G.R. No.

L-28089

October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act
4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present
original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba,
reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,

Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from
said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the
same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be
elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts
and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967,
the pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality
of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in
the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum
situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province
of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation
of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter
for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional;
and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed
in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read
from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill,
being of local application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill,
study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The
title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes
the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the
province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are
the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in
"the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need
not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes
the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a
sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction
of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of

the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not
reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling
here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695)
reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and
Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the
provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the
provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this
pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected
to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly
germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before
us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent
but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of
the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two
provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village
of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act
to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the
following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . .
. be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village
of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa
county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control,
including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object,
which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of
nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a
sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but
we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be
disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of
an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A.
539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those

affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich.
316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The
act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is
erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative

purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to
the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the
mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the
municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where
a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will
be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception
to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried
into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them,11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence

of this Court, thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by
itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, .
. . .12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create
the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur
into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang,
Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality

of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an
agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character
that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the
State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group
of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst
these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which
induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of
the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory
note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves
and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That
this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law,
states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality
of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus:
Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population,
collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a
motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal
corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their
community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate
obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions.
And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still
cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared
will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations
of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may
not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original
twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this
unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point.
To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on
legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may
not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of
the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute
a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that
petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of
Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real
party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to
sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired
by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing
has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote
in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as
is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire
to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new
town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and
continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the
candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them;
he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in
its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to
reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the
Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to
prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., conc

G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC
DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL,
RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers
of Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989

ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651
and 89965.

Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation
of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and
Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .

After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which
the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the
issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with
Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of
the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front
with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic
Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took
effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the
"areas of autonomy." 2

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional
autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by
law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of
the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law
on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by
petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the
Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is
part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement . The Solicitor
General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been
entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified
according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international
agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the
Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under
public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution
itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The
standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so
provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734
and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli
Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of
the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at
all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent
law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution
would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have
been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous
region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the
autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the
outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to
be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner
contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous
region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the
favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be
clarified.

Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the
autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed
over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place

only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision
in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates
substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details,
thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in
paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall
be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in
R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim

Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question
has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total
votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the
constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the
votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section
27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with
the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not
on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have
simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which
the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have
been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other
hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous
region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural
heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of
the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any
review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court
cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January
31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis,
petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in
Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers
several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of
the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said
areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had
earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should
compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would
necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the
autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may
not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure
Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court
ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are
based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not
infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates
the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection
centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any
conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted)
on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created
under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not
be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection
by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code
and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's
religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII,
Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy
between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v.
Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case,
no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims
involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious
freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is
merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and
national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734
which, among others, states:

. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the
President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is

challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which

provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of
the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement
of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an
Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers,
appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act
[Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national
government offices and their properties to the regional government shall be made
pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer
should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional
government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the
Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon
approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked
with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would
in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result
of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by
constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result
of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by
constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of
effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an
impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting
a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on
this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA
734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978,
82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,

unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their
petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]

192 SCRA 100

Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao

Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor
MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and
TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut);
Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident
REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO;
Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B.
BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and
CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO
IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON
BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY
BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY
GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon.
CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional
Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management;
and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the
only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite
held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that
the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces
and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority
of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of
Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution
and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province

which voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p.
7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of
March 1991.: nad
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on
February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the nonratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the
ratification of the Organic Act.- nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC
resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of
the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and
prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public
funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to
be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall
have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the
constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and decide
the case.

This petition is meritorious.

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in
its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are
groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was
made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by
itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive

historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution,
as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that
the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See
Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one
province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another
set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the
Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts
apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region.
chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall
then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of
having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And
since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would
have too many government officials for so few people.:-cralaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board
composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or
their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members
representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level
called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions
(Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the
Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If it takes only one person in the
provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire
Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a
larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the
Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements
cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.

