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ART.

487
ARNELITO ADLAWAN vs. EMERETIO M. ADLAWAN AND NARCISA M. ADLAWAN
G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
FACTS: Arnelito (petitioner) claims sole ownership of the land (Lot 7226) and house registered in the name of the late Dominador
Adlawan. According to him, he is an acknowledged illegitimate child and sole heir of Dominador Adlawan. Moreover, he said that he
only allowed the respondents, who are his fathers siblings, to occupy the property out of respect and generosity but with the condition
that they will vacate the property when he needs it.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject property was owned by their parents. According to them, renovation should be
made in the house, however, their parents dont have money to finance it and they are not qualified to obtain a loan. Therefore, the
transfer was made to Dominador since he is the only one who had a college education. Dominador and his wife never disturbed
respondents possession of the property.
Petitioner asked the respondents to vacate the property, however, the latter refused. Petitioner filed the case.
MTC dismissed the complaint. According to the MTC since Dominador was survived by Graciana , Gracianas legal heirs are also
entitled. (establishment of petitioners filiation and settlement of estate are conditions precedent to accrual of petitioners action for
ejectment.)
RTC reversed MTCs decision.
CA reinstated MTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may bring an action for ejectment.
HELD: No. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived
was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by
consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is
presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the
instant petition should be dismissed.
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and
not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA
G.R. NO. 168943, October 27, 2006
FACTS: Plaintiffs alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-square-meter parcel of land located
in TandangSora, Quezon City. He died on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were
their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and adverse possession of the property, and of the owner's duplicate of said title.
Sometime in February 1996, plaintiffs learned that defendant was claiming ownership over the property under the name of the
Philippine National Bank, which allegedly cancelled TCT No. 252070 in the names of the spouses Marcos and Romanadela Cruz. In
1996, plaintiffs had the property fenced but defendant deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property.
Plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique Santos, represented by Enrique G. Santos who signed the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping in their motion against defendant INC (now petitioner). Plaintiffs (now private respondents) prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor. Defendant (now petitioner) moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the following
grounds: (1) plaintiffs failed to faithfully comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure since it was only Enrique G. Santos who signed the verification and certification and not all of the heirs who are co-owners of
the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent heirs of Enrique Santos complied with the procedural requirements.
HELD: Respondents complied with the procedural requirements. Article 487 of the NCC provides: Any one of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment.

The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed by only one of plaintiffs. As heirs, they are
considered co-owners pro indiviso of the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any of the heirs.
Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is
sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of the case. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment,
forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring
such an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all.
The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who
has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to
it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative. The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping.
SANTOS V. HEIRS LUSTRE
G.R. No. 151016, 6 August 2008
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 1330, Cecilia Macaspac and TarcisioManiquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages
against Froilan M. Santos, son of the appellant spouses.
While Civil Case no. 1330 was pending,Civil Case No. 2115 was instituted. It was filed by Lustres other heirs against the parties of this
case. They averred that the sale of the property to Natividad Santos was simulated, spurious or fake, and that they discovered that
spouses Santos transferred the property to Froilan Santos when the latter filed an ejectment suit against them. Thereafter, Froilan
Santos, through fraud and deceit, succeeded in transferring the property.
The petitioners claimed that the second action must be dismissed based on it being barred by litispendetiaand prescription and
laches.The RTC denied the respondents petition to dismiss.The CA likewise dismissed the petition for lack of merit and pronounced
that the respondents were not guilty of forum shopping. There was no identity of parties because Cecilia Macaspac, who was a plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 1330, was a defendant in Civil Case No. 2115; and there was only one defendant in Civil Case No. 1330, while there
were several additional defendants in Civil Case No. 2115. On the issue of prescription and laches, the CA declared that an action for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe, and laches could not have set in since there was no unreasonable delay in
the filing of the case.
ISSUES:
Whether the second action is barred by litispendentia
Whether the action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe
HELD:
The petition has no merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
No, the second action is not barred by litispendentia because there is no identity of parties. Forum shopping exists when the elements of
litispendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Among its elements are identity
of the parties, identity of the subject matter and identity of the causes of action in the two cases.
While we agree with the CA that there is no identity of parties in the two cases, we do not agree with the rationale behind its conclusion.
In the case, respondents are not guilty of forum shopping because the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1330 does not, in fact, share a common
interest with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2115. Plaintiff Cecilia Macaspac in Civil Case No. 1330 filed the complaint seeking the
reconveyance of the property to her, and not to Dominga Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the co-ownership which
would negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with the other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the co-ownership. In
contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the co-ownership when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2115.
Yes. The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually
an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription
does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit
for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be used
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible
legal right.
FERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014
FACTS: On August 21, 2008, petitioner Lourdes C. Fernandez (Lourdes) and her sister, Cecilia Siapno (Cecilia), represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Imelda S. Slater (Imelda), filed a Complaint for Ejectment5 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,

