American Behavioral Scientist 2004 Tumber 1122 37

ARTICLE
Scandal and Media in the United Kingdom

From Major to Blair
HOWARD TUMBER
City University, London
This article looks at the recent spate of political scandal news, both financial and sexual, in
the United Kingdom during the Major and Blair administrations. Scandal revelations, especially those produced by the press, may be due in part to the audience-building strategies of
the media. Dissenting views, in contrast, may possibly be offered as a result of the medias
own legitimation needs. Stories of scandal serve to undermine institutions in the publics
mind and can often provoke the setting up of government and parliamentary committees
leading to the regulation of particular activities. This article shows how the accumulation of
scandal stories may have serious repercussions for the popularity of governments and prime
ministers and may influence the representation of all aspects of policy.
Keywords: media; scandal; events; politicians; journalism
Why is corruption apparently exploding all over the media? Many commentators try to locate the increase in media scandals in a much larger picture of the
crisis of democracy. Castells (1997) saw media scandals as phenomena of many
liberal democratic countries, particularly those where the political parties who
have been in power for many years have collapsed. If one contends it is unlikely
that corruption generally is at a historical high point, why is it coming to the fore
now and in addition, why is it affecting political parties, politicians, and institutions so much (Castells, 1997, p. 333-335)?
One of the principal features of recent change in the personalization of politics is the move from a reactive mode of behavior to a proactive one involving the
increasing use of long-term promotional strategies by governments, political
parties, institutions, and corporate interests to promote their images and influence policy making (Tumber, 1995). The culture of promotionalism is taking
over many areas of public life. For government, the breakdown of party identification and partisanship is leading politicians to turn increasingly to political
consultants and public relations advisors to get themselves elected and once in
office, to continue to employ these spin doctors and professional communicators to promote themselves and maintain public approval for their policies.
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 47 No. 8, April 2004 1122-1137
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Information management is thus pervading all aspects of government behavior

whether it is directed toward domestic or foreign policy (Berkman & Kitch,
1986, p. 147; Wernick, 1991, p. 135).
The promotional culture and the mass media provide politicians with the
main way of publicizing themselves. At the same time, they make politicians
vulnerable. Governments and institutions of the state are constantly faced with
the risk of loss of legitimacy and can have their institutional personal authority
deconstructed by the media (Ericson, 1991, p. 233). Scandal has become big
business for the tabloid newspapers.
For politicians, the rise in scandal news has led to a preoccupation with new
strategies and tactics to counter negative images. For the corporate world, as
globalization has developed, multinational companies in particular face the
prospect of problems arising in one small part of their global operation turning
into an international crisis within minutes thanks to ever faster and more ubiquitous electronic links and the consequent speed with which media agencies can
flash news around the world. During the 1980s and 1990s, a spate of corporate
public relations offensives was launched to refute criticisms over safety procedures and corporate responsibility in response to a number of well-publicized
disasters and accidents. Swift action was also deemed necessary in the wake of
takeover and other financial scandals and to allay public fears about the real or
potential dangers of contaminated or faulty products. High profile cases illustrate that an efficient crisis management plan, with an emphasis on skilful news
management, can be effective in lessening the damage such catastrophes can
wreak on a company. Indeed, those that have managed crises well in public relations terms have even managed to benefit from them. They have achieved this by
attracting public sympathy in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and then by
winning peoples trust and respect for the way in which the disaster subsequently has been handled. In contrast, a corporate crisis that is badly handled in
public relations terms can cause irreparable damage leading to board
resignations, a plunge in share value, and even corporate takeover.
Castells (1997) contended that scandal politics is the weapon of choice for
struggle and competition in informational politics (p. 337). His argument echoes that of the common political communication position that politics is now
enclosed in the space of the media (see Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995):
The media have become more powerful than ever technologically, financially and
politically and their global reach allows them to escape from strict political controls. Their capacity for investigative reporting and their relative autonomy vis-vis political power makes them the main source of information and opinion for
society at large. Parties and candidates must act in and through the media to reach
society. (Castells, 1997, p. 337)
Rather than acting as a fourth estate, the media instead are the ground for power
struggles (Castells, 1997, p. 337; see also Waisbord, 1994).
