Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 706

PART I

CRIMINAL LAW BOOK 1


REVIEWER

I.

CRIMINAL LAW: INTRODUCTION


A. DEFINITION
Criminal law is that branch of municipal law that defines
crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment.
It is that branch of public substantive law that defines offenses
and prescribes their penalties. It is substantive because it
defines the states right to inflict punishment and the liability of
the offenders. It is a public law because it deals with the
relation of the individual with the state.
B. STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES
1. Sources of State Authority
a. Constitution
i.
Section 5, Art. 2, 1987 Constitution
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
ii.
Section 1, Art. 6, 1987 Constitution
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.
b. Revised Penal Code (RPC)
c. Special Criminal Laws
d. Penal Provisions in Other Laws
e. Local Ordinances
f. Jurisprudence
2. Limitations to State Authority
a. Due Process and Equal Protection Section 1, Article III,
1987 Constitution
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535


Facts
The accused, a Japanese spy, guided the Japanese
military police to the houses of Martin Mateo and Fermin
Javier. The Japanese soldier then broke into the said houses
and seized Martin Mateo, Ladulao Mateo and Fermin Javier.
They were sent to Fort Santiago where they were tortured
and released 6 days later.
Contention of the state: the accused is guilty of treason

Contention of the accused: they cannot be convicted of


the crime of treason because it is a settled principle of
international law that once the territory is occupied by an
enemy, the allegiance is a legal obligation distinguishable
by the inhabitants therein, the government is temporarily
suspended. The peoples court violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of laws.
Ruling:
The peoples court was not meant to last forever and
so that all cases within 6 months and where deemed
enough to occupy the attention of the peoples court within
its limited to life should be cognizable by it and the rest
should be instilled in the peoples court doesnt violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of laws and
due process because the constitution does not present a
state from adjusting its legislative to difference in
situations and making a distinction in its legislation
provided that the distinction has reasonable foundation on
national basis and is not purely and entirely arbitrary in the
legislative sense.
b. Freedom of Expression Section 4, Article III, Constitution - a.
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Barnes vs. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
Facts
An Indiana statute made it a misdemeanor to appear
in a public place in a state of nudity within a statutory
definition of nudity, such as the female genitalia, pubic
area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering part
of the nipple. Two entertainment establishments in south
bend Indiana wished to provide totally nude dancing as
entertainment, which brought suit in the US courts for the
northern district of Indiana against the city of South Bend.
Contention of the state: the prohibition against nude
dancing or entertainment did violate the constitution; first
amendment of freedom of expression.
Contention of the accused: the statute prohibition violated
the freedom of expression, first amendment.
Ruling
The prohibition of nude dancing or entertainment
does not violate the first amendment because the statute
was a general law regulating conduct and was specifically
directed at expression.

c. Freedom of Religion Section 5, Article III, Constitution


No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
a. Employment
Division,
Department of Human Resources
of Oregon vs. Smith 494 U.S. 872
Facts
Two Native Americans were fired by a private drug
rehabilitation organization because they used drugs for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native
American church. Their application for employment
compensation was denied by the state of Oregon due to a
state law disqualifying employees discharge for work related
to misconduct. The two Native American filed a complaint in
court to determine if their right was violated, in case of the
free exercise of religion.
Contention of the state: there was no violation of freedom of
religion
Contention of the accused: there was a violation of freedom
of religion
Ruling
Religious belief of individual does not excuse him from
compliance with a valid law. An individual does not excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the government is free to regulate allowing
exemptions to every state law on regulation affecting
religion would lead to confusion and chaos.
b. Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1
Facts
Complainant Alejandro Estrada is a concerned citizen
who wrote a request to Judge Jose Caoibes to investigate
rumors surrounding court interpreter, Soledad Escritor, who
allegedly has been living with a man who is not her
husband. They purportedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Though unrelated to both respondent and
her spouse, complainant assails that he believes that she is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor started working in the judiciary


one year after following the death of her husband. In truth,
respondent has been living with a certain Luciano Qualipo
for twenty years without the benefit of marriage and they
have a son. However, she avers that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs as
she and Luciano are devoted members of Jehovahs
Witness. As a matter of fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness, insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they
remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Contention of the state: it gives rise to the confusion of the
separation of state and church.
Contention of the accused: she was not violating any law,
her relationship with Qualipo was approved by the elders of
Jehovah witnesses.
Ruling
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same
time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. The Court
distinguishes between religious practices, including the
seemingly bizarre, which may not be regulated, and
unacceptable religious conduct which should be prevented
despite claims that it forms part of religious freedom.
A clear and present danger of a substantive evil,
destructive to public morals, is a ground for the reasonable
regulation of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession. In addition to the destruction of public morals,
the substantive evil in this case is the tearing down of
morality, good order, and discipline in the judiciary.
Jurisprudence on immoral conduct of employees in the civil
service has been consistent. There is nothing in this case
that warrants a departure from precedents. The court
cannot sanction or encourage illicit or adulterous relations
among government employees.
The court held that exemptions granted under our
Muslim Laws to legitimate followers of Islam do not apply to
them. The Court has no legislative power to place Jehovahs
Witness in the same legal category as Muslims.
d. Section 14 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
e. Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,


and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
f. Section 18 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
and aspirations.
g. Section 18 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
h. No excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Sec. 19, Par. (1), Article III, Constitution
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion Perpetua.
i. Section 19 (2) Article III, 1987 Constitution
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906
Facts
The accused was found guilty and was sentenced to a
5 year imprisonment and a fine of P5,000.00 plus costs for
violating EO 331 of RA 509.
Contention of the state: violation of RA 509 justifies the
ruling of the lower court on the matter at hand.
Contention of the accused: there should be modification of
the ruling as provided in the provision of Section 19, Article
3 pertaining to no excessive fines nor cruel degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Held
Judgment was modified. They reduced the penalty to
6 months imprisonment and that the fines to be paid for
the reason that SC can exercise such considering also the
right of the accused.
People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682

Facts
Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape
for raping the 10 year old daughter of his common spouse
with death penalty.
Contention of the state: the crimes punishable by death
under RA 1659 are heinous crimes for being grave and
hateful offenses and which by reason of their inherent and
manifest wickedness and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just civilized and ordered society.
Contention of the accused: the accused argues that RA
8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, violation
of our international treaty obligation, being an undue
delegation of legislative power and being discriminatory.
Held
The court denied the motion for reconsideration and
the supplemental motion for reconsideration with a finding
that congress duly complied with requirements for the
reimposition of death penalty and therefore the death
penalty law is not unconstitutional.
j. Section 20, Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
k.Bill of Attainder Section 22, Article III, Constitution
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
a. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
Facts
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed
against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac
concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of
being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the government of the Philippines by
means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other
illegal means. Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a
bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five
others were also charged in the same court with
subversion. Tayag copied Cos attack on the law. The court
ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of
attainder and that it is vague overbroad. Government
appealed to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.
Contention of the state: the court holds the validity of the
anti-subversion act of 1957

Contention of the accused: it is the bill of attainder


because it has expressly created the presumption of
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
be overthrown even if the only issue is whether or not the
accused is a knowing and voluntary member.
Held
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes
of the accused under the act. The SC set aside the
resolution of the trial court and leaves this matter to future
determination and government is still proving such
circumstances.
l. Ex post facto law Section 22, Article III, Constitution
a. U.S. vs. Diaz-Conde, 42 Phil. 766
Facts
Complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia
Lianco entered into a contract with the defendants
concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated
to pay five percent interest per month within the first ten
days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde
and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the
Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of
P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law.
They took it to SC to plead.
Contention of the state: the defendants violated the Act
2655 and they were not guilty on the court of first
instance. Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Liancoborrowed
p300 and had to pay 50% interest monthly.
Contention of the accused: the contract upon the alleged
interest collected was executed before act 2655,when the
contract was made there was no usury law and act 2655
could have no retroactive effect.
Held
The SC decided that the acts complained of by the
defender did not constitute a crime at the time they were
committed and therefore the sentence of the lower court
should be revoked and that the complaint be dismissed and
the defendants be discharged from the custody of the law.
m. Rule 115, Rules on Civil Procedure
Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the

judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial
dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the
assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to crossexamination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence
shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify,
given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
(1a)
n. Article 2, New Civil Code
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
Pesigan vs. Angeles (129 SCRA 174)
Facts
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from
Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They
were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate
from
the
provincial
veterinarian,2)
permit
to
transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and 3)
three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the
carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian
and the towns police station commander while passing
through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO No.
626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos & carabeef
from one province to another.
Issues: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is
enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June
14, 1982.
Held

No. The said order isnt enforceable against the Pesigans


on April 2, 1982 because its a penal regulation published
more than 2mos. later in the OG. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The word laws in article
2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe
penalties. Publication is necessary to appraise the public of
the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act
No. 638requires that all Presidential EOs having general
applicability should be published in the OG. It provides that
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty
shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal
effect. This applies to a violation of EO No.626-A because its
confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a
penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for
the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation
wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return
them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the
said executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering
the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Tanada vs. Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)
Facts
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due
process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24,
1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish
in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances
which are of general force and effect. The petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not. The
publication means complete publication, and that
publication must be made in the official gazette. In a
comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first
that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless
otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not
have to be made in the official gazette.
Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an
indispensable requirement for the effectively of the PDs,
LOIs, general orders, EOs,etc. where laws themselves
provide for their own effectively dates.

10

Held
Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters
of public concern & corollary access to official records, & to
documents & papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be before the citizens
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6
AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable,
must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of
effectively does not preclude their publication in the OG as
they constitute important legislative acts. The publication
of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
informed of its contents.
o. Article V, Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines
and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise
within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the military law of the United States over
United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating
to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the
Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses
relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the
laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article,
an offense relating to security means:
(1) Treason;
(2) Sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national
defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States personnel,
except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this
Article.

11

(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the
military law of the United States in relation to:
(1) Offenses solely against the property or security of the United
States or offenses solely against the property or person of United
States personnel; and
(2) Offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of
official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities
of the other government to waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military
authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their forces,
Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular
importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines
determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities
within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the
United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an
offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States
personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of
official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such
determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate
authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of
performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of
this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty
certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities
shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States
military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position.
Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take
disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases,
and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise
jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government as
soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify
each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities
of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise
jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest
of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them
over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
the provisions of this article.

12

5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine


authorities of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who
are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine
authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of
the arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with
United States military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.
United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel
available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial
proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall
present its position to the United States Government regarding
custody, which the United States Government shall take into full
account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not
completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any
obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include
the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not
include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by
Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail
to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and
Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all
necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in
providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and
production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the
delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with
the provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been
convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had
their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they
may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines.
Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States
military authorities from trying United States personnel for any
violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which
constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine
authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or
prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all
procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the
minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges
made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a
defense;

13

(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to crossexamine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice
on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by
United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at all
judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the
court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who have
no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United
States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States
personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine
courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
C. PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Identify Wrongful Behavior
Defines with crimes under the Philippine law has been committed
2. Prescribe Punishment
It provides the punishment or penalties for the crime committed
De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City, 417 SCRA 636
Facts
The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with
violation of BP 22 before the MTC of Batangas. After 5 years,
petitioner was arrested while applying for NBI clearance. She was
detained at Batangas city jail. She filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her motion to MTC
was denied.
Contention of the state: judgment of conviction against the
petitioner had long attained finality and could no longer be modified.
Contention of the accused: her detention was illegal. SC
administrative circular 12-2000 deleted the imprisonment of violation
of BP 22 and allows only the imposition of fines.
Held

14

SC administrative circular 12-2000 is not a penal law;


hence Article 22 of RPC is not applicable. The circular applies
only to those cases pending as to the date of its effectivity and
not to cases already terminated by final judgment. The petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.
a. Retribution
- Exact justice for the victims family, intended to punish bad conduct in
the past. Penalty should communicate with the act.
b. Prevention
i.
Deterrence
Specific- exist to affect behavior of individual
General- relies on cost benefit analysis to stop people from
committing crimes. Most effective in deterring well planned crimes. It
includes evaluation of social stigma and it requires the public to be
educated
ii.
Incapacitation - cannot stop individual in committing crimes
iii. Rehabilitation - it modifies the undesirable behavior of an individual
D. CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
1. Liberality in Favor of the Accused
People vs. Gatchalian (104 Phil. 664)
Facts
On August 4, 1951 to December 31, 1953, Alfonso
Gatchalian, owner of New Life Drugstore in Zamboanga City,
employed Expedito Fernandez as sales man, did then and
there willfully and feloniously, pays and cause to be paid in
his employees a monthly salary of P60-P90which is less than
that provided by law. The appellee was charged before the
court of the first instance with a violation of section 3 of RA
602.
Contention of the state: The City attorney of Zamboanga
filed his answer to the motion to dismiss contending that the
law which was violated by the accused that carries with it
both civil and criminal liability the latter being covered by
section 5 which provide for the penalty for all willful
violations of any of the provisions of the minimum wage law.
Contention of the accused: The accused pleaded guilty. His
counsel filed a written motion to dismiss based on two
grounds; that the violation charged does not constitute a
crime offense but carries only civil liability and even if it
does this section because of the alleged to have been
violated does not carry any penalty penalizing it.
Held:
According to the court of first instance of
Zamboanga, sustained the view that section 5 is not
applicable to violations of section 3 of the minimum wage

15

law. We have the well-settled principle in the interpretation


of penal laws that in case of doubt, he interpretation
available to the accused is adopted.
People vs. Sultan, 331 SCRA 216
The victim was abducted by the appellant and
brought her to his house. When they arrived atthe
appellants house the victim was divested of her jewelry
and other valuables, after which shewas raped several
times. The appellant was convicted of the special complex
crime of robberywith homicide. Whether multiple rapes can
be considered as an aggravating circumstance?
HELD:
No. In several cases the Court realized that there was
no law providing for the additional rape/sor homicide/s for
that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance.
It further observedthat the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code
isexclusive unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code that
enumerates the mitigating circumstanceswhere analogous
circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies
with the legislature.
Consequently, unless and until a law is passed
providing
that the additional rape/s or
homicide/smay be considered
aggravating, the
Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offenderas no person
may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute. Underthis view, the additional rape committed by accusedappellant is not considered an aggravatingcircumstance. Applying Art.
63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i)n
allcases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the followingrules shall be observed in the
application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigatingnor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall beapplied," the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed on accused-appellant.
2. Retroactive Application if Favorable to the Accused
People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611, 616-620 and 630-631
Facts: On 7 June 1977, Eleno Maquiling was shot while at the yardof
their house. Esmenia, the victims mother, and Dionisio, thevictims
brother, saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio runningdown the hill
away from the bamboo groves. The lower court decidedthat the
accused are guilty of murder, imposing upon each them thecapital
penalty of death, damages and costs.
Issue: WON there was a conspiracy between the accused in
killingMaquiling.
Held: Yes. Judgment AFFIRMED. But under the 1987 Constitution,
inview of the abolition of capital punishment, the applicable penalty
isreclusion perpetua. The evidence of the prosecution is more
thanadequate to sustain the finding of conspiracy between the
twoaccused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to

16

showwho was between the two who actually pulled the trigger
thatconsequently killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators
sinceany act of a co-conspirator become the act of the other regardless
ofthe precise degree of participation in the act.
Also, there was presence of treachery, because of thecircumstances
that the crime was done at night time and that theaccused hid
themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation isalso an
aggravating circumstance (the accused had planned to kill the victims
some days before).
Go vs. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451
Facts: The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando
Dimagiba issued to petitioner Susan Go 13 checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due
dates were dishonored for the reason account closed. Dimagiba was
subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 under
separate complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Courts in the cities in
Baguio City.
Ruling: Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC
issued an order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from
confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the decision of the MTC was
not touched upon. A subsequent order, explaining in greater detail the
basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus was issued on October
11, 2001.
3. Equipoise Doctrine
People vs. Dindo, 349 SCRA 492
Facts: On July 26, 1996, the accused, with 3 unknown persons, shot
Crestita Lao which caused the death of the latter.
Ruling: In the absence of any evidence that accused-appellant
conspired with the assailants, conspiracy cannot be attributed against
him for, in criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish its case with the degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind, with evidence which stands or false on its
merits, and which cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Unless it discharges the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Thus, when the
guilt of the accused has not been proven with the moral certainty, such
as the case at bar, it is the policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his
exoneration be granted as a matter of right.
People vs. Sayana, 405 SCRA 451
Facts: The accused raped Cheska Angelika de Dios, an 11 year old
girl.
Ruling: The lone uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is
sufficient to warrant a conviction provided that such is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. However, the said requisites were not satisfied by the
victims testimonies, and that it seems that the victims relatives has a
motive for filing charges against the complainant.

17

4. Void for Vagueness or Over breadth (Doctrine of Pro Reo)


Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 394, 426-445
Facts
During the period from June 1998 to January 2001, Joseph
Estrada unlawfully and criminally amass and accumulate indirectly or
directly,
ill gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,163.17, unjustly enriching himself at the expense damage
of people of the Philippines, any or combination or a series or overt or
criminal acts, similar schemes or means.
Contention of the accused: plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum
prohibition and thus, Estrada should not be punished for the crime of
plunder as one since the accumulation of his ill-gotten wealth was
done in a series of acts, he should be punished for one act not
including the other with no criminal intent.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because
when the acts are inherently immoral or
and it does not matter that such acts are
especially since in the case of plunder the
se.
II.

it is a heinous offense. For


wrong, they are mala in se
punished under special laws
predicate crimes are mala in

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW


A. GENERALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Section 11, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
2. Article 14, New Civil Code of the Philippines
Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
3. Republic Act 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE
PROPER
OBSERVANCE
BY
THE
REPUBLIC
AND
INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES,
RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon
himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or any other official of a
foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud such
foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any
person, or in such pretended character shall demand or obtain,
or attempt to obtain from person or from said foreign
government or the Government of the Philippines, or from any
officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of
value, shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or shall
be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in addition

18

to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal


Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer
or attach, who shall act in the Republic of the Philippines as an
agent of a foreign government without prior notification to, and
registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall be fined
not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be
imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead,
within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear any naval, military,
police, or other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of any
foreign State, nation or government with which the Republic of
the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia
so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive,
unless such wearing thereof be authorized by such State, nation,
or government, shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any
person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any
judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public
minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by
the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or
chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed
void, and every person by whom the same is obtained or
prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer
concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not
exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to
any case where the person against whom the process is issued is
a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the
service of an ambassador or a public minister, and the process is
founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such
service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the
person against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant
of an ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of the
servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who
shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in
his office. All persons shall have resort to the list of names so
posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without
fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or
in any other manner offers violence to the person of an
ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of
nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years, and fined
not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court,
in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in
case where the country of the diplomatic or consular
representative adversely affected has provided for similar

19

protection
to
duly accredited diplomatic
or
consular
representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing
like or similar penalties for like or similar offenses herein
contained.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4. Article V, VFA
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to
exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United
States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
United States personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable
under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the
United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
United States personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable
under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the
Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this
article, an offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to
national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent,
the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States
personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b),
and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to
the military law of the United States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United
States or offenses solely against the property or person of United
States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in
performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the
authorities of the other government to waive their primary right
to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military
authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their
forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United
States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in
cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of
particular importance, it shall communicate such determination

20

to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the
Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that
an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against
United States personnel arises out of an act or omission done in
the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a
certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will
be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty
for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those
cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate,
United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall
consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United
States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities
will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official
duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the
actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise
jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government
as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall
notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the
authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right
to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of
the Philippines and the United States shall assist each other in
the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in
handing them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify
Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States
personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive
jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United
States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from
the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any
investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with
which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United
States Government regarding custody, which the United States
Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine
judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this
paragraph. The one year period will not include the time
necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include

21

any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed


because United States authorities, after timely notification by
Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and
Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of
all necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in
providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper
cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance
with the provisions of this article and have been acquitted or
have been convicted and are serving, or have served their
sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or
have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however,
shall prevent United States military authorities from trying United
States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising
from the act or omission which constituted an offense for which
they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into
custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be
accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the
Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be
entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or
charges made against them and to have reasonable time to
prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross
examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own
choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by
United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at
all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless
the court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons
who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of
United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed
on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United
States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have
the right to visits and material assistance.

22

11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in


Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject
to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
5. US vs. Sweet (1 Phil. 18)
Facts
Sweet was employed by the United States military who
committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the
CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he
was acting in the line of duty.
Issues:
1.WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee
upon a prisoner of war is not an offence under the penal code?
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the
military character sustained by the person charged with the
offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the
ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
Held
Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a
military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an
order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against
the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Civil Government. Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil
Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a
fine greater than $100may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have
jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal
Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military
character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within
the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was
indeed acting in the line of duty. Yes. Though assault by military
officer against a POW isnt in the RPC, physical assault charges
may be pressed under the RPC. No. The application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character brought
before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055).Appellant claims that the act
was service connected. If this were true, it may be used as a
defense but this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes
jurisdiction of the case.
6. Schneckenburger vs. Moran (63 Phil. 249)
Facts
Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at
Manila, was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of
falsification of a private document. He objected to this saying
that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no
jurisdiction to try him. After his objection was overruled, he filed
a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from
this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases affecting

23

ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively upon the


Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Issues:
1.WONthe US SC has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, consuls, et. Al and such jurisdiction excludes
courts of the Philippines.
2.WON original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Held
Has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of
prohibition must be denied. First of all, a consul is not entitled to
the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from
criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country
where here sides. The inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935 caused the Philippine
Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is
the supreme law of the land. It also provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, consuls et.al. The Supreme Court shall have
original and appellate jurisdictions may be possessed and
exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution. According to Section 17 of Act
Number 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo
warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus
was also conferred on the CFIs. As a result, the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not
exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFIs. The original
jurisdiction conferred to SC by the Constitution was not an
exclusive jurisdiction.
7. Liang vs. People (232 SCRA 652)
Facts
Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the
Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against her fellow worker w/ 2 counts of grave
oral defamation. MTC judge then received an office of protocol
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
agreement between ADB and the government. MTC judge,
without notice, dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution
filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MTC to
enforce the warrant of arrest.
Issues: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the
agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal cases were filed in court.
Held
He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a
crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot
blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the

24

DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a person


is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the
accused as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not
covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official
duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations,
commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the
contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation isnt a
matter of right in cases cognizable by the MTC such as the one at
bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may
be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on
criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is
required in cases falling within in the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesnt affect
the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective.
B. PROSPECTIVITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Articles 21 and 22, RPC
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. No felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
2. Article 4, New Civil Code - Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.
3. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons (37 SCRA 420)
Facts:Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May
5, 1953 to reclusion perpetual for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The
decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March
8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan.12,
1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more
than 13 years by virtue of their convictions. They now invoke
the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez that negated
such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down
until after their convictions have become final. In People v.
Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed
down until after their conviction shave become final. Since
Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that
could have been served against him, he is entitled to
freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

25

Issue: WON Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment


are proactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial
decisions favorable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively.
Held:Yes. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be
applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC,
which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual
criminal. CC also provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system.
Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal
protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted
for the same offense as they have, though their sentences
were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting
the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable
decision.
4. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami (35 SCRA 429)
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock,
non-profit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8
saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom
of expression and is an ex post facto law
Issues:
1.WON it violates three rights? No. Its set up to prevent
prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of
laws.2.WON it is an ex post facto law? No. Ex post facto law
defined: a. makes criminal an act done before law was
passed and punishes act innocent when done. b. aggravates
a crime, makes it greater than it was c. inflicts greater
punishment than the law prescribed when committed alters
legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less
or different tests e. assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
right which when done was lawful f. deprives a person
accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
Held
Petition denied. Constitutional act, Constitutional inhibition
refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts
committed after approval of law.
5. People vs. Ringor (320 SCRA 342)
Facts
The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen
entering Peoples Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw
the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting,
pulled his hair, & poked a knife at the latters throat. After,
leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun,
entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached
the victim from behind & shot him 6 times successively. The

26

defendant was later apprehended and caught in his


possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in
Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
firearm holder & that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put
up self-defense but he failed to prove Floridas unlawful
aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by
treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty
of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm
with a sentence of 17 to 20 yrs.
Issues
1. WON the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect
in1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable. No. At the
time of the commission of the crime the use of an
unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance
in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetual to death. Hence, RA
8294cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest
it becomes an ex post facto law.
2.WON RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years. Yes. In cases
where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for
the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866. It
is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no
longer as a separate offence. According to theA22 of RPC,
retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favorable to
the accused. Thus, insofar as it spares accused-appellant a
separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, RA
8294 has to be given retroactive application.
3.WON trial court erred in convicting accused of murder. No.
For
self-defense
to
prosper,
unlawful
aggression,
proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack
of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In
this case, defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The
statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was
inconsistent to the witness statement of the victim being in
a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the
requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the
first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no
basis.
4.WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for
murder which wasnt proven & that the alleged murder
committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the
offense is reclusion perpetual due to the absence of an
aggravating circumstance.Yes. In the absence of mitigating
or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as
described by A248 RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion
Perpetua has to be imposed in according to A63(2) RPC.

27

C. TERRITORIALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW


1. Article 2, RPC
Application of its provisions Except as provided in the
treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of
this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine
Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of
the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands; chan robles virtual
law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction
into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit
an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security
and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.
2. Article 1, 1987 Constitution
NATIONAL TERRITORY -The national territory comprises
the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of
the Philippines.
3. Article V, VFA
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to offenses committed within
the Philippines and punishable under the law of the
Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to
exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the
United States over United States personnel in the
Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over United States personnel with respect to offenses,
including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines,
punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under
the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over United States personnel with respect to offenses,
including offenses relating to the security of the United
States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but
not under the laws of the Philippines.

28

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of


this article, an offense relating to security means:
(1) Treason;
(2) Sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to
national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is
concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United
States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs
l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel
subject to the military law of the United States in relation to:
(1) Offenses solely against the property or security of the
United States or offenses solely against the property or
person of United States personnel; and
(2) Offenses arising out of any act or omission done in
performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the
authorities of the other government to waive their primary
right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States
military authorities to maintain good order and discipline
among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request
by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the
Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines
that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States
authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine
authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines
that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines
against United States personnel arises out of an act or
omission done in the performance of official duty, the
commander will issue a certificate setting forth such
determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the
appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases
where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty
certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine
authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities
at the highest levels may also present any information
bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall
take full account of the Philippine position. Where
appropriate, United States military authorities will take
disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty
cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the
actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not
exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the
other government as soon as possible.

29

(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States


shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which
both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States
have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the
authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall
assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in
the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who
are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify
Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United
States personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or
exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly
notify United States military authorities of the arrest or
detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom
the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately
reside with United States military authorities, if they so
request, from the commission of the offense until completion
of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities
shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities
and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial
proceedings relating to the offense with which the person
has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine
Government shall present its position to the United States
Government regarding custody, which the United States
Government shall take into full account. In the event
Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one
year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations
under this paragraph. The one year period will not include
the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will
not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures
are delayed because United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the
presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States
and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the
carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses and
shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses
and in the collection and production of evidence, including
seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects
connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in
accordance with the provisions of this article and have been
acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have
served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted
or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried
again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this
paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military
authorities from trying United States personnel for any

30

violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or


omission which constituted an offense for which they were
tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into
custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall
be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the
law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States
personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge
or charges made against them and to have reasonable time
to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to
cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their
own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly
by United States authorities, and to have such authorities
present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall
be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law,
excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of
United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material
assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in
Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be
subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious
courts.
4. US vs. Ah Sing (36 Phil. 978)
Facts
The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman
on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which
arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought 8 cans
of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship
and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon
to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu,
the authorities on making the search found the cans of
opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamers
engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of
the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He

31

did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug.
Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium into the
Philippine Islands has been proven?
Held
Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the
vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine
waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this
case, it is to be noted that 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any
person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should
be construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going
into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. The importation is not the making entry of
goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them
into the port, and the importation is complete before the
entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal
use is unlikely, judging from the size of the amount brought.
5. People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
Facts
Wong Cheng smoked opium while aboard merchant vessel
Changsa , anchored in Manila Bay 2.5 miles from shore.
Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships
in its territory?
Held
Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce
pernicious effects, which is against public order. It is also an
act of defiance of authority.
6. US vs. Look Chow, 18 Phil. 573
Facts: Mrs. Jacks and Milliron found sacks of contraband
substance opium on steamshipErrol on 18 August 1910 in,
around 11-12 am. 3 sacks were found containing 49, 80
packs, (4) packs each; total = 129 packs to be sold, 4 for
personal consumption. The 129 were supposedly going to be
sold in Mexico and Vera Cruz.
Issue: Was Look Chaw accountable, as he didnt bring down
the opium from the ship and did not intend to sell within
Philippines
Held: Yes; investigation showed that he did sell to a secret
service agent while in the port.
7. Miquiabas vs. Commanding General (80 Phil. 267)
Facts
Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the
US army in the Philippines who had been charged of
disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to
the US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US.
He was arrested and a General Court-Martial was appointed.

32

He was found guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a


sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed
within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
consent that the US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain
offenses committed within said portions of territory.
Issues:
1.
WON the offense has been committed within a US
base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case. No.
The Port of Manila Area where the offense was
committed is not w/in a US base for it is not names in
Annex A or B of AXXVI of the Military Base Agreement
(MBA) & is merely part of the temporary quarters
located w/in presented limits of the city of Manila.
Moreover, extended installations & temporary
quarters arent considered to have the same
jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases & are
governed by AXIII pars. 2 & 4. The offence at bar,
therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of military
courts.
2.
WON the offender is a member of the US armed
forces. No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not
considered as a member of the US armed forces.
Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a
civilian employee is in the service of the US Army
does not make him a member of the armed forces.
8. Extraterritorial Application
a. Article 2, RPC
Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code on
crime committed on board Philippine ship or airship refers
only to a situation where the Philippine ship or airship is
not within the territorial waters or atmosphere of a
foreign country. Otherwise, it is the foreign countrys
criminal law that will apply.
However, there are two situations where the foreign
country may not apply its criminal law even if a crime
was committed on board a vessel within its territorial
waters and these are:
(1) When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a
foreign country, because war vessels are part of the
sovereignty of the country to whose naval force they
belong;
(2) When the foreign country in whose territorial waters
the crime was committed adopts the French Rule, which
applies only to merchant vessels, except when the crime
committed affects the national security or public order of
such foreign country.
b. Forgery: Articles 163, 166 and 169, RPC
Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins.
Any person who makes, imports, or utters, false coins,

33

in connivance with counterfeiters, or importers, shall


suffer:
1. Prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and
a fine not to exceed P10,000 pesos, if the counterfeited
coin be silver coin of the Philippines or coin of the Central
Bank of the Philippines of ten centavo denomination or
above.
2. Prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not to exceed P2,000 pesos, if the
counterfeited coins be any of the minor coinage of the
Philippines or of the Central Bank of the Philippines below
ten-centavo denomination.
3. Prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P1,000 pesos, if the counterfeited coin be
currency of a foreign country.
Art. 166.Forging treasury or bank notes on other
documents payable to bearer; importing, and uttering
such false or forged notes and documents. The forging
or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or
other obligations and securities payable to bearer and the
importation and uttering in connivance with forgers or
importers of such false or forged obligations or notes,
shall be punished as follows:
1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a
fine not to exceed P10,000 pesos, if the document which
has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered, is an
obligations or security of the United States or of the
Philippines Islands.
2. The word "obligation or security of the United States
or of the Philippine Islands" shall be held to mean all
bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank notes,
fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or
drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of
the United States or of the Philippine Islands, and other
representatives of value, of whatever denomination,
which have been or may be issued under any act of the
Congress of the United States or of the Philippine
Legislature.
3.
By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine
not to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the falsified or altered
document is a circulating note issued by any banking
association duly authorized by law to issue the same.
4.
By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the falsified or counterfeited
document was issued by a foreign government.
5.
By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P2,000 pesos, when the forged or altered
document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign
bank duly authorized therefore.
Art. 169. How forgery is committed. The forgery
referred to in this section may be committed by any of
the following means:

34

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument,


payable to bearer or order mentioned therein, the
appearance of a true genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by
any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
therein.
c. Public Officers: Articles 171, 210-213, 216-221, RPC
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify
a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature
or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them; 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the
offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil status
of persons.
Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall
agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of this official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the
mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of
not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three
times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall
have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime,
and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same

35

penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said


act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium
period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such
gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised
was to make the public officer refrain from doing
something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift
and] not less than three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding
paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs
shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other
persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and
public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer
who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June
10, 1985).
Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. The same
penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except
those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed
upon any person who shall have made the offers or
promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the
preceding articles.
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or
a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with
regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or
the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to
public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement
with any interested party or speculator or make use of
any other scheme, to defraud the Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses,
fees and other imposts shall be guilty or any of the
following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly, or indirectly, the payment of
sums different from or larger than those authorized by
law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by
law, for any sum of money collected by him officially.

36

(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way


of payment or otherwise things or objects of a nature
different from that provided by law.
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the
provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied.
Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public
officer. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or a
fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon a public officer who directly or indirectly,
shall become interested in any contract or business in
which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provisions is applicable to experts, arbitrators and
private accountants who, in like manner, shall take part in
any contract or transaction connected with the estate or
property in appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which
they shall have acted, and to the guardians and
executors with respect to the property belonging to their
wards or estate.
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property;
Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and
a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be

37

prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds


or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts.
Any public officer, whether in the service or separated
therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is
required by law or regulation to render account to the
Insular Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to
do so for a period of two months after such accounts
should be rendered, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both.
Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render
accounts before leaving the country. Any public officer
who unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine
Islands without securing a certificate from the Insular
Auditor showing that his accounts have been finally
settled, shall be punished by arresto mayor, or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos or both.
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any
public officer who shall apply any public fund or property
under his administration to any public use other than for
which such fund or property were appropriated by law or
ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to
the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such
misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall
have resulted to the public service. In either case, the
offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has
resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent
of the sum misapplied.
Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or
property. Any public officer under obligation to make
payment from Government funds in his possession, who
shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by
arresto mayor and a fine from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum
which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being
ordered by competent authority to deliver any property in
his custody or under his administration, shall refuse to
make such delivery. The fine shall be graduated in such
case by the value of the thing, provided that it shall not
less than 50 pesos.
d. National Security: 114-122, RPC
e. RA 9372
III.

GENERAL
LIABILITY

PRINCIPLES

OF

FELONIES

AND

CRIMINAL

38

A. DEFINITION OF FELONY ART.3


Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but
also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Felony
A crime under the Revised Penal Code is referred to as a felony.
Do not use this term in reference to a violation of special law.
Offense
A crimes punished under a special law is called as statutory
offense.
Misdemeanor
A minor infraction of the law, such as a violation of an
ordinance, is referred to as a misdemeanor.
Crime
Whether the wrongdoing is punished under the Revised Penal
Code or under a special law, the generic word crime can be
used.
HOW A FELONY MAY ARISE
The term felony is limited only to violations of the Revised Penal
Code. When the crime is punishable under a special law you do
not refer to this as a felony. So whenever you encounter the
term felony, it is to be understood as referring to crimes under
the Revised Penal Code.
This is important because there are certain provisions in the
Revised Penal Code where the term felony is used, which
means that the provision is not extended to crimes under
special laws. A specific instance is found in Article 160 QuasiRecidivism, which reads:
A person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve
sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished under
the maximum period of the penalty.Note that the word "felony"
is used.

Dolo or culpa
However, It does not mean that if an act or omission is punished
under the Revised Penal Code, a felony is already committed. To
be considered a felony, it must also be done with dolo or culpa.
Under Article 3, there is dolo when there is deceit. This is no
longer true. At the time the Revised Penal Code was codified, the
term nearest to dolo was deceit. However, deceit means fraud,
and this is not the meaning of dolo.

39

Dolo is deliberate intent otherwise referred to as criminal intent,


and must be coupled with freedom of action and intelligence on
the part of the offender as to the act done by him.
The term, therefore, has three requisites on the part of the
offender:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Criminal intent;
Freedom of action; and
Intelligence.

If any of these is absent, there is no dolo. If there is no dolo, there


could be no intentional felony.
B. ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY ART. 3
1. Physical Element (Actus Reus)
a. Act

An act refers to any kind of body movement that


produces change in the outside world.

Any body movement tending to produce an effect


must be overt or external
Powell vs. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 Ct. 2145, 20
L.Ed. 2d. 1254
Facts
Powell was arrested and charged with being found in
a state on intoxication in a public place, in violation of
Texas Penal Code, Article 477 which says, Whoever shall
get drunk or found in a state of intoxication in any public
place, or at any private house expect his own shall be
fined not exceeding 100USD.
Contention of the state: chronic intoxication was not a
defense to be charged. The appellant has no defense
because he is legally sane and know the difference
between right and wrong.
Contention of the accused: he was afflicted with the
disease of chronic alcoholism that his appearance in
public while drunk is not in violation and therefore to
punish him criminally for that conduct would be cruel and
unusual, in violation of the 8th and 14th amendments of
the US constitution.
Held
Ruled as a matter of law that chronic alcoholism was
not a defense to the charge. The court found that Powell
was guilty and fined him.
Concurring opinion of Justice Black
Criminal law serves to punish a person who, in fact,
committed prescribed act, without regard to whether his
action was compelled by some irresponsible aspect of his
personality. The punishment can be clearly justified in
term of deterrence, isolation and treatment.

40

b. Omission

In action, the failure to perform a positive duty which


one is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the
doing or performance of an act.

Must be punishable by law.


a. Articles 4, 116, 137, 208, 223, 234 and 275 (2), RPC
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an
account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. Every person owing
allegiance to (the United States) the Government of
the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and
having knowledge of any conspiracy against them,
conceals or does not disclose and make known the
same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of
the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which
he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as
an accessory to the crime of treason.
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees.
The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon public officers or
employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all
the means in their power, or shall continue to
discharge the duties of their offices under the control
of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office
under them. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and
tolerance. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed
upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously
refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission
of offenses.
Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.
Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a
prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and temporary special disqualification in its
maximum period to perpetual special disqualification,
if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final
judgment to any penalty.ch
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive

41

shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a


detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance.
Art. 232. Disobedience to order of superior officers,
when said order was suspended by inferior officer.
Any public officer who, having for any reason
suspended the execution of the orders of his superiors,
shall disobey such superiors after the latter have
disapproved the suspension, shall suffer the penalties
of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and perpetual special disqualification.
Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and
abandonment of one's own victim. The penalty of
arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any
person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place
wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render
such assistance without detriment to himself, unless
such omission shall constitute a more serious
offense.ch
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to
another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured.
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child
under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver said child
to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take
him to a safe place.
b. PD 953 and 1153
PD 953- requiring the planting of trees in certain
places
and
penalizing
unauthorized
cutting,
destruction, damaging, and injuring of certain trees,
plants and vegetation.
PD 1153- requiring the planting of one tree every
month for 5 consecutive years by every citizen of the
Philippines.
1. People vs. Sylvestre, 56 Phil. 353
Facts
While Nicolas Dela cruz and his wife, Antonia
de la cruz, were gathered together with the
appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told
the couple to take their furniture out the house
because he is going to set it on fire. Upon asked
why, he answered that it was the only way he could
be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he
said, had instigated the charge of adultery against
his co-defendant Sylvestre. No one dare to say
anything because he was armed with a pistol, not
even Romana Sylvestre. Alarmed of what Atienza
said, the couple left the house to communicate with
the barrio lieutenants, but they had hardly gone a
hundred arms length, turned back and saw their
house on fire. The fire destroyed 28 other houses.

42

Contention of the state: Romana Sylvestre is an


accomplice because she cooperated.
Contention of the accused: Romanas mere
presence and silence while they simultaneously act
do not constitute cooperation fir it does not appear
that she encouraged or nerved Atienza to commit
the crime of arson and as for her failure to give
alarm that being a subsequent act it does not make
her liable as an accomplice.
Held
Mere passive presence at the scene of another
crime, mere silence and failure to give alarm
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy is not
punishable. Only omissions in the revised penal
code are punishable.
2. People vs. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19
Facts
Bernardo Bagabog was murdered in his own house
by Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, Bides, and Teresa
Domogma, his alleged wife (whome cannot be charged
of parricide because no certificate or proof of marriage
could could be presented by the prosecution).
Contention of the state: the worn statement of a 13
year old Corazon was true. She knew the accused
because they live nearby their place. Besides the
accused-appellants testimonies are indefensible and
futile. Moreover her claimed that she had no suspect in
mind during the investigation in their house although
she was in conspiracy with the other.
Contention of the accused: theres no law which
punishes someone by saying you can call for help and
I will kill you.
Held
In these premise, the crime committed by the
appellant, that is murder, qualified by treachery and
attended by aggravating circumstances, the court has
no alternative under the law but to impose upon them
the capital penalty. Teresa was found guilty as an
accessory to the same murder by concealing the
escape of the principal in the scene, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 5
years prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of
prision mayor as maximum with accessory penalty of
the law.
2. Mental Element (Mens Rea)
Mens rea
The technical term mens rea is sometimes referred to in
common parlance as the gravamen of the offense. To a
layman, that is what you call the bullseye of the crime.

43

This term is used synonymously with criminal or deliberate


intent, but that is not exactly correct.
Mens rea of the crime depends upon the elements of the
crime. You can only detect the mens rea of a crime by
knowing the particular crime committed. Without reference
to a particular crime, this term is meaningless.
For
example, in theft, the mens rea is the taking of the property
of another with intent to gain. In falsification, the mens rea
is the effecting of the forgery with intent to pervert the truth.
It is not merely writing something that is not true; the intent
to pervert the truth must follow the performance of the act.
In criminal law, we sometimes have to consider the crime on
the basis of intent. For example, attempted or frustrated
homicide is distinguished from physical injuries only by the
intent to kill. Attempted rape is distinguished from acts of
lasciviousness by the intent to have sexual intercourse. In
robbery, the mens rea is the taking of the property of
another coupled with the employment of intimidation or
violence upon persons or things; remove the employment of
force or intimidation and it is not robbery anymore.
a. Deliberate Intent (Dolo)
Deliberate Intent is not deceit. Do not use deceit in
translating dolo, because the nearest translation is
deliberate intent.
i.

ii.

Elements
Freedom- voluntariness on the part of a person it
commit an act or omission.
Intelligence-the capacity to know and understand the
consequence of the act.
Intent- the purpose to use a particular means to
achieve an objective.
General and Specific Intent
i. In criminal law, intent is categorized into two:
(1)
(2)

General criminal intent; and


Specific criminal intent.

General intent is presumed from the mere doing of a


wrong act. This does not require proof. The burden is
upon the wrong doer to prove that he acted without
such criminal intent.
Specific intent is not presumed because it is an
ingredient or element of a crime, like intent to kill in
the
crimes
of
attempted
or
frustrated
homicide/parricide/murder. The prosecution has the
burden of proving the same.
Distinction between intent and discernment

44

Intent is the determination to do a certain thing, an


aim or purpose of the mind. It is the design to resolve
or determination by which a person acts.
On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity
to tell right from wrong. It relates to the moral
significance that a person ascribes to his act and
relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo,
distinct from intent.
Distinction between negligence and imprudence
(1)
In negligence, there is deficiency of action;
(2)
In imprudence, there is deficiency
perception.

of

a. People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85


Facts
8 Sep. 1970 around 2pm Ernesto Puno entered the bedroom of
72 y.o. Francisca Col also known as Aling Kikay, in Little Bagio,
barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling Kikay was on the bed, when
Puno entered & insulted her by saying Mangkukulam ka,
mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog. Then, he repeatedly
slapped her and struck her on the head several times with a
hammer until she was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria
dela Cruz who was present in the room during the attack, and by
Lina Pajes, a tenant in the next room. After killing the old lady
Puno went into the next room, where the girls had taken refuge &
made the following confession & threat Huag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin nunyo na umalis
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda. Or according to Lina pinatay ko na ang iyong
matanda. Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng
pulis, kayo ang pahihigantihan ko. After Puno left, Lina called the
police. Puno fled to his parents house then later on to his second
cousin, Teotimos house.
10 Sep. 1970 Punos father surrendered him to the police. He
was brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong,
Rizal. He was charged with murder in the municipal court.
Punos wife, his sister in law and his 2nd cousin all testified in
court describing his appearance [bloodshot eyes] and his behavior
immediately before and after them murder, [boxing the dog,
having an imaginary bumble bee flying around him, singing, etc..]
The defense presented 3 doctors to prove insanity but the
doctors instead proved that Puno had acted with discernment
when he killed Aling Kikay.
Dr. Araceli Maravilla of Dr. Jose Reyes Memorial hospital said
Puno was an outpatient who could very well live with society even
if he was afflicted with schizophrenic reaction.

45

Dr. Reynaldo Robles stated that Puno had schizophrenic


reaction but that this condition was not socially incapacitating.
Dr. Carlso Vicente of the National Mental Hospital testified that
Puno acted w/ discernment & could distinguish right from wrong.
21 October 1970 Puno was indicted for the murder in the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as
aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of
superiority and disregard for sex. Puno was sentenced to death
and ordered to pay P22K to the heirs of the victim
Issue: WON Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay.
Held
No. Record from Punos stay at the National Mental Hospital
stated that he had been an outpatient for schizophrenia in 1962,
recovered, had a relapse in 1964, improved and in 1966 his
sickness remained UNIMPROVED. Treatment continued in San
Lazaro Compound up to 1970 where he was relieved of symptoms
and did not come back for medication. It cited that he was quiet
and as usual manageable. The report stated that he is presently
free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms, but
persons suffering from schizophrenia may retain some of the
residual symptoms but it wouldnt affect their discernment of right
and wrong.
The court says: in the light of the strict rule just stated and
the circumstance surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed, the
victim The court cited that had he been a homicidal maniac he
would have killed Lina and Hilaria too. The evidence should prove
clearly that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived
of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
a complete absence of the power to discern, or total deprivation of
freedom of wilt. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
Two aggravating circumstances, dwelling and disregard of the
respect due to the age of the victim are offset by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and the offenders mental
illness (mild schizophrenic reaction) which diminished him of his
will power but did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts.
iii.

Mistake of Fact
When an offender acted out of a misapprehension of fact, it
cannot be said that he acted with criminal intent. Thus, in
criminal law, there is a mistake of fact. When the offender acted
out of a mistake of fact, criminal intent is negated, so do not
presume that the act was done with criminal intent. This is
absolutory if crime involved dolo.
Mistake of fact would be relevant only when the felony would
have been intentional or through dolo, but not when the felony is
a result of culpa. When the felony is a product of culpa, do not
discuss mistake of fact. When the felonious act is the product of
dolo and the accused claimed to have acted out of mistake of fact,

46

there should be no culpa in determining the real facts, otherwise,


he is still criminally liable, although he acted out of a mistake of
fact. Mistake of fact is only a defense in intentional felony but
never in culpable felony.
a. U.S. s. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488
Facts
Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad
elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in
his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to
bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He
called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing
that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called
out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise
moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against
the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a
kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned
out to be his roommate. He was found guilty and sentenced to 6
years and 1 day.
Contention of the accused: he admitted that he killed his
roommate but admitted that he struck the fatal blow without
intent to do a wrongful act in the exercise of hid lawful right to
self-defense. There is an innocent mistake of fact..
Held
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would
have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the
RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of
Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part
of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of
Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would
have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such
aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under A11
of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in
the act of the person making the defense. Thus, he must be
acquitted.
b. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
Facts
Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were
under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and
escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on
seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door,
simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first
making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned
out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal.
Held
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was

47

sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the


law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the
fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of law who
are trying to capture him that killing him would be justified. Thus,
both accused are guilty of murder
iv.

Malum Prohibitum exception to the requirement of mens rea,


criminal intent is not important. These are wrong crimes because
they prohibited by special laws and are punished by it.
DISTINCTION OF MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in
se, which literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or
per se wrongful. On the other hand, violations of special laws are
generally referred to as malum prohibitum.
Note, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala
prohibita. While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does
not follow that prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are
always mala prohibita. Even if the crime is punished under a
special law, if the act punished is one which is inherently wrong,
the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good faith and the lack of
criminal intent is a valid defense; unless it is the product of
criminal negligence or culpa.
Likewise when the special laws requires that the punished act be
committed knowingly and willfully, criminal intent is required to be
proved before criminal liability may arise.
When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, it is wrong only
because a law punishes the same.
For example, Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes piracy in
Philippine waters and the special law punishing brigandage in the
highways. These acts are inherently wrong and although they are
punished under special law, the acts themselves are mala in se;
thus, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense.
Distinction between crimes punished under the Revised Penal
Code and crimes punished under special laws
1.

As to moral trait of the offender

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the moral trait
of the offender is considered. This is why liability would only arise
when there is dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable
act.
In crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the
offender is not considered; it is enough that the prohibited act was
voluntarily done.
2.

As to use of good faith as defense

48

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, good faith or


lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless the crime is the
result of culpa
In crimes punished under special laws, good faith is not a defense
3.

As to degree of accomplishment of the crime

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the degree of


accomplishment of the crime is taken into account in punishing
the offender; thus, there are attempted, frustrated, and
consummated stages in the commission of the crime.
In crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a
crime only when it is consummated; there are no attempted or
frustrated stages, unless the special law expressly penalize the
mere attempt or frustration of the crime.
4.

As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, mitigating and


aggravating circumstances are taken into account in imposing the
penalty since the moral trait of the offender is considered.
In crimes punished under special laws, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are not taken into account in imposing the penalty.
5.

As to degree of participation

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, when there is


more than one offender, the degree of participation of each in the
commission of the crime is taken into account in imposing the
penalty; thus, offenders are classified as principal, accomplice and
accessory.
In crimes punished under special laws, the degree of participation
of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the
prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no
principal or accomplice or accessory to consider.
Test to determine if violation of special law is malum prohibitum or
malum in se
Analyze the violation:
Is it wrong because there is a law
prohibiting it or punishing it as such? If you remove the law, will
the act still be wrong?
If the wording of the law punishing the crime uses the word
willfully, then malice must be proven. Where malice is a factor,
good faith is a defense.
In violation of special law, the act constituting the crime is a
prohibited act. Therefore culpa is not a basis of liability, unless
the special law punishes an omission.