Dagupan City(MTCC), docketed as Civil Case No. 15980, against respondent Norma Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her
behalf including her family (respondents), seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land situated in Guilig Street, Dagupan City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 19170 (subject property).
In their complaint, Lourdes and Cecilia(plaintiffs) averred that they are the registered owners of the subject property on which both
Lourdes and respondents previously lived under one roof. However, when their house was destroyed by typhoon "Cosme," Lourdes
transferred to a nipa hut on the same lot, while Norma, Cecilias daughter-in-law, and her family were advised to relocate but, in the
meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof. Instead, respondents erected a house thereon over plaintiffs objections and, despite
demands, refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. The dispute was referred to the Barangay Office of Pugo
Chico and the Public Attorneys Office, both of Dagupan City, but no settlement was reached.
For their part, respondents, in their Answer, averred that the complaint stated no cause of action, considering that Lourdes has no
standing to question their possession of the subject property as she had already donated her portion in favor of Cecilia, adding too that
the latter is bound by her declaration that "the house and lot belong[s] to Eddie," who is Normas late husband. Respondents further
asserted that there was no compliance with the required conciliation and mediation under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law as no
Certificate to File Action was attached to the complaint, thereby rendering the complaint dismissible.
MTCC RULING: MTCC found that respondents failed to impugn the validity of plaintiffs ownership over the subject property. As
owners, plaintiffs therefore have the right to enjoy the use and receive the fruits from the said property, as well as to exclude one from
its enjoyment pursuant to Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the MTCC ordered respondents to: (a) vacate the subject
property and pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the portion of
the lot occupied by them, reckoned from the filing of the complaint; (b) pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (c) pay the cost
of suit.
RTC RULING: The RTC, Branch 40 granted respondents appeal and ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) there was no substantial compliance with the mandatory conciliation and mediation process before the barangay,
especially considering that the parties are very close relatives; and (b) respondents are builders in good faith and cannot be summarily
ejected from the subject property without compliance with the provisions of Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code.
In the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the grounds that: (a) Cecilia failed to personally verify the
petition; and (b) the appeal is dilatory. In their comment, plaintiffs maintained that Lourdes, as co-owner of the subject property, has
the right tofile an ejectment case by herself, without joining her co-owner, Cecilia, as provided under Article 487 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, Lourdes was specially authorized by Imelda to file the CA petition.
In a Resolution dated June 22, 2011, the CA granted respondents Motion to Dismiss Appeal, holding that the verification and
certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition was defective since it was signed only by Lourdes, one of the plaintiffs
in the case, in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same. There was also no
showing that Lourdes was authorized by her co-plaintiff, Cecilia, to represent the latter and to sign the said certification, and neither did
the submission of the special powers of attorney of Cecilia and Imelda to that effect constitute substantial compliance with the rules.
The CA further noted that plaintiffs failed to comply with its prior Resolution dated October 11, 2010 requiring the submission of an
amended verification/certification against forum shopping within five (5) days from notice, warranting the dismissal of the CA petition
on this score.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective verification and certification against
forum shopping attached to the CA petition.
HELD: YES. The CA committed reversible error in dismissing the CA petition due to a defective verification and certification against
forum shopping.
It is undisputed that Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof together with her co-plaintiff/sister,
Cecilia. As such, she is "one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the CA petition" and is therefore
qualified to "sign the verification" attached thereto in view of paragraph 3 of the guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the
requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping.
In fact, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate,
both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as
against respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that the
same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted
substantial compliance with the rules. As held in the case of Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing:
Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interestin the property subject of the action, the fact that only one
of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
It is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure the assurance that the
matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the correction of the pleadings or act on them
and waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2011 and December 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 116143 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the CA
for proper and immediate disposition.
JALANDONI V. MARTIR-GUANZON
FACTS:
In January 9, 1947, the appellant spouses began a suit (Case No. 573)against the appellees Antonio Guanzon, eta al., for partition
of variouslots and for recovery of damages caused by the defendants' unwarrantedrefusal to recognize plaintiffs' right and partition said
lots, as was toaccount for and deliver plaintiff's share in the crops obtained during theagricultural years from 1941-1942 to 1946-1947.Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental held for plaintiffs andordered the partition of the lands involved, but denied their claim
fordamages because of failure to "prove the exact and actual damagessuffered by them.The decision having become final because none of the parties appealedtherefrom, the plaintiffs instituted the present action seeking
recoveryfrom the defendants for moral and exemplary damages, share of theproducts of the property from 1947 until 1955, taxes due
unpaid and attorneys fees.
Upon motion of defendant's, the court a quo dismissed the secondcomplaint for failure to state a cause of action; and after their motion
toreconsider was denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court on points of law.
ISSUE: W/N dismissal was proper?
RULING: YES. The Court found the dismissal of the lower court to have beencorrectly entered. Except as concomitant to physical
injuries, moral and correctivedamages (allegedly due to suffering, anguish and axiety caused by the refusal ofdefendants in 1941 to
partition the common property) were not recoverable underthe Civil Code of 1899 which was the governing law at the time. Recovery
of such damages was established for the first time in 1950 by the new Civil Code, and action not be made to apply retroactively to
acts that occurred character of these damages. The rule is expressly laid down by paragraph 1 of Article 2257 of the new Code.
As to the value of the plaintiff's share in the products of the land during the time that the former action was pending (which are the
damages claimed under the second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by the previous judgment. In the same way that
plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from 1941 to1947, these later damages could have been claimed in the first action, either
in the original complaint or else by supplemental pleading.
To allow them to be recovered by subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against multiplicity of suits, and specifically of
sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules of Court, against the splitting of causes of action, since these damages spring from the same
cause of action that was pleading in the former case No. 573 between the same parties.
Anent the land taxes allegedly overdue and unpaid, it is readily apparent that, taxes been due to the government, plaintiffs have no
right to compel payment thereof to themselves. Little need be said concerning the claim for attorney's fees under the fourth cause of
action. If they be fees for the lawyer's services in the former case, they are barred from recovery for the reasons already given; if for
services in the present case, there is no jurisdiction therefor, since no case is made out for the plaintiffs.
ART. 488
G.R. No. L-10423
January 21, 1958
AMADO JALANDONI V. ANGELA MARTIR-GUANZON
It appears that on January 9, 1947, the appellant spouses began a suit (Case No. 573) against the appellees Antonio Guanzon, eta al., for
partition of lots Nos. 130-A, 130-B and 130-F of the Murcia Cadastre, as well as lots Nos. 1288 and 1376 of the Bogo Cadastre, and for
recovery of damages caused by the defendants' unwarranted refusal to recognize plaintiffs' right and partition said lots, as was to
account for and deliver plaintiff's share in the crops obtained during the agricultural years from 1941-1942 to 1946-1947. By decision of
February 22, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental held for plaintiffs and ordered the partition of the lands involved,
but denied their claim for damages because of failure to "prove the exact and actual damages suffered by them.
The decision having become final because none of the parties appealed therefrom, the plaintiffs instituted the present action (No. 3586
of the same Court of First Instance) on August 26, 1955, seeking recovery from the defendants of the following amounts: (1) P20,000 as
moral and exemplary damages due to suffering, anguish and anxiety occasioned by the defendant's refusal to partition of the properties
involved in the proceeding case; (2) P55,528.20 as share of the products of the property from 1947 (when the preceeding case No. 573
was filed) until 1955 when judgment was rendered therein (3) P4,689.54 as land taxes due unpaid on the properties involved; and (4)
P2,500 for attorney's fees.
Upon motion of defendant's, the court a quo dismissed the second complaint for failure to state a cause of action; and after their motion
to reconsider was denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court on points of law.

We find the dismissal to have been correctly entered. Except as concomitant to physical injuries, moral and corrective damages
(allegedly due to suffering, anguish and axiety caused by the refusal of defendants in 1941 to partition the common property) were not
recoverable under the Civil Code of 1899 which was the governing law at the time. Recovery of such damages was established for the
first time in 1950 by the new Civil Code, and action not be made to apply retroactively to acts that occurred character of these damages.
The rule is expressly laid down by paragraph 1 of Article 2257 of the new Code.
ART. 2257. Provision of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or ommissions which were
not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force may have executed the act or incurred in
the ommission forbidden or condemmned by this Code.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
As to the value of the plaintiff's share in the products of the land during the time that the former action was pending (which are the
damages claimed under the second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by the previous judgment. These damages are but the
result of the original cause of action, viz., the continuing refusal by defendants in 1941 to recognize the plaintiffs' right to an interest in
the property. In the same way that plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from 1941 to 1947, these later damages could have
been claimed in the first action, either in the original complaint (for their existence could be anticipated when the first complaint was
filed) or else by supplemental plaeding. To allow them to be recovered by subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against
multiplicity of suits, and specifically of sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules of Court, against the splitting of causes of action, since
these damages spring from the same cause of action that was pleading in the former case No. 573 between the same parties.
That the former judgment did not touch upon these damages is not material to its conclusive effect; between the same parties, with the
same subject matter and cause of action, a final judgment on the merits is conclusive not only the questions actually contested and
determined, but upon all matters that might have been litigated and decided in the former suit, i.e., all matters properly belonging to the
subject of the controversy and within the scope of the issue (Penalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 312; National Bank vs. Barretto, 52 Off. Gaz.,
182; Miranda vs. Tianco, 96 Phil., 526, 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366). Hence, the rejection of plaintiffs' claim for damages in Case No. 573
imports denial of those who claimed, since there are a mere continuation of the former.
Annent the land taxes allegedly overdue and unpaid, it is readily apparent that, taxes beein due to the government, plaintiffs have no
right to compel payment thereof to themselves. The case could be otherwise if plaintiffs had paid the taxes to stave of forfeiture of the
common property of tax delinquency; in that event, they could compel contribution. But the complaint does not aver any such tax
payment.
Little need be said concerning the claim for attorney's fees under the fourth cause of action. If they be fees for the lawyer's services in
the former case, they are barred from recovery for the reasons already given; if for services in the present case, there is no jurisdiction
therefor, since no case is made out for the plaintiffs.
ART 493
DELA CRUZ V. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners Raul Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz, along with their mother and siblings Primo, Ma. Lorenza, Ana Maria,
Maximiano, Julio and Iraida are co-owners of two parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters.
When Iraida passed away, her husband, respondent Nolasco and their children, succeeded her. Petitioners filed a petition for relief
under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co- owners, except for respondents, have authorized
petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject properties and that only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of
their shares. Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they co-owned because
they were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale and that respondents
withholding of their consent is prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners. On appeal, CA held that the respondents had the
full ownership of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their undivided shares in the
properties under Art. 493 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares in the
co-owned properties.
RULING: No. Art. 493. states:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part.
The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their

