How To Succeed in the DI

Fifteen Axioms for

Intelligence Analysts (U)

Frank Watanabe

the Directorate of Intelli

Recently,

spate of new
its mission and on how

(DI) has

gence

thinking

on

seen a

it conducts that mission. Notable

examples

are

craft 2000

just

general
what
a

we

tried

to

codify
guide

rules that

in the DI do

on

daily basis...

mandatory Tradeand the

and, if that is the

better. I

just

case, all the

tried to codif, general
rules that guide what we in the DI
do on a daily basis, and I would not

presume to invent new tradecraft.

But the new DI analyst, and more

publication of a paper entitled Intel

ligence Changes in Analytic Tradecrt~fI
in CIA ~ Directorate of Intelligence.
As well-meaning and insightful as all
this new thinking is, however, most
is coming from senior DI managers,
not from the analysts and other jun

than a few old hands, would be well

served by remembering these 15 prin

ior and midlevel officers who carry

mission on a daily basis.
out the Dls

judgments. Always

In

addition,

some

ersmyself
exception

9~

the

course

truisms

to

frontline DI offic

includedwould take
the idea that the con

cepts put forth in Tradecraft 2000

truly represent new thinking. Much
of it is

merely

a return to

the basics

of DI tradecraft that many of us in

the Directorate seem to have

forgotten.

ciples

in their

everyday conduct,

suspect that many will

as

be

never

adopted officially.
Believe in your

be

alternative conclusions

ten to

other

professional
willing to lis

own

points of view,

or

but stand your

ground if you really believe the intel

ligence supports a certain conclusion.
Just because

someone

is your

boss, is

higher grade, or has been around

longer than you does not mean he or
a

she knows

more

about your

account

than you do. You are the one who

reads the traffic every day and who
studies the issue.

Before

leaving

the DI

on a

assignment,

I endeavored

down

of the axioms

some

have tried

tially,

to

live in my

this exercise

rotational

by

which I

career.

Ini

begun
provide some practical advice to a
new analyst joining my branch, but I
eventually decided that these axioms
might be of interest to officers
throughout the DI. Although I have
not rigidly adhered to them, they
have served me well as general guides
to professional conduct as a DI ana
lyst. To experienced analysts, many
of the principles will sound like
was

aggressive, and do not fear

being wrong. Anyone can restate
what a raw intelligence report said,
but in the DI we are supposed to be
in the analysis business. As a DI
officer, it is your job to go beyond
the factsin a rigorous, logical
wayto understand what they
mean. Do not be afraid to predict
the future, or of being wrong. If you
are right most of the time, you are
doing pretty well. But if you are
always right, then you are not doing
your job.
Be

to set

to

It is better

Jack Davis, Intelligence Changes in

lytic Tradecraft in CIA~- Directorate ofIntel
ligence (CIAPES ICATCIADI-9504),
April 1995
Ana

Frank Watanabe is in the Director

ate

of Intelligence.

to

be mistaken than

to

be wrong. One of the hardest things

to do is to admit that your original
assessment was

people

mistaken. Too many

to admit a

in the DI refuse

45

Axioms

mistake

and

incorrect

or an

change

to

their

good

assessment

assessments

in

of new facts. But it is always

better to admit you were wrong and
to change a position when the facts
warrant it than to stand by an incor

light

in the face of

rect assessment

new

example, earlier in my
career, I was responsible for evaluat
ing foreign export control systems to
determine if they could protect sensi
tive Western technology. I was
convinced that

was

one

of the countries I

studying was not able to protect

technologies because of

sensitive

weaknesses in its control system, and

I had written my intelligence assess
ments

Later, I had the

accordingly.

the country and

go
firsthand the system in operation.
I was surprised to find that it was far

opportunity

to

to

see

more secure

than I had believed, and

I reversed my earlier assessments of

its unreliability. Had I stuck to my
I would have been

original analysis,

Westerners, while inva

But Saddam

illogical.

Hussein did

not

precisely

as

view the situation

many

analysts

did.

all

are

right.

But it may also be

because you have fallen into a groupthink mentality that does not allow
you

the other side. As

to see

ple, following

Intelligence

is of

no

value if it is

disseminated. It does

not

facts. For

sense to

sion seemed

not mat

how much you know about a

subject unless you clearly and effec
ter

tively

communicate the

and your

assessment to

intelligence
the

consumer

timely manner. We cannot sup

policymakers if we do not
provide them with the intelligence.
The US Navy had SIGINT provid
ing advance warning of Japanese
plans to bomb Pearl Harbor, but it
did not analyze the information and
in

port

the proper officials

prevent the attack.

disseminate it
in time

to

to

Coordination is necessary, but do

settle for the least common

not

denominator. We coordinate
ensure a

to

product and to
substantive expertise of oth

the

collapse

an exam

of the

Soviet Union, there was an almost

unanimous belief that large numbers
of Russian ballistic missile

specialists

would flood into the Third World

and aid missile programs in other

states (the so-called brain drain). The

thoughtful

this issue obstructed a

debate on the probability

of such

exodus

unanimity
an

on

occurring and

of

alternative scenarios. As it turned

departure of
specialists, but Rus
sian expertise was supplied to other
states in ways that had been ignored
due to the overemphasis on the brain
drain. Differences of opinion are
healthy because they force both sides
our,

there

was no mass

Russian missile

make their case

intellectual battle.

to

on

the field of

corporate

the

The

does

how

wrong.

bring

Avoid mirror

ers to bear. But, as one commentator

is valuable,
once said, Consensus

much you know, just tell him what

is important. Too many analysts

indeed essential, for moving the ship

of state in a reasonable, orderly way.

