
riflemen. Many blocks could be guarded by caliber 0.30 weapons
only.

In the Third Phase where the Corps was operating

offensively, the protection provided by Corps on one flank com­
prised thirty road blocks and on the other twenty- two. This, in
effoct, established flank barrier's each 25 to 30 miles long and
separated by sone 50 to 60 miles. Between these barriers, which
could be expected to delr.y though not completely stop hostile

35
(Section VIII, Find Report, Third Army Maneuvers )

35*
a.
(2)
mechanized units, the Corps was free to operate without danger
of a sudden flank incursion.

In the Fourth Phase, where the Corps was on the de­

fensive, similar barriers were employed initially. "When delay­
ing elements of the Corps had withdrawn from the first position
to the second position, where a determined defense was to be
made, the flanks and rear wore secured by streams that could be
crossed only by bridges. For that reason the bulk of the Corps
road blocking detachments were withdrawn, and the additional
antitank guns thus made available were employed to reinforce
the defense where the hostile tank attack was expected to, and
did, develop.

The three caliber 0.50 batteries and the 37-mm battery

of the Antiaircraft regiment were given the dual mission of AA and
AT defonse. In the last phase (IV Corps defending) both roles
were of equal importance. Including those four batteries, to­
gether with the regimental antitank platoons and caliber 0.50
platoons of one division and of two regiments in corps reserve,
and the attached guns of the Corps Antitank Battalion, a total
of fifty-four 37-mm guns and sixty-six caliber 0.50 guns were
massed in tho critical sector of about eleven miles whorein the
hostile tank attack Yras certain to be canalized. This sector,
while favorable for tanks in that thoro were only a fow shallow
streams, was largely cut-over land closoly covered by stumps
that would greatly retard tank movement.

It was always found necessary to employ the Antitank

Battalion as a reserve from which to reinforce divisions or send
detachments on road blocking missions. It is believed that such
procedure will bo normal and can be satisfactorily carried out.
Coordination and control of antitank protection on the flanks was
placed under the Commanding Officer of the Antitank Battalion.
'
It is considered impracticable in most situations to
hold the bulk of tho battalion in readiness, sinco the time lag
involved in transmitting warning of a tank attack and in moving
guns to positions ordinarily vrill bo too groat to permit timely
intervention.

b. Antiaircraft.

(l) Employment. The 62nd Coast Artillery (AA) vrc.s em­

ployed durirg tho Third Army exercises to protect the IV Corps
in moving situations involving river crossings, development,
attack and defense. In many situations automatic weapons
batteries provided antitank protection in addition to tho anti­
aircraft mission. In the initial exorcises tho primary mission
of the regiment was the protection of bridges over tho Red River
and the airdrome at Natchitoches. After this protection was taken
over by Third Army, the gun batteries of the regiment provided
protection for the Corps artillery while the automatic weapons
batteries were attached to divisions, one battery usually pro­
tecting the balloon squadron. The searchlights had little opport­
unity to work, as no night high-flying targets wore presented.

36
(Section VIII,Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
35.
b.
(^) WQWQQ-P ons .
The automatic weapons batteries were found
to bo highly mobile and capable cf keeping up with the type corps,
whereas the 3 inch guns, owing to their weight, must make re­
latively fo\r changes of position and move over roads having strong
bridges if they are to perform their mission. Since protection
against high-altitude bombardment willnormally be required only
in rear areas, it is believed that Army rather than the Corps
should be provided with the heavy guns. When required by the
corps they could be attahced to it.

The 37-mm gun ordinarily should be adequate to provide

protection against the low-flying or medium-altitude planes which
are most likely to attack the elements of the Corps. This gun also
has characteristics which make it an admirable antitank gun for
defense in depth.
36, EMPLOYMENT OP NEW TOUTS.

a. Triangular Divisions.

The organization of the triangular division is fundamentally

sound. Itmakes the infantry division a very flexible unit that
can be readily controlled, with a minimum of delay, in fast-moving
situations. Slight adjustments in the organization may be necessary.
It is believed that a mechanized reconnaissance troop of three
platoons should be included in tho division.

In employing those divisions tho general principle was foll­

owed that tho infantryman marches only vrhon compelled to do so by
enemy fire. Maximum use was made of transportation, utilizing
empty space in trucks of heavy weapons companies, artillery units,
and administrative vehicles that were not performing their normal
mission, for the purpose- of carrying riflemen. When Army truck
companies wore not made available to the Corps, use was also made
of trucks not needed by tho ponton company after construction of
the ponton bridges, of available trucks of AA gun batteries, of
spare trucks in the Medical Regiment after its installations were
established, and vehicles from tho Artillery Brigado when no longer
needed for its own movement. Extra ammunition was issued to rifle­
men before placing them on trucks. Supplies not ossential for the
initiation of combat were dumped and troops given first priority.

When the threat of enemy combat aviation was present and

filtration
-
time permitted, movements by day generally were effected by in­
trucks moving 500 to 600 yards apart. Whon a move­
ment had to bo completed rapidly, the distance between vehicles '\u25a0
was reduced to roughly 200 yards. Such ir.o /emonts require strict
traffic control and supervision by staff officers. Only when the
distance to be moved was under 4 or 5 miles, or whon roads were
not available, or when enemy fire or combat aviation mado it
necessary, was inarching on foot resorted to. Whon close to the
enemy and threatened by his artillery fire* woapons carriers and
other vehicles were moved across country to the Maximum, extent
possible. This can be done to a marked degro" "w.i.'-h the now four-
wheel-drive transportation.

To insure rapid issuance of orders, general missions were

assigned rather than detailed instructions. Detailed instructions
were contained in the standing operating procedure of all units.
Brevity and tho inaxiiium use of operation maps wero habitual in all

37
(Section VIII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
36.
a. (Cont'd)
orders. Liaison officers were used to the utmost between higher and
lower units. It is believed that they should have been used to a
greater extent between adjacent units.