part, which petitioners will sell, shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the coownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners sale of their parts, the nature of the
property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. This is because under Art. 493, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. Co-owners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners which is
not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co-owned with others. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental
portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co-owners. Thus, the respondents cannot be ordered to
sell their portion of the co-owned properties. Petitioners may however bring a suit for partition, which is one of the modes of
extinguishing co- ownership.
LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624
with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez,
widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting
Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC.
MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the
property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the
property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed
the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that
used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the
inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
HELD:
Co-ownership; nature
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing,
not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being
exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing
or right to which it refers is one and the same.
Co-ownership; characteristics
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which
means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the
recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.
Co-ownership; relationship
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.Whether established by
law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as coowners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his
undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the
thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she
was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be
respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such

partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under
dispute.
VAGILIDAD VS. VAGALIDAD
G.R. NO. 161136
FACTS:
A parcel of land was bought by Gabino and later on without the consent of the wife of Gabino was transferred to Wilfredo without any
payment in conformity that Wilfredo can use the lot to as a collateral to obtain loan. And when the loan was paid and the mortgaged was
cancelled. Spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Document, Reconveyance and Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they already bought it to from
the former owner who sold the same to Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said
property.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property?
RULING:
The contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had
an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to
GABINO, JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.Be that as it may, the co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and
interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they
have previously received their respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION. The rights of
GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO
in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of the title to the
subject property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged
incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from
the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.
On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to apply the rule that an action for reconveyance based
on fraud prescribes after the lapse of four years. They cite Article 1391 of the Civil Code and the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.
We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line
of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is
four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was
discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30,
1950 xxx. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the
old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period
for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
SANTOS et al. vs SPOUSES LUMBAO
GR No. 169129
March 28, 2007
FACTS:
Herein petitioners are the legitimate and surviving heirs of Rita Santos, who died on Oct. 20, 1985. Meanwhile, respondentspouses are the alleged owners of the 107 sq. m. lot which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime on two separate
occasions, both of which were evidenced by a notarized document denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa. Respondents even alleged that the
first transaction of sale was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo Santos, as shown by their signatures affixed therein.
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and they have been
occupying the same as exclusive owners up to the present. They then made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and
thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao. However in 1986 petitioners executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning
among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao. Because of this, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages before the RTC of Pasig City.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa because the
same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified documents because one of those documents made it appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before the notary public, when in truth
and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to
the subject property in litigation were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the

respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4)
the respondents Spouses Lumbaos claim over the subject property had already prescribed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the documents known as Bilihan ng Lupa are valid and enforceable and consequently making the petitioners
bound to comply therein.
HELD:
Yes, the two documents known as Bilihan ng Lupa are valid and enforceable; therefore petitioners are bound to comply
therein
In upholding the validity of the documents the Supreme Court did not give weight to the allegations of the petitioners that the
documents were falsified documents as it is made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the said
documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not been established by
the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
In petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979. However,
in order to avoid their obligations in the said Bilihan ng Lupa, petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of
the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the
length of time that had passed.
Furthermore, both Bilihan ng Lupa documents were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. To overcome this presumption,
there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. Petitioners
denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the abovementioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid Bilihan ng Lupa are
upheld.
With respect to the defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the Bilihan ng Lupa were not
established by respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is likewise not acceptable. It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of
the documents denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her
and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the Bilihan ng Lupa because the
exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that
time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law
and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their
respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-owner, however, has no right to
sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an
aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion
does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore,
the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from
the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no
longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start that they bought the
107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their
names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot had not
been partitioned yet.
LEONARDO ACABAL v.VILLANER ACABAL
G.R. No. 148376. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
In dispute is the exact nature of the document which respondent Villaner Acabal (Villaner) executed in favor of his
godson-nephew-petitioner Leonardo Acabal (Leonardo) on April 19, 1990.
Villaners parents owned a parcel of land situated in Negros Oriental AND by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971 his
parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to him, who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. Sometime after the
foregoing transfer, it appears that Villaner became a widower.
Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed conveying the same property in favor of Leonardo Acabal.
Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19, 1990 document he executed now appears to be a "Deed of Absolute Sale, what he
actually signed was a document captioned "Lease Contract" wherein he leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo.
Villaner thus filed on October 1993 a complaint before the Dumaguete RTC against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in
turn conveyed the property, for annulment of the deeds of sale.
Trial ensued wherein Villaner averred the following:
That he (Villaner) only executed a Lease Contract; and

That what he can see now is that perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin (a person working under
the sala of the Judge of RTC Bais City) under the documents which he signed as the lease contract;
RTC found for the therein defendants-herein petitioners Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas and accordingly dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the trial court, it holding that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo was simulated and
fictitious.
Hence, Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the deed of absolute sale is valid; and
(2) WON the subject property is a conjugal property
RULING:
(1) Yes, it is valid.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he
must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.
More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never
presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, except for Villaners bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he FAILED to adduce
evidence in support thereof. His conjecture that "perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the
documents which I signed the contract of lease," must fail, for facts and not conjectures decide cases.
Petitioner Leonardos witness (the drafter of the actual deed), on the other hand, was able to prove that the deed was duly drafted, read
and signed by Villaner.
The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation . The
rule has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of
any kind will be given to one against the other.
The principle of pari delicto is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes
among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality,
The principle of pari delicto, however, is not absolute, admitting an exception under Article 1416 of the Civil Code: When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he
may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered
In fine, Villaner is estopped from assailing and annulling his own deliberate acts.
(2) Yes, there is no question that the property is conjugal.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that: all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption, this Court has held, applies to all properties acquired during marriage. In the case at bar , the property was
acquired on July 6, 1971 during Villaners marriage with Justiniana Lipajan. It cannot be seriously contended that simply
because the tax declarations covering the property was solely in the name of Villaner it is his personal and exclusive property. What is
material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Justiniana Lipajan, the conjugal partnership was terminated. With the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, Villaners interest in the conjugal partnership became actual and vested with respect to an undivided one-half
portion. Justiniana's rights to the other half, in turn, vested upon her death to her heirs including Villaner who is entitled to the same
share as that of each of their eight legitimate children. As a result then of the death of Justiniana, a regime of co-ownership
arose between Villaner and his co-heirs in relation to the property.
With respect to Justinianas one-half share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the provisions on the law of
succession, her eight children and Villaner each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in
the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or
nine-eighteenths (9/18), Villaners total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9).
While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title to any definite portion of the community
property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the property. Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided
share thereof.
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co-owned property and is free to alienate, assign or
mortgage his interest except as to purely personal rights. Villaner, however, sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of
the other co-owners.

Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so
the disposition affects only Villaners share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the
partition of the property owned in common.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale . This is because under the aforementioned
codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to this
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED declaring the sale in favor of petitioner Leonardo Acabal and the subsequent sale in favor
of petitioner Ramon Nicolas valid but only insofar as five-ninths (5/9) of the subject property is concerned.
CUIZON vs. REMOTO
G.R. No. 143027 October 11, 2005
FACTS: The parties in this case are vying for ownership of a 4,300 square meter-land located in Barangay Basilisa, Remedios T.
Romualdez, Agusan del Norte.
Petitioners-spouses Encarnacion L. Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon rely on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3121 in the name of
"Encarnacion L. Cuizon, married to Salvador Cuizon," issued by the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte on March 15, 1984 pursuant
to a notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale dated in 1983 executed by the heirs of Placida, wherein they adjudicated unto
themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same time, sold said portion to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon. TCT No.
RT-3121 is a transfer from TCT No. RT-183 which originally covers 16 hectares in the name of Placida (married to Gervacio Lambo),
Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, each being one-fourth shareowner.
On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed of Sale of Real Property dated in 1968 involving a portion of the
same property covered by TCT No. RT-183, measuring 4,300 square meters, executed by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto (Angel),
husband of respondent Mercedes C. Remoto, and father of the other respondents, Leonida R. Meynard, Celerina R. Rosales and
Remedios C. Remoto.
In a Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court which is an action for reconveyance filed by respondents against petitioners, the trial
court ruled in favor of respondents and ordered that the property be reconveyed to them. The court holds that the Deed of Sale of Real
Property of September 1968 can be the legal basis not only of the possession and ownership of the lot in litigation, but also for the
reconveyance of the same in favor of the plaintiffs.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings and conclusion of the trial court. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied it.
In the present petition for review, petitioners insist that they are the rightful owners of the property based on TCT No. RT-3121, and that
the 1968 Deed of Sale is void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no legal effect. Petitioners also argue that: (1) the property is covered by
TCT No. RT-183 issued on June 21, 1930, and every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title;
(2) at the time the 1968 Deed of Sale was executed, no written notice was given to all possible co-redemptioners, co-heirs, and coowners, as provided for under Articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code; (3) respondents possession is ineffectual against a torrens title;
and (4) respondents action is barred by prescription and laches.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners Cuizon has a better right to the property in dispute

RULING:
No. The 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in favor of Angel should prevail over the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale made
by the heirs of Placida in favor of petitioners-spouses Cuizon.

Prior tempore, potior jure. It simply means, "He who is first in time is preferred in right." The only essential requisite of this rule is
priority in time, and the only one who can invoke this is the first vendee. Records bear the fact that when Placida sold her one-fourth
portion of the property covered by TCT No. RT-183 in 1968, the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale was still inexistent, and more
importantly, said portion was yet to be transferred by succession to Placidas heirs. The records also show that after Placida sold her
portion to Angel, the latter immediately took possession of the same. Applying the principle of priority in time, it is clear that Angel, and
consequently his heirs, the respondents herein, have a superior right to the property.
It must be noted that the sale by Placida to Angel is evidenced by a duly notarized deed of sale. Documents acknowledged before
notaries public are public documents and public documents are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Petitioners failed to present any clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the deed of sale is "void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no legal effect."
Furthermore, where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the
same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. As was found by the trial court,
before petitioners bought the property in 1983, they went to the Remotos residence in 1982 and were shown a copy of the 1968 Deed of
Sale. While petitioners dispute the year, saying that it was in 1983 and not 1982 when they went to the Remotos residence, the Court
abides by the trial courts finding considering that it was in the best position to assess the respective testimonies of the contending
claimants.
Petitioners rely heavily on TCT No. RT-3121 issued in their names. In the first place, the issuance of the title was made pursuant to the
1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale. At the time this document was entered into by the heirs of Placida, the latter was no longer
the owner of the property, having earlier sold the same to Angel. No one can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod non habet.
Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can
transfer legally. Such being the case, the heirs of Placida did not acquire any right to adjudicate the property unto them and sell it to
Encarnacion.
The right of Placida to sell her one-fourth portion of the property covered by TCT No. RT-183 is sanctioned under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal

rights

involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the

portion

may
are
which

may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The sale to Angel affects only Placidas pro indiviso share in the property, and Angel gets only what corresponds to Placidas share in the
partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Given the foregoing, the portion sold by Placida and bought by Angel under the 1968 Deed of Sale should only pertain to
one-fourth of Placidas share in the 16-hectare property, or 4,000 square meters.

LUZ CARO V. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. NO. L-46001, MARCH 25, 1982
FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of land. Mario died sometime in
January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed as joint administrators
of Mario's estate. In August 1959, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels
of land in favor of petitioner, Luz Caro. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito
and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over
Lot I-C under a TCT.
Private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito only learned sometime in the month of May, 1966, from an allegation in a
pleading presented by petitioner in a special proceeding, of the said sale. She sent to petitioner, a written offer to redeem the said onethird undivided share but the same was ignored by petitioner. Private respondent filed the present case and sought to prove that as a
joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale.
The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption. The trial court denied private respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finding for plaintiff (herein private respondent) held that since the right of the coowner to redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger arose after the death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the
hereditary estate of Mario but instead was the personal right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it behooved either the
vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the intended or consummated sale under Article 1620 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON the lot in question sought to be redeemed is still under co-ownership.
HELD: No. The fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and
the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario
Benito, agreed to subdivide the property through a petition for subdivision then filed for the purpose.
The affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, stated to the effect that they agree to the segregation of the land
formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by common
agreement Lot I-C thereof, was ceded to petitioner. Thereafter, the co-owners took actual and exclusive possession of the specific
portions respectively assigned to them. A subdivision title was subsequently issued on the lot assigned to petitioner, to wit, TCT No. T4978.
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold
to a third person. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the
share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. However, in the present case and the ruling in Caram, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., the Court held that once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has
terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. This pronouncement has reference to either a sale made
after partition, or a sale before the partition agreement.
Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private
respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. While
under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased,
so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery
or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not
include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death
of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected
and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner.
(Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
The issue on the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a subdivision title has
already been issued in the name of the petitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic, if not unnecessary to decide
whether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of the right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of
the New Civil Code.
The decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
TORRES, JR. ET AL. v. LAPINID AND VELEZ
G.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners, including respondent Velez, are co-owners of several parcels of land including the disputed lot. Velez filed an
action for partition of the parcels of land against petitioners and other co-owners. A judgment was rendered based on a compromise
agreement signed by the parties wherein they agreed that petitioners and respondent Velez were jointly authorized to sell the said

