1

HON. ISIDRO CARIO vs THE COMMISSION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Facts: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a
class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what
they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities
to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. According
to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally
staged at the DECS premises on September 14,
1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for
the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the
Secretary
of
Education.
Through
their
representatives, the teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply and to hire their replacements. Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed.
Among those who took part in the "concerted
mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed
to support the non-political demands of the
MPSTA.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the
CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced.
An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807.
In the administrative case in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran,
Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among
others, named respondents, the latter filed
separate
answers,
opted
for
a
formal
investigation, and also moved "for suspension of
the
administrative
proceedings
pending
resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order." But when their
motion for suspension was denied by Order dated
November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their motion
for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by
their counsel staged a walkout signifying their
intent to boycott the entire proceedings." The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well

as the answers, affidavits and documents

submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo.
In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition
for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was
dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme
Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of
the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court. Both petitions
in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals, and "other
teacher-members so numerous similarly situated"
or "other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded."
The Commission on Human Rights has made
clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution. It has also made
plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case
on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try
and decide or hear and determine.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Human
Rights has the power under the Constitution to
hear and decide a cases
Held: The Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined
authoritatively,
finally
and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.
The proposition is made clear by the
constitutional provisions specifying the powers of
the Commission on Human Rights.

2
The Commission was created by the 1987
Constitution as an independent office. Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing
at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. Its powers and functions are the
following
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect
for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7)
Monitor
the
Philippine
Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers
accordance with law; and

and

employees

in

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as

may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on
its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It

may exercise that power pursuant to such rules

of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course
of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority,
it
may
grant
immunity
from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth. It may also request the assistance of
any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may
be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge.
BRIGIDO R. SIMON
HUMAN RIGHTS

vs

COMMISSION

ON

Facts: Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990,

signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents. In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three
(3) days within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of
the demolition notice, the private respondents
were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led
by their President Roque Fermo, filed a lettercomplaint with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop
the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. The CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted
by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as
well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners
carried out the demolition of private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in
its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more
than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials
and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from
further demolition, with the warning that violation
of said order would lead to a citation for contempt
and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990,
questioned CHR's jurisdiction.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that

3
the Commission's authority should be understood
as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were)
not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege
to engage in business."
In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR
cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and
it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of
the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and
political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines
Issue: Whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violations of
the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners
at the instance and authority given by the Mayor
of Quezon City.
Held: The Commission on Human Rights was
created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally
constituted
by
then
President
Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5
May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power
at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as
well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body. This view, however, has not heretofore
been shared by this Court. In Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights, the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions that bears
any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment,"
but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The
Court explained:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . .
was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.

The function of receiving evidence and

ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined
authoritatively,
finally
and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on
Human Rights that would focus its attention to
the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such
areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials,
(4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed
against the religious." While the enumeration has
not likely been meant to have any preclusive
effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone
it has set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it
fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission,
taking
into
account
its
35
recommendation."
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil
that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as
temporary
shanties,
erected
by
private
respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City
which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to
life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right
which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is,
in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition
of
the
stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall
within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
On
its
contempt
powers,
the
CHR
is
constitutionally
authorized
to
"adopt
its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

4
." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. The "order to desist" in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative
power that it does not possess.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a

Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10
December 1997, directing the latter to increase
the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both
Central and Regional Offices to implement the
Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights
Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and
Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance
with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)

COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION
(CHREA)
vs
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions

of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998,
no organizational unit or changes in key positions
shall be authorized unless provided by law or
directed by the President, thus, the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs
Office
cannot
be
given
favorable
recommendation.

Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed

Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided
for
Special
Provisions
Applicable
to
All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.
The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the
appropriations of the CHR. On the strength of
these special provisions, the CHR, through its
then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and
Commissioners
Nasser
A.
Marohomsalic,
Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and
Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission.
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed
creation of ten additional plantilla positions,
namely: one Director IV position, with Salary
Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four
Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five
Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the
Office of the Commissioners. 4
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No.
A98-0555 providing for the upgrading or raising of
salary grades.
To support the implementation of such scheme,
the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount
generated
from
savings
under
Personnel
Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant
positions in the body to provide additional source
of funding for said staffing modification. Among
the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III,
four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special
Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting
Clerk II.8
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for
its approval, but the then DBM secretary
Benjamin Diokno denied the request.
Based on the evaluations made the request was
not favorably considered as it effectively involved
the elevation of the field units from divisions to
services.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in

representation of the rank and file employees of
the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate
authority mandated by law to evaluate and
approve
matters
of
reclassification
and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in
a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and
reversed the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured.
Issue: Can the Commission on Human Rights
validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in
the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
Held: The term "government" refers to the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
Branches and the Constitutional Commissions
and shall include all, but shall not be limited to,
departments,
bureaus,
offices,
boards,
commissions,
courts,
tribunals,
councils,
authorities, administrations, centers, institutes,
state colleges and universities, local government
units, and the armed forces. The term
"government-owned or controlled corporations
and financial institutions" shall include all
corporations and financial institutions owned or
controlled by the National Government, whether
such corporations and financial institutions
perform governmental or proprietary functions.
The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the
CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that
the coverage thereof, as defined above,
encompasses the entire gamut of government
offices, sans qualification.
This power to "administer" is not purely
ministerial in character as erroneously held by
the Court of Appeals. The word to administer
means to control or regulate in behalf of others;
to direct or superintend the execution, application