"&• Corps Cavalry Regiment.

The Corps Cavalry regiment was employed during the maneuvers

for the following missions: Reconnaissance; counterreconnaissance;
security of front, flanks and rear; delaying action; assisting attack.
It performed excellently, and was found to be able to cover a front
of 50 to 100 miles when on reconnaissance. The part the horse elements
could play was hampered by the failure of the trailers to arrive for
use in the exercises. The horse elements were used in what were con­
sidered to be appropriate places, and performed their mission well
for close-in reconnaissance.

Although the regiment executed its reconnaissance and screen­

ing mission very satisfactorily, difficulty was experienced in trans­
mitting information obtainod over tho distancos involved. The scout
car was found to have considerable resisting power and proved very
useful in executing delaying action.

In the second phase, whore a provisional mechanized brigade

was formed that included the corps reconnaissance regiment (less
animal squadron), this cavalry element performed its mission in
excellent fashion.

The efficiency of the Corps Reconnaissance Regiment, both for

reconnaissance and screening purposes, and the assistance itrendered
when operating with the division, indicates that a mechanized troop
should be included as an organic part of tho triangular division.

able for attachment to each combat team

—
The troop should contain throe platoons, so that one would be avail­
tho whole troop to operate
as a unit for screening purposes.

c. Corps Antitank Battalion.

Tho employment of the Corps Antitank Battalion is covered

earlier in this Section under "Antimechanized and Antiaircraft Tactics"

37. CHARACTER OP MANEUVER.

a. Flanking Action vs Frontal Action.

Flanking action rather than frontal action should be normal

with the triangular division. The ideal is to contain the enemy in
front with the smallest force practicable and to envelop one or both
flanks. Y/ide envelopments that would have been extremely dangerous
before the employment of motorized vehicles for the movement of troops,
can now be made with greater safety, owing to the short time required
for reinforcements to come up. Time and not distance is tho de­
termining factor.

A penetration was employed when the enemy was widely extended,

and was strong in mechanization which would have dangerously intor­
ferred with enveloping attack. Night attack would bo especially ad­
vantageous in carrying through a penetration under such circumstances
in as much as armored units would 'not be able seriously to interfere.

When armored units are available to the attacking force it may

be possible to employ them initially against tho enemy flanks in such
a way that he will become over-extended and mass his reserves on the
flanks and thus present a favorable opportunity to penetrate his center.

38
(Section VIII,Find Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
37.
b. Iho Offensive.
The offensive possesses many advantages for mechanized
forces or triangular divisions, Rapid novenent makes it possible
for a corps to carry out envelopments on flanks separated by
100 miles or more.

It is believed that by attacking terrain objectives

(vital road centers and dominating ground), without making a
methodical development of the enemy position, maximum advantage
can bo taken of mechanized elements and stream-lined divisions,
and that by so doing it is possible to attain a great measure of
surprise and to prevent the enemy from shifting his rcservos in
time to moot the attack successfully. Care should bo taken, of
course, to protect the flanks, and to have mobile reserves read­
ily available which can bo pushed forward behind the units that
make tho greatest advance. It is most dosirablo that the leading
eloments of attacking columns contain armored elomonts. It is
also essential that close liaison be maintained with observation
aviation. Combat aviation should bo present if possible, to support
the action of tho ground troops. Such action also requires positive
moans of rapid comrrur.ication between adjacent units and with tho
higher headquarters in rear.

This procedure of attacking terrain without prior develop

ment was followed with success in the Second Phaso, This is'
covered in Section 111.

The svdft advances made by the Gorman Army in Poland,

Norway, Belgium end France indicates that no time has been wasted
in feeling out the onemy. Objectives are assigned and then attack­
ed without prior reconnaissance. Roconnaissanco is conducted at
tho same time as the attack.
c, Ihc Defensive,

A defense against an enemy strong in mechanized forcos

should be conducted on two or more positions. Biore should bo
a road blocking and barrage zone several miles deep between the
first and second positions to give an opportunity for slowing
down the enemy, determining the location and strength of his main
effort, destroying his armored elements, and breaking up his for­
mation. The action in this z one should bo delaying action from
the first position all the way back to the second positon, carried
out by tho garrison and supporting units of the Ist position when
compelled to fall back, and assisted by Engineers and Antitank
elements, as well as tho fires of machine guns, mortars and artillery,
to be delivered on call. It is imperative that tho flanks be made
secure, resting them if possible on obstacles such as unfordablo
streams, even though this results in a considerable extension of
front.
Iho forces used to occupy the first position and effect
delay through tho road blocking and barrage zone should constitute
only a small fraction of the whole force and should comprise
units capable of considerable resistance, notably machine guns,
antitank guns and artillery. Tho bulk of tho force should occupjjr
the second position and mobile reserves should be hold at strat­
egic points from where they can be moved quickly to dolivor a
counter-attack. An effort should bo made to so locate the several
positions, and to so protect tho flanks and effect tho dolaying
action, that the enemy ls armored forces will bo canalized within
a zone where antimechanized defense organized in depth will bring
about their immobilization and eventual destruction, Hhis
procedure was employed in tho Fourth Phaso (IV Corps defending)
which is covered in Section 111.

39
 SECTION IX

CORPS AND COP|% JjjOOPS

38. TEE CORPS.

The exercise in the Sabine area have not caused any change of
opinion from that expressed in the final report on the maneuvers
in the Benning area. The. triangular corps of the modernized mobile
divisions is a homogenous, very mobile and flexible organization
and is fctill capable of rendering a powerful effort. "When deploy­
ed in a mobile situation it extends over such a wide area that it
about reaches the limit of present means of communication. Any
additional divisions added to it would only tend to extend its field
of action beyond those limits without any compensating advantages.
It is also believed that any mixture of less mobile units would
only tend to slow down its operations. Some of the elements in
the corps troops arc in need of increased mobility or otherwise
reorganized so as to permit them to keep pace with the speed and
tempo of the other units and be able to play their part. £t_J^s_
iysß]^s^.appj«:.e}at_jfeha.tL..tp.^e^th© most_out of tho_mobile divisions,
the commanders and staffs must bo highly trained, Gnergetlc^in^tr"'
aggros sivS,^^^ the uniT is wasted in long
deTiber ation or indec i ,
si on

39. CORPS TROOPS.

ja. Corps Artillery.