properties and receive the proceeds thereof to be distributed to all the co-owners. The agreement was later amended to exclude Velez as
an authorized seller. Upon inspection of the property, petitioners discovered that respondent Lapinid was occupying a specific portion
of the disputed lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Velez in favor of Lapinid. Petitioners then filed a Complaint praying for the
nullification of the sale, the recovery of possession and ownership of the property, and the payment of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Velez, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another person (Lapinid).
HELD: YES. As provided by Article 493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso
share in the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in
its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected. In this case, Velez can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of
Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Velez from the date
of the execution of a valid sale. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Velez as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the
property held in common. Lapinid thus became a co-owner of the property. It is established that no individual can claim title to a
definite and concrete portion before partition of co-owned property as each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal
share after the partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation
null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. Whether the
disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains validly executed.
Moreover, the subsequent compromise agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a coowner. Such agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Velez. Accordingly,
when the compromise agreement was executed without Lapinids consent, said agreement could not have affected his ideal and
undivided share. The Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a coowner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing
owned in common.
In addition, Lapinid is not required to pay rentals to his co-owners. Lapinids right of enjoyment over the property owned in
common must be respected despite opposition and may not be limited as long he uses the property to the purpose for which it is
intended and he does not injure the interest of the co-ownership.
ART 494
SALVADOR V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109910, April 5, 1995
FACTS:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Cagayan de Oro City. Title devolved upon his nine children,
namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during
the WWII.
Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, filed with the CFI a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo for quieting of title.
He alleged that he owned 8/9 of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share of his
wife, Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated, and
possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively the two parcels of land.
The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo filed a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages
against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that said lots are the common
property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo; that after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo
became the de facto administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise, they discovered that the Salvador spouses,
who were strangers to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiffs.CA held, among others, that prescription and laches have not run against the private
respondents with respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired
from her brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
WON Pastor Makibalo has acquired by prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners.
HELD:
No.
Upon Maria's death, the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved. Half of the conjugal properties, together with Maria's 1/9
hereditary share in the disputed lots, constituted Maria's estate and should thus go to her surviving heirs. Under Article 1001 of the Civil
Code, her heirs are her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be entitled to half of her estate; and her brother, Jose, and the children of her
other brothers and sisters, who shall inherit the other half. There having been no actual partition of the estate yet, the said heirs became
co-owners by operation of law.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property implies that an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be
invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by
prescription. Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a
period of time fixed by law.
The possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial
to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and
the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear
and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of
the other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following
elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3)
that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the
Office of the Register of Deeds which caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in
Alipio's name and the issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the coownership over the lots is his filing of an action to quiet title. The period of prescription started to run only from this repudiation.
However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private respondents herein, instituted an action for partition. Hence, the adverse
possession by Pastor being for only about six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent
acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor.
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR V. HEIRS OF DOLORES CICHON
G.R. NO. 161720, NOVEMBER 22, 2005
FACTS: Emilio Restar died intestate leaving properties and eight (8) compulsory heirs. The eldest son, Flores took possession of one of
the lands owned by his father and secured title thereto. His co-heirs objected and seek the declaration of the nullity of the title in favor
of Flores.
ISSUE: Whether or not Flores Restar validly acquired ownership over the subject land.
HELD: YES.
The court held that while the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire
ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
Flores Restar acts constitutes repudiation and possession adverse to his co-heirs. He acquired the property through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription (uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or good faith).
Flores as early as 1960 adjudicated the land unto himself and requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land
declared in his name. He executed a Joint Affidavit with Helen Restar stating the he is the owner and possessor of the lot to the
exclusion of the respondents. He also paid for the real estate taxes and irrigation fees without respondents having contributed therein.
He also have the continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of the respondents. All these constitutes Flores
acts of repudiation and adverse possession.
Respondents were also deemed to have been aware of the adverse claim. From the time that Flores secured a tax declaration in
his name, respondents were deemed to have knowledge of the claim. Additionally, it was admitted that the heirs made a verbal partition
of some of the properties of their father and from that partition, the subject land is not included.
Counted from 1960 where Flores had the tax declaration in his name, Flores occupy the property in an open, adverse and
continuous possession in the concept of owner for 38 years. And from the span of 38 years, respondents neither questioned, rebutted or
disputed said possession. Hence, his possession has ripened into ownership

ART 496
BETTY LACBAYAN VS BAYANI SAMOY, JR.
GR NO. 165427; MARCH 21, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married,
their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979. During their illicit relationship,
petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of
land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and
wife.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to
divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to
petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three
other properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon
City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of
marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00. Respondent, in his Answer,
however, denied petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any
contribution from petitioner.
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would
still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning. Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate
properties from the income of the company which she and respondent established. Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties
were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions. He countered that the said properties were
registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to
prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler. Respondent added that he also
purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. In resolving the issue on
ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not from her
own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least,
misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the
record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an issue
correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action
for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to
original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To
our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of
the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as husband and wife.
ISSUES:
I.
II.

Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;


Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition;
and
III.
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.

III.
HELD:
The case was dismissed for lack of merit

In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, it was explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition
is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of coownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer
certificates of title covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the
subject properties.
A resolution on the issue of ownership would notsubject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over
a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the
respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, SC held in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or
is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate
prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his
own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is
not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need
to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she
intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, SC did not subscribe to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees.
The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him
an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But it was noted that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon
petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and petitioner as
husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has
no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
ART 520
COFFEE PARTNERS, INC. VS. SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE AND ROASTERY, INC.
G.R. NO. 169504, MARCH 3, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioner holds a business in maintaining coffee shops in the Philippines. It is registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in January 2001. In its franchise agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd, it carries the trademark San Francisco Coffee.
Respondent is engaged in the wholesale and retail sale of coffee that was registered in SEC in May 1995 under a registered business
name of San Francisco Coffee &Roastery, Inc. It entered into a joint venture with Boyd Coffee USA to study coffee carts in malls.
When respondent learned that petitioner will open a coffee shop in Libis, Q.C. they sent a letter to the petitioner demanding them to
stop using the name San Francisco Coffee as it causes confusion tothe minds of the public. A complaint was also filed by respondents
before the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office for infringement and unfair competition with claims for damages.
Petitioners contend that there are distinct differences in the appearance of their trademark and that respondent abandoned the use of
their trademark when it joined venture with Boyd Coffee USA. The Bureau of Legal Affairs of the IPO held that petitioners trademark
infringed on the respondents trade name as it registered its business name first with the DTI in 1995 while petitioner only registered its
trademark in 2001.
Furthermore, it ruled that the respondent did not abandon the use of its trade name upon its joint venture with Boyd Coffee USA since
in order for abandonment to exist it must be permanent, intentional and voluntary. It also held that petitioners use of the trademark
"SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE" will likely cause confusion because of the exact similarity in sound, spelling, pronunciation, and
commercial impression of the words "SAN FRANCISCO" which is the dominant portion of respondents trade name and petitioners
trademark. Upon appeal before the office of the Director General of the IPO, the decision of its legal affairs was reversed declaring there
was no infringement. The Court of Appeals however set aside its decision and reinstated the IPO legal affairs decision. Petitioner
contends that the respondents trade name is not registered therefore a suit for infringement is not available.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners use of the trademark "SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE" constitutes infringement of respondents
trade name "SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC.," even if the trade name is not registered with the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO).
RULING: Registration of a trademark before the IPO is no longer a requirement to file an action for infringement as provided in
Section 165.2 of RA 8293. All that is required is that the trade name is previously used in trade or commerce in the Philippines. There is
no showing that respondent abandoned the use of its trade name as it continues to embark to conduct research on retailing coffee,
import and sell coffee machines as among the services for which the use of the business name has been registered.

The court also laid down two tests to determine similarity and likelihood of confusion. The dominancy test focuses on similarity of the
prevalent features of the trademarks that could cause deception and confusion that constitutes infringement . Exact duplication or
imitation is not required. The question is whether the use of the marks involved is likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of
the public or to deceive consumers. The holistic test entails a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products,
including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity.15 The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the
predominant words but also on the other features appearing on both marks in order that the observer may draw his conclusion whether
one is confusingly similar to the other. Applying either the dominancy test or the holistic test, petitioners "SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE"
trademark is a clear infringement of respondents "SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC." trade name. The descriptive words
"SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE" are precisely the dominant features of respondents trade name. And because both are involved in coffee
business there is always the high chance that the public will get confused of the source of the coffee sold by the petitioner. Respondent
has acquired an exclusive right to the use of the trade name "SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC." since the registration of
the business name with the DTI in 1995.
PEARL & DEAN (PHIL), INC. VS SHOEMART, INC.