5
or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public
affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
As measured by the foregoing legal and
jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the
DBM must first be sought prior to implementation
of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of
the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM
Secretary
to
disallow
the
upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional
plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of
the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its
three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now
claiming that the nod of approval it has
previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the
CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such
enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in
Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which
are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In
contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent
on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR.
From
the
1987
Constitution
and
the
Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that
the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional
Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence
excludes
all
others.
Stated
otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum
what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.21
Nor is there any legal basis to support the
contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from
outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with
law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its
needs may require from time to time.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted
as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with
fiscal
autonomy.
Fiscal
autonomy
is
a
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a

constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal
autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM
that
the
grant
of
fiscal
autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all
the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on
its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without
approval of the DBM.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG)
Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as
"taxpayer, citizen and former government official
who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and
their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder
of the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy alleges that
what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports . These news items referred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to
information 3 and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
the national interest, 4 demands that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount public interest," since it has a
"debilitating effect on the country's economy"
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people
in general have a right to know the transactions
or deals being contrived and effected by the
government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny
forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action
is premature, because there is no showing that he
has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations
and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG
may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.
Issues:

6
1.
Whether or not the petitioner has the
personality or legal standing to file the instant
petition; and
2. Whether or not this Court could require the
PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses
Held: The arguments cited by petitioner
constitute the controlling decisional rule as
regards his legal standing to institute the instant
petition. Access to public documents and records
is a public right, and the real parties in interest
are the people themselves.
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when
the issue concerns a public a right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real
parties in interest; and because it is sufficient
that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
interested in the execution of the laws, he need
not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case,
the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be
informed on matters of public concern, a right
then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while
reiterating Taada, further declared that "when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of
a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general 'public' which possesses the right.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the
right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general,
is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of
the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1)
the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by
a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar
should be allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of
Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The
standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested
by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitionersintervenors have a legal interest in the subject
matter of the instant case, since a distribution or
disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties
may adversely affect the satisfaction of their
claims.
2. The "information" and the "transactions"
referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and
extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the
exact limitations within which the right may be

exercised or the correlative state duty may be

obliged. However, the following are some of the
recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.
In Valmonte
v.
Belmonte
Jr., the
Court
emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may
be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full
public disclosure extends only to "transactions
involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law." As to the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern, the Court,
in Legaspi
v.
Civil
Service
Commission, elucidated:
In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen.
The Nature of the Marcoses' Alleged IllGotten Wealth
Upon the departure from the country of the
Marcos family and their cronies in February 1986,
the new government headed by President
Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to
"[r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime
and [to] protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." 41 Thus, President Aquino's very first
executive orders dealt with the recovery of these
alleged ill-gotten properties.
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February
28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses
fled the country, created the PCGG which was
primarily tasked to assist the President in the
recovery of vast government resources allegedly
amassed by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates
both here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12)
days later, all persons and entities who had
knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and
properties were warned and, under pain of
penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from
concealing, transferring or dissipating them or
from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the
recovery efforts of
With such pronouncements of our government,
whose authority emanates from the people, there
is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses'

7
alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. 42 We
may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very
nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten
wealth" refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates through or as a
result of their improper or illegal use of
government funds or properties; or their having
taken undue advantage of their public office; or
their use of powers, influences or relationships,
"resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing
grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines."
Clearly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government itself.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, they
belong to the people.
G.R. No. 93005 April 16, 1991
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO vs ANTONIO J.
ROXAS
G.R. No. 93005 April 16, 1991
DUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR vs ADOLFO
AZCUNA

Facts: In G.R. No. 91925 the facts alleged are

undisputed. Petitioners are stockholders of record
of SMC. On April 18, 1989, the annual meeting of
shareholders of SMC was held. Among the
matters taken up was the election of fifteen (15)
members of the board of directors for the ensuing
year. Petitioners were among the twenty four (24)
nominees to the board.
On the date of the annual meeting, there were
140,849,970 shares outstanding, of which
133,224,130 shares, or 94.58%, were present at
the meeting, either in person or by proxy.
Because of PCGG's claim that the shares of stock
were under sequestration, PCGG was allowed to
represent and vote the shares of stocks.
Representatives of the corporate shares present
at the meeting claimed that the shares are not
under sequestration; or that if they are under
sequestration, the PCGG had no right to vote the
same. They were overruled. With PCGG voting the
corporate shares.
The fifteen individuals who received the highest
number of votes were declared elected.
The PCGG claimed it represented 85,756,279
shares at the meeting including the corporate
shares which corresponded to 1,286,744,185
votes which in turn were distributed equally

among the fifteen (15) candidates who were

declared elected.
Petitioners allege that the 27,211,770 shares or a
total of 408,176,550 votes representing the
corporate shares, were illegally cast by PCGG and
should be counted in favor of petitioners.
The petitioners assert that is they were allowed
to vote their corresponding shares accordingly,
then they would obtain enough votes to be
elected.
On May 31, 1989, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a petition for quo warranto
impleading as respondents the fifteen (15)
candidates who were declared elected members
of the board of directors of SMC for the year
1989-1990. Summons was issued only as to
respondents Antonio J. Roxas, Jose L. Cuisia, Jr.
and Oscar T. Hilado whose election will be
affected by the claim of petitioners if the same
were upheld.
In due course, a resolution was rendered by the
Sandiganbayan on November 16, 1989, affirming
its jurisdiction over the petition but dismissing it
for lack of cause of action on the ground that the
PCGG has the right to vote sequestered shares.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the main thrust
of which is that the right to vote sequestered
shares of stock is vested in the actual
shareholders not in the PCGG.
In G.R. No. 93005, the facts alleged are
substantially similar in nature. Petitioners are
stockholders of SMC.
On April 17, 1990, the annual meeting of the SMC
shareholders was held. Among the matters taken
up was the election of the fifteen (15) members
of the board of directors of SMC for the ensuing
year. Petitioners were among the twenty (20)
nominees to the board.
On the date of the meeting, there were
565,916,550 shares outstanding, of which
531,598,051 shares, or 93.58%, were present at
the meeting, either in person or by proxy. The
PCGG was allowed to represent and vote the
shares of stock under sequestration.
The above shares are once again referred to as
"corporate shares" in the petition. At the meeting,
a representative of the corporate share
maintained
that
they
are
not
under
sequestration, or if they are under sequestration,
the PCGG had no authority to vote them.
The fifteen individuals who received the highest
number of votes were declared elected.
Representatives
of
the
corporate
shares
manifested that if they were allowed to vote their

8
shares, the votes corresponding to their shares,
would have been cast equally.
As the petition under G.R. No. 91925 which was
decided adversely by the Sandiganbayan is now
before this Court, and since time is of the essence
as petitioners have been denied the right to vote
since 1986, instead of seeking relief from the
Sandiganbayan, the petitioners filed this petition
for quo warranto (G.R. No. 93005), the issues in
which are the same as those raised in G.R. No.
91925.
Issue: Whether the right to vote over
sequestered shares of stock is vested in the
actual shareholders not in the PCGG.
Held: The petitions are impressed with merit.
Nothing is more settled than the ruling of this
Court in BASECO VS. PCGG, that the PCGG cannot
exercise acts of dominion over property
sequestered. It may not vote sequestered shares
of stock or elect the members of the board of
directors of the corporation concerned
a. PCGG May Not Exercise Acts of Ownership
The PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over
property sequestered, frozen or provisionally
taken over. As already earlier stressed with no
little insistence, the act of sequestration, freezing
or provisional takeover of property does not
import or bring about a divestment of title over
said property; does not make the PCGG the owner
thereof. In relation to the property sequestered,
frozen or provisionally taken over, the PCGG is a
conservator, not an owner. Therefore, it cannot
perform acts of strict ownership; and this is
especially true in the situations contemplated by
the sequestration rules where, unlike cases of
receivership.
b. PCGG Has Only Powers of Administration
The PCGG may thus exercise only powers of
administration over the property or business
sequestered or provisionally taken over, much
like a court-appointed receiver, such as to bring
and defend actions in its own name; receive
rents; collect debts due; pay outstanding debts;
and generally do such other acts and things as
may be necessary to fulfill its mission as
conservator and administrator. In the case of
sequestered businesses generally, as in the case
of sequestered objects, its essential role, as
already discussed, is that of conservator,
caretaker, "watchdog" or overseer, it is not that
of manager, or innovator, much less an owner.
c. Powers over Business Enterprises Taken
Over by Marcos or Entities or Persons Close
to him, Limitations Thereon

In the special instance of a business enterprise

shown by evidence to have been "taken over by
the government of the Marcos Administration or
by entities or persons close to former President
Marcos," the PCGG is given power and authority,
as already adverted to, to "provisionally take (it)
over in the public interest or to prevent . . . (its)
disposal or dissipation" and since the term is
obviously employed in reference to going
concerns, or business enterprises in operation,
something more than mere physical custody is
connoted; the PCGG may in this case exercise
some measure of control in the operation,
running, or management of the business itself.
But even in this special situation, the intrusion
into management should be restricted to the
minimum degree necessary to accomplish the
legislative will, which is "to prevent the disposal
or dissipation" of the business enterprise.
d. Voting of Sequestered Stock; Conditions
Therefor
So, too, it is within the parameters of these
conditions and circumstances that the PCGG may
properly exercise the prerogative to vote
sequestered stock of corporations, granted to it
by the President of the Philippines through a
memorandum dated June 26, 1986. That
memorandum authorizes the PCGG "pending the
outcome of proceedings to determine the
ownership of (sequestered) shares of stock," "to
vote such shares of stock as it may have
sequestered in corporations at all stockholders"
meetings called for the election of directors,
declaration of dividends, amendment of the
Articles of Incorporation, etc.

There should be no exercise of the right to vote

simply because the right exists, or because the
stocks sequestered constitute the controlling or a
substantial part of the corporate voting power.
The stock is not to be voted to replace directors,
or revise the articles or by-laws, or otherwise
bring about substantial changes in policy,
program of practice of the corporation except for
demonstrably weighty and defensible grounds,
and always in the context of the stated purposes
of sequestration or provisional takeover, i.e., to
prevent the dispersion or undue disposal of the
corporate assets.

The rule in this jurisdiction is, therefore, clear. The

PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of
sequestered property. It is a mere conservator. It
may not vote the shares in a corporation and
elect the members of the board of directors. The
only conceivable exception is in a case of a
takeover of a business belonging to the
government or whose capitalization comes from
public funds, but which landed in private hands
as in BASECO.

9
The constitutional right against deprivation of life,
liberty and property without due process of law is
so well-known and too precious so that the hand
of the PCGG must be stayed in its indiscriminate
takeover of and voting of shares allegedly illgotten in these cases. It is only after appropriate
judicial proceedings when a clear determination
is made that said shares are truly ill-gotten when
such a takeover and exercise of acts of strict
ownership by the PCGG are justified.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Court
finds and so holds that the PCGG has no right to
vote the sequestered shares of petitioners
including the sequestered corporate shares. Only
their owners, duly authorized representatives or
proxies may vote the said shares. Consequently,
the election of private respondents Adolfo
Azcuna, Edison Coseteng and Patricio Pineda as
members of the board of directors of SMC for
1990-1991 should be set aside.
However, petitioners cannot be declared duly
elected members of the board of directors
thereby. An election for the purpose should be
held where the questioned shares may be voted
by their owners and/or their proxies. Such
election may be held at the next shareholders'
meeting in April 1991 or at such date as may be
set under the by-laws of SMC.
Private respondents in both cases are hereby
declared to be de facto officers who in good faith
assumed their duties and responsibilities as duly
elected members of the board of directors of the
SMC. They are thereby legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office including salary, fees
and other compensation attached to the office
until they vacate the same.
Nevertheless, the right of the Government,
represented by the PCGG, as conservator of
sequestered
assets
must
be
adequately
protected.
It is through the right to vote that the stockholder
participates in the management of the
corporation. The right to vote, unlike the rights to
receive dividends and liquidating distributions, is
not a passive thing because management or
administration is, under the Corporation Code,
vested in the board of directors, with certain
reserved powers residing in the stockholders
directly.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 258 SCRA 685

Facts: On April 14, 1986, a sequestration order

was issued by Atty. Jose Tan Ramirez, a PCGG
representative and head of its task for region VIII
against Dio Island Resort Inc. and all its assets

and properties. The said order was served upon

representatives of respondent Corporation on
April 15, 1986.

On July 22, 1987, petitioner filed with the

respondent court a civil complaint against Alfredo
T. Romualdez, Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos
and 46 others defendants, for reversion,
reconveyance,
restitution
accounting
and
damages seeking to recover alleged ill-gotten
wealth acquired and accumulated by defendants.

In its manifestation and motion dated June

10, 1988 filled in the same case, respondent
Corporation asked respondent court to stop the
PCGG and its agents. It further alleged that up to
the present time, there is no case filed against
movant before the Sandiganbayan by reason of
which the alleged sequestration order shall be
automatically lifted pursuant to Article XVII, sec.
26 of the Constitution.

On November 22, 1988, the respondent

court granted respondent manifestation and
issued the assailed resolution holding that the
PCGG had not legally sequestered the assets of
respondent pursuant to an order issued only by
duly authorized representative.

Issue: Whether or not the Dio Island Resort Inc.

and its assets was validly sequestered

Held: No. the sequestration order was not issued

in accordance with the rules and regulation of the
PCGG promulgated on April 11, 1986, sec. 3 of
the said rules clearly outlined the requirements
for the issuance of sequestration order.
The aforequoted provision, couched in
clear and simple language, leaves no room
for interpretation.
The
invalidation of
sequestration order was made more apparent
by the fact that Atty. Ramirez did not have
any specific authority to act on the
commission at the issued said sequestration
order.
Even assuming arguendo that Atty.
Ramirez had been given prior authority by the
PCGG to place Dio Island Resort under
sequestration,
nevertheless,
the
sequestration order he issued is still void
since PCGG may not delegate its authority to
sequester
to
its
representatives
and

10
subordinates, and any such delegation is
invalid and ineffective."
Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan 244 SCRA 152

Facts: Benjamin Romualdez at the time of the

institution of the proceeding, he was holding two
office simultaneously. The proceeding concerns
the mandatory duty imposed on every person in
the government service by sec. 7 of the graft and
corrupt practices act. The annual filing of
statements of assets and liabilities. Upon theory
that Romualdez had failed to comply with the
said requirements for 24 years from 1962-1985.
After investigation the PCGG filed an information
against Romualdez for transgression of ssaid act
as regards the nature of Romualdezs office.

The Sandiganbayan issued warrant for the

arrest of Romualdez. But these could not be
executed since he was out of the country.
Romualdez filed a motion to recall warrant of
arrest. He prayed informations against him be
nullified, no valid preliminary investigation having
been conducted as predicate for said indictments.
That motion was followed by another dated
November 3, 1991.

Issue: Whether or not the PCGG and the

Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction and or
with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Undoubtedly the PCGG has the power

under Sec. 2 (a) of EO. No. 1, to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth amassed before or after
February 25, 1986. It does not seem however that
this power extends to other acts or omission not
involving ill-gotten wealth. The court hold in Cruz
vs Sandiganbayan. Now the crimes ascribed to
Romualdez do not relate to alleged ill-gotten
wealthamassed by him.

No such relation may be perceive in the

indictments themselves, which in fact merely
state that there was no justifiable cause for
Romualdez refusal or failure to file his annual
statements. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan itself
made the finding that the cases against
Romualdez did not refer to acquisition of wealth
under a crony status but solely to his bare
physical non-compliance with his mechanical
duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities
over a period of 24 years.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

vs

Facts: On 22 July 1987 the Republic of the

Philippines through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of
the Solicitor General filed before respondent
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
against Messrs. Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., Roberto S. Benedicto, Juan Ponce
Enrile and Potenciano Ilusorio before the
Sandiganbayan. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0009, alleged that defendants illegally
manipulated, under the guise of expanding the
operations of Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), the purchase of major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited, a
London-based telecommunications company, in
ETPI which shareholdings defendants Roberto S.
Benedicto, Jose L. Africa and Manuel H. Nieto Jr.,
by
themselves
and
through
corporations
organized by them, namely, Polygon Investors
and Managers, Inc., Aerocom Investors and
Managers,
Inc.,
and
Universal
Molasses
Corporation, beneficially held for themselves and
for defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.
Private respondents Victor Africa, Lourdes Africa,
Nathalie Africa. Jose Enrique Africa, Paul Delfin
Africa, Rosario Arellano, Racquel Dinglasan,
Victoria N. Legarda, Angela N. Lobregat, Manuel
V. Nieto, Ramon Nieto, Benito Nieto, Carlos Nieto,
Ma. Rita N. Delos Reyes, Evelyn Romero. Rosario
Sangco, Carmen N. Tuazon and Rafael V. Valdez,
who are registered stockholders of ETPI, were not
impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009. Nonetheless,
they were denied the dividends appertaining to
their shares. Thus on at least two (2) different
occasions, i.e., on 8 November 1988 and 31
January 1991, they had to file motions for leave
of court to intervene in Civil Case No. 0009 to be
able to receive their cash dividends, which
motions were both granted. 3 On 4 October 1991
they filed a Motion for Declaration of NonSequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration.
Private respondents anchor their Motion for
Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of
Sequestration on the absence of a valid
sequestration over their shares of stock, and on
the automatic lifting of the writ of sequestration.
In a Resolution dated 26 November 1991, the
Sandiganbayan
granted
the
Motion
for
Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of
Sequestration filed by private respondents on the
ground that since no judicial proceeding was ever
commenced
against
them
within
the
constitutionally-mandated six-month period, the

11
writ of sequestration issued over their shares of
stock is deemed to have been automatically
lifted.
The Government through the PCGG is now before
us on certiorari claiming grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in granting
private respondents' Motion for Declaration of
Non- Sequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid

sequestration on the assets of the petitioners

Held: It is elementary that before a person can

be deprived of his right or property he should first
be informed of the claim against him and the
theory on which such claim is premised. He
should be given an opportunity to defend himself
and protect his interest.
In the instant case, private respondents have in
the past years been deprived of their dividends
which have now accrued and accumulated,
without affording them an opportunity to protect
and defend their interests. Their shares of stock
in ETPI have been challenged by the Government
without the latter instituting an action to recover
the same, and only on the mere allegation in a
collateral proceeding, belatedly made, that they
are also part of ill-gotten wealth. The Government
is thus seeking to recover the shares of stock of
private respondents through an action where the
named defendants are different from private
respondents herein.
The procedure is highly irregular and seriously
flawed. If the Government is really interested in
claiming the shares of stock of private
respondents the proper procedure is to implead
them in a complaint for the recovery of those
shares. Unfortunately, it has allowed the period to
lapse without impleading them. If the defendants
in Civil Case No. 0009, who have been
particularly identified as having manipulated the
transfer of shares of stock in ETPI to their names
allegedly under unconscionable terms and
conditions, were impleaded to be able to defend
themselves and their interests, with more reason
should private respondents herein, who have not
even been shown to have participated in the illicit
transactions, be impleaded and given a chance to
be heard. For, the sanctified principle that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law requires that
at the outset a person should first be named and
included in a suit before his very existence is
disregarded and his freedom and property taken
away from him. Actions must be brought against
the persons who are to be bound by the judgment
obtained therein.

The defendants therein banked on the omissions

and sought the lifting of the orders of
sequestration on the ground that no proper
judicial action had been filed within the time and
in the manner required by the Constitution
against the corporations with which they were
associated.
Private respondents in the instant case, as
already stated, are not even sued nor impleaded
as defendants in Civil Case No, 0009 before
public respondent Sandiganbayan. Neither are
they mentioned in the complaint of the
Government. Their names only surfaced when
they were forced to intervene in the case since all
the cash dividends declared by the Board of
Directors of ETPI were being turned over to the
PCGG including the cash dividends due them.
Thus, each time a cash dividend was declared
they had to file a motion to intervene in Civil
Case No. 0009 to be able to petition respondent
court to order the PCGG to release to them their
respective
dividends.
Accordingly,
private
respondents had to file in Civil Case No. 0009
a Motion for Declaration of Non-Sequestration or
Invalidity of Sequestration, which respondent
court granted.
Thus, since only Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto F.,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
R. Marcos Jr., Roberto S. Benedicto, Juan Ponce
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio were impleaded as
defendants in Civil Case No. 0009 While private
respondents were not, only the shares of stock
registered in the names of defendants should be
in issue. Those registered in the names of
others, e.g., those of private respondents, should
be spared unless it can be shown in a proper
proceeding that they are likewise ill-gotten-wealth
or fruits of ill-gotten wealth. In this regard, if only
to uphold the rule of law, the minimum
requirement is to implead the registered owners
of those shares in a formal complaint to recover
them.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: On March 19, 1986, pursuant to
powers vested upon it by the President of the
Philippines under Executive Order No. 1,
promulgated on February 28, 1986, the PCGG
issued a writ of sequestration against all assets,
movable
and
immovable,
of
Provident
International
Resources
Corporation and
Philippine
Casino
Operators
Corporation
("respondent corporations").
On July 29, 1987, Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed
before the Sandiganbayan a complaint, against
Edward T. Marcelo, Fabian C. Ver, Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for reconveyance,
reversion,
accounting,
restitution
and
damages. Said complaint sought to recover from

12
named
defendants
alleged
ill-gotten
wealth. Among the corporations listed[6] in the
complaint as being held and/or controlled by
Defendant Marcelo, and among the assets
apparently acquired illegally by defendants, were
respondent corporations.
Prior to such amendment, specifically on
September 11, 1991, respondent corporations
filed
before
the
Sandiganbayan
a
petition for mandamus praying for the lifting of
the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against
them and for the restoration of their sequestered
assets, properties, records and documents, on the
ground that PCGG failed to file the appropriate
judicial action against them within the period
prescribed under Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.
On December 4, 1991, public respondent
issued the assailed Resolution.
PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration. In
denying said motion on the ground that the
allegations therein were "essentially a mere
rehash of respondent's Answer to the Petition as
well as Opposition to the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleading," public respondent further noted
that the sequestration order dated March 19,
1986, was issued and signed by only one PCGG
commissioner in violation of Section 3 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations.
Issue: Whether the sequestration order issued
against respondent-corporations was valid and
effective despite having been signed by only one
commissioner, contrary to the PCGG Rules and
Regulations requiring the authority of at least two
commissioners therefor.
Held: "Sec. 3. Who may issue. - A writ of
sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be
issued by the Commission upon the authority of
at least two Commissioners, based on the
affirmation or complaint of an interested party
or motu proprio when the Commission has
reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance
thereof is warranted."
The
questioned sequestration order was,
however, issued on March 19, 1986, prior to the
promulgation
of
the
PCGG
Rules
and
Regulations. As a consequence, we cannot
reasonably expect the Commission to abide by
said rules which were nonexistent at the time the
subject writ was issued by then Commissioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista. Basic is the rule that
no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation
(and even policies) shall be given retrospective
effect unless explicitly stated so. [33] We find no
provision in said Rules which expressly gives
them retroactive effect, or implies the abrogation
of previous writs issued not in accordance with
the same Rules.

In the case at bar, there is no question as to

the presence of prima facie evidence justifying
the issuance of the sequestration order against
respondent corporations. But the said order
cannot be nullified for lack of the other requisite
(authority of at least two commissioners) since,
as explained earlier, such requisite was
nonexistent at the time the order was issued.
In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth
brought
by
or
against
the
Presidential
Commission on Good Government, it is the policy
of this Court to set aside technicalities and
formalities that serve merely to delay or impede
their judicious resolution. This Court prefers to
have such cases resolved on the merits before
the Sandiganbayan. Substantial justice to all
parties, not mere legalisms or perfection of form,
should now be relentlessly pursued.
Eleven years have passed since the
government started its search for and reversion
of such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is adequate proof of illegal
acquisition,
accumulation,
misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now.
Let the titles over these properties be finally
determined and quieted down with all reasonable
speed, free of delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.
PRESIDENTIAL
AD
HOC
FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS vs HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Facts: On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman
of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as
Vice Chairman; and one representative each from
the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department
of Finance, Department of Justice, Development
Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank,
Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate
Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation as members.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the
COMMITTEE to "include in its investigation,
inventory, and study all non-performing loans
which shall embrace both behest and non-behest
loans." It likewise provided for the following
criteria which might be "utilized as a frame of
reference in determining a behest loan.
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON
BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July
1993, 5 the COMMITTEE reported that the
Philippine, Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which
the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the
Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations
which obtained behest loans.