There has been nothing to change the opinion expressed in

the report rendered at tho close of tho Bonning maneuvers. The
modernization of artillery firing tactics which will cause them to
bring their guns farther forward and firo thorn with less complicated
systems is clearly indicated. For their employment in a mobile
situation under their present methods, they do not pull their weight.

Reinforcing artillery and artillery capable of missions be­

yond tho capabilities of tho artillery with the divisions is ess­
ential to the corps. A brigade of such artillery does not appear
to bo excessive. Perhaps two rogimonts of mixed would be sufficient.
The artillery which constituted the 13th Field Artillery Brigade
was not found to be entirely appropriate. The 155 mm -guns* both the
American and French type woro found to be entirely too slow to
keep up with the mobile troops, and too heavy in weight for most of
the bridges in this part of the country. Their maximum rate of spood
was nine miles per hour, while the rost of the troops were aver­
aging thirty and traveling up to forty-fivo miles per hour on good
roads. The slow spocd of the tractor-drawn guns put them way be­
hind in tho long marches and practically confined their movements
to night marches. In addition it should bo noted that during the
day thoir slow moving column is very vulnerable to air attack.
As a gun element in the corps artillery a snallor caliber weapon
of long range of about 105mu seens to be indicated or a faster
moving prime-mover developed. Whether they should bo a separate
regiment or as a battalion combine^, with 155nn howitzers is not
yet cloarly indicated.

40
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Manouvers)

39.
b. Antiaircraft.

The Corps needs an antiaircraft roginent. It should be

composed entirely of 37ram gun batteries as this v/ould increase
their usefulness both for antiaircraft missions and for antitank
tasks. The lattor frequently will bo their primary mission. It
should be provided vrith ample vehicular radio oquipmont so as to
take advantage of reports from antiaircraft warning service, as
"vroll as for intrarogimental communication.

c. Enginocrs.

Combat and General Service Regiments.

The remarks nadc in our provious report are ropoatod as
still pertinent. The Corps was given both a combat and a general
service roginent. As constituted there was vory little difference
botwoon then in equipment or personnel. Both wore new regiments
with only a limited amount of training, and were usod almost
interchangeably throughout the excrcisos. Both rogimonts showed
fine osprit and both performed excellently during tho oxorcisos.
Both rogimonts were over encumber od with exceedingly heavy oquipmont.
"Mien tho ponton companies wore attached to thorn they wore entirely
overburdened and unable to move without a groat deal of shuttling
or assistance from other troops. It ie believed that, when the corps
is operating as a combat unit, one reginont of throe battalions
would be sufficient. It should be of the combat typo with only a
limited amount of heavy oquipmont and should bo completely motor­
ized. The gonoral service regiment is more appropriately an Army
unit which can bo added to tho corps should the situation stabilize
and heavy construction work become necessary. This combat regiment
should have sufficient armament to enable it to defend the road
blocks which it is called upon to construct.
The Engineer Company, Topographic requires further study as
to its proper organisation, equipment, and duties.

_d. The Antitank Battalion is an essential corps unit. Its

organization should be increased to 4 companies of 4 platoons
each, making a total of 64 guns. This vfould pornit reinforcing
each division with a company and still havo a company in reserve
or to protect corps installations.

o. Medical Troops.

Tho Corps Medical Regiment seoned to bo the proper medical

unit to be assigned to tho corps. It should bo employed as a re­
inforcing unit and not as a link in tho chain of ovacuation be­
tween the divisions and tho amy. It functioned as such during tho
maneuvers and it would appear that that is its proper role.

f. Military Police.

The military police troops had to bo improvised from a

detachment of tho Tvronty-socond Infantry. They were constituted
into one company of about one hundred men. They performed all the
functions of traffic police and that number was found to bo about
sufficient. It is believed that a similar organization would bo
sufficient for tho corps with an .addition of numbers to take care of
the evacuation of prisonors in actual operations.

41
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)
39.
Ja* Signal Battalion.
The Signal Battalion should include a radio intelligence
company. The Battalion did not have equipment of sufficient range
to take care of tho area covered by the Corps, Better and more
distant communications are absolutely essential. The introduction
of teletype between the Corps and Army was a great success. It
is recommended that similar equipment b© provided so that this
type of communication can bo had betweon corps and divisions as
well# It proved to bo tho fastest and most reliable means of dis­
patch of routine matters. The activities of tho battalion were
handicapped by tho detachment of 1 officer and 44 men for duty with
tho Army Control Group,
—• Headquarters Special Troops.

No necessity is seen for this headquarters .

Ono was ex­
temporized and used during tho IV Corps Maneuver s. No uso was
found for it so it was dropped during tho Sabinc maneuvers. It
had proved a purposeless headquartors.

JL* Corps Cavalry Rogimont.

This unit was found to bo very essential to the Corps and

sooms to be of about the correct sizo and general organization.
Tho play of tho horse portoe squadron was handicapped by tho fact
that tho trailers for the horses did not arrive, but their pro­
fitable uso was indicated. This rogimont successfully bridges
tho gap in observation between aviation and the foot-soldior and
supplants aviation when tho latter cannot work.

A* Avis-tion.