49

When given a problem, take note if the crime is a violation of the


Revised Penal Code or a special law.
a. Padilla vs. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127
Facts
On August 6, 1987, commissioner of custom, Alexander Padilla
filed a complaint against Baltazar Dizon, RTC Judge rendered a
manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross
incomplete and gross ignorance of the law in criminal case. Lo Chi
Fai was caught by the custom guard at the NAI while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of
the country. He was apprehended by the guard on July 1996.
Contention of the accused: he is not liable for violation of
which is a special law for lack of intention. Accused Lo Chi
no willful intention to violate the law. A Judge cannot be
account or answer criminally, civilly, administratively
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.

BC 960
Fai had
held to
for an

Held
Proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws which are mala prohibita. In
requiring proof of malice, the judge has by his gross ignorance
allowed the accused to go free. Added to this, he directed in his
decision to release to the accused of at least the amount of USD
3000 allowed according to him under CBC 965.
The SC found Judge Dizon guilty of gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting
his integrity and efficiency. He was ordered to be dismissed from
the service.
b. Magno vs. CA, 210 SCRA 475
Facts
Oriel Magno was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of BP 22 and was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment in each crime
case.
Contention of the accused: he questioned mala prohibita which
the RTC relied their ruling without regard to the circumstance.
Contention of the state: there was a violation of BP 22 for mere
issuance of bouncing checks.
Held
Even if mere issuance of a bouncing check does not constitutes
violation of BP 22, Magno is not liable for in the first place, he
informed the spouse that the check were not funded.
c. Griffith vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 94
Facts
Griffith was convicted for the violation of BP 22 and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment for a period 6 counts in each count.
Contention of the accused: he relied on the ruling of magno vs. ca
where the court laid the doctrine that a conviction under BP22
cannot be based on an irreversible application of the elements of

50

knowledge. He points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge


through a note that the checks were unfunded at the time of their
issuance that good faith in his part negate any intent to put
worthless checks.
Held
While we agree with the private respondent that the violation of
BP22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the applicable of the law is
consistent with the purpose and reason for the law ratione cessat
lex, et cessat lex. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life. This is so in this case where a debtor
criminalization would not serve the ends for justice but subvert it.
d. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394
Facts
During the period from June 1998 to January 2001, Joseph
Estrada unlawfully and criminally amass and accumulate indirectly
or directly, ill gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,163.17, unjustly enriching himself at the expense
damage of people of the Philippines, any or combination or a
series or overt or criminal acts, similar schemes or means.
Contention of the accused: plunder as defined in RA 7080 is
malum prohibition and thus, Estrada should not be punished for
the crime of plunder as one since the accumulation of his illgotten wealth was done in a series of acts, he should be punished
for one act not including the other with no criminal intent.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because it is a heinous offense. For
when the acts are inherently immoral or wrong, they are mala in
se and it does not matter that such acts are punished under
special laws especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mala in se.
v.

Distinguished from Motive


Intent is demonstrated by the use of a particular means to
bring about a desired result it is not a state of mind or a reason
for committing a crime.
On the other hand, motive implies motion. It is the moving
power which impels one to do an act. When there is motive in the
commission of a crime, it always comes before the intent. But a
crime may be committed without motive.
If the crime is intentional, it cannot be committed without
intent. Intent is manifested by the instrument used by the
offender. The specific criminal intent becomes material if the
crime is to be distinguished from the attempted or frustrated
stage. For example, a husband came home and found his wife in
a pleasant conversation with a former suitor. Thereupon, he got a
knife. The moving force is jealousy. The intent is the resort to the
knife, so that means he is desirous to kill the former suitor. Even if
the offender states that he had no reason to kill the victim, this is

51

not criminal intent. Criminal intent is the means resorted to by


him that brought about the killing. If we equate intent as a state
of mind, many would escape criminal liability.
In a case where mother and son were living in the same
house, and the son got angry and strangled his mother, the son,
when prosecuted for parricide, raised the defense that he had no
intent to kill his mother. It was held that criminal intent applies on
the strangulation of the vital part of the body. Criminal intent is on
the basis of the act, not on the basis if what the offender says.
Look into motive to determine the proper crime which can
be imputed to the accused. If a judge was killed, determine if the
killing has any relation to the official functions of the judge in
which case the crime would be direct assault complexed with
murder/homicide, not the other way around. If it has no relation,
the crime is simply homicide or murder.
Omission is the inaction, the failure to perform a positive
duty which he is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the
doing or performing of an act.
People vs. Temblor (161 SCRA 623)
Facts
On 30 December 1980, Vicente Temblor alias Ronald went
to Julius Cagampangs house to buy cigarettes. Cagampang, while
opening a pack of cigarettes, was shot. The accused (and another
person, Anecito Ellevera) demanded Victorina Cagampang (Julius
wife) that she brings out her husbands firearms. The accused
fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Victorina gave a suitcase
to Temblor, who then took the .38 caliber which was inside, and
fled.
In August 1981, Temblor, an NPA, surrendered (it was actually
a mass surrender of NPAs) after hiding in the mountains. In 26
November 1981, he was arrested by Buenavista police at the
public market and then detained at municipal jail. Regarding the
murder of Cagampang, Temblors alibi was that day until the next;
he was with his father for drinking and pulutan. On 8 June 1982,
the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpertua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P12, 000. He
appealed.
Contention of the accused: In this appeal, the appellant alleges
that the court a quo erred: (1) in finding that he was positively
identified by the prosecution witness as the killer, and (2) in
rejecting his defense of alibi.
Held
The accused is guilty of murder. Judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in all respects and civil indemnity increased to P30K. It
was proven that he had motive in killing Cagampang: he had
knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm; this was motive
enough to kill him, as part of NPAs agaw armas campaign or
killings perpetrated by NPA for the purpose of acquiring more
firearms. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the
culprit has been positively identified. Also, his flight implies guilt.

52

The prosecution witness, Victorina Cagampang, may have


minor inconsistencies in her testimony but this does not diminish
her credibility that is part of being human? What is important is
that she had positively identified the accused as the assailant and
that her testimony is corroborated by other witnesses.
Furthermore, the accuseds alibi was unacceptable because it was
self-serving and uncorroborated. It cannot overrule positive
identification, it was merely 15-20 minutes away from crime scene
and Perol was at work.
People vs. Hassan (157 SCRA 261)
Facts
Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old was convicted of murder of Pichel.
Pichel was stabbed to death while waiting his friend Jose Samson
who was buying fruits.
Contention of the accused: the ruling was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt that he must, therefore, be set free. The
prosecutions evidence was weak and unconvincing that he is not
of legal age on that time of commission of crime. There was a
total absence of motive.
Held
Lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal note
toward his acquittal. This is especially true when there is doubt as
to identity of culprit as when the identification is extremely
denvous in this case.
People vs. Delim (January 29, 2003)
Facts
Marlon, Leon & Ronald Delim were convicted for murder of
Modesto Delim. Modesto is the adopted child of Marlons Dad.
Marlon, Manuel and Robert are brothers and Leon and Ronald are
their nephews. Around 6:30 pm, January 23, 1999, Modesto and
family were preparing to eat dinner when Marlon, Robert and
Ronald arrived. Marlon poked gun, other two grabbed, hog tied
and gagged Modesto. They herded him out of the hose and went
to the direction of Paldit. Leon and Manual guarded Rita & Randy
until 7 am and told them to stay put. They searched for him for 3
days and reported to police three days after the incident. Randy
with relatives found Modesto in the housing project in Paldit under
bushes. He was dead due to gunshot wound on head.
Contention of the accused: no motive since the prosecution failed
to prove motive on the part of the accused to kill Modesto. They
are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but not
kidnapping.
Contention of the state: the sudden disappearance of the accused
from their house is a strong circumstantial of their guilt,
admissible evidence against them if it tends to show that they in
fact killed the victim.
Held
The accused were found guilty. He was identified therefore,
motive is not important. They were sentenced from 10 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum.

53

b. Constructive Intent (Culpa) Art. 3 and Art. 365


Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a
light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal
to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall
be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of
the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The
penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot
to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
i.Elements

Freedom
Intelligence

54


Negligence- deficiency of perception to avoid a
foreseeable damage

Imprudence- lack of foresight, failure to take necessary


precaution.
People vs. Carmen (355 SCRA 267)
Facts
The trial court rendered a decision and the accusedappellants were all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder after having performed a cultic healing pray-over
which resulted to the death of Randy Luntayao. They were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Contention of the accused: the accused has no intention to cause
an evil but rather a remedy on the victims illness. She was just
performing her duty as faith healer. The court should not convict
them of murder rather it must be reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide.
Held
Intent is not important. The strange procedure resulted to the
death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent
to kill Randy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide not murder.
Accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide & are each sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of 4 mos. of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years & 2 mos. of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly &
severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the
amount of P50K, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P30K.
Madeja vs. Caro (126 SCRA 293)
Facts
Dr. Eva Japson is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
Contention of the accused: no motive and intent. The instant civil
action may be instituted only after final judgment has been
rendered.
Contention of the state: Carmen Maceja, wife of the deceased
alleged that her husband died because of group negligence of Dr.
Japso. She filed a separate civil action for damages.
Held
The petition is granted. It is apparent that the civil action
against Dr. Japson may proceed independently to the criminal suit
against her. Death due to negligent act may be delict or quasidelict. It may create a civil action based on Article 100 of RPC,
criminal liability of a person guilty of felony- every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, also as stated in
Article 2176 of the civil code.
ii.
iii.

Imprudence or Lack of Skill a deficiency of action


Negligence or Lack of Foresight indicates a deficiency of
perception

55

People vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439


Facts
May 19,1982, after midnight during the town fiesta in the public
plaza, pugay, Samson, and several companions and they
appeared to be drunk. As the group saw Miranda (25 years old
retardate), they started making fun of him. They made him dance
by buckling him a piece of wood. Not contented in what they are
doing, Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
ferries wheel and poured it on the body of Miranda. Then Samson
set Miranda on fire which caused his death.
Contention of the state: gabions straight forward, positive, and
convincing testimonies remain unaffected by the uncorroborated,
self-serving and unreliable testimonies of Pugay and Samson.
Contention of the accused: Pugay poured a can of gasoline
believing that the content was water and doesnt have intention to
kill Miranda. Samson merely intended to burn the victims clothes
that it was not his intention to kill him.
Held
A criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act had done be different from what
was intended. Pugay can only be convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence because of his failure to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that maybe committed by his companion at
the time they were making fun at Miranda.
iv.

Distinguished from Dolo - the requisites of criminal intent, which is


required in dolo replaced the requisites of imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill committed by means of
culpa.
People vs. Buan (22 SCRA 1383)
Facts: Charges moved to quash on the ground that he had
alreadybeen acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the
Peace Court.
Issue: WON second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy
forthe same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
Held: Yes. Order appealed from is reversed and the CFI of Bulacan
isdirected to quash & dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No.
5243,no costs. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
recklessimprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that sameact. The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal
negligence underRPC A365 lies in the execution of an imprudent
or negligent act that,if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The lawpenalizes the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. Thegravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determinethe penalty; it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. As thecarelessness of the act is single, whether the
injurious result shouldaffect one person or several persons, the
offense remains one andthe same. It cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.

56

The exoneration of appellant by the Municipal Court of the


charged ofslight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents hisbeing prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
recklessimprudence in the CFI of the province where both charges
arederived from the consequence of one and the same
vehicularaccident. The second accusation places the appellant in
the secondjeopardy for the same offense.
c. Transferred Intent Art. 4, Par. 1 (El que de la cause del
mal causado)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
Criminal liability
Since in Article 3, a felony is an act or omission punishable by law,
particularly the Revised Penal Code, it follows that whoever
commits a felony incurs criminal liability. In paragraph 1 of Article
4, the law uses the word felony, that whoever commits a felony
incurs criminal liability. A felony may arise not only when it is
intended, but also when it is the product of criminal negligence.
What makes paragraph 1 of Article 4 confusing is the addition of
the qualifier although the wrongful act be different from what he
intended.
Proximate cause
Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the
proximate cause of the resulting felony. It must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the felonious act.
Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion other
causes and which unbroken by any efficient supervening cause
produces a felony without which such felony could not have
resulted. He who is the cause of the cause is the evil of the cause.
As a general rule, the offender is criminally liable for all the
consequences of his felonious act, although not intended, if the
felonious act is the proximate cause of the felony or resulting
felony. A proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause.
This may be a cause which is far and remote from the
consequence which sets into motion other causes which resulted
in the felony.
Wrongful act done be different from what was intended
What makes the first paragraph of Article 4 confusing is the
qualification although the wrongful act done be different from
what was intended. There are three situations contemplated
under paragraph 1 of Article 4:
(1)
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow;
(2)
Error in personae or mistake in identity; and
(3)
Praeter intentionem or where the consequence exceeded
the intention.
i.Aberratio ictus
In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended
victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody
else. In aberratio ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual
victim is both at the scene of the crime.

57

Distinguish this from error in personae, where the victim


actually received the blow, but he was mistaken for another who
was not at the scene of the crime. The distinction is important
because the legal effects are not the same.
In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon the
intended victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed on
somebody else. You have a complex crime, unless the resulting
consequence is not a grave or less grave felony. You have a single
act as against the intended victim and also giving rise to another
felony as against the actual victim. To be more specific, let us
take for example A and B. A and B are enemies. As soon as A saw
B at a distance, A shot at B. However, because of poor aim, it was
not B who was hit but C. You can readily see that there is only one
single act the act of firing at B. In so far as B is concerned, the
crime at least is attempted homicide or attempted murder, as the
case may be, if there is any qualifying circumstance. As far as the
third party C is concerned, if C were killed, crime is homicide. If C
was only wounded, the crime is only physical injuries. You cannot
have attempted or frustrated homicide or murder as far as C is
concerned, because as far as C is concern, there is no intent to
kill. As far as that other victim is concerned, only physical injuries
serious or less serious or slight.
If the resulting physical injuries were only slight, then you
cannot complex; you will have one prosecution for the attempted
homicide or murder, and another prosecution for slight physical
injuries for the innocent party. But if the innocent party was
seriously injured or less seriously injured, then you have another
grave or less grave felony resulting from the same act which gave
rise to attempted homicide or murder against B; hence, a complex
crime.
In other words, aberratio ictus, generally gives rise to a
complex crime. This being so, the penalty for the more serious
crime is imposed in the maximum period. This is the legal effect.
The only time when a complex crime may not result in aberratio
ictus is when one of the resulting felonies is a light felony.
People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela
(Barrela) and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who
were the injured parties, as the information filed against him
provided. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against
him, but was later found after duly admitting his intention to kill
the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and was sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for
the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple
frustrated murder of President Roxas and company.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of
the said crime.
Ruling
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused
guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act

58

of Guillen was not fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of
the stage, preventing him from fulfilling his act of assassinating
the President. Therefore, Guillen is not guilty of the crime of
multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of multiple attempted
murder.
ii.

Error in personae
In error in personae, the intended victim was not at the
scene of the crime. It was the actual victim upon whom the blow
was directed, but he was not really the intended victim. There
was really a mistake in identity.
This is very important because Article 49 applies only in a
case of error in personae and not in a case of abberatio ictus.
In Article 49, when the crime intended is more serious than
the crime actually committed or vice-versa, whichever crime
carries the lesser penalty, that penalty will be the one imposed.
But it will be imposed in the maximum period. For instance, the
offender intended to commit homicide, but what was actually
committed with parricide because the person he killed by mistake
was somebody related to him within the degree of relationship in
parricide. In such a case, the offender will be charged with
parricide, but the penalty that would be imposed will be that of
homicide. This is because under Article 49, the penalty for the
lesser crime will be the one imposed, whatever crime the offender
is prosecuted under. In any event, the offender is prosecuted for
the crime committed not for the crime intended.
How does error in personae affect criminal liability of the
offender?
Error in personae is mitigating if the crime committed is
different from that which was intended. If the crime committed is
the same as that which was intended, error in personae does not
affect the criminal liability of the offender.
In mistake of identity, if the crime committed was the same
as the crime intended, but on a different victim, error in persona
does not affect the criminal liability of the offender. But if the
crime committed was different from the crime intended, Article 49
will apply and the penalty for the lesser crime will be applied. In a
way, mistake in identity is a mitigating circumstance where Article
49 applies. Where the crime intended is more serious than the
crime committed, the error in persona is not a mitigating
circumstance
People vs. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751
The Case: Beronga, Sabalones, Cabanero and Alegarbe
wereconvicted of 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated
murder ofGlenn Tiempo, Alfred Nardo, Rey Bolo, Rogelio Presores
and Nelson Tiempo. A shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in
Manuela Compound,Talisay Cebu led to these deaths.
Issues:
1. WON prosecution witnesses and evidence are credible
Yes.
RTC
findings
were
binding
to
court
with
appreciatedtestimonies of two witnesses. There was positive

59

identificationby survivors who saw them when they peered during


lulls ingunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of
carsheadlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing
becausethe conviction was based on positive identification. It is
binding,though, to the co-accused because it is used as
circumstancialevidence corroborated by one witness. The
inconsistencies areminor and inconsequential which strengthen
credibility oftestimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus (mistake in
blow),mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity
applies,more proper to use error in personae
2. WON alibis acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled
bypositive identification. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
3. WON correct penalty imposed?
No. Under RPC A248, the imposable penalty is reclusiontemporal,
in
its
maximum
period
to
death.
There
being
noaggravating/mitigating
circumstance,
aside
from
the
qualifyingcircumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly
imposedreclusion perpetua for murder. The CA however erred
incomputing the penalty for each of the three counts of
frustratedmurder. Under RPC A50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is thenext lower in degree than that prescribed by law for
theconsummated felony xxx. Because there are no aggravating
ormitigating circumstance as the CA itself held, the
penaltyprescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period.
iii.

Praeter intentionem Art. 13, Par. 3


A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he
has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of
this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible,
the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the
preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of
his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and
education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
Praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularly covered by
paragraph 3 of Article 13. In order however, that the situation
may qualify as praeter intentionem, there must be a notable
disparity between the means employed and the resulting felony. If
there is no disparity between the means employed by the offender
and the resulting felony, this circumstance cannot be availed of. It
cannot be a case of praeter intentionem because the intention of
a person is determined from the means resorted to by him in
committing the crime.
People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150
Facts
Albuquerque is a 55 year old, widower with children. He, together
with his unmarried children lived with the family of her daughter,
Maria. He has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time,
walks dragging from partial paralysis with one leg and has
controlled the movement of his right arm.

60

When one of his child Pillar got pregnant, he confronted the


father of the child Mr. Manuel Obma to marry Pillar. Upon the
latters refusal, Albuquerque brought out a knife intending only to
wound Obma on the face that would leave a permanent scar.
Since he had no control on his right hand, the knife landed on the
base of the neck inflicting a fatal wound causing his death.
Held
Albuquerque is criminally liable because according to article 49
of RPC, liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done was different from that
which intended.
C. LIABILITY FOR INCOMPLETE ELEMENTS
1. Impossible Crime Art. 4, Par. 2
By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Paragraph 2 refers to a situation where the wrongful
act done did not constitute any felony, but because the act
would have given rise to a crime against persons or against
property, the same is penalized to repress criminal
tendencies to curtail their frequency.
Because criminal
liability for impossible crime presupposes that no felony
resulted from the wrongful act done, the penalty is fixed at
arresto mayor or a fine from P200.00 to P500.00, depending
on the social danger and degree of criminality shown by the
offender (Article 59), regardless of whether the wrongful
act was an impossible crime against persons or against
property.
An impossible crime is an act which would be an
offense against person or property were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Under Article 4, paragraph 2, impossible crime is true
only when the crime committed would have been against
person or against property. It is, therefore, important to
know what are the crimes under Title VIII, against persons
and those against property under Title X. An impossible
crime is true only to any of those crimes.
a. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
Facts
Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land
dispute. They fired at her room. However, she was in another city
then thus they hit no one.
Contention of the accused: they should only be liable for
impossible crime and not attempted murder. Bernardines absence
from her room made the crime inherently impossible for its
accomplishment.
Held
In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible
crimean act which, were it not aimed at something quite

61

impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate


would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is
to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1) legal
responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility
would apply to those circumstances where:
(1)
The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law;
(2)
There is no intention to perform the physical act;
(3)
There is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4)
The consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of
intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be
invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
******In the Intod case, the wrongful acts of the culprits caused
destruction to the house of the intended victim; this felonious act
negates the idea of an impossible crime. But whether we agree or
not, the Supreme Court has spoken, we have to respect its ruling.
b. People vs. Saladino, 89 Phil. 807
Facts
Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his
13-yr old niece. Taking into account the qualifying circumstance of
the minority of the victim and her relationship to accusedappellant, the lower court meted three (3) death penalties
pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court also found accused-appellant
guilty of attempted rape, and sentenced him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum asminimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as
maximum.
Contention of the state: Saladino committed the crime of rape that
is now against a person under RA8353.
Contention of the accused: Saladino claimed that on the alleged
rape, he was drunk.
Held:The court found Saladino guilty of 3 counts of simple rape
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetual for each
count.

62

2. Uncompleted Crimes
a. Attempted Felonies - when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident, other than his own
spontaneous acts.
i.Article 6, RPC
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary
for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than this own spontaneous desistance.
ii.

People vs. Campuhan (March 30, 2000)


Facts
Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four year old Crysthel
Pamintuan. Campuhan was caught by childs mother on April 25,
1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of
Corazons brother was allegedly kneeling in front of the child with
both their pants downa dn child was crying ayoko, ayoko while
Primo forced his penis into childs vagina.
Held: Modified to attempted rape
1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight
penetration is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external
genitalia considered when its an essential part of penetration not
just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia majora
must be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober)
2. Attempted no penetration or didnt reach labia/mere grazing
of surface
3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mothers testimony
questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo and
child. They failed to establish how she could have seen actual
contact in her position
4.
Mans instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have
stayed or to satisfy his lust even when he saw the victims mother.
5.
Child denied penetration occurred

iii.

People vs. Lopez (312 SCRA 684; 1999)


Facts
Federico Lopez was accused of killing Rogelio Saldera & Rodolfo
Padapat & frustrated murder of Mario Seldera. They work in a
farmland in Nancalabaasan, Umingan, Pangasinan. On their way
home on Nov. 15, 1991 at around 9 pm they were met by Lopez &
another guy. There were in trail beside Banila river. Lopez had a
shot gun & shot 3. Thinking they were dead, he left. Mario
survived and identified Lopez.
Held

63

Lopez was guilty of double murder and 1 count of attempted


murder. Under article 48, a complex crime is committed only when
a single act constitute 2 or more grave or less grave felony. In this
case, the victims were successively shot by the accused, each
shot necessarily constitute only one act. The accused Lopez, thus,
be held liable for 3 separate crimes.
iv.

v.

People vs. Lizada (G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)


Facts
Freedie Lizada was accused of raping his step daughter Analia
Orilloso in four instances in their house in Tondo, Manila, sometime
in August 1998, on or about Nov. 5, 1998, on or about Oct. 22,
1998 and on or about September 15, 1998. Physical examination
showed no extragenital physical injuries. Hymen intact.
Held
Attempted rape only:
1.
No proof of introduction of penis into pudendum of childs
vagina
2.
Not act of lasciviousness,
3.
RPC Art. 6 attempted is based on 4 elements (reyes)
4.
Not preparatory (devise means or measure to accomplish
desired end). Attempt should be equivocal. No need to complete
all acts, just needs to start act w/ causal relation to intended
crime.
5.
Acts must be directly related to consummation of act and
ascertainable from facts.
6.
Accused had intended to have carnal knowledge of
complainant. Acts not preparatory, he commenced execution but
failed to finish due to presence of 3rd party, not spontaneous
desistance.
People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424
Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of
thejudgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of
parricide - she allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero,
using ahunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had
adaughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the
husband'sgambling and drinking and there were times when he
maltreatedand abused his wife. After more than a year,
Franciscoabandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling
withher friends and when she was on her way home she met
herhusband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused
herof going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her,
heldher by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed
hertowards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her
and proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a
knifetucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist
soshe wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife
andthrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just
abovethe thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the
stabwound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The
nextday, she surrendered herself to the police along with the
torndress that she wore the night before.
Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted
inlegitimate self-defense
Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted

64

Ratio:
1.Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In
thiscase, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms
thatthe said victim, the husband, was the aggressor.With her
husband kneeling over her and choking her,accused had no other
choice but to pull the knife tucked inhis belt line and thrust it into
his side.The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the
knifewas drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of
thetestimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of
theincident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to
lungethe knife into husband's left side.
2.Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present:
Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the
ground then choking her just because she wasout caroling at
night constitutes unlawful aggression, Therewas imminent
danger of injury.Reasonable necessity of means employed. While
beingchoked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take
holdof the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order
toprotect herself. Reasonable necessity does not dependupon the
harm done but on the imminent danger of suchinjury.
Lack of sufficient provocation: provocation is sufficientwhen
proportionate to the aggression. In this case, therewas no
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused(Cunigunda) to
warrant the attack of her husband. All thatshe did to provoke an
imaginary commission of a wrong inthe mind of her husband was
to be out caroling at night.
b. Frustrated Felonies
a. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
(Article 6, Revised Penal Code)
Elements
i) Offender performs all the acts of execution
ii) All the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence
iii) The felony is not produced by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
People vs. Mison, 194 SCRA 432
Facts
Mison stabbed Lelith Dagohoy and her niece Luciana at the
formers store which resulted to Lucianas death after 24 hours
in the hospital due to blood inspection while Lileth was
released 5 days after being treated.
Held
Lileth was in fact released in the hospital after 5 days.
Even so, the assaults upon her constituted frustrated murder,
her relative quick recovery being the result of prompt medical
attention which prevented the infection in the wound from
reaching fatal proportions which would otherwise has ensued.
People vs. Erina, 50 Phil. 998

65

Facts
Julian Eria charged of raping 3 yrs & 11 mo. old
Doubt on whether actual penetration occurred. Physical
showed slight inflammation of exterior parts of
indicating effort to enter vagina. Mom found childs
covered with sticky substance

child.
exam
organ
organ

Held
Frustrated only
1.
Possible for mans organ to enter labia of a 3 years and
8 months old child.
2.
No conclusive evidence of penetration so give accused
benefit of the doubt. Frustrated only.
D. LIABILITY FOR CRIMES WITH COMPLETE ELEMENTS
1. Article 6, RPC
Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present;
and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.
2. Relate to Articles 134 and 134-A, RPC
3. People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 105
Facts
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina
arrived at her boarding house from a party. She knocked at a
door, then all of a sudden, somebody held her, and poked a
knife at her neck. She then recognized Orita who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded to release her but he ordered her to go
upstairs with him. With his left arm wrapped around her
neck, he dragged her upstairs. He commanded her to look
for a room, still the knife poked around her neck. Then they
entered Cristinas room. With one hand holding the knife,
Orita undressed himself and ordered her to undress too.
Scared, she did undress. He ordered her to lie down on the
floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
inserted in her vagina. In his position, Orita cannot fully
penetrate her as she keeps on moving. Then he again
ordered her to lie down as he mounted on her back, with
this, only a small part of his penis was inserted in her
vagina. However, Cristine escaped and dashed out to the
next room. Orita pursued her so she ran again to the nest
room and jumped out through a window. Still naked, she
went to the municipal building and a policeman rescued her.

66

Contention of the accused: He should only be guilty of


frustrated rape since no penetration happened. Since only a
small part of his penis was inserted into the victims vagina.
Contention of the state: Perfect penetration is not essential.
Any penetration of the female organ is sufficient to charge
the accused of consummated rape.
Held
The rape was consummated from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of the victim, since by it, he
attained his objectives. All elements of the offense to do so,
having performed all the acts necessary to produce the
crime and accomplish it.
The entry of the penis to the labia of the vagina, even
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina was
sufficient to warrant conviction of consummated rape.
4. People vs. Sanchez (250 SCRA 14)
Facts
On the evening of December 14, 1989, Gladys was left
alone in their apartment. While she was lying in bed,
Sanchez entered the room. He grabbed her and covered her
mouth. Then and there, he succeeded in inserting his penis
into Gladys vagina. She didnt tell anyone about the
incident, afraid that her mother would get angry and hit her.
On December 21, 1989, while Gladys was again alone
watching TV, Sanchez forced her to have sexual intercourse
with him. As before, she didnt report the incident. On
January 2, 1990,while Gladys was inside the toilet, Sanchez
entered, pinned her against the wall and he satisfied his
sexual desire again. Again, Gladys did not report it to
anyone. But on May 22, 1990, her sister Marites saw her
slap Sanchez and asked her why she did that. Then that was
the time he told her about her ordeal.
Contention of the accused: He capitalizes on the fact that
the medico legal report by Dr. Cenido showed no laceration
of the hymen of Gladys. He contends that the three incidents
of penetration, if true, could not have failed to produce
lacerations of the hymen.
Contention of the state: Sanchez committed three counts of
rape. The victim even saw Sanchez penis and thought that it
was big and it was inserted into her private part and felt
pain. The pain could be nothing but the penetration to
sufficient to contribute the crime.
Held
Even if there was no laceration of the hymen, this fact
doesnt necessarily mean that there was no rape because
lacerations heal within ten days. A broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. The mere introduction of the
penis into the labia of the vagina is sufficient for the crime to
be consummated. And the credibility of Gladys was proven.

67

She described in detail how she had been sexually abused


and is accorded with high respect.
5. People vs. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671
Facts
On April 12, 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused
Bienvenido Salvilla, Reynaldo Canasares, Ronaldo canasares
and Simplido Canasares conspiring and confederating
among them, working together and helping one another,
armed with guns and hand grenade, entered the compound
of New Iloilo Lumber Company. With the use of violence and
intimidation to Severino Choco, owner, Mary Choco and
Minnie, Rodita Gablero (employee). The accused took and
carried away, with intent to gain cash, in the amount of
P200,000.00, two mens wrist watch, one lady Seiko quartz
wrist watch and one lady wrist watch and assorted jewelries.
All valued P50,000.00 on that occasion. Then his two
daughters and Rodita were hostaged for claim of
P100,000.00 but they could not release money because
banks were closed. The manyor offered P 50,000.00 and the
accused agreed to receive and release Rodita. Ultimatum
was given. Finally, the police and military decided to break
the offensive assault. This resulted to injuries of Mary Choco
and Minnie.
Contention of the state: the crime was consummated when
they acquired robberies of the properties, the moment they
possession of the things, unlawful taking is complete. While
it is claimed that they intended to surrender, they did not,
despite several opportunities to speak out. The accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention. And
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Contention of the accused: The crime should be
consummated because having the same was only
attempted. They claim that the voluntary surrender is a
mitigating circumstance. The crime of robbery has 3 stages:
1. Giving, 2. Taking, 3. Carrying away or asportation. And
without asportation, thje crime committed is only attempted
Held
The elements of the offense of serious illegal detention were
present in the case. The victims were illegally deprived of
their liberty. It follows that as the detention in this case was
not merely incidental to the robbery but necessary means
employed to facilitate it. the penalty imposed by the TC is
proper.
6. People vs. Dalisay, 408 SCRA 375
Facts
On about Sept. 26, 1996 at Batangas, Ruben Dalisay, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay and had carnal knowledge
with Lanie, below 12 years old, against her will and consent.
Lanie furthermore testified that Ruben had sexually abused

68

her since she was in grade 3, or in 1994. Seventeen times in


estimation.
Contention of the state: a rape victims testimony is entitled
to great weight especially when she accuses her own father
or a close relative for having ravished her. Rupture of hymen
or laceration of the vagina is not essential. Entrance or mere
penetration of the male organ within the labia of the female
organ is sufficient. Dalisay is guilty of statutory rape, and
imposing upon him death penalty.
Contention of the accused: Dalisay claimed that the TC
erred: 1. In giving full weight and credibility oto the
compliants testimony. 2. In failing to appreciate the expert
testimony of the medico legal in favour of the appellant
finding out that the victims hymen is intact
Held
Among other contentions, such findings as to Lanies age is
erroneous since it is based solely on Lanies testimony that
she was 11y/o when her father raped her on 9/26/96.
Nonetheless, Dalisay, should be convicted of simple rape
under Article 335 (1) of the RPC, pay the victim with P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000
for exemplary damages.
7. People vs. Nequia, 412 SCR 628
Facts
At 7am of 1/23/99, in Oton, Iloilo, Helena, mistress of
Nequia, left their house to collect to customers accounts.
Nequia and his mother Linda, and John Gil (son of Helena),
were left in the house. At about 9 am, Mary Ghel (daughter
of Helena), who was 12 arrived at the house and asked
Nequia to make a flower vase for her project and the latter
agreed.
At noontime, he ordered them to sleep at the second
floor. Momentarily, Nequia went to the 2nd floor, forcibly
held Mary Ghels hands and placed them behind her. Nequia
hit her at her buttocks with his hands and placed a pillow on
her face to prevent her from shouting or making any noise.
Rape was consummated. The pain Mary Ghel felt in her
vagina made her loud cry. Alarmed, the accused dressed up
Mary Ghel and hurriedly went down. Lola Linda went up and
inquired but Mary Ghel was afraid to tell.
Contention of the accused: the accused contends that the TC
gravely erred in convicting the accused of the crime of
consummated rape despite of certainty of commission.
Accused also contends that the insertion of his 4th finger to
the private complainants vagina does not constitute rape
under the anti-rape law. He agrees that the insertion of the
human finger into the victims vagina is excluded in Senate
Bill No 950 and House Bill No. 6265. He also contends that
there was no evidence proving that he threatened the victim
with physical harm.

69

Contention of the state: the state contends that mere


insertion of an object to the vagina against her will
consummates the crime of rape. The state also contends
that the threats of physical harm on the part of the victim is
not indispensible element in the crime of rape. For rape to
be consummated, it is enough that the victim is intimidated
or forced into submitting into the beastial lust of the accused
Held
The accused is guilty of consummated rape because
all the elements were present: a. to force, threat of
intimidation; b. when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
In the light of all the foregoing, the decision of the RTC
is affirmed with modifications and that the accused is
ordered to pay Mary Ghel the amount of P75,000 for moral
damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
8. Light Felonies Punishable Only When Consummated Art. 7
and Art. 9, par. 3
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable Light
felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exemption of those committed
against persons or property.
Article 9 (3). Light felonies are those infractions of law for
the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding P200 or both, is provided.
E. COMMON LIABILITY FOR CONSPIRATORS ART. 8
1. Implied Conspiracy:
Art 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable
only in the cases in which the law specially provides a
penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exist when 2 or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person who
has decided to commit the crime.
Implied Conspiracy act of one is the act of all
Holds two or more persons participating in the
commission of the crime collectively liable as conspirators
although absent any agreement to that effect, when they act
in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a
common purpose of objective.
Two ways for conspiracy to exist:
(1)
There is an agreement.
(2)
The participants acted in concert or simultaneously
which is indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a
common criminal goal or criminal objective. When several
offenders act in a synchronized, coordinated manner, the

70

fact that their acts complimented each other is indicative of


the meeting of the minds. There is an implied agreement.
Two kinds of conspiracy:
(1)
Conspiracy as a crime; and
(2)
Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability
When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary
to bring about the criminal liability. The mere conspiracy is
the crime itself. This is only true when the law expressly
punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy
does not bring about the commission of the crime because
conspiracy is not an overt act but a mere preparatory act.
Treason, rebellion, sedition, and coup detat are the only
crimes where the conspiracy and proposal to commit to
them are punishable.
People vs. Liad, 355 SCRA 11
Facts
Lydia Cuenca was driving her tamaraw FX when 3
men flagged down her vehicle but when the former refused
to open the car; they fired 2 successive shots at the
windshield. Hitting Lydia Cuenca which caused her death.
Her husband Manuel Cuenca with his employee Lary
Buseron were following Lydia when this incident happened
so they saw the faces of the 3 men accosted his wife. The 3
men were later identified as Edgardo Valderama and
Liberato Quintoa also known as Baeng.When the policemen
were on the act to arrest them they exchanged fire with the
policemen and Baeng was killed.After which Edgardo liad
and Jun Villarama were apprehended.
Contention of the accused: They tried to established that the
crime was committed only by the deceased, Liberato
Quintoa, Edgardo Liad denied that have conspired with
Liberato Quintoa in committing the crime. Jun villarama also
claimed that there is no evidence that will prove that they
planned the execution of the crime together.
He just banged the door, and not involved in the killing he is
guilty of conspiracy of robbery, not in killing.
Held
Supreme court ruled that in conspiracy, direct proof of a
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated from the acts of the accused
themselves without such point to a joint purpose and
designed concerted actions and community interest.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during or after.
2. People vs. Gonzales-Flores, 356 SCRA 460
Facts
Gonzales-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment
as seamen three different people at the same time and
collecting money from them without the necessary license.

71

The complainants filed a complaint after they tried to followup their applications and nothing happened for three months
and they found out from the POEA that the accused wasnt
licensed. The evidence consisted of the complainants
testimonies and testimonies of other witnesses. Accused
now argues that the Court didnt have enough evidence to
convict her.
ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the
accused.
HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegal
recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in
acts of recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the
accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused
commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. All the conditions are present. The
evidence shows that she could do something to get their
applications approved. Accused contends that all she did
was to refer the complaints but the Labor Code, recruitment
includes referral which is defined as the act of passing
along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial
interview of a selected application for employment or a
selected employer, placement after initial interview of a
selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer, or bureau. Also she did more than just
make referrals, she actively and directly enlisted
complainants for employment aboard, when promising jobs
as seamen, and collected money.
3. People vs. De Leon, 350 SCRA 460
Facts
Accused-appellant was charge and convicted of several
counts of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.
Held
Guilty. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not
necessary for the information to allege the exact date and
the time of the commission of the crime is such is not an
essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the
date of the commission is not an essential element. The
delay in reporting the crime committed can also be
attributed to the tender age of the victim and the moral
ascendancy of the accused over the victim. Oftentimes, a
rape victims actions are moved by fear rather than by
reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to report
the crime immediately is not indicative of fabrication. Also,
victims are not expected to recall the exact and accurate
account of their traumatic experiences. However, accused
cannot be sentenced to death because the information
against him failed to allege victims minority and her
relationship to the accused. RA 7659 enumerates the
circumstances that justify the imposition of the death
penalty. Consistent with the accuseds right to be informed

72

of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,


these circumstances must be specifically pleaded or alleged
with certainty in the information and proven during the trial.
Accused is guilty only of simple rape and sentenced only to
reclusion perpetua on each count of rape.
4. People vs. Elijorde (306 SCRA 188)
Facts
Elijorde and Punzalan charged with murder of Eric
Hierro. Altercation began when Hierro told Meneses not to
touch him cause his clothes will get dirty. Fist fight occurred.
Hierro hid. After 30 mins he went out to go home but was
attacked again & stabbed to death.
Held
No. Punzalan acquitted. Elijorde guilty. In People v. Lugaw, conspiracy should be proven through clear and
convincing evidence. In People v. De Roxas, it is established
that it must be proven that he performed overt act to pursue
completely. Visbal testified that only Elijorde chased Hierro.
Punzalans only participation was kicking which does not
prove that he might have known Elijordes evil design or
intent to kill. In People v. Agapinay, there was no proof that
the accused knew about the deadly weapon and that it was
to be used to stab victim. In the case at bar, Punzalan
desisted from acts of aggression and did nothing to assist
Elijorde in committing murder.
5. People vs. Sanchez , 308 SCRA 264
Facts
Appellants Antonio Sanchez, the mayor of Calauan,
Laguna, Averion, Peradillas and Corcolon were found guilty
of the complex crime of double murder for the killing of
Nelson Pealosa and his son, Rickson. The aggravating
circumstances of conspiracy, evident premeditation, and
conspiracy were appreciated. The shooting was carried out
upon the order of former Mayor Sanchez, using armalites in
automatic firing mode. Witnesses say that three bursts of
gunfire were heard.
Issue: Whether the court was correct in convicting the
accused of the complex crime of double murder.
Held: Three bursts of gunfire were heard. Although each
burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the
trigger, in view of its specialmechanism, the person firing it
has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it
would fire continuously. Hence, it is not the act of pressing
the trigger which should be considered as producing the
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them. Thus the accused are liable for as many
offenses resulting from pressing the trigger. They are liable
for two counts of murder and not the complex crime of
double murder.
6. People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640
Facts

73

Arthur Pangilian, Arnolf Lopez and Reynalso Yambot


were found guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
illegal possession of firearms and imposing upon each of
them the supreme penalty of death and a prison term of 6
yrs and 1 day to 8 yrs. On the other hand, Antonio Hamton
was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 yrs of prision correccional
to 8 years of prision mayor.
Held
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention
(Art. 267, RPC). The court agreed with the TC that they were
guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
However, they cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms since there was another crime
kidnapping for ransomwhich they were committing at the
same time.
Interpreting Sec. 1, P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, the SC has consistenly ruled that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of any other crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms.
Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. Since the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant, no other
interpretation is justified. Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of 2 separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide.
Moreover, since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime
was committed by the person arrested. The law does not
distinguish or refer only to homicide and murder.
Hence, the Court set aside judgment convicting them
of illegal possession of firearms.
7. People vs. Asuela (376 SCRA 51)
8. People vs. Hamton (395 SCRA 156)
9. People vs. Baldogo (396 SCRA 31)
Facts: Baldogo was convicted for the death of Jorge and for
kidnapping the laters sister Julie.
Held
There is conspiracy. The prosecution adduced that Baldogo
conspired with Bernas not only in killing Jorge but also in
kidnapping and detaining Julie. As long as all conspirators
performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate common purpose
or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all
conspirators are criminally liable for the death of the victim.
10. People vs. Abut (401 SCRA 498)
Facts

74

In the evening of September 19, 1997, Winchester,


Richie and Gregmar went into the store of Rudy Galarpe and
had a drinking spree. In the store were Rudys employees:
Maricar Perez and her boyfriend Edgar Galarpe, Rosie
Pabela and her boyfriend Al Cailing. Rosie had been
Winchesters boyfriend before Al Cailing.
2:00 a.m. the following day, the employees decided to
have a stroll in the park and thereby seated at the benches.
After a few minutes, the three accused arrived at the park.
Wiznchester told Maricar that he wanted to be acquainted
with Edgar. After the handshake, Winchester boxed Edgar
who eventually fell to the ground. The accused ganged up
on Edgar and Ritchie struck him with broken bottles of red
horse beer. The three continued the assault on the victim
and stabbed him. Afraid that he would be the next victim, Al
fled from the park towards the nationalhighway. When he
heard the girls shout, he returned to the park and together
flaggeddown a truck which transported Edgar to the
hospital. Unfortunately, Edgar was already dead on arrival at
the hospital.
Held
Treachery was not alleged in the information; hence, it
should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in
the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order that
treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
it must be shown that: a.) the malefactor employed means,
method or manner of execution affording the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and b.) the means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The
second is the subjective element of treachery. Treachery
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
conclusively as the killing itself. In the absence of any
convincing proof that the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the means by which they committed
the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must
resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the
mode or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the appellants when they stabbed
the victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the victim. The
appellants and Ritchie then mauled and kicked the victim.
There is no evidence that at the outset, they had decided to
stab and kill the victim. It was only at the late stage of the
assault that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the victim.
The Court believes that after ganging up on and mauling the
victim, the appellants, at the spur-of-the moment, decided to
stab the victim. Thus, the subjective element of treachery
was not present.

75

11. People vs. Pagalasan, 404 SCRA 275


Facts
The residence of George and Desiree Lim was ransacked
by 4 unknown men. They overpowered Ferdinand Cortez, the
security guard, and housemaid Julita Sarno and got their
cash and valuables then kidnapped George and son
Christopher.
Held
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt that Michael, in conspiracy with 3 others, kidnapped
George and son for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Conspiracy maybe inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime
showing that they have acted the common purpose and
design. He is found guilty of kidnapping under article 267(4)
of RPC.
12. People vs. Tilos, 349 SCRA
Facts
Tilos and Mahinay simultaneously attacked and
assaulted Narciso, a sickly 60 years old man who suffered
stroke. The act was witnessed by the victims daughter,
geralyn. Tolentino died 2 days later from hematoma.
Held
There was no conspiracy. Conspiracy needs not be
proven by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the
accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime. The accused were guilty of murder, however it was
reserved and only guilty of slight physical injuries.
13. People vs. Hilario, 354 SCR 354
Facts
One quiet evening, Carlos Reyes, while relaxing with
hisfriend Berong in front of a store, he was subjected to a
treacherous assault by Rodolfo and Rodrigo Hilario and their
cumpadre. Rodrigo was the one who furnished the weapons
and acted as a look-out; their cumpadre suddenly stabbed
Carlos with the ice pick, simultaneously saying, Ito ba?.
Rodolfo standing one-arm length from the victim acted as a
back-up man, and uttered, Walang makikialam! After the
stabbing, all of them ran away together. It turned out the
three mistakenly bent their terror on Carlos the one they
really planned to kill was Berong. Together, they were
indicted for the crime of murder. Their cumpadre, however,
remains unidentified.
Defense:
Rodlofo Hillarion contends that they have no intention
to kill Carlos. Moreover, it was only Rodrigo and their
cumpadre who stabbed Carlos, and he only acted as a look
out/ back up man, thus, he is not liable for the crime
charged. State:
The evidence sufficiently demonstrates the existence
of conspiracy in the execution of the crime. Thus, all their

76

acts tend to manifest a common purpose and devise. The


familiar rule in conspiracy is that when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible,
when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others,
done in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a conspiracy, every
act of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or
purpose, is in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the
act of all. Hence, all the three accused are liable as
principals for the death of the victim Carlos Reyes.
Ruling:
The accused is found GUILTY of MURDER qualified by
treachery. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
14. People vs. Biong, 372 SCRA 34
Facts
April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija:
Armed men entered the house of spouses Luisito and
Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 & jewelry.
Subsequently, they also took the spouses car and forcibly
boarded Priscilla along with them. They headed towards
Manila, and along the way Priscilla recognized the one of the
kidnappers, who then was driving the car. They told her
that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later
on left her at Paxton Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers
having convinced themselves that the kidnapping did not
materialize.
On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which
led the police authorities to the detention and investigation
of accused Vergel Bustamante at the WPD in Manila. He was
later identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when they
kidnapped her.
HELD
1) Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and
include the correct name of Dan Saksak as Vergel
Bustamante is not without basis. Records of the criminal
case forwarded by the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the
judge of the latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan Saksak
was one & the same person (di sinabi sa case kung bakit
kasali yung MTC dito. Apparently, it conducted a preliminary
examination):
a) A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in
Crim Case Nos. 186-80 & 192-80 was directed to one Vergel
Bustamante alias Dan Saksak.
b) In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of
the City Jail of Manila informed the Clerk of Court of the MTC
of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @ Dan Saksak said to
be one of the accused is not included in the list of present
Inmates of said Jail
c)
The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a
prima facie case against the accused therein also stated that
one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak

77

d) The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to


the RTC of NE stated that one of the accused therein, Vergel
Bustamante aka Dan Saksak is detained at the Manila City
Jail
2) In any event, the issue cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal . The issue is one affecting jurisdiction over the
person and should have been raised before the RTC in a
motion to quash the information. Since the defendantappellant failed to do so, he is deemed to have waived his
objection to the information.
15. People vs. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321
Facts
While Lorna, Vanely and others walking going home
from a pre-nuptial dance, when they were escorted and
forced to follow by Caraang and Canlas who were armed and
wear bonnets. They sexually abused them but threatened to
kill them if they will inform anyone about the incident after
they are released.
Held
The act of one is the act of all and each of them will
thereby be deemed guilty of all the crimes committed. All of
them performed special acts with such closeness and
coordination as to include common purpose or design to
commit the crime.
16. Liability:
Once crime was established, all the conspirators are
criminally liable as principals regardless of the degree of
participation of each of them for in the contemplation of the
law. the act of one is the act of all.
a. People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424
Facts:Cunigunda
Boholst
Caballero
seeks
reversal
of
thejudgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of
parricideshe allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero,
using ahunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had
adaughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the
husband'sgambling and drinking and there were times when he
maltreatedand abused his wife. After more than a year,
Franciscoabandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling
withher friends and when she was on her way home she met
herhusband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused
herof going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her,
heldher by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed
hertowards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her
andproceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a
knifetucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist
soshe wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife
andthrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just
abovethe thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the
stabwound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The
nextday, she surrendered herself to the police along with the
torndress that she wore the night before.

78

Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted


inlegitimate self-defense
Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted
Ratio:
1.Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In
thiscase, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms
thatthe said victim, the husband, was the aggressor.With her
husband kneeling over her and choking her,accused had no other
choice but to pull the knife tucked inhis belt line and thrust it into
his side.The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the
knifewas drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of
thetestimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of
theincident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to
lungethe knife into husband's left side.
2.Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are presentUnlawful
aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground
then choking her just because she wasout caroling at night
constitutes unlawful aggression, Therewas imminent danger of
injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed. While beingchoked,
Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take holdof the knife and
plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself.
Reasonable necessity does not dependupon the harm done but
on the imminent danger of suchinjury.
Lack of sufficient provocation: provocation is sufficientwhen
proportionate to the aggression. In this case, therewas no
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused(Cunigunda) to
warrant the attack of her husband. All thatshe did to provoke an
imaginary commission of a wrong inthe mind of her husband was
to be out caroling at night.
b. People vs. Givera, 349 SCRA 513
Facts
Givera was sentenced to death for stabbing Eusebio Gordon.
Contention of the accused: givera claimed that he was merely
trying to pacify the victim and Maximo and ran away because the
victims son, armed with bolo, and charged at him.
Held
In conspiracy, it is necessary that all participants performed
specific acts designed to bring about the death of the victim.
Givera is guilty of the crime murder as he himself dealt the death
blow that sent Eusebio to his grave.
c. People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528
Facts
In a chapel located at Barrio Macalong, La Paz, Tarlac, a
pabasa was being held. It was held on the evening of April 10l
1933, between 11 and 12 oclock. Procopio Reyes, Hermogenes
Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castro Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived
at the place.They were carrying bolos and crowbars and started
to construct barbed wire fence in front of the chapelAlfonso
Castillo, chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa,
tried to stop them from carrying out their plan and reminded
them that it was holy week.The people attending the pabasa
noticed the verbal altercation, and they became curious and

79

excited of whats happening that they left the place hurriedly to


have a look.Dishes and saucers and benches that were used in
the pabasa were toppled over.The pabasa was discontinued and
was not resumed until after an investigation condceted by the
chief of police on the following morning.The accused persons are
partisans of the Clemente Family. Apparently, the land on which
the old chapel was erected was informally donated by the
Clemente Family. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was
erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel
is impinging the land that belongs to the Clemente Family.
Appellants were convicted of a violation of Art. 133 of the
Revised Penal Code: Offending the religious feelings.
Held
They are guilty of violating article 287 of the RPC: unjust
vexation.It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal
Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful."The construction of a fence, even though irritating and
vexatious under thecircumstances to those present, is not such
an act as can be designated as"notoriously offensive to the
faithful". The act would be a matter of complete indifference to
those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind they
might be.The fence was constructed late at night and in such a
way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to
celebrate the pabasa.Therefore, the court ruled that the
appellants are therefore acquitted of aviolation of article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code but found guilty of aviolation of article
287 of the Revised Penal Code.
d. People vs. Almazan, 349 SCRA 281
Facts
Artemio was struck on the head with a bolo by his wife, Amparos
nephew, Jerito Almazan. Artemio then turned around and was
stabbed by Jaime Almazan, the younger brother which caused his
death. Antonio was trying to help his father but he was struck
with a bolo on the face and left hand by Danilo Villegas.
Held
There
was
no
aggravating
circumstance
of
evident
premeditation. Indeed, there is no evidence showing the time
when accused appellants determined to commit the crime, acts
manifestly indicating that they had clung to their determination,
and a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow them opportunity to reflect upon the
consequences of their acts and to allow their conscience to
overcome the resolution of their will.
e. People vs. Patano, 399 SCRA 90
Facts
The accused kidnapped Vicente Uy for ransom worth 10 million
first but the final bidding was at 5 million.
Contention of the accused: the RTC erred grossly in convicting
the accused without being identified as the abductions. The RTC
erred in convicted them solely on the basis of the tone and
uncorroborated testimony of the co-conspirators.
Held

80

James Patano was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to


prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There was never any
positive identification made. No conspiracy because mere
knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as party to a conspiracy. The mere
presence of Patano at the resort after the commission of the
crime does not comply conspiracy.
f. People vs. Gonzales, 357 SCRA 460
Facts
Inside the publishing house, Joselito saw Teodoro Gonzales and
Enrico Soriano. They were known to Joselito for Enrico was a
former classmate. At around 1 am Joselito noticed that they were
no longer around.
while Joselito, Froilan and Rolando were walking home, Teodoro
suddenly appeared from the direction of Bibig ng kabataan St.
armed with a pen of knife. teodoro attacked Rolando hitting him
at the middle portion of the chest. teodoro made a second
attackon Rolando which eroded by the later. Joselito and Rolando
survived the fatal wounds.
Held
Teodoro Gonzales was convicted of murder and 2 counts of
frustrated murder. Enrico Soriano was acquitted because mere
knowledge or approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one party to
conspiracy.
g. People vs. Natividad, 411 SCRA 587
17.
Extent of Liability:
a. People vs. Escote, 400 SCRA 603
Facts: On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo
Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing
Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City
to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was
Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some
passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded
the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.
who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets.2
Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the middle
row of the passengers' seats, while Victor stood by the door in
the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger,
SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at
the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City.
Tucked on his waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number
769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view
mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop
the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking
vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was
attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery
when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and

81

unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,


depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may
also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger
to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the
time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the
victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the
right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one
on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right
iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first
disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded
for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He
was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was
on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead,
he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for
his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter
inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
b. People vs. Binarao, 414 SCRA 177
c. People vs. Vicente, 372 SCRA 765
Crime: Muder
Held: after the commission of the crime, Vicente immediately
placed himself to the police station. Under Sec 388 of Local govt.
code for posses of the RPC, kagawad is a person in authority Art
63 provides that the lesser of the 2 indivisible penalties shall be
imposed there being a mC attending the commission of the
crime.
d. People vs. Pabillare, 418 SCRA 104
e. People vs. Bisda, 406 SCRA 454
Held: The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the
spouses William and Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim.
The trial court did not award any moral and exemplary damages
to the victim. The decision of the trial court has to be modified.
Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and
detention. In this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim
as they took her from the school. The appellants also tied her
hands, and placed scotch tape on her mouth. The hapless victim
was so shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF barged into the
office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that she
cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and
psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award
of moral damages in the amount of P300,000.[104] Since there
were demands for ransom, not to mention the use by the
appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim from the school to
the Jollibee Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda, the
victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.[105] Although the victim claims that the appellants
took her earrings, the prosecution failed to prove the value of the
same.
F. LIABILITY FOR MULTIPLE, COMPLEX, AND CONTINUING
CRIMES
1. Art. 9, pars. 1 &2 and Art. 48

82

2. People vs. Sanchez, 313 SCRA 254


Facts: M14 rifle. Mayor Jorge Areda of Bugney, Cagayan
arrived at Octagon Cockpit Arena for a sponsored cock
derby. He was assisted by peace officers and the cockpit was
assigned with guards to maintain peace and order. At
around 10pm, Mario Tabaco seated at the lower portion of
the arena, without warning and provocation shot the mayor
followed the successive burst of gunfire resulting to the
death of the mayor and the two other seated with him.
Mario rushed of the cockpit arena meeting Sgt. Raquepo
and Pat. Retreta and the former pointed the gun to Raquepo
prompting Retreta to grapple fo the possession of the gun. In
the process, the gun went of hitting Raquepoon his leg and
Jorge Siriban who died on the spot.
Contention of the state: There should be 4 penalties of R.P.
as there were 4 victims killed.
Contention of the accused: It is a complex, crime, hence,
there should be only one penalty. Only one criminal impulse
by pressing the trigger once.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the state.
The court declared that it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the
no. of bullets which actually produced them. Hence, where
the accused pressed the trigger of a submachine gun and
the gun fired continually and several persons were killed or
injured, there are as many crimes as persons killed or
injured.
3. People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Facts: Amado Hernandez, bung the founder and President of
Congress of Labor Organization (CLO) and a communist by
principle was charged with the crime of REBELLION. The
information alleged that on several speeches conducted by
him, Hernandez expressed his strong discontent with the
gout and his support for the fight of communist party of the
Phil. The trial court found him guilty as principal of the
charges and sentenced him to a penalty of Reclusion
perpetua with its accessories provided by law and to pay the
proportionate amount of the costs.
Contention of the State: He was guilty of rebellion because
he was a member f the communist party that through his
speeches he aroused the labor class to rebel against the
gout and providing the needed supply and clothes.
Contention of the accused: He was a mere communist by
ideology and was not part of the conspiracy to overthrow
Zuirino government. He did not actually participated in the
rebellion or any act of conspiracy to commit or faster the
cause of the rebellion.
He merely plays the role of propagation by lecture, meetings
and organizations of committees of education by
communists.

83

Ruling: Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of


the crime of rebellion, as a means necessary for the
perpetration of the offense. Such offenses are absorbed or
inherent in the crime of rebellion. In as much as the act
specified in art. 135 constitute one single crime, it follows
that said acts offer no occasion for the application of act. 48,
which requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.
4. People vs. Ducay, 225 Phil. 1
G. LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL LAWS
1. Article 10, RPC
a. Padilla vs. Dizon (158 SCRA 127; 1988)
b. Padilla vs. CA (269 SCRA 402)
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He
was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon
arrest following high powered firearms were found in his
possession:
1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and
run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of
firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found
guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of
Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court
of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of
other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment
praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his
arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest
of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since

84

he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all


those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable
lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
- Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a)
prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which
police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence
inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c)
evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo:
objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found
in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
- Search of moving vehicle
- Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under
section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by
exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within
arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by
arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at
the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a
reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under
a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms
and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a
valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during
trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven
by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of
the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under
suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent
courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt
is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5,
1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in
the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of
Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission
order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short
firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987
Constitution

85

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in


applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a nonsubversive context and adds that respondent court should have
applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms
since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21
years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive
in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court
and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at
the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until
its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for
simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple
possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants
erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto
make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute
in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not
convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court.
Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal
possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the
Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That
question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them.
The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and
apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA
sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED
EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10
yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the
penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said
code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period
should be applied.
c. People vs. Simon (234 SCRA 555; 1994)
Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken
from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by
degrees of determining the proper period should be applied.
IV.

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE


A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 11)

86

1. SELF-DEFENSE;
DEFENSE
OF
RELATIVES
AND
STRANGERS; DEFENSE OF PROPERTY; DEFENSE OF
REPUTATION
a. Elements
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22,
1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two
were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from
getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a
nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and askedthem to stop destroying
his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost
his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot
Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's
gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischer's family)was involved in a legal battle with
the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain
pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was
still pending for annulment(settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case
pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his
house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
Issues:
1.WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the
walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of
aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was
not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to
property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners
to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim
was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still
pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted
that the victim was the original aggressor.
2.WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although
he acted in defense of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art.
11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

87

- Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful


aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given
Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before
time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up
fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
- Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel
attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
- Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending
himself. Here, there was no provocation atall since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited withthe
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant
to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation. Crime is homicide (2
counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on
account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to
arresto mayor.
3.WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is
unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment
of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39
applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused,
indemnification
of
consequential
damagesand
costs
of
proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to theaccused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be givenretroactive effect pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
Held:
Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4
months arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000
w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/oaward for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained14 years so his immediate
release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting.
Defense of property can only beinvoked when coupled with form
of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this
was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should be
released.
People vs. Geneblazo (371 SCRA 573)
HELD: 1. Assuming that geneblazo version that the aggression
emanated from opalsa and obien, the aggression ceased to exist
when the 2 ran away so when geneblazo pursued them it was
then that he became the aggressor. 2. Geneblazo still continued to
stab opalsa in the neck even in the presence of SPO1 quique. 3.
Geneblazo admitted that he recognized SPO1 quique after he had
stabbed the victim for the second time. His taking flight instead of

88

surrendering to the latter was evidentiary of guilt and negates


self-defense.
-

People vs. Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267


Held: The prosecution was able to establish that appellant
suddenly and unexpectedly shot the victim at the back without
any provocation on his part. In fact the trial court found that
Bullet wounds Nos. 3 and 4 on the thoraco abdominal region
were inflicted while the assailant was at the back of the victim.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of
any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring without risk
to the aggressor the commission of the crime. There being
treachery, appellant must be convicted of murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty imposable when the crime was committed in 1972 is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which has a
duration of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to death. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which
is reclusion perpetua. Hence, the trial court imposed the correct
penalty upon appellant.
On the civil aspect of the case, we affirm the trial courts award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. By way of
exemplary damages based on the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, an amount of P25,000.00 should be
awarded to the said heirs.
As to actual damages, Serafin Hubines, Sr. presented the receipts
showing that he spent P106,288.85 as hospital and medical
expenses; P13,000.00 as funeral expenses, or a total of
P119,288.85.

People vs. Bates, 400 SCRA 95


Facts: On or about the 28th day of November 1995, at around 5:30
oclock in the afternoon, in Brgy. Esperanza, Ormoc City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused MARCELO BATES and MARCELO BATES, JR., conspiring
together and confederating with and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to
kill, being then armed with long bolos, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hack to death the person of
the victim herein, JOSE BOHOLST without giving the latter
sufficient time to defend himself, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple wounds which caused his instantaneous death. Death
Certificate and Autopsy Report are hereto attached. In violation of
Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
Held: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is
punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender which is not offset by any aggravating
circumstance, the maximum period of the penalty to be imposed
shall be taken from the minimum of reclusion temporal which is 12
years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months; while the minimum

89

period shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.For the guidance
of both the bench and bar, it must be mentioned that the trial
court committed an error in imposing the penalty of "forty (40)
years of reclusion perpetua". We reiterate our earlier
pronouncements in a number of cases that while Section 21 of RA
No. 7659 amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by fixing
the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40
years, reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty in
the absence of a clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification as an indivisible penalty.25 Hence, in applicable
cases such as the present case, "reclusion perpetua" should
simply be imposed without specifying its duration. WHEREFORE,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35,
is MODIFIED. Appellant Marcelo Bates is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum; and is
ordered to pay the Heirs of Jose Boholst the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death, P50,000.00 for
moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
-

People vs. Caratao, 403 SCRA 482


Held: Bulawin was found to be the unlawful aggression. In Caratao
being made to wait and make update pleas for his rice vale must
have have moved him to be the unlawful aggressor thereby
inflicting stab wounds to Bulawin. The decision was modified,
Caratao was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide.

People vs. Vicente, 405 SCRA 40


Held: But above all, what convinces us to affirm the trial courts
finding is the presence of badges of guilt that renders appellants
claim of self-defense dubious and unworthy of belief. First, the
victim suffered a fatal wound at the chest. It lacerated his vital
organs. The location of the wound belies and negates the claim of
self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the
life of the victim.
Second, appellant failed to inform the
authorities that he acted in self-defense. And third, he failed to
surrender the knife to the authorities. We have ruled that failure
to inform the authorities of the unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing him
militates against the claim of self-defense. In People vs. Mier, we
also held that the non-presentation of the weapon which was
allegedly used by the victim in attacking the accused and the
failure of the defense to account for its non-presentation are fatal
to the accuseds plea of self-defense.
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His
duty is to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise conviction would follow from his admission that he killed
the victim. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge such
burden.

90

The trial court also held that the crime committed by appellant is
qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery is present in this case. The fact that the attack is frontal
does not negate the finding of treachery. Even a frontal attack
can be treacherous if sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. Here, the victim was suddenly stabbed when he was
extending his hand to the appellant. With his mindset, the victim
could not have any inkling that there was danger to his life when
he approached appellant.
-

People vs. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463


Held: The accused who avers that the killing arose from an
impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of proving the
elements thereof. The essential requisites of self-defense are the
following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person resorting to self-defense. Verily, to invoke selfdefense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who
was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
employing reasonable means to resist the attack. Under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal.
There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000,
but failed to award P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim. Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof
therefor. Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not
automatically given in murder or homicide. The prosecution was,
however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of P28,650.
The award of exemplary damages should be omitted considering
that no aggravating circumstance was duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held
guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the victim the amounts
of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual damages,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. The grant of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED.

Cano vs. People, 413 SCRA 92


Facts:
On the morning of May 31, 1993 Orlando Cano (victim) arrived at
the RUSH ID booth of his brother Conrado Cano (petitioner). That
happens to be his competition on the aforementioned business.

91

He said to the employeeP***** ina nya! Why did he Xerox our


permit. Since Conrado wasnt around, he returned to his own
booth which was a few meters away. The r eason the Orlando was
furious, earlier Conrado photocopied his businesspermit without
his permission. When the Conrado arrived on his booth, Orlando
arrived. He held the Conrado by the shoulders and turned him
around. "Anong gusto mong mangyari?" the Orlando said and
there was no responsefrom the Conrado. Conrad noticed that
Orlando was holding a butterfly knife/balisong, Conrado found
refuge on the dark room of the studio. Orlando was forcing himself
to open the door, as he was shouting Get out of the re
pakialamero ka! Get out of there and I will kill you. When the door
suddenly gave way, Orlando charged Conradoand Conrado
deflected the attack. Conrado picked up a pair of scissors. After
they grappled Orlando collapsed andfell bloodied on the floor.
Conrado picked his brother up to bring to the hospital but the wife
of Orlando had hit him with a chair and shouted Holdupper!.
Conrado was forced to leave the vicinity in the fear of being
lynched by the public. When he was pursued, the saw a policeman
and surrendered.
Contention of the State:
Conrado has intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack,assault and use personal violence upon
Orlando by then stabbing the latter on different parts of the body,
therebyinf
licting mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
Contention of the Accused:
Conrado had pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, during the
pendency of theappeal the, Gloria the widow of Orlando executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay where she said that it was merely self
defense. And she withdraws the charges against Conrado.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense.
Hence, his act of killingthe victim was attended by a justifying
circumstance, for which no criminal and civil liability can attach.
Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that
anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur anycriminal
liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for his lawful act.
The only instance when a person whocommits a crime with the
attendance of a justifying circumstance incurs civil liability is when
he, in order to avoidan evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of
theRevised Penal Code. Otherwise stated, if a person charged with
homicide successfully pleads self-defense, hisacquittal by reason
thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgmentappealed
from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Conrado Cano is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged againsthim and his immediate
release from custody is ordered unless there is another cause for
his continued detention.
-

Santos vs. CA, 415 SCRA 384


FACTS:

92

At 7:00 p.m. on May 15, 1990, Loreto Hernandez, a resident of


Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Paombong, then employed with the Manila
Hotel as a security guard and his companion Roy de Borja, were
walking along a narrow footpath on their way home from a visit to
a mutual friend, Fely Jumaquio. Upon reaching that portion of the
footpath in front of the house of Rufino Panganiban (a maternal
uncle of petitioner Oscar P. Santos), the petitioner and his brother
Pedro Santos, Jr. suddenly emerged into view and effectively
blocked their way. Hernandez greeted the petitioner by his name
Ka Oscar but, without much ado, Pedro, Jr. aimed a .45 calibre
automatic pistol at the face of Hernandez, and squeezed the
trigger of the gun which, fortunately, did not fire. Forthwith, the
petitioner hacked Hernandez twice with a jungle bolo. Hernandez
was struck; first, at the right forearm which he defensively raised
to parry the blow and, second, at the right side of the head.
Hernandez fell to the ground semi-unconscious, blood oozing from
his wounds. The petitioner then turned to De Borja who attempted
to flee. The petitioner stabbed De Borja at the back, near the
waistline. De Borja fell to the ground, and saw the petitioner hack
another person whom he could not identify. The petitioner even
told his brother, Utol, Jr. alis na tayo; patay na ang mga iyan.
As soon as Santos and his brother left the premises, De Borja,
although himself already injured, endeavored to help Hernandez
to his feet. The two crossed a river and proceeded to the barangay
road where, at the foot of a bridge, Hernandez was left behind, as
De Borja went to look for any available vehicle that would take
them to the hospital. While Hernandez was waiting for De Borja, a
tricycle appeared. Hernandez boarded the same and proceeded to
the De Leon Clinic in Paombong, where he was refused admission
for undisclosed reasons. Thereafter, Hernandez boarded another
tricycle which brought him to the provincial hospital at Malolos
where he was administered blood transfusion and extended firstaid treatment.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
Santos testified that when Hernandez aimed his gun at his head,
the petitioner raised his right hand, and holding his bolo, swung it
downwards. Hernandez then raised his right hand to parry the
thrust of the petitioner. In the process, the petitioners bolo hit
Hernandez right forearm and the right side of his head above the
right ear. Santos interposed self-defense. He claimed that he
hacked Hernandez and De Borja only as an act of self-defense.
RULING:
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, as
experience has demonstrated, can easily be fabricated. To merit
approbation, the accused is burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the confluence of the following essential
requisites for self-defense: (a) there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) that the means employed to prove or
repel such aggression was reasonable; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

93

Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and


unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or an imminent
anger thereof; and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
where there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution for even if the
evidence of the prosecution were weak, the same can no longer
be disbelieved after the accused has admitted killing or injuring
the victim.
-

People vs. Retubado, 417 SCRA 384


Held: Retubado is guilty of homicide. He is the unlawful aggressor
provocation and the author of the deliberate and malicious act of
showing Canon Sr. at a close range on the forehead.

Rugas vs. People, January 14, 2004


Fact: At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 16,
1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol was conversing with Perla
Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in barangay
Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when the accused Alexander P.
Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to
know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his
stomach. He ran and shouted for help. Somebody helped him in
boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital at
Cajidiocan where Dr. Fermin M. Fatalla operated on him and issued
the medico-legal certificate, dated September 25, 1977 (Exh. F)
and he drew a sketch (Exh. G). Dr. Fatalla found a stab wound on
the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, 3 cms. in length and
about 4 to 5 cms. in depth penetrating the abdominal cavity as
well as the right lobe of the liver. This was a fatal wound, involving
as it did the liver, one of the vital organs of the body. The patient
could die of severe hemorrhage if no surgical operation was done.
And he immediately operated the patient upon arrival at the
hospital. The second stab wound was 7.5 cms. in length located at
the lower left quadrant or at the uppermost part of the left lateral
thigh. This was not a fatal wound. Both could have been caused by
any sharp pointed or bladed instrument like a knife. The first stab
wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front of the
victim or at the right side of the victim or somewhere obliquely to
the right of the patient, using his right or left hand. The second
stab wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front or
could be on the left side of the victim, obliquely to the side of the
victim, which he could inflict if he comes from the rear or from the
back of the victim using his right hand.
Held: Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which
can be easily fabricated. When the accused interposes selfdefense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the
victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential
requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed and to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The

94

accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the prosecutions, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. In People v.
Alfaro, and People v. Camacho, we held that the failure of the
accused to account for the presentation of the bladed weapon
allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his plea of self-defense. In
this case, the appellant failed to account for the knife supposedly
held by the victim and the bolo which the victim allegedly handed
over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used in
stabbing the victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to
the police authorities and to admit having stabbed the victim in
self-defense. Such failure rejects appellants claim of self-defense.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide defined and
penalized under Article 247 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium
period, as maximum. The petitioner is hereby directed to pay to
the victim Herberto D. Rafol P25,000.00, as moral damages, and
P25,000.00, as exemplary damages. Costs against the petitioner.
b. Burden of Proof
- Unidad vs. CA, 399 SCRA 27
Held: To start with, petitioner claimed self-defense, thereby
shifting upon him the burden of the evidence to prove that: (1)
the victim unlawfully attacked him; (2) he took the necessary
means to repel the attack; and (3) he did not provoke said attack.
Petitioner had to prove these by clear and convincing evidence. As
to the award of damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim in homicide is correct.[46] The grant of
P192,000.00 for unearned income of the victim is also supported
by the evidence, according to the formula set forth in People v.
Silvestre, The record shows that the victim was 32 years old and
was earning at least P1,120.00 a month. Finally, the actual
damages for funeral expenses should be reduced from
P131,000.00 to P54,500.00, as only the latter amount is supported
by receipts.
The crime of homicide is punished by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20
years). With the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
the penalty should be imposed in its minimum, which is, 12 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
Thus, petitioner should serve an indeterminate sentence the
maximum of which is anywhere within one degree lower than the
above prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal; hence, anywhere
within prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). The
maximum of the indeterminate sentence can be anywhere within
the properly imposable penalty abovementioned, reclusion
temporal in its minimum period (12 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months). The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

95

are MODIFIED, so as to reduce the penalty to an indeterminate


sentence of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is AFFIRMED
except that of actual damages for funeral expenses, which is
hereby reduced to P54,500.00.
-

People vs. Areo, 404 SCRA 30


Held: When Areo admitted committing the crime and invokes selfdefense is escape criminal liability the burden of proof shift to him.
He must prove the 3 requisite be present. But having no scratch or
bruise in the alleged attack show that unlawful aggression was not
found in the case.

People vs. Annibong, 403 SCRA 92


Facts: Appellant, a kitchen aide serving at the camp, testified that
on February 13, 1998, while he and Tallong were in their camp at
Barangay Doa Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao, the victim arrived coming
from Centro, Pudtol, Apayao. When Obngayan went to the kitchen
to get a drink, he was irritated to discover the water container
empty. Hopping mad, Obngayan rushed to appellant and boxed
him three times in the stomach and uttered: Vulva of your
mother, it is better that I will kill you. Obngayan proceeded to his
bunker, got his M-16 rifle and aimed it at appellant, prompting the
latter to shoot the victim once. After the first shot, the victim
managed to stand and aim his gun at appellant prompting the
latter to fire his M-16. But since the M-16 malfunctioned, appellant
grabbed the garand rifle of Artemio Tallong and shot the victim
once more. Immediately after the shooting, appellant escaped
with Tallong and proceeded to Suan, Pudtol, Apayao. Two days
later, both surrendered to Governor Batara P. Laoat, who advised
them to surrender to the police.
ARTEMIO TALLONG was presented by the defense to show
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. As one of the
CAFGUs on duty at the time of the incident, he said he witnessed
the incident from the time Cpl. Obngayan arrived at the
detachment until he was shot.
Tallong narrated that on February 13, 1998, around 2:00 P.M., Cpl.
Obngayan arrived at the Philippine Army detachment in Brgy.
Doa Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao where he was then the commanding
officer. Still perspiring and thirsty from an operation in Centro,
Pudtol, Apayao, Cpl. Obngayan hurriedly proceeded to the camps
kitchen for a drink. Incensed that all of the water containers were
empty, Obngayan confronted appellant whose duty it was to
maintain the camps kitchen. He gave appellant a jab in the
abdomen, then slowly walked away towards his bunker.
Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14 armalite
rifle and strafed the former on the back. Obngayan sprawled
bloodied on the ground. Shortly after, appellant took the garand
rifle of Artemio Tallong, and unleashed another barrage of
gunshots. Obngayan died instantaneously with his brain splattered
and an eye fallen on the ground.
The prosecutor adopted the testimony of defense witness Artemio
Tallong for purposes of the prosecution.
Other prosecution

96

witnesses were Dr. Dan Redel Edroso, the Municipal Health Officer
of Pudtol, Apayao, who conducted a post-mortem examination on
the victims body; Lt. Walfrido Felix Querubin of the Philippine
Army; Cpl. Robert Salarzon, from the Philippine Army assigned at
Nararragan, Ballesteros, Cagayan; Capt. Efren Paulino, from the
Philippine Army assigned at the Headquarters Service Battalion,
Camp Upi, Gamu, Isabela; and Mrs. Agnes Obngayan, the victims
widow.
Held: In his Brief, appellant offers no substantial reason, however,
why we should overturn the trial courts appreciation of the
evidence presented against him. Instead, he merely reiterates in
this appeal his claim of self-defense. In cases where the accused
admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense, the basic
rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the
prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the
accused to prove the elements of his defense.[16] In our view, the
defense has not discharged its burden successfully.
The elements of self-defense are (1) that the victim has
committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2)
that there is reasonable necessity in the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there is lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming selfdefense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person
claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause
of the victims aggression.
-

People vs. Gonza, 415 SCRA 507


Held: Gonza is guilty of murder. When the accused invokes selfdefense, the burden of evidence is shift to him to prove that he
killed the victim to the save his life. He must rely on his own
evidence and not on the weakness of evidence of the prosecution.
He must prove w/ clean and convincing evidence all the requisites
of self defense.

2. STATE OF NECESSITY (AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL)


Elements:
1. Evil sought to be avoided actually exist
2. Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. There is no other practical & less harmful means of preventing
it
The evil or injury sought to be avoided must not have been
created by the one invoking the justifying circumstances.
General rule: No liability in justifying circumstances because
there is no crime.
Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this paragraph. They
shall be liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
been received.
People vs. Ricohermoso, 56 SCRA 431 (1974)
Facts: On the morning of January 30, 1965, Geminiano met Pio and
asked him if he could have his share of the palay that Pio
harvested from tilling Geminianos land. Pio told him to drop by his
house anytime to get it so Geminiano said he will drop by in the
afternoon with his son Marianito. That afternoon, Geminiano sat
outside Pios house to wait for the promised palay. Pio was

97

standing by the door of his house with Severo also standing by.
Marianito was standing a few feet behind his father with a gun
slung in his shoulder. Hostile, Pio told Geminiano that he was not
going to give him palay thus Geminiano remonstrated. Pio then
unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from the left.
Severo took an axe and approached from the right. At this,
Geminiano held up his hands and told Severo not to fight. Pio then
stabbed Geminianos neck with the bolo. With Geminiano faced
down on the ground, Severo hacked his back with the axe. While
this was going on, Juan suddenly embraced Marianito from behind.
They grappled and rolled downhill where Marianito passed out.
When he came to, he saw his mortally wounded father and carried
him a short distance. Geminiano died at approximately 2pm.
Pio is a fugitive from justice in this case. Severo and Juan
were convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The two were also convicted of lesions leves (for Marianito). Other
three were acquitted. Severo and Juan appealed for the murder
conviction. They contend that Geminiano unsheathed his bolo first
so Pio met him and struck. As Geminiano turned to flee, Pio struck
again on the left side and thus Geminiano fell to the ground and
died due to the bleeding. Marianito was embraced by Juan
because he allegedly reached for his gun and tried to shoot Pio.
With this argument, they shift the responsibility of the killing to Pio
(who was not there and not trieda fugitive) and that Pio was only
acting in self-defense. Juan contends he was just protecting Pio
and Severo when he prevented Mariano from firing his gun. A few
days after filing this appeal however, Severo withdrew and in
effect accepted prosecutions version. So, this appeal concerns
Juan only.
Issue: WON Juan conspired with Pio and Severe in the killing of
Geminiano and is he deserving of reclusion perpetua?
Held: Yes, judgment affirmed. Considering the trios orchestrated
behavior and Juans close relationship to Pio and Severo,
conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them, planning the
whole thing, from the time after Pio met Geminiano in the morning
to the event in the afternoon. He cannot invoke Article 11, par 4
(justifying circumstances) in explaining his act of preventing
Marianito from shooting Pio and Severo as evidence shows he did
this to ensure that the killing of Geminiano happened without any
risk to Pio and Severo. His malicious intention was not to avoid any
evil from Marianito but to forestall any interference in the assault
done by Pio and Severo. Even though he did not take direct part in
the killing, his conspiracy with the others made him a principal
too. Moreover, treachery was involved. Juan weakened the victims
defense by disabling Marianito and ensured the killing without any
risk to themselves. Thus, the act of one is the act of all, and Juan
is also guilty of murder.
3. FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR LAWFUL EXISTENCE OF RIGHT
Elements:
1. Offender acted in performance of duty or lawful exercise of a
right/office
2. The resulting felony is the unavoidable consequence of the due
fulfillment of the duty or the lawful exercise of the right or office.
If first condition is present,
but the second is not because the offender acted with culpa,

98


the offender will be entitled to a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
the penalty would be reduced by one or two degrees.
People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738 (1922)
Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe
Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a
pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered
his surrender but Napoleon answered with a stroke of his lance.
The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didnt hit
Napoleon. The criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his
weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima was tried and
convicted for homicide; he appealed.
Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held
that the killing was done in performance of a duty. Napoleon was
under the obligation to surrender and his disobedience with a
weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action was justified by
the circumstances.
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943)
Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta
were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious
criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get hi dead
or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a
room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door,
simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first
making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned
out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal..
Held: Both accused are guilty of murder
Ratio: Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious
criminal, the accused would not be justified in killing him while the
latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious
criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only
when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of
law who are trying to capture him that killing him would be
justified.
People vs. Lagata, 83 Phil. 150
FACTS:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of
Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace,
Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol
plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up
gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio
Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners
to go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he
heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were
already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace
being shot. He said he ran away because he was afraid that he
might be shot again and that his companions were also probably
scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibaez stated that Epifanio
Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go
look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the

99

camote plantation and found footprints and called on Lagata to


inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the
flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio
Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria told
Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to
assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and
shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was
shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment
from Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the other
prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto
Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot wound
and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because
the prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered
them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner
escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged
from duty like the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the
picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoners work.
HELD: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide
and serious physical injuries. Appellant was entitled to the benefit
of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance.
(Art.11 par.5, RPC)
RATIO:
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at
Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace was bent on
committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards
and around him. How could anyone intending to escape run
towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape
from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the
performance of his duties, the circumstances show that there was
no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to
wound them seriously and even kill one of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to
escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire
against them.
4. OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDER
Elements:
1. Order must have been issued by a superior
2. The order is for some lawful purpose
3. The means used to carry it out must be lawful
A subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his
superior,
if he is not aware of the illegality of the order and
he is not negligent.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Facts

100

1. Pres. Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly


to the Office of the President in cash what MIAA owes PNCC which
later was reiterated in writing.
2. The Marcos memo indicated the amount of P55m for partial
payment of the obligation to PNCC.
3. In obedience to Marcos instruction, the accused withdrew the
amount by means of 3 separate issuances of managers check and
encashment in 3 separate dates as well.
4. The money withdrawn were placed in peerless boxes and duffle
bags and delivered to the private secretary of Marcos also in 3
separate days. According to the accused, the disbursement was
not in the normal procedure since there were no vouchers
supporting it and no receipt from PNCC.
5. Tabuena and Peralta were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
malversation.
Held: The accused were acquitted. Theyre entitled to the
justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Sandiganbayan claimed that
Marcos memo was unlawful because it orders disbursement of
P55M when the Ongpin memo reveals that the liability is only
34.5M. Granting this to be true, it will not affect Tabuenas good
faith as to make him criminally liable. Thus, even if the order is
illegal if it is patently legal and subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only
be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
People vs. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10
Ruling: Under the present law (Article 122 as amended by R.A.
7659 and P.D. 532) piracy may be committed in the Philippine
waters or in the high seas by any person (outsider, passenger, or
member of the complement of the vessel)
5. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Battered woman syndrome is a criminal defense involving a
pattern of psychological dependency among women caught in
long-term relationships with abusive male partners. Over time,
abuse produces an irrational mental state of "learned
helplessness," limiting free choice and placing victims of abuse in
a spiral of conflict that occasionally results in a violent and
sometimes fatal response over which they have no rational
control.
The traditional legal concept of self-defense is based on a
contest of equals more typical of fights between males. The
proponents of the defense argue criminal intent issues in the
conventional standards of self-defense is inadequate to explain
male-female conflicts. While the battered women syndrome
defense has been argued successfully in many cases, it has been
contested by forensic psychologists and legal scholars.
People vs. Genosa, 419 SCRA 357
Held: one who resorts to self defense must fact a real the of
ones. The was no more unlawful aggression when Marivic killed
Ben, it was not completely justified.
RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004)

101

RA 9262 (ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINTS WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN


ACT OF 2004)
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and
their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according
to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted,
frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting
serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor;
those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished
by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical
injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment
of two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the
consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but
shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by
arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision
correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto
mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision
mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or
committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied
shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in
the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
B. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 12)
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.

102

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he


has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of
this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the
court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding
paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and education
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or
person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.
1. INSANITY AND IMBECILITY
IMBECILE - One who, while advanced in age, has a mental
development comparable to that of children between 2 and 7
years of age. Exempt in all cases from criminal liability
INSANE - there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act but capable of having lucid intervals. During a
lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence and thus, not
exempt from criminal liability.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance
and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
Evidence of insanity must refer to
The time preceding the act under prosecution or
At the very moment of its execution.
Insanity subsequent to commission of crime is not exempting
Feeblemindedness is not imbecility
a. People vs. Florendo, 413 SCRA 132
Held: he was apparent well until 3-4 prior to his admission the
hospital. He claimed that he suspected his wife of having a
extramarital affair. There should be complete deprivation of
intelligence, reason, absence and freedom. Florendo is guilty of
parricide.
b. People vs. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699 (2000)
Facts: December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan
City, while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by
the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the center of
the altar and sat on the Bishops chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was
an assistant saw this. He requested the accused to vacate, but the
latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated request,
he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim
with his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a
knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up
and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1
Francisco saw a man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one
hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife. Accused-

103

appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the


hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he
claims that: prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was
unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was
of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the
court to allow accused-appellant, to be treated at the Baguio
General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or
be transferred to some other institution. While motion for
reconsideration was pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a
Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that
accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the
past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the
same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying
the Demurrer to Evidence. Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a
resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio
General Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and
diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld
the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of
the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue: WON he was indeed insane
Held: When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed
to have been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind
and that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from
criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. In the
eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes
insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and
positive evidence. There are certain circumstances that should
have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have
been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he
attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone. Accusedappellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are
two distinct matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is
coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and
his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to
convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights
to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation
or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of
the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved
for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds
mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding
that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently
answered by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to
answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive
evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist
in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to
determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a

104

psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with


the specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough
to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accusedappellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should
have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case,
there were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital,
as well as the counsels filing of motion. And despite all the
overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind,
the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even
considered
subjecting
accused-appellant
to
a
medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death!
Judgment: At this late hour, a medical finding alone may
make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition
at the time of the crimes commission for him to avail of the
exempting circumstance of insanity. Nonetheless, under the
present circumstances, accused-appellants competence to stand
trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in
his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings.
c. People vs. Villa Jr., 331 SCRA 142 (2000)
Facts: Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass when his neighbor
Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU came out with his M-1
Garand rifle and shot Dionito killing him instantly (discovered later
that Dionito accused him of stealing chickens). Ronald and Sheila,
children of Dionito, rushed out and were also shot. Sheila was only
shot in the thigh and tummy. Samuel Eclevia, attempted to wrestle
the rifle but was also gunned down. Villa Jr. surrendered and was
charged with multiple murder. He pleaded not guilty and invoked
self defense (says that Dionito was charging at him with a bolo).
His new lawyer (he changed lawyers in the middle) moved for a
psychiatric examination and it was granted. He was confined in
the Mental Hospital for evaluation (for insanity) for a month which
resulted in the finding of Insanity or Psychosis classified as
Schizophrenia. He was found to be incompetent to stand trial.
After 6 months, the doctors found him fit to stand trial. After his
release, he pleaded insanity as a defense, which was disregarded.
The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellant was
insane during the commission of the crimes as would exempt him
from criminal liability.
Held: Court was not convinced that he was insane during the
commission of the crime since the evaluation did not say so in
unequivocal terms. Dr. Zalsos was unsure when she testified. In
order that insanity can be considered as an exempting
circumstance, it must be shown to exist just before or during the
commission of the offense. It must be shown beyond doubt that
there was complete deprivation of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime,
which the accused failed to prove.
- Insanity is evidenced by a deranged and perverted condition of
the mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct.
An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his acts. We are convinced that accused-

105

appellant was sane at the time he perpetrated the killings. The


following circumstances clearly point to saneness. (a) Immediately
surrendering to the Police; (b) He showed remorse during his
confinement; (c) Gave a sworn statement before the Prosecutors
Office after the crimes narrating the incident (admit that he was of
sound mind). These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick
mind.
- The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Thus, a
person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.
- The defense banks heavily on the findings of the psychiatrists.
Doctors did not say that he was totally insane to warrant
conclusion that he was insane enough to kill all those people. We
agree with the trial court that the results of the examinations
conducted by the psychiatrists on accused-appellant appear to be
based on incomplete or insufficient facts. Records show that the
psychiatrists relied mainly on the data supplied by accusedappellant and his police escort. It could be that he was insane
while being evaluated and was contacted during his detention
prior trial, maybe due to guilt or realizations. To be a defense it
has to be there when crime was commissioned.
d. People vs. Madarang, 332 SCRA 99 (2000)
Nature: Appeal to decision of RTC that convicted him of 4 murders.
There should be no aggravating circumstance just because he was
from CAFGU and had an M-1 Grand Rifle.
e. People vs. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168 (1999)
1. Fernando and his wife quarreled. In the heat of the fight, the
accused stabbed his wife causing her death.
2. The accused declared that he had no recollection of the
stabbing incident.
3. Court ordered the accuseds confinement in a mental institution
where it was found that he was inflicted with schizophrenia. He
was submitted to treatment for 2 years, after which, he faced the
charges against him.
Held: The accused failed to prove that he was completely deprived
of intelligence in committing the act. He did not show any signs of
insanity prior to and immediately after the act. He was only
diagnosed of schizophrenia months after the incident.
Held: The court found out that Diaz while he was committed to the
Natl Center for mental health was not diagnosed as insofar but
was suffering from pedophilia. Thus there is no doubt in mind that
he was sane during his 2 year confinement in the center,
pedophilia being similar to insanity.
f. People vs. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 (1998)
Facts: Tabugoca in two criminal cases guilty of 2 counts of rape
committed against his own daughters sentenced him to reclusion
perpetue for the first & death for the second.
Facts: Jacqueline & her 3 younger sisters Janet, Jinky & jewel lived
under the sole care of their father after their mother died August
28, 1991.
March 28, 1992, around 10pm, Jacqueline (12yrs 3mos at the
time, b. December 27, 1979)
- Tabugoca woke up Jacqueline to scratch his back.

106

- Tabugoca removed her shorts and underwear and made her lie
beside him, then inserted his penis in her vagina.
- Tabugoca told her not to tell anyone if she did not want to be
harmed.
December 9, 1994, early morning Jinky (12yrs 9mos at the time,
b. March 5, 1982)
- Jinky was cleaning some articles in their house when Tabugoca
aproached her and took off his clothes.
- Tabugoca ordered her to lie down and removed her shorts and
underwear then inserted his penis into her vagina.
- Jinky cried out & complained to Tabugoca that she was in pain.
- Tabugoca explained that it is ordinary to feel pain because it was
her first time to do it.
- After a while, he did not continue, and told Jinky that they would
continue the following day.
December 10, 1994, dawn Jinky
- Tabugoca made another attempt to molest Jinky.
- Jinky resisted, causing Tabugoca to just lie down & leave her
alone.
December 10, 1994, later on
- Jacqueline and Jinky were watching TV in their grandmothers
(Perlita Alejandro).
- Jinky told their lola about the sexual abuses of their father. This
prompted Jacqueline to reveal her similar experience 2 yrs past.
December 12, 1994
- Their grandmother brought them to the Municipal Health Officer
of Naguilian for physical examination.
- Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares findings suggested that in
Jacquelines case, she was forcibly abused & the incident, the first
1 happened long ago, based on the healed scars of the hymen, &
in Jinkys case that full penetration was unsuccessful although
attempts were done based on the swollen vulva of the victim.
Tabugoca tried to claim exemption from criminal liability on the
ground of insanity brought about by intoxication
- Jacqueline: Tabugoca allegedly only came to know of what
happened to Jacqueline when the police arrested him on
December 10, 1994. Jacqueline allegedly informed him on the
date of his arrest that he was drunk on March 28, 1992, Tabugoca
surmised that he was based on Jacquelines supposed statement.
Jacqueline testified that Tabugoca did smell of liquor and may
have had had a few drinks then
- Jinky: Tabugoca said that he had also been drinking then and
could not recall what had happened after he had finished drinking.
Jinky testified that Tabugoca had been drunk on the night of
December 9, 1994.
Tabugoca claimed that he started drinking after his wife died,
resorting to drink when he remembered his wife and that before
her death, he did not drink. He also claims that his children filed
the complaints in revenge for his castigating or whipping them
whenever they committed mistakes.
Issues, Held, Ratio
1.
WON Tabugoca is guilty of rape
- Yes. Tabugocas guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
- Tabugoca neither denied the charges against him nor raised any
absolutory cause in his defense.

107

- The categorical and untraversed testimonies of Jacqueline and


Jinky as to how Tabugoca committed the bestial outrage, and their
identification of the accused as their defiler remain
uncontroverted and fully establish the charges. Jacquelines failure
to immediately report the crime does not necessarily cast doubt
on the credibility of her charge. We cannot expect young
Jacqueline to disregard the threat on her life and immediately cry
rape in the face of her fathers threats and his constant presence
in her home.
- It is highly inconceivable that Jacqueline would invent a charge
that would only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their
family and be the object of gossip among their classmates and
friends in order to get even with their father or to empathize with
her sister, especially given our culture.
- It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction
for rape, full penetration is not required.
- 2 forms of intimidation under Art. 335 RPC (Matrimonio): (1)
threats, (2) overpowering moral influence.
- Tabugoca exercised overpowering moral influence over the
victims, being their father. This is sufficient to intimidate and force
them to submit to his desires
- For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the intimidation
employed be so great or of such character as could not be
resisted. What is necessary is that the intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose the accused had in mind.
- In the case at bar, with the previous beatings Jinky had gotten
from Tabugoca, resistance could not have been expected from her.
- Tabugocas contention of consensual sex is ridiculous! No
showing that Jinky is a sexual pervert or a woman of loose morals.
- Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is not consent!
- Therefore, Tabugoca is guilty of two (2) counts of rape.
2.
WON the RTC had jurisdiction
- Yes. Tabugocas position that the the RTCs jurisdiction to punish
him is limited only to the Jinkys criminal complaint of frustrated
rape & cannot cover consummated rape is a meritless argument.
- When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended
party in cases of rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, but it is not
the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the
case.
- The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.
(People v. Leoparte)
- Since the penalty for rape in the complaint filed by Jacqueline is
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the lower court involved
in this case may hear and try the offense charged in the
information and may impose the punishment for it.
- The right and power of a court to try the accused for the crime of
rape attaches upon the fifing of the complaint, and a charge in the
allegations thereof as to the manner of committing the crime
should not operate to divest the court of jurisdiction already
acquired. (People v. Bangalao, et.al.)
- Therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction.
3.
WON the death penalty should be imposed
- Yes. The only possible basis of the penalty under the rules of
graduating penalties under the RPC is the presence of a privileged
mitigating circumstance. There was none shown to exist.

108

- Therefore, the death penalty should be imposed.


4.
WON drunkenness in this case is a valid defense
- No. Tabugocas feeble excuse of having been under the influence
of liquor in order to disclaim knowledge of his actions is
unbelievable.
- He did not comply with the evidentiary requirements whereby he
could claim intoxication as a mitigating circumstance.
- The attendance of intoxication is affirmed as an aggravating
circumstance on the additional finding that it was habitual.
- Therefore, drunkenness was not a valid defense. It was an
aggravating circumstance!
5.
WON Tabugoca was sane when he committed the crime
- Yes. Tabugoca failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The
law presumes every man to be sane. The person accused of a
crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has
necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. (People v.
Catanyag)
- In order for insanity to be taken as an exempting circumstance,
there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the
commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
preclude imputability. (People v. So)
- The defense did not present any expert witness, psychiatric
evaluation report, psychological findings or evidence regarding
Tabugocas mental condition at the time of commission of the
offenses.
- His charade of amnesia is a desperate ploy for exculpation. In
any case, amnesia is not, in and of itself, a defense to a criminal
charge unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused did
not know of the nature and quality of his action and that it was
wrong.
- Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition
of the accused when the crime was committed. (Thomas v. State)
- Therefore, Tabugoca was sane at the time of commission of the
crimes.
Judgment: Affirmed with modification.
In accordance with Art. 83 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 25 of
RA 7659 (reimposing the death penalty), upon finality of this
decision, the records will be forwarded immediately to the Office
of the President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
2. MINORITY
a. RA 9344 (Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice
System)
1) 15 yrs old or below at the time of commission of offense:
absolutely exempt from criminal liability but subject to
intervention program
2) Over 15 yrs old but below 18:
exempt from criminal liability & subject to intervention program
If acted w/ discernment: subject to diversion program
3) Below 18 yrs are exempt from:
a) Status offense
b) Vagrancy and Prostitution
c) Mendicancy (PD1563)
d) Snuffing of Rugby (PD 1619)

109

b. People vs. Estepano, 307 SCRA 707 (1999)


Facts: Enrique Balinas was stabbed & hacked to death for w/c
Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney, Dante & Rene, all surnamed
Estepano were charged w/ murder. Rodrigo died during the trial &
before judgment could be rendered. Dante was never
apprehended hence, as against him, the case was never archived.
After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only
Ruben, Rodney & Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the 3 were
sentenced to reclusion perpetua & ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Enrique Balinas in the amount of P100K for moral damages &
P9.5K for actual damages w/o subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
As to the crime: The case was woven mainly on the testimony of
Florencio Tayco, that on April 16, 1991 at around 10 pm, he was
on his way home in Barangay IV Himamaylan with Lopito Gaudia
and Enrique Balinas. En route, they met Dominador at the BM
Trucking compound. Lopito than talked to Dominador while he and
Estepano stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared without any
provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a guinunting
(fighting bolo). Ruben armed with a cane cutter and Rodney,
Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo followed suit in hacking
Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador told his
companions You better kill him! Lopito confirmed the testimony
of Florencio.
Dominadors version: That on April 16 1991 at 10pm, he was at
home w/ his wife & son Roberto. They were about to eat supper
when he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come
down. He peeped through the window & saw Rodrigo hacking
Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground, Rodrigo fled. Robert
Hautea & Luz Cuepas, both residents of Barangay IV corroborated
the testimony of Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene & Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that
he was at the provincial hospital attending to his wife who earlier
underwent a caesarian operation. Rene & Rodney, sons of Rodrigo,
claimed that they were at home sleeping when the killing
occurred. Rene, who was only 13 then, testified that he came to
know about the incident that same night when his mother
awakened him. Rodney on the other hand, was awakened by
shouts that his father killed Enrique Balinas.
Issues
1.
WON the lower court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco
Findings of the TC is binding & conclusive on the appellate court
unless some facts or circumstances of weight & substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, w/c isnt true
in the present case. Florencios testimony is clear & convincing, as
he was only 2 arms length away from the victim as well as from
the assailants. Alibi of appellants were not supported by any
pieces of evidence & thus were not sufficient to outweigh their
positive identification by 1 of the prosecution witnesses.
2.
WON conspiracy had taken place
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in w/c the
offense was committed and concerted acts of the accused to
obtain a common criminal objective signifies conspiracy.