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AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
The kind of corruption that is prominent may be slightly different in terms of

the ratio of personal morality against political corruption. It may alter in different countries, with Britain having a much higher proportion of sexual scandals
and corruption than other countries (Castells, 1997). The question of the
enhancement of the newspapers market position is often crucial. Scandalous
news may be a direct consequence of the audience-building strategy of the
media, although there may be some pompous editorial justification for its presence (Tumber, 1993). The rise of business stories and business scandals in Britain since the 1970s shows how business was embraced within the realm of scandal. In part, this was due to the changing economic climate during the Thatcher
era. The 1980s saw a huge rise in the amount of financial business information
available in Britain. As well as increased coverage in the national press, the specialist financial press expanded and the Conservative governments privatization program gave a huge impetus for the increase and for the growth of personal
finance columns. Advertisers also increased the proportion of their advertising
expenditure on the tabloid press, and the tabloid press themselves launched their
own personal finance columns. A number of major criminal business scandals
emerged, in particular the Guinness case, in which a number of directors of
Guinness were charged, tried, and found guilty of rigging the share price in a
takeover battle with Distillers. There were other instances involving BCCI,
NatWest Bank, and Maxwell. But there were other scandals featuring business
during the 1980s and 1990s, sexual scandals involving high profile chairmen of
major companies and their sexual peccadilloes. These front-page stories involving the business community are commensurate with the news values inherent in
all press-reported scandal concerning leading figures in public life (Tumber,
1993, p. 350).
One interesting scandal involved Gerald Ratner, the chairman and chief executive of Ratners, a high street jewelry chain. The interesting part of this story was
that Ratner declared at a lunch at the Institute of Directors that his business success was founded on selling people what they wanted: total crap. He told his
audience that in his thousands of shops across Britain, he sold earrings costing
no more than a 99 pence Marks and Spencers prawn sandwich but that they
probably will not last as long. The tabloid press went to town on the speech, with
the Daily Mirror running the headline You 22 Carat Mugs, with a subheading
underneath a picture of Ratner saying I sell crapsays jewels king Ratner. The
story ran on April 24, 1991. The interesting point about the affair was that The
Financial Times, in January 1988, reported these same comments that Ratner
was to repeat in 1991. The difference the second time was that the tabloid press
got hold of the story and gave it front-page treatment; the quality press featured
the story on its nonbusiness pages (Tumber, 1993, p. 352).
One of the factors cited in relation to the recent scandal coverage is the
increasing tabloidization of the press; the broadsheet press have gone
downmarketand they often follow the tabloids in the coverage of scandal
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(particularly those of a sexual nature). So it can be argued that some scandals

become a scandal only when they are taken up by the tabloid press and then
reproduced by the broadsheets.
It is difficult to know how to classify the Ratner scandal. There are certain
types of scandal that have to be revealed by the tabloid press before being taken
up by the rest of the media. Indeed, in a number of cases, some sections of the
news media, including television, will refuse to take up a scandal. For example,
Games (1997), in a report in the London Evening Standard, said that the BBC
was reluctant to cover a sex scandal about a Conservative member of Parliament
that broke in one of the Sunday tabloids, the News of the World. Games questioned whether we should be celebrating the BBC as the last bastion of good
taste or instead voicing concern over what appeared to be hesitancy in the case of
unsavory stories. According to Games and the Standard, the BBC, in response
to charges that it was holding back on this particular story, answered that the
story was pursued during the day but there were no major new developments and
an editorial decision was taken not to include it in subsequent TV news programs. The BBC was also concerned, allegedly, about the potentially defamatory nature of the story. Games and the Standard hinted that the BBC had perhaps been hobbled by the government, although, of course, the BBC denied this.
The preoccupation of the British tabloids with sexual scandal was an issue
raised by Sabato and Lichter (1994) in their look at the media coverage of the
Clinton scandals, pre-Monicagate. Although news organizations in the United
States tended to downplay or even ignore the allegations of sexual affairs, the
British press reveled in them and delighted in every new detail. Both Troopergate and Paula Jones were big stories, but many of the headline stories in the
British tabloids received barely any attention in the American press. The allegations from various women about their relationships with Clinton produced
headlines such as Sex Scandal in Little Rock: President Fails To Deny Six Mistresses Claim (Daily Mail, December 23, 1993) and A Legend in His Own
Bedtime(Mail on Sunday, January 2, 1994). In the United States, one factor that
discouraged reporters from seeking out stories involving sex is the view that
they have of themselves as professionals. Most national journalists tried to avoid
Troopergate and Paula Jones because they deemed such low-brow scandals to be
unworthy of their attention. The perceived stigma attached to covering distasteful sexual allegations affects not only individual reporters but also news
organisations (Sabato & Lichter, 1994, p. 101-103). Sabato and Lichter quoted
Howard Kurtz, The Washington Posts media writer, who believed that
for journalists who felt uncomfortable or dirty pursuing these allegations of infidelity, Whitewater was the perfect scandal. High-minded. Financial. Dry. I dont
have any doubt that a lot of news organisations redoubled their efforts on Whitewater to show that they were not soft on Bill Clinton even though they werent
going to dive into the muck of Troopergate. (p. 33)
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Sabato and Lichter went on to note that

the medias extremely tough critique of the Clinton administrations policies has
been partly a substitute for, or a channelling of, journalists disapproval of
Clintons private activities. Even if they chose not to put it in print or onto the airwaves, most reporters were well versed in the details of allegations about Clintons
sexual behaviour. A further motive for the journalists de-emphasising of Clintons personal behaviour was their revulsion at the tabloid and ideological forces
pushing the stories to the fore. (p. 33)
The recent scandals in Britain can be broadly classified into three categories:
political (lying to the House of Commons; breaking of UN embargoes on arms
sales), financial (cash for questions; the funding of political parties), and sexual.