Pearl & Dean (Phil), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of advertising display units called light boxes. In January 1981,
Pearl & Dean was able to acquire copyrights over the designs of the display units. In 1988, their trademark application for Poster Ads
was approved; they used the same trademark to advertise their light boxes.
In 1985, Pearl & Dean negotiated with Shoemart, Inc. (SM) so that the former may be contracted to install light boxes in the ad spaces of
SM. Eventually, SM rejected Pearl & Deans proposal.
Two years later, Pearl & Dean received report that light boxes, exactly the same as theirs, were being used by SM in their ad spaces. They
demanded SM to stop using the light boxes and at the same time asked for damages amounting to P20 M. SM refused to pay damages
though they removed the light boxes. Pearl & Dean eventually sued SM. SM argued that it did not infringe on Pearl & Deans trademark
because Pearl & Deans trademark is only applicable to envelopes and stationeries and not to the type of ad spaces owned by SM. SM
also averred that Poster Ads is a generic term hence it is not subject to trademark registration. SM also averred that the actual light
boxes are not copyrightable. The RTC ruled in favor of Pearl & Dean. But the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of SM.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. The light boxes cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as either prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising
copies, labels, tags or box wraps, to be properly classified as a copyrightable; what was copyrighted were the technical drawings only,
and not the light boxes themselves. In other cases, it was held that there is no copyright infringement when one who, without being
authorized, uses a copyrighted architectural plan to construct a structure. This is because the copyright does not extend to the
structures themselves.
On the trademark infringement allegation, the words Poster Ads are a simple contraction of the generic term poster advertising. In
the absence of any convincing proof that Poster Ads has acquired a secondary meaning in this jurisdiction, Pearl & Deans exclusive
right to the use of Poster Ads is limited to what is written in its certificate of registration, namely, stationeries.
LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 101897. March 5, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner is an educational institution duly registered with the SEC. it used the corporate name Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc., when it
first registered with SEC and has used that name ever since. Then, the petitioner instituted proceedings before the SEC to compel the
private respondents, which are also educational institutions, to delete the word "Lyceum" from their corporate names and permanently
to enjoin them from using "Lyceum" as part of their respective names.
Petitioner had sometime before commenced in the SEC a proceeding (SEC-Case No. 1241) against the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. to require
it to change its corporate name and to adopt another name not "similar [to] or identical" with that of petitioner. In an Order Assoc .
Commissioner Sulit held that the corporate name of petitioner and that of the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. were substantially identical
because of the presence of a "dominant" word, i.e., "Lyceum," the name of the geographical location of the campus being the only word
which distinguished one from the other corporate name. The SEC also noted that petitioner had registered as a corporation ahead of the
Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. in point of time, and ordered the latter to change its name to another name "not similar or identical [with]" the
names of previously registered entities. The Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. assailed the Order of the SEC before the Supreme Court but the
Court denied the Petition for Review for lack of merit.

Armed with the Resolution of this Court in the mentioned case, petitioner then wrote all the educational institutions it could find using
the word "Lyceum" as part of their corporate name, and advised them to discontinue such use of "Lyceum." The SEC hearing officer
rendered a decision sustaining petitioner's claim to an exclusive right to use the word "Lyceum." The hearing officer relied upon the SEC
ruling in the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. case and held that the word "Lyceum" was capable of appropriation and that petitioner had
acquired an enforceable exclusive right to the use of that word. On appeal, the decision of the hearing officer was reversed and set aside
by SEC En Banc. CA affirmed the SEC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the corporates names of private respondents are identical with or deceptively similar to that of the petitioner.
2. WON the use by the petitioner of Lyceum in its corporate name has been for such length of time and with such exclusivity as to have
become associated or identified with the petitioner institution in the mind of the general public (Doctrine of Secondary meaning).
HELD
1. No. Section 18 of the Corporation Code establishes a restrictive rule insofar as corporate names are concerned.The policy underlying
the prohibition in Section 18 against the registration of a corporate name which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly similar" to
that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance
of fraud upon the public , the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision
over corporations.
The Court do not consider that the corporate names of private respondent institutions are "identical with, or deceptively or confusingly
similar" to that of the petitioner institution. True enough, the corporate names of private respondent entities all carry the word
"Lyceum" but confusion and deception are effectively precluded by the appending of geographic names to the word "Lyceum." Thus, the
court do not believe that the "Lyceum of Aparri" can be mistaken by the general public for the Lyceum of the Philippines, or that the
"Lyceum of Camalaniugan" would be confused with the Lyceum of the Philippines.
Etymologically, the word "Lyceum" is the Latin word for the Greek lykeion which in turn referred to a locality on the river Ilissius in
ancient Athens. In time, the word "Lyceum" became associated with schools and other institutions providing public lectures and
concerts and public discussions. Thus today, the word "Lyceum" generally refers to a school or an institution of learning. In the name of
the petitioner, "Lyceum" appears to be a substitute for "university;" in other places, however, "Lyceum," or "Liceo" or "Lycee" frequently
denotes a secondary school or a college. Since "Lyceum" or "Liceo" denotes a school or institution of learning, it is not unnatural to use
this word to designate an entity which is organized and operating as an educational institution.
2. NO. The CA recognized this issue and answered it in the negative. The CA held that "Under the doctrine of secondary meaning, a
word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because geographical or
otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in
that trade and to that group of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his produce.
Consequently, the same doctrine or principle cannot be made to apply where the evidence did not prove that the business has
continued for so long a time that it has become of consequence and acquired a good will of considerable value such that its articles and
produce have acquired a well-known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the disputed name.
No evidence was ever presented in the hearing before the Commission which sufficiently proved that the word 'Lyceum' has indeed
acquired secondary meaning in favor of the appellant. While the appellant may have proved that it had been using the word 'Lyceum' for
a long period of time, this fact alone did not amount to mean that the said word had acquired secondary meaning in its favor because
the appellant failed to prove that it had been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others. More so, there was no evidence
presented to prove that confusion will surely arise if the same word were to be used by other educational institutions. Furthermore,
educational institutions of the Roman Catholic Church had been using the same or similar word like 'Liceo de Manila,' 'Liceo de Baleno'
(in Baleno, Masbate), 'Liceo de Masbate,' 'Liceo de Albay' long before appellant started using the word 'Lyceum'.
It may be noted also that one of the private respondents, the Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc., used the term "Lyceum" 17 years before
the petitioner registered its own corporate name with the SEC and began using the word "Lyceum." It follows that if any institution had
acquired an exclusive right to the word "Lyceum," that institution would have been the Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc. rather than
the petitioner institution.
In this connection, petitioner argues that because the Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc. failed to reconstruct its records before the SEC
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 62, which records had been destroyed during World War II, Western Pangasinan Lyceum
should be deemed to have lost all rights it may have acquired by virtue of its past registration. Whether or not Western Pangasinan
Lyceum, Inc. must be deemed to have lost its rights under its original 1933 registration, appears to us to be quite secondary in
importance; The Court refer to this earlier registration simply to underscore the fact that petitioner's use of the word "Lyceum" was
neither the first use of that term in the Philippines nor an exclusive use thereof. Petitioner's use of the word "Lyceum" was not exclusive
but was in truth shared with the Western Pangasinan Lyceum and a little later with other private respondent institutions which
registered with the SEC using "Lyceum" as part of their corporation names. The Court conclude and so hold that petitioner institution is
not entitled to a legally enforceable exclusive right to use the word "Lyceum" in its corporate name and that other institutions may use
"Lyceum" as part of their corporate names.
PHILIPS EXPORT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96161 February 21, 1992