These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet,
Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the second smallest
number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above mentioned. The
Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet,
486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and
Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000
according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which
cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on
Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from
different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the
Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come
from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a
system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the Region.
Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based
upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is
expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the
Region.:-cralaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is
not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the
Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x

". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes
approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his
conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:
x x x

". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the
votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that
only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province

of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably can, alone, legally and validly
constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the
Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
determine (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in
Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the
two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the
Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall
comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same
rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is
nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous
region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one
province or one city is to constitute it.chanrobles virtual law library
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can
validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not
whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It
is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region,
the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic
Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be
still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597 Petitioner,

- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,

Respondents.

x------------------------x
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628
Petitioner,

Present:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. July 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007,
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City
and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan,
Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province,
which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment
by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall
continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where
they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes
vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all
incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher
elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor,
and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the
next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries
they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of
salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution
in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother
province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus,
what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part
of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on
29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act
201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan
in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted
the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated
27 February 2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt
the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on
29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City).[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No.
7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite
the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress
power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial,
power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot
with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on
1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen added that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent
Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first
legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to
reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that
Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No.
177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in
Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms
the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c)
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created
provinces.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier
stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes
with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing.
Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a
national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds:
(a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that
is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the
creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which
encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM
Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM
in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces
without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City,
which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the
House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16]
On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties
in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid
delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20
(9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their
organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment
to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant
in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that
Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing
standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and

(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus
effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the
Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent
Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to
submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the
Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the
House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate
law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily

(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of
such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws,
Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasijudicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner
in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens
election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether
the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the
novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the
recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in
question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite
in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the
question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section
10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys

population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one

representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also
validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold
issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in
the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The
allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new
legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by
Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such
a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior

legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership
of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as
amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is
always elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30]

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,

and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It
would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly
to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory.
The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of
its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local
or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA
Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus,
the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)B and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards
set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29
October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives
in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the
statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and KalingaApayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and
twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall
have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the

same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact
territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a)
indirectly, through the creation of a province for each province shall have at least one
member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the
apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the
second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those
incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only
from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress.
Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district,
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions
under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof
were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the
Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of
fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the
consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the
aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts indirectly through a special law enacted by Congress creating a
province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa
does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created
by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created
merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of
the Constitution because the Constitution provides that each province shall have at
least one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from
the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs
exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress,
from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such
legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act
of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the
Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a
legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of
only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district
of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires
that [E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have
at least one representative.

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or
minimum population of 250,000.[34] The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or
more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the
House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution
(unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM
Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA
7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of
Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of
provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack
Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.

Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x
and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can
be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there
may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will
each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what
you are saying?

Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand
(1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is
legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended
these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not
the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states,
[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created by Congress
itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the
actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress
can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district
representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since
party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there
should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list
candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district
representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there
is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of
the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is
established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X
of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily
involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply
with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays
does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue
to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being

contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well

as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as
it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,

Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL,
Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and
from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper
of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

1st District

Del Gallego

Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Libmanan

Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

417,304
2nd District Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

474,899
3rd District

Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

Sangay

4th District

Iriga

Baao
Balatan
Bato Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3
illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del Gallego

Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

176,383
2nd District Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

San Fernando

Gainza
Milaor

276,777
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan

Population

Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay

San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga

Baao
Balatan
Bato Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of
the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No.
4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new
congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before
us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least
250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill
by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part
of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two;
neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x 2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is
the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The
petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative
district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be
reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will
represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the
creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national
population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to
roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently
from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population
threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in
Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from

legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek
the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2)
fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction
between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue
that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has
no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather,
the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only
creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The
respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting
as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant
petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the
Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the
petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with
issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments
on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle
of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the wellentrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan
v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20
and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of
direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive
Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must
be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.
This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by
this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum

population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that
the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less
than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least
one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of
a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred
fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission
which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an
ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such
records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many
districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is
the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one
legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the
precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the
sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the
entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original
number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73)
provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member
and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which
are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250,
000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on
the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This
projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account
the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall
have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces,
and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and
Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the
number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from
this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests
and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants
other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns
when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point,
Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the
Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by
the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the
standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the
legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was
included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto
Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and
based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a
combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that
Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact,
Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed
out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto
Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be
less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He
then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the
interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of
Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He
proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to
satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer
the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of
Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total
population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would
be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the
Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection,
the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the
Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by
the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation
with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect
to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are
placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a
special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines,
Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own
constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon.
Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during
certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population
substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is
beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of
the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City
are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be
reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit
the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado
stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he
had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the
summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I,
particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr.
Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the
amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with
Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of
Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La
Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City
alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of
Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts
based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district
"supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice
growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters
discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area"
and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political,
traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in
the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu,
Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and
population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.
The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as
a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of
petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a
250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of
250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986
numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is