It is useful to look at these scandals in the years of the last Conservative government under the leadership of John Major and those of the New Labour
administration under Prime Minister Tony Blair. Major was elected leader of the
Conservative Party in 1990, and in 1992, he won the general election. In 1997,
New Labour won a landslide election under the leadership of Blair.
The biggest major political and constitutional scandal in the 1990s was the
Matrix Churchill affair in 1992. This was a scandal involving a number of defendants who were prosecuted for the unlawful export of defense equipment to
Iraq. Conservative government ministers, on the grounds of public interest
immunity, used the right to refuse to disclose public documents in the trial. The
trial judge insisted on inspecting these documents and subsequently ordered
their disclosure to the defense counsel. The scandal began to emerge when Alan
Clarke, a government minister who was appearing as a witness in the trial,
admitted that the government knew the arms equipment was being exported to
Iraq. As a result of Clarkes testimony, the case collapsed with the prosecution
abandoning its case. The case received an enormous amount of publicity. Newspapers and politicians attacked the government on the grounds that the defendants had very narrowly avoided being wrongfully convicted, and that the government should not have allowed the prosecution to go ahead, thereby putting
the defendants at serious risk of losing their liberty. As a consequence of the
scandal surrounding the trial, a senior judge, Richard Scott, was appointed to
conduct an inquiry into the matter and his report was published in February
1996 (Scott, 1996).
The conclusions of the report were that there had been excessive secrecy on
the part of the government, a misleading of Parliament by both ministers and
civil servants, and a willingness by the government to withhold certain documents from the court to cover up what they perceived as sensitive matters. The
Scott investigation and subsequent report became a scandal in itself. At various
times during the inquiry, ministers attempted to rubbish Scott through unofficial briefings to journalists and tried to cast doubts and aspersions on the conduct of the investigation. When the report was published, opposition ministers
were given little time to read it before it was presented and debated in
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Parliament. In line with the arguments about rebuttal and counter-rebuttal in the
face of scandal, the government tried to attack the media for their reporting of
the Scott inquiry. Then Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service Sir
Robin Butler launched an attack on the media when called to give evidence to
the inquiry.
JOHN MAJOR SCANDALS
The 5 years of the Major government, from 1992 to 1997, were dogged by
scandal. Apart from the big political scandal of Scott, the government was
immersed in a number of financial scandals, in particular, the revelation that
Conservative members of Parliament had been receiving money in return for
asking questions in Parliament. In the early and mid-1990s, members of Parliament received monies amounting to thousands of pounds. The Committee of
Privileges of the House of Commons investigated a number of these allegations
and in three of the cases, found them proved. They recommended that one of the
members should be reprimanded and suspended from service in the House of
Commons for 10 days with suspension of his salary, that one be reprimanded
and suspended for 20 days without salary, and in the case of the third, that no
action should be taken. At the same time, it was also revealed that many members of Parliament were being paid retainers by lobbyists or in some cases salaries by lobbying organizations to look after their interests. Part of the duties
expected of the member of Parliament was to arrange meetings with ministers,
to table amendments to bills as they were making their way through the House of
Commons, and to make speeches in Parliament and generally look after the lobbyistsinterests (Oliver, 1997, p. 545). The Guardian first published this story. It
made allegations against Member of Parliament Neil Hamilton, who was a minister of trade, that he had accepted unregistered payments. A number of allegations were also made against various members of Parliament at the same time.
This proved to be a very embarrassing affair for the Conservative government,
particularly when Hamilton began libel proceedings against The Guardian
newspaper. A number of other related scandals involving Conservative
ministers were also disclosed at the same time (see Oliver, 1997, p. 554).
In response to the huge media coverage of the Cash for Questions affair and
concern about standards of conduct in public life, the government set up the
Committee on Standards in Public Life in November 1994 under the chairmanship of Law Lord, Lord Nolan.1 The Nolan Committee included members of
Parliament from the major parties, retired civil servants, a professor of politics,
and other people with experience in public life. It was requested to inquire into
standards in public life generally rather than investigate individual cases. Unlike
some inquiries that are obviously set up by governments with the sole purpose of
deflecting attention, the Nolan Committee became an embodiment for a new
world of self-regulation and tightening of the rules governing the conduct of
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people in public life. The Nolan Committees remit was limited, and in its first
report, it was unable to say conclusively that standards of behavior in public life
had declined. It did, however, conclude that conduct in public life was more rigorously scrutinized than it had been in the past, that the standards demanded by
the public remained high, and that although the great majority of people in public life met those high standards, there are weaknesses in the procedures for
maintaining and enforcing them. And it called for urgent remedial action.2 The
majority of the Nolan Committees proposals for members of Parliament were
implemented a few months later, and a tightening of the regulations within the
House of Commons on standards of conduct occurred, including registration
and declaration of interests by members of Parliament. In addition, a new Select
Committee on Standards and Privileges took over the function of an older committee that had looked into members interests, and the House of Commons
appointed a parliamentary commissioner for standards in 1995. A footnote to
the Nolan Committee is that since that time, both members of Parliament and
newspapers have been assiduous in publicly decrying any breach of so-called
parliamentary regulations and rules regarding freebies for members of Parliament. Any time a member of Parliament accepts any kind of hospitality and fails
to register it in the Lists of Members Interests, he or she receives the tabloid
treatment.
Another political scandal arising during the Major years involved gerrymandering by the Westminster City Council in which the leader of the council and
other councilors were accused of buying homes for votes. The allegation was
that, to secure victory in the 1990 council elections, the leader of the council and
her staff had organized the moving of homeless families out of key electoral
wards to be replaced by home owners for the electoral advantage of the majority
party. The district auditor wrote a substantial report outlining all the allegations
and in fact, when it went to court, the leader of the council was found guilty of
gerrymandering and was fined many millions of pounds.
The third feature of the Major years was the spate of sexual scandals involving many of the ministers. This catalogue of events led to allegations of sleaze
and corruption on the part of the Major government. A number of ministers were
forced to resign as a result of tabloid allegations of sexual misconduct. One of
the earliest scandals involved David Mellor, a minister in the government who
had to resign over an affair with an actress. In October 1993, in a speech to the
Conservative Party Conference, Major made a speech about family values and
back to basics that subsequently came back to haunt him. Soon after that
speech, revelations of the private lives of ministers lost Major further credibility.
TONY BLAIR SCANDALS
The New Labour government, elected in May 1997, has suffered from a number of media-reported scandals, including revelations about the private life of
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Foreign Secretary Robin Cook; the resignation of Welsh Secretary Ron Davies
amid accusations of gay sex after being mugged in London; the exposure of
adultery by Tourism Minister Janet Anderson; the charges of electoral fraud
against Labour Members of Parliament Fiona Jones and Mohammad Sarwar;
the resignation of Ministerial Aide Derek Draper amid allegations of cash for
gaining access to ministers and influencing decisionsknown as Lobbygate;
the admission of the Agriculture Secretary that he was gay; and the disclosure
that the boss of Formula One, Bernie Ecclestone, had donated U.K.1 million to
the Labour Party before the election in connection with the fact that once
elected, the Labour government had ruled out banning tobacco advertising in
grand prix motor racing.
Apart from the Ecclestone donation, the most damaging scandal so far
has been the resignations of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Peter
Mandelson and Treasury Minister Geoffrey Robinson over a controversial
house purchase loan.3 Days of revelations originating from the initial investigation by The Guardian culminated in the following national press headlines of
December 24, 1999, emphasizing the possible affect on the Blair government:
The Financial Times led with Blow To Blair as Ministers Quit, The Times
headline read New Labours Darkest Day, The Independent led with Black
Christmas for Blair as Mandelson and Robinson Quit, The Daily Telegraph
observed Blair Shattered by Loss of Labours Chief Propagandist and Paymaster, The Guardian headline readGoodbye . . . for NowCrisis for Blair as
Mandelson and Robinson Quit Over Secret Loan Deal, The Daily Mail led with
The PurgeDark Day for New Labour as Blair Loses His Closest Adviser and
His Most Troublesome Minister, The Mirror observed both Bloody Dazzling . . . But He Had To Go and Exclusive: Blairs Verdict on Mandelson, and
The Sun led with STUFFED (on top of a picture of Mandelsons head sticking
out of a turkey).
The importance of the story was twofold. First, it was a financial scandal
(unlike the outing of gay ministers that preceded this story) in which the press
could claim genuine public interest and confirm its role as watchdog of government. Second, in Peter Mandelson, it involved the chief architect of
image and media relations. He was credited with orchestrating the change in
the Labour Partys image during the late 1980s and 1990s. The Guardian editorial of December 24, 1998, stated
Labour will not be able to recover its pre-1997 status as the whiter-than-white
party of anti-sleaze but that was foregone a year ago when the government
appeared to take 1 million from Bernie Ecclestone while reversing its policy on
Formula One. . . . This was not Neil Hamilton or Tim Smith style sleaze (cash for
questions). Far from it. It hardly plumbs the depth of the Tory years. (A Sudden
Departure, 1998, p. 15)
An editorial in The Telegraph argued,
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They are not like the last lot: they are far worse. Tory sleaze took almost 15 years
in office to become a serious problem. New Labour has managed it in as many
months. Tory sleaze, though far too frequent, was, for the most part, low-level
the venality of the parliamentary under-secretary for drains. The trouble with Mr.