FACTS: Petitioner Philips Export B.V. (PEBV), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Netherlands, although not
engaged in business here, is the registered owner of the trademarks PHILIPS and PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM under Certificates of
Registration Nos. R-1641 and R-1674, respectively issued by the Philippine Patents Office (presently known as the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer). Petitioners Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc. (Philips Electrical, for brevity) and Philips Industrial
Developments, Inc. (Philips Industrial, for short), authorized users of the trademarks PHILIPS and PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM, were
incorporated on 29 August 1956 and 25 May 1956, respectively. All petitioner corporations belong to the PHILIPS Group of Companies.
Respondent Standard Philips Corporation (Standard Philips), on the other hand, was issued a Certificate of Registration by respondent
Commission on 19 May 1982.
On 1984, Petitioners filed a letter complaint with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) asking for the cancellation of the word
"PHILIPS" from Private Respondent's corporate name in view of the prior registration with the Bureau of Patents of the trademark
"PHILIPS" and the logo "PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM" in the name of Petitioner, PEBV, and the previous registration of Petitioners
Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial with the SEC. As a result of Private Respondent's refusal to amend its Articles of Incorporation,
Petitioners filed with the SEC a Petition praying for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, alleging, among others, that
Private Respondent's use of the word PHILIPS amounts to an infringement and clear violation of Petitioners' exclusive right to use the
same considering that both parties engage in the same business. Private Respondent countered that Petitioner PEBV has no legal
capacity to sue; that its use of its corporate name is not at all similar to Petitioners' trademark PHILIPS when considered in its entirety;
and that its products consisting of chain rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw are grossly different from Petitioners' electrical
products.
The SEC Hearing Officer ruled against the issuance of such Writ. The same Hearing Officer dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. On
appeal, the SEC en banc affirmed the dismissal declaring that the corporate names of Petitioners and Private Respondent hardly breed
confusion inasmuch as each contains at least two different words and, therefore, rules out any possibility of confusing one for the other.
ISSUE: WON private respondents use of the word PHILIPS amounts to violation of petitioners exclusive right to use the same.
RULING: YES
Our own Corporation Code, in its Section 18, expressly provides that:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the proposed name is identical or
deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is
patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.Where a change in a corporate name is approved, the commission
shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation under the amended name.
The statutory prohibition cannot be any clearer. To come within its scope, two requisites must be proven, namely:
(1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name; and
(2) the proposed name is either:
(a) identical; or
(b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name
(c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

already protected by law; or

The right to the exclusive use of a corporate name with freedom from infringement by similarity is determined by priority of adoption In
this regard, there is no doubt with respect to Petitioners' prior adoption of' the name ''PHILIPS" as part of its corporate name.
Petitioners Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial were incorporated on 29 August 1956 and 25 May 1956, respectively, while
Respondent Standard Philips was issued a Certificate of Registration on 12 April 1982, twenty-six (26) years later. Petitioner PEBV has
also used the trademark "PHILIPS" on electrical lamps of all types and their accessories since 30 September 1922, as evidenced by
Certificate of Registration No. 1651.
The second requisite no less exists in this case. In determining the existence of confusing similarity in corporate names, the test is
whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person, using ordinary care and discrimination. In so doing, the Court must look to the
record as well as the names. While the corporate names of Petitioners and Private Respondent are not identical, a reading of Petitioner's
corporate names, to wit: PHILIPS EXPORT B.V., PHILIPS ELECTRICAL LAMPS, INC. and PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,
INC., inevitably leads one to conclude that "PHILIPS" is, indeed, the dominant word in that all the companies affiliated or associated
with the principal corporation, PEBV, are known in the Philippines and abroad as the PHILIPS Group of Companies.
Respondents maintain, however, that Petitioners did not present an iota of proof of actual confusion or deception of the public much
less a single purchaser of their product who has been deceived or confused or showed any likelihood of confusion. It is settled, however,
that proof of actual confusion need not be shown. It suffices that confusion is probably or likely to occur. It may be that Private
Respondent's products also consist of chain rollers, belts, bearing and the like, while petitioners deal principally with electrical
products. It is significant to note, however, that even the Director of Patents had denied Private Respondent's application for
registration of the trademarks "Standard Philips & Device" for chain, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw. That office held that PEBV,
"had shipped to its subsidiaries in the Philippines equipment, machines and their parts which fall under international class where
"chains, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw," the goods in connection with which Respondent is seeking to register 'STANDARD
PHILIPS' . . . also belong
Furthermore, the records show that among Private Respondent's primary purposes in its Articles of Incorporation are the following:
To buy, sell, barter, trade, manufacture, import, export, or otherwise acquire, dispose of, and deal in and deal with any
kind of goods, wares, and merchandise such as but not limited to plastics, carbon products, office stationery and supplies,

hardware parts, electrical wiring devices, electrical component parts, and/or complement of industrial, agricultural or
commercial machineries, constructive supplies, electrical supplies and other merchandise which are or may become articles of
commerce except food, drugs and cosmetics and to carry on such business as manufacturer, distributor, dealer, indentor,
factor, manufacturer's representative capacity for domestic or foreign companies.
For its part, Philips Electrical also includes, among its primary purposes, the following:
To develop manufacture and deal in electrical products, including electronic, mechanical and other similar products . . .
Given Private Respondent's aforesaid underlined primary purpose, nothing could prevent it from dealing in the same line of business of
electrical devices, products or supplies which fall under its primary purposes. Besides, there is showing that Private Respondent not
only manufactured and sold ballasts for fluorescent lamps with their corporate name printed thereon but also advertised the same as,
among others, Standard Philips As aptly pointed out by Petitioners, [p]rivate respondent's choice of "PHILIPS" as part of its corporate
name [STANDARD PHILIPS CORPORATION] . . . tends to show said respondent's intention to ride on the popularity and established
goodwill of said petitioner's business throughout the world" The subsequent appropriator of the name or one confusingly similar
thereto usually seeks an unfair advantage, a free ride of another's goodwill
Lastly, under the Guidelines in the Approval of Corporate and Partnership Names formulated by the SEC, the proposed name "should
not be similar to one already used by another corporation or partnership. If the proposed name contains a word already used as part of
the firm name or style of a registered company; the proposed name must contain two other words different from the company already
registered". In a ruling made by SEC in favor of the Private Respondent, the former pointed out that Petitioners Philips Electrical and
Philips Industrial have two words different from that of Private Respondent's name. What is lost sight of, however, is that PHILIPS is a
trademark or trade name which was registered as far back as 1922. Petitioners, therefore, have the exclusive right to its use which must
be free from any infringement by similarity. A corporation has an exclusive right to the use of its name, which may be protected by
injunction upon a principle similar to that upon which persons are protected in the use of trademarks and tradenames Such principle
proceeds upon the theory that it is a fraud on the corporation which has acquired a right to that name and perhaps carried on its
business thereunder, that another should attempt to use the same name, or the same name with a slight variation in such a way as to
induce persons to deal with it in the belief that they are dealing with the corporation which has given a reputation to the name. Notably,
too, Private Respondent's name actually contains only a single word, that is, "STANDARD", different from that of Petitioners inasmuch
as the inclusion of the term "Corporation" or "Corp." merely serves the Purpose of distinguishing the corporation from partnerships and
other business organizations.
The fact that there are other companies engaged in other lines of business using the word "PHILIPS" as part of their corporate names is
no defense and does not warrant the use by Private Respondent of such word which constitutes an essential feature of Petitioners'
corporate name previously adopted and registered and-having acquired the status of a well-known mark in the Philippines and
internationally as well.
ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. 103543 July 5, 1993
FACTS:
In September 1988, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sued Asia Brewery Inc. for allegedly infringing upon their trademark on their beer
product popularly known as San Miguel Pale Pilsen; that Asia Brewerys Beer na Beer product, by infringing upon SMCs trademark
has committed unfair competition as Beer na Beer creates confusion between the two products. The RTC ruled in favor of Asia
Brewery but the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Asia Brewery infringed upon the trademark of SMC.
HELD: No. Both products are manufactured using amber colored steinie bottles of 320 ml. Both were labeled in a rectangular fashion
using white color paint. But other than these similarities, there are salient differences between the two. As found by the Supreme Court,
among others they are the following:
1. The dominant feature of SMCs trademark are the words San Miguel Pale Pilsen while that of Asia Brewerys trademark is the word
Beer. Nowhere in SMCs product can be seen the word Beer nor in Asia Brewerys product can be seen the words San Miguel Pale
Pilsen. Surely, someone buying Beer na Beer cannot mistake it as San Miguel Pale Pilsen beer.
2. The bottle designs are different. SMCs bottles have slender tapered neck while that of Beer na Beer are fat. Though both beer
products use steinie bottles, SMC cannot claim that Asia Brewery copied the idea from SMC. SMC did not invent but merely borrowed
the steinie bottle from abroad and SMC does not have any patent or trademark to protect the steinie bottle shape and design.
3. In SMC bottles, the words pale pilsen are written diagonally while in Beer na Beer, the words pale pilsen are written
horizontally. Further, the words pale pilsen cannot be said to be copied from SMC for pale pilsen are generic words which originated
from Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Pilsen is a geographically descriptive word and is non-registrable.
4. SMC bottles have no slogans written on them while Asia Brewerys bottles have a copyrighted slogan written on them that is Beer na
Beer.
5. In SMC bottles, it is expressly labeled as manufactured by SMC. In Asia Brewery beer products, it is likewise expressly labeled as
manufactured by Asia Brewery. Surely, there is no intention on the part of Asia Brewery to confuse the public and make it appear that
Beer na Beer is a product of SMC, a long-established and more popular brand.