110

3.
WON the appellants are guilty of murder (particularly
Rene, who was 13)
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records
show that he was only 13 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense. Under A12. par. 3 of the RPC, a person
over 9 years of age & under 15 is exempt from criminal liability
unless it is shown that he acted with DISCERNMENT. Scrutiny of
records show that prosecution failed to prove that Rene acted w/
discernment, what was only established was his presence & his
supposed participation in the killing.
* Damages of P100K were also modified and reduced to P50,000,
considering that the purpose of such award is not to enrich the
heirs but to compensate them for the injuries to their feelings.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified and accusedappellants Ruben and Rodney are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, Rene Estepano is ACQUITTED.
c. People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 (1939)
Facts:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos andEpifanio
Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual,
Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused,intercepted the ball,
and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in thestomach. Miffed, Ragojos
chased Doquena, and upon catchinghim, slapped Doquena on the
nape, and punched him in theface. After doing this, Ragojos went
back to Rarang to resumeplaying volleyball. Insulted, Doquena
looked for something tothrow at Ragojos, finding none, he got his
cousin's (RomualdoCocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's
deniedDoquena's request for a fight and resumed playing.
Doquenastabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing
thelatter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused
acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature
andconsequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was
aminor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th
gradepupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in
theCAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of
homicide.The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School
for Boysuntil he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by
theaccused, stating that to determine whether or not there
wasdiscernment on the part of the minor, the following must
betaken into consideration:a)The facts and circumstances which
gave rise to the actcommitted; b)The state of mind at the time the
crime was committed; c)The time he had at his disposal; d)The
degree of reasoning of the minor.
Issue:
WON the accused acted with discernment
Held:
Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted withdiscernment.
Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least
for lack of intention, as a mitigatingcircumstance. However, the
DISCERNMENT that constitutes anexception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited bylaw, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to
understand the differencebetween right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known andshould be determined by taking into
consideration all the factsand circumstances afforded by the

111

records in each case, thevery appearance, the very attitude, the


very comportment andbehavior of said minor, not only before and
during thecommission of the act, but also after and even during
the trial.
3. ACCIDENT
Elements:
1. A person performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
ACCIDENT
something that happen outside the sway of our will and
although it comes about through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
Under Article 12, paragraph 4, the offender is exempt not only
from criminal but also from civil liability
a. People vs. Agliday, 367 SCRA 273 (2001)
Facts:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to
do, without malice, an act from which material damageresults by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on thepart of the
person performing or failing to perform such act.Once malice is
proven, recklessness disappears. On Feb. 25,1999 in the evening
Agliday shot his son Richard Agliday withan unlicensed shotgun,
causing his death. Prosecution witnessConchita Agliday, wife of
appellant testified that while she waswashing the dishes in the
kitchen when her husband shot her son; shortly after appellant ran
away while she brought her sonfirst to the Sto. Nio Hospital, then
to the San Carlos Hospital,then finally to the Region I General
Hospital where he died.Before shooting, she and appellant
quarreled over her being alaundry woman. Richard was only 19
years old and in 4th year college. Another witness Rey Agliday,
brother of Richard saidthat he was in the house resting on a
wooden bed when he sawappellant shoot his brother. He said that
while his parents werequarrelling he did not interfere, but his
brother did that is why hewas shot by appellant. Appellant claims,
on the other hand thathe was in the house cleaning a homemade
gun to be used for evening patrol (he was a barangay tanod) when
the gunaccidentally went off, fatally hitting his son (in the
gluteusmaximus!!!) after which he went to his son and embraced
him.Afterwards he surrendered. The ruling of trial court
gavecredence to prosecution witnesses; disbelieved that
appellant'sshooting was an accident.
Issue, Held and Ratio:
1.WON witnesses are credible
Conchita and Rey Agliday are credible witnesses. Appellant claims
court should have believed him since he does not have any reason
to kill his son who has a bright future, and that his witnesses (Jose
Matabang and SPO1 Opina) aremore credible. Court disagrees.
When the issue is one of credibility, an appellate court will
normally not disturb thefindings of the trial court. Matabang's
testimony wasbasically what appellant told him - biased and
limited; whileOpina's claim that Conchita told him that shooting

112

wasaccidental is not accurate, since she was still in a state of


shock
2.WON appellant's shooting was an accident which maybe used as
an exempting circumstance
No, it cannot. Apellant contends that since his gunaccidentally
went off while he was cleaning it, he should beacquitted on the
basis of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12(4)
of the RPC. The court is notpersuaded. In Art. 12(4), criminal
liability does not arise in acase where a crime is committed by any
person who, whileperforming a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury bymere accident without fault or intention of causing
it.Exemption is based on the lack of criminal intent.Declarations of
innocence of appellant contradicted bytestimonies of wife and
surviving son. Before accused canbe exempted from criminal
liability under Art 12 (4), there should be:
- A person performing a lawful act
- Due care
- Causes an injury to another by mere accident
- Without any fault and intention of causing it. Act of firing a
shotgun (and an unlicensed one at that) is notlawful. Accident is
an occurrence that "happens outside thesway of our will, and
although it comes about through someact of our will, lies beyond
the bounds of humanlyforeseeable consequences connotes
absence of criminalintent. Firearm was a shotgun that needs to be
cocked firstbefore it can be fired.Appellant contends that he is
only guilty of recklessimprudence. But the court disagrees.
Reckless imprudenceconsists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice,an act from which material damage results by
reason of aninexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
personperforming or failing to perform such act. Intent is
notlacking in the instant case. Appellant's external acts
provemalice or criminal intent.
b. U.S. vs. Tanedo, 15 Phil. 196 (1910)
Facts:
On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, wentwith
some workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying withhim
his shotgun and a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, theaccused
went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting thevictim,
Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother and Uncle. Theaccused went
into the forest upon the recommendation of thedeceased to
continue his search for the elusive wild chickens.Upon seeing one,
Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, heheard a human cry out in
pain. After seeing that Sanchez waswounded, Tanedo ran back to
his workers and asked one,Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide
the body, which they didby putting it amidst the tall cogon grass,
and later burying in anold well. Only one shot was heard that
morning and a chickenwas killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken
feathers were found atthe scene of the crime. There was no
enmity between theaccused and the deceased. Prior to the trial,
the accuseddenied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed
duringthe trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of
homicide,having invited the deceased into the forest and
intentionallyshooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to
14 years,8 months and one day of reclusion temporal,
accessories,indemnifications and costs. The accused appealed.

113

Issue: WON the accused is guilty


Held:
No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez isnegated by the
fact that the chicken and the man were shot at thesame time,
there having only one shot fired. Also, according to:
- Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors
arevoluntary acts and omissions punished by law
- Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with duecare,
causes some injury by mere accident without liabilityor intention
of causing it.
- Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in
acriminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until
thecontrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt thathis
guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal. In
this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of
theaccused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in
alegal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to
killthe deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the
actand his concealment of the body.The court quoted State vs.
Legg: "Where accidental killing isrelied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to provesuch a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, becausethere is a denial of
intentional killing, and the burden is upon thestate to show that it
was intentional, and if, from a considerationof all the evidence,
both that for the state and the prisoner, thereis a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing wasaccidental or intentional,
the jury should acquit."Court held that the evidence was
insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
4. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE/UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR Actus
Me Invito Factus Non Est Meus Factus
Elements:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
3. That the physical force must come from a third person

a. People vs. Baldogo, 396 SCRA 31


Gonzalo Baldogo alias Baguio & Edgar Bermas alias Bunso
were serving sentence in the Penal Colony of Palawan. They
were also serving the Camacho family who resides w/in the
Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) &
abducted Julie (12 y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their
clothing & belongings from a trunk which was located under a
Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for
herself. Julie went to the lowlands & there she asked for help
from Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie.
Baguio contends that while he was preparing for sleep he was
approached by Bunso who was armed with a bloodied bolo.
Bunso warned him not to shout, otherwise he will also be killed.

114

- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt


Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the
entire period that he and Julie were in the mountain before
Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accusedappellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her
parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but
accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder appreciating against him the specific
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and use of
superior strength, w/o any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, & pursuant to the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 1, of A63
of the RPC, he is hereby sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping no modifying circumstance appreciated
and pursuant to the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of
the RPC, & not being entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, w/ the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction for life, & of perpetual absolute disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping.
YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was
threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas
ordered him to do. He claims that he was even protective of
Julie. He insists that Julie was not a credible witness and her
testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was
merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and
her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.Julies testimony is
credible findings of facts of the TC, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the
probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties & its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the
appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison
detre of this principle is that this Court has to contend itself w/
the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues
posed by the parties; The TC has the unique advantage of
monitoring & observing at close range the attitude, conduct &
deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective
testimonies before said court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported
by the evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted
and/or misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which,
if considered, will alter the outcome of the case
Its incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti,
more specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed
& that accused-appellant precisely committed the same.
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence & not
on the weakness of accuseds evidence. The prosecution
adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired w/
Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping &
detaining Julie. There is conspiracy if 2 or more persons agree to

115

commit a felony & decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be


proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused,
before, during & after the commission of a felony pointing to a
joint purpose & design & community of intent. As long as all the
conspirators performed specific acts w/ such closeness &
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or
design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the
conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the ff. requisites
a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to
his determination; and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination
and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the
crime itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time
the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time
that he actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after
deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his
determination to commit the crime. The law doesnt prescribe a
time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has
decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag
containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer
or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear
evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is
possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to
escaping from the colony. insufficient evidence for evident
premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, theres no evidence
that they took advantage of their numerical superiority &
weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cant
be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge
was killed in their house or taken from their house and killed
outside the said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery Court has previously held
that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender
years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by
treachery. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
b. People vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740
FACTS:
Joselito del Rosario and three other accused were chargedwith
robbery with homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof

116

shot andkilled her. Thereafter, the court found accused Joselito


del Rosarioguilty as charged and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
WON del Rosario's arrest was unlawful since there was
nowarrant therefore.
HELD:
Yes, Sec. 5 par, Rule 113, requires that the accused becaught in
flagrante delicto or caught immediately after theconsummation
of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is outside of theaforequoted
rule since he was arrested on the day following thecommission
of the robbery with homicide.
c. People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 (1998)
1. Manalili asked Garcia to find someone who could arrest of
Herrera the suspect of the killing of his brother.
2. Garcia introduced Lising and they had an agreement. Lisings
surveillance group was at the Castanos residence in the hope
of spotting Herrera. The group saw a man and a woman (the
victims) leave the residence and followed them and were
accosted. Later, the bodies of the 2 were found.
3. Lower court found that since there was an agreement among
Manalili, Garcia and Lising, they were all coconspirators. Garcia
claimed that he acted under compulsion of irresistible force.
Held: To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking
irresistible force must show that the force exerted was such that
it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without
will but against his will. Garcias participation from when the
abduction was hatched to the killing of the victims is
undisputed.
d. People vs. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71 (1993)
Facts: Brothers, Edwin & Esminio Balaan were taken by 7 armed
men in fatigue uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA
members, accompanied by the accused Rudy Fronda and
Roderick Padua from the house of Ferminio Balaan. The armed
men tied the hands of the deceased at their back lying down
face downward, in front of the house of Ferminio. They all
proceeded towards Sitio Tulong passing through the rice fields.
Three years later, the bodies or remains of the Balaan brothers
were exhumed. Afterwhich, the remains, were brought to the
house of Freddie Arevalo, a relative of the deceased where they
were laid in state for the wake. The RTC declared Fronda guilty
as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The appellant says
he was only taken by the armed men as a pointer & interposes
the exempting circumstance under RPC A12(6) claiming that all
his acts were performed under the impulse of uncontrollable
fear and to save his life.
Issue: WON Fronda can claim the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear.
Held: No. Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. (People vs.
Abanes) In the case at bar, the records indicate that appellant
was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed
men a hunting knife. Also, as aforesaid, appellant was not able

117

to explain his failure to report the incident to the authorities for


more than three years. These circumstances, among others,
establish the fact that the appellant consciously concurred with
the acts of the assailants. In order that the circumstance of
uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People v. Loreno)
Appellant had the opportunity to escape when he was ordered
by the armed men to go home after bringing the victims to the
mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed men when
required to bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the
grave. Appellant also chose to remain silent for more than three
years before reporting the killing to the authorities. Based on
these circumstances, We hold that the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as having
been done under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.
5. INSUPERABLE OR LAWFUL CAUSE
Elements:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful
or insuperable cause
a. U.S. vs. Vincentillo, 19 Phil. 118 (1911)
Crime: illegal and arbitrary detention
Held: Vicentillo was exempt from criminal, he was acquitted
from the offense w/c was charged
b. People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530 (1936)
Facts:
One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor,
JosefinaBandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the
call of nature.Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the
thicket with herclothes stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering andvisibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. Rushing toher aid, he brought her to her house
and placed her on the bed. Hecalled on Adriano Comcom to
help them Comcom saw he body of anewborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellanthad gone a few
moments
before.
She
claimed
it
was
hers.
Dr.
EmilioNepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her
own houseand three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial
court gavecredit to this opinion.
Issue:
WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable,must be committed willfully or consciously, or at
least it must be theresult of a voluntary, conscious and free act
or omission. Theevidence does not show that the appellant, in
causing her childsdeath in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did sowillfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill orabandon it, to expose it
to death, because her affair with a formerlover, which was not

118

unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took placethree years


before the incident; her married life with Kirolsheconsiders
him her husband as he considers him his wifebegan ayear
ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancyand
that it was his and that theyve been eagerly awaiting the
birthof the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be
ashamed o herpregnancy to Kirol.Apparently, she was not aware
of her childbirth, or if she was, it didnot occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness,which cause may be
considered lawful or insuperable to constitutethe 7th exempting
circumstance, to take her child from the thicketwhere she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned andexposed to
the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket topee,
she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in
thatsame place and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence orany other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizzinessand extreme debility, she could not be blamed
because it allhappened by mere accident, with no fault or
intention on her part.The law exempts from liability any person
who so acts and behavesunder such circumstances (RPC
A12(4)). Thus, having the fourth andseventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of thecrime that she
had been accused of.
C. OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES
1. INSTIGATION
- the criminal plan or design exists in the mind of the law
enforcer with whom the person instigated cooperated so
it is said that the person instigated is acting only as a
mere instrument or tool of the law enforcer in the
performance of his duties.
a. People vs. Lua Chu, 56 Phil. 44 (1931)
Facts: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of
the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who
represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of
Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson
& Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of
P6K for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On
Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the
ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the
former consult the real owners on how to proceed the
payment of P6K & will come over to Samson house on
Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On
the same day Samson informed the Constabulary
represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal
requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation
between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17,
1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named
Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the
curtains in the house of Samson to witness the
conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu.
Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important
facts:
1.Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of
the owners of the Opium.

119

2.Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there


were co-owners namedTan and another located in Amoy.
3.Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of
the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng.
4.A Customs Collector had a conversation before when
Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and
agreed on the business of shipping the Opium. The
following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay
presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo
showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two
Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu &
confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins).
Crime: illegal importation of opium
Held: It is true that Samson smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibition drug, but that was open
the accused had already planned its importation and
ordered for said drug. Samson neither nor instigated Chu
to import the opium but pretended to have an
understanding with the Collector of Asom, who promised
them to removed all the difficulties in the enterprises.
This is not a case where an innocent person is induced to
commit a crime to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap
to catch a criminal.
b. Araneta vs. CA, 142 SCRA 532 (1986)
FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco is the widow of
Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of NIA. She approached
the appellant, Atty Aquilina Araneta, a hearing officer of
the Workmens Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to
inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death
compensation.
Learning the reqirements, Yoyongco
prepared the forms and filed them at the Unit. When she
went again to follow up on the status of the application,
she was told by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100
so that her claim would be acted upon. She told the
officer that she had no money then but if she would
process her claim, Yoyongco would give her the PhP100
upon approval. To this, Atty Araneta refused and said
that on previous occasions certain claimants made similar
promises but they failed to live up to them.
Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco
(hala ka), the Chief of Criminal Investigation Service, Phil
Constabulary, and informed him the demand of the
appellant. The Col then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and
instructed her to go to Col Laureaga.
The latter
concocted a plan to entrap the appellant. The 2 PhP50
bills were marked w/ notations CC-NE-1 and CC-NE-2,
photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder. The
complainant went to the officer along w/ CIC Balcos who
pretended to be her nephew. She again requested the
officer to process her claim but was again asked if she
already had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out the 2
P50 bills & handed them to the appellant. As she took
hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand &
arrested her. In the PC headquarters, Atty Aranetas
hands were examined for the presence of UV powder &

120

result was positive. Appellant contends that the bills, w/c


she never accepted, were rubbed against her hand and
dress.
CRIME: Bribery
HELD: There is entrapment when law officers employ
ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.
There is instigation when the accused was induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two
lies in the origin of the crim intent. In entrapment, the
mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from
him.
In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused
who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of bribery,
a violation of Sec 3 RA No 3019 known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Considering though that this
case was pending since 1971 and she is a mother of four
and the amount involved is only PhP100, it is
recommended that petitioner be granted either executive
clemency or the privilege of probation if she is qualified.
Decision affirmed.
c. Cabrera vs. Pajares, 142 SCRA 127 (1986)
Facts: On Jan. 16, 1965, enrico Cabrera statement to the
Natl Bureau of Naga denouncing that Judge James
Pajares asked money from him in connection with his
case. Cabrera gave P1000 to judge Pajares bec. The latter
had been under strict, preventing him from making
statement during the trial of his case. After 2 mo. Judge
told him again that he needed most was then that he
asked the assistance of the NBI in entrapping them.
Cabrera accompanied by NBI agent Angelica Somera
when he introduced as his wife got the envelop
containing the marked money and handed it to Judge
Pajares and rushed out of the chamber and gave signal to
the waiting nbi agent. Thr Jugde was arrested. The
envelop was found inserted to a diary on the judges
table.
Crime: indirect bribery
Issue WON Pajares is guilty of acts unbecoming of a
judge.
Held: NO. GUILTY ONLY OF INDIRECT BRIBERY. Evidence
only shows that he accepted the money & that he knew it
was being given to him by reason of his office as per the
investigation conducted by Investigating Justice Mendoza.
Unfortunate since the Court has always stressed that
members of the judiciary should display not only the
highest integrity but must at all times conduct
themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach &
suspicion. For the judge to return the peoples regard of
him as an intermediary of justice between 2 conflicting
parties, he must be the first to abide by the law & weave
an example for the others to follow. He should be
studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of

121

law. But Mendozas recommendation of merely


suspending the judge for 2 yrs & 4 mos as the proper
administrative penalty by virtue of Pajares serious
misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary & public interest
cannot
be
upheld.
Court
approves
Mendozas
recommendation to acquit Pajares for lack of evidence of
the 2nd charge of having committed acts unbecoming of
a member of the judiciary. Pajares dismissed from the
service w/forfeiture of all retirement benefits & pay &
w/prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the govt or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities. Clerk of Court
ordered to return the ten marked P100.00 bills to
Cabrera.
d. People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668
FACTS
Philippine
National
Police
(PNP)
Narcotics
Command(Narcom), received information from two (2)
civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in
illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided
to entrap him via a buy-bust operation.-The poseur-buyer,
PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600pesos as marked money for
the entrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun
upon transaction. Jun returned an hour later bringing
marijuana where he and his associates subsequently
arrested Jun but
did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the
bills to his associate Neneth. Jun led the police to
Neneths house.- The police went to Neneths house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps
was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's"
house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found
the marked bills. They arrested Jun and Neneth and
brought them to headquarters. It was only then that the
policelearned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while"Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.- The trial
court found them guilty.
ISSUES
1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao,the
search of the latters person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom
is valid 2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being
inplain view of the police officers
HELD
1. YES- We also hold that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when

122

lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without


a warrant, arrest a person:(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
- Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person maybe
arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."- In the case, Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation,
the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.- However, the
warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is
invalid- Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught redhanded during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao
to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.- Neither could the
arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second
instance of Rule 113."Personal knowledge" of facts in
arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113
must be based upon "probable cause" which means an
"actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."In case,
there was no reasonable suspicion especially as she was
arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification
made by her co-accused- Doria did not point to appellant
Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her
house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any
conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that
she was engaged in drug pushing.- As the arrest was
illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the
arrest2. NO- The marijuana was not in plain view of the
police officers and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution
as the contents of the box where the marijuana was
partially hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit,
one of the arresting officers.
As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting
officers may be seized without a search warrant but must
follow these requisites: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.However, if it is not plain view of the police officers,it may

123

not be seized without a warrant except if the package


proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then thecontents are in plain
view and may be seized.- The fact that the box containing
about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the
house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a
finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
Dispositive
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig
City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D
is reversed and modified as follows:1. Accused-appellant
Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine of five
hundred
thousand
pesos(P500,000.00).2.
Accusedappellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
2. EFFECT OF PARDON
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A pardon
of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil
liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is
extinguished by his express waiver.
ARTICLE 266-C. EFFECT OF PARDON.
-Subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the
offended party extinguishes the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.
- A Husband may be guilty of raping his wife.
- When the legal husband is the offender, subsequent
forgiveness of the wife extinguishes the criminal action or
penalty. This does not follow if the marriage is void ab initio.
a. RPC, Arts. 23, 266-C
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A
pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal
action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but
civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured
party is extinguished by his express waiver.
ARTICLE 266-C. EFFECT OF PARDON.
-Subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the
offended party extinguishes the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.
- A Husband may be guilty of raping his wife.
- When the legal husband is the offender, subsequent
forgiveness of the wife extinguishes the criminal action or
penalty. This does not follow if the marriage is void ab
initio.
3. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
a. RPC, Arts. 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344 - are those
where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy the accused is exempt from criminal liability.
A. RPC, Arts 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344
Art 6(3) - There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly or over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which

124

should produce the felony by reason of some cause or


accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
Art 7 - When light felonies are punishable. - Light
felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed
against person or property.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal
liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall
not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following
are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
Article 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person
who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other
kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise
have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall
not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any private
person who shall enter the dwelling of another against
the latter's will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or
intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any
person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose
of preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be

125

applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for


the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn
and other public houses, while the same are open.
Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No
criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same
shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-inlaw, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission of
the crime.
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.
b. People vs. Oyanib, 354 SCRA 196 (2001)
Facts: Manolito Oyanib & Tita Oyanib were legally
married. Years thereafter they separated. Tita had affairs
w/ other men. Manolito reminded her that they were still
legally married, but Tita still continued with her affairs.
One day, Manolito came to see Tita to inform her of a
meeting w/ their sons school regarding their sons failed
subject. He then came upon Tita and his paramour, Jesus
Esquierdo, having sex w/ the latter on top of the other w/
his pants down to his knees. Upon seeing him, Jesus
kicked Manolito in the check and Manolito immediately

126

stabbed Jesus. Tita left the room, got a Tanduay bottle


and hit Manolita with it in the head. Tital then stabbed
Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This
angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita as well.Thereupon,
Edgardo, owner of the house where Tita was staying
entered the room. Manolito hid but later gave himself
up.He was found guilty of homicide and parricide and was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 month, 1 day
to 6 yrs of prision correccional as minimum to 6 yrs 1 day
to 8 yrs of prision mayor as maximum and to pay P50K
civil indemnity and costs for the death of Jesus and to
reclusion perpetua, to pay P50K and costs for the death
of his wife Tita. He appealed, admitting the killings but
arguing that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstance provided in A247 RPC.
Issue: WON hes entitled to the exceptional privilege
under RPC A247
HELD:YES. He invoked Art. 247, RPC as an absolutory and
an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is present
where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused
to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction
of the court in order to be relived of any criminal
liability.RPC A247 prescribes the ff essential elements for
such defense:
- That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
- That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and
- That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution
of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Accused
must prove these elements by clear and convincing
evidence, otherwise, his defense would be untenable. The
death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his
spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing of the
husband of his ide must concur with her flagrant adultery.
The Court finds the accused to have acted within the
circumstances contemplated in Art. 247, RPC. The law
imposes very stringent requirements before affording
offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of RPC
A247. The vindication of a Mans honor is justified
because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law
is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise
her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe that it can only be justified when
the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, & it
must be resorted to only w/ great caution so much so that
the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter (People v. Wagas).
Court thus sentenced Manolito to 2 yrs & 4 mos of
destierro and shall not be permitted to enter or be w/in a
100 km radius from Iligan City.

127

4. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF


EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
a. RPC, Art. 5
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the
law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper
to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
b. People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995)
Facts: On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a
seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo
P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to
impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather
imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The
city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
Crimes: grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose
penalty lower than that prescribed by law.
HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper
penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless
of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the
respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9
that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the
laws.
D. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 13)
Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are
mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.

128

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the


offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of
a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a
person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise
suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of
the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned.
1. INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION/EXEMPTION
those circumstances has reference be (1) justifying
circumstance. Not all the requisites necessary to justify the
act or except from from criminal liability in the respective
are attendant.
a. People vs. Jaurigue, supra
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were
prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for
the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was
acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one
day of prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and
eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to
pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with onehalf of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by
her. From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina
Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8oclock in the
evening, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the
Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services.
Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attend in
greligious services, Upon observing the presence of
Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on
which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and,
without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of
impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right
thigh. Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity
and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife

129

which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention


of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized
Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife
with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base
of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound
about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal.
Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio
lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein
defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to
close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody
into the house, unless accompanied by him. Then three
policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that
night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant
and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked
as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what
had actually happened.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding
said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional mitigating
circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of
the
alleged
offense
attended
by
aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that,
in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the
manner and form and under the circumstances above
indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance
whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in
her favor. Said chapel where the incident took place was
lighted with electric lights and there were several people
inside; under the circumstances, there was and there
could be no possibility of her being raped. The means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability. The facts that
the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily
and unconditionally surrendered and admitted having
stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate
vindication of grave offense committed against her, (3)
had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted
to punish his offending hand, be considered as mitigating
circumstances. Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of
prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to
exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should

130

also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive


imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated.
b. People vs. Narvaez, supra
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder
(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and
Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence
that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house
and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he
heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and askedthem to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things
over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot
Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was
placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischer's family)was involved in a legal
battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of
the shooting, the civil case was still pending for
annulment(settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though
case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating
contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was
given 6 months to remove his house from the land.
Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI
ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders,
CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1.WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of
the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a
form of aggression on the part of the victim. However,
this aggression was not done on the person of the victim
but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the
courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30
of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close
and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim
was not in the position to subscribe to the article because
his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim
was the original aggressor.
2.WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
although he acted in defense of his rights.

131

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying


circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
- Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was
unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have
left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the
Civil Code also provides that possession may not be
acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be
respected in his possession
- Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or
repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to
the attack.
- Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person
defending himself. Here, there was no provocation atall
since he was asleep Since not all requisites present,
defendant is credited withthe special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art.
13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation. Crime is homicide
(2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable
on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault
was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer
acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence
of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to
mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can
be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3.WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment
since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the
offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions
of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of
damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damagesand costs of proceedings. Although it was
enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA
5465 is favorable to theaccused who is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be givenretroactive effect pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
Held:
Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating
circumstances
and
extenuating
circumstance
of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto
mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o
subsidiary imprisonment and w/oaward for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained14 years
so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting.
Defense of property can only beinvoked when
coupled with form of attack on person defending property.
In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then

132

be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has


served more than that, he should be released.
2. UNDER 18 OR OVER 70 YEARS OF AGE
a. RA 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE
AND
WELFARE
COUNCIL
UNDER
THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
b. People vs. Cortezano, 411 SCRA 431
Facts: Leah, 8 years old, was raped of about thirty-six
times by her uncles, Joel, 13 years old, and Bernardo, 12
years old. The two wetted her vagina with saliva, acted in
conspiracy by acting as a lookout for each other,
threatened to kill her and her family if such case be
divulged, forced Boyet to rape her, laughed at him while
he was raping her, and ordered Leah Lou and Lionel, the
victims siblings to see her naked and did the same
threat.
Contention: They should be exempted because they are
minors when they committed the acts.
Held:
The contention is wrong. A minor who is over
nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of
the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal
liability only when the said minor acted without
discernment.
In this case, the evidence on record show beyond cavil
that the appellants acted with discernment when they
raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victims vagina
before they raped hey; (b) one of them acted as a lookout
while the other was raping the victim; (c) they threatened
to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they
did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e)
they laughed as Boyet was raping the victim; (f) they
ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked
after the appellants had raped her.
However, though they are not exempted, their charges
are mitigated. Where the accused are minors at the time
they committed the offenses, they are entitled to benefits

133

of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, as


provided in Art 68 of the RPC, par 1.
Discernment: The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances, afforded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of the said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial.
3. NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG
a. People vs. Regato, 127 SCRA 287 (1984)
Facts: Regato, Salceda, & Ramirez arrived together at the
residence of Victor Flores and pretended to buy
cigarettes. When Felicisima Flores opened the door, they
went inside the house and demanded of Victo to bring out
their money. When he refused, Ramirez and Regato
maltreated him, while Salceda went inside the bedroom
and ransacked the trunk where the money was kept.
Ramirez then inquired whether he found the money and
Salceda answered in the affirmative. Ramirez called
Victor a liar and the latter called them robbers to which
Ramirez responded by shooting Victor. The two (Ramirez
remained at large) were convicted and found guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Held: There is no merit in the contention that there was
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. Intention is a mental process & is an internal
state of mind. The intention must be judged by the
action, conduct and external acts of the accused. What
men do is the best index of their intention. In the case at
bar, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance cannot be
appreciated considering that the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce the result
that they actually madethe death of the victim.
With respect to nighttime and craft, it is obvious that the
crime was committed at night. Craft involves intellectual
trickery or cunning on the part of the accused. Shouting
from the outside that they wanted to buy cigs, they
induced the inmates to open the door for them.
For lack of necessary votes, the death penalty cannot
be imposed, thus the penalty is modified to reclusion
perpetua.
b. People vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439
Facts:
Miranda, deceased, is a 25-year old retardate and the
accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to fun errands for Pugay and at times, they
slep together.

134

On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public


plaza and there were different kinds of rides including the
ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion who was
sitting at the ferris wheel reading a comic book with a
friend. Pugay and Samson with several companions
arrived and were drunk as they were noisy and happy. As
they saw Miranda walking nearby, they started making
fun of him and tickled him with a piece of wood to dance.
Pugay took a can of gasoline from under the engine of
the ferris wheel and poured its contents on Miranda.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Then Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
Body of deceased was still aflame when the police
arrived at the scene. Upon inquiring among the people,
they spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson.
Miranda was rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment
while the two accused and other five persons were took
for interrogation.
A few hours after the incident, the accused gave their
written statements to the police. Pugay admitted that he
poured gasoline and accused Samson alleged in his
statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline but did not
see who set Miranda on fire. They both did not impute
any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission.
The accused repudiated their written statements and
claim that they were extracted by force into admitting the
crime. They also blamed Gabion for the crime
Although there were written statements, these were not
the sole basis forthe findings of facts. Even without these,
Gabions
straightforward
testimonywhich
remains
unaffected by the uncorroborated testimony of the
accused.
Accused asserted that prosecution suppressed other
witnesses and onlyGabion was presented. There is no
dispute that there were other witnesses In crime but their
non-presence doesnt give rise to the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. This presumption doesnt apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence. The matter
as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to
decide.
They also alleged that the mother of Miranda asked
Gabion to testify buteveidence shows that this is not the
case. The uncle was the one who talkedto him. And even
so, Gabion has no reason to testify falsely against them.
They also alleged that his testimony is incredible bec of
the absurdity of reading a comic book while in the Ferris
wheel. However, during cross-examination, Gabion clearly
stated that after he told Pugay not to pour gasoline, he
resumed reading the comics, and that when the victims
body ison fire, that is only when he noticed a commotion.
SC held: The judgment is affirmed with modifications.

135

There is nothing in the records that shows that there


was a precious conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention bet the two accused immediately before the
crime. There was no animosity and their meeting atthe
scene of the crime was accidental. They only want to
make fun of the deceased.
The respective criminal resp of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the deceased
is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable
only for the act committed by him.
Pugays criminal responsibility: he failed to exercise all
the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed
by his companions who at the time were making fun of
the victim. SC agrees with SOL gen that Pugay is only
guilt of HOMICIDE THRURECKLESS IMPRUDENCE under
365 of RPC.
Proper penalty for Pugay: Indeterminate from 4 months
of Am as minimum to4 years and 2 months of PC as max.
Samsons criminal responsibility: SOL Gen contends
murder is proper considering setting victim on fire
knowing that gasoline has been poured onhim,
characterized by treachery. SC do not agree.
There is an absence of intent to kill and that his act was
just part of their fun-making that evening. Treacherydeliberate attack and employing means to insure its
execution removing any form of defense from the
offended party.
His act however doesnt relieve him of crim resp.
Burning the clothes of victim would cause at the very
least some kind of physical injury.
ART 4, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from what is intended.
Guilty of HOMICIDE under 249 with mitigating circ of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong. They were actually
stunned to see the victim burning.
Indemnity for death=P30K, with moral and exemplary
damages.
c. People vs. Gonzales, 359 SCRA 352
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of
Noel Andres and herein accused-appellant were both on
their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the
intersection point, the cars they were driving almost
collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he
cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over
to Gonzales. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino
Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense
of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez
took out the gun which was already in his car
compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalezs
daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process
held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free
his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight

136

pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and


the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noels wife,
was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew
Kevin were wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex
crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also
ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs.
Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible
error when it found treachery was present in the
commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible
error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender,
passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be
considered as mitigating circumstances.
RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance
encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the
spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for
lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ
a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack
made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of
the victims provocation was held to be without treachery.
Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses
and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to
retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the
victim were held to be without treachery as the victim
was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on
treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim
and without provocation on the part of the latter. We
affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that
the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber
Andres is homicide and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded
by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none
can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the
appellants pretense of voluntary surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is
also not obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to
excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that
the provocation must be commensurate to the crime
committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies
according to the circumstances of the case. The
aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant
and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not

137

sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants


vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also
unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and
shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to
an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable
disparity between the means employed by the accused to
commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The
intention of the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode
of attack employed and the injury sustained by the
victim. The appellants use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should
have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the
possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is
sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
d. People vs. Canete, 410 SCRA 544
Facts: leonaldo Tumaya, Joel quimod, and litio Tundag
were on their way home after attending a wedding party.
Tumaya was walking ahead of Tundag and Quimod. As
they passed by the houses of canetes, quimod and
tundag heard succession gunshots and when they looked
in the direction where where the bursts of gunfire were
coming from, they saw Ruben, Alfred Sergio, Sotero and
Trinidad all surnamed Canete shooting Tamayso who
stumped to the ground. Apperently not satisfied are the
accused approach the falten Tumayao and continued
shooting him.
Held: No MC, they are liable. It is their intention to
commit the act done bec. The time elapsed bet. The
incident the crime is sufficient to plan the intended act
and the use pugakhang a kind of gun, is sufficient to
produce the intent act to kill tumayao. To shoot
tumayaos head is also an evidence of the intention to
commit a grave offense against the victim.
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT
This is mitigating only if the crime was committed on
the very person who made the threat or provocation. The
common set-up given in a bar problem is that of provocation
was given by somebody. The person provoked cannot
retaliate against him; thus, the person provoked retaliated
on a younger brother or on an elder father. Although in fact,
there is sufficient provocation, it is not mitigating because
the one who gives the provocation is not the one against
whom the crime was committed.
a. People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 (1977)
Facts: Pagal and Torcelino were convicted of the crime of
robbery with homicide. They invoke the mitigating

138

circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion or


obfuscation.
Held: First, provocation and obfuscation arising from one
and the same cause should be treated as only one
mitigating circumstance. Since the alleged provocation
which caused the obfuscation of the appellants arose
from the same incident, that is, the alleged
maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the appellants by the
deceased, those two mitigating circumstances cannot be
considered as two distinct and separate circumstances
but should be treated as one.
Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation
cannot be mitigating in a crime which is planned and
calmly meditated before its execution, as in the case at
bar.
Third, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim
to have committed against them occurred much earlier
than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation
in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and
immediately preceding the act.
Thus, where the accused killed his wife during a quarrel,
because he, who had no work, resented her suggestion to
join her brother in the business of cutting logs, the 2
mitigating circumstances of provocation & obfuscation
cannot be considering in favor of the accused.
b. US vs. Malabanan, Phil .262
Facts: Before 6 oclock on the morning of the 8th of
November, 1906, Felino Malaran, a prisoner and assistant
jailer, reported to the foreman Pedro Pimentel that
Esteban Malabanan had taken some bread out of a tin
can that was in the jail; Malabanan being resentful at this
and also because he had received a severe blow with a
cane from the said assistant jailer, attacked the latter
after breakfast with a small knife, and wounded him in
the chest, the right arm, and in the back. Raymundo
Enriquez, another assistant jailer, upon seeing what was
taking place, tried to separate them and prevent the
accused from further attacking Malaran, but he did so
with such bad luck that he also was wounded with the
knife in the right side near the abdomen, and in
consequence of said wound Raymundo Enriquez died of
peritonitis and hemorrhage of the spleen eleven days
thereafter. Quintin de Lemos, another assistant jailer, who
also tried to stop Malabanan, was wounded in the chin.
Foreman Paulino Canlas, upon becoming aware of what
was going on, ordered the opening of the door of the
department where detachment No. 6 of the prisoners was
confined, and Malabanan upon seeing him come in tried
to attack him; thereupon Canlas took hold of a stick to
defend himself and to take away from Malabanan the
knife he held, which, like the hand and the clothes of the
accused, was covered with blood. As soon as the accused
was disarmed Canlas blew his whistle to call the
inspector, who on his arrival at the place where the fight
had taken place ordered the three wounded men to the

139

hospital and the aggressor locked up in the cell. It was


ascertained from the accused that the knife had been
found by him among the bamboo kept within the
department of the detachment, and it was recognized by
him when the same was exhibited.
Held: in the commission of the homicide there is no MC/
AC to be considered and as to WON Malabanan was illtreated or provoked prior to his assult to Malabanan such
a circumstance cannot be dealt within the present
proceeding instituted by reason of the violent death of
Enriquez.
5. IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
~ allows a lapse of time as long as the offense is still
suffering from the mental anguish and wounded feelings
brought about by the offense by him.
Elements:
1. That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the
felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degree.
2. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave
offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication andthe
doing of the grave offense.
The vindication need not be done by the person upon whom
the grave offense was committed
Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication
The question whether or not a certain personal offense is grave
must be decided by the court, having in mind
the social standing of the person,
the place and
the time when the insult was made.
Vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation
cannot be counted separately and independently.
a. People vs. Espina, 361 SCRA 701
Facts: Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina, Samson Abuloc who were
having a drinking spree and playing cards during an association
meeting, when accused-appellant RomeoEspina arrived, Bulicatin
asked three (3) bottles of kulafu wine from him and he acceded
by buying three (3) bottles of kulafu wine from the store of
EufroniaPagas. Later on that afternoon, Bulicatin again demanded
another bottle of kulafu wine from accused- appellant but this
time, the latter refused to give in tothe demand. Bulicatin then
proceeded to where accused-appellant was playingcards and
without any warning, urinated on the latter and clipped him under
hisarms. Accused-appellant got angry. He however did not engage
Romeo in anyaltercation but instead went home.Later on in the
evening, while the trio were still having a drinking spree, they
heardaccused-appellant calling Bulicatin from outside, saying,
Borgs, get out because Ihave something to say. The trio came
down from the house. Rogelio and Samsonwere ordered to lie on
the ground, Bulicatin was still at the stairway and when heturned
his back towards accused-appellant, the latter shot him, hitting
him at theback. Bulicatin ran away but he was chased by accusedappellant who fired two (2)more shots at him.On appeal he

140

alleged that the court erred by overlooking and misinterpreting


somesignificant facts in convicting him.
Issues:1.Are appellants contentions tenable?2.Is appellant
entitled to any mitigating circumstance?
Ruling: The court held that, contrary to the claim of accusedappellant, the trial court didnot overlook his contention that he
could not have committed the offenses chargedbecause at the
time of the incedent, he was unconscious due to a stab wound.
Infact, the trial court treated the same as a defense of denial and
alibi. Indeed, thesedefenses cannot prevail over the categorical
and positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution
witness Abuloc who was not shown to have any ill motiveto testify
falsely against him.Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that the
assessment of the credibility of witnessesand their testimonies is
a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of itsunique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their
demeanor,conduct and attitude under grilling examination. In the
case at bar, the trial courtdid not err in giving credence to the
version of the prosecution. The facts andcircumstances alleged to
have been overlooked by the trial court are not material tothe
case and will not affect the disposition thereof. The trial court
however correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
havingacted in immediate vindication of a grave offense. As the
evidence on record show,accused-appellant was urinated on by
the victim in front of the guests. The act of the victim, which
undoubtedly
insulted
and
humiliated
accused-appellant,
camewithin the purview of a grave offense under Article 13,
paragraph 5, of theRevised Penal Code. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant.
Nevertheless the decision of the lower court wasaffirmed with
modifications, his sentenced was reduced to prision mayor.
b. People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271
Facts: Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to the charge of
murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo,
Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by treachery
and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was
mitigated by plea of guilty.
Held: No MC of vindication of grave offense can be appreciated
where a 6hr interval transpired bet the alleged grave offense
committed by Moncayo against Benito to recover his serenity. But
instead of using that time to regain his composure he evolved the
plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hrs. Benito literally
ambushed moncayo first a few mins after after the victim had left
the office He acted w/ treachery and evident premeditation in
perpetrating the cold-slooded murder.
c. People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331
Facts: Parana was convicted of the crime of murder with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased. The aggravating circumstances that the appellant is a
recidivist and that there was treachery must be taken into
consideration. Are mitigating circumstances attendant?
Held: The fact that the accused was slapped by the deceased in
the presence of many persons a few hours before the former killed

141

the latter, was considered a mitigating circumstance that the act


was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense.
Although the grave offense (slapping of the accused by the
deceased), which engendered perturbation of mind, was not so
immediate, it was held that the influence thereof, by reason of its
gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted
until the moment the crime was committed. The other mitigating
circumstance that the appellant had voluntarily surrendered
himself to the agents of the authorities must be considered.
Cases of voluntary surrender. Surrender is not mitigating when
defendant was in fact arrested. But where a person, after
committing the offense and having opportunity to escape,
voluntarily waited for the agents of the authorities and voluntarily
gave himself up, he is entitled to the benefit of this circumstance,
even if he was placed under arrest by a policeman then and there.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Elements:
1. The accused acted upon an impulse.
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce
passion or obfuscation in him.
Passion or obfuscation not applicable when:
The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS.
The act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.

The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from


jealousy cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose
relationship with the woman was illegitimate.
Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing
only in the honest belief of the offender.
a. People vs. Rabanillo, 307 SCRA 613
Facts: Rabanillo & the deceased Morales were drinking w/ their
friends. One friend started a water fight game & Rabanillo joined
the fun, accidentally dousing Morales w/ water. Morales
reprimanded him because water got into his ear & they argued
which led into a fistfight. They were pacified & ushered to their
respective houses. The prosecutions version of the events was
given credit by the court which claimed that after 30 minutes
after, while Morales & some friends were having a conversation in
the terrace of the house of Morales, Rabanillo went out his house
w/ a 1-meter samurai & hacked Morales who died that same day.
Rabanillo offered his testimony to prove the mitigating
circumstances of passion & obfuscation, drunkenness, & voluntary
surrender thereby admitting having killed Morales.
Held: For passion & obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must
originate from lawful feelings. From the version of the facts by the
prosecution, clearly the assault was made in a fit of anger. The
turmoil & unreason that would naturally result from a quarrel or
fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in
the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement w/c is
inherent in all persons who quarrel & come to blows doesnt
constitute obfuscation.
Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the accused might have regained his normal

142

equanimity. In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fight


and the killing. Having been actuated more by the spirit of
revenge or anger than of a sudden impulse of natural or
uncontrollable fury, passion and obfuscation cannot be
appreciated.
To be mitigating, the accuseds state of intoxication should be
proved or established by sufficient evidence. It should be such an
intoxication that would diminish or impair the exercise of his
willpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. The
accused must then show that (1) at the time of the commission of
the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as
to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of selfcontrol; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to
the plan to commit the felony. The accused merely testified that
he joined his friends de Guzman and Soriano in a drinking session,
but only for a short time. The fact that he was able to resume his
routine work thereafter, belie his claim that he was heavily drunk
at the time he attacked the victim. The regularity of Rabanillos
alcohol intake could even have increased his tolerance for alcohol
to such an extent that he could not easily get drunk.
For voluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites
must concur:
1.
the offender was not actually arrested;
2.
he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a
person in authority; and
3.
his surrender was voluntary
A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred
in his search and capture.
In the case, the baranggay captain had to go to the house of
Rabanillo to take the latter to the police station. The latter did not
present himself voluntarily to the former, who is a person in
authority pursuant to Art. 152 of the RPC, as amended; neither did
he ask the former to fetch him at his house so he could surrender.
The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the
baranggay captain does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered.
Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
Judgment: There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance the penalty is the medium period of that prescribed
by law for that offense. Accused is found guilty of homicide, and
not murder, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty rangin from
10 yrs of prision mayor as minimum to 17 yrs and 4 mos of
reclusion temporal as maximum with all accessories thereof, and
to indemnify the heirs.
b. People vs. Germina, 290 SCRA 146
Facts: The appellant went to the house of the victim. A heated
conversation took place between victims relatives and appellant
concerning a quarrel between the accuseds brother and victim.
When the victim arrived, appellant drew his gun. Victims relatives
scampered to safety and victim tries to run but tripped. When the
appellant caught up with him, the appellant shot him at the nape.

143

Appellant was convicted of murder because of the presence of


treachery, the victim, having been shot at the back.
Held: The mere fact that the victim was shot at the back while
attempting to run away from his assailant would not per se qualify
the crime to murder. If murder was his bent, he wouldnt have
gone to the house of the victim not would he engage the victims
relatives to a heated argument. Thus, the crime is not attended by
treachery (aleviosa). Moreover, passion cannot co-exist with
treachery because in passion, the offender loses his control and
reason while in treachery, the means employed are consciously
adopted. One who loses his reason and self-control could not
deliberately employ a particular means, method or form of attack
in the execution of the crime. Thus, without treachery, the
mitigating circumstance of passion as well as voluntary surrender
may be appreciated.
c. People vs. Gelaver, 223 SCRA 310
Facts: Eduardo Gelaver and his wife Victoria had a heated
argument. Thereafter, Eduardo held Victorias neck dragged her
with a knife on his right hand stabbed her 3 times on her breast
Eduardo then went out of the gate and fled in the direction of
public market
Held: Before this circumstance may be taken into consideration it
produce such a condition of mind The act producing the
obfuscation must not be for removed from the commission of the
crime by considerable length of time during w/c the accused
might have recover his equanimity. The crime almost after Victoria
abandoned the conjugal dwelling.
d. People vs. Ignas, 412 SCRA 311
Facts: Herein appellant was charged with information of murder
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearm, to which he pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment. Apellant was married to a certain
Wilma Grace Ignas, who is having extramarital affairs with the
victim Nemesio Lopate, who was the brother of a certain Pauline
Gumpic, owner of Windfield Enterprise, where Wilma Grace used
to work as a cashier.Appellant came to know about the affairs of
his wife and the victim through Romenda Foyagao, Wilma Graces
close friend. She was instructed by Wilma Grace to disclose her
affairs to the appellant, in which upon the disclosure, she also
showed Wilma Graces letters, addressed to her, but intended for
her paramour. It was only sometime late in February 1996 that
Romenda, following her bosom friends written instructions,
informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma
Grace and Nemesio. Romenda informed him that the two had
spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa Inn in
Manila. Appellant became furious. He declared Addan to aldaw na
dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a
day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio). Appellant then got
all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda. That same week
Alfred Mayamnes, elder of the Kankanaey tribe to which appellant
belonged, talked to the appellant. He wanted to confirm whether
Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise from the same tribe, was
having an affair with appellants spouse. Talk apparently had
reached the tribal elders and they wanted the problem resolved as

144

soon as possible. A visibly angry appellant confirmed the gossip.


Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and
offered his equipment for sale. Among the potential buyers he
approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the offer.
Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw
appellant load his bakery equipment on board a hired truck and
depart for Nueva Vizcaya. At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10,
1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a
trader, testified that she saw a person falling to the ground.
Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away, was
another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and
casually walked away.She immediately recognized him as the
appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he was
her townmate and had known him for several years. Witness
Bayanes was five or six meters away from the scene, and the
taillight of a parked jeepney, which was being loaded with
vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of the bagsakan, aided
her recognition of appellant.
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness
Marlon Manis. He testified that on hearing gunshots from the
Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where
the gunfire came from. He saw people converging on a spot
where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground. Witness Manis
saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he
had known since Grade 2 in elementary school. Manis then saw
another person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from
the scene. He could not see the persons face very well, but from
his gait and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and
neighbor, June Ignas. Manis said that the scene was very dimly lit
and the only illumination was from the lights of passing vehicles,
but he was familiar with appellants build, hairstyle, and manner
of walking.
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that
she knew appellant. She said they were co-workers formerly at
the Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Barredo declared that at around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996,
appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being
served refreshments, appellant took out a handgun from his jacket
and removed the empty shells from the chamber. Appellant then
told her to throw the empty cartridges out of the window.
Because of nervousness she complied.
She also said that
appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot his wifes
paramour. Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9 hours; he
left only in the morning of March 11, 1996. Police investigators
later recovered the spent gun shells from witness Barredos sweet
potato garden.
According to witness on the scene, responding policemen
immediately brought the victim, Nemesio Lopate, to the Benguet
General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad,
Benguet, testified during that trial that she conducted the postmortem examination of the victims cadaver. Dr. Jovellanos
determined the cause of death to be Hypovolemia due to gunshot
wound, back, right, (Point of Entry fifth intercostal space
subscapular area). She further stated on the witness stand that
she recovered a bullet from the victims left shoulder, which she

145

turned over to the police investigators. According to her, given the


blackened edges of the gunshot wound at the victims back,
Nemesio was shot from a distance of less than three (3) feet.
Among others, several witness were presented by the prosecution
whose testimonies lead to the identification that herein appellant
was the actor of the offense. Apellant interposed a defense of
alibi which was corroborated by Ben Anoma. Anoma declared that
during the last week of February 1996, he met with appellant in La
Trinidad. There, the witness said, he proposed a partnership with
appellant in the baking business to be based in Kayapa to which
appellant agreed. The trial court disbelieved appellants defense
and sustained the prosecutions version.
Initially, the court
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Both
the prosecution and the defense filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The prosecution sought the imposition of the
death penalty. The defense prayed for acquittal on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion,
sentencing the appellant to suffer death through lethal injection.
Hence ,this automatic review.
Issues:
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding that the killing of the
victim amounts to murder.
2. WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm be taken against the appellant.
3. WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction of death
penalty.
Held:
On the issue WON the trial court was correct in finding that the
killing of the victim amounts to murder.
NO. The trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of
murder. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
specifically alleged in the information. Although the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or
long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural
rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective
application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity
in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to
consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As
worded, we find that the amended information under which
appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for
the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the
scope and coverage of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. As
for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree
with the trial courts order to dismiss the information for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 97-CR2753. Under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997,
where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of
firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely a
special aggravating circumstance. This Court has held in a number

146

of cases that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of


illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by
R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect
over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is
advantageous to the appellant insofar as it spares him from a
separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus
should be given retroactive application.
On the issue WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of
an unlicensed firearm be taken against the appellant.
No. It is not enough that the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter
must be proven with the same quantum of proof as the killing
itself. Thus, the prosecution must prove: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
own or possess the same.[108] The records do not show that the
prosecution presented any evidence to prove that appellant is not
a duly licensed holder of a caliber .38 firearm. The prosecution
failed to offer in evidence a certification from the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Division to show that
appellant had no permit or license to own or possess a .38 caliber
handgun. Nor did it present the responsible police officer on the
matter of licensing as a prosecution witness. Absent the proper
evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was
satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Hence such special
circumstance cannot be considered for purposes of imposing the
penalty in its maximum period.
On the issue WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction
of death penalty.
No. As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that
he cannot, under the provisions of RA No. 7659, be sentenced to
suffer the death penalty. The penalty for homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of
homicide the penalty imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be
imposed on appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Decision: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522 is
MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

147

e. People vs. Bates, 400 SCRA 95


1. While Edgar, Simon, and Jose are along a trail leading to the
house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick
banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose
who was then walking ahead of his companions.
2. Jose tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the 2 were
grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito.
3. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr.,
brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the
banana plantation and attacked Jose hacking him several times.
Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on
hacking him.
Held: Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in
favor of the appellant. To be considered as a mitigating
circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful
sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from
anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was
infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However,
a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo
hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the
latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter
shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything
else fter that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing
his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then
was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking
Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the
spirit of revenge.
f. Donofrate vs. People, 412 SCRA 357
FACTS: Miguel donofrate was engaged in a slugging matchwife
Leonor one evening. She struck Miguel w/ a plastic chair he punch
her to retaliate. Miguel then ran home but short he rushed outside
again and kicked the neighbors encounter turns 3 neighbors
whom he uncivilly treated garged up and maltreat him causing
Miguel to run home again. Miguel then armed Gonzales house the
father of alfredo Miguel challenged mang Mario to fight then he
spotted alfredo who was on his way home w/ warning Miguel
stabbed alfredo in the chest fatally.
Held: This is P and O when the crime was committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or due to legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. In this case it was establish that Donofrate and
wife had a violent alternation and that his neighbor mauled his
after he kicked some of them for laughing at him. These event and
circumstances prior to the killing of Gonzales could had caused
outburst of passion and emotion or Donofrates part is entitled to
MC analogous to P and O.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Elements:
1. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
2. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
or to the latters agent.
3. That the surrender was voluntary.