Mandelson and Mr. Robinson goes right to the heart of Mr. Blairs Government.
Mr. Blair invented New Labour. Mr. Mandelson propagated it. Mr. Robinson paid
for it. Now two of them are gone, and the one remaining is left exposed. (New
Labour Peters Out, 1998, p. 17)
The Independent said it was nothing short of a disaster for Mr. Blairs project
(Hard Lessons To Be Learned From a Very Public Downfall, 1998). An editorial in The Times suggested that the bond forged between the government and
the people was under strain, Its admirable reforming energy has been dissipated. . . . Mr. Blair promised that a Labour Government would be tough on
sleaze, and tough on the causes of sleaze.. Yesterday the Government struggled
to stand by its word (Blairs Bleak Midwinter, 1998, p. 17). Apart from The
Telegraph, the editorials, although critical of the protagonists, were less severe
than they might have been toward previous Labour governments.
The shift to the center of both major political parties has left some of the
newspapers in a dilemma as to where their own political convictions belong.
Traditionally in Britain, the majority of the national press has supported the
Conservative government. A change occurred in the 1997 election when some
sections of the Murdoch press announced that they were backing Blair. Post the
2001 election, this support generally still remains. Some of the more solidly
conservative press, such as The Express, have to find areas to promote their
opposition and often concentrate on small aspects of corruption rather than on
major policy issues. A good example of this was the headline story in March 29,
1999, issue of The Express: The headline Euro Chiefs Car Scandal was
paired with the subheading How Top Socialist Pauline Wastes Public Money
on Trips Back Home. The Express has never been frightened of attacking
champagne Socialists and often tries to find corruption or hypocritical behavior. This particular story concerned Pauline Green, Britains Socialist leader in
the European Parliament, who was accused of wasting 1,000 of taxpayers
money each year. The paper posed the story in terms of Green herself being a
critic of wasteful spending in Europe. She was accused of frequently sending
her luxury chauffeur-driven car across the Channel so that she could use it in
Britain while she traveled home by plane:
The Blairite Labour MEP [member of the European Parliament] for North London
is given exclusive use of a BMW Seven Series car along with a Dutch driver who is
based in Brussels. The car is a perk of her position as leader of the fifteen socialist
groups in the European Parliament. (Euro Chiefs Car Scandal, 1999, p. 1)
The story then went on to detail the cost of the three-day round trip. Selfpromotion by the paper is another feature: The Express tracked Mrs. Greens
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movements in the last two months and detailed some of the trips that she undertook (Euro Chiefs Car Scandal, 1999, p. 1).
The effect on public opinion, measured in opinion polls, of the scandals
engulfing the Blair administration compared with those occurring during
Majors period in office is very different. Majors administration was viewed as
sleaze ridden and suffered drops in its popularity whereas poll ratings for Blair
remain high. New Labour remains the most popular midterm government since
record keeping began, despite being enmeshed in media-reported scandal. Are
there special factors that have a bearing on scandal effects? Why is the effect on
public opinion different under successive governments? We can explore certain
answers to these questions by looking at a governments honeymoon period.
Most governments come into power and enjoy a honeymoon period. At issue
is how long the period lasts and why it may collapse at some particular time.
Newspapers are always full of phrases such as the honeymoon is now officially
over. Nevertheless, tracing back the poll ratings for both Major and his government, there was a big collapse in both party fortunes and particularly in Majors
fortunes from Black Wednesday of September 1992 when the pound fell out
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Coming to power in November
1990, Majors personal honeymoon could be said to have lasted through the
whole of 1991, encompassing the Gulf War and the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty of Europe. After the election victory in April 1992, the major turning
point came on September 16, 1992, when Britain suspended sterling membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Sterling opened that day
under intense pressure; and despite the Bank of Englands attempts to push up
the rate by buying pounds with reserves of foreign currency, the pound remained
under pressure. Despite raising interest rates to 12% and then 15%, the treasury
realized the position was hopeless. The financial markets assumed devaluation.
By the end of the week, the pound had fallen 6% below the old European
Exchange Rate Mechanism floor. The Conservatives, always seen as the party
best able to manage the economy, lost credibility from that point and were
unable to garner public opinion throughout the next 4.5 years up to the election
of May 1997 when they suffered a landslide defeat.
Labours lead in the polls more than doubled as a result of this debacle. The
legitimacy and political cohesion of Majors government was killed at this point.
The rift in the Conservative Party grew larger and larger from this particular time
on. It is doubtful whether any other event affected the Conservative Party as
much or has been as crucial. The Conservatives, previously the party always
considered the safe managers of the economic prosperity of Britain, collapsed
overnight, and they have been unable to come anywhere close to re-establishing
that reputation to date.4
It may be necessary, therefore, to explore other areas in relation to the effect
on public opinion of media scandals. Revelations of sexual misconduct, particularly prevalent in the British press, usually force the individual minister to
resign. Political or financial impropriety can sometimes lead to an investigation
1132
of procedures and new regulations for the conduct of persons in public life (as in
the Scott and Nolan Committees). But it may be that the key element affecting
public opinion is the economic climate and the perceived view of the ability of
the government to manage the economy. Certainly the contrast between Major
and Blair in Britain, together with the ability of Clinton to maintain public
support, suggests this may be the case.