Tho Corps had an aviation group of throo squadrons plus

ono balloon squadron. Aviation of this typo is essential but it
is believed that four squadrons should bo normally assigned.
Our experiences in this regard however wore complicated in that
none of tho squadrons had a full compliment of pilots and so their
ability was restricted. It was however clearly evident that tho
observation squadrons must have a considerable number of pianos
capable of landing on improvised or simplo landing fiolds. Tho
pianos wo had, required such olaborato landing fields, that we
could not find appropriate ones in proper tactical locations for
them. They must be able to land close to headquarters so as to bo
in the communication net.

k. Quartermaster Servico.

Tho remarks made at jfchc close of tho Banning jaaneuvers are

still applicable and are copied. ,•
f ff. (

Th© quartermaster services woreLJ&ll, improvised from infantry

units. A gasoline company, Csoven^Y-fiv^men,)
lye of footed, the distribu^
tion of gasolino to corps tro^opsaßWßffervisod the arrangements
for. other troops* It is an essential unit and functioned satisfact­
orily, l
.„_

A Quartermaster servico company, about sixty mgn, effected

the ration distribution to Corpg Troops. It is an essential unit
and functioned satisfactorily.

// i!
/

42
(Section IX, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

39.
k. (Cont'd)

A car platoon, fifteen men, furnished the drivers for the

automobiles for headquarters, and motorcyclo messengers. It is an
essential unit but doos not belong vdth the Quartermaster service.
It works for Corps Hoadquarters and should bo quartored and ration­
ed with them and should be an adjunct of the Corps Headquarters
Company,

The Corps had no attached truck companies. Those which wero

originally attaohod wero taken over by the Army and constituted the
Army Motor Transport Service The Corps constantly felt the nood
of somo transportation of its own to augment transportation of
divisions to haul ammunition, and for othor purposes. Three truck
companies should bo an organic part of tho Corps Troops.

The Corps had one Light Motor Maintenance Company which took
care of the corps needs satisfactorily end appears to bo sufficient.

1. Ordnance.

The Ordnance Battalion consisted of ono maintenance company,

two medium maintenance companies and one ammunition company. This
proved to bo a good organization under tho ordnance plan which was
adopted. The question of whethor or not tho corps should handle
tho ammunition problem through tho ordnance or through the art-
illery direct with tho army is a moot ono. If tho ordnanco is to
handle it, then tho ammunition company is essential.

40. RECOMMENDATIONS.
As a result of our experience the "typo corps should bo about
as follows:

Corps Hq « Hq Co.
3 Triangular Divisions
Corps Troops:
Artillery Brigade
1 ikitiaircraft Regiment
1 Antitank Battalion
1 Engineer Regiment (Combat. 3 Bns),
1 Engineer Company (Topographic)
1 Uedioal Regiment
1 Cavalry Composite Regiment
1 Observation Aviation Group
1 Signal Battalion
1 Military Police Company
1 Ordnance Battalion
1 Quartormastor Battalion

43
 J

SECTION X

CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF

40. ORGANIZATION.

ja. t/O 100-1 for Corps Headquarters of an Army Corps pre­

scribes a peace time strength of 40 officers and- 76 enlisted men.
The actual strength during the maneuvers was 36 officers and 67
enlisted men. t/o 100-1 does not show a break down of the General
Staff into its several sections. In general the authorized strength
of the separate general staff sections was therefore based on that
shown in Chart 48-A, Tables of Organization and Reference Data,
The Command and General Staff School, 1939. Special Staff Sections
conformed as far as possible to the organization shown in T/o 100-1.

"k* The G-l Section can function properly undor peace time
conditions similar to thoso of the maneuvers if reduced from 1
officer and 4 enlisted men to 1 officer and 2 enlisted men, pro­
vided that it is officed and operates intimately with the G- Jr
Section, or its work can be allotted in part to G«4 and the AG Sec­
tion. For the Third Army Maneuvers tho G-l Section functioned as
such only for the planning phase for the movement to, and concen­
tration in the Sabine Area. Thereafter its duties were taken over
entirely by the G-4 Section and by that part of the AG Section with
the Forward Echelon. Prior to leaving Fort Benning, the G-l Section
had completed all plans and issued administrative instructions for
the movement, and for the period in Sabine Area base camps.

£. The G-2 Section was augmented by one officer for the Third
Army Maneuvers, so that its actual strength was 2 officers and 6
enlisted men as compared to 3 officers and 6 onlistod men authorized.
The part-time services of the Air Officers to the G-2 Section was
continued, as for the IV Corps Manouvors.

&,• The G*3 Section functioned with 2 officers and 5 enlisted

men as compared to 3 officers and 6 enlisted men authorized. The
part-time services of the Chemical Warfare Officer and one aide
were made available to G-3.

£• The G-4 Section consisted of 2 officers and 3 enlisted mon.

Ordinarily when the Corps functions only as a tactical unit, part
of an army, this strength for the G-4 Section is adequate. When
given the' additional functions of mobilization, concentration, pre­
paration of camping areas and corps supply, or in short, when oper­
ating as an independent corps, an additional officer and one addi­
tional enlisted man should be provided.

£• Special Staff Sections functioned satisfactorily at author­

ized or reduced strength, except in the cases noted hereinafter:

(1) Corps Antiaircraft rloadquartors was not in existenco

except during the early planning phaso. During maneuvers the Com­
manding Officer, 62d Coast Artillery (AA) acted as Corps Anti-air­
craft Officer in addition to his command duties.

44
(Section X, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

40.
f.
(2) Koadquart Corps Quartormastor Service;
or s uorps
Jri.oaaqus.rT;ors oorvigc This office
was improvised
sod and consisted of four officers and f
f ive onlistcd men
of the Quartermaster Corps. It should be a part of tho Corps Quartor
master Battalion and of appropriate size to administer it.

(3) Ordnance Section; Should bo the headquarters part

of tho Corpa Ordnanco Battalion.

41. EQUIPMENT.
Efforts were made to minimize tho amount of equipment
taken into the field. Standing Operating Procedure limited the
assignment of tentage, typewriters and other equipment.

