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AFFAIRS
OCTOBER 1977
Volume 56 Number 1
The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.
1977 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.
Ralf Dahrendorf
INTERNATIONAL POWER:
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glorious independence, the fact remains that, more often than not,
as Europeans they find themselves in the same boat and guided by
the same attitudes, whether such community has been organized or
not.
This then is the position of Europe as a world power now you
see it, now you don't, but it exists. At times its existence becomes
manifest through the institutions of the European Community, at
other times through other institutions (e.g., the Council of Europe,
the Euro-Group of NATO); but more often its reality is latent,
informing the attitudes and actions of governments as well as the
general climate in which governments act. And despite the obvious
weakness of European institutions, this Europe has become more
rather than less real in recent years.
Such statements must sound metaphysical, or at least metapolitical, unless it is possible to say what the invisible Europe stands for.
What is the specifically European contribution to the patterns of
power in the world and their changes? This is no small question; it
is in fact the question of what is the European interest. Perhaps the
following five elements may be regarded as relatively widely recognized and clearly important.
1. Europe neither includes a superpower nor is it a superpower
itself. While most countries of Europe have had their day as
superpowers of past centuries or even decades, few if any serious
politicians today entertain such dreams. There are some, to be
sure, who like to think of Europe as a superpower; this, in fact, is
the Gaullist dream, one which is held by some in Britain as well; but
such a view is neither dominant nor particularly plausible. In fact,
Europe consists of small and medium-sized powers. If it ever forms
a community, it will have to be based on respect for small powers.
This has restrictive consequences: in a world of superpower warfare, Europe will not be able to defend itself. It also has useful
consequences: in a world of power dissipation, Europe is more
likely to understand, and be appreciated by, other small nations
than the superpowers, actual or potential.
2. Small and medium-sized nations cannot rely on a free-floating
power game; they need institutions and international organizations. Direct relationships between centers of power always presuppose a degree of self-sufficiency. Small powers are not self-sufficient; they are interdependent with others in almost every aspect of
their existence. This means that in the end the only guarantee of
their survival is in the creation and observance of rules that bind
nations. The countries of Europe may find it difficult to build their
own community; but in so far as they have succeeded, such constructions were and are based on equality of all members. Europe
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The theme of the last three decades has been military and political
rather than economic; the arena was the battlefield of the cold war
from Potsdam to the CSCE in Helsinki and now in Belgrade.
However, history does not progress by the resolution of conflicts;
even wars do not resolve conflicts; nor does "convergence" or any
other mechanism. What happens is that a new conflict and a new
arena emerge, begin to overshadow the old, and gradually reduce
its relevance. While we are still and rightly discussing detente,
we can already see many signs of a new economic theme of world
conflict, and the arena is going to be that which is so misleadingly
called North-South. (The geographical terminology betrays the
degree to which our thinking is caught up in East-West categories;
yet it is the very nature of the new conflict that there are no clear
centers of power, quite apart from the fact that the majority of
people in underdeveloped countries live North of the equator, and
a few of the advanced industrialized [or OECD] countries, as well
as most of those on the threshold to development, are in the
South.) The period between two dominant patterns of conflict is
particularly difficult to describe. There are those who would like to
regard the new conflict in the old terms: development as a struggle
between East and West for domination. There are those who
ignore the old conflict at their peril, although it remains virulent.
The attempt to avoid both pitfalls may not succeed.
The process of transition from the military to the economic
theme of international relations is familiar, although its precise
history has yet to be written. Ironically, it reached its first climax in
connection with a military event, the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
Whatever this war is remembered for in the Middle East, the rest
of the world is more likely to think of the oil embargo, the rise in
the price of energy, and the consequent aggravation of the impending recession. But the ascendancy of international economic
relations began earlier, perhaps on August 15, 1971, when the
United States gave notice to a system that had depended on its
readiness to lead the rest of the developed world economically as
well as militarily. The first rumblings of the North-South conflict
should not be overlooked either: the second U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development in 1968, for example, when there was the
modest and only moderately convincing offer of generalized preferences to developing countries; the enlargement of the Club of
Ten in the IMF into a Club of Twenty; the first skirmishes of the
current GATT round of tariff reductions when it soon became
clear that it could not be another Kennedy Round.
In the meantime, and in the shadow of such new developments,
the old conflict between East and West continues to smolder.
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placed by apparently more extravagant, though more serious demands for recognition. The struggle between richer and poorer
nations takes on a more absolute character; it becomes a struggle
for power.