Indeed, the effect on the Conservative Party is still evident in 2003. A further
interesting consequence of the Conservative government and Conservative
Party collapse in the opinion polls was the belief (for a period) that incompetence had spread to other institutions. To illustrate this point, it is useful to look
at a particular media event.
Media events are predominantly characterized as live, open, and ceremonial.
The emphasis in the analysis of the media coverage of events is on their role in
social integration and in legitimating authority. The role of the journalist is relegated to that of a commentator, a master of ceremonies.
In their famous study, Dayan and Katz (1992) described special media
events as
interruptions of routine; they intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and our
lives. Like the holidays that halt everyday routines, television events propose
exceptional things to think about, to witness, and to do. Regular broadcasting is
suspended and pre-empted as we are guided by a series of special announcements
and preludes that transform daily life into something special and, upon the conclusion of the events are guided back again. (p. 5)
The role of the media may be celebratory and not only may be a forum for the
celebrations but also play an active part in them (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 5).
Televisions reading, as Dayan and Katz (1992) stated, is
more expositive than interpretive. In a sense it is an exercise in authority. . . . The
television organisations endorse the events goals and an affirmative assessment of
the events power to achieve these goals. . . . Once the commitment is made by the
television organisations it is not easy to switch back again to journalism, as in the
hijacking of an event. In the face of media events, the journalistic paradigm of
objectivity and neutrality is simply irrelevant. (p. 193)
Indeed, Katz and Dayan suggested that broadcasters are rewarded with status
and legitimacy for abandoning their adversarial stance in favour of an integrative and consensual role (p. 193). 5
Sporting events in Britain have a special and prominent place and are good
examples of media events. The arguments arising over the debate about listed
sporting events is just one indication of the strength of feelings aroused. One of
the premier sporting events in Britain is the Grand National, a grueling steeplechase horse race held every year at Aintree, Liverpool. The race held in 1993
was of particular significance because it turned into a fiasco. The chaos began
after one false start. All the horses returned, and the race was started again. But
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there was another false start, although this time most of the jockeys failed to
notice. They continued running with some stopping after realizing that there had
been a second false start. Seven horses, though, completed the 4.5-mile race.
The organizers launched a stewards inquiry immediately, and an angry crowed
booed officials. The nonrace was watched on television by millions throughout
the world and over U.K.75 million was placed in bets. Headlines on the front
pages (as well as the sports pages) of the next day (April 4, 1993) screamed
National Disaster (The Sunday Telegraph), Grand Fiasco as National
Declared Void (The Sunday Times), and Chaos at Grand National Reduces
Spectacle to Farce (Independent on Sunday).
The Grand National disaster as a one-off event in itself would not have
become a symbol of national decline and incompetence had it not followed a
series of government failures and scandals. Far from becoming a unifying
event, as is the potential for many media events, the episode became a totem of
gross national ineptitudea scandal. An editorial in The Independent at the
time summed the situation up rather well:
The resonance of such moments depends on their timing. Had this happened in a
period of national self-confidence it would have been dismissed as an aberration.
Coming at a time of national self-doubt it will be used to re-enforce the case that
too many areas of British life, from the Government down, are run by bands of
largely self-selected incompetents and amateurs. Comparisons will be made with
other countries. (Horse Race Ruined, Not Many Dead, 1993, p. 19)
The Daily Mirror, by the positioning of two columns on the same page, made the
link between the Grand National and the government very obvious. In the first
column, in the editorial titled Mirror Comment: Time To Turf Them Out
(1993), the paper stated,
The Grand National has an appeal far beyond racing fans. . . . But those who organise and run the National are a very different breed of people from the majority who
follow it. As anyone who saw their stumbling half-apologies after Saturdays
fiasco realised, they are drawn from what remains of Britains ancient ruling class.
For them the Grand National is the perfect opportunity to exercise their grand
notions of superiority. Even down to wearing bowler hats which they no longer do
for their day jobs in the City. They care nothing for the ordinary folk who look to
the National as a very special occasion. (p. 6)
The second article, written by David Seymour (1993), positioned underneath

the editorial and entitled From Fiasco To Disaster, launched a bitter attack on
the competence of Prime Minister John Major:
It is a totally incompetent Government led by a man who is utterly inadequate. . . .