4-a. PROCEDURE.
a. Standing Operating Procedure.

The value of standing operating procedure in reducing tho

amount of material in orders and instructions and in thus reducing
tho time necessary to prepare arid publish them, was still further
demonstrated during the Third Army Maneuvers. Standing Operating
Procedure, IV Corps, is included in ANNEX NO. 19. Typical Standing
Operating Procedure for a division is included in ANNEX NO. 21. Ex­
perience during tho IV Corps maneuvers noar Fort Benning indicated
that certain changes and additions to Standing Operating Procedure,
IV Corps, were advisable in order still further to reduce tho amount
of material required to be published in orders and instructions.
These changes and additions arc also included in ANNEX NO. 19. They
provided an "H-Hour" time schedule for ration distribution, stand­
ing procedure for traffic control, stragglers, prisoners of war, and
bivouac and assembly areas for corps troops. In addition, standing
procedure prescribed that liaison officers from the divisions, and

for duty during tactical exercises

in increasing tho rapidity
.
from designated major units of corps troops, report to tho Corps CP
Those officers proved invaluable
with which orders and instructions wore
distributed to units and in providing intelligent interpretation
thereof to unit commanders. It reducod but did not eliminate the
necessity for using Corps staff officers on liaison missions to
subordinate units.

b. Standing Command Post Procedure.

ANNEX NO. 20 gives tho general procedure at the Corps CP.

In addition each staff section developed standing procedure for its »
own operation, especially for procedure immediately following the
issuing of tho directivo of the Commanding General. All procedure
was designed to speed up the preparation, issue, and dispatch of
orders to troops. The standing intelligence procedure included
in Section 111, Standing Operating Procedure for IV Corps, ANNEX
NO. 19, is typical. In general it required 1-j- hours from the time
of receipt of the Commanding General's directive until a complete
written field order togethor with operation map (s) he.d been pre­
pared, reproduced and were ready for transmission to the troops.

45
(Section X, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

42.
c. Duties and Functions.

In genoral, staff sections operated as prescribed in

the Staff Officers Fiold Manual, with the following exceptions:
The Secretary to the General Staff croated during
tho IV Corps Maneuvors, by using an assistant AG, continued to
operate as such during tho Third Army Maneuvers.

Tho G-l Section, as noted above, was eliminated beginn­

ing with the movement to tho Sabino Area. The Forward Echelon of
tho AG Section handled all matters pertaining to personnel such as
discharges, casualties, replacements and strength returns. The G-4
Section handled all matters pertaining to military police, traffic
control, stragglers and prisoners of war. This system operated
satisfactorily.

d. Relations between Staff Sections.

In fast moving situations such as developed during theL.e

maneuvers, tho majority of tho intercommunication of staff sections
was of necessity by personal contact. Time did not permit tho
rapid dissemination of information received in ono section to an­
other section. Information within tho staff proper was therefore
obtained by tho staff officer needing it, going to tho proper section
for it, rather than receiving it automatically. Frequent visits,
particularly to G-2 and G-3, wore therefore necessary. The problem
of furnishing up-to-dato information on the situation to liaison
officers and visiting officers, was- mot by keeping a situation map
posted for this purpose in tho tent allotted to the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary to tho Goner r.l Staff.

43. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The strength for a corps headquarters prescribed in T/O
100-1-P is in need of rovision.

Jd. Those officers on the special staff of the branches of

tho service represented by units of corps troops should command
those troops in addition to their duties as staff officers. This
would apply to tho Corps Artillery Officer, the Corps Antiaircraft
Officer, the Corps Engineer, the Corps Surgeon, tho Corps Quarter­
master, the Corps Ordnance Officer and the Corps Signal Officer.
Enlisted men required for tho headquarters of these staff officers
should be o. part of the units commanded, rather than of the Corps
Headquarters Detachment. An exception should be made in the case
of tho Corps Chief of Aviation who should be solely a staff officer.
The distance between the Corps CP and the airdrome on which the
obsorvction group is based ie usually so groat, and the movements
of the Corps CP so froqucnt and rapid, as to preclude one individual
performing both command and staff dutios.

46
 SECTION XI

FACTUAL DATA

44. POTOR MOVEMENTS-,

The following tables are a consolidation of the factual data ob­
tained during the movement from Fort Benning to the Sabine Area and dur­
ing the Third Army Maneuvers, Insofar as possible the figures have been
averaged and reduced to a common basis by the elimination of such vari-*
abjes as the time allowed between the major elements of a march group.

a, Normal Convoys,

(l) Table I gives data obtained during the march to the Sabine
Area, This data is given separately because divisions were reinforced by
Corps troops, and units of Corps troops were therefore split up, attach­
ments and detachments were in accordance with the provisions of F} 3 3,, Hq,
IV Corps, Fort Bonning, Ga,, 30 April 40, All movements were during day­
light.

47
(Section XI, Final Roport, Third Army Maneuvers)

44.
a.

(2) TABLE II Normal convoys during Third Army Maneuvers,

(a) Daylight.

j Time Time Number No. of sets

length length Closing of data

UNITS at IP at pt, of used to REMARKS

enroute Time . . \u25a0 compute

average
Vohicles
CT :48
:54 :59 243 4JT
Division Tps. 2:20 2:35 3:00 481 3
6th Cavalry :25 :20 :25 276 5 (less Ist Sq)
Lt.Tank Bn, :23 . :18 :28 101 142
13th FA Brig, j ;53 | :50 | :50 | 282 | 4 |
(b) Night w/lights.
CT "755 (1:12 [1756 | 263 | 10 |
Division Tps. 2:30 2:41 3:40 481 3
6th Cavalry :25 :20 270 2
Lt.Tank Bn. [ :23 | :18 [ :33 | 101 | 42 |
(o) Night w/o lights. ~
jIT3B [1754 [2728 j
_^