13
In his instructions handwritten on the
cover of the aforementioned Report, President
Ramos
directed
COMMITTEE
Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, "proceed
with administrative and judicial actions against
the twenty-one firms (out of 21) in this batch with
positive findings ASAP." 6
On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through
Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant
detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint 7 against the
Directors of PSI and the Directors of the
Development Bank of the Philippines who
approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e)
and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended.
In the resolution 8 dated 14 May 1996 and
approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN
dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the
ground
of prescription.
Relying
on People
v. Dinsay, 9 a case decided by the Court of
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the
questioned transactions were evidenced by public
instruments and were thus open for the perusal
of the public, the prescriptive period commenced
to run from the time of the commission of the
crime, not from the discovery thereof. Reckoning
the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970, 1975,
and 1978, when the disputed transactions were
entered into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that the
offenses with which respondents were charged
had already prescribed.
Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the OMBUDSMAN in the Order 10 of 19
May 1997
Issue: Whether or not public respondent
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that the prescriptive period in this case
should be counted from the date of the grant of
the behest loan and not from the date of
discovery.
Held: In the present case, it was well-nigh
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the
time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with
the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which the respondents in OMB0-96-0968 were charged should be computed
from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the OMBUDSMAN that the
phrase "if the same be not known" in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 does not mean "lack of knowledge"
but that the crime "is not reasonably knowable" is
unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation
that defeats or negates the intent of the law,
which is written in a clear and unambiguous

language and thus provides no

interpretation but only application.

room

for

The
OMBUDSMAN's
reliance
on Dinsay is
misplaced. The estafa committed by the accused
was known to the offended party from the very
start; hence, it could even be said that the
commission and the discovery of the offense
were
simultaneous. 20 Neither
is People
v. Sandiganbayan 21 of any help to OMBUDSMAN.
We ruled therein that the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the filing of the
application for the following reasons:
The theory of the prosecution that the
prescriptive period should not commence upon
the filing of Paredes' application because no one
could have known about it except Paredes and
Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the
Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only
the Lands Inspector who passes upon the
disposability of public land . . . other public
officials pass upon the application for a free
patent including the location of the land and,
therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p.
30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and
approving the application.
In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith
dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-960968 without even requiring the respondents to
submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the
basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were
granted, or the dates of the commission of the
alleged offense was committed.
Since the computation of the prescriptive period
for the filing of the criminal action should
commence from the discovery of the offense, the
OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-096-0968. It should have first received the
evidence from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on its merits and
on the issue of the date of discovery of the
offense.
G.R. No. 189434
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. vs REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
x--------------------------x
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts: On 17 December 1991, the Republic,
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for
Forfeiture[2] before the Sandiganbayan pursuant
to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A.
1379) in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and
14.
Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought the
declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD

14
356 million (now USD 658 million), and two
treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5
million, as ill-gotten wealth.[5] The Swiss accounts,
previously held by five groups of foreign
foundations,[6]were deposited in escrow with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), while the treasury
notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
Respondent also sought the forfeiture of
the assets of dummy corporations and entities
established by nominees of Marcos and his wife,
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as
real and personal properties manifestly out of
proportion to the spouses lawful income. This
claim was based on evidence collated by the
PCGG with the assistance of the United States
Justice Department and the Swiss Federal Police
Department.[7] The
Petition
for
Forfeiture
described among others, a corporate entity by
the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an
account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York,
and which was purportedly organized for the
same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.[
Before the case was set for pretrial, the
Marcos
children
and
PCGG
Chairperson
Magtanggol
Gunigundo
signed
several
Compromise Agreements (a General Agreement
and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28
December 1993 for a global settlement of the
Marcos assets. One of the whereas clauses in the
General Agreement specified that the Republic
obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (USD 356
million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met xxx. This Decision was in turn based on the
finding of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey
that the deposits in the name of the foundations
were of illegal provenance.[9]
On 18 October 1996, respondent Republic
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings (the 1996 Motion)
pertaining to the forfeiture of the USD 356
million. The Sandiganbayan denied the 1996
Motion on the sole ground that the Marcoses had
earlier moved for approval of the Compromise
Agreements, and that this latter Motion took
precedence over that for summary judgment.
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation
claiming she was not a party to the Motion for
Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and
that she owned 90% of the funds while the
remaining 10% belonged to the Marcos estate.[10]