strive

imaging at all costs.

imagingprojecting your

Mirror

thought

process

elseis

someone

threats

value system onto

one of the greatest

or

to

objective intelligence analy

sis. Not everyone is

alike, and

cultural, ethnic, religious, and politi

cal differences do

because

matter.

something

ical conclusion
you does

seems

or course

not mean

Just
like the

log

of action

to

that the person

widespread

But

agreement and

assumptions do not mean the

agreements and assumptions are cor
rect. True analytic differences of
opinion do occur. If you think you
shared

right,

are

and the coordinator dis

agrees, let the assessment reflect that

difference of opinion and use a foot

facts and details. But the consumer

of intelligence does not care how
much you know. He wants you to
tell him only those things that are

really important for him to know

they mean. Superfluous
details merely serve to obscure the
important facts.

and what

When everyone agrees

would

something probably is

seminated. But the

rare

to

are

not

invade, and that its hostile

intended to
intimidate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
into abiding by OPEC production
quotas, thereby driving up the price
of oil. The argument made perfectly

military

46

actions

were

note

never water

down your assessment to a lowest

common denominator just to obtain

Form is

coordination.

than substance.

spend
on an

issue,

wrong. It is
when everyone in the Intelli

analytic judgment.
instances do

it is time

do

worry.

occur,

Maybe

to

it is because all of you

lot of time

needs

wants to

to

or

we

worrying about
our analysis is dis
consumer wants

intelligence

says,

know it when he

know it. Most

not care

looks

important

In the DI,

know what the

and he

Community

never more

the form in which

agrees on an
When these

gence

not care

to demonstrate their depth of

knowledge and sophistication in
their products by loading them with

analyzing will see it

group you
that way, particularly when differ
ences in values and thought processes
come into play. For instance, in the
days before Iraq invaded Kuwait, the
conventional wisdom was that Iraq
or

if necessary. But

consumer

consumers

how attractive

report

whether the format is

Axioms

I have lost

correct.

ber of times

they
a

do

not care

the
as

all

possible,

it;

they just

has

least in time

at

want

in their hands

decision. This is

to

as soon

help

for
let

not

concerns over

the form of

product get in the way of the

substance of what you are trying to
communicate and its timeliness.

your

pursue collection of
information you need. In the Intelli
gence Community, we have the

Aggressively

unique ability

to

substantial

bring

collection resources to bear in order

to collect information on important
issues. But

too

many

analysts

DI sit in front of their

screens

in the

and

passively wait for the information

they need for their jobs to come to
them. If you are examining a prob
lem and there is no intelligence
available, or the available intelligence
is insufficient, be aggressive in pursu
ing collection and in energizing
collectors. During my career, I
played a central role in reorienting
collection toward

targets

new,

rest-of-world

to meet new consumer

requirements following

the

collapse

of the Soviet Union. My investment

in time and energy did not expand
my production file, but it did result
in valuable new intelligence that

allowed

me

munity to
questions.
the

the

consumer

needs

know (some

to

times better than the

consumer

knows himself) and which collectors

can obtain the needed intelligence. If

frequently tasking collec

tors and giving them feedback on
their reporting, you are failing to do
an important part of your job.
you

are not

answer

the customers

analyst, you have

of
advantage knowing both what
an

the available information. Sometimes

this

requires taking positions or

doing things that may make you
unpopular with colleagues or supervi
sors. But never let your legitimate
concerns

dence
Do

take the

not

editing

process

seriously. If editorial changes do

meaning of what you
are trying to say, accept them
gra
ciously. When the changes do alter
the meaning, however, do not be
afraid to speak up and contest the
too

changes.

over

take prece
your obligation to do
career

job.

Community
to

them

not

have

parts and talk

The CIA does

either the truth

counter

frequently.
monopoly

or on

all informa

know your
counterparts in the various Intelli
tion. So get

to

Community agenciesboth
analysts and collectorsand talk to
them frequently, finding out what
they are doing and informing them
of what you are doing. Frequently
gence

means

several times

month,

not

something. If
you cannot recognize their voices
over the phone, then you probably
are not talking to them often
enough. My close ties to counter

just

when you need

parts

at

NSA and DIAand

the

resulting collaborationhave repeat

edly resulted in better collection,
better products, less duplication, and
less conflict

Being an intelligence analyst is not

a popularity contest. Some of
your
assessments may be unpopular or
unwanted, particularly by policymak
ers

Know your

on

your

for your

alter the

not

over

who do

many friends in the coordination pro

But your job is to pursue the

cess.

truth. I recall
warded

dence

career

take prece

job. As a
professional intelligence officer,
over

colleague

analysis

an

who for

that called into

the wisdom behind several

question

US weapon systems. This

new

sis caused criticism of the

analy

CIA, of his

office, and of himself. He stood his

ground, however; the Agency sup
ported him, and eventually he was

proved right.

He did

not

of friends, but he did his

Do

not rest on

ders. Also, there will

lot

your shoul

always

work than there is time

to

jobor your
seriously. The fate of the

world does

not

make

job.

take your

not

selftoo

Do
Never let your

not want to see

intelligence that undercuts their

objectives. You also may not make

have

coordination.

and others in the Com

As

responsibility is to present the best

intelligence analysis possible, given

not an

sioppy or shoddy work, or

bypassing the review process, but

excuse

for
do

over

assessment

make

assessment

me

on

or

stamped

if an

num

have told

it, if it is in the proper

even if it has draft

CIA seal

format,

of the

count

consumers

keep things
become

in

to

be

more

do it. You

perspective.

workaholic;

remember

to take care of yourself

family. You are doing a
conducting a crusade.

and your

your

your

job,

not

47