148

a. People vs. Mallari, 404 SCRA 170


Facts:
Based on the accusatory portion of the Information filed against
Rufino Mallari, he was accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph
Galang with an Isuzu Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that the said incident was
preceded by an altercation between RufinoMallari and Joseph
Galang when the latter admonished the former not to drive fast
while passing by the latter's house. To end the situation Joseph,
together with his brothers, who were also present at that time,
asked for apology from Rufino. However, the conflict did not end
there because when dusk came and while Joseph was watching
basketball game with his wife, Rufino arrived with some
companions and attacked Joseph with bladed weapons. They
chased him and when Joseph was able to run away, Rufino
pursued him with the use of theIsuzu Canter Elf truck. When he
caught up with him, he bumped him which resulted in his instant
death. The doctor who conducted the medico-legal inspection of
the cadaver testified that Joseph's cause of death was
crushinginjury on the head secondary to vehicular accident. The
trial court found Rufino liable with murder and sentenced with the
penalty of death after considering the qualifying circumstance of
use of motor vehicle in committing the crime. The case was
brought to the Supreme Court pursuant to the requirement of
automatic review of cases penalized with death penalty based on
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. Rufino argued that the use of
a motor vehicle was only incidental, considering that he resorted
to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch
up with the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor
vehicle wascorrectly appreciated by the trial court in imposing the
death penalty?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in
pursuingJoseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with
the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore
clear that the truck was the meansused by Rufino to perpetrate
the killing of Joseph.The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino
finds no application to thepresent case. In the said case, the police
patrol jeep was merely used by theaccused therein in looking for
the victim and in carrying the body of the victim tothe place where
it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, whichcaused
the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to
kill thevictim by running over him.Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of a motor
vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehiclequalifies
the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua
todeath. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads:3. When the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigatingcircumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.In the present
case, the aggravating circumstances of evidentpremeditation and
treachery, which were alleged in the information, were notproved.

149

What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary


surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which
were not rebutted by theprosecution.In view of the absence of an
aggravating circumstance and the presenceof one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the
penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
b. People vs. Vicente, 405 SCRA 40
Crime: Muder
Held: after the commission of the crime, Vicente immediately
placed himself to the police station. Under Sec 388 of Local govt.
code for posses of the RPC, kagawad is a person in authority Art
63 provides that the lesser of the 2 indivisible penalties shall be
imposed there being a mC attending the commission of the crime.
c. People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 311
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about
9:30 oclock in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
riding on two motorcycles, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, together with Peter Doe, John
Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as
soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by shooting him with
the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest
was issued on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and
w/o having been served on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano &
communicated his desire to surrender. Lozano contracted CD
Psupt Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco could have
opted to go on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the
authorities & face the allegations leveled against him. For this he
should be credited with the MC of voluntary surrender.
d. People vs. Magallanes, July 9, 1997
Facts: On September 29, 1991, at around three oclock in the
afternoon, the appellant, GREGORIO MAGALLANES, who was a
mananari or gaffer of fighting cocks, trekked the road to the
cockpit of Poblacion Sagbayan, Bohol. The appellant was in the
company of several other cockfighting afficionados, among whom
were Romualdo Cempron and Danilo Salpucial. While on their
way, they passed by Virgilio Tapales who was drinking in the store
of Umping Amores which was located on the elevated side of the
road. Tapales hailed Cempron and invited him for a drink but the
latter courteously refused as he was going to the cockpit. Tapales
approached Cempron and conversed with him briefly. For some
unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to the
appellant who was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales
held the appellant by his shirt, slapped him and strangled his

150

neck. But seeing a knife tucked in Tapales waist, the appellant


pulled out the knife and slashed at Tapales to loosen his grip. The
appellant succeeded in wounding the face and neck of Tapales
who let go of the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the
appellant pursued Tapales and when the latter fell, the appellant
stabbed him several more times before uttering the following
words: you are already dead in that case.[1] With that, the
appellant stood up and rode on the motorcycle being driven by
Danilo Salpucial. Later, the appellant surrendered to the police
authorities of the town of Inabanga, Bohol.
Crime: Murder to Homicide
Held: Although the confession was qualified and introduction of
evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny the
defendants guilt and, what is more, was subsequently fully
justified.
It was not the defendants fault that aggravating
circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and
mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom. If such qualification
could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the
prosecution could nullify this
mitigating circumstance by
counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating
circumstances. The judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED
by convicting the appellant Gregorio Magallanes of the crime of
homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty in his favor, and imposing upon him
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment of
the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
e. People vs. Pinca, 31 SCRA 270
Facts: The accused alleged that the victim doused him w/ alcohol.
While aboard a tricycle w/ a friend, the accused spotted the
victim. He got off the tricycle & got a piece of wood, waited for the
victim & once near, he suddenly struck the victim on the head. He
was found guilty of murder. On issue is the attendance of
modifying circumstances.
Held: For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance,
two conditions must concur: (1) offender employed such means,
method or manner of execution as to ensure his safety from the
defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means,
method or manner of execution was deliberately adopted. The
essence of treachery is the deliberateness and unexpected of the
attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or to escape. In the case at bar, the appellant
struck the drunk victim from behind. The attack, being sudden and
deliberate and the victim being utterly unsuspecting and thus
unable to put up any resistance, was treacherous indeed.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, there must be clear & convincing proof of: (1) time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, & (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between such determination & the
execution that allowed the criminal to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. These were not established by the
evidence in the case at bar.

151

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating


circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offender has not been actually arrested, (2) the offender
surrendered to a person in authority, and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to
ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the
surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary. Appellants
actions after the incident are not marks of voluntary surrender.
Denying to the police any personal knowledge of the crime, he
even tried to distance himself from the place of the incident by
going to Tagbilaran. He only went to the police station to clear his
name. Such acts do not show any intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities.
Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of
the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if
it is not habitual or subsequent to the plant to commit the
contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or
intentional, it is considered aggravating. A person pleading
intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of
obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show
proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic
drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the
crime. Appellant belatedly pleads that intoxication should mitigate
his penalty and relied merely on the prosecutions narrated facts
which supposedly showed that he was intoxicated at the time of
attack and that no evidence was presented to show that his state
of intoxication was habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit
said felony. Appellant cannot simply rely on these statements of
the prosecution. He must himself present convincing proof of the
nature and effects of his intoxication. It was not proven that
alcohol had blurred his reasonan element essential for
intoxication to be considered mitigating.
f. People vs. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166
Facts:
Celso and Gildo Amaguin, together with others, attacked Pacifico
and Diosdado Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armedwith a knife
and an Indian target. And just as they were aboutto finish off the
Oro brothers, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguins,appeared with a
revolver and delivered the coup de grace. Theyinvoke the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Held:
While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a weekbefore
turning themselves in, the fact it, they voluntarilysurrendered to
the police before arrest could be effected. For voluntary surrender
to be appreciated, the following must bepresent: (a) offender has
not been actually arrested; (b) offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All
these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
g. Luces vs. People, 395 SCRA 524
FACTS: one evening dante reginio, nelson magbanua and dela
gracia were on their way to Didoy Elican house in met jose Luces.

152

Jose collared Clemente and said Thereafter Luces immediate


stabbed Clemente on the chest w/ a balisong.
Held: Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance Luces
surrendered the responsibility for the killing of the victim. This
hardly shows any repentance on acknowledgement of crime on
Luces part. At the time of the surrender there to be ceased.
h. People vs. Basite, 412 SCRA 558
Facts: On 1 September 1996 at around 10:30 in the morning,
Sonia was in Natuel, Buguias, Benguet, on her way to her parents
home in Tinoc, Ifugao, to get her allowance. As she was walking,
she met Eddie Basite who was headed towards the opposite
direction. They passed by each other. A few seconds later, Sonia
heard footsteps behind her. When she looked back she saw Eddie
Basite following her. He reached her, held her by both hands and
told her to go down with him. Sonia resisted. But the accused
Eddie Basite pulled out a knife from his waistband, thrust it at her
neck and threatened to stab her if she continued to resist. He
ordered her to lie down on the ground and out of fear she obeyed.
The accused undressed himself and forcibly removed Sonias
pants and underwear. He placed himself on top of her, inserted
his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.
Sonia felt pain in her vagina. She resisted but the accused
threatened to stab her. When he was through with the sexual
assault, he warned her not to relate the incident to anyone or else
he would stab her. Sonia pleaded with the accused to allow her
to go home. Upon seeing that the accused had laid down his knife
beside her head while he was putting on his clothes, Sonia
grabbed the knife and stabbed him on the left shoulder.
Wounded, the accused ran away.
Sonia tried to put on her clothes, but losing her balance she rolled
down the cliff and lost consciousness. When she recovered, she
felt pain all over her body and could not find her bearings in her
weakened state. She fell asleep and woke up at around midnight.
She made her way up the mountain by the light of the moon. She
reached the place where she was raped and rested for a while
until she decided to continue on her way to her parents house in
Tinoc, Ifugao.
Held: For voluntary surrender be qualified, it must be spent
indicative of acknowledgement of guilt of guilt and for
convenience nor constitutional. If none of these impelled the
accused to surrender the it is not spontaneous.
8. PLEA OF GUILT
Elements:
1. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating.
2. That the confession of guilty was made in open court, that is,
before the competent court that is to try the case;
The extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not
voluntary confession because it was made outside the court.
3. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution.
The change of plea should be made at the first opportunity
when his arraignment was first set.
A conditional plea of guilty is not mitigating

153

a. People vs. Almendras, 372 SCRA 737


Facts: That on or about June 4, 1996, in the Municipality of Samal,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with a bladed
weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hack and stab one Criselda Manidlangan thereby
inflicting upon her wounds which caused her death and further
causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of
the victim.
Held: The belated plead of guilt cannot be appreciated favor. TO
effectively alleviate the criminal liability of a plead of guilt must be
made at the first opportunity, in repentance on the almendras to
such plea considered almendras pleaded guilty only after the
prosecution presented by two witnesses.
b. People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47
Facts: While Crisostomo was passing near the house of Geronimo,
he met the latter & invited him to have a drink in the place of a
friend. Geronimo declined the offer. Suddenly Crisostomo rushed
towards Romeo who was then standing near a store facing the
street w/ his back towards Crisostomo & shot him at a distance of
1 meter.
Held: Under RPC A15 of the RPC, intoxication of the offender shall
be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same
is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony.
Otherwise when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as
an aggravating circumstance.
The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he
committed the offense is self-serving and uncorroborated.
Besides, appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy,
and that he was on the way to another drinking spree. Obviously
he had not drunk enough. He remembers the details of the
shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he
imbibed and the persons who were with him. He realized the
gravity of the offense he committed so he fled and hid from the
authorities. He sought sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario,
boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca
bus to Manila. All these are acts of a man whose mental capacity
has not been impaired.
As the fifth assigned error appellant argues that he should be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
stating that although he hid himself from the authorities for 10
days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter upon
the advice of his parents.
The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the offender had
not actually been arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (c) that
the surrender was voluntary.
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution
that while in hiding, upon the advise of his parents, he voluntarily
surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was detained in the
municipal jail of Hagonoy. The Court agrees that the appellant is
entitled to this mitigating circumstance.

154

However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance


of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide as
invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are:
1.
that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2.
that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that
is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and
3.
that the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the
prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the
prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
c. People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519
FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came tothe house of
Ronito and his common-law wife, Maria Fe toborrow money.
Manuel, Jose, and Ronito then had adrinking spree. Later, Manuel
armed with a .38 caliber gun,entered the bedroom of Ronito and
Maria Fe and poked thesaid gun on Maria Fe. Jose, armed with a
knife followedManuel to the bedroom. Upon Manuels order Jose
tied thehands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on
hermouth. Jose also tied the hands of Marifes cousin, Leo.Jose and
Manuel then divested Maria Fe of her necklace,rings and earrings.
Manuel demanded that she give themher money but Maria Fe told
them that she had used hermoney to pay her partners in the fish
vending business.Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe and
ransackedthe room but failed to find money. Manuel then
threatenedto explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill
MariaFe, her family and their househelps if she refused
tosurrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took the moneyfrom her
waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel andJose. Manuel took a
blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronitowith it. Jose went to the
kitchen, got a knife, coveredRonito with the blanket and sat on top
of him then stabbedthe latter several times. Manuel also stabbed
Ronito ondifferent parts of his body. Manuel hit Ronito with the
buttof his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito and took thelatter's
wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, ahousehelp of
Marife.
HELD: The law does not require that the solemotive of the
malefactor is robbery and commits homicideby reason or on the
occasion thereof. In People vs. Tidula,et al., this Court ruled that
even if the malefactor intendsto kill and rob another, it does not
preclude his convictionfor the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held that the fact
that theintent of the felons was tempered with a desire also
toavenge grievances against the victim killed, does notnegate the
conviction of the accused and punishment forrobbery with
homicide.A conviction for robbery with homicide is propereven if
the homicide is committed before, during or afterthe commission
of the robbery. The homicide may becommitted by the actor at the
spur of the moment or bymere accident. Even if two or more
persons are killed and awoman is raped and physical injuries are
inflicted onanother, on the occasion or by reason of robbery, there
isonly one special complex crime of robbery with homicide.What is
primordial is the result obtained without referenceor distinction as

155

to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the


commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide is committed
even if the victim of the robbery is different from the victim of
homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery. It is not even necessary that the
victim of the robbery is the very person the male factor intended
to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the
robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other
element of the crime. It maybe true that the original intent of
appellant Manuel was to borrow again money from Ronito and
Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed the couple of
their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof,
killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery
with homicide.
d. People vs. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, at 3:00
oclock in the morning, more or less, at Poblacion West, Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, and while armed with a
deadly weapon (bolo) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hack FELIX AYROSO OLANDA with a
bolo while victim was asleep in the masters bedroom, inflicting
upon him serious hackwounds in his face and other parts of his
body, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical attendance
extended to the victim which prevented his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
Held: There is MC of plea of guilt. He pleaded guilty upon being
arraign and before the prosecution presented their witness. A plea
of guilt be made at the first opportunity indicating repentance on
the part of Ibanez.
9. PHYSICAL DEFECTS AND ILLNESS
This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and
uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons.
Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being
armless, cripple, or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend
himself or communicate with his fellow beings are limited.
The physical defect that a person may have must have a
relation to the commission of the crime.
Elements of Illness:
1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of
his will-power.
2.That such illness should not deprive the offender of
consciousness of his acts.
- When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it
may be an exempting circumstance.
It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of
pathological state that trouble the conscience or will.
a. People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 576

156

Dec 1954: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier was married to


Florentina Laceste. They begot 10 children. On June 96, after 41
yrs of marriage, Javier admitted killing his wife. Testimonies of
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, a desk investigator, and Consolacion Javier
Panit & Alma Javier, daughters of the sps:
o
Between 23am, Consolacion, who lived 10-15m. away,
heard her mom shouting, your father is going to kill me!
(translated from local dialect). She ran outside & met her sister
Alma who was weeping & informed her of their parents quarrel.
Together, they went to their brother Manuels house, about 7080m. away from their parents house.
o
Upon reaching the latter, Manuel, who entered first, found
the lifeless body of his mother in their bedroom and his father,
wounded in the abdomen.
o
Their father, Eduardo, confessed to son Manuel that he
killed his wife and thereafter stabbed himself. April 1997: RTC held
Javier guilty of the crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of PhP50K as moral damages and PhP21,730 as actual
expenses.In his appeal, Javier claims he killed his wife because he
was suffering from insomnia for a month and at the time of the
killing, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he
was doing. He claims that he was insane then.
Issues and Ratio:
1.
WON accused-appellant Javier can claim mitigating
circumstances of illness and of passion and obfuscation
No to both. On illness, since Javier has already admitted to the
killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating
circumstance.
OSG found no sufficient evidence or medical
finding to support his claim. For the mitigating circumstance of
illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the ff requisites:
Illness must diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender,
and Such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness
of his acts.
For the circumstance of passion and obfuscation of the offender to
be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the ff requisites:
There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind, and Such act w/c produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during w/c the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity.
The defense never presented any medical record of the accused
nor was a psychiatrist presented to validate the defense of
insanity. None of the elements-requisites were proved to be
present & in his testimony, Javier even stated that he was not
jealous of his wife. Equally important, the defense, during the trial,
never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of
illness & passion & obfuscation, thus weakening the case of
accused-appellant.
The alleged mitigating circumstances are
mere afterthought to whittle (to shape) down his criminal liability.
2.
WON he should be sentence to suffer a lower penalty
Yes. The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se is not
punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties. The
application of the lesser of greater penalty depends on the

157

presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Thus, in


the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the
accused, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
Holding: Appealed decision affirmed w/ modification. Javier to
suffer reclusion perpetua and PhP50K imposed as civil indemnity
instead of moral damages.
b. People vs. Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999
Facts: Marlon Parazo was convicted for rape and frustrated
homicide. On May 29, 1997, Parazo filed a motion for
reconsideration which alleged that Parazo was not provided with a
sign language expert. If the allegation should be proven the
judgement of conviction should be set aside. On February 10,
1998 the court resolved to grant the urgent omnibus motion
-To hold in abeyance consideration of his motion pending his
medical examination
-To allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his
medical examination
-To submit the appellant for examination by a physician of the
Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the judgment of conviction should be set aside
Held: Yes. Appellant was examined by Beatriz O. Cruz (SC Medical
Services Psychologist). The result of her examination was that Mr.
Parazos intelligence function based on the Goodenough is gauged
on the mild to moderate degree of mental retardation with an
estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the other hand, is
equivalent to 7 yrs & 9 months.
July 29, 1998 Memorandum report Problem of Marlon Parazo is
the severe defect or deafness. The presence of an organic
disorder cannot be determined because of the latters inability to
communicate. However, some degree of mental retardation was
gathered with the use of Paper & Pencil Test. His mental age is
seven years and nine months. His IQ is 60.
Memorandum report of Dr. Rosa Mendoza of PGH Mr. Marlon
Parazo is indeed hearing impaired and suffers from mental
retardation.
Testimonies of the people who have known Marlon Parazo since
childhood corroborated the testimonies of the medical experts.
The mother of Parazo, barangay chairman, school teacher stated
that the appellant was deaf and mute.
Based on the collateral information gathered from persons who
have known the patient since childhood, together with the result
of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the
psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is
suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe
Hearing Loss, right ear (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
Records show that Parazo was tried without the benefit of a sign
language expert and he was only assisted by a person who has
been known to him since 1983.
People v. Crisologo absence of an interpreter in sign language
who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf mute, the full
facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also
have communicated the accuseds version of the circumstances
which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of
a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

158

Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these
inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified
interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against
him denied the accused his fundamental right of due process of
law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the
guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the
proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
c. People vs. Formigones, supra
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm
in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From
there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as
harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the head of
the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house
& stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the
right lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death.
Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of the
living room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he was
found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by
his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to
his statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason
that he often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that
he suspected the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him. During the
preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case
in the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didnt testify. His counsel
presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather
strange & that he behaved like an insane person, at times he
would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a
bath & wash his clothes etc The appeal is based merely on the
theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE & therefore exempt from
criminal liability under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission
of the crime, thus exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes,
although he was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could
still distinguish between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In
order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the
meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment & freedom
of will at the time of committing the crime. (Note that definition is
same as insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement,
assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his
wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy & take violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of

159

being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was


vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
WON the suspicions were justified, is of little or no importance.
The fact is that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in his
written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at
the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written
statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense
of catching him & securing his conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or
obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous rage) &
feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide &
the lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification
that appellant will be credited with half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating
circumstances)
10. OTHER RELATED CIRCUMSTANCES
a. People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436
Facts: Appellant pleaded guilty for information of theft of 2 sacks
of paper amounting to Php 10. He was convicted and sentenced
for penalties prescribed for theft and that for habitual delinquency.
This is because he has been convicted of the same crime twice, in
1928 and in 1942. The trial court also took into consideration 2
mitigating circumstances which a re voluntary surrender and
extreme poverty. However, the trial court also took into account
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
Issue: Whether or not recidivism should have been taken into
account, when in fact it is inherent in habitual delinquency
Held: That issue raised by appellant is not to be considered at all
since what should be considered is whether he actually falls under
habitual delinquent. It is to be noted that the crimes were
committed 14 years apart. This is beyond the 10 year limit. This
means that it is only the 1942 crime which should be considered.
Thus, he is not to be considered as a habitual delinquent. The
Court affirmed the consideration of the mitigating circumstance of
extreme poverty as it is obvious that the appellant committed the
crime by reason of necessity having several minor children to feed
and selling the paper for 2.50. The Court still recognizes the
importance of life over property. The court affirmed the principal
penalty and removed the additional penalty.
b. People vs. Velasquez, 72 Phil. 98
Facts: Santiago velasques was an assistant cashier at the Pang.
Prov. Treasury. He received from different municipalities various
amount of money to the sum of P1701. 26 w/c receipt issued.
Auditors Delegate book the test and caution of the funds in the
custody of Velasquez and found deficit of P1701. 26 w/c could not
explain.
Held: MC should be considered for Velazquez returned estimated
amount defrauded.
E. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

160

Those circumstances which raise the penalty for a crime in


its maximum period provided by law applicable to that crime or
change the nature of the crime.
The aggravating circumstances must be established with
moral certainty, with the same degree of proof required to
establish the crime itself.
According to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, BOTH
generic and qualifying aggravating circumstances must be
alleged in order to be appreciated.
The list in this Article is exclusive there are no analogous
circumstances.
Basis:
the motivating power behind the act
the place where the act was committed
the means and ways used
the time
the personal circumstance of the offender and/or of the
victim
Kinds:
1) GENERIC Those that can generally apply to all crimes. Nos.
1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 20 except by
means of motor vehicles.
2) SPECIFIC Those that apply only to particular crimes. Nos. 3
(except dwelling), 15, 16, 17 and 21.
3) QUALIFYING Those that change the nature of the crime.
Art. 248 enumerates the qualifying AC which qualify the killing
of person to murder.
4) INHERENT Those that must accompany the commission of
the crime and is therefore not considered in increasing the
penalty to be imposed such as evident premeditation in theft,
robbery, estafa, adultery and concubinage.
5) SPECIAL Those which arise under special conditions to
increase the penalty of the offense and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances such as:
quasi-recidivism (Art. 160)
complex crimes (Art. 48)
error in personae (Art. 49)
taking advantage of public position and membership in an
organized/syndicated crime group (Art. 62)
When there are several applicable qualifying aggravating
circumstances, only one will be deemed as such and the others
will be deemed as generic.
1. PLACE OF COMMISSION
a. Palace of the Chief Executive, etc., or in a Place of
Religious Worship
People vs. Jaurigue, supra
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas
Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000,

161

and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half
of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her. From said
judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the
Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8oclock in the evening, Nicolas
Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend
religious services. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after
the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attend in greligious
services, Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado
Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by
her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest
of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled
out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand.
Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife
with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left
side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches
deep, which was necessarily mortal. Fearing that Amado's relatives
might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue
and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to
close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the
house, unless accompanied by him. Then three policemen arrived in
their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them
about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said
policemen briefly of what had actually happened.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant
had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in
her favor additional mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that
the commission of the alleged offense attended by aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing
to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and
under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and
appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating
circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.
Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric
lights and there were several people inside; under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped. The means employed by her in the defense of her
honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability. The facts that the
defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered and admitted having stabbed the
deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against her, (3) had not intended to kill the
deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be
considered as mitigating circumstances. Defendant and appellant
Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision

162

correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed


by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the
sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should
also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and
the knife marked ordered confiscated.
b. Uninhabited Place
People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370
Facts: Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz
were residents of Barrio Bangar, municipality of Victoria, province of
Tarlac. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959,
Donata and Victoriano heard the barkings of dogs outside their
house. Shortly, two men armed with guns, entered, pointed their
weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano, covered him with
a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her daughter
Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked
the door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly pushed
aside. Donata was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which
the two men took valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and
cutting instruments. All the while, Donata and Victoriano could hear
the movements and voices of some three to four other persons
beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina Sabado down
from the house and then asked where they could find Susana
Sabado, Donata's other daughter who was then in her store located
about five meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard
the men opening the door to Susana's store. After several minutes,
feeling that the intruders had left, Donata untied the hands of
Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to see if her daughters
were there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent
Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report the incident. Accordingly,
Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to
town to inform the police of the occurrence. On the same night,
Chief of Police Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a
handful of civilians went out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was
only the following morning when the two women were found already
dead with wounds in several parts of their bodies. They were found
in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros, located about
one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.
Crime: robbery w/ Double Homicide
Held: The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the
distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether
or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was
done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough
to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no
reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That
the accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly
shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane
field although they could have disposed of them right in the house of
Donata Rebolledo where they were found. Thus, in People v.
Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been committed
in an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a secluded
place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited. The penalty is
to be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of

163

three aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, to wit: that


the robbery was committed by a band, with treachery, and in an
uninhabited place. There is likewise the additional aggravating
circumstance that the robbery was committed in the dwelling of the
victim. Donata Rebolledo which although not alleged in the
Information is however established by the evidence.
People vs. Coderes, 130 SCRA 134
FACTS: Complainant Elsa, 17 years old, declared on the witness
stand that she had been repeatedly raped by her father since she
was eight years old, the first sexual molestation having been
committed on November 23, 1988 and the latest on November 16,
1996 when she was already sixteen years old. Around 8:00 in the
evening of November 16, 1996, Elsa testified that she was sleeping
together with her two sisters in one of the rooms of their house
located at Subaan, Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. She woke up finding
appellant lying beside her. He undressed her and, thereafter,
inserted his penis in her vagina. Elsa knew that her sisters were
aware of the various times that their father raped her but they did
not inform anybody about these incidents. Complainant herself did
not tell their mother that their own father was raping her. However,
after she was raped on November 16, 1996, she was prompted by
her conscience and her fear that her sisters might suffer the same
fate in the hands of their father to reveal her ordeal to her Lola
Mercedes who in turn informed her Lola Leonor. Both grandmothers
brought her to the Municipal Health Officer in Socorro and had her
examined.
HELD: The failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, Pinarnalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case No. P5586 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nestor Coderes y
Ablaza is ACQUITTED and his immediate RELEASE from confinement
is ordered, unless some other lawful cause warrants his further
detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court
immediately of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
c. Dwelling
Building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
This is considered an AC because in certain cases, there is an
abuse of confidence which the offended party reposed in the
offender by opening the door to him.
Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party.
It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest,
comfort and privacy.
Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile.
A person has more than one dwelling.
So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them places of their
own, each one is his own dwelling.
If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he
also stays there once in a while.
The crime of adultery was committed.
Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour.
However, if the paramour was also residing in the same dwelling,
it will not be aggravating.
The offended party must not give provocation.

164

It is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered


the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault.
Dwelling includes dependencies,
the foot of the staircase
and the enclosure under the house.
-

People vs. Torre, 373 SCRA 104


Facts: Anthony Inocencio testified that around 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. of
November 5, 1989, Paulino Cordova went to see him at his farm, also
located in Barrio Pantay, Teresa, Rizal, near the La Fiesta Farm.
Paulino asked for his assistance because the accused, then armed
with a knife and bolo, was causing trouble and commotion at the La
Fiesta Farm of Mr. Alindada. Anthony responded to Paulino's call for
help.
Upon arriving at the La Fiesta Farm, he learned that the
accused forcibly took the shoes and money of Mr. Alindadas
workers. Marita and her children asked Anthony whether they could
stay in his farm. He obliged and they all proceeded there. Upon
reaching the farm, Marita told Anthony that she was raped by the
accused that night. Thereupon, he immediately fetched policemen
from Teresa, Rizal and accompanied them to the La Fiesta Farm
where the accused was accosted.
As to how the rape was committed, Marita, the principal witness for
the prosecution, recounted her harrowing experience at the hands of
the accused. She testified that around 8:00 oclock in the evening
of November 5, 1989, she was cooking at the kitchen of the La Fiesta
Farm. She was with her five (5) children then, namely: Merly, 13
years old; Melanie, 10; Lyndon, 7; Fullimer, 4; and Johnny Boy, 1.
Suddenly, the accused, holding a knife and a bolo, appeared in the
kitchen and dragged her outside and brought her towards a house
under construction about 200 meters away. Maritas children tried to
follow but they desisted when the accused threatened (tinakot)
them. So they just stayed at the kitchen. While going to the said
house, Marita and the accused met Joel Villasis and Johnny
Dizon, also workers in the farm. They saw the accused poking a
knife and a bolo at her. Marita asked for their help but they did
nothing because they were afraid of the accused.
Held: The kitchen at the La Fiesta Farm where Marita was dragged by
appellant is her dwelling, albeit the same does not belong to her.
The Court stressed that the dwelling contemplated in Article 14(3)
of the Revised Penal Code does not necessarily mean that the victim
owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder,
or a bedspacer, the place is his home, the sanctity of which the law
seeks to protect. The fact that the crime was consummated in the
nearby house is also immaterial. Marita was forcibly taken by
appellant from her dwelling house (kitchen) and then raped her.
Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was taken from his house
although the offense was not completed therein.
Nonetheless, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is in accordance with law and jurisprudence. At that time,
the penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[46]
when committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as the

165

knife,is reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two


indivisible penalties.
People vs. Almoguerra, 415 SCRA 647
Facts: On or about May 9, 1994, in the morning thereof, at Sitio
Nabarira, Barangay Pia, Municipality of San Jacinto, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain by means of violence and/or
intimidation of person, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob the residence of spouses FLORENTINO JULATON and
LILY AMOR located at the above-mentioned address by then and
there taking away the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(p15,000.00) in different denominations and coins without the
consent of said spouses, to their damage and prejudice in the
amount aforementioned and that on the occasion of said Robbery
and pursuant to the same conspiracy, herein accused, with intent to
kill, by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the persons of GINA JULATON Y AMOR, 14 years old, LYN JULATON, 8
years old, and REY JULATON Y AMOR, 7 years old, by then and there
stabbing them with a bladed weapon (machete), hitting them on
different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them serious
and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
their untimely deaths.
Held: There is Ac of Dwelling. Appellants deliberated instruments in
the privacy of Julators domicile shows perversity. Dwelling is
considered aggravating in robbery with homicide because this kind
of robbery cannot be committed w/o the necessity of transgressing
the sanctity of the house.
People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCR 607
Facts: That on or about February 17, 1991 in the evening thereof at
Barangay Asid, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring
together and confederating with another whose true name and
identity is still unknown, with intent to gain, by means of violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Robbery
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there demanding money
from the spouses RODRIGO and FELICIDAD REJUSO but the said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Robbery as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that
is the said spouses refused and/or denied having money, and
pursuant to the same conspiracy, with intent to kill, by means of
treachery, said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help each other attack, assault and hack, with a bolo,
RODRIGO his wife FELICIDAD and their children, SHEILA and
REBECCA, all surnamed REJUSO, inflicting upon them several wounds
in different parts of the body which caused their instantaneous
death; that before killing their victims, the said accused gained
entrance into the victims' dwelling by pretending to ask for a glass of
water but once inside, they tied the hands of the victims and raped
REBECCA REJUSO before killing her.

166

crime: ATTEMPTED ROBBERY with MULTIPLE HOMICIDE with the


aggravating circumstances of rape, dwelling, band, treachery and
craft
Held:Dwelling or morada was present because the principal crime
took place in the house of the victims, although the killings were
committed outside. The accused showed greater perversity in the
deliberate invasion of the tranquility of the domicile. Dwelling
includes inclusion of the house.
People vs. Arizobal, 341 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24
March 1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband
Jimmy with one Francisco Gimenez arrived. Jimmy informed Erlinda
that they had already bought a carabao. After he handed her the
certificate of large cattle, and while he was in the process of skinning
a chicken for their supper, three (3) men suddenly appeared and
ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the
ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a
mask, another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter
helplessness of their victims, the robbers took the liberty of
consuming the food and cigarettes Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari
store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their snack, two (2) of the
intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the neighboring
store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers
proceeded to ransack the household in search for valuables. They
took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and told them to
produce P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple
could not produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda
offered to give their certificate of large cattle. The culprits however
would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her.
Three (3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and
together with Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away
while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard
Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of
gunfire which reverberated through the stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them
informed Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed
for trying to escape. Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens
had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which
can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass
to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime
without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the
case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the
inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into
submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands
before dragging them out of the house to be killed.
People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519

167

FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came tothe house of Ronito
and his common-law wife, Maria Fe toborrow money. Manuel, Jose,
and Ronito then had adrinking spree. Later, Manuel armed with a .38
caliber gun,entered the bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe and poked
thesaid gun on Maria Fe. Jose, armed with a knife followedManuel to
the bedroom. Upon Manuels order Jose tied thehands of Maria Fe
behind her back and put a tape on hermouth. Jose also tied the
hands of Marifes cousin, Leo.Jose and Manuel then divested Maria Fe
of her necklace,rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give
themher money but Maria Fe told them that she had used hermoney
to pay her partners in the fish vending business.Manuel and Jose did
not believe Maria Fe and ransackedthe room but failed to find
money. Manuel then threatenedto explode the grenade tucked under
his shirt and kill MariaFe, her family and their househelps if she
refused tosurrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took the
moneyfrom her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel andJose.
Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronitowith it. Jose
went to the kitchen, got a knife, coveredRonito with the blanket and
sat on top of him then stabbedthe latter several times. Manuel also
stabbed Ronito ondifferent parts of his body. Manuel hit Ronito with
the buttof his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito and took thelatter's
wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, ahouse-help of
Marife.
HELD: The law does not require that the solemotive of the
malefactor is robbery and commits homicideby reason or on the
occasion thereof. In People vs. Tidula,et al., this Court ruled that
even if the malefactor intendsto kill and rob another, it does not
preclude his convictionfor the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held that the fact that
theintent of the felons was tempered with a desire also toavenge
grievances against the victim killed, does notnegate the conviction
of the accused and punishment forrobbery with homicide.A
conviction for robbery with homicide is propereven if the homicide is
committed before, during or afterthe commission of the robbery. The
homicide may becommitted by the actor at the spur of the moment
or bymere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and
awoman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted onanother, on the
occasion or by reason of robbery, there isonly one special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.What is primordial is the result
obtained without referenceor distinction as to the circumstances,
cause, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime.
Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the
robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very
person the male factor intended to rob. For the conviction of the
special complex crime, the robbery itself must be proved as
conclusively as any other element of the crime. It maybe true that
the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again money
from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed
the couple of their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion
thereof, killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of
robbery with homicide.
People vs. Delos Santos, 398 SCRA 436

168

Facts: Accused-appellant was sentenced to death after he was


convicted of raping his stepdaughter.
He argues that the
Information filed against him failed to state that he is the stepfather
of the victim, hence, his relationship with the victim may not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance to justify the imposition of
the death penalty.
Held: The circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section
11 of Republic Act 7659 the attendance of any which mandates the
single indivisible penalty of death, instead of the standard penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death prescribed in Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.
Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment.
People vs. Bagsit, 409 SCRA 350
FACTS:
On September 12, 1999 at around 8:20 pm, Richard Sison and his
younger sister Heidi werewatching television inside their house at
Brgy. Soro-soro, Ilaya, Batangas City. When Richard looked out of
thewindow, he saw Angelito Bagsit pointing a gun at his father,
Pepito Sison, who was then closing the front doorof their house. The
barrel of the gun held by Angelito protruded thru their grilled
window. Not for long,Richard heard a gunshot and almost
simultaneously saw his father falling to the cement floor. With the
helpof his mother Teodora who came from his grandfathers house
next door, Richard rushed his father to thehospital where he died
shortly after.Richard Sison further testified that Angelito Bagsit, a
second cousin of his mother, used to frequent theirhouse. He could
not say what motivated Angelito to kill his father but as far as he
knew, his father had noquarrel with the appellant before the
shooting incident.Zenaida Bagsit Aguilar, daughter-in-law of the
deceased, also testified that at around 8:20 pm of the killingshe was
inside her house which was about 10 meters away from that of the
Sisons. As she was preparingcoffee in the kitchen, Angelito, who was
toting a gun, passed by. Moments later, she heard Angelito cock
hisgun. Worried that something untoward would happen, she hurried
towards her fathers house nearby. Butbefore she could even talk to
her father, a shot rang out. From her fathers house she looked out
of thewindow and saw Pepito, awash in his own blood, being carried
by his wife.
CONTENTION OF STATE:
Angelito Bagsit is found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED:
Angelito Bagsit denied having anything to do with the death of
Pepito Sison.He averred that in the evening of 12 September 1999
he became drunk after a drinking bout with DanteBagsit and a
certain Marcos Barte who hired him earlier that morning to take care
of his piggery. Heremembered having left the house of Marcos Barte
at around eleven oclock in the evening. He recountedthat he failed
to reach his house, a mere 10-minute walk, because it was already
very dark. Instead, he spentthe night leaning on a fence by the
house of one Felix Agdon. When he finally arrived home at around
fiveoclock the following morning his wife told him about the
shooting of Pepito and that some police officerswere looking for him.
RULING:

169

It is dogmatic that the positive identification of the accused, where


categorical and consistent andwithout any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibiand denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-servingevidence undeserving of
weight in law. Richard Sison and Angelito Bagsit were no strangers to
each other.Richard Sison would not have imputed a crime as serious
as murder if he were not truly convinced that in thehands of that
person dripped the blood of his father.
Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise
aggravating. The triggermanshowed greater perversity when,
although outside the house, he attacked his victim inside thelatters
own house when he could have very well committed the crime
without necessarilytransgressing the sanctity of the victims home.
He who goes to anothers house to hurt him ordo him wrong is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of
dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered thedwelling of the victim to commit the
offense - it is enough that the victim was attacked inside hisown
abode, although the assailant might have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from theoutside.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to
Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code asamended by RA 7659. There
being two (2) aggravating circumstances without any mitigating
circumstance tooffset the same, the trial court correctly imposed the
penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant
Angelito Bagsit y Bagsit guilty of murderqualified by treachery, with
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
and
Thegeneric aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and imposing on
him the supreme penalty of DEATH, isAFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another P50,000.00 asmoral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages of
P25,000.00 shall be awarded to the heirs of the victim Pepito Sison.
2. TIME OF COMMISSION
These 3 circumstances may be considered separately
when their elements are distinctly perceived and
can subsist independently,
revealing a greater degree of perversity.
Aggravating:
When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or
When especially sought for by the offender to insure the
commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity; or
When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose
of impunity.
a. Nighttime
1) NIGHTTIME
The commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished
in the nighttime.
The offense must be actually committed in the darkness of the
night.

170


When the place is illuminated by light, nighttime is not
aggravating.
It must be shown that the
offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness and t
he offender purposely took advantage of nighttime to facilitate
the commission of the offense.
People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35
FACTS: Emmanuel Desalisa, a 22-yr old farmer, lived w/ his 18-yr
old legal wife, Norma, who was then 5 mos pregnant and their 2-yr
old daughter in a small nipa hse on a hill at Pinaductan, Sorsogon.
The whole neighborhood consists of 3 houses. The other 2 houses
are about 150 meters away: the house of his parents-in-law and
the house of Carlito Dichoso. The view of the houses is obstructed
by the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
On Oct 9, 1983, Vicente Dioneda, the father-in-law of the accused,
testified that the latter went to their house and left his 2 yr-old.
The next day, at about 6 or 7AM, Vicente went to the house of the
accused only to find plates scattered on the floor, the kettle w/
cooked rice untouched, and the other rope holding the hammock
missing. He went out of the house and noticed the couples pig to
be hungry. He thought of feeding it w/ coconut meat from the tree
w/c was nearby. He saw the back of the body of his daughter. He
called her and touched her back. However, her body swayed. It
was only then that he realized that she was hanging from a branch
of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was suspended about 4 inches
above the ground. Her neck was tied w/ the missing rope of the
hammock. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident.
Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he
suspected her of having a paramour and that the baby in her
womb was not his. He believed that one Ariate was courting his
wife.
Desalisa invokes the defense of denial. He speculates that it was
his wife who was jealous. She suspected him of having an affair
w/ the daughter of Manoy Charito.
HELD: The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The
house where they lived is up a hill and isolated. The whole
neighborhood consists only of 3 houses. No one can go up the hill
to visit w/o being known to the neighbor. Moreover, the motive of
jealousy is evident for what can be more humiliating to a man
aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to ones
very home? Although the accused did not flee after the crime,
there is no case law holding that non-flight is conclusive of proof
of innocence.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be
appreciated against accused-appellant absent any proof as to how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before
it was carried out.
Neither may the aggr circumstance of
nighttime be appreciated against him because there is no proof
that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of or that it
facilitated the commission of the crime.
However, the aggr circumstance of uninhabited place is present.
The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance
of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but WON there was
reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help in the
place of commission. Considering that the killing was done during

171

nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstructed the view of
the neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility
for the victim to receive any assistance.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of parricide w/ unintentional abortion and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
civil indemnity of PhP50K. Being a single indivisible penalty,
reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.
People vs. Avendano, 396 SCRA 309
Facts: The principal witness for the prosecution was JEFFRE
CASTILLO, an eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo
and brother of the victim Melvin Castillo. In his testimony, he
stated that his parents were named Remedios and Boyet; that
they were six children in the family, namely, Michael, Dikong, Ape,
Manolito, the victim Melvin and himself; and that he was a Grade I
pupil at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that he knows
appellant, having known him for about three or four years before
the incident of July 29, 1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M.,
;he saw appellant in their house, looking for his plow and asking if
he knew who got it, to which he replied that he did not. While
appellant was in their house, his mother was upstairs and his Kuya
Melvin was also inside the house. His father and the rest of his
brothers and sisters were in Cabanatuan City. He recalled that
appellant was then wearing a green t-shirt and shorts, the color of
which he could not remember. Thereafter, appellant left. After
dinner, he, his mother and brother went to sleep. Before they
slept, he recalled they had a pangmagdamagan or overnight lamp
which was turned on.
That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He
was suddenly awakened when he heard a commotion
(kalambugan). However, by the time he woke up, the room was
very dark because the lamp was already turned off. He heard his
mother shout, Dikong, tulungan mo kami. When he heard the
kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept
their pillows and tried to hide. Then, there was silence. Then he
heard somebody going downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the
lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was. He then heard the person
downstairs going up again. He saw through his blanket that the
person had come up: Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao. That
was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, Kuya Willie,
tama na, tama na! That was just before Melvin was killed.
Held: As to nighttime, this circumstance is considered aggravating
only when (1) it was especially sought by the offender; or (2) the
offender took advantage of it; or (3) it facilitated the commission
of the crime by ensuring the offenders immunity from
identification or capture. In this case, the prosecution did not
adduce evidence that the appellant deliberately sought the cover
of the night to commit the offense. The mere fact that the killing
was committed at night would not suffice to sustain nocturnity for,
by, and of itself. Aggravating circumstances must be established
with the same quantum of proof as fully as the crime itself, and

172

any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in favor of


appellant.
People vs. Caloza, 396 SCRA 329
Dionisio Bulaclac was a tenant of a farm lot located in Bakod
Bayan, Cabanatuan City. He and his 16-year-old wife, Edna, and
their infant son, Mark Joseph Anthony, lived in a hut situated near
the farmstead Dionisio was tilling. Allan Bulaclac, the younger
brother of Dionisio, used to frequent the latters place whenever
Dionisio requested help to farm the field.
On July 5, 1997, Dionisio asked Allan to come to his farm the
following day to help him till the land. Allan agreed. At about
5:00 a.m. on July 6, 1997, Allan left their place in Liway, Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and proceeded to Dionisios farm. Allan had a lente
placed on his forehead to illumine his path as it was still dark.
When Allan was about a hundred meters away from Dionisios hut,
he noticed Rafael at a distance of ten meters coming from the
direction of the hut of Dionisio. Rafael was no stranger to Allan
because the latter used to help Dionisio till the field. Allan readily
recognized Rafael from the illumination coming from the lente
on his forehead. Allan noticed bloodstains on the clothes of
Rafael. Allan was perplexed when Rafael tried to evade him as
they met. Allan then entered Dionisios hut which at that time was
lighted by a kerosene lamp called kingke. Allan called but
nobody answered. He peeped through the window and was
horrified to see his brothers feet as well as blood under the bed.
Allan immediately rushed home and reported the incident to his
parents. Allan and his parents proceeded posthaste to Dionisios
hut. They saw several persons near the hut of Dionisio including
some policemen who prevented Allan and his parents from
entering the hut. It turned out that Dionisio, his wife Edna and
their young son Mark Joseph Anthony were already dead.
Held: There is AC of nighttime. Rafael took advantage of the night
darkness to successfully consummate his dastardly acts. Not
proven that nighttime is sought.
People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 190
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about
9:30 oclock in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
riding on two motorcycles, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, together with Peter Doe, John
Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as
soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by shooting him with
the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest
was issued on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and

173

w/o having been served on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano &
communicated his desire to surrender. Lozano contracted CD
Psupt Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco could have
opted to go on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the
authorities & face the allegations leveled against him. For this he
should be credited with the MC of voluntary surrender.
People vs. Mactal, 401 SCRA 612
Facts: Appellant and the deceased were married by a Catholic
priest in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, on March 23, 1985. However, their
union was not a happy one, beset by frequent violent quarrels due
to appellants drinking, gambling and womanizing. The couple
separated a number of times but deceased Evelyn always came
back to her husband inspite of the physical abuse because she
loved him. As appellant failed to earn a living for his family,
Evelyn ran a small sari-sari store located in front of their house.
On the night of the incident, July 14, 1995, at around 7:00 p.m.,
appellants brother-in-law, Romeo Rivera, whose house was right
beside the couples, heard the couple arguing but he did not mind
them as he was used to their arguments. At around 8:00 p.m.,
Liwayway Rillon, the deceaseds good friend, went to the store to
buy something but did not stay long as Evelyn seemed to be in a
bad mood and was getting ready to close the store. Through the
door of the store, Rillon saw appellant inside the store and the
couples children sleeping in bed; their living quarters were
adjacent to the store.
At around midnight, appellant went to Riveras house to check
whether his wife Evelyn was there. Rivera did not reply but instead
asked if the two had a quarrel. The appellant answered in the
negative. Rivera, his wife and appellant conversed in the formers
garage for about 30 minutes, with the Rivera couple suggesting
places where appellant should look for his wife. Then appellants
sister-in-law went to appellants house and peeped inside the
unlighted room of the couple but did not find her sister, the
deceased. After this, the Rivera couple returned to their house and
went to sleep.
At around 1:00 a.m., Alfred Young, on board a tricycle, was
passing by appellants house. From a distance of 15 meters, he
saw Evelyn seated on a wooden chair in front of the window of the
house. She appeared lifeless because her head was hanging.
Appellant was about an arms length away from Evelyn and, when
he saw the tricycle, he disappeared into a unlighted part of the
house. At about the same time, Romeo Adayo, who was walking
home, saw appellant. The latter was about 20 steps away from
him, carrying the body of his wife Evelyn over his right shoulder,
face up, with the head at appellants back and the legs in front.
Appellant was walking very fast towards a dark street. As Adayo
was very tired after his trip from Manila, he did not call appellant
and just continued walking. The body of Evelyn was discovered by
a neighbor at around 5:00 a.m., 15 meters away from her house.
State: Mactal committed parricide w/ AC of nighttime.
Ruling: Nighttime could not be appreciated as an AC where no
evidence is presented showing that nocturnity was specially by

174

the accused nor taken acts. Facilitate the commission of the crime
or insure his immunity from captive.
b. On the Occasion of Calamity
3. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER
a. Recidivism
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall
have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
People vs. Baldera, 86 Phil. 189
Facts: 1947, Casa manila bus was loaded w/ passengers left
Batangas and bound for Manila. On the highway, the bus way up
by pedro Balidinas group. Baldera, armed w/ .45 caliber pistol hail
of bullets and several passengers were wounded. Baldera then
the bus and took the money of the passengers. He then alighted
and ordered the bus to proceed.
Held: There is AC of recidivism by reason of his previous convict
for theft it appearing that crime was committed on or about 1947
while this offense now charge took place 7 place before the date.
b. Reiteration or Habituality
1. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
2. That he previously served sentence for another offense to
which the law attaches:
a. an equal or
b. greater penalty, or
c. for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty than
that for the new offense;
and
3. That he is convicted of the new offense.
Reiteracion or Habituality
it is essential that the offender be previously punished;
that is, he has served sentence.
Par. 10 speaks of
penalty attached to the offense,
not the penalty actually imposed
-

RPC, Arts. 62 (5), 160


Habitual delinquency under Article 62 (5)The offender within a
period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto,
estafa or falsification, is found guilty of any of the said crimes a
third time or another.
Quasi-recidivism under Article 160Any person who shall commit
a felony after having been convicted by final judgment before
beginning to serve such sentence or while serving such sentence
shall be punished by the maximum period prescribed by law for
the new felony.
People vs. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 652 (1998)
Facts: Marivel Fuentes, complainant, went to Rowena Sanchezs
house upon the latters instruction. When Marivel got there,
Rowena went to the bathroom. Then, Alberto, Rowenas common
law husband and appellant herein, approached Marivel, covered