So far, the results of this incipient struggle are scattered and
indecisive. Clearly, the new pattern of international relations has
diminished the role of the Soviet Union. In terms of international
economic relations, the Soviet Union is almost irrelevant, because
while it is counted among the rich by the developing world, it has
neither the wealth nor the will to contribute to effective solutions of
the problem of development. (In terms of the superimposition of
two patterns of conflict, it may be argued that this makes the Soviet
Union more incalculable, more likely to employ its means, especially arms, in cases of limited significance but great nuisance
value.) In a sense, the new pattern has also diminished the role of
the United States. While still the greatest world power, even in
economic terms, it differs in degree rather than dimension from
some other countries. It could be argued that former Treasury
Secretary John Connally's wish of 1971 has come true, and the
United States has become a country with the same rights and
obligations as others.
However, the main result of the process of a historical change of
subject is diffusion, and perhaps confusion. The old conflict is
beginning to lose relevance, although it is still there and will be for
a long time to come. The new conflict has no clear protagonists.
China is too unlikely a leader of the small and the poor. In fact, the
position of the poor is rather like that of Europe; sometimes they
are represented by Libya's Qaddafi, sometimes by Venezuela's
Perez Guerrero, sometimes by Tanzania's Nyerere, and there are
many other candidates. Nor is the position of the other side very
clear. When the leaders of the Big Seven industrialized countries
meet, they discuss their domestic problems first and the NorthSouth dialogue second. With respect to the latter, they have no
very clear, and probably several different views. The structure of
international power is thus neither bipolar nor pentagonal, but
amorphous, although one can discern the forces which are likely to
move it into a new pattern.
IV
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tries must be at least doubtful, although of course there are degrees and mixtures.) From that minimum level, countries can
either find opportunities for steady and noticeable improvement,
or else they are likely to become a force for unrest and confrontation in international relations, allying themselves with whoever
attacks the chosen enemy, and producing a revolutionary situation
on a global scale. I realize that some leaders of Western countries
take the view that developing countries are too weak and too
dependent ever to take such a stance with any degree of conviction;
but it may not be wrong to ponder the possibility before one gets
too self-assured.
In what I called the old conflict, the third group of the nonaligned was really weak and defensive. In the new conflict (the
patterns of which I am extrapolating as much as describing), the
third group, or threshold countries, is both assertive and crucial.
The threshold countries may hold only limited power today
although OPEC has shown that this has considerable factual and
nuisance effects but their choices will determine more than any
other development what the world of tomorrow and the day after
looks like. And these choices will revolve around one fundamental
question: will the threshold countries gain access to the Club of the
Rich and play a leading positive role in developing the world order,
or will they find it necessary to form the vanguard of confrontation
with the old rich?
The threshold countries have one thing in common apart from
their condition of potential development, and that is that they are
almost all, though in varying degrees, rather disagreeable in their
political attitudes and circumstances. Although there are exceptions such as Venezuela, there is hardly a democracy among them,
and there are few that respect the rule of law as we would like to see
it respected. They are more likely to be neo-feudal states or military dictatorships accommodating large transnational firms and
combining incentives for the chosen few with discipline for the
unasked many, than to be either liberal or socialist. They betray in
their political order the mixture of potential and actual conditions
characteristic of their economic circumstances. Yet they are not
only potentially rich, but also potentially powerful, for example,
possible future members of the nuclear club as well as owners of
petrodollars: Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil,
Nigeria, Algeria, to mention but a few.
So far, indications are that the threshold or OPEC countries
want to join the Club of the Rich, occasional confrontations notwithstanding. Indeed, rapid growth with large profits in the
hands of a few, but some improvement for all, is the order of the
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day in many of these countries. Their support for what I called the
Group of 77 consists of words and conscience money. But then, the
Club of the Rich is ambivalent in its attitude toward these countries; and their domestic social circumstances are in every case
tense and fraught with explosive potential. Contrary to the Group
of 77, the threshold countries doubtless realize that they have the
weapons to make life very unpleasant for the OECD world. Conditions are conceivable under which this would lead some, or all of
them, to choose a confrontation course that would be welcomed by
the Group of 77, however divergent their objectives may remain. If
the threshold countries become members of the Club of the Rich,
this is likely to be accompanied by internal changes and to hold out
opportunities for development for those who have not yet reached
the threshold. If, on the other hand, this path should turn out to
be too difficult or even blocked, the ensuing conflict could lead to
clashes compared to which the history of industrial relations is
child's play.
