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Background Briefing:
Cambodia: The Trump
Administration and Hun Sens
Pro-China Tilt
Carlyle A. Thayer
January 19, 2017

[client name deleted]

We are preparing an assessment about the coming Trump administrations tough talk
on China and what that might mean for Cambodias relationship with China and the
United States in the coming years. We completely understand the difficulty of
predicting just what a Trump administration will do, however, in light of comments on
China by Donald Trump and Rex Tillerson we request your assessment of the following
issues:
Q1. If the new U.S. administration does increase pressure on China over the South
China Sea, how likely is Hun Sen to speed up his move away from the U.S. and toward
China? How bad is Hun Sen prepared to allow relations with the U.S. to get?
ANSWER: Cambodia needs access to the U.S. market, also, Cambodia benefits from
U.S. aid (and aid from Japan as well), this places restraints on how far Cambodia can
turn away from the United States without any penalties. Besides, although Cambodia
leans toward China it is not in Cambodias interest to become overly dependent on
the China. If the U.S. ratchets up tensions with China, Cambodia can be expected to
protest because of its impact on regional stability. The Hun Sen regime is mainly
concerned about staying in power and keeping domestic politics trouble-free in 2017
when commune elections will be held and in 2018 when national elections will be
held.
Q2. What are the chances that Cambodias decision to cancel its annual military
exercises with the U.S. for the next two years was a reaction, possibly called in from
Beijing, to Tillersons tough talk at his confirmation hearing (which happened just a
few days earlier)?
ANSWER: Secretary of State designate Rex Tillersons remarks were off-the-cuff and
do not yet represent official Trump Administration policy. Trump is more likely to
focus on trade and currency issues with China and use Taiwan and the South China
Sea as leverage towards these ends. Tillerson testified on 11 January and Cambodia
announced its cancellation of military exercises five days later. This seems too short a
period of time for Beijing to act and Phnom Penh to respond. Hun Sen has been adept
at anticipating what will please China and given Trumps criticism of China and Chinas

2
harsh response, Hun Sen may have calculated it was in his interest to ingratiate himself
with Beijing. Another factor that may have weighed in Hun Sens decision was the
election cycle and the likelihood of public protests by the opposition. Hun Sen may
have taken the precaution to ensure that no American troops were in the country at
that time.
Q3. Besides the exercises, if a more aggressive US position on the South China Sea
does move Cambodia closer to China, what forms is that likely to take? And, critically,
at what costs to Cambodia/Cambodians?
ANSWER: The year 2017 is not 2012 when Cambodia broke ranks with its fellow ASEAN
members over the South China Sea. The Arbitral Tribunal is no longer hanging over
ASEAN-China relations. President Duterte has put the Philippines policy into reverse.
Malaysias Prime Minister Najib is currying favour with Beijing. And Vietnam has just
sent it party leader to Beijing to seek reassurances that China will act towards Vietnam
with restraint. With all this fluidity, a pro-China tilt by Cambodia would represent more
continuity than change. Cambodia would find itself in good company in decrying U.S.
assertiveness and its threat to regional stability.
A close China-Cambodia relationship, without any interference by Beijing in
Cambodias internal affairs, will result in a strengthening of Hun Sens grip on power.
It will mean an opportunity cost for those promoting democracy, human rights, the
rule of law, human security and environmental protection.
Q4. On the other hand, theres the impression that Trump may be good for autocrats
like Hun Sen insofar as he puts business ahead of human rights. And weve seen Hun
Sen endorse Trump. How is that possible advantage for Hun Sen likely to balance out
against his needs to stick with China on the South China Sea should tensions there
mount?
ANSWER: The Trump Administration will not give priority to Southeast Asia let alone
Cambodia. President Trump has stated and signalled through his various
appointments that his main priorities lie in defeating the Islamic State with Russian
cooperation, improving ties with Russia (in order to break up the Beijing-Moscow
entente cordial) and renegotiating the terms of trade and currency valuation with
China. Taiwan not Southeast Asia is the main leverage point for Trumps future
relations with China. Trump is a realist when assessing power relations, Cambodia is
unlikely to be on his radar screen.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Cambodia: The Trump Administration and Hun
Sens Pro-China Tilt, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 19, 2017. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.