This has been an administration blundering from fiasco to disaster, staggering
from crisis to debacle, crashing from farce to chaos. It has failed over and over
again. Failed the British people. Failed in industry and the jobless. Even failed in
its own party, which is the greatest crime in the Tory book. All of that must be
1134
blamed on one man. John Major. . . . On Black Wednesday after losing 10 billion
propping up sterling, he was humiliated by having his ERM [European Exchange
Rate Mechanism] suck-blanket torn from him. Then he clung on to his Chancellor,
Norman Lamont, who had insisted this was the only credible economic policy . . .
[and] David Mellor (another Minster) was exposed as a philanderer and a freeloader. (p. 6)
Events that can be classed as scandals may take on a very different hue if they
occur within an already perceived view of incompetence and untrustworthiness.
Many media outlets used the debacle as a snapshot for commentary on the state
of Britains class system. An editorial in The Economist stated,
Britains humiliation is all the sharper since the Grand National is the kind of thing
Britain is supposed to be good at. Ceremony and spectacle have long been the
jewels of national life. British industry was notorious through the world for its
uncompetitiveness and its them-and-us attitudes; the City was an old boy network
of long lunches and insider dealers; government was run by an amateur civil service. But come a coronation or Wimbledon, the gentlemen suddenly got their act
together. Even last Saturday, the BBCs flawless coverage rose above events to
remind the world of those traditional strengths. But organising racing is not one of
them. The Jockey Club seems a microcosm of Britains failings. Membership is by
rank more than merit: its members include four princes, 25 peers, 18 knights, 14
military officers, five honourables, three sheiks (admitted on sufferance since their
horses were essential to keep racing going) and a judge. (Grand Finale, 1993,
p. 18)
The Economist editorial ends on a more optimistic note, acknowledging that

the fiasco is not a true cameo of modern Britain. Neanderthals no longer occupy
the commanding heights of industry. The City is run by professionals who lunch
off their sandwiches at their desks. The yes, minister types are on the retreat in
Whitehall. Now, the old guard is being evicted from its last bastions, including the
Jockey Club. The events at Aintree were a disaster for the National, but not a
national disaster: they displayed the Britain of yesterday, not that of today.
(Grand Finale, 1993, p. 18)
Dramatic economic events, then, can have a tremendous affect on subsequent

events, whether they are sporting fiascos or scandals (political, financial, or sexual). The media often frame these subsequent events within a wider context of
decline or incompetence. This is inextricably linked to the poll ratings of governments and political parties and the publics view of their elected officials.
However, it is not always clear when a governments or presidents honeymoon dissipates. In the case of New Labour in Britain, the final 6 months of
1998 may come to be interpreted as the beginning of the end of the press honeymoon with Blair. But since that time, Blairs popularity has remained relatively
high, although there have been low periods linked to specific events. Like President Clintons opinion poll ratings in the United States, New Labour remained
1135
the most popular midterm government since records began, despite being enmeshed in media-reported scandal.
How do the media operate during these episodes of prolonged scandal? During periods of consensus, the media tend to report a story within a consensus
framework, even knowing that policy opponents exist but may have been
silenced through the corruption of the democratic process (Bennett, 1996,
p. 377).6
An important question, though, is when do the news media begin to offer a
questioning of the policy goals? Does a honeymoon period of critical abstinence
on policy effectiveness exist in the national media? If so, how long a politician or
government lasts remains an empirically researchable question. Support for a
particular policy is often bound up with general support for a government. Once
this dissipates, all policy goals may be subjected to journalistic criticism. If the
honeymoon continues, then the news media may eschew offering critical analysis of policy execution inside any bipartisan consensus that may exist. The size
of the electoral mandate may also act as a brake on media criticism (Tumber,
2002).
The case of John Majors government is an interesting one. For 4.5 years
from September 1992, following Black Wednesday when the government lost
most of its credibility, the majority of policy goals were questioned through
media coverage. It may be the case that scandal envelops a government to the
extent that all policy is subjected to journalism criticism with a consequent
effect on public opinion.
Indeed,
the strategy in scandal politics does not necessarily aim at an instant blow on the
basis of one scandal. It is the relentless flow of various scandals of different kinds
and with different levels of likelihood, from solid information on a minor incident
to shaky allegations on a major issue. . . . What counts is the final impact on public
opinion by the accumulation of many touches. (Castells, 1997, p. 338)
And what better way of demonstrating public opinion than through the ballot
box, where the public votes a politician or government out of office.
NOTES
1. For a concise and detailed account of recent parliamentary scandals, the Nolan Committee,
and changes to the rules and regulations governing members of Parliament, see Dawn Oliver (1997).
2. In the First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995), the Nolan Committee
set out seven principles of public life that would apply to all areas of public life. These principles
include
Selflessness: Holders of public office should make decisions solely in terms of the public interest, they should not do so to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their
families, or their friends.
1136
Integrity: Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organizations that might influence them in the performance
of their official duties.
Objectivity: In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding
contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office
should make choices on merit.
Accountability: Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the
public and must subject themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.
Openness: Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and
actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information
only when the wide public interest clearly demands.