I have thought for some time that the most important practical
task for the OECD countries is to sort out their attitude toward the
threshold countries, without hypocrisy but without misplaced moralism as well. This, however, is merely a part of the more general
question with which the OECD countries are faced in a new pattern
of world power: will they find it possible to accommodate changes
even if these detract from their monopoly of wealth and power, or
will they turn protectionist and defensive and thus contribute to
making a tense situation explosive? Like the other groups, the
OECD countries are by no means homogeneous. For one thing,
they have themselves crossed the threshold to development at quite
different times, and some of the Latin European countries are not
that far removed from the more advanced threshold countries. For
another thing, a new debate about first principles is raging in the
OECD countries, with incentive systems being criticized, while
discipline systems are rejected; this is one of the internal problems
that is going to contribute to the answer given to the question I
have raised here.
At this stage, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the OECD
countries behave like most monopolists: they defend their power
and give way only under duress or where they feel that this is on
balance in their favor. This leads to apparently paradoxical attitudes, such as the demand for rights for transnational companies
coupled with a rejection of the transfer of certain technologies, or
the insistence on more development aid coupled with resistance
against generalized preferences (which, of course, especially benefit the threshold countries). Such inconsistencies cannot last very
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interest used. And here, Europe has signally failed to make its
mark. More than that, the history of the last decade is one of
decreasing rather than increasing integration in Europe. The reasons for this are many. They have to do with the Cartesian quality
of the original construction of Europe, which was bound to founder one day on the more Humean qualities of reality. They have to
do with the end of a long period of economic growth, and the
reawakening of protectionism and nationalism under pressure.
They have to do also with a remarkable lack of imagination and will
among Europe's leading politicians. But they have to do, above all,
with Europe's inability to work out its relationship with the United
States an inability, to be sure, which is not simply the failure of
individuals but built into the condition of the partners.
This is not the place to recount the tortuous story of events that
led or rather, should have led from a partnership with an undisputed senior and an equally undisputed junior partner to one of
fundamental equality on the basis of complementary strengths. It
is a story as rich in dramatic incidents as it is poor in political
substance. The more important question in our context is what
went wrong in this process. Why is it that Europe and the United
States have been unable to develop a mature and firm partnership?
There is one fundamental answer to this question: different European countries have interpreted their interest (the European interest?) in relation to the United States differently. But it is important
to pursue this answer into the problem areas of the relationship.
There is, first of all, defense. A mature partnership would imply
recognition of the fact that an alliance is the basis of European
security in which the United States will continue to be the senior
partner for a long time to come. Germany has seen and accepted
this fact, not least because it is most immediately involved in what I
have called the old conflict. France must have seen the facts but has
insisted on a dangerous prestige game with the alliance, which gave
the appearance at least of a basic doubt of the need for the senior
partner. It is not irrelevant in this context that numerous European idealists, including most recently the Belgian Prime Minister
Leo Tindemans in his report, have toyed with the old idea of a
European defense community, without apparently realizing fully
that under modern technological conditions a NATO structure,
which recognizes the special interest and contributions made by
Europe, is the most one can sensibly hope for.
Then there is the question of the OECD economic order, that is,
the politico-economic rules by which the developed countries
themselves feel bound. The Kennedy Round was probably the last
occasion at which the OECD world displayed a common interest,
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countries, and notably Germany, enter into an even closer relationship with the United States than existed in the past. It is a seniorjunior partnership, to be sure, in which the junior partner asks the
senior not only to defend him but also to keep the dollar stable.
Other European countries drift away into a kind of intermediate
socioeconomic condition with only occasional and localized political influence in the world.
There is, as a result, much instability in Europe. Eurocommunism threatens an orthodox Soviet view of communism as much as
a traditional Western view of Europe. In some countries, the desire
to opt out of alliances altogether begins to grow. I have always
understood balkanization to mean that a relatively small geographical area is split up into many parts that find no common denominator and, therefore, tend to go in all directions in unpredictable
ways, thus presenting a picture of extreme volatility. This, as I said
earlier, is certainly a European possibility today.
The conclusion I anticipated at the beginning of this section will
now be understandable. The old conflict, which is no longer dominant but still with us, was military and political and had the United
States and the Soviet Union as its main actors. The new conflict,
which is not yet dominant, has the OECD countries and the developing countries as its main actors. Neither side is as yet clearly
organized, but the disorganization of the OECD countries is such
that no mature partner for the United States has emerged, nor is
one likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. One may regret or
salute this fact, but it means in any case that the United States is in a
position of unusual responsibility in both patterns that determine
the future of international relations not perhaps a super-superpower, but an unmistakable power tons azimuts. It is therefore a
matter of much more than local interest whether that great country
will effect the transition from the arrogance of power in the 1960s
to the responsibility of power in the 1980s.