FACTS:

DEL MONTE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. L-78325
January 25, 1990

Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States and not engaged in
business in the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the United States are signatories to the Convention of Paris, a treaty which grants
to the nationals of the parties rights and advantages which their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of infringement and
unfair competition. On the other hand, petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized
under the laws of the Philippines.
Sometime in 1965, Del Monte authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle
configuration, for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark Registration by the Philippine Patent Office under the Supplemental
Register. In 1969, Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural
products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo. In 1972, Del Monte also obtained two registration certificates
for its trademark DEL MONTE and its logo.
Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Domestic
Trade in 1980 to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine
Fruit Catsup. The logo was registered in the Supplemental Register in 1983. Sunshine Sauces product itself was contained in various
kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which it bought from the junk shops for recycling.
Philpack received reports that Sunshine Sauce was using its exclusively designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del
Montes. Philpack warned Sunshine Sauce to desist from doing so on pain of legal action. Thereafter, claiming that the demand had
been ignored, Philpack and Del Monte filed a complaint against the Sunshine Sauce for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition.
In its answer, Sunshine alleged that it had long ceased to use the Del Monte bottle and that its logo was substantially different
from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse the buying public to the detriment of the petitioners.
RTC- dismissed the complaint. It held that there were substantial differences between the logos or trademarks of the parties; that the
defendant had ceased using the petitioners' bottles; and that in any case the defendant became the owner of the said bottles upon its
purchase thereof from the junk yards. Furthermore, the complainants had failed to establish the defendant's malice or bad faith, which
was an essential element of infringement of trademark or unfair competition.
CA- affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sunshine Sauce is guilty of unfair competition.
2. Whether or not Sunshine Sauce is guilty of infringement for having used the Del Monte bottle.
HELD:
1. YES, IT IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR COMPETITION.
It has been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity. Such comparison requires a careful
scrutiny to determine in what points the labels of the products differ, as was done by the trial judge. The question is not whether the two
articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the
casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original.
Even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see that the Sunshine label is a colorable imitation
of the Del Monte trademark. The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green and red-orange, the
same with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the
same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato.
The person who infringes a trade mark does not normally copy out but only makes colorable changes, employing enough points of
similarity to confuse the public with enough points of differences to confuse the courts. What is undeniable is the fact that when a
manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before him a boundless choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols sufficient
to distinguish his product from the others. When as in this case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable explanation, to use the same
colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was
done deliberately to deceive.
2. YES, IT IS NOT GUILTY OF INFRINGEMENT.
We find that the private respondent is not guilty of infringement for having used the Del Monte bottle. The reason is that the
configuration of the said bottle was merely registered in the Supplemental Register.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that although Del Monte has actual use of the bottle's configuration, the petitioners cannot
claim exclusive use thereof because it has not been registered in the Principal Register. However, we find that Sunshine, despite the
many choices available to it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled" was embossed on the
bottle, still opted to use the petitioners' bottle to market a product which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the private
respondent's bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the latter's reputation and goodwill and pass off its own product as that of Del
Monte.
As Sunshine's label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the cancellation of the private
respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing the questioned label from the market. With regard to the use of Del

Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfair competition; hence, the respondent should be permanently enjoined from the use of such
bottles.
FRUIT OF THE LOOM, INC V CA
G.R NO.VL-32747, NOVEMBER 29, 1984
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the law of State of Rhode Island, USA. It was a registrant of a trademark in the
Philippine Patent Office. The classes of merchandise covered by registration certificate were mens, womens, and childrens underwear.
Private respondent, Fruit for Eve, was a registrant of trademark in the Philippine Patent Office and was issued registration certificate
covering garments similar to petitioners products like womens underwear and pajamas. Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement
of trademark and unfair competition. It alleged that private respondents trademark was confusingly similar to its trademark Fruit of
the Loom. The color get-up and general appearance of hang tag consisting of big red apple was an imitation of petitioners. Private
respondent claimed that their products only cover womens underwear while petitioners products cover also mens underwear.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents trademark Fruit for Eve and its hang tag are confusingly similar to petitioners trademark
Fruit of the Loom and its hang tag so as to constitute trademark infringement
HELD: No. The Court held that in determining trademark infringement, comparison of words is not the only determinant factor. The
trademarks in their entirety as they appear in respective hang tags must also be considered in relation to the goods to which they are
attached. In the case, the word FRUIT is the lone similar word and by mere pronouncing the two marks, it could hardly be said that it
will provoke confusion. Fruit of the Loom is different from Fruit for Eve. The Court did not agree that the dominant feature is the word
FRUIT for even in the printing of the trademark in both hang tags, the word FRUIT is not at all made dominant over the other words.
As to the design of hang tags, the shape of petitioners is round with a base while private respondents is plain rectangle without any
base. Petitioners trademark is written in semi-circle while that of private respondent is written in straight line in bigger letters. Private
respondents tag has only an apple in its center but that of petitioner has also cluster of grapes that surround the apple in the center.
The colors are also very distinct since the petitioner used fight brown while respondent used pink with white colored center piece. The
apples which are the only similarities in hang tag are also different. Petitioners apple is dark red while private respondents apple is
light red. The similarities are completely lost in the substantial differences in the design and general appearance of their respective hang
tags. The court ruled that trademarks do not resemble each other as to confuse or deceive ordinary purchaser.

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