On 10 March 2000, the Republic filed

another Motion for Summary Judgment (the 2000
Motion), based on the grounds that: (1) the
essential facts that warrant the forfeiture of the
funds subject of the Petition under R.A. 1379 are
admitted by respondents in their pleadings and
other submissions; and (2) the respondent
Marcoses pretrial admission that they did not
have any interest or ownership over the funds
subject of the action for forfeiture tendered no
genuine issue or controversy as to any material
fact.
In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the
Sandiganbayan initially granted the 2000 Motion,
declaring that the Swiss deposits held in escrow
at the PNB were ill-gotten wealth, and, thus,
forfeited in favor of the State.
On 16 July 2004, the Republic filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2004
Motion) to declare the funds, properties, shares in
and interests of ARELMA, wherever they may be
located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
1379 in the same manner (that) the Honorable
Supreme Court forfeited in favor of the petitioner
the funds and assets of similar Marcos
foundations
such
as
AVERTINA,
VIBUR,
AGUAMINA, MALER and PALMY
On 2 April 2009, the Sandiganbayan
rendered
the
assailed
Decision
granting
respondents
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment.[14]
Issues:
a. Whether the forfeiture proceeding, Civil Case
No. 0141 with the Sandiganbayan is criminal in
nature, such that summary judgment is not
allowed;
b. Whether petitioner Republic complied with
Section 3, subparagraphs c, d, and e of R.A.
1375;
Held: a. Forfeiture cases impose neither a
personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability
that arises from the commission of a crime (ex
delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute
that safeguards the right of the State to recover
unlawfully acquired properties. [29] Executive Order
No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction
Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of
Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes
the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings.
Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file
independent civil actions separate from the
criminal actions.
Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case
with a criminal case and assail the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that
they were deprived of a full-blown trial. In
affirming the Sandiganbayan and denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in the
Swiss Deposits Decision.
As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil
in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the Rules of

15
Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to
the present case. This is consistent with our
ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding
the summary judgment rendered by the
Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which
are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as
the Arelma assets.

The alleged receivables from prior years were

without basis, because Marcos never had a
known law office nor any known clients, and
neither did he file any withholding tax certificate
that would prove the existence of a supposedly
profitable law practice before he became
President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits
Decision.

b. R.A. 1375 provides that whenever any public

officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer and to his other lawful income, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired.[35] The elements that
must concur for this prima facie presumption to
apply are the following: (1) the offender is a
public officer or employee; (2) he must have
acquired a considerable amount of money or
property during his incumbency; and (3) said
amount is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property.

The Sandiganbayan found that neither the

late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner Imelda
Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, as required by law, from which their
net worth could be determined. Coupled with the
fact that the Answer consisted of general denials
and a standard plea of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations what the Court
characterized as foxy replies and mere pretense
fairness dictates that what must be considered as
lawful income should only be the accumulated
salaries of the spouses and what are shown in the
public documents they submitted, such as their
Income Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets.

Thus, in determining whether the presumption of

ill-gotten wealth should be applied, the relevant
period is incumbency, or the period in which the
public officer served in that position. The amount
of the public officers salary and lawful income is
compared against any property or amount
acquired for that same period. In the Swiss
Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner
Republic was able to establish the prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties
acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and
patently disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials.[36]
For a petition to flourish under the
forfeiture law, it must contain the following:
(a)The name and address of the
respondent.
(b)The public officer or employment he
holds and such other public offices or
employment which he has previously held.
(c)The approximate amount of property he
has acquired during his incumbency in his
past and present offices and employments.
(d)A description of said property, or such
thereof as has been identified by the
Solicitor General.
(e)The total amount of his government
salary and other proper earnings and
incomes
from
legitimately
acquired
property, and
(f)Such other information as may enable the court
to determine whether or not the respondent has
unlawfully
acquired
property
during
his
incumbency.
Petitioners claim that the Republic failed
to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e above,
because the latter allegedly never took into
account the years when Ferdinand Marcos served
as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing
lawyer, a trader and investor, a congressman and
senator. We find this claim to be a haphazard
rehash of what has already been conclusively
determined by the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision.

The amount reported by the Marcos

couple as their combined salaries more or less
coincided with the Official Report submitted by
the Minister of Budget. Yet what appeared
anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing
Legal Practice, which accounted for 67% or more
than three-fourths of their reported income. Out
of this anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836,
or 96% thereof, represented receivables from
prior years during the period 1967 to 1984.
In addition, the former President also
reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he
referred to as Miscellaneous Items and Various
Corporations under Other Income for 1972-1976.
Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from
any deposits that may be subject to a 5%
withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains
tax returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue attested that there are no
records pertaining to the tax transactions of the
spouses in Baguio City, Manila, Quezon City, and
Tacloban.
Thus, for the final time, we soundly
reiterate that the Republic was able to establish
the prima facie presumption that the assets and
properties acquired by the Marcoses were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their
aggregate salaries as public officials. The
Republic presented further evidence that they
had bigger deposits beyond their lawful incomes,
foremost of which were the Swiss accounts
deposited in the names of five foundations
spirited away by the couple to different countries.
Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this
presumption when they merely presented vague
denials and pleaded lack of sufficient knowledge
in their Answer.
In any case, petitioners may no longer
question the findings of the Sandiganbayan
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss
Deposits Decision, as these issues have long
become the law of the case in the original Petition
for Forfeiture.

16