Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Go-Tan vs. Tan

G.R. No. 168852. September 30, 2008

Facts:
Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married and had two female children.
Petitioner
filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
against
Steven and her parents-in-law, spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan before the Regional
Trial Court.
She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with the respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological
and economic abuses upon her in violation of Republic Act No. 9262. On Regional
Trial Court
granted the TPO. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to the
issuance of
Permanent Protection Order contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. The RTC
dismissed
the case as to respondents under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration contending that the doctrine should be applied in the
broader. The
RTC denied the petitioners verified motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the respondents may be included in the petition for the issuance of a
protective

order.

Ruling:
The express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal
construction as will best ensure that attainment of the object of the law according to
its true
intent, meaning and spirit- the protection and safety of violence against women and
children.
Contrary to the RTCs pronouncement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius finds no
application here. It is not of universal application, neither is it conclusive. It should
be applied
only as means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.

Ubi lex non distinguit necon distingeuere debemus

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]

15
AUG
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of
a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in
attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of
a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of
P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached
properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin.
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin
then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in
respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru
its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of
was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe

enforced on the counterbond of the petitioner.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with
costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded
on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one
part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of
the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers
not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment
pending appeal.

Dura lex Sed Lex

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 : May 21, 2009

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim

Monina Lim, petitioner

Facts: Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were
unknown and whose whereabouts were unknown were brought to them. They
reared and took care of the two kids. Primo died in 1998 but Monina got married to
Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the children were brought to them, they
registered them making it appear that they were the natural parents. Monina
decided to adopt the two (2) children by availing of the amnesty under RA 8552 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she filed the petition on
April 24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the time of the
filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of Michelle gave his
consent to the adoption. The DSWD issued a certification that they were abandoned
children. After trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the husband
of Monina did not join her in the petition as required by Section 7(c), Article III, RA
8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. She filed a Motion for reconsideration as
she did not fall under any of the exceptions provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c),
Article III, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the contention that mere consent of her
husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether
or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted. She argued that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable
to adoption cases. She argued that joint parental authority is not necessary in this
case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.

ISSUE: Is the petition proper? Explain.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative.

The husband and wife should have jointly filed the petition for adoption. The
principle of dura lex sed lex is applicable as the law is explicit that the husband and
wife shall jointly adopt.

The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.

The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. (Rep. v. Toledano, G.R. No.
94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9).

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and her husband are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that her husband must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to

adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are
not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
her husband. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA,
petitioner,
vs.
ZOSIMO A. PESCA,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001. VITUG, J
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman,got
married March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children.
However, in1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally immature
and irresponsible.Respondent became violent. On March 1994, respondent
assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed acomplaint and respondent was convicted by
the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries andsentenced to 11 days of
imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided
infavour of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that
petitioner hadfailed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him tobe incognitive of the basic marital covenant as
provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) thatincapacity is grave, (3) preceded

the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity ispsychological (6) that
the root cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has beenproven by
an expert (8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner
fileda Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos v. CA(promulgated on January 1995), as well as the guidelines
set out in Republic v. CA and Molina(February 1997) should have no retroactive
application. Petitioner further argues, the applicationof the Santos and Molina dicta
should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial courtfor further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply tothe
case at bar
RULING:
The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of the
CivilCode, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of thelegal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim
legis interpretado legis vimobtinet that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneouslegislative intent
of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute apart of
that law as of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the
Courtfinds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to beapplied prospectively in favour of the parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have actedin good faith in accordance therewith (lex
prospicit, non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both inher allegations and in her
evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of therespondent.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED.