LEGARDA VS SALEEBY

FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The
said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system
under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is
released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the
Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the
stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of a land which has been registered under the
name of two persons?
HELD: The Court ruled that where two certificates purports to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will
prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa,(viewpoint of your home) to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the
Torrens system.

FLORENCIA DIAZ VS REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES

FACTS: The Petitioner filed an application for registration of a vast tract of
land located in, Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner
and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of
the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years. Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question
was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR). Thus, it was
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. Prior to this case the Court
already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes that the property subject of Garcias
application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the
Republic. In its decision, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza , the appellate
court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was
applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same property.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, the
CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter. The
parties entered into one. However, OSG backed out from the settlement and
informed the CA that the track of land subject of the amicable settlement was still
within the military reservation. CA ruled in favor of the Republic. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the land in dispute can be registered to the petitioner.
HELD: By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where
the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to
possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely
mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was
conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest.

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands
are not registrable under CA 141.
Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its
inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty
or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon
the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce
such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is
because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirtyyear possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act.