"CT 330 ] 4 I
Division Tps, 3:10' 3:20 4:14 481 3
Lt.Tank Bn. :18 :18 :38 101 16
13th FA Brig. {1:25 |1:26 ?.:38 ] 39 | 6 }
b. Infiltration by Truck*

This method of movement was used extensively to reduce the

danger of loss by air attack. The majority of such movements, however,
were made by individual combat teams or smaller units under the stress of
tactical necessity and no records were kept. The data available appears
in the following table:

Time -Tim© Number

length length Closing Number of
UN X T
at at pt. Time . of sets of
IP enroute Vehicles data
Combat Team 2741 2733 3701 233 9
Division Tps 6:20 6:40 12:02 481 2
Lt.Tank Bn. 1:08 1:08 1:12 101 16
13th FA Brig. l 6:24 | 6:24 j 4:52 260 | 2 : )
c. Shuttle Movements.

Shuttling as a method of movement was not used to any extent

during these exercises. The attachment of Army truck companies or the
attachment of additional transportation from other units precluded for the
most part the necessity ,of shuttling. In six cases v/here shuttling was
resorted to, the "turn around" factor varied from 0.5 hour to 2.8 hours.

48
(Section XI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

44.

d. Rate of March.
MPH (ay.) Number of eets

(1) Trucks .
Daylight 24,1
of data

55
Might with lights
Night without lights, • .•..
Infiltration. •••••••.•••••
21.1
15.8
24.5
19
6
11

(2) Tanks.
Daylight 30 142
Night with lights,.,. 30 42
Night without lights, •• ••• 10 16
Infiltration. , 30 16

(3 ) Tractor elements,
36th P. A.
Daylight
Night ivith lights
.
• • 5.7
4,1
Night without lights. • •• • • 3.3
Infiltration. 5.7

45. TRUCKS IJEED3D TO COMPLETE MOTORIZED COMBAT TEAMS .

Ist Divi5i0n,.......»,. ,27* ..,••
" " " " "
lg- ton trucks por combat team
"
sth Division, 82 " " " " "
6th Division 112 "« " " " " "
18th Engineers
21st Engineers
16
16
" " " " " "
*= Providing each light artillery battalion carries two rifle
companies.

49
(Section XI, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

47. TIME REQUIRED FOR DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS TO KITCHENS,

{ UNIT DISTRIBUTION i Rhd. DISTRIBUTION

UNIT TIME Lstfr^Rhd, TIME lpist>fr!Rhd,
Ist Division 3:IQ 12 3tlO 12
sth Division 4:20 17 5:25 17
6th Division 6:00 27 6:00 27
13th FA Brig, not used 6:45 17
Lt.Tonk Bn. not used 7:00 30
6th Cavalry not used; J 8:00 81

Fas^ast time and

for^'Woakdown
for^'broakdown distribution to 'unit trains
--
for Railhead distribution to Corps troj3£S, i.e.
-'3:45 x
-^3:45
~~
•
(under cover of darkness),
darkness). a^^^fc.--
48. TIME REQUIRED FOR DISTRIBUTING GASOLINE TO VEHICLES.

a. While on the inarch, with each vehicle carrying a can of sc.zeline »

a column can be regassed during a ten minute halt.

b. At QM DPs.

(l) A maximum of 150 vehicles per hour can bo regassed from an

eight (8) outlet pumping unit.
(2) Using cans, a much faster distribution may be effected.
The time required is entirely dependent upon the system and number of
DPs used.

50
 SSCTION XII

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

49, SUMMARY OF TACTICAL LESSONS,

a. Conference at conclusion of maneuvers.

The remarks of the Commanding General, IV Corps, at the

conference held at Alexandria, Louisiana, May 25, 1940, are in­
cluded in ANNEX NO, 22.
b. Team Tactics,

(References are to paragraphs of this report)

(1) Infantry-Artiller;
The basio elements of the combat team should be a
regiment of Infantry and a battalion of light artillery, which
should march, bivouac, and initiate combat together. In many
situations a battery of medium artillery should be included.
(Par. 34 ju)
(2) Infantry-Air,
One squadron of observation aviation should be avail­
able to support each division, liaison through division air officer
communication through radio at division CP. (Par. 34 b, )
(3) Cavalry-Air.
One flight of observation aviation and one autogyro
should habitually be at disposal of Corps Reconnaissance R.egiment;
liaison officer at regimental CPj Cavalry-Air radio set at regi­
mental CP. (Par. 34 c* )
(4) Combat Aviation.
Ground troops should bo trained to operate with and
against combat aviation. (Par. 34 d. )
(5) Antitank-Air.
Antitank units and observation aviation should have
combined training. (Par, 34 c. )
(6) Infantry-Cavalr;

Combined training of Triangular Divisions and Corps

Cavalry is desirable. If divisional mechanized reconnaissance
troops are constituted, each should train with its respective
division. (Par, 34 f,)

51
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

49.

£. (Cont'd)
(7) Infantry- Tank.
Frequent training of tanks with infantry is impora
tive, a tank battalion working with an infantry regiment or com­
bat team. (Par. 34 £.g )

(8) Provisional Mechanized Brigades.

The combined training of tanks with infantry should
also include artillory, antitank units, engineers, observation
aviation, and cavalry scout car units. Provisional brigades com­
prising various combinations of the several arms should be formed
and tested in field exorcises. (Par, 34 h. )

(9) Engineers.
Engineers should train froquently with the othor
arms, both in the performance of normal Engineer duties and in
combat duties with antitank units and as a component of a combat
team. (Par. 34 i.)
c. Anti-mechanized and anti-aircraft tactics.

(1) Anti-mechanized defense.