Honesty: Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public
interest.
Leadership: Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership
and example. (p. 14)
3. Trade Minister Geoffrey Robinson lent Secretary of State Peter Mandelson U.K.373,000 at a
preferential rate of interest to purchase a house. Mandelson failed to declare the loan and inform
Blair or the cabinet secretary of the arrangement.
4. For a brief account of the events of September 16, 1992, see Will Hutton (1992).
5. Although acknowledging Dayan and Katzs (1992) main sentiments, the advent of all-news
networks such as CNN, Sky News, BBC World, and BBC 24 in the broadcasting landscape means
that big news events are not interruptions on these channels in the same way as previously. Many of
the old broadcasters do not even cover some of these events live. For example, the U.S. House of
Representatives impeachment debate and vote against President Clinton was not shown live by any
of the five British terrestrial channels. In contrast, CNN, Sky News, and BBC 24 had full coverage.
CNN split the screen to enable coverage of the bombing of Iraq alongside the impeachment vote. The
press plays their part in these events with historic photos and special editions.
6. Bennett (1996) cited an incident of the reporting of Reagans policy on Nicaragua in 1986, on
the eve of the election, when Democrats opposition to the administrations line was silenced in the
face of a red scare dirty tricks campaign run by the White House. Bennett reported that the mainstream press told the story through a policy consensus framework rather than continuing to report the
serious doubts of the now politically neutered opponents (p. 377).
REFERENCES
A sudden departure [Editorial]. (1998, December 24). The Guardian, p. 15.
Bennett, W. L. (1996). An introduction to journalism norms and representation of politics. Political
Communication, 13(4), 373-384.
Berkman, R., & Kitch, L. W. (1986). Politics in the media age. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Blairs bleak midwinter [Editorial]. (1998, December 24). The Times, p. 17.
Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M. (1995). The crisis of public communication. London: Routledge Kegan
Paul.
Castells, M. (1997). The power of identity. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Dayan, D., & Katz, E. (1992). Media events. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ericson, R. (1991). Mass media, crime, law, and justice: An institutional approach. British Journal of
Criminology, 31(3), 219-249.
Euro chiefs car scandal. (1999, March 29). The Express, p. 1.
First report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. (1995). CM 2850. U.K. Stationery Office.
Retrieved from http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm28/2850/2850.htm
1137
Games, A. (1997, January 8). How the BBC cant spot a good story. London Evening Standard, p. 49.
Grand finale [Editorial]. (1993, April 10). The Economist, 327(7806), p. 18.
Hard lessons to be learned from a very public downfall [Editorial]. (1998, December 24). The Independent, p. 3.
Horse race ruined, not many dead [Editorial]. (1993, April 5). The Independent, p. 19.
Hutton, W. (1992, December 1). Inside the ERM crisis: Black Wednesday massacre. The Guardian
City Page, p. 15.
Mirror comment: Time to turf them out [Editorial]. (1993, April 5). The Daily Mirror, p. 6.
New Labour peters out [Editorial]. (1998, December 24). The Telegraph, p. 17.
Oliver, D. (1997). Regulating the conduct of MPs: The British experience of combating corruption.
Political Studies, XLV, 539-558.
Sabato, L. J., & Lichter, S. R. (1994). When should the watchdogs bark? Media coverage of the
Clinton scandals. London: University Press of America.
Scott, R. (1996, February). Report of the inquiry into the export of defence equipment and dual-use
goods to Iraq and related prosecutions (HC Paper).
Seymour, D. (1993, April 5). From fiasco to disaster. The Daily Mirror, p. 6.
Tumber, H. (1993). Selling scandal: Business and the media. Media, Culture and Society, 15,
345-361.
Tumber, H. (1995). Marketing Maastrict, the EU and news management. Media, Culture and Society, 17, 511-519.
Tumber, H. (2002). Sources, the media and the reporting of conflict. In E. Gilboa (Ed.), The media
and international conflict (pp. 135-152). Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.
Waisbord, S. R. (1994). Knocking on newsroom doors: The press and political standards in Argentina. Political Communication, 11(1), 19-34.
Wernick, A. (1991). Promotional culture. London: Sage.
Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Constructing news about peace. Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel Aviv University, Tai
Steinmetz Center for Peach Research.
HOWARD TUMBER is professor of sociology and dean of the School of Social Sciences,
City University, London. He is the editor of Media Power, Policies and Professionals
(Routledge Kegan Paul, 2000) and News: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 1999); joint
author of Reporting CrimeThe Media Politics of Criminal Justice (Oxford University
Press, 1994) and Journalists at War (Sage, 1988); and author of Television and the Riots
(British Film Institute, 1982). He is a founder and coeditor of the Sage journal Journalism:
Theory, Practice and Criticism.

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Scandal and Media in the United Kingdom

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Tumber / SCANDAL AND MEDIA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Information management is thus pervading all aspects of government behavior

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