175

her mouth and pointed a hunting knife to her neck. He told her
that hed kill her if shed tell her mother.Marivel fought but Alberto
got her inside a room and had intercourse with her. All the while,
private
complainants
mouth
was
covered
with
a
handkerchief.After about 5 minutes, Rowena came back and saw
Alberto still on top of Marivel. Alberto instructed Rowena to step
out of the room. After a while, he got up, put on his briefs and
called his wife inside the room.The second incident of rape
happened while Marivel was sleeping but then awakened by the
Albertos kisses. He had a knife which scared Marivel and he again
had sex with her. She did not shout because she was afraid of
Alberto who was a prisoner and had already killed
somebody.Marivel reported the incidences eventually and after a
due trial, RTC convicted Alberto with 2 counts of rape and
sentencing him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: WON Quasi-Recidivism was established
NO. Appeal denied.The two Informations alleged that both
instances of rape were attended by the aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made no express ruling that
appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial,
the prosecution manifested that appellant had been convicted by
the RTC of Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental in Crim. Case No. 013
and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide. However, the
prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record
of appellants previous conviction.Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism
and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy
of the sentence convicting an accused. The fact that appellant
was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had
been rendered against him.
People vs. Baldogo, G.R. No. 129106-07, January 24, 2003
of Palawan. They were also serving the Camacho family who
resides w/in the Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) & abducted
Julie (12 y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their
clothing & belongings from a trunk which was located under a
Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for
herself.
Julie went to the lowlands & there she asked for help
from Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Baguio
contends that while he was preparing for sleep he was
approached by Bunso who was armed with a bloodied bolo. Bunso
warned him not to shout, otherwise he will also be killed.
- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie
or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire
period that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left
him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant
asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after
Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was
afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength,
w/o any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, & pursuant to

176

the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 1, of A63 of the RPC, he is


hereby sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping no modifying circumstance appreciated and
pursuant to the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of the
RPC, & not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, w/
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, & of perpetual
absolute disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping. YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was
threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas
ordered him to do. He claims that he was even protective of Julie.
He insists that Julie was not a credible witness and her testimony
is not entitled to probative weight because she was merely
coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her
kidnapping and detention by Bermas.Julies testimony is credible
findings of facts of the TC, its calibration of the testimonial
evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight of
the collective evidence of the parties & its conclusions anchored
on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if
not conclusive effect. The raison detre of this principle is that this
Court has to contend itself w/ the mute pages of the original
records in resolving the issues posed by the parties; The TC has
the unique advantage of monitoring & observing at close range
the attitude, conduct & deportment of witnesses as they narrate
their respective testimonies before said court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by
the evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted
and/or misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case
Its incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more
specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed & that
accused-appellant precisely committed the same. Prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence & not on the
weakness of accuseds evidence. The prosecution adduced
indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired w/ Bermas not
only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping & detaining Julie. There
is conspiracy if 2 or more persons agree to commit a felony &
decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused, before, during & after the commission of a
felony pointing to a joint purpose & design & community of intent.
As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts w/ such
closeness & coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common
purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the
conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the ff. requisites

177

a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination and
the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime
itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the
malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he
actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after
deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination
to commit the crime. The law doesnt prescribe a time frame that
must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a
felony up to the time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag
containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or
so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence
that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that
they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the
colony. insufficient evidence for evident premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, theres no evidence that
they took advantage of their numerical superiority & weapons to
kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cant be deemed to
have attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was
killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside
the said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery Court has previously held that
the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years
could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by
treachery. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
4.
5.
a.
-

PRICE, PROMISE, OR REWARD


MEANS OF COMMISSION
Taking Advantage of Public Office
RPC, Art. 19 (3)
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take
part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manners:
By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty
of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
People vs. Sumaoy, Oct. 22, 1996
Facts: Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy in a
billiard hall on Roxas Street, Tagum, Davao. At 5:45 p.m. of July
9, 1988, he left the billiard hall to have some beer at the Pacings
Carinderia on Sobrecary Street. Afterward, he went back to the

178

billiard hall, passing by the J Spot Carinderia at the corner of


Roxas and Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the deceased Zandro
Vargas talking to accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. Three
other men were with them but Jacobe did not recognize the
three. Upon reaching the billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled
some billiard balls, then went out and stood on the sidewalk. He
was startled by the sound of a gunshot. When he turned to find
out where the sound came from, he saw Zandro Vargas running
towards Roxas Street with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas
tried to seek refuge at the Try Me beauty parlor, but he was
overtaken by accused-appellant who dragged him towards a
waiting tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun. The accusedappellant and three other men then boarded the tricycle taking
Zandro Vargas with them.
Jacobe allegedly heard one of
accused-appellants companion say that they were taking Zandro
to the hospital. Later that evening Jacobe learned that Zandro
was found dead in a kangkong field near the Davao Visayan
Village.
Held: The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of official position in the
commission of the offense. This circumstance requires that the
accused, as a public officer, used the influence or reputation of his
position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the accused
could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position. In the case before us, no
evidence was adduced to show that the killing of Zandro vargas was
in any way facilitated by the accused-appellants public position. It
was not even shown whether the accused-appellant wore his uniform
or used his service firearm when he committed the crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED,
finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of homicide, and
SENTENCING him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro Vargas in
the increased sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
People vs. Capalac, 117 SCRA 874
Facts: September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at a licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor(Jimmy
Magaso), attempting to escape, was confronted by two brothers of
Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally included in the information but now
deceased, and appellant Mario Capalac. The attempt of Magaso to
board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots
were fired in succession. Knowing that he was completely at the
mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of
surrender, but they were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped
by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several blows on the head
and the face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac
stabbed the deceased on the chest three or tour times. He was
brought to the hospital where he died, the cause, according to the
coroners report, being hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the
heart.
Mario Capalac was convicted of murder. The lower court found that
the crime was committed w/ evident premeditation & treachery. The
lower court also held that appellant took advantage of his position as

179

a police officer & employed means or brought about circumstances


w/c added ignominy to the natural effects of his act. It sentenced
him to suffer the death penalty.
Issues:
1.
WON Conspiracy was proved.
Yes. The brothers apparently had one purpose in mind, to avenge the
stabbing of Moises Capalac. In their actions they were impelled by a
common purpose & the acted in concert.
US v. Magcamot Justice Mapa stressed as the essential element for
conspiracy to exist the concurrence of wills and unity of action
and purpose
2.
WON there was treachery involved
Yes. RPC provides: There is treachery when offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof w/c tend directly & specially to insure its
execution, w/o risk to himself arising from the defense w/c the
offended party might make
Magasos situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up
would be futile and unavailing. Even when his hands were raised in
surrender he was still pistol-whipped. When he was lying on the
ground he was still stabbed. In the testimony it was also stated that
there were two other people who were assisting the brothers. There
was no risk, therefore, to the aggressors, no hope for the victim
3.
WON there was evident premeditation, of means being
employed or circumstances brought about to add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act, and of the crime being committed w/ the
offender taking advantage of his official position as having attended
the commission of the crime.
No. United States v. Alvares Justice Mapa ruled that: an
aggravating circumstance must be as fully proven as the crime
itself.
He added: Without clear and evident proof of their
presence, the penalty fixed by the law for the punishment of the
crime cannot be increased. Moreover, insofar as evident
premeditation is concerned, the record contains no evidence
showing that the defendant had, prior to the moment of its
execution, resolved to commit the crime, nor is there proof that this
resolution was the result of meditation, calculation and persistence.
People v. Mendova it should not be premeditation merely; it is
evident premeditation
People v. Anin, ruled that the perpetration of a criminal act
evidently made in the heat of anger didnt call for a finding that
there was evident premeditation. Whats required is that the offense
was the result of cool & serene reflection.
What was done by the brothers of Capala, cant be categorized as
falling w/in the norm of means being employed or circumstances
being brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the
act. It is well to stress that they were prompted by their desire to
avenge their brother, They went after Magaso, the victim. They
assaulted him, relying on the weapons they carried w/ them. Jesus
stabbed him & appellant Mario pistol-whipped him. They did what
they felt they had to do to redress a grievance. It cannot be said,
therefore, that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy
to the natural effects of the act. It is quite apparent that all they
were interested in was to assure that there be retribution for what
was done to their brother. The mere fact that appellant Mario
Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself

180

justify that the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken


by the offender of his public position be considered as present. He
acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a
vicious assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved 1. It
would be an affront to reason to state that at a time like that &
reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman to
commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his
pistol w/ him. It came in handy & he acted accordingly. That he was
a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal
responsibility.
4.
WON the brothers can avail of the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense
Yes. RPC: That the act was committed in the immediate vindication
of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree.
What was done was an immediate vindication of the stabbing
perpetrated by Magaso on appellants brother Moises.
The brothers Capalac reacted in a manner w/c for them was
necessary under the circumstances. That was a fulfillment of what
family honor & affection require. The aggressor who did them wrong
shouldnt go unpunished. This isnt to justify what was done.
PEOPLE VS GAPASIN 231 SCRA 728 (1994)
Facts: According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and
Rodrigo Ballad left the house of Enteng Teppang at about 2 PM of Oct
6 79 after a pamisa for Teppangs deceased father.
- Jerry Calpito followed them. When they reached the point of the
road facing the house of Nick Saludares, Calpito was shot by
appellant C1C Loreto Gapasin with an armalite rifle.
- When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him.
Thereafter, accused Amor Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver
on the left hand of Calpito. Faustina Calpito ran to help her fallen
husband. Calpito died due to 4 bullet wounds, w/c as his body was
autopsied by Dr Layugan, were on his right arm, right front portion of
the head, right and left rib.
- Appellant invoked self-defense saying that he was issued a mission
order to investigate a report re the presence of unidentified armed
men in Barrio San Jose, Isabela. He was informed that Jerry Calpito
had an unlicensed firearm.
- He positioned himself in the yard of Nicanor Saludares at the night
of the pamisa only to see Calpito.
- However, when Calpito was about 3 meters away from him,
Gapasin asked what was bulging in his waist. Calpito took a step
backward, drew his firearm from the waist and fired twice at
appellant. He missed because appellant dropped to the ground
simultaneously firing his armalite.
HELD: TC correctly ruled that the crime of murder under A248 RPC
was committed. Treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The 2 conditions to constitute treachery were present, to wit: (1)
employment of the means of execution that gives the person who is
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; & (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Appellant deliberately executed the act in such a way that Calpito
was unaware & helpless. This can be gathered from his act of
waiting for the victim behind the hollow-block fence of Saludares &

181

shooting the victim from his right side. Evident premeditation, as a


generic aggravating circumstance, was proven by the act was
preceded by his cool thought & reflection.
3 other generic aggravating circumstances: (1) ignominy, ruled out
because autopsy indicated no other injuries w/c could show that the
victim was kicked by assailants, (2) abuse of superior strength, w/c
was absorbed by treachery, and (3) taking advantage of public
position. As a member of the Philippine Constabulary, appellant
committed the crime w/ an armalite w/c was issued to him when he
received the mission order. Voluntary surrender may be considered
but this is offset by the aggravating circumstance of taking adv of
public position. Thus, only the generic aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation may be appreciated against the appellant.
The correct penalty would have been death acdg to A248 & 64 RPC
were it not for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally
abhorrent. The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
b. Insult to Public Authority
Elements:
1) That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his
functions.
2) That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of his functions is
not the person against whom the crime is committed.
3) The offender knows him to be a public authority.
4) His presence has not prevented the offender from committing the
criminal act.
Public Authority / Person in Authority
directly vested with jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has
the power to govern and execute the laws.
The councilor, mayor, governor, barangay captain, barangay
chairman etc. are persons in authority.
A school teacher, town municipal health officer, agent of the BIR,
chief of police, etc. are now considered a person in authority.
Par. 2 is not applicable if committed in the presence of an agent
only such as a police officer.
Agent
A subordinate public officer charged
with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property,
such as barrio policemen, councilmen, and any person who comes
to the aid of persons in authority.
Knowledge that a public authority is present is essential. Lack of
such knowledge indicates lack of intention to insult public authority.
If crime is committed
against the public authority
while in the performance of his duty,
the offender commits direct assault
without this aggravating circumstance.
People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614
FACTS
- Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro, together with de la Cruzand Santiago, where they were
detained under thecharge of Attempted Homicide

182

. While in the act of escaping, Tiongson killed a member of the


policeforce who was guarding them and a PC Constablewho went in
pursuit.- By reason thereof, Tiongson was then charged withMurder,
in two separate informations, alleging thatthe commission of the
offense was qualified by thecircumstance of treachery, and
aggravated by thecircumstances of evident premeditation, in
contemptof
or
with
insult
to
the
public
authorities,
nocturnity,committed in an uninhabited place and with abuse of
superior strength.- Upon arraignment, the said accused, assisted
bycounsel
de oficio, pleaded guilty to bothinformations. The trial court did not
render judgmentoutright, but ordered the prosecution to present
itsevidence, after which, it sentenced the said accusedto suffer the
death penalty in each case, and toindemnify the heirs of the victims.
ISSUES
1. WON a plea of guilt is always binding upon theaccused for all the
contents of the information2. WON the killing was qualified by
treachery3. WON there were aggravating circumstancespresent
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: It may be true that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the
material facts alleged in theinformation, including the aggravating
circumstanceslisted therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet
wherethere has been a hearing and such circumstancesare
disproven by the evidence, they should bedisallowed in the
judgment.
Reasoning: The norm that should be followed wherea plea of guilty is
entered by the defendant,especially in cases where the capital
penalty may beimposed, is that the court should be sure
thatdefendant fully understands the nature of thecharges preferred
against him and the character of the punishment provided by law
before it is imposed.For this reason, the Court requires that in every
caseunder a plea of guilty, where the penalty may bedeath, the trial
court should call witnesses for thepurpose of establishing the guilt
and degree of culpability of the defendant and not only to satisfythe
trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court indetermining whether
accuse understood andcomprehended the meaning, full significance
andconsequences of his plea. In the instant case, the
trial judge required the taking of testimony as to thecircumstances
under which the crime was committed before passing judgment
so that the resulting verdictcannot in any way be branded as
deficient.2. NO.
Reasoning: The circumstances qualifying oraggravating the act of
killing a human being must beproved in an evident and
incontestable manner,mere presumptions or deductions from
hypotheticalfacts not being sufficient to consider them justified.According to the RPC, "there is treachery when theoffender commits
any of the crimes against theperson, employing means, methods, or
forms in theexecution thereof which tend directly and specially
toinsure its execution, without risk to himself arisingfrom the
defense which the offended party mightmake."- It does not appear
how and in what position thevictim was when he was killed so that it
cannot besaid for certain that the accused had adopted amode or
means of attack tending directly to insure orfacilitate the
commission of the offense without riskto himself arising from the
defense or retaliationwhich the victim might put up.- Pat. Garcia of

183

the Bulalacao police force merelydeclared that he was in his house,


about 15 metersaway from the municipal building when the
accusedRudy Tiongson and his companions escaped fromprison, and
he did not see the accused shoot Pat.Gelera. Pat. Gelera was already
dead when the otherwitness saw him.- Treachery is also not present
in the killing of PCConstable since the deceased was actually
warnedby another PC not to remain standing but seek coverbecause
of the known presence of the accused in thevicinity, but that the
said deceased disregarded thewarning.
- Since treachery, which would qualify the killing of Pat. Gelera and
PC Constable Canela to Murder, wasnot present,
the crimes may only be punished asHomicide
.3. NO.
Reasoning: (a) Evident premeditation must be ruledout in view of the
absence of sufficient proof that aplan to kill the victims existed, the
execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought
andreflection. (b) That the crimes were committed incontempt of or
with insult to the public authoritiescannot be appreciated since they
are not persons inauthority, but merely agents of a person in
authority.(c) In order that commission of a crime in anuninhabited
place may be considered, it is necessarythat the place of occurrence
be where there are nohouses at all, a considerable distance from
thevillage or town, or where the houses are a greatdistance apart.
(d) Abuse of superior strength mustalso be ruled out since there is
no direct evidencethat the accused employed it.
Dispositive Petition isaffirmed with the modification that the accused
Rudy Tiongson should be sentenced to sufferimprisonment of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) yearsand eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
for each homicide committed by him. Theindemnity to be paid to the
heirs of the victims ishereby increased to P30,000.00 in each case.
People vs. Magdueno, 144 SCRA 210
Facts: A few minutes part 8:00 am City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa
Fernando M Dilig placed himself at the drivers seat in his jeep parked
near his houses. Suddenly, 2 sucessive gunshots burst into air. The
gunman coming from his left side aimed and poured shots into
Diligs body that cause his death
Held: The AC of insult to public authority does not seem to be borne
by the records . For this circumstance to be considered, it must not
only be shown that the time crime was not committed in the
presence of the public authority but also that crime was not
committed against the public authority himself.
c. Disregard of Rank, Age, or Sex
Four circumstances are enumerated in this paragraph,
which can be considered singly or together.
If all the 4 circumstances are present, they have the weight of one
aggravating circumstance only.
There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime,
the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or
age of the offended party.
1) RANK OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Designation or title used to fix the relative position of the
offended party in reference to others.

184

There must be a difference in the social condition of the offender


and the offended party.
2) AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
May refer to old age or tender age of the victim.
3) SEX OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
This refers to the female sex, not to the male sex.
4) DWELLING
Building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
This is considered an AC because in certain cases, there is an
abuse of confidence which the offended party reposed in the
offender by opening the door to him.
Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party.
It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest,
comfort and privacy.
Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile.
A person has more than one dwelling.
So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them places of their
own, each one is his own dwelling.
If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he
also stays there once in a while.
The crime of adultery was committed.
Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour.
However, if the paramour was also residing in the same dwelling,
it will not be aggravating.
The offended party must not give provocation.
It is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered
the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault.
Dwelling includes dependencies,
the foot of the staircase
and the enclosure under the house.
People vs. Lapaz, March 31, 1989
Facts: In the evening of April 14, 1984, Eulalia Cabunag, a 70-year
old woman who was living alone, was beaten to death by three men
at Barangay Katipunan, Carmen, Bohol. One of them was discharged
as a state witness; the second pleaded guilty and the third pleaded
not guilty so he underwent a trial. Thereafter, both were found guilty
and sentenced to death. Said verdict is now before this Court on
appeal.Appellant Johnson Barleso used to stay in the house of said
victim, Eulalia Cabunag, as his common-law wife was the niece of
the latter. They transferred to the house of Aurelio Gaudicos, son-inlaw of Eulalia, when Eulalia called Barleso a thief in the presence of
many people. Apparently, Barleso resented the remark. Paulino
Lapaz, Jr. was then in his parent's house in the same barangay when
he was fetched by his uncle, herein appellant Cristoto Lapaz, to go to
the house of Barleso. Thereat, Barleso proposed to Cristoto in the
presence of Paulino that they kill Eulalia. Cristoto agreed. He asked
Paulino to buy a bottle of "kulafu" wine which be drank to embolden
himself. Thereafter the three proceeded to the house of the victim
who was living alone. Cristoto carried a rounded piece of wood 1
which was given to him by Barleso, while Barleso also carried
another piece of wood 2 and a bolo.

185

Held: The AC of disregard of sex cannot be similarly absorbed.


Disregard of sex and age pertains to the relationship of the victim
who is 70 yrs old woman and the appellant is young man 27 yrs old
at the time of the commission of the offense.
People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCRA 607
Facts: That on or about February 17, 1991 in the evening thereof at
Barangay Asid, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring
together and confederating with another whose true name and
identity is still unknown, with intent to gain, by means of violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Robbery
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there demanding money
from the spouses RODRIGO and FELICIDAD REJUSO but the said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Robbery as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that
is the said spouses refused and/or denied having money, and
pursuant to the same conspiracy, with intent to kill, by means of
treachery, said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help each other attack, assault and hack, with a bolo,
RODRIGO his wife FELICIDAD and their children, SHEILA and
REBECCA, all surnamed REJUSO, inflicting upon them several wounds
in different parts of the body which caused their instantaneous
death; that before killing their victims, the said accused gained
entrance into the victims' dwelling by pretending to ask for a glass of
water but once inside, they tied the hands of the victims and raped
REBECCA REJUSO before killing her.
crime: ATTEMPTED ROBBERY with MULTIPLE HOMICIDE with the
aggravating circumstances of rape, dwelling, band, treachery and
craft
Held:Dwelling or morada was present bec. the principal crime took
place in the house of the victims, although the killings were
committed outside. The accused showed greater perversity in the
deliberate invasion of the tranquility of the domicile. Dwelling
includes inclusion of the house.
People vs. Banez, 301 SCRA 248
Facts:
Wilfredo Baez was found by the RTC to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide for the killing of his father, Bernardo, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.
Accused was living in his parents house. One day, his sisters, Elvira
Baez-Bustamante and Emelinda Baez-Antiado came to the house
because their father complained that the accused made trouble
whenever drunk.
They were discussing the plan for putting up the accused in another
house or sleeping quarters. Afterwards, the accused, who looked
drunk because he was red in the face, ran into the kitchen, got 2
knives, went into his fathers room & stabbed him. Elvira tried to
take away the knives but he lunged at her & stabbed her. Emelinda
also tried to stop him. He chased her while Elvira locked herself in
their fathers room. After the accused had left, she rushed their
father to the hospital but he was already dead.

186

The accused entered a plea of insanity.


Elvira testified that the accused had been staying in their fathers
house for 4 years after the accused separated from his wife; that he
was confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center for addiction to
gasoline and was discharged; that he was also treated at the Baguio
General Hospital for addiction to gasoline, and; that he had not
shown any indication that he was crazy. Dr. Gerona III of the NCMH
(National Center for Mental Health) testified that accused was
admitted to the NCMH 20 days after the crime; that the accused was
suffering from schizophrenia, described as a mental disorder
characterized
by
thought
disturbances,
hallucination,
suspiciousness, and deterioration in areas of work, social relations
and self-care; that schizophrenia can be caused by use of substances
(inhaling gasoline and alcoholism); that he could not say whether the
accused was insane at the time he committed the crime.
Marina Gabel-Banez, mother of the accused, testified that he had
been confined for more than a year at the Bicutan Rehab Center;
that he was also treated at the Baguio General Hospital; that after
killing his father, he was confined at the Mandaluyong Mental
Hospital for treatment; that his wife left him and he blamed his inlaws for his marital troubles; that he resorted to gasoline to forget
his problems, &; that he was not a drunkard.
The trial court found him guilty of parricide with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling and habitual intoxication and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death
Issues:
1.
WON he was insane at time of commission of crime and thus
exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, RPC
No. Accused must prove that he was completely deprived of reason
when he killed his father in order to be considered exempt from
criminal liability
In People vs. Formigones: it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act; that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a
complete absence of power to discerninsanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
People vs. Rafanan, Jr: Formigones established 2 distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition& (b) the test of volition..But our
caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than
on a test relating to freedom of the will. Burden to prove his
insanity at the time of the commission of the act rests on the
defense. But he was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt his
insanity at the time immediately preceding the killing or at the very
moment of the killing. Evidence merely consisted of the testimony of
his mother regarding his treatments. The testimony of Dr. Gerona III
is inconclusive as to whether the accused was insane at the time
immediately preceding the killing or at the very moment of the
killing. He could not have testified to this effect, considering that he
treated the accused after the accused was confine at the NCMH.
2.
WON there exists the aggravating circumstances of
intoxication and dwelling in the commission of crime
No. Dwelling cannot be considered aggravating because accused
and his father were living in the same house where the crime was

187

committed. The rationale for considering dwelling as an aggravating


circumstance is the violation by the offender of the sanctity of the
home of the victim by trespassing therein to commit the crime. The
reason is entirely absent in this case. Regarding the aggravating
circumstance of intoxication, it has not been shown that it is habitual
or intentional as required by RPC A15. Even assuming that the
accused was drunk at the time he committed the crime, it wasnt
shown that he is a habitual and excessive drinker or that he
intentionally got drunk. Neither can intoxication be mitigating
because there is no showing that he accused was so drunk that his
will power was impaired or that he couldnt comprehend the
wrongfulness of his acts.
3.
WON RTC gravely erred in imposing the death penalty upon
the accused instead of reclusion perpetua on the assumption that he
was sane at the time of the killing.
No. Under RA 7659, the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since in this case there was neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed.
Judgment: the decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Paraiso, 319 SCRA 422
Facts: Roland Paraiso was found guilty of the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death. Confederating with John Doe he entered the house of Lolita
Alipio Tigley, and stole several items and on the occasion thereof,
with intent to kill, dragged Tigley inside a room, and thereafter
assaulted, attacked and stabbed the latter on the different parts of
the body which caused her death shortly thereafter.
Issues:
1.
WON Paraiso was guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
Yes. The essential elements of the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide (Art. 249, RPC) are: (1) the taking of personal
property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(2) the property thus taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and, (4) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide
which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that appellant and his
companion, with a gun and a knife, took possession of personal
properties belonging to the victim, with intent to gain, and on the
occasion thereof, the victim was killed.
2.
WON aggravating circumstances were rightly appreciated
No. Dwelling and abuse of superior strength may be appreciated but
not disregard of respect due the offended party on account of her
sex.
Dwelling. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Here,
robbery was committed in the house of the victim without
provocation on her part. In robbery with violence and intimidation
against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of
robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of

188

trespassing the sanctity of the offended partys house. Dwelling is


considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy
the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to
hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.
Abuse of superior strength. While abuse of superior strength may be
considered when there is an inequality of comparative force between
the victim and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless, be a situation
of strength notoriously selected and made use of by the latter in the
commission of the crime. What should be considered is whether the
aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense. Abuse of strength is present not only when
the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor but also
when the offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion
to the defense available to the offended party. Here, the victim was
totally helpless in the face of two (2) perpetrators who were armed
with a gun and a knife.
Disregard of respect due to sex. However, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason
of her sex cannot be appreciated. This aggravating circumstance can
be considered only in crimes against persons and honor. The special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide is a crime against property
not against persons. Moreover, nothing appears in the record that
appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the age or sex of
the offended party. Moreover, such an aggravating circumstance
would be absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength.
Judgment: Penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is composed of 2
indivisible penalties. Applying Art. 63, RPC, penalty that should be
imposed is death which is the maximum provided for by law in the
absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and abuse of superior strength. These
aggravating circumstances need not be alleged in the information
since they are mere generic aggravating circumstances which have
the effect of increasing the penalty to the maximum period which is
death. But in accordance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83
of the RPC, upon finality of this decision, certified true copies
thereof, as well as the records of this case, are forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
People vs. Arizobal, 341 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24
March 1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband
Jimmy with one Francisco Gimenez arrived. Jimmy informed Erlinda
that they had already bought a carabao. After he handed her the
certificate of large cattle, and while he was in the process of skinning
a chicken for their supper, three (3) men suddenly appeared and
ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the
ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a
mask, another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter
helplessness of their victims, the robbers took the liberty of
consuming the food and cigarettes Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari
store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their snack, two (2) of the

189

intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the neighboring


store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers
proceeded to ransack the household in search for valuables. They
took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and told them to
produce P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple
could not produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda
offered to give their certificate of large cattle. The culprits however
would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her.
Three (3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and
together with Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away
while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard
Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of
gunfire which reverberated through the stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them
informed Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed
for trying to escape. Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens
had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which
can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass
to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime
without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the
case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the
inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into
submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands
before dragging them out of the house to be killed.
People vs. Bajar, 414 SCRA 494
Facts: on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock
in the evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of
Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak,
accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed
by law. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage
of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on
account of his age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended
the commission of the crime.
Held: Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of age, it is
considered present when the offended person, by reason of his age,
could be the father of the offender.[39 This is obvious in this case.
Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age, considered old enough to
be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared in open court
that he was 58 years old),[40 he was also the latters father-in-law.
The presence of this aggravating circumstance by reason of their
age difference is, therefore, reinforced by their actual relationship by

190

affinity. Further, it is ingrained in Philippine culture that those


advanced in age are respected especially in the provinces.
d. Abuse of Confidence
Elements:
a. That the offended party had trusted the offender.
b. That the offender abused such trust by committing a crime
against the offended party.
c. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the
crime.
The confidence between the offender and the offended party
must be immediate and personal.
It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa by conversion
or misappropriation and qualified seduction.
People vs. Mandolado, 123 SCRA 133
Julian Ortillano and Martin Mandolado, appellants, as well as Conrado
Erinada and Anacleto Simon, were on a bus bound for Midsayap,
North Cotabato. All 4 were trainees/draftees of AFP. They alighted at
the bus terminal in Midsayap. Being all in uniform, armed &
belonging to the same military outfit, they got acquainted & decided
to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus terminal. After drinking for about
an hour, Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market.
Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and
started firing. His companions tried to dissuade him but he
nonetheless continued firing his gun. Sensing trouble, Conrado and
Anacleto ran away, hailed and boarded a passing Ford Fiera with
some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also
the vehicle and forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to
the Midsayap crossing. All the while, Mandolado was harassing the
driver and firing his gun. They for off at the Midsayap crossing and
waited for a ride. When Herminigildo Tenorio, driving a privately
owned jeep where Nolasco Mendoza was on board, passed by the 4
boarded the jeep. The whole time, Mandolado was still causing
trouble and firing his gun.
Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not
Pikit, North Cotabato, appellant Mandolado got angry, cocked his
gun and ordered the driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a
full stop, Conrado and Anacleto immediately jumped off the jeep and
ran towards their detachment camp. Appellants also got off the jeep
but then Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the
occupants of the jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his armalite,
not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards hitting the ground.
Then they ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle and
went in so many places until they were apprehended. Mandolado
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
while Ortillano was penalized by imprisonment for being an
accessory
Issues:
1.
WON the abuse of superior strength may be appreciated.
NO. Although the SC appreciated the presence of treachery, it did
not appreciate aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and the use of superior strength. While it may be true that a soldier
in the AFP is deemed as one who holds public position, there is no
persuasive showing that herein appellants being draftees of the

191

Army, in full military uniform and carrying their high-powered


firearms, facilitated the commission of the crimes they were
charged.It may be conceded that as draftees, the accused could
easily hitch hike with private vehicles, as in the case of the deceased
Tenorios owner-type jeep, but there is no evidence that when they
stopped the jeep the accused already intended to shoot the
occupants of the vehicle.
People v. Pantoja: There is nothing to show that the appellant took
advantage of his being a sergeant in the Philippine Army in order to
commit the crimes. The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and
had an army rifle at the time is not sufficient to establish that he
misused his public position in the commission of the crimes
There could be no abuse of confidence as evidence on record
showed lack of confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this
confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence
facilitated commission of crimes. In order that abuse of confidence
be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that there exists a
relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one
against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use
of such a relationship to commit the crime. It is also essential that
the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal
such as would give that accused some advantage or make it easier
for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage
of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence. In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of any
personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might
rest between the victims and the assailants who had just met each
other then. Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could
have facilitated the crimes. Similarly, there could have been no
obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for the simple
reason that the requisite trust of the victims upon the accused prior
to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated under
Art. 14(4) RPC are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all
likelihood, the accused Army men in their uniforms and holding their
high-powered firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for
a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of
gratefulness or appreciation.
2.
WON Ortillano is an accessory
NO. Julian Ortillano should be convicted, not as an accessory, but as
an accomplice. An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct
participation in its execution or does not force or induce others to
commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its
accomplishment (Art. 18, RPC).
People vs. Silvestre: To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an
accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or
simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the
offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral
People vs. Tamayo: It is an essential condition to the existence of
complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention

192

of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an


efficacious way.
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts, showed knowledge of the
criminal design of Mandolado. In other words, Ortillanos
simultaneous acts supplied, if not material, moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way. Ortillanos presence
served to encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the
odds against the victims
Held: Mandolado is guilty of murder qualified by treachery while
Ortillano is convicted as an accomplice to the crime of murder.
e. Aid of Armed Men
ELEMENTS:
1. That the armed men or persons took part in the commission of
the crime, directly or indirectly.
2. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them
when the crime was committed.
Exceptions:
1. When both the attacking party and the party attacked were
equally armed.
2. When the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in
the commission of the crime acted under the same plan and for the
same purpose.
3. Casual presence, or when the offender did not avail himself of
any of their aid nor did not knowingly count upon their assistance in
the commission of the crime.
If there are more than 3 armed men, aid of armed men is
absorbed in the employment of a band.
f. Inundation, Fire, Poison
Unless used by the offender as a means to accomplish a criminal
purpose,
any of the circumstances in paragraph 12
cannot be considered to increase the penalty or to change the
nature of the offense.
When another AC already qualifies the crime,
any of these ACs shall be considered as generic aggravating
circumstance only.
Fire is not aggravating in the crime of arson.
Whenever a killing is done with the use of fire, as when you kill
someone, you burn down his house while the latter is inside, this is
murder.
There is no such crime as murder with arson or arson with
homicide. The crime is only murder.
If the intent is to destroy property,
the crime is arson even if someone dies as a consequence.
If the intent is to kill,
there is murder even if the house is burned in the process.
g. Evident Premeditation
Elements:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and

193

3.
A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to allow is conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
Evident premeditation implies
a deliberate planning of the act
before executing it.
The essence of premeditation
an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate
on the meaning and
consequences of what he planned to do,
an interval long enough for his conscience and better
judgment
to overcome his evil desire and scheme.
The premeditation must be based upon external facts, and must
be evident, not merely suspected indicating deliberate planning
Evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, adultery, theft,
estafa, and falsification.
People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464
FACTS: On Jan 12, 1994, 8PM, Arola Dilangalen & Mohammad
Managuili escorted home their friend, Jukaris Buan, to Nayon Shariff
Kabunsuan on a service owned by 1 Nong Fred. After dropping off
their friend. The 3 went on their way home. Dilangalen & Managuili
asked to be dropped off at 4J Pizza House along Notre Dame Avenue
to eat. After w/c, while waiting for a tricycle to take them home,
they saw 4 men near an electric post 5 meters away from the 4J
Pizza Hse entrance.
W/o warning, the 4 men suddenly &
simultaneously stabbed them.
Arola Dilangalen died of
hemmorhage & antecedent multiple wounds while Managuili, who
sustained stab wounds on his right anterior-axillary line, was still
rushed to the ER. He was confined for 2nts. On Jan 14 94, Police
Officer Tayong brought before him 5 persons including appellant
Gerry Sumalpong for identification purposes. He was positively
identified by Managuili as 1 of the assailants. Dilangalens mother
testified that they spent PhP70K for the burial of her son & for other
Muslim ceremonies for the dead.
Two of the 4 men remain at large. Only Sumalpong and Fernando
were convicted w/ the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. For
their defense, both gave their defense of alibi. Fernando said he was
working then from 7-10pm at his employers shop, making balusters
(railings), taking only 10 min breaks for lunch and supper. He denied
previously knowing the accused. However, his employer testified
that in making balusters, they had to wait for 4 hrs from the time
they poured mixed cement into the molding till it hardened. During
this wait, Fernando would usually go home to eat and sleep and one
would just wake him up when his services were again needed.
Sumalpong, on the other hand, claimed that he was a home reading
in the evening of Jan 12. This was attested to by his father.
The court held that their defenses were of no merit. The residence
of Fernando was just a few minutes ride from the scene of the crime.
And it was unusual for Sumalpong, a college student, to be at home
and asleep at such an early time in the evening. Moreover, both
were positively identified by victim Managuili as those who attacked
them. The court found the presence of treachery in the sudden and
simultaneous attack against the victims who were unarmed and

194

unsuspecting. It also believed that there was conspiracy among the


accused. But w/o explanation, it found that evident premeditation
aggravated the crime. Thus, it imposed upon both the penalty of
death for the fatal stabbing of Dilangalen and reclusion temporal
maximum for the wounding of Managuili, w/ damages.
Both appeal that in the clear absence of any generic aggravating
circumstance attending the murder, appellants may be sentenced
only to reclusion perpetua, not death.
HELD: Evident premeditation and even voluntary surrender were
wrongly appreciated by the trial court. Appellant Fernando claim
that he voluntary surrendered to the brgy capt. However, it was
shown that the police had tried to arrest him prior but he implicitly
allowed his father to conceal his presence. When the brgy capt
came, he submitted himself only w/ the assurance of his safety. His
surrender then was not of his own knowing and unconditional accord
as required by law. It has been held that if the only reason for the
accuseds supposed surrender is to ensure his safety, his arrest
being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and not voluntary.
The court re premeditacion conocida did not make any ratiocination
or analysis as to how or why it was appreciated. For evident
premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as
the evidence of the crime itself, of the ff elements: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that he clung to his determination; & (3) sufficient laps of
time between determination & execution, to allow himself to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. The SolGen correctly observed
that these requisites were not duly established by the prosecution.
Absent any clear and convincing evidence of evident premeditation
or other aggr/mit circumstances, the penalty imposable for the
murder of Dilangalen is reclusion perpetua (A63(2) RPC).
The penalty for the attempt on Managuilis life is prision mayor in its
medium period. However, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty imposable against appellants is 4 yrs & 2 mos of
prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 10yrs of prision mayor
medium, as maximum.
Both sentences shall be served successively. Assailed decision
modified.
People vs. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27
Nature:
Appeal from RTC Manila decision
- Oct 14, 1992, 1:30 p.m.: Gari Bibat stabbed todeath Lloyd del
Rosario along G. Tuazon cor Ma. Cristina Sts.,Sampaloc, Manila. Del
Rosario was then waiting for a ride toschool.
- Witness: Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, wasthen at Funeraria
Gloria waiting for her bettor.1.She saw somebody talk to Bibat who
told Bibat, Pareanduon na. Siguraduhin mo lang na itumba mo na.
Bibatthen demonstrated how he was going to perform the act.2.After
some time, she then saw Bibat approach del Rosario& took a pointed
object from a notebook, then he stabbedvictim in the left chest
twice. Bibat left but after hearing delRosario shout for help, he
returned & stabbed him again.Bibat ran away & Avila left too.
- Witness Florencio Castro testified that he saw Bibatw/4 others
inside the Gloria Memorial Homes. He saw one of them open a
notebook where a stainless knife was inserted.

195

- Witness Rogelio Robles testified that Bibat frequentedhis place in


Sampaloc because of Tonton Montero. Montero is thepresident of
Samahang Ilocano Fraternity, a frat Bibat was part of.Montero told
Robles about a rumble in their school whereinsomebody died & that
Bibats group planned to take revengeagainst del Rosario. He knew
del Rosario by face & he furthertestified that he knew Bibats group
kept tusok & guns in hishouse.
- Bibat claimed that it was his moms birthday on thatday & that he
was at home during that time reviewing for his finalexams. He also
testified that he went to school for his finals wherehe stayed until
4:30 p.m. He denied all allegations & he claimsthat he was merely
implicated & he didnt know anything aboutthe incident.
- Witnesses Marte Soriano & Lino Asuncion III,classmates of Bibat,
corroborated his claims.
- RTC found Bibat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of murder.
ISSUES & RATIO:1.WON the prosecution witnesses are notcredible.
- NO. SC respects trial court findings unless theres clearproof that it
was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked somesubstantial facts/value
that might affect result.
- Cincos failure to shout for help & delay in reporting incidentis
acceptable considering that she must have been scaredherself. It
doesnt affect her credibility if it is sufficientlyreasoned out. Not
impossible either for her to rememberdetails of the incident. Bibats
camp theorized that Cincocouldve not been taking bets for the PBA
on the day of theincident w/c was a Wed because PBA games were
then heldon Tues, Thurs & Sat. But she couldve done so to
maximizeprofit. Besides, such is immaterial in the case.
2.WON defense of alibi should be appreciated.
- NO. For alibi to be appreciated, there must be clear & satisfactory
proof that it was physically impossible foraccused to be at the crime
scene at the time of commission.
- Alibis of Bibat that he was at home & then in school atArellano
University. These places are actually near the crimescene. He could
very well be present in the crime sceneduring commission. Besides,
this claim is unsubstantiated.He should have presented a class card
or grading sheet toprove that he did take the exam.
- Positive identification of accused by witnesses is given moreweight
than the negative & self-serving denials & alibispresented by Bibat.
3.WON AC of evident premeditation should be appreciated.
- YES. Requisites: time when offender determined/conceivedto
commit crime, act manifestly indicating that culprit hasclung to his
determination, & sufficient lapse of time betdetermination &
execution to allow him to reflect uponconsequences of his act.
- Essence: execution of criml act is preceded by cool thought&
reflection upon resolution to carry out criml intent duringspace of
time sufficient to arrive at calm judgment.
- Witnesses Robles & Cinco have testified to prove that 3requisites
were met. Bibat tried to contest Robles testimony. Robles testified
that he allowed Bibats group tohide guns & tusok in his house. Bibat
claims that it was notlogical for someone in his rt frame of mind to
allow anybodyto do that. But Robles explained that he was scared of
Bibats group & he wanted to protect his family thats whyhe allowed
them to do so. Besides, evident premeditationwas clearly proven by
Cincos testimony. She heard Bibatsgroup plan the killing at around
11:30 a.m. then theycommitted crime at around 1:30 a.m. Thus,

196

there was asufficient lapse of time for Bibat to reflect & such is proof
that Bibat clung to his resolution to kill del Rosario.
- People vs. Dumdum: one hour was considered a sufficientlapse of
time.
HELD:Affirmed.
People vs. Julandia, 370 SCRA 448
~ The supreme court held that when it is not shown as to how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it
was carried oyt, evident premeditation cannot be considered.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 398 SCRA 415
Gonzalo Baldogo alias Baguio & Edgar Bermas alias Bunso were
serving sentence in the Penal Colony of Palawan. They were also
serving the Camacho family who resides w/in the Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) & abducted
Julie (12 y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their
clothing & belongings from a trunk which was located under a
Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for
herself. Julie went to the lowlands & there she asked for help from
Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Baguio
contends that while he was preparing for sleep he was approached
by Bunso who was armed with a bloodied bolo. Bunso warned him
not to shout, otherwise he will also be killed.
- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or
deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period
that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he
tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he
wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them
and to surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr.
might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, w/o
any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, & pursuant to the
provisions of the 2nd par., No. 1, of A63 of the RPC, he is hereby
sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping no modifying circumstance appreciated and
pursuant to the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of the RPC,
& not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, w/ the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction for life, & of perpetual absolute
disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping. YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was
threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas
ordered him to do. He claims that he was even protective of Julie. He
insists that Julie was not a credible witness and her testimony is not
entitled to probative weight because she was merely coached into
implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping and
detention by Bermas.Julies testimony is credible findings of facts
of the TC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its

197

assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the


parties & its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by
the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison
detre of this principle is that this Court has to contend itself w/ the
mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by
the parties; The TC has the unique advantage of monitoring &
observing at close range the attitude, conduct & deportment of
witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said
court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses
are ignored by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by
the evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case
Its incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more
specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed & that
accused-appellant precisely committed the same. Prosecution must
rely on the strength of its own evidence & not on the weakness of
accuseds evidence. The prosecution adduced indubitable proof that
accused-appellant conspired w/ Bermas not only in killing Jorge but
also in kidnapping & detaining Julie. There is conspiracy if 2 or more
persons agree to commit a felony & decide to commit it. Conspiracy
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before,
during & after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose
& design & community of intent. As long as all the conspirators
performed specific acts w/ such closeness & coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in bringing
about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are criminally
liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must
establish the confluence of the ff. requisites
a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime
itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the
malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he
actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding
to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit
the crime. The law doesnt prescribe a time frame that must elapse
from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the
time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag
containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so

198

from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that
they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid
their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony.
insufficient evidence for evident premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, theres no evidence that
they took advantage of their numerical superiority & weapons to kill
Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cant be deemed to have
attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was
killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the
said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery Court has previously held that the
killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could
not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. Since
treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by said circumstance.
People vs. Delada, 399 SCRA 538
Facts: That on or about July 7, 1997 in the afternoon at Pres. Sergio
Osmea Street corner Lim Ket Kai Drive, Cagayan De Oro City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and armed with a knife which he was then
conveniently provided, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Danny Paredes towards the
right side of his body with said knife, thereby inflicting a fatal wound
on the vital part of the latters body resulting in his untimely death.
Appellant interposed self-defense to justify the killing of the victim,
Paredes. He claimed that in the early morning of July 7, 1997,
Paredes entrusted the pedicab to him while the former went inside
the market to have breakfast. He knew the victim because his wife
is a cousin of the lattters wife. He asked for Paredes permission to
use the pedicab, which the latter gave. He was, therefore, surprised
when the victim confronted him at 12:00 noon for using the pedicab.
He surmised that the latter was intoxicated since he had engaged in
a drinking spree with Quipanes. The victim allegedly boxed him for
no reason, hitting him on the right side of the face. When he saw
Paredes scrambling for an umbrella tube with which to strike him, he
then got a knife from inside the shoe repair shop. The victim
wrestled with him and kicked him on the back. To defend himself
against Paredes, who was a man of robust build, he thrust the knife
without even knowing which part of the victims body was hit.
Thereafter, he ran towards the public market.
Held: On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation did not attend the killing. The prosecution was not
able to show: (a) the time when accused-appellant decided to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accusedappellant had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and its execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequence of his act.
People vs. Aposaga, 414 SCRA 69
Jeffrey Alipoon testified that on March 28, 1992, at around 7:00
oclock in the evening, he was with Marlon Tad-y, Wilbert Vasquez,
and the deceased Medel Sigueza drinking a small bottle of whiskey
at the house of Friday Magalona in Burgos Street, Hinigaran, Negros

199

Occidental. After an hour, the deceased wanted to go home. The


group went to accompany the deceased home when they chanced
upon two persons named Windy and Rey who invited them to have
another round of drinks. The group were already drinking beer at
Foodtastic restaurant near an emergency hospital when appellant
happened to pass by. The deceased invited him to join them but
appellant angrily declined, saying, I will not drink, I will go home.
At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, the group started on their
way home when appellant suddenly appeared from behind a mango
tree. Appellant, who was carrying an axe in his right hand and a
long pointed instrument in his left, shouted at the deceased to come
near him. As appellant advanced towards the group, Alipoon tried to
pacify appellant and block his path. When Alipoon placed his hand
on appellants shoulder, appellant brushed away his hand.
Undeterred, Alipoon again placed his hand on appellants shoulder
and placated him saying, We were just drinking on the same glass,
lets forget this and settle this tomorrow. Appellant answered Yes,
but as soon as Jeffrey turned to leave, appellant rushed towards the
deceased shouting, You son of a bitch! Alipoon, who told the
deceased to run, noticed appellant raise his left hand which was
holding a long pointed instrument. Moments later, Alipoon heard a
thud as the two men grappled with each other to wrest control of the
weapons held by appellant. Thereafter, the deceased ran towards
the house of a certain Peleng Mugat at Sitio Boling-Boling while
appellant also ran in the same direction. Alipoon, on the other hand,
accompanied by Wilbert and Marlon, proceeded to the house of the
father of the deceased, Tio Manuel, located twenty meters away
from the place of the incident. After reporting the incident to Tio
Manuel, Alipoon and his companions, together with the father of the
deceased, headed back to the place of the incident, equipped with a
flashlight. When they reached the place, they found the deceased in
a pool of blood, lying face up. They brought the deceased to the
emergency hospital in Hinigaran and later had him transferred to the
Riverside Hospital in Bacolod City where the deceased expired.
Held: Appellants contention has merit. It is the contention of the
posecution that the deceased and appellant had a misunderstanding
a month before the stabbing incident. At past 8:00 oclock in the
evening of the incident, he declined, allegedly in anger, the
invitation of the deceased to join them for a drink. Under the
aforesaid circumstances, the deceased should have been sufficiently
forewarned of the hostile attitude of appellant. Although the
deceased may have been taken by surprise since appellant stabbed
him from behind, just when appellant appears to have been placated
by Alipoon, treachery may not be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. Treachery does not connote the element of surprise
alone. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.[35] It must be shown that the offender employed means,
methods or forms which tended directly to ensure the execution of
his criminal objective without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
In the case at bar, when appellant stabbed the deceased at the
back, the two men fell to the ground and grappled for the possession
of the deadly weapons held by appellant. Said stab wound inflicted
on the deceased could not have rendered him defenseless since he

200

was still able to run after he and appellant fell to the ground
grappling for the possession of the deadly weapons. It is significant
to note that apart from a bolo and an axe, a fan knife was also
recovered from the scene of the crime and appellant himself
suffered a stab wound. This indicates that the deceased was not
completely helpless when he was assaulted. While the medical
examination shows that the deceased suffered four stab wounds, it
was not established, apart from the wound at his back, how and
when, during the scuffle, the other stab wounds were inflicted.
Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be
appreciated against appellant.
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance attending the killing of
the deceased, appellant may only be convicted of the crime of
homicide which is punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
reclusion temporal. Considering that no modifying circumstance
attended the commission of the felony, the minimum imposable
penalty therefor, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be
taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal, and the maximum period of the penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.
People vs. Gialolo, 414 SCRA 278
Facts:At around half past three in the early morning of April 13,
1994, prosecution witness Desiderio Baculi was awakened by a call
of nature. While urinating, he heard a voice coming from the house
of appellant Federico Gialolo, saying, What is this? He peeped
through the wall of his kitchen made of hog wire towards the house
of appellant Federico which was more or less, twenty (20) meters
from his house.[6] He saw the three appellants, together with the
victim Jose Platon. The place was illuminated by an incandescent
lamp situated near the door outside Federicos house. The victim was
held close by appellants Federico Gialolo and Oscar Makabenta.
Federico embraced the victims left side with both arms, while Oscar
embraced the victims right side below the waist also with both his
arms. Appellant Marcos Gialolo was at the back of Jose. He pulled
Joses hair with his left hand and then slashed his neck with a scythe.
They then left Jose who zigzagged towards a nearby coconut tree by
the side of the road, where he eventually fell. The three appellants
proceeded to Federicos house, and switched off the light.
Contention of the Accused:
The appellants cite the allegedly contradictory and unnatural
testimony of eyewitness Baculi. They also contend that the trial
court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
Ruling of the Court:
It is not unbelievable for Baculi to have heard a mans voice uttering,
What is this? coming from the scene of the crime. The scene was a
mere twenty (20) meters away from him. It was also 3 oclock in the
morning when silence reigned and hence where noises were
magnified. The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against the
appellants. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the
following elements must be present: (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating

201

that he has adhered to such determination; and (c) sufficient lapse


of time between the determination and execution to allow the
offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act.In the case at
bar, no proof was presented to show any of these elements. Nor can
the aggravating circumstance of superior strength be appreciated
against the appellants. This circumstance was not alleged in the
Information and hence cannot be the subject of proof during the
trial. Even disregarding this bar, abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery.
h. Craft, Fraud, Disguise
Involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the
accused.
It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime.
Fraud
Insidious words or machinations used
to induce the victim
to act in a manner
which would enable the offender to carry out his design.
Craft and fraud may be
absorbed in treachery if they have been deliberately adopted as
the means, methods or forms for the treacherous strategy, or
they may co-exist independently where they are adopted for a
different purpose in the commission of the crime.
Disguise
Resorting to any device to conceal identity.
The test of disguise is
whether the device or contrivance resorted to by the offender
was intended to or did make identification more difficult, such as
the use of a mask, false hair or beard.
But if in spite of the use of handkerchief to cover their faces, the
culprits were recognized by the victim, disguised is not considered
aggravating.
People vs. Marquez, 117 SCRA 165
Nature: Appeal from the judgement of the CoFI of Quezon
- Lower court found Francisco Forneste & Samuel Jacobo guilty of the
crime of robbery w/ rape. Renato Marquez died during trial.
- Nov. 16, 1966 accused pretended to be PC soldiers that were
looking for contraband. Francisca Marquez said that there was no
contraband in their house. The men ordered her to open up
otherwise theyll shoot. She opened the window & Renato Marquez
forced himself him. The door to the house was then opened & his
companions were able to enter the house.
- The accused demanded the money and other valuable items of the
occupants of the house. Leticia (daughter 13 year old) & Rufina
(household help) was also raped.
- During the initial investigation Rufina and Leticia did not name
names of their aggressors but instead they described them.
Francisca pointed out secretly to the PC that the accused were the
perpetrators of the crime
Issues:
1.
WON the accused were identified beyond reasonable doubt
that they were the perpetrators of the robbery.

202

- YES. Silence of the complaining witnesses on the identity of the


accused immediately after the incident was explained by the ordeal
that they just suffered at the hands of the accused.
- The accused were positively identified by the victims and it was not
shown that witness have an improper motive or were biased against
them,
- Experience has shown that witnesses are reluctant to divulge the
identity of their assailants except to propere authorities or until they
feel safe enough from any probable harm.
2.
WON the AC of nighttime, unlawful entry, dwelling of the
offended parties, disguise (pretending to be PC officers) & utter
disregard due to victims age & sex can be appreciated.
- YES. Properly alleged in the information and was proven by the
prosecution.
People vs. Empacis, 222 SCRA 59
FACTS: At about 9PM of Sept 16, 1986, as vicitms Fidel Saromines
and his W Camila were about to close their small store in Cebu, 2
men, Romualdo Langomez and Crisologo Empacis, came and asked
to buy some sardines and rice. After they finished eating, Langomez
told Fidel to sell him some cigarettes. He then announced a hold-up
and ordered Fidel to give up his money. The latter started to hand
him PhP12K but suddenly decided to fight to keep it. A struggle
followed in the course of w/c Langomez stabbed Fidel about 3x.
Empacis joined in and w/ his own knife also stabbed Fidel. At this
time, gunshots were heard outside the house. It was only when
Peter, Fidels 13-yr old son, saw his father fighting for his life and
rushed to his fathers defense w/ a pinuti (a long bolo) striking
Empacis and inflicting 2 wounds on him did the 2 men flee. Fidel
died from the fatal injuries, w/c penetrated his lungs and heart.
Empacis went to the clinic of Dr Eustaquio for the treatment of his
wounds inflicted by Peter. He told the doctor that he was assaulted
w/o warning by a young man near the Papan Market.
The next day, police officers went looking for a man who might have
been treated for wounds from a bladed weapon. They came to Dr
Eustaquios clinic who told them about Empacis. He was found at
the public market taking breakfast & there they arrested him. He
admitted going to the store of Fidel but denied having joined
Langomez in his attack. He asserts that he tried to stop him but the
latter succeeded in stabbing Fidel. He further alleges that he was
brought by his neighbors to the the clinic. The other 2 men, who
were accused of firing the gun from outside, denied any participation
in the crime. They were both absolved by the court. Langomez
disappeared & could not be found.
HELD: Conspiracy was adequately proven by the evidence. Both
acted in concert, helping and cooperating w/ one another by
simultaneous acts, evidently in pursuit of a common objective.
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly
appreciated against Empacis. Both men pretended to be bona fide
customers of the victims store and on this pretext gained entry into
the latters store and later, into another part of his dwelling. In
previous cases, the Court held the presence of fraud or craft when
one pretended to be constabulary soldiers to gain entry into a
residence to rob and kill the residents, pretended to be needful of
medical treatment only killing the owner of the house, and

203

pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way to enter into a


house.
Nighttime was also properly appreciated as an AC as nocturnity was
deliberately and purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the
crime. For superior strength to be deemed present, it doesnt suffice
to prove superiority in number on the part of the malefactors but
that they purposely employed excessive force, force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked
w/c was present in this case. Empacis & his companion took
advantage of their combined strength & their bladed weapons to
overcome their unarmed victim & assure the success of their
felonious design to take the money. Dwelling was also correctly
appreciated.
Indemnity for death payable is increased to PhP50K & restitution of
PhP12K shall be made by the accused. Decision affirmed w/
modification.
i. Abuse of Superior Strength
To TAKE ADVANTAGE of superior strength means
to use purposely excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.
Superiority may arise from
aggressors sex, weapon or number
as compared to that of the victim (e.g. accused attacked an
unarmed girl with a knife; 3 men stabbed to death the female
victim).
No advantage of superior strength when
one who attacks is overcome with passion and obfuscation or
when quarrel arose unexpectedly and the fatal blow was struck
while victim and accused were struggling.
People vs. Padilla, 233 SCRA 46
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CoFI of Catbalogan Samar
Sgt. Felix Padilla was a member of the Philippine Air Force. He was
charge w/ a crime of murder qualified by treachery, evident
premeditation & taking advantage of his public position for fatal
shooting on May 5, 1981 of his comrade-in-arms Pfc. Ontunca. 2 AC
were alleged to have attended the commission of the offense: aid or
armed men & abuse of superior strength.
TC convicted Padilla of murder qualified by treachery w/ the generic
AC of taking advantage of his public position but at the same time
MC of sufficient provocation in favour of the accused.
Prosecution Witness Pat. Omega Together with Maj. De la Cruz they
were just across the street (15 meters) and from where they stood
they could see clearly the side view of the accused & the victim
facing each other. Ontuca begged for his life & said that he was not
going to fight with him.
The accused showed no mercy and
squeezed the trigger pumping a single bullet into the head of his
victim who was just some 3-4 meters from him. The accused
backtracked & then returned to the fallen policeman & tauntingly
kicked him saying, Are You Still Alive?
Version of Padilla the victim was shot at the head by unidentified
men. He contends that he was at a distance struggling with a
woman at the time that Ontunca was hit.
Issues:

204

1.
WON the Padilla shot Ontunca.
YES. Improbability of the version of the defense lies principally on
the medical findings on the point of entry of the bullet, size of the
gunshot wound and its characteristics as well as the location of the
slug taken from the head of the victim ? all points towards the
accused
Difficult to believe that the alleged gunman fired the shot that hit
the victim at the top of his head from his right side, while the latter
was at a distance struggling with a woman at the time he was hit.
The testimony was made in a straightforward manner.
2.
WON there is treachery.
NO. Accused did not deliberately employ means, methods or forms
in the mode of his attack which tended directly and specially to
insure his safety from the any offensive or retaliatory act the victim
might make.
Appellant didnt consciously adopt a particular method or manner of
killing the victim that would eliminate any risk to himself, for it
wasnt until Ontuca & the woman he was holding hostage
accidentally fell to the ground that appellant was accorded the
instant opportunity to kill his victim w/ facility.
People vs. Canete circumstance that the deceased had fallen to
the ground gave the accused the opportunity of which he promptly
availed of to come up with the deceased and dispatch him at once.
But the act of so doing cannot be interpreted as envincing a design
to employ a method indicative of alevosia.
Assault on the victim was not made in a sudden and unexpected
manner. Victim was forewarned of a graver evil when accused and
his companions mauled him.
3.
WON AC of abuse of superior strength can be appreciated
YES. Properly alleged.
Abuse of superior strength is present not only when the offenders
enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, but also when the
offender uses a powerful weapon w/c is out of proportion to the
defense available to the offended party.
Accused was armed w/ a powerful pistol w/c he purposely used,
gaining him an advantage to his victim who only had a piece of
plywood to cover himself after he was disarmed.
4.
WON the accused abused his public position.
NO. Public official must use his influence, prestige, & ascendancy w/c
his office gives him in realizing his purpose
Could not be said that the accused purposely used or took
advantage of his position or rank in killing the victim because he
could have committed the crime just the same by using another
weapon not necessarily his service firearm.
People vs. Lobrigas, 394 SCRA 170
On or about the 19th day of February, 1996 in the municipality of
Loon, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill
and without justifiable cause, with treachery by attacking the victim
without affording the latter an opportunity to defend himself and
with abuse or taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and box one
Felix Taylaran who was already 76 years old and could no longer put

205

up an effective defense, thereby inflicting injuries on the vital parts


of the body of the said victim which resulted in his death; to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Held: In the case at bar, not only did accused-appellant evade arrest
when he went to Cebu under the pretext that he was going to work
at Southern Island Hospital, but justice was further frustrated when
he escaped from detention with the flimsy excuse that no one was
guarding them. These two instances of flight by accused-appellant,
taken together with the other circumstances established by the
prosecution, support the trial courts finding of accused-appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Courts go by the biblical truism that
the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion. However, we do not agree with the trial court that
the crime committed was murder qualified by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. To appreciate abuse of
superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of
the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They
must have notoriously selected and made use of superior strength in
the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength
is to use excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for
self-defense available to the person attacked; thus, the prosecution
must clearly show the offenders deliberate intent to do so. There
was no clear indication in this case that the accused-appellant and
his companions purposely used their joint efforts to consummate the
crime. Consequently, the crime committed by accused-appellant
was only homicide.
People vs. Casitas, 397 SCRA 382
At around 7:30 oclock in the morning of March 2[5], 1998, at
Karangahan, Bombon, Tabaco, Albay, appellant Jose Casitas, Jr., also
known as Boboy, was at the store of Romeo Briones. This store is
located near the house of Mario Chan, the house where Haide
Marbella was working as caretaker. Appellant and Romeo Briones
were able to converse for about 20 minutes.
During their
conversation, appellant showed Romeo the 3 25-centavo coins which
he had and said, and lakaw kong ini sapalaran x x x (this venture of
mine is being taken on a chance). Thereafter, Romeo turned away
and lay down on the table. He never noticed when appellant left his
store.Nearby, Corazon Goyena passed by the store of Romeo Briones
going towards the Jasmin Street for the purpose of dumping the sand
piled at the side of the road on the drainage. This pile of sand was
on the road beside the house of Mario Chan.
While she was proceeding to the pile of sand, Corazon saw Haide
standing in the middle of the road near the steel gate of the house of
Mario Chan talking with Meriam Manzano. Seeing that Haide wanted
to talk with her, Corazon went to the store of Romeo and waited
there for Haide. At the store, Haide asked Corazon if the latter was
willing to lend her P200.00 to which the latter agreed. Before Haide
left to go back to the house of Mario Chan, she looked at appellant
who was still at the store.Thereafter, Corazon followed Haide to
borrow the shovel which she would use for the pile of sand. She
then proceeded towards the pile of sand and began to shovel sand
to a pail and dumped it on the drainage.After 3 trips, Corazon felt
thirsty. As the house of Mario Chan was the closest house, she went
there to ask Haide for cold drinking water.

206

Calling out to Haide, Corazon decided to enter the compound as


there was no answer from inside the house. Since the gate and the
door to the house were not locked, Corazon entered the house to
look for Haide. Again, she called for Haide but still she did not get
any response.Looking inside the room of Haide, Corazon saw that
there was nobody there. So, she proceeded towards the kitchen of
the house of Mario Chan.At the kitchen, she saw Haide sprawled on
the kitchen floor lying face down and bloodied. Surprised, Corazon
ran outside and asked for help from Romeo.On the other side of the
house of Mario Chan, Nemesio Capiz, the house boy of Gerardo Musa
Jr., while bringing out a gas tank to the car of latter, saw a man
inside the compound of the residence of Mario Chan.
At a distance of about 25 meters, Nemesio saw the man looking
from side to side and then jumped over the fence. Then, this man
casually walked away from the house of Mario Chan tucking in his
shirt inside his pants. Nemesio noticed that the mans shirt was
bloodied and very red and the edge of his pants [was] red. Nemesio
recognized this man to be appellant.However, Nemesio did not mind
appellant. Instead, he went back to the house of Gerardo Musa and
informed the latter that he saw a man jumping from the fence of the
house of Mario Chan and that the mans shirt and pants were very
red.
Thereafter, he went to the pigsty and continued to
work.Outside the house of Mario Chan, Remegio Almonte, Jr. saw the
commotion and entered the house of Mario Chan. There, he saw the
bloodied cadaver of Haide. He suggested that the cadaver be
brought to the hospital and one man lifted the cadaver and brought
it outside. Outside, people commented that there were many stab
wounds on the neck of Haide. Remegio tried to look for clues about
the murder but he found nothing. Then he decided to go home.
Held: A perusal of the Information filed against appellant clearly
shows that dwelling was not alleged as an aggravating
circumstance.
Even assuming that this circumstance was
subsequently proven during trial, the lower court was precluded from
appreciating it because of the new requirement under the rules.
Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Article
249 of the RPC, which defines and penalizes the crime of
homicide.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
considering the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Although the trial court correctly awarded P50,000 to the heirs of the
victim as civil indemnity, it failed to grant actual and moral
damages, which were prayed for and proven during the trial. An
examination of the records of the case will show that the defense
agreed to the stipulation of P39,000 as actual damages, which the
heirs had spent for the funeral of the victim.
Moreover, the
prosecution presented one of her children to prove the pain and the
moral anguish they had suffered by reason of her untimely demise.
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant is found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as minimum; to 14 years eight (8) months

207

and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. In


accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, he shall pay the heirs of
the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages and P39,000 as actual damages.
People vs. Aliben, 398 SCRA 255
~ the court ruled that taking avantage of superior strength which
would present. The 3 accused were all armed. Ronnie and Diosdado
were armed w/ a piece of wood while aliben was armed w/ a bolo
and helped one another in assaulting Borgn who was alone on
Bongons time of death he was 25 yrs old while Ronnie 23, Diosdado
29 Aliben 41 yrs old. There is a wide gap of age bet. The victim and
the accused showing that victim was much older than the 3 accused
who were younger and physically stronger.
People vs. Rollon, 410 SCRA 295
Facts: in the meantime, Felipe and his sons Errol and Ariel, with
Eddie Lachica, Salvador Romano, Danilo Perez and Francisco Rabino,
all boarded the tricycle and went after Tito. As they reached the gate
of Titos house, they chanced upon Alejandro and Melchor. The two
were on their way home from the wake and were just waiting for
their younger brother Isidro who got separated from them during the
commotion. Errol alighted from the tricycle and greeted Alejandro
and Melchor, waving his left hand. Alejandro likewise waved his hand
saying, Pre, waya kita (Friend, there is nothing between us). Errol
curtly retorted, Waya ka diyan (You have nothing here). Errol
blocked Alejandro and Melchors way. Ariel vented his ire on
Alejandro and hacked the latter on his left arm. Alejandro retaliated
and boxed Ariel, who fell to the ground. Errol then joined the fray,
but was held at bay by Alejandro. Eddie suddenly shot Alejandro,
who fell prostrate to the ground. In the meantime, Melchor could not
help his brother because Francisco had his gun aimed at the latter.
Errol then shot Alejandro two more times on the head and on his
body. Ariel, for his part, then hacked the hapless Alejandro with his
bolo. Melchor somehow managed to sneak out without being noticed
and ran for dear life to the house of Thomas Rios. When Melchor was
already inside the house, he heard someone shout, Patay na ina!
(Kill him!). Melchor heard another gunshot. He peeped through a
hole and saw the dead body of his brother, Alejandro, being run over
by the tricycle driven by Errol. Melchor could only watch in horror
and grief. He could not do anything more for his brother.
Held: The appellants use of a firearm to consummate the crime
cannot, however, be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance because there was no such allegation in the
Information that the appellant had no license to possess the firearm,
as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The lack of a license to possess firearms is an essential
element of the crime of violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8294, whether as an independent crime or as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. Hence, such
circumstance cannot aggravate the crime of murder and the penalty
therefor; otherwise, the appellant would be deprived of his right to
be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Although the
crime was committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, the
same should be applied retroactively as it would be favorable to the
appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

208

by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is punishable by reclusion


perpetua to death. With no generic or special aggravating
circumstances and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellant, in accordance
with Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum
period, which is reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Hugo, 410 SCRA 62
Joel Talon testified that at 7:00 p.m. of 21 August 1997, he fetched
his cousin Remegio at the birthday party of Lolito Villamar at
Barangay Narra, San Manuel, Pangasinan. They left the party at
around 7:00 p.m. On their way home, they were met by Ernesto,
Lorenzo, and Rudy. Ernesto was walking along the left side of the
road, while Rudy and Lorenzo took the right side. Ernesto came face
to face with Remegio. Suddenly, Ernesto hacked Remegio twice with
a bolo, first on the forearm and then on the right shoulder, causing
the latter to fall to the ground. Ernesto quickly ran away, and his
bolo slipped from his hand. Remegio then told Joel to run after
Ernesto. Joel promptly gave a chase. Though wounded, Remegio
stood up to follow them. Lorenzo and Rudy also chased Remegio
and Joel.
Since Ernesto was already some distance away, Joel decided to turn
back. Standing approximately ten meters from Remegio, Joel saw
Lorenzo and Rudy overtake Remegio. Thereafter, Joel witnessed
Lorenzo hack Remegio with a bolo on the back of his head, causing
Remegio to fall to the ground. Shocked by what he saw, Joel could
not move to help Remegio. From where he stood, Joel witnessed
Lorenzo deliver another blow at Remegio's neck. Afterwards, Rudy
hacked Remegio at the mouth and forehand. Lorenzo and Rudy
forthwith fled. When the brothers had gone, Joel approached
Remegio, who lay prostrate on the ground, and then he shouted for
help. Bobby Antimano, Joey Villamar, Ben Gapisan, and Eniong
Marcelo arrived and helped Joel carry Remegio's lifeless body to the
street pavement. Eventually, SPO3 Dominador Urbiztondo Jr. and
other policemen arrived at the crime scene and conducted an
investigation.
On 23 August 1997, Joel executed a sworn statement before SPO3
Urbiztondo.
He declared that only Ernesto hacked Remegio.
However, on 26 August 1997, Joel executed an addendum to his 23
August 1997 sworn statement, adding that he saw Lorenzo and Rudy
coming from a dimly-lit area and walking towards the scene of the
crime immediately after Ernesto hacked Remegio. But, he could not
tell what Lorenzo and Rudy did, as he was already in pursuit of
Ernesto.
Held: The records are bereft of any information with respect to the
physical condition of both Ernesto and Remegio. For the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, the
age, size, and strength of the parties must be considered. There
must be a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, giving the latter a superiority of strength which is taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[42] And even
assuming arguendo that it existed, abuse of superior strength should
not be appreciated separately, for it is absorbed in treachery.

209

PEOPLE VS ROXAS 410 SCRA 451


Joelyn B. Maceda, a security guard at the First Unity Textile Mills in
Novaliches, Quezon City, stayed with her sister, Lorna Maceda Puno,
in San Roque, Bagong Pag-asa, Quezon City, in a one-storey
structure with the front door leading to the kitchen and with two
steps leading to the sala. Joelyn shared the house with Lorna and
her husband, the couples five-year-old son, Jonas, and a niece.
Lorna, like Joelyn, was a security guard at the Citibank in Makati City.
When on duty, the sisters were issued caliber .38 service firearms
that they were not, however, allowed to bring home and, instead,
had to entrust each time to a reliever. Although the sisters were
trained to handle firearms, they, upon the other hand, only had
minimal instruction on self-defense.
Between nine oclock and nine-thirty on the evening of 8 March
1996, Joelyn was washing clothes in front of the door of their house,
lighted by a fluorescent lamp, when she saw Lorna coming home
from work in her type B uniform and carrying a brown bag. From a
distance of barely four to five meters, Joelyn could see Lorna running
away from appellant. Appellant, apparently drunk, had no clothes
from waist up, was wearing shorts and carrying a gun. When Joelyn
asked the pale and trembling Lorna why she was running, the latter
replied, Lyn, Lyn, enter, close the door, a man (is) following me!
(Lyn, Lyn, pasok, sarado ang pinto, may sumusunod sa akin lalaki).
Joelyn promptly closed the door but appellant was able to kick it
open. Joelyn, her forehead hit by the door, was pushed aside.
Appellant grabbed Lornas bag, opened it and, apparently not finding
what he could have been looking for, hurled the bag to the floor
(binalibag po niya ang bag sa sahig). Appellant asked Lorna, Why
did you run? Why did you not mind me? (Bakit ka tumakbo? Bakit
di mo ko pinansin?). Lorna answered, I did not hear you. Joelyn
tried to hold the hand of appellant but he pushed her hand away.
Appellant then shot Lorna with a caliber .45 gun with its muzzle just
two feet away from Lornas face. Lorna fell on the floor with half of
her body outside the door and the other half inside the house.
Joelyn held her sister. Lorna was still alive. A neighbor responded to
Joelyns cries for help. Lorna was brought to the hospital. At six
oclock the following morning of 9 March 1996, Joelyn went to Camp
Karingal to report the incident. Later, Joelyn, accompanied by Randy
who took down her statement at the camp, went to the East Avenue
Hospital where Lorna had been taken.
Held: Even beyond that, as so expressed above, is the overriding
principle that an accused has the unfettered right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court has
no reason to doubt the fact that the prosecutor and trial judge must
have relied in utmost good faith on the old rule (that a generic
aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the accused
even if it is not alleged in the information), but it is not enough for
this Court to now take that belief into account against appellant and
to abandon a standing tenet that the law, as well as rules of
procedure favorable to the accused, must be given retroactive
effect. The Court realizes that neither the Solicitor General and the
prosecutor nor the trial judge, are out of line; indeed, in People v.
Mitra the Court has virtually agreed to consider aggravating
circumstances not alleged in the information but proved during the

210

trial and appreciated in imposing the sentence, without necessarily


impinging the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nevertheless,
in subsequent cases, starting with People v. Salalima, the Court,
taking a hard look on the issue has concluded that the new rules
must be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule
that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.
People vs. Roxas, 410 SCRA 451
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, and with abuse of
superior strength and by means of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot Juanito
Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Appellants are
entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum
term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. In accordance with prevailing judicial policy,
the civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00. The award of
moral damages has no factual basis. However, the heirs of the
victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount
thereof cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to
prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No.
113892-H, is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y
Carpio a.k.a. Jhun Tayo and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
People vs. Gregorio, 412 SCRA 90
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one

211

another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, and with abuse of
superior strength and by means of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot Juanito
Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Appellants are
entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum
term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. In accordance with prevailing judicial policy,
the civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00. The award of
moral damages has no factual basis. However, the heirs of the
victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount
thereof cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to
prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No.
113892-H, is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y
Carpio a.k.a. Jhun Tayo and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
j. Band
In the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is taken into
account is
not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed
but their relative physical might vis--vis the offended party
Means Employed to Weaken Defense
This circumstance is applicable only
to crimes against persons and
sometimes against person and property, such as robbery with
physical injuries or homicide.
The means used must not totally eliminate possible defense of
the victim,
otherwise it will fall under treachery
People vs. Polores, 230 SCRA 279
The SC held that in the AC the crime was committed by band under
art 14 par. 6 of the PRC find no sufficient factual basis since the

212

testimony of Malto does not dispose at least 4 of the aggressors


were armed.
People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48
Facts: Appellants Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano
Toacao, Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache, all armed, entered
the house of Dioscoro Abonales, killed the latter by shooting him in
the neck then forcibly took the sum of P30,000 from the victims
wife. They also got the wallet of Rolando Verdida, the future son-inlaw of the victim, containing P10,000 which was the money prepared
by Rolando for his wedding to the victims daughter. After the
robbery, they all fled. But, while escaping, they encountered Artemio
Abonales, the father of the victim, who was responding to
investigate the gunshots he heard. They all stopped momentarily
and Paulino in fact tried but failed to shoot Artemio. Thereafter, all
the accused continued their escape.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with
robbery in band with homicide. There is no such crime in the
Revised Penal Code. The felony is properly called robbery with
homicide. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the
indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with
homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the
circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the
commission of the crime be appreciated when it is not properly
alleged in the information?
Held: No. We cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of
band because it was not alleged in the body of the information.
Though it is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. With regard to its
Section 9, the use of the word must indicates that the requirement
is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule
110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if
such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal
rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused.
k. Treachery
People vs. Verchez, 233 SCRA 174
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bacoor
Accused were convicted of Murder, Frustrated Murder and violation
of PD 1866
Version of the Prosecution:
Aug 15, 1985 Raul Castaneda & Lt. Marcelo Garbo of the Special
Operations Groups (SOG) of the Central Organized Crime Task Force
of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police led a team
of govt agents in conducting a surveillance operations on a house
reported to be the hideout of a gang of suspected bank robbers.

213

- They stopped a car the came out from the subdivision. The driver
was Balane and he was asked by the police officers to accompany
them to where his companions where staying.
- When the 1st car approached the house they were met w/ heavy
volley of gunfire. Norcio died while Noora & Pagsanjan were injured.
- Men inside the house eventually surrendered.
- Accused were assisted by Atty. De la Rosa when they executed
their sworn statements. Verchez, Aldave and Balane admitted being
involved in several bank heist and Verchez also admitted that he
fired the first shot at the policemen.
- The firearms of the accused were unregistered and unlicensed.
Version of the Defense:
- Verchez invited Balane on August 15, 1994 to visited his brother.
They were joined by Aldave, While they were waiting for the brother
of Verchez, Balane went out to buy cigarettes and pulutan. His car
was blocked and the occupants of the other car pointed their
firearms at him. They dragged him out of the car, handcuffed and
blindfolded him.
- Verchez saw several cars stop outside the house and he heard a
gunshot. Verchez and Aldave got loaded firearms from the rooms
and fired back.
- They contended that they were forced into signing a prepared
statement confessing their illegal activities, including having
engaged the police officers in a fire fight.
Issues:
1.
WON the extrajudicial statements are admissible.
- IMMATERIAL. Theres sufficient evidence, independent of their
confessions to hold them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
2.
WON treachery was sufficiently established.
- NO. Two conditions must concur
o
Employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
o
Said means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted
- Lawmen were prepared for any resistance that may be possibly be
put up
- Norcio was killed and Noora was wounded during and not before
the gun battle
- There is no showing that the appellants deliberately and
consciously adopted their mode of attack.
- No showing that they planned to ambush the lawmen, much less
that they knew the lawmen were coming. Appellants were caught
by surprise by lawmen, hence, acting on the spur of the moment,
they fired back.
3.
WON the AC of disregard of the respect due the offended
party on the account of his rank can be appreciated. YES
- No showing that the appellants deliberately intended to offend or
insult the rank of the victim.
- Raiding police officers were not even in uniform
4.
WON they are guilty of illegal possession of firearms YES
- Argument that they just used the firearms in self defense and that
they didnt own the firearm cannot be accepted by the court. Law
does not prescribe a minimum period for the holding of the firearm.
Besides they retrieved the firearms from the cabinet in their
respective rooms.

214

5.
WON the qualifying circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm in homicide or murder should be appreciated. NO
- For it to be considered as a qualifying circumstance it must be
alleged in the information.
People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC of Quezon City
Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, flr manager of Cola
Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside the pub while talking w/
his co-worker. Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the
pub and informed him that hell be on his way home. However,
when he was about an arms length from Eulogio, appellant Robert
Castillo came out from nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning
stabbed Tony w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for
help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand.
Eulogio placed a chair between the two to stop Castillo from further
attacking Tony. Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio
came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside
the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified
that the proximate cause of Tonys death was the stab wound on his
chest. Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony was
attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto Marcelino, a
tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony by the compound
of Iglesia ni Cristo. TC did not appreciate Castillos defense of alibi
and held that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength,
the accused having surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon.
And although treachery was present, it also held that this was
absorbed by abuse of superior strength. Appellant contends that the
TC showed its prejudice against him by asking questions that were
well w/in the prosecution to explore and ask.
HELD: Appellant Castillo is guilty of murder for the death of Antonio
Dometita. The allegation of bias & prejudice isnt well-taken. It is a
judges prerogative & duty to ask clarificatory question to ferret out
the truth. The propriety of a judges queries is determined not
necessarily by their quantity but by their quality & in any event, by
the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such
questioning.
The prosecution was unable to prove the aggr circumstance of
evident premeditation. However, SC held that the killing was not
qualified by abuse of superior strength, contrary to TCs ruling. The
prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked difference
in the stature and build of the victim and the appellant w/c would
have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim.
However, the killing was qualified by treachery.
Treachery is
committed when 2 conditions concur: (1) means, methods and forms
of execution employed left the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) that such means, methods,
and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted
by the accused w/o danger to his person. These requisites were
evidently present when the accused appeared from nowhere and
swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding
goodbye to his friend. The action rendered it difficult for the victim
to defend himself. The presence of defense wounds does not
negate treachery because the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted
on the chest and hence, rendered Tony defenseless.

215

Appeal denied, assailed decision affirmed. Award of indemnity to


the heirs of Castillo in the amount of PhP50K.
People vs. Dacibar, February 17, 2000
On appeal is the decision dated January 25, 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder, imposing
upon them the amended penalty of reclusion perpetua with its
accessory penalties, instead of life imprisonment.
HELD:
While the principal witnesses for the prosecution did not actually see
appellants shoot and kill the victim, direct proof of their culpability is
not necessary when circumstantial evidence would suffice. The
requisites thereof are: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have held that conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by
a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances, which
vary according to the purpose accomplished. Thus, the rule is that
conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial
evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the
absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be
deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
The trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. Although the triggerman fired the shot
from outside the house, his victim was inside. For the circumstance
of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit
the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own
house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without.
People vs. Cando, 334 SCRA 331
Facts: At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando, armed with
two knives and carrying a shoulder bag, climbed the fence of the
factory. They walked on the galvanized iron roof towards the other
building. One by one, they slipped through a narrow window at the
side of the building. The trio proceeded to the victims room, which
was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Cando picked a piece of lead pipe
and told Vargas to pull open the door where the victims mosquito
net was attached. When Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito
net snapped and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead
pipe. The victim awakened and Cando demanded money from him.
When the victim replied that he had no money, Cando struck him
again with the lead pipe. Blood oozed from the victims head. Cando
asked the victim if he recognized him. The victim weakly replied
Yes, You are Roger (Cando). Thereafter, Cando repeatedly hit him
with the lead pipe until he became unconscious. Cando placed the
victims radio cassette in his bag. He went upstairs to get more
items and the keys of the Cimarron van. Thereafter, the trio went
downstairs to where the van was parked. Vargas, the only one who
knew how to drive, sat on the drivers seat. Cando and Rapcing

216

opened the gate, then pushed the van outside. Once they were out
of hearing range, Vargas gunned the motor and the two clambered
into the van. Cando sat on the passenger side while Rapcing sat at
the back. Cando prevailed upon the group to proceed to Quiapo to
visit his girlfriend, but they could not locate her so they just drove
around until daybreak. When they reached Hemady Street in Quezon
City, they abandoned the van. The trio boarded a jeep going to Taft
Avenue and went their separate ways. It was then already early
morning of May 14, 1995.
Held: As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply established
the following elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of
personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or
intimidation against a person, (b) the property taken belongs to
another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed. It matters
not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal
properties of the victim and the other occupants of the house. What
is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct
relation, and intimate connection between robbery and the killing,
whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether
both crimes be committed at the same time. The rule is wellestablished that whenever homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they
did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. While Cando was
bashing the head of the victim, and placing the personal items in his
bag, nary a peep could be heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their act
of simply watching Cando shows their moral assent and complete
acquiescence to the commission of the crime.
People vs. Arizobal, 348 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24
March 1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband
Jimmy with one Francisco Gimenez arrived. Jimmy informed Erlinda
that they had already bought a carabao. After he handed her the
certificate of large cattle, and while he was in the process of skinning
a chicken for their supper, three (3) men suddenly appeared and
ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the
ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a
mask, another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter
helplessness of their victims, the robbers took the liberty of
consuming the food and cigarettes Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari
store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their snack, two (2) of the
intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the neighboring
store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers
proceeded to ransack the household in search for valuables. They
took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and told them to
produce P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple
could not produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda
offered to give their certificate of large cattle. The culprits however
would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her.

217

Three (3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and
together with Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away
while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard
Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of
gunfire which reverberated through the stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them
informed Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed
for trying to escape. Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens
had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which
can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass
to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime
without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the
case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the
inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into
submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands
before dragging them out of the house to be killed.
People vs. Mazo, 367 SCRA 462
Held : For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender
had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. To be
voluntary, the surrender must be spontaneous and deliberate, that
is, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the
authorities.
The
surrender
must
be
considered
as
an
acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require.
The trial court held that there was no voluntary surrender, reasoning
that the surrender was worked out only because Senior Police
Inspector Mazo accidentally found appellant when he accompanied
the latters relatives back to their house. It did not occur to the trial
court, though, that appellant could have escaped right after that
meeting but he did not.
Instead, he submitted himself
unconditionally later that morning when Senior Police Insp. Mazo
came for him. By doing so, appellant manifested his intention to
save the authorities the trouble of conducting a manhunt for him.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon is MODIFIED
insofar as it convicts appellant Dennis Mazo of Murder and imposes
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Judgment is hereby
rendered finding appellant GUILTY of Homicide and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as maximum.
People vs. Mantes, 368 SCRA 661
Held: Moreover, the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected,
and unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the latter. In the instant case,
Elicazar was already alerted to the fact that appellants meant him
harm. According to his wifes testimony, Elicazar was already

218

pleading for his life with appellants when they took him away. They
even hacked at his wife when the latter tried to follow them. All
these circumstances point to the fact that Elicazar was already
forewarned of the danger to his life. In People vs. Lopez (249 SCRA
610 [1995]), we declared that there is no treachery were the victim
was aware of the danger on his life, when he chose to be courageous
instead of cautious, courting obvious danger which, when it came,
cannot be defined as sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen. Violeta
Latagans testimony is no less enlightening. Violeta testified that
she heard appellants and Elicazar quarreling prior to the attack on
the latter, and that during the attack the latter even tried to escape.
The fact that there was a quarrel prior to the attack proves that
there was no treachery, and it is also all too obvious that Elicazar
was well-aware of the danger to his life as shown in his attempt to
escape, albeit unsuccessfully, from his assailants.
The killing not being attended by treachery or evident
premeditation, appellants can only be found guilty of homicide, the
penalty for which, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is
reclusion temporal. Article 64(1), on the other hand, provides that in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
medium period of the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty
shall be an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be
within the range of prision mayor, and the maximum of which shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
People vs. Costales, 373 SCRA 269
Facts: Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o'clock in the
evening of 27 November 1997, she and her sisters Donabel and
Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken
their own corners of their small house to prepare for the night.
Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while the others
occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of
available space settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and
Erlinda had just watched tv when two (2) persons suddenly barged
into their house passing through the door kept ajar by sacks of palay
and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie readily recognized the two
(2) intruders because the entire room was illuminated by a
nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight. Jessie narrated
that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at
the head of her father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter
the other assailant Fernando Ramirez sprayed on their faces what
she described as "something hot and pungent," and with his
firearm pumped a bullet on her mother's chest.
Held: Without doubt, treachery has been established by the
prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant
Fernando Costales and his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and
unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo residence in the middle of the
night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina who
almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance which temporarily
blinded the other occupants of the house. The suddenness of the
attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry
the assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly
deed without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims
was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly
appreciated.

219

People vs. Lopez, 395 SCRA 64


Facts: Richard Lanzanas, 11-year-old son of the victim, Mauricio
Lanzanas, testified that, on August 22, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m.
while he was standing near the barangay hall of Barangay
Sampiruhan, Calamba, Laguna, he heard two gunshots. Turning his
head, he saw his father inside the sash factory, lying on the ground
face up. The trigger man, Felix Lopez, shot his father twice more and
then got the latters two handheld radios. Richard remained
motionless but, after regaining his composure, rushed home and met
his mother along the way. He told his mother about his fathers fate.
She tried to catch up with the appellant but failed.
Held: Since the value of the personal property taken from the victim,
as fixed by the trial court, amounted to P18,000, the penalty
imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 309 which is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty for this particular theft is anywhere from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional medium period to 6 years of prision
correccional maximum period, as minimum, to anywhere from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor medium period.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 20, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna in Criminal Case No.466896-C finding accused-appellant Felix J. Lopez guilty of murder is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the moral damages of
P50,000, appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000 as civil indemnity. The award of actual damages is reduced
to P1, 012.
People vs. Alfon, 399 SCRA 64
Held: The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack
on the victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack. This criterion applies, whether the attack is frontal or from
behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected
and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it. The fact that the location of the fatal stab wound
is in front does not in itself negate treachery. In the case at bar, it
was established that appellant came from behind, went towards the
right of the victim, and suddenly stabbed the victims chest while
holding the latters left shoulder. Evidence shows that, first, at the
time of attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, as
he was unarmed and totally unsuspecting when appellant suddenly
held and stabbed him; and second, appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means of attack, as he was seen
surreptitiously following the victim with a balisong tucked under his
waist. Clearly therefore, treachery attended the crime.
People vs. Escote, 400 SCRA 603
Facts: On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian,
the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination
in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular
conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile,
Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan

220

and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber
shoes, hats and jackets.2 Juan seated himself on the third seat near
the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers' seats, while Victor
stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo.
Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles
City, was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to
Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun bearing Serial
Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side
view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop
the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles
and to observe the passengers of the bus.
Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was
attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when
the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b)
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on
the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was
warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and
unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In
the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth,
another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right
breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They
first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded
for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was
shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his
way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead, he was
mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely
demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man
to his fellowmen.
People vs. Caraig, 400 SCRA 67
Facts: on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and confederating with
and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of one MELENCIO CASTRO Y PASCUA, JR., by then and
there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the different parts of
the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds,
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Melencio P. Castro, Jr., in
such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
held: The attack upon the victims in these cases was attended by
treachery. Per Danilo Javiers testimony, the taxi on which the
victims were riding was moving slowly away from the beerhouse
when Caraig and his co-assailants pursued it and then blocked its
path. The interception took place at less than 100 meters away from
the beerhouse. Since the victims were inside the taxi, they had no
chance to fight back or defend themselves. The number of the

221

victims individual wounds and their relative positions when found


dead by the police emphasized further the essence of treachery.
The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were,
therefore, consciously adopted and effectively forestalled the victims
from employing a defense against their attackers.
People vs. Abut, 401 SCRA 498
Held: The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder
with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
However, the trial court erred in appreciating treachery against the
appellants. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In order that treachery may be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that: a.)
the malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution
affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and b.) the means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The second is
the subjective element of treachery. Treachery must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. In
the absence of any convincing proof that the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the means by which they committed the
crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must resolve the
doubt in favor of the accused. In this case, the prosecution failed to
prove that the mode or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the appellants when they stabbed the
victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the victim. The appellants
and Ritchie then mauled and kicked the victim. There is no evidence
that at the outset, they had decided to stab and kill the victim. It was
only at the late stage of the assault that the appellants and Ritchie
stabbed the victim. The Court believes that after ganging up on and
mauling the victim, the appellants, at the spur-of-the moment,
decided to stab the victim.
Thus, the subjective element of
treachery was not present. However, the appellants and Ritchie
abused their superior strength. They boxed and kicked the victim
without let up. They mauled and kicked the victim even as he was
already sprawled on the ground. The victim was outnumbered. As
against the combined strength of the appellants and Ritchie, the
victim was helpless. There was indubitably inequality of strength
between the victim and the appellants and Ritchie.
People vs. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463
Held: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a
defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without
risk to the aggressor. Treachery requires the concurrence of two
conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution.

222

There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated


exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the
victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.
In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the
attack proves that there was no treachery, and that the victim was
aware of the imminent danger to his life. Moreover, the prosecution
failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a
treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the victim
of a chance to fight or retreat.

Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could
eventually turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a
struggle before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly
shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he
was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. Indeed, a killing
done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any
doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of
the accused.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 416 SCRA 24

l. Ignominy
It is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order,
which adds disgrace to the material injury caused by the crime.
The means employed or the circumstances brought about must
tend to make the effects of the crime
MORE HUMILIATING or
TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO SHAME.
Applicable to crimes against chastity, rape, less serious physical
injuries, light or grave coercion and murder.
Raping a woman from behind is ignominous because that is not
the normal form of intercourse, it is something which offends the
morals of the offended woman. This is how animals do it.
People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
Nature: Appeal from and automatic revue of a decision of Rizal CFI
June 26, 1967 Magdalena de la Riva was abducted outside her own
by Jaime Jose, Edgardo Aquino, Basilio Pineda and Rogelio Canal.
They brought Maggie to Swanky Hotel. Jose, Aquino, Pineda and
Canal took turns raping Maggie.
They decided to leave her on a spot in front of the Free Press
Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5
to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just
come from the studio.
They threatened that she would be doused with acid if she would
inform anyone of the incident.
When she was inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F.
Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a
car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in
the negative
When she reached home she informed her mother of the incident
Appellant Canal and Pineda executed swore to separate statements
on the day of their arrest
1.
Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose
that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from
the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her.

223

Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the


commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar
as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on
condition that he would release her
2.
Pineda executed a statement stating that he and his other
three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that
Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to
follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched
her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear,
however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual
intercourse with him.
Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded guilty.
Issues
1.
WON the accused were motivated by lewd designs. YES
YES. Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the
abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a
plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously
contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of
criminality by the complainants subsequent consent to perform a
striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed,
negated the existence of the element of lewd design.
This testimony of Ms. De la Riva, whose evidentiary weight has not
in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to
establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. The claims
of the accused that they were not motivated by lewd designs must
be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2.
WON the accused rape Ms. de la Riva.
YES. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in
the complainants vagina disproves the fact of rape.
Dr. Brion stated that semen is not usually found in the vagina after
three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has
douched herself within that period
The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of
rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen,
but penetration.
When the victim got home she immediately told her mother that the
four raped her. The statement was made by the complainant to her
mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in
whom a daughter would confide the truth.
3.
WON the extrajudicial statements is admissible.
YES. The accused contends that secured from them by force and
intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied
by the police investigators. The statements were given in the
presence of several people & subscribed & sworn to before the City
Fiscal of QC, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated
the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete w/
details which could hardly be known to the police; & although it is
suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from
their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish
the truth of such allegation. Even disregarding the in-custody
statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for
the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the
two.
4.
WON there was a mistrial for Pineda.
NO. Pineda contends that there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against

224

him and his co-appellants is a capital offense & the amended


complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would
raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on
his presence during all stages of the trial.
The court held that plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters
not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty)
covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying
and/or aggravating the crime it was not incumbent upon the trial
court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in
court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court
to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be
the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his
request.
5.
WON the enormous publicity of the case affected the
decision of the trial court.
NO. The appellants took notice of the enormous publicity that
attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. Jose
himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge had not been
influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful
of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to
fair trial.
6.
WON aggravating circumstances were present.
- YES. Nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes
- Abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by
the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De
Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113)
- Ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes,
before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to
make the effects of the crime more humiliating. use of a motor
vehicle.
7.
WON the imposition of four death penalty is valid.
YES. The Supreme Court held that in view of the existence of
conspiracy among the accused and of its finding regards the nature
and number of crimes committed, as well as the presence of
aggravating circumstances, four death penalties can be imposed.
People vs. Butler, 120 SCRA 281
That on or about the 8th day of August, 1975, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill and taking
advantage o his superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniosly assault, attack and hit with a statue of
Jesus Christ oue Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios' and after said
Enriquita Alipo fell flat on her fare the above-named, accused again
taking advantage of superior strength then and there apply force
and pressure on the back of the head of said Enriquita Alipo thereby
forcing and sinking the latter's mouth and nose against the mattress
of the bed, and as a result thereof, the said Enriquita Alipo was not
able to breathe and was choked, thus directly causing the death of
said Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios'.
Held: The dismissal of the case against the accussed Michael Butler
is, therefore, meritorious and justifiable. We hereby order his final

225

discharge therefrom. His final release, however, shall not obliterate


his civil liability for damages in the amount of P24.000.00 to the
heirs of the victim which We hereby affirm. Such release shall be
without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery
of civil damages. (Article 198, P.D. 603).
People vs. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159
The victim was abducted by the appellant, who brought her to his
house. When they arrived at the appellants house the victim was
divested of her jewelry and other valuables, afterwhich she was
raped several times. The appellant was convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. Whether multiple rape can
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. In several cases the Court realized that there was no law
providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be
considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code
which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous
circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the
legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing
that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered
aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the
offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not
clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape
committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that (i)n all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there
are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied, the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accusedappellant.
People vs. Siao, 327 SCRA 231, 2000
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cebu (2000)
On May 27, 1994, at about 3PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao in his
residence ordered Reylan Gimena, his familys 17yr old houseboy, to
pull Estrella Raymundo, their 14yr old housemaid, to the womens
quarters. Once inside, appellant Siao pushed her to the wooden bed
and asked her to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of
sprite. Appellant lit the candle and dropped the melting candle on
her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her back on the bed w/
her head hanging over one end. Appellant then poured sprite into
her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun pointed
to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and hands w/ an
electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed.
As Siao pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to undress and
commanded her to take the initiative on Gimena. Not understanding
what he meant, appellant motioned to her poking the gun at her
temple. Gimena was then ordered to remove his shorts. He did not
do so but only let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of
Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and
shouted for help twice. Siao then ordered Gimena to rape Estrella.

226

At first, Gimena refused because he has a sister. However, Siao said


that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated at gunpoint
by Siao to have carnal knowledge of each other. They performed the
sexual act because they were afraid they would be killed. Siao
commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3 diff positions (i.e.
missionary position, side-by-side and dog position as narrated vividly
in the case), pointing the handgun at them the whole time.
Thereafter, Siao warned them, If you will tell the police, I will kill
your mothers. Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole
event.
He asserts that she retaliated through this accusation
because Estrella herself was accused of stealing many of his familys
personal effects. TC held Rene Siao guilty as principal by induction of
rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
indemnification of PhP50K. Gimena was acquitted for having acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal, if not greater
injury.
HELD: SC respected TCs finding of facts and found any
inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies inconsequential
considering that they referred to trivial matters w/c have nothing to
do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is carnal
knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was
pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of
less than 30 mins, w/c does not conform to common experience,
rape was still present from the evidence because rape is not the
emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the
male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is
what constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by
many people at the time of the crime, rape was still committed
because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrellas and
Gimenas decision not to flee proves only the fear and intimidation
that they were under because Siao was after all their amo or
employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they did not
succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/
the use of a deadly weapon. The TC overlooked and did not take
into account the aggr circumstance of ignominy and sentenced
accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing
the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male superior,
female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from
behind, as was proven in the case, the aggr circumstance of
ignominy attended the commission thereof.
However, the use of a deadly weapon serves to increase the penalty
as opposed to a generic aggr circumstance w/c only affects the
period of the penalty. This nonetheless should be alleged in the
information, because of the accuseds right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Considering that
the complaint failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty to be reckoned w/ in determining the penalty for rape would
be reclusion perpetua, as prescribed for simple rape. Simple rape is
punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua,
w/c must be applied regardless of any mit/aggr circumstance w/c
may have attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed by the TC is correct.

227

Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages,


w/c is automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in
the amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggr
circumstance of ignominy justifies the award of exemplary damages
pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment affirmed w/ modification of
damages awarded.
m.Unlawful Entry
There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not
intended for the purpose.
Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not for
escape.
There is no unlawful entry when
the door is broken
hereafter the accused made an entry thru the broken door.
The breaking of the door is covered by paragraph 19.
Unlawful entry is
inherent in the crime of trespass to dwelling and robbery with
force upon things
but aggravating in the crime of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons.
People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of RTC Pasig
Oct. 10, 1990, 5 a.m.: Brgy. Capt. Eustaquio Borja awoke to find out
that the front door of his house was open & that their TV set in the
sala was missing. He & his wife went to the 2nd floor & found their
daughter, Veronica Baello dead. She was stabbed to death. Borja
reported the incident to the authorities & they later on discovered
that some more items were missing in their house. Lost items
amount to about P50k.
Suspects: John Baello, also known as Totong along with one Jerry
whos still at large. Why? TV set discovered in the house of Baellos
bro-in-law, Eugenio Tagifa. Tagifa executed a sworn statement
testifying that it was Baello who brought the TV to their house.
Baello was captured later on & he admitted that he took part in the
commission of the crime. His testimony was taken in the presence of
PAO lawyer Atty. Generoso since he couldnt afford his own counsel.
He admitted that they passed through the window of the houses
2nd floor however, he claimed that he only got the TV set & he
didnt know what items Gerry took from the house. He further
claimed that Gerry was responsible for Veronicas death since he
was the one who stayed on the 2nd floor of the house.
He later on claimed that he was mauled & that his lawyer (Atty.
Generoso) didnt really help/defend him. According to him, Atty.
Generoso simply stared at him & that the lawyer asked Baello to sign
a typewritten statement w/the promise that hell be released later
on. Baellos mother attested to the fact that her son had contusions
caused allegedly by one Gabriel, Eustaquios nephew, who was in jail
too.
RTC found Baello guilty & sentenced him to RP (reclusion perpetua)
w/indemnity of P50k & ordered to pay P50k as repatriation for the
stolen items.
ISSUES & RATIO:

228

1.
WON Baellos extra-judicial confession is admissible even if
he allegedly was not fully & duly assisted by counsel when such was
given
- YES. He voluntarily accepted Generosos services pursuant to Sec.
12(1), Art. III of the Consti w/c provides that if a person cant afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided w/one.
- Document was presented that the counsel duly informed Baello of
his constitutional rights as well as the consequences of his
confession. He was even advised not to make any but he insisted.
- If these were true, then he should have not signed the document or
he should have complained.
- Similar cases have upheld the admissibility of such extra-judicial
confessions such as People vs. Pinzon & People vs. Masongsong.
2.
WON there was conspiracy
- YES. He admitted in his sworn statement that he & Gerry had a
prior agreement to commit robbery. They met at 4 in the morning &
they went in the house together. Taken as a whole, these acts
establish that there was common design between the 2.
- Even if he only took part in the crime of robbery, since conspiracy
was proven, he shall likewise be liable for the homicide Gerry
committed unless he can prove that he prevented Gerry from
committing such.
- Testimonies of witnesses are admissible. Respect is accorded to the
findings of the lower courts since it did not overlook or
misappreciate any facts that may change the result.
3.
WON the AC of unlawful entry should be appreciated.
- YES. They entered the Borja residence through the second floor
window w/c is not intended for ingress.
- NOCTURNITY also appreciated (AC) since the crime was committed
in the darkness & they took advantage of such circumstance to
accomplish the crime.
HELD: Conviction affirmed.
People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 768
Held: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling also attended the
commission of the crime even if the victim was killed outside his
residence. A person's abode is regarded as a sanctuary which should
be respected by everybody. Here, while the victim was resting in the
comfort of his home, accused-appellant and his cohort(s) forcibly led
him (the victim) out of his house shortly before he was shot to death.
At that point, the aggression had begun, although it ended outside
the victim's house. An act performed cannot be divided or its unity
be broken up, when the offender began the aggression in the
dwelling of the offended party and ended it in the street or outside
said dwelling. Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was taken from
his house and killed just beside his abode although the offense was
not completed therein.
The penalty prescribed for Murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was offset by the generic
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, that is, reclusion perpetua.
n. Breaking a Wall, Door, etc.
To be considered as an AC,
breaking the door must be utilized

229

as a means to the commission of the crime.