(a) Anti-mechanized dofense should be stressed in

tho training of all ground arms, emphasis being placed on tho

utilization of natural obstacles and the construction, install­

ation, and protection of roadblocks and flank barriers. The es­
tablishment of a roadblocking and barrage zono between positions

in defensive operations should be seriously considered and thor­

oughly tostod with a view to adoption as a procedure in defensive

operations. (Par. 35 a.)

(b) Automatic weapons batteries of anti-aircraft

artillory with the Corps should be trained to provide anti-mechan­

ized defense in addition to anti-aircraft dofense. For this addi­
tional mission a proportion of armor-piercing ammunition should be

carried. (Par. 35 a.)

(c) Normally, detachments of the Corps antitank

battalion are sent to divisions and to provide flank protection
for the Corps. Tho battalion seldom will operate as a unit.
(Par, 35 a. )

(2) Anti-aircraft defense.

The primary nood of tho Corps is for automatic

weapons caf suitable caliber for protection against low and modium­
altitudo attack. Three-inch or larger guns should be in Army units
and attached to a Corps only for defense of permanent
"
or seni-perma 1

nent rear-area installations. (Par. 35 b, )

52
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

49.

$i Employment of New Units.

T"!

(l) Triangular Divisions.

(a) The organization of the triangular division is
fundamentally sound, but may require slight additions and adjust­
ments. (Par. 36 a.)
(b) The general principle should be followed in
the triangular division that the infantryman marches only when com­
pelled to do so by enemy fire. Maximum use must be made of all
available? transportation. (Par. 36 a*)

(c) Training in motor movements should stress in­

filtration by trucks, convoy by bounds from one covered position
to another, cross-country movement, and movement at night without
lights. All commissioned and enlisted personnel should be indoc­
trinated with the need for, and methods of, handling motor trans­
portation when enemy air or mechanized attack or artillery fire

threatens. (Par. 36 cv )

(d) On non-tactical marches of divisions, bivouacs

for regiments or combat teams should bo so 4»©pareit© d th^t fcino id Siot
1

lost in closing or resuming march, (Par. 36 a.)

( 2 ) Corps Cavalry Regiment.

A Corps Reconnaissance Regiment is essential-

capable of performing all cavalry missions. (Par. 36 b. )

c. Character of Maneuver.

(l) Flanking action versus frontal action.

Flanking action should be normal with the triangular

division. Penetrations are employed only whon the enemy is over-ex­

tended, has secure flanks, or is strong in mechanization. The

lattor condition makes night attack desirable. Tho employment

of armored elements against the enemy's flanks may cause him to

ovor-extond his front, shift his reserves, and thus permit his

center to be penetrated* (Par. 37 a. )

(2) Tho Offensive.

Rapid movement makes it possible for a Corps to

carry out envelopment on flanks separated by 100 miles or more.

(Par. 37. b. )

(3) Attacking terrain objectives without prior development.

In many situations it is believed that development

of the enomy should be dispensed with and that the attack should
be launched directly upon vital terrain objectives. (Par. 37 b, )
(4) The defensive.

A defense against an enemy strong in raochanizod forces

should be conducted on two or moro positions separated by a road­
blocking and barrage zone several miles deep in which the enemy will
be delayed, the location and strength of his main effort determined,
his armored elements destroyed, and his formation broken up.
(Par. 37 c. )

53
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

50, FACTUAL DATA.

For details of a statistical nature see Section XI, page 47,

and pages 23 and 31.

51. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AM) RECOIgfISNDATIONS .

a» Organization.

(l) The organization recommended for the typo corps is shown in

paragraph 40.

(2) The speed of heavy corps artillery units and anti-aircraft

units should be increased so that all units of the Corps will
have approximately equal mobility. (Par. 39 a.)
(3) An observation group of 4 squadrons plus a balloon squadron
is necossary in the corps. (Par. 39 i.)

(4) The Corps Composite Cavalry Regiment is an essential and

valuable unit. A mechanized roconnaissanco troop of 3 platoons
should be a part of each division. (Par. 36 b. )
(5) The Corps Antiaircraft Regiment should consist entirely of
37mm gun batteries. The 3-inch gun batteries should be pro­
vided in Army troops, (Pars. 35 b (2)
& 39 b7)

(6) The AT Battalion should be increased to 4 companios of 4

platoons each, making a total of 64 guns, (Par. 39 d, )
(7) The Corps Engineers should consist of one combat regiment of

3 battalions and one topographic company. General Service

regiments should be part of Army troops. (Par. 39 c. )

(8) The Corps QM Services should include a small headquarters,

a gasoline supply company, a service company, a light, mainten­
ance company, and 3 truck companies (2i=r-T). The present car
platoon should be a part of Hq. Co. of the Corps. (Par. 39 k. )

(9) The Corps Medical Regt. is satisfactory. It should reinforce

division medical service and not bo a link in the evacuation
chain. (Par. 39 o. )
(10) A Headquarters Special Troops is unnecessary. (Par. 39 h. )
(11) The Signal Battalion should include a radio intelligence
unit, and a messenger service section with its necessary trans
portation. (Pars, 21 &
39 £.)
(12) One Military Police company of 100 men, with additional per
sonnel to take care of prisoners in actual operations
ficient.
is suf­
(Par. 39 f ) .
(13) t/o for Corps Hq, is in need of revision. (Par. 43 a.)
(14) A Secretary to the General Staff created by using an Asst. '
AG in the forward echelon proved valuable. (Par. 42 c. )
54
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

51.

a. (Cont'd. )
(15) Except for the planning phase the G-l Section pan be dispens­
ed with in peace time maneuvers, its duties b&irig taken over
by G-4 and *h© AG. (Par. 40 £ ) .
b. Equipment.
(l) Every motor vehicle, not a prime mover for weapons should
be provided with trailers to increase cargo capacity and make
trucks available for personnel. (Par, 15 a.)
(2) Semi- trailer vans outfitted as CP's should be provided for
headquarters; 4 per Corps, 2 per Div, and 1 per Combat Team.
(Par. 15 b.)

(3) Sedans should be provided with sleeping accommodations

for 2 persons. (Par. 15 c. )

(4) Commercial make of motorcycles now in use is not satisfactory.

(Par. 15 f.)

(5) A low profile motor carrier operated by a driver in prone

position should be provided for mortars, machine guns, am­
munition, and as a litter. (Par # 17 f. )

(6) Slow planes or autogyros should be provided for air mesenger

service at corps headquarters. (Par. 20 c. )
(7) Tho present observation plane (0-47) is unsatisfactory
for Corps and Divisions. Observation planes must bo capable
of landing and taking off on small improvised landing fields
near tho Corps CP.

(8) Extensive tests are necessary to settle whether autogyros or

balloons are to be used for observation purposes. A small, non-
motorized, one-man balloon capable of rapid field inflation, and
with a puncture proof feature similar to that for airplance
gas tanks should be developed. (Par. 18 d, )
(9) Several small, one-man, non-motorized balloons per squadron
are required. (Par. 18 d.)
(10) New gas ranges 1.0.937 are most satisfactory. Lines and filters
should be redesigned to permit use of leaded gas. Now food con­
tainer for dispensing hot food to front line troops is satis fac
tory. (Par. 16 a, )

(ll) A lightweight sleeping bag with air mattress, for officers

and men should bo adopted. (Par. 16 c.)
(12) Substitute 6 additional 37mm AT guns for the cal, .50 MG f s
in the infantry regiment. (Par. 17 b.)
(13) Modification of carriages to permit firing with negative
angle of site, for antitank use is recommended. Ammunition
should include a. proportion of armor piercing shell.
(Par. 17 c.)

55
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)

51.
b. . (Cont'd.)

(14) The 26,000 yard range of the new 155ram gun M-l is an asset.
Either an increase in speed of its prime mover, or decrease in
caliber of this v/oapon is needed to make its road speed equal
to the rest of the corps, (Par. 17 £ ) .
(15) A supply of AT mines should be carried at all times by
division and corps engineer units. (Par. 17 g.)

(16) Four 900 gal, per hour water purification units should be
provided for the corps and for each division. Shower bath
accessories should be included in each unit. They should be
mounted complete on a trailer, (Par, 18 ji & Id)

(17) Further study of the transportation and technical equipment of

tho engineer company topographic is required. (Par. 18 c.)

(18) Camouflage nets for vehicles are suggested. (Par. 15 d. )

(19) Visibility of tonts, day and night should be reduced by

developments in camouflage paint, and impregnation to prevent
passage of light. (Par. 16 b. )
c. Communications,

(l) Present methods, types of equipment, and organization of all

signal units require radical changes to conform to the 'speed

and distance traveled by the new corps. (Par # 20 a.)

(2) Corps radio sets should give positive communication for

100 miles; division sets, 40 miles. A. separate radio set for

use between corps and corps aviation is required, A rapid

mechanical coding and decoding device is needed. Radio tele­

type, facsimile radio and directional radio sets should be

.developed. (Par, 22 a & d, )

(3) Additional signal personnel and equipment for engineer units
are required. (Par. 20 b.)

(4) Field wire transmission range should bo increased to 30 miles

and a more rapid method of laying developed. Further tests
of laying wire by airplanes are needed. Teletype service be­
tween corps and divisions, "corps and airdrome, and between
corps echelon is necessary* Telephone toll credit cards for
commanders and staff officers should be provided in all maneuvers.
(Par. 23)

£r Suppiy*

(l) Railheads near each staging aroa to ©nablb Qlstributlofroi^frosh and

perishable rations proved tho best method of supply for a march of
several stages. (Par. 25 b. (l))
(2) Strict peaco time ration accountability should not obtain dur­
ing maneuvers. A reserve to meet sudden tactical changes is
a necessity, (Par. 25 b, (2-) (c))
(3) The type C Field ration being too bulky and containing more
food than can be eaten at ono time, should be reduced in size
and contents. (Par, 25 b, (2) (d))

56
(Section XII, Final Report, Third Army Kanouvors)

51.
d. (Cont'd.)
(4) Gasoline distribution to cans from tank trucks "by special
multiple-distribution outlets was a success. Refueling ve­
.
hicles from 10 gal. cans is the fastest nothod, Six 1500
gal. tank trucks with power pumps should be provided the
Gasoline Supply Company to obviate dependence on civilian con­
tractors, (Par. 25 c. (1) (a))

(5) The establishment of regional motor maintenance at each stag­

ing area for a long motor movement proved a successful method.
(Par. 25 d. (l) (a))

(6) All ammunition required to bo carried in war should be carried

or represented in maneuvers. Blank ammunition should be provid­

ed in a one to one. ratio to the service ammunition represented.

(Par, 27 c. (4))

c. Administration,

(l) Plans and administrative arrangements for disposition of

personnel to bo discharged, tho sick and injured, and prisoners,
should bo :aado well in advance of any concentration of troops.
(Par. 31)

(2) For divisions and larger units advance Billeting Officers,

and Billeting Detachments composed chiefly of engineer troops.,
should be provided on long non- tactical marches of several
stages. (Par, 7c.)
(3) When concentration areas are distant from an army post, the
largest hen.d quarters present should operate a central distri­
buting army post office. (Par. 33 c. (2))
(4) Locator card files should be required at all army post offices.
(Par. 33 c.(3))
(5) Mail should be flown to march bivouac areas for a long march
of several stages. (Par. 33 c.(l))
'

52. REPORTS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS AND CORPS STAFF.

/A
Valuable detailed and technical information, comments, and
recommendations are contained in tho final reports of subordinate
unit commanders and the Corps Staff to this headquarters, and are
available in its files. Much of this data has been included in
special reports required to bo submitted by those officers directly
to Chiefs of Branches and other Headquarters.

tyjUfc^. <?.., /

WALTER C. SHORT
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

57