It is only aggravating in cases where
the offender resorted to any of said means TO ENTER the house.
If the wall, etc. is broken in order to get out of the place, it is not
aggravating
People vs. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723
Facts: That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock
in the evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument
(unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death
and thereafter, the accused rode on an unregistered motorized
tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they used
in escaping from the crime scene.
Held: As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same
inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was
deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of
the crime or that the crime could not have been committed without
it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use
thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to
facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of
the offender easier and his apprehension difficult.
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the
law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad
or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages
to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 190
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about
9:30 oclock in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,

230

riding on two motorcycles, conniving and confederating together and


mutually helping one another, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and
Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as soon as
procedural requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Alden Abiabi by shooting him with the use of said
unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest
was issued on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and w/o
having been served on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano &
communicated his desire to surrender. Lozano contracted CD Psupt
Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco could have opted to go
on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the authorities & face
the allegations leveled against him. For this he should be credited
with the MC of voluntary surrender.
o. With the Aid of Persons Under 15, or With Motor Vehicles,
etc.
With the aid of persons under 15 years of age
To repress, so far as possible,
the frequent practice resorted to by professional criminals
to avail themselves of minors
taking advantage of their responsibility
(remember that minors are given leniency when they commit a
crime)
By means of a motor vehicle
To counteract the great facilities found by modern criminals in
said means to commit crime and flee and abscond once the same is
committed.

This circumstance is aggravating only when used in the


commission of the offense.
If motor vehicles are used only in the escape of the offender, it is
not aggravating. It must have been used to facilitate the commission
of the crime to be aggravating.
or other similar means the expression should be understood
as referring to
MOTORIZED vehicles or
other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile or
airplane.
People vs. Ong, January 30, 1975
Held: To find appellant Benjamin Ong guilty as principal of the crime
of murder, with the aggravating circumstances of use of motor
vehicle and evident premeditation although these are offset by the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, passion or obfuscation
alternatively with vindication of a grave offense and the disclosure of
all the details of the offense that enabled the prosecution to allege
aggravating circumstances which otherwise could not have been
known, which in my opinion is analogous to the plea of guilty but
separate and distinct therefrom. In consequence, said appellant
should suffer an indeterminate sentence of from 12 years of prision

231

mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,


with the accessory penalties of the law.
Likewise, the appellant Bienvenido Quintos guilty of murder, but
only as an accomplice, with the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle offset only by one
mitigating circumstance similar to that in the case of Ong which is
analogous to the plea of guilty inasmuch as Quintos also revealed
details that the government would not have known otherwise.
Accordingly, he should be sentenced to 6 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties of the law.
People vs. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723
Facts: That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock
in the evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument
(unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death
and thereafter, the accused rode on an unregistered motorized
tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they used
in escaping from the crime scene.
Held: As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same
inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was
deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of
the crime or that the crime could not have been committed without
it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use
thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to
facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of
the offender easier and his apprehension difficult.
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the
law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad
or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages
to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to

232

an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of


Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
p. Cruelty
Elements:
1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other
wrong;
2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the
purpose of the offender.
Cruelty
For it to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and
delighted in making his victim suffer.
If the victim was already dead when the acts of mutilation were
being performed,
this would also qualify the killing to murder due to
outraging of his corpse.
People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231
Facts:
A decapitated body of a man was found in a grassy portion at Tinio
St., Angeles City. He was later identified as Nestor de Loyola thru his
voters identification.
Apart from the decapitation, the decease bore 43 stab wounds in the
chest as well as slight burns all over the body.
The head was found 2 feet away from the corpse (nice!yech!)
5 persons were charged for the crime although Ruben and Rogelio
Ilaoa were the only ones who stood trial and the two were found
guilty of murder attended by evident premeditation, abuse of
superios strength and cruelty.
Circumstancial evidence established that Nestor was drinking with
the two, and later Ruben and Nestor were engaged in an argument.
Nestor was then kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel
and Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. Thereafter he was dragged to
Rubens apartment. Ruben and Julius later borrowed the tricycle of a
certain Alex Villamil. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle with a sack
in the sidecar that looked like it contained a human body. Alex noted
bloodstains on the tricycles floor. Blood was found in Rubens shirt
and shoes and hair near his right forehead was found partly burned.
Susan Ocampo, Rubens live-in partner was likewise seen sweeping
what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their apartment.
Issues:
1.
WON crime was attended with evident premeditation
NO. There is nothing in the records to show that appellants, prior to
the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there
proof to show that such killing was the result of meditation,
calculation or resolution on his part.
On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of
circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an
unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them
for calculation and meditation.
2.
WON crime was attended with cruelty
NO. The fact that Nestors decapitated body bearing 43 stab wounds,
24 of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is not
sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that
Ruben, for his pleasure and satisfaction, cause Nestor to suffer

233

slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and


moral pain.
Number of wound alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance
Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victims body
was dismembered.
People vs. Allan, 245 SCRA 549
Held: The court is not convinced that cruelty had been sufficiently
shown on the basis of the finding alone. Cruelty cannot be
appreciated in the absence of any showing that appellants, for their
pleasure and satisfaction caused the victim to suffer slowly and
painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical & moral pain.
The mere fact that wound in excess of what was indispensably
necessary imply that such wound s were inflicted with cruelty & with
the intention to deliberately & inhumane intensifying or AC the
suffering of the victim.
People vs. Sibonga, 404 SCRA 10
Held: The Court agrees with the appellants contention that the trial
court erred in ruling that cruelty attended the commission of the
crime when the victim was thrown into the precipice. The trial court
premised its ruling on its finding that when the appellants and their
co-accused threw the victim into the precipice, he was still alive.
Paragraph 21, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is cruelty in the commission of a felony when the wrong done
in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for its commission. There is no cruelty
when the other wrong is done after the victim is already dead. The
test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is
whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the
wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission,
or inhumanly increased the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed
at his person or corpse. The Court agrees with the trial court that the
accused and appellants are guilty of murder qualified by treachery.
The hands of the victim were tied behind his back when he was
stabbed. The attack was sudden. The appellants, with their coaccused, stabbed the victim with their knives/bolos.
The
commission of the crime was thus aggravated by abuse of superior
strength. However, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery. Dwelling aggravated the crime. However, it cannot be
appreciated against the appellants because it is not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime was committed before
the said rule took effect, the new rule had been applied retroactively
since it is more favorable to the accused. No other modifying
circumstances attended the commission of the crime. At the time
the crime was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Notwithstanding the
suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time, the
medium of the prescribed penalty remained reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court
is correct.
People vs. Salamillo, 404 SCRA 211

234

Held: The number of wounds is not the criterion for the appreciation
of cruelty as an AC, the mere fact that wounds in excess of what is
necessary to cause death were inflict upon the body of the victim
does not necessarily imply that such wound were inflicted with
cruelty.It is necessary to show that the accused intentionally &
increased the victims suffering. In this case, there is no evidence of
showing appellants intent to commit such cruelty.
F. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 15)
Art. 15. Their concept. Alternative circumstances are
those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
the other conditions attending its commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into
consideration when the offended party in the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother
or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the
offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender
has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony
but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
1. RELATIONSHIP
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS EXEMPTING:
In the case of an accessory who is related to the principal
within the relationship prescribed in Article 20;
Also in Article 247, a spouse does not incur criminal liability
for a crime of less serious physical injuries or serious physical
injuries if this was inflicted after having surprised the offended
spouse or paramour or mistress committing actual sexual
intercourse.
Those commonly given in Article 332 when the crime of theft,
malicious mischief and swindling or estafa.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS AGGRAVATING:
in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in cases where
o the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the
offender (grandson kills grandfather), or
o when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the
same level, as killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother
or adopted brother.
When CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the offended party is a
descendant of the offender, relationship is AGGRAVATING.
o But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by a
parent upon his child by excessive chastisement.
When the crime is LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the
offender
When crime against persons is HOMICIDE OR MURDER,

235

o relationship is aggravating even if the victim of the crime is a


relative of lower degree.
In CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY,
o relationship is always aggravating
In the CRIME OF QUALIFIED SEDUCTION,
o the offended woman must be a virgin and less than 18 years
old.
o But if the offender is a brother of the offended woman or an
ascendant of the offended woman,
regardless of whether the woman is of bad reputation,
even if the woman is 60 years old or more,
o crime is qualified seduction. In such a case, relationship is
qualifying.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS MITIGATING:
When the CRIME IS LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of lower degree
Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when
relationship is an element of the offense
People vs. Atop, 286 SCRA 157
1. 11-year-old Regina lives with her grandmother.
2. Atop is the common-law husband of her grandmother.
3. Atop was found guilty of 4 counts of rape which was
committed in 1993 (2x), 1994 and 1995. The lower court took
into account the Aggravating Circumstance of relationship.
Held: The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached
by common-law relations. In this case, there is no blood
relationship or legal bond that links Atop to his victim.
2. INTOXICATION
It is only the circumstance of intoxication which
if not mitigating,
is automatically aggravating.
WHEN MITIGATING:
1. There must be an indication that
a. because of the alcoholic intake of the offender,
b. he is suffering from diminished self-control.
c. It is not the quantity of alcoholic drink.
d. Rather it is the effect of the alcohol upon the offender which
shall be the basis of the mitigating circumstance.
2. That offender is
a. not a habitual drinker and
b. did not take alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his
resolve to commit crime
WHEN AGGRAVATING:
1. If intoxication is habitual
2. If it is intentional to embolden offender to commit crime
People vs. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, at 3:00
oclock in the morning, more or less, at Poblacion West, Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, and while armed with
a deadly weapon (bolo) did then and there willfully, unlawfully

236

and feloniously attack, assault and hack FELIX AYROSO OLANDA


with a bolo while victim was asleep in the masters bedroom,
inflicting upon him serious hackwounds in his face and other
parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
some causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is,
the timely medical attendance extended to the victim which
prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
Held: There is MC of plea of guilt. He pleaded guilty upon being
arraign and before the prosecution presented their witness. A
plea of guilt be made at the first opportunity indicating
repentance on the part of Ibanez.
People vs. Bajar, 414 SCRA 494
Facts: on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00
oclock in the evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan,
Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a
sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation,
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds
father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as
may be allowed by law. The aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the
respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual
intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the
crime.
Held: Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of age, it is
considered present when the offended person, by reason of his
age, could be the father of the offender.[39 This is obvious in
this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age, considered
old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally
declared in open court that he was 58 years old),[40 he was
also the latters father-in-law. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance by reason of their age difference is, therefore,
reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity. Further, it is
ingrained in Philippine culture that those advanced in age are
respected especially in the provinces.
People vs. Mosende, 371 SCRA 446
Held: Not Aggravating. The court a quo, in considering the AC of
Intoxication gave much weight to the testimony that appellant
was so identified as a habitual drunkard. While Leticia testified
to having seen Mosende drinking alcoholic beverage at a store
earlier the afternoon of the incident , nothing would show that
he was in any state of intoxication or in drunken condition
when the dastardly deed was being committed.
People vs. Renejane, 158 SCRA 258

237

FACTS: On Nov 1, 1981, at 11PM, Laborte and Maraasin were


invited to the house of Beniano to partake of some food and
drinks. After a considerable length of time, Paulino Laborte
stabbed policeman Mario de Jesus. It was followed by another
stabbing done by Beniano Renejane.
Likewise, the police
officers companion, Regino Maraasin was also stabbed by
Rodolfo Ripdos.
It was alleged that previously, in Oct, the police officer
apprehended Renejane for illegal possession of marijuana and
that Maraasin was suspected of having been the informer.
Renejane, as his motive, must have harbored a grudge against
the comrades.
HELD: Denials made and alibi advanced by the appellant cannot
prevail over their positive identification. Furthermore, Renejane
had a motive in the killing.
Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual or intention. The fact
that the accused drank liquor prior to the commission of the
crime did not necessarily qualify such action as an aggr
circumstance.
The affair was an ordinary drinking party.
Neither can this be considered as a mitigating circumstance in
the absence of proof that the intake of alcoholic drinks was of
such quantity as to blur the appellants reason and deprive him
of a certain degree of control. This has been strengthened by
the fact that treachery has been established. Therefore, the
means of execution employed were deliberately or consciously
adopted. Moreover, the aggr circumstance of the act being in
disregard of rank is appreciable in the case at bar.
People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688
1. After the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice
the victim Pascua with a bolo while the latter was walking along
the barrio street.
2. After hacking and stabbing to death the victim, the accused
proceeded to the seashore and on finding Buenaflor hacked the
latter with the same bolo.
Held: Intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor
intentional, that is, no subsequent to the plan to commit the
crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be
mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is
one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks.
The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that
it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual
resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making its
victim a potential evil doer. The intoxication of the appellant not
being habitual and considering that the said appellant was in a
state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony,
the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be
considered mitigating.
3. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION
Refers to the
lack of sufficient intelligence of and knowledge of the full
significance of ones act
Being illiterate does not mitigate liability
if crime committed is one which one inherently understands
as wrong (eg. parricide)

238

To be considered,
degree if instruction must have some reasonable relation to
the offense.
People vs. Galigao, G.R. No. 140961-63, January 14, 2003
Held: The court hereto acknowledge that circumstance could
exist to warrant an exercise of such foreberance (death
penalty). The SC in deciding this case can do no less herein
considering that accused is unletter fisherman. Because of thid,
there is sufficient justification in imposing on accused-appellant
the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape.
V.

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE


A. PRINCIPALS ART. 18
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those persons who,
not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
-

1. By Direct Participation
People vs. Nunag, 173 SCRA 274
FACTS: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about 15.5 y.o., declared
that in the 2nd wk of May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a
TV program in the house of her neighbor, Laxamana, she saw the
accused Mario Nunag, 1 of her neighbors, coming towards her.
Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her & asked her to go w/ him.
Because she refused, Nunag held her by the hand & poked a knife
at her stomach & threatened to kill her. Nunag placed something
in her mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about 15m. away
from Laxamanas house. Very soon thereafter, the accused was
joined by 4 others, whom she knew also. After conspiring in
whispers, Mandap & Salangsang held her hands while Carpio &
Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on the ground. Nunag
undressed her & had sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap
followed. She lost consciousness & only regained it while Manalili
was abusing her. The 5 accused left w/ a threat that they would
kill her & her family.
After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation
period whenit became due and noticed that her stomach was
getting bigger. Yet she didnt tell anybody until her family noticed.
In Oct 1978, she gave birth prematurely to female twins who died
after baptism.
Accused Nunag admitted having sexual intercourse w/ Lopez but
denied the charge of rape. He asserted that it was while he was
sleeping when she came on to him and they went to the ricefield
to relieve their lasciviousness. She asked money after the act and
he gave her PhP4.00 and went home.
Accused Salangsang offers the same testimony but asserts that he
gave Lopez P2 instead. Accused Manalili also contends that it was
Lopez who came on to her but he refused to give her money. It
was only Carpio & Mandap who denied having sexual intercourse
w/ her.
RTC found them guilty of the charge & sentenced Nunag, Mandap
& Salangsang to suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio & Manalili,
who were both above 16 & below 18 at the time of the
commission of the offense, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

239

10 yrs of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4 mos of reclusion


temporal as max.
HELD: Finding that Lopez, a poor barrio girl who looked timid and
inexperienced in the ways of the world, had no motive whatsoever
to testify falsely against the appellants, each of the 5 accused
must be found guilty of 3 distinct and separate crimes of rape, the
first 3 men by direct act & participation & the other 2 by
indispensable cooperation.
Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang
sentenced to suffer 3 penalties of reclusion perpetua while
Manalili & Carpio both being above 16 but below 18 yrs at that
time, sentenced to suffer 3 indeterminate penalties of 10 yrs of
prision mayor as min & 17 yrs 4 mos of reclusion temporal as
max. Judgment affirmed w/ modification.
-

People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668


- Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun
was engaged in illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents
decided to entrap and arrenst Jun in a buy-bust operation.
- On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the
marked bills and Jun instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him
while he got the marijuana from his associate.
- When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic
upon which PO3 arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find
the marked bills on him. Jun revealed that he left the money at
the house of his associate named neneth
- They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dinin table and noticed something wrapped in plastic
inside the box.
- Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and
found that it ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves.
- Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
Neneth. The policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and
Jun, together with the coz, its contents and the marked bill and
turned them over to the investigator at headquarters,
- Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is
Violata Gaddao.
- They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and
giving away to another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as amended by RA 7659
Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable
- Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised
by an accused & partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance.
- American federal courts and state courts usually use the
subjective or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to
determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to commit the offense is
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial
exposure to government agents.
- Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is
whether the conduct of the law enforcement agenst was likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready
and willing, to commit the offense.
- The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly & adequately
shown. Courts should look at all factors to determine the

240

predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as


they are relevant to determine the validty of the defense of
inducement.
- In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of
Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the
finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee
from the policement to justify her arrest in hot pursuit
- Neither could her arrest ne justified under second instance of
personal knowledge in Rule 113 as this must be based upon
probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of
the alleged indentification made by her co-accused. PO3
Manlangt, however, declared in his direct examination that
appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his query as
to where the marked money was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom
he lfet the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria in
pushing drugs, If there is no showing that the person who effected
the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of the acts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
- Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of
marijuana was found in Gaddaos house does not justify a finding
that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
- The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired
with Doria in the sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted
-

People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528


FACTS: Cergontes forcibly took the wristwatch ofSolis while Reyes
stabbed the latter at the back resulting tohis death. The victims
gold necklace, one gold ring, all ofan undetermined value, and a
wallet containingunspecified amount of cash were also taken from
him.Reyes was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide.Appellant
now contends that the animus lucrandi was notsufficiently
established as the taking of the watch couldhave been a mere
afterthought and the real intent of themalefactors was to inflict
injuries upon the victim.Moreover, there was no evidence of
ownership of thewristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two
personswho attacked the victim
HELD: The court held that appellants contentionis devoid of merit.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is aninternal act which can be
established through the overtacts of the offender. Although proof
of motive for thecrime is essential when the evidence of the
robbery iscircumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may
bepresumed from the furtive taking of useful propertypertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveala different intent on
the part of the perpetrator. Theintent to gain may be presumed
from the proven unlawfultaking. In the case at bar, the act of
taking the victim'swristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes
while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him
sufficiently gaverise to the presumption.The detailed narration of
how the victim wasforcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused
Cergontesand stabbed at the back by accused-appellant cannot
betaken lightly on the argument that the attackers owned

241

thewristwatch and they attacked the victim solely on theirdesire to


retrieve it. In any event, in robbery by the takingof property
through intimidation or violence, it is notnecessary that the person
unlawfully divested of thepersonal property be the owner thereof.
Article 293 of theRevised Penal Code employs the phrase
"belonging toanother" and this has been interpreted to merely
requirethat the property taken does not belong to the
offender.Actual
possession
of
the
property
by
the
persondispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held
thatrobbery may be committed against a bailee or a personwho
himself has stolen it. So long as there isapoderamiento of personal
property from another againstthe latter's will through violence or
intimidation, withanimo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable
to theoffender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reasonof
the robbery, the offense is converted into the compositecrime of
robbery with homicide.
2. By Induction
- People vs. Yamson-Dumancas, 320 SCRA 584
On February 20, 1992, Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in
a fake gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao
and Rufino Gargar, Jr. On Aug. 5, 1992 10:30 AM Mario Lamis,
Dominador Geroche, Rolando Fernandez, Jaime Gargallano, Edwin
Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Moises Grandeza were planning to
abduct Lumangyao & Gargar Jr. because they swindled the
Dumancas family. Col Nicolas Torres was also informed of the plan
of the group. On August 6, 1992, Jeannette investigated the two
abducted and told the group of Geroche to take care of the two.On
Aug 7, 1992, Gargallano shot Gargar while Geroche shot
Lumangyao. Then the 2 bodies were buried by Pecha & Hilado.
The RTC found the following guilty of:
o
Principals by Induction: Jeanette Yanson Dumancas
o
Principals by Induction and by Direct Participation and/or
Indispensable Cooperation: Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
o
Principals by Participation:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto
Police Officer Mario Lamis Y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche Y
Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin
Divinagracia, Teody Delgado
o
Principals by Participation: Cesar Pecha & Edgar Hilado
Issues:
1.
WON Charles Dumancas and Jeannette Yanson Dumancas
can be considered principals by induction?
NO. Jeanette Yanson Dumancas is not guilty as principals by
induction because there are not other evidence that can prove the
shes guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 17. Principals The following are considered principals:
1.
Those who take a direct part in the execution of the acts.
2.
Those who directly force or induce other to commit it;
3.
Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime,
namely: (1) by using irresistible force or (2) by causing
uncontrollable fear. Likewise there are two ways of inducing
another to commit a crime, namely: (1) by giving a price or
offering reward or promise and (2) by using works of command.

242

All of the factors arent admissible to Jeanette. The only evidence


that may be considered is the word to take care of the two w/c
may constitute words of command. Evidenced should the Jeanette
meant the to take care of the two is to allow the law to its
course upon cross examination of Moises Grandeza. This also
raises some doubt of what the interpretation of the phrase. Thus
it cannot be concluded since it cannot be concluded that there is
command to kill the victims beyond reasonable by the vague
phase itself.
2.
WON Police Inspector Adonis Abeto can be considered
principals by participation?
NO. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto participation was to serve a
search warrant on Helen Tortocios residence (person which
Gargar and Lumangyao told the police officers where the money
might have gone) and that subsequently interrogated Gargar and
Lumangyao.
3.
WON Police Col Nicolas M. Torres can be considered
principals by induction?
NO. Police Col Nicolas M. Torres should have been criminally liable
but since his death the criminal liability is extinguished but the
civil liability still subsists.
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore.
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. CC A1157
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law,
(b) Contracts, (c) Quasi-contracts, and (d) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to 1, 1985 RCP 111, as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon w/c the same is based
as explained above.Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file a separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action & prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably w/
provisions of CC A1155, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.
-

People vs. Bolivar, 317 SCRA 577


FACTS: On Feb 14, 1987, at around 9 PM, Damaso Suelan came
home along w/ Rolly Brendia aboard a tricycle from the town of
Barotac to Brgy Vista Alegre. After they alighted from the vehicle,
they passed by the store of Rodney Balaito to buy some
cigarettes. They were then invited by the storeowner to drink a

243

bottle of beer to w/c the 2 obliged. After much drinking, the


moved out to drink beer at the small hut situated at the back of
the store. There they joined the group accused Renato Balbon,
Gracian Bolivar, Joel Soberano and Cresenciano Canaguran.
While the group inside the hut was still drinking, a certain Quirino
arrived carrying w/ him a .12 gauge pistolized firearm w/c he
handed to Canaguran. Then the group accused asked permission
to go home.
At around 1130PM, while there was still a group drinking, a shot
burst & a spray of pellets hit Damaso, Jr. on the shoulder & on the
right forearm, while 4 shots were targeted to & hit Hugo Callao
resulting to his death.
The injured Damaso, Jr. looked for a tricycle for Callao. He passed
through the main gate of the storeowners compound & saw 4
persons running away from the place where the shot came from.
He identified the 4 to be the group of Bolivar that previously asked
permission to go home.
RTC found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of murder w/ frustrated murder. The case of
Graciano Bolivar who died of cardio-respiratory arrest in 1993 is
dismissed. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal and civil liability.
HELD: Witness Rodolfo Panaga testifies that he saw Barrion and
Canaguran talking but apparently, the subject of such discussion
was not the killing of Callao. Hence, the testimony of the witness
is not conclusive to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Barrion
was a principal by inducement of the crime. The fact that he
would take care of the problem, as overheard by the witness, is
ambiguous & doesnt necessarily lead to the conclusion that he
plotted to kill Callao.
Principals are those who directly force or induce others to commit
an offense. One is induced to commit a crime either by a
command (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any
other similar act w/c constitutes the real and moving cause of the
crime and w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal
act and was sufficient for that purpose. The inducement exists
whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is
determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him
who commits the act whatever the source of such influence.
In the case at bar, only the testimony of the witness is offered and
no evidence of force, fear, price, promise or reward exerted over
or offered to Canaguran by Barrion that impelled him to kill Callao
was presented. Moreover, from the examination of evidence,
there is nothing to show that a conspiracy in fact existed among
the accused-appellants. The factors given (Such factors include
drinking together in the night of the crime, seen running away
together from the scene of the crime after the shots were fired)
are circumstantial in nature, w/c even taken collectively, do not
reasonably lead to proof BRD that a conspiracy existed.
Wherefore, RTC ruling reversed.
The accused-appellants are
acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
-

People vs. Dela Cruz, 97 SCRA 385


Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of
the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and
sentencing him to death. The facts are such that Agapito met up

244

w/ Mohamad Sagap Salip, Alih Itum and a certain Asmad and


proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu & the kidnapping of the
Antonios younger bro Yu Chi Chong, for ransom. Agapito
happened to be the oversser of Antonios rubber & coconut land
for no less than 10 yrs. He gave them instructions as to how and
where to locate the Yu brothers at a given time and how they were
to ambush the brothers. (But he didnt directly participate in
actual crime).But Antonio had to go somewhere and so the
younger Yu went with Isabelo Mancenido to Isabela (Isabelo
Isabela hehe.. funny..). The younger Yu was ambushed as
instructed but when Yu Chi Chong tried to escape by striking Angih
with a piece of wood, Angih got so pissed he shot Yu several
times, killing him.The gun shots alerted the villagers so the
kidnappers fled. When the villagers left after seeing the body
(they said theyll come back in the morning with police in tow), the
kidnappers took the body and threw it in the ocean. Antonio
testified and provided the possible motive for Agapito to commit
such crime. Agapito was assigned manager and administrator of
the farm but when the younger Yu came back, Agapito was
demoted to overseer. Further, profits were higher with Yu as
manager and Antonio became stricter with Agapito. Agapito was
convicted as mastermind or principal by inducement
Issue: WON Agapito should be convicted as mastermind or
principal by inducement in the absence of the elements of
conspiracy to the crime charged.
NO. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be
convicted as a principal by inducement are:
o
That the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime; and
o
That such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime by the material executor
The foregoing requisites are indubitable present in this case.
Jamas Jumaidi & Oyong Asidin, 2 discharged witnesses, testified
that Asmad & Amil contected them to go to Basilan to do a job for
Agapito. When the group was brought face to face with him, he
lost no time in lating down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu
and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who
knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to Latawan
to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route the
truck would take & the approximate time that it was to pass by. He
even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had positive
resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too,
presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in
the form of ransom, w/c was the determining factor of the
commission of the crime by his co-accused. W/o him, the crime
would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he
was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility
with the material executors. One is induced to commit a crime
either by a commans (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or
by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real and moving cause
of the crime & w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. The person who
gives promises, or offers the consideration & the one who actually
commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or
reward are both principals. The inducer need not take part in the
commission of the offense. 1 who induces another to commit a

245

crime is guilty as principal even though he might have taken no


part in its material execution.
3. By Indispensable Cooperation
- People vs. Maluenda, 288 SCRA 225
On August 19, 1992 at around 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E.
Resus ("Engr. Resus") and his wife, Dr. Bernardita B. Resus ("Dr.
Resus"), arrived at their residence/clinic at Diatagon, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, from a novena they attended. Waiting for the
Resus spouses at the clinic which adjoins the Resus spouses'
residence were three men who identified themselves as
Commander Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Raul Mondaga),
Commander Bongkoy (who is actually Maluenda) and alias "Alex".
Upon the arrival of the Resus spouses, Mondaga declared that
they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an alleged NPA
Commander, with his directive to solicit money and medicines
needed for the victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at
Melale, Agusan del Sur. The trio demanded from the couple
medicines and money in the amount of P20,000.00, but when the
couple told them that they did not have such an amount, they
lowered their demand to P10,000.00, and reduced it still to
P5,000.00 when the couple still could not produce the said
amount. Finally, the demand was lowered to any amount the
Resus couple could provide. The latter gave the amount of
P500.00 plus assorted medicines worth P800.00. After they were
given the money and medicines, the trio demanded that they be
driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, but the couple begged off reasoning that their car
[did] have any sufficient gasoline and that the car was not in good
running condition to travel that night. Mondaga then demanded
that very early in the morning, the couple should prepare the
vehicle so Engr. Resus [could] drive them to San Roque, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur. They left the clinic with [a] threat not to tell
anybody about their coming, otherwise they [would] kill all the
members of their family and blow-up the clinic.
Held: The appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED as regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards
Legarto. Legarto is hereby found GUILTY as an ACCESSORY only
and is ORDERED to serve the indeterminate sentence of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is further ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr.
Miguel E. Resus the amount of thirty-six thousand pesos (P36,000)
corresponding to the amount he used to pay his loan arrears. The
amount which the trial court ordered to be restituted by Mondaga
and Maluenda is accordingly reduced by said amount.
-

People vs. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700


Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the
smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc.
Renato Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and
they both smelled the marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente
Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre.
Camantigue collared the 2 & said Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?
He forced them up, holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled out

246

a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at the back. Camantigue


let go of Montealegre to get his gun but Montealegre restrained
Camantigues hand to prevent the latter from defending himself.
They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue
pursued him firing some shots. Then he stopped and asked to be
brought to a hospital. Capalac was found slumped in the street,
with a bullet to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died the next
day. Montealegre on the other hand, escaped through the
confusion. He was later apprehended.
Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered a co-principal for
having corroborated with Capalad in the killing of the police
officer.
YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing
Camantigue 7 times and Montealegre holding on to victims hands
to prevent him from drawing the pistol and defending himseld, as
Abadilla had testified.
While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack against him.
Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under
A17(3), RPC. The requisites of this provision
o
Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., theres either
anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose & intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; &
o
Cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act w/o w/c it would not have been
accomplished.
But although there was no evidence of prior agreement between
Capalad & Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court has consistently upheld
such view in previous cases (People v. Laganson, People v.
Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v. People)
Montealegre was correctly convicted of the complex crime of
murder, qualified by treachery, w/ assault upon a person of
authority.
B. ACCOMPLICES
a. RPC, Art. 18
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those persons who,
not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
b. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806
FACTS: Balo, an employee of Banco Filipino befriended
businessman Abejuela. One day, Balo went toAbejuelas
welding shop and asked him if he could borrow his passbook
so he could deposit a sum of money. Abejuela reluctantly
agreed. This practice lasted for quite some time. Abejuela
decided to close hisaccount. The bank noticed discrepancies
in his account. As a result, it confronted Balo and the
latteradmitted the offense. An action for estafa was filed
against the two. During the trial, Balo was killed by theNPA.
Abejuela was found guilty of the crime.
HELD: In a number of cases decided by the court, it has been held
that knowledge of the criminal intentionof the principal is
indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice. It

247

has been satisfactorilyestablished that Banco Filipino suffered


damage. Although abejuela was unaware of the criminal
workingsof Balo, he nevertheless contributed to their eventual
consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbookto Balo and
by signing the withdrawal slips. He failed to exercise prudence and
care. Therefore he must beheld civilly accountable.
c. People vs. Elijorde, 306 SCRA 188
Facts: Hierro and others were drinking. Together with Visbal, he
went out to buy mango at a sari-sari store. The accused and his
companions were in front of the store. One of them approached
Hierro but the latterwarned not to touch him. They eventually got
into a fight. The deceased and Visbal ran for their lives. As Hierro
and his wife was on their way home, the accused and his
companions assaulted the deceased.Despite Hierros plea, Elijorde
stabbed him with a knife on the chest which caused his death.
Held: In the absence of a previous plan or agreement or
agreement to commit a crime, the criminalresponsibility arising
from different acts directed against one and the same person is
individual and notcollective and that each of the participant is
liable only for his own acts. Consequently, accused Punzalanmust
be absolved. It may be emphasized that at the time accused
Elijorde intervened in the assault,Punzalan had already desisted
from his own acts of aggression.
d. People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640
On June 8, 1992 12:00am Kenneth Florendo (Kenneth) together
with Edwin De Vera (Edwin), Roderick Garcia (Deo) and Elmer
Castro (Elmer) drove to Filivenvest QC to dropped by the house of
Frederick Capulong (Frederick).
Kenneth & Elmer went to see Frederick while Deo & Edwin was left
in the car. Later Kenneth have a heated conversion with Frederick
and later Kenneth shot Frederick using a .32 cal. Bernardino
Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street in Filinvest Quezon was
one of the witness in the murder of Frederick Capulong by Kenneth
Florendo, Roderick Garcia, Edwin De Vera & Elmer Castro. RTC
found Edwin De Vera & Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder & sentencing them to rec. perpetua.
Issues: WON de Vera can be considered as an accomplice or as a
conspirator in the crime committed by Florendo & Castro?
Accomplice. RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) that
two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the
agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the
execution of the felony [was] decided upon.Except in the case of
the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the
accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a
previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may
be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose, concerted action & community of interest
Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who,
not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The Court has held that

248

an accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the


principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by
an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed
just the same.To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must be present: (1) the community of criminal
design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
(2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they
know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however,
know the criminal intention because they themselves have
decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only
then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators
decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
e. People vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
Facts: On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed
a petition for bail,3 underscoring the weakness of the Peoples
evidence, there being no direct evidence against them, a fact
admitted by the City Prosecutor in his resolution4 for their
indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were conducted in the
course of which the prosecution, after presenting several
witnesses, filed on October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge5
accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein
that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with,
and submitting her sworn statement6 which detailed how her coaccused carried out the crime. The respective counsels for the
other accused opposed the motion, insisting that it could only be
filed during trial on the merits and that Locils testimony was not
absolutely necessary.7 By Order of October 20, 1994,8 the trial
court deferred the resolution of the bail petition until after the
prosecution had rested its case, but it granted the motion to
discharge Locil.
Held: The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a selfconfessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or
implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the
latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material
points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and
must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes
manifest.
For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil
Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the
decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said
appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
f. People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA 134

249

Held: When one cooperates in the commission of the crime by


performing an overt act w/c by themselves a reacts of execution,
he is a principal by direct participation. In this case, Odilon was
stabbing the victim, the appellant & Ronnie agreed to join in, they
rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim w/ their
respective knives. The victim died bec. Of multiple stab wounds
inflicted by 2 or more person. There is no evidence that before the
arrival of Ronnie and Rene at the situs criminis , the victim was
already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time Rene and
Ronnie joined Odilon in the stabbing the victim, the crime was
already consummated. Therefore, Ronnie and Rene conspired w/
Odilon to kill the victim; hence all of them are criminally liable for
the latters death. The appellant is not not merely an accomplice
but a principal by direct participation.
g. Comelec vs. Espanol, 417 SCRA 554
FACTS:
Bautista executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the Poblete,
et.al. of vote buying and filed the same with the Law Department
of the COMELEC which recommended that the resolution of the
Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the
accused are exempt.
HELD:
The Court sustained the authority of the COMELEC to exempt from
prosecution persons charged with vote-buying, vote-selling, and
conspiracy to bribe voters who volunteer to give information and
testify on any information under Section 28 of R.A. No. 6648.The
immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the
legitimate demands of government to encourage citizens,
including law violators themselves, to testify against law violators.
The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to
which the information was given. Comelec won not only principal
but also accomplices & accessories are criminally liable for
election offense. But under sec 68 or sec 265 of bp 381 those
violators who testified against violators (vote buying/ selling) are
exempt from prosecution. Therefore all the 13 are excempt from
prosecution & their criminal cases are dismissed.
C. ACCESSORIES
a. RCP, Arts. 19, 20
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty
of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the

250

Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other


crime.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon
those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
b. Pres. Dec. No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be
punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property
involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000
pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto
provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200
pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property
involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value
is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
c. PD 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION
OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall
be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding
or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of
any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit,
intimidation, force or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper,
record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in
any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to
be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;

251

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any


person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a
crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or
concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for
the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the
service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the
fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or
object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the
course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings
in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in
consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the
prosecution of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of
any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any
immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent
such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether
lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in
the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent
the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or
from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating
information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating
authorities for purposes of background information and not for
publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead
the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law
with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public
official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties provided
thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public
office.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-one.
d. People vs. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19
Facts:
Bernardo and Teresa lived together but for quite some time their
relationship has gottenbitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had an
illicit relationship with Talingdan. Their child testified that on
theday the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside their house
and Bernardo knew about it but continuedplowing his field. Later,
when Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired
at Bernardoand the 4 climbed the stairs of the Batalan. Seeing
that the victim was alive they fired at him again.Teresa came out
after from her room and pulled her child to question her. Teresa
threatened to kill her if she would reveal the incident.
Held:

252

One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the


crime can be held guilty asaccessory. There is morally convincing
proof that Teresa is an accessory to the offense. She was inside
theroom when her husband was shot. As she came out after the
shooting, she inquired from the child if shewas able to recognize
the assailants and when the latter identified the 4 accused as the
culprits, Teresadid not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what
she knew to anyone but she went to the extent of warning her not
to tell anyone or else she would kill her. Later when the police
came, she claimed she hadno suspects in mind. She, thus,
became active in her cooperation with the 4 accused.
e. People vs. Cui, 314 SCRA 153
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1990, at about 9:00
P.M. more or less and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accuse, all private individuals, conniving and
confederating together, and mutually helping with one another,
armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent
of gain, enter the dwelling house of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim
and while inside therein with violence and intimidation, take and
carry away cash and jewelries in the amount of P20,000.00 from
the possession of and belonging to spouses Johnny and Rose Lim
and that on the occasion thereof, and in connection therewith and
for the purpose of extorting ransom from said spouses Johnny and
Rose Lim, herein accused, in pursuance of their superior strength
did then and there kidnap and detain Stephanie Lim 17 years old
[sic] daughter of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while
Stephanie Lim was under detention in the place other than the
latter's dwelling place, the said accused demanded the amount of
P1,000,000.00 for the release of Stephanie Lim to which demands
and for fear of the latter's life spouses Johnny and Rose Lim
delivered and caused to be delivered the amount of P1,000,000.00
to said accused; and accused
(1)
Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and
(2)
Beverly Cui y Cantuba
who are hereby charged for the same offense as accomplices
cooperate in its execution by previous acts and subsequently
profiting in the effects of the crime by receiving the amount of
P10,000.00 from the principal accused as their share of the loot,
to the damage and prejudice of Johnny, Rose and Stephanie Lim in
the total amount of P1,020,000.00.
Held: They are accessories not accomplices. Conviction of an
accused as an accessory requires the following elements: a) that
he has the knowledge of the commission of the crime b) that he
took part in the commission by any of the 3 modes enumerated in
art.19. The twin elements are present in this case. It was shown
that Toto Garcia gave Cui P 10000 as their profit from the crime.
f. People vs. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166
Facts :
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John
Doewere changed with murder for the killing Andre Man
Masangkay. As narrated bya witness, the victim answered the
called of nature and went to the back portionof the house where
they were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followedhim

253

and later they heard the victim shouting for help and when they
ran towardsthe scene he saw the accused on top of the victim and
stabbing the latter with along bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega
and Garcia brought the victim to a welland dropped him and
placed stones into the well. The trial court found theaccused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed averring thatthe
trial court erred in holding them criminally liable because at the
time thevictim was dropped into the well, he was still alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the
death of the victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds
but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct
naturaland logical consequences of his wrongful act even where
the resulting crime ismore serious than that intended. The
essential requisites for this criminal liabilityto attach are as follows
:
1. the intended act is felonious ;
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the
actor'swrongful acts.
PENALTIES
I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PENALTIES
A. PURPOSE OF PENALTIES
B. THEORIES JUSTIFYING PENALTIES
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
1. Constitution (1987), Art. 3 Secs. 18 (1) & (2), 19 (1), 20,
22
Section 18.
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.
Section 19.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment
of a poll tax.

254

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.


2. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, nonprofit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec.8 saying it
violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression and
is an ex post facto law
Issues:1.WON it violates three rights?
No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral processand equal
protection of laws.
2.WON it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:a.makes criminal an act done before
law was passedand punishes act innocent when done.b.aggravates a
crime, makes it greater than it wasc.inflicts greater punishment than
the law prescribedwhen committedd.alters legal rules of evidence
and authorizes convictionupon less or different testse.assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only ineffect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right whichwhen done was lawful
Held:
Petition denied. Constitutional act.Constitutional inhibition refers
only to criminal laws. Penalty inlaw imposed to acts committed after
approval of law.
3. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that
declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the
following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion
by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag
and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped
the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a
judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an
act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full
knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.
Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section
7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision
mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to
the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the

255

constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if


thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of
1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the
benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured
as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is
also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not
only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same
purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not
person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be
shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a members direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement
to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful
acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given
an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of
mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter.
Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech
and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the
CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.

256

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution


under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that
the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of
the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.
Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.
Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused
under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the
TRIAL COURT.
4. People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380
FACTS:
On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with
Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of
Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively identified
by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of
the victims.
Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of
Jehovahs Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid
refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to
see three men emerge from inside the house. The three men then
dashed off.
Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the
Paranalas housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100,
were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon
and Bracamonte were at large until the latters arrest in October of
the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and
interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there
was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime and
that Parnala couldnt possible know him to merit identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamontes defense of alibi and Parnalas lack of
personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the
appellant of the crime.
RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it
is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it
must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the
accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but
that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be
at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte
tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the victims house at the time
the crime was committed.

257

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been


shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail
over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused.
Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or
motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is also nothing
in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to be
a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must
know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution
would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the
perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness
degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be
helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of
positive identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other coaccused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double
homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have
been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were
killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1)
of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings
accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain,
though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
5. People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 (1999)
Held: From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleamed that when
appellant was asked to get off the bus and bring his bag, appellant
brought with him said bag. If, indeed, the bag was not his, he should
not have taken it with him in alighting from the bus. Besides, denial,
like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law.
Appellant further avers that the civilian asset should have been
presented in court to shed light on how he managed to get his
information. This argument is not tenable. The settled rule is that
the presentation of an informant in illegal drugs case is not essential
for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of
appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence on record.
With the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty
imposable upon violators of Section 4 of Dangerous Drugs Act is
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more. In this case,
the quantity of marijuana involved weighs more or less two
kilograms, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, the rules for the application of indivisible penalties under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. This is
pursuant to our pronouncement in People vs. Simon[24] where we
recognized the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the
Revised Penal Code as well as the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
the Dangerous Drugs Act after the amendment of the latter by R.A.

258

No. 7659.[25] Thus, as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating


circumstances in the commission of the crime, the trial court
correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally,
considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be
applied.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the
lower court finding appellant guilty of the crime illegal transport of
marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay fine
of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
D. ART. 21. NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. No felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
E. ART. 22. RETROACTIVITY
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
1. Exceptions
2. RPC, Arts. 21, 22; Civil Code Art. 4
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. No felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.
3. People vs. Patalin, 311 SCRA 18 (1999)
Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were
convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the evening of
August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted the
supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death,
however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed
were reduced to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the present
case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA
7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that
the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was
suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

259

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was
retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right
thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no
longer cover them?
Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
the present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that the framers
intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases
without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. The
retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a
criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been committed and the
prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service
has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being carried out. The
abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of
Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony
who is not a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction
of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute
cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued
under the old law.
4. People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 (1999)
Facts: In 1998, an RTC decision found Romeo Gallo guilty of the
crime of qualified rape with the penalty of death. In 1999- Gallo filed
a Motion to Re-Open the Case seeking modification of the death
sentence to reclusionperpetua in line with the new court rulings on
the attendant circumstances inSec 11 of RA 7659. According to
People vs. Garcia: the additional attendantcircumstances introduced
in RA 7659 should be considered as specialqualifying circumstances
distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and if notpleaded as such,
could only be appreciated as generic aggravatingcircumstances. The
information filed against Gallo does not allege hisrelationship with
the victim Marites Gallo (his daughter), thus it CANNOT beconsidered
as a qualifying circumstance.
Ruling
Judicial decisions applyingor interpreting the law or the constitution
form part of the legal system of theland and so the doctrine forms
part of the penal statutes and therefore maybe applied retroactively
being favorable to the accused who is not a habitualcriminal,
notwithstanding
that
final
sentence
has
already
been
pronouncedagainst him. The doctrine of People vs. Garcia may be
retroactively appliedas it is favorable to him. The case is reopened
and the judgment is modifiedfrom death to reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine:
Special qualifying circumstances have to be alleged in
theinformation for it to be appreciated.
5. People vs. Ramirez, 357 SCRA 222
Held: In line with current jurisprudence, we affirm the award of
indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P50,000. This award needs no proof other than the commission of
the crime. Likewise, we sustain the award of P50,000 for moral
damages, which has evidentiary basis. The victims father testified
that as a result of the crime, he suffered heaviness of heart as well
as mental anguish.

260

We disagree with the trial court, however, in sentencing appellant


to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.
There was no justification or need for the trial court to specify the
length of imprisonment, because reclusion perpetua is an indivisible
penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle was laid
down by the Court in People v. Diquit: Since reclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum
periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is
imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be
pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless
by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27,
Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, except in regard
to the penalty, which is hereby MODIFIED; accordingly, appellant is
sentenced to the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs
against appellant.
6. People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48
Facts: Appellants Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano
Toacao, Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache, all armed, entered
the house of Dioscoro Abonales, killed the latter by shooting him in
the neck then forcibly took the sum of P30,000 from the victims
wife. They also got the wallet of Rolando Verdida, the future son-inlaw of the victim, containing P10,000 which was the money prepared
by Rolando for his wedding to the victims daughter. After the
robbery, they all fled. But, while escaping, they encountered Artemio
Abonales, the father of the victim, who was responding to
investigate the gunshots he heard. They all stopped momentarily
and Paulino in fact tried but failed to shoot Artemio. Thereafter, all
the accused continued their escape.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with
robbery in band with homicide. There is no such crime in the
Revised Penal Code. The felony is properly called robbery with
homicide. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the
indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with
homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the
circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the
commission of the crime be appreciated when it is not properly
alleged in the information?
Held: No. We cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of
band because it was not alleged in the body of the information.
Though it is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. With regard to its
Section 9, the use of the word must indicates that the requirement
is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule
110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although

261

proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if


such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal
rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused.
7. Effect of Repeal of Penal Laws
a. With re-enactment
b. Without re-enactment
c. People vs. Pimentel, supra
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as amended
before the RTC of Manila, and a warrant ofarrest was issued on July
29, 1983, but was not carried out due to his disappearance. After
seven years, on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the
basis of the warrant of arrestin the subversion case, and was
likewise found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber specialrevolver
and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of this, Tujan was
charged with IllegalPossession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 beforethe RTC in
Makati.
Contention of the People:
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD
No.1866 on the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of
being convicted for Subversion, based on Sections 3(H) and 7, Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.Furthermore, Tujan
contends that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms
andammunition should be absorbed in subversion. The present case
is the twin prosecution ofthe earlier subversion case, and therefore
he is entitled to invoke the constitutionalprotection against double
jeopardy.
Contention of the State:
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second
timebecause: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion
case, and (b) the previousoffense charged against him is for
Subversion, punishable under RA 1700, while the presentcase is for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion,punishable under PD 1866, a different law.
Issue/s to be Solved:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double
jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700,
as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition infurtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as
amended, can co-exist, the subsequentenactment of of RA 7636 on
Sept. 22, 1992, totally repealing RA 1700, as amended,
hassubstantially changed the complexion of the present case,
inasmuch as the said repealinglaw being favorable to the accusedprivate respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,should be given
retroactive effect. With the enactment of RA 7636, the charge of
subversionagainst the accused-private respondent has no more legal
basis, and should be dismissed. Itwould be illogical for the trial
courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an
offense that no longer exists.Subversion charge against Tujan was

262

dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and ammunitionin


furtherance of subversion against the same accused is deemed
amended. Accused wasordered to be released immediately from
detention, since he was already detained for 7years, whereas the
amended charge has a penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six
years.
F. ART. 23. PARDON
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal
action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil
liabilities with regard to the interest of the injured party is
extinguished by his express waiver.
1. See also Art. 36, RPC
Article 36, RPC Pardon; its effect. A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of of the
pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
2. RA 8353
Republic Act No. 8353
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,
RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape
Law of 1997."
Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall
hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight
of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the
same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to
read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is
committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any

263

instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another


person.
"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to
death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities or any law enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of
consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious
vocation or calling and is personally known to be such by the
offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human
Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the
virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or para-military units thereof or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the
offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission
of the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party
at the time of the commission of the crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time
of the commission of the crime.
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to
reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.

264

"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason


or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with
any of the ten aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in
this article.
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be
extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
void ab initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting
resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended
party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render
her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as
evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266A."
Section 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision of this
Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not
affected thereby shall remain valid.
Section 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders,
administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified
or repealed accordingly.
Section 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after completion of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
3. People vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 350
Facts: Juan Luna was condemned to 1 year, 8 months and 20 days of
prision correccional due to abduction. While the appeal was pending,
Tomasa Ri