based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional
Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words,
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional
district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly
based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the
increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the
invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first
and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the
resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not
the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional
district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit
of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue
presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,
- versus
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT;
House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of
Dinagat Islands,
Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.
ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON.
MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M.
BAGUNDOL,
Intervenors.
G.R. No. 180050
Promulgated:
April 12, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated
October 20, 2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on October 29, 2010,
praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief
background of the relevant antecedents
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).[2] On December 3,
2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite
for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.[4]
With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim
set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during
the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.[5]

On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355.[6] The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.[7]
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte,
filed another petition for certiorari[8] seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when
the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a
population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i)
a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii)
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision[9] granting the petition.[10] The
Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC.
Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as
null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article

9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, [t]he
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as
such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.[11]
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their
respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May
12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the said motions.[14]
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of
court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second
motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually noted without action by this
Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8790, relevant to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously
components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In
December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s]
was created and its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this
purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice
Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats
pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the
Philippines, et al. rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act
No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a
province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10,
Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above
decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of
Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2)
names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor,
Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the
Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for
the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the
candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into
the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the
elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether
the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:

a.
If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system
configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate
provinces;
b.
If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat
Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice
Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the
candidates for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the
position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First District
of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates
for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the
position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for the
said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for
the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of]
Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for
Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands.
Also, the voters of the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for
the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission
will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of
Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the
election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for
Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative
District, and Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat
Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c.
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same
reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat
Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.

They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del
Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the
event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the
instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355.
Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be
annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted
for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover,
as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of
their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case
inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of
the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have
to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other
developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights
would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors
raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the
passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the
LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable
in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this
case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings[17] of the Court, allowing intervention as
an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any
time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to
the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even
for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed
out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del
Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal
Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice
Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First
District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal
interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the
above motion.

At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions
for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus
Motion, which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for
reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for
reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to
treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion
to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a
second motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.[18] It should be noted that this motion prays for
the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial
of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the May
12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the
May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their
motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in
this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion
for intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution
merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support
the claim that this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite
an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set
this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution
reads:
c.
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same
reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat
Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper
party interest for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main
case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not
entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to
the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the
Courts mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment by movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing
at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their interest in this
case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it
is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is
because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case
attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government
officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario,
movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to
the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have

remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they
have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are often public actions in
which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently
arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.[19]
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed,
they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to
their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects
would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movantsintervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their
interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The
consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to
their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision
would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it
is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are
not only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire
repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather
than dismissed on account of mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3)
the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.[20] The second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[21]
where technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the
constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for
intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their
substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners
themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May
12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment
of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements
of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed
with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects,
and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected,
would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause,
freed from the constraints of technicalities.[22]

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in
light of attendant extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to suspend or even
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself had already declared final.[24] In this case, the compelling
concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they
would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original
parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the
LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of
the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to
decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will
effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court
finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve
affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e.,
income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this
light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of
these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of
the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional debates are
quoted hereunder
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we
thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the
economic viability of the new local government unit, the new province?
xxxx
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the
House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum.
Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you
have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic development,
population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you
disallow the particular area from being converted into a province because of the
population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it
could become a province simply because it will never have the economic take off for it
to trigger off that economic development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay
for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and
above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development
which will attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector.
This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the
proponents, simply by telling them, Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200
thousand, you will never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to
your place. Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability.

xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area
because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters,
ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative
efficiency and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted,
there is only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was
later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no
longer there precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so
wide that no one man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are
needed.
Secondly, when you say delivery of basic services, as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor,
there are sections of the province which have never been visited by public officials,
precisely because they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because
its so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the population
requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are creating
provinces, which is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in
administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is
able to do it without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we
go on a minimum income level, then we say, this is the trigger point at which this
administration can take place.[25]
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a
city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a
contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within
Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities
where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000)
inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the
original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed
herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities,

barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding
the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based
on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall
be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned
for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area
and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be
prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of
Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the
indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU
or LGUs where the cultural community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in
municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as
may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The
creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or
barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million
five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand
(25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous
territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of
the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring
income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall
not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(i)
Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial
treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii)
Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii)
Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be
borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisities:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)
a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation
thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to
be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous
if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1)
Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1)
Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and non-recurring income; and

(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to
be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed
minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the
petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the
creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with
respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population,
and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in
the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands
would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision
was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus,
when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC
and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold
the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations
underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government
units.

This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR[26] and in the
Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270,[27] which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President
to convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective
implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all
the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local
autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the
formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component
cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the
province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area
over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of selfreliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the
2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are
separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection
clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as
enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together
with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove
enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,[28] with respect
to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the
distinguished Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166.
This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for
consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including our

distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the
Chairman then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less
interested in the creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas
that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And
as I have said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two
years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech
that he will support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local
Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he
wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an
impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the
concern of the respective Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the
mother province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to
create another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will
happen to Palawan? We wont have one million people there, and if you look at
Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So,
the development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2,
1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House
Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No.
7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155,
which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.

Very truly yours,

That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the
Senate has adopted another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the
only bill that is involving the present Local Government Code that we are practically
considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved
by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference
Committee Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as the creation of the
province, not only in my province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will
participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the province, lets say, on the basis of the
result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I dont see why,
we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they
are seeking.

So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an
approved version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the
Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill.
And they have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me
to make sure that it takes the cudgel of the House approved version.
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the
wish of the House, but because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote
them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen
the amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the
plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words,
we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the
devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their
situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial
conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital
town is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West.
And if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is
about one hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the
same distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is
the problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not
because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I
to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am looking at the future
development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can
foresee what the creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them
prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors.
Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and
even the AID people are asking me, What is holding the creation of a new province
when practically you need it? Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about
140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like
Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities
there that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have
the income. Of course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of
promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that there are
more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will
enhance the development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my
province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life
to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I
hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166,
which the House has already approved because we dont want them to throw the
Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you
know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we
are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that
into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the
legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am
sure there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was
incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were
introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version
and as a result new criteria were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a
book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your
end so that the objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it
with sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate
version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIMAN ALFELOR. Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on
economic stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our
province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts
and I feel it should be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and
conversed proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on
those areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon,
fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From
Albay going to Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That
area now is infested with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be
extended to these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator
or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would
like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical
impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain
provisions in the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far
as provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which
only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in
Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in
Batanes province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one
congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito.
Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a
population of 63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe
thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is
only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for
every province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is
very clear that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan
natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh.
Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve
powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in
their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot
make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province
because of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic
growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a
particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually,
tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to,
say, 20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin
and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its
composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of
Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even
with sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very
carefully.[29]
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly
show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the previously
underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the
allocation of funds under the
national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285 of the LGC,
the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area,
population, and local revenue.[30]

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction, such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of
executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee
consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to
Section 533[32] of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring
compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It
was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted
by Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis
supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to
attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC,
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991,
which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local
government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence,
the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it
cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from
the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1)
or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in
Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the
LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically
insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee
evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the
LGC when the IRR was formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an
executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,[34] but to
legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the
four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative
construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put
in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to
immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing
the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No.
9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to
the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In
effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood
into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted
upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption
from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby,
and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat
is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it
is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is
as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts
ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the
intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a
co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in
mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in
the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which
enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy
for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its
official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of
statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the
theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to
ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a
law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such
a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors,
dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is
declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO

GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA,
ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES
LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.

Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the
Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on
December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of
stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3,
1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from
the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north
and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this
Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a
majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall
appoint the first officials of the province.

SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our
Constitution, it is expressly mandated that
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist
to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at
least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five
hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the
Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother
province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the
general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring
income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during
which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a
supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that
the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as
scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed
upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte,
namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador
Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the
end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated
and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite
which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered
its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have
brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot
the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be
enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to
desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January
3, 1986.

Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros
Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued,
directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another
plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as
now existing shall participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial
Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses
incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the
issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus
curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2,
1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in
Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986
resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment,
not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their
Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be
accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on its
face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that
the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question.
They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because
the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore,
they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of
the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of
Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de
not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to
in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case
of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the
President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the
pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the
expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as
respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from
the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a
result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one
of validity. ...

3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are
indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a
parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to
ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who
shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be
imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter
of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow
other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even
frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they
constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the
Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule
as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction,
that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts,
the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari
materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in
the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local
Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the
requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government
Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the
area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about
2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress
that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares
that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square
kilometers, more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot
and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3,
1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out
of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of
Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast
represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del
Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del
Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were
announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case should be
dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the new
province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to
be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros
Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in
connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment
to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated
January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said
Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any
public funds on account of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further
consideration.

Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it
expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South
and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West,
North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less. (Emphasis
supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were
defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from
the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a new province to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West,
North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by
Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July
16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have
the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines
1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census
and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8
2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6
7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0
8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3

11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)

This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose
it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that
the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new
province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the
land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the
uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire
municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D",
Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions
derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City
(Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area
of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the
total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R.
Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in
approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis the Special
Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of
the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of
petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644,
reads:
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the
creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new province.
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change
in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite
"shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and
towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as
violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI
thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the
creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the voters in the
remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to
participate in the questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as
already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the
commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such
wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait

accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation
is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so
propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a
dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting
and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut
about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily,
confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if
they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the
unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly
scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the
commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by
whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with
favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative
measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would
violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that
this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is
done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court,
nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its
attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of
Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves
around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of
the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that
there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered.
The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two
component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the
parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors
and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a
mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged
good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our
Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be
observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a

supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local

government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the
Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no
different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be
dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged
by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive
in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of
judicial inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to
say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court
cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained
changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval
of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles
regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all
serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned
in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to
respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this
Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said
case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing
barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in
exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is,
however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is
"one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway"
and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or
units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of
the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of
how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et
al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is
acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain
Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters
therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs.
Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong
dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court,
as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar
or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity
in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling
which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio
C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985,
136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein

assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include
all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if
the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan
Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the
present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein
were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local
autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains
persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter
under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated
problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is
the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and
lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to
the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form
the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities
will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the
removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing
province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy
to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily
will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as
that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse.
Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they
are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that
may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned
from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the
plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and
twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas,"
what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption
will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill
No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said
enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the
unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by
the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province,
thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained
apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed
province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong
challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in
the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area
affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is
misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province

is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del
Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established
Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No
controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will
lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole
province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing
territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and
dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the
petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation;
and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial
alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional
provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to
each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two
provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished
and definitely the boundary being substantially altered.
It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its
boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the
voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its
boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this
case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is
the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the
ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to
an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from
participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of
another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that
a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to
schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire
province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make
a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for
being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and
void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is
not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no
legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas
Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the
holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new
province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must
now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its
existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the
complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent
province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the
new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del
Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and
transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be
at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province
of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even
satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code,
as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by
the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a
territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate
the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more
than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856
square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to the total area of
the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when
Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be
created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is
contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said
province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in
this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in
determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is
strained, incorrect, and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated
therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The
use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in
the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political
unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a)
in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as
an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact,
or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in
a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them
in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in
the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the
physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the
word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area
but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first
paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words
and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature
(82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an
artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the
statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely
different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the
language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A
construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of
the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but
which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said
to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose
land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by
"dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret
haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that
recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its
autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p.
43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this
case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the
making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made
by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or
wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions
taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on
the electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the
Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism
displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued
existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful
commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite
the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly
and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as
long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners
herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on
November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of
Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same
province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a
municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in
holding the plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal
year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to
promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected,
namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only
2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte,
seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA
7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that
the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or
units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,

Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should
not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte. 4
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the
1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v.
COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the
case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be
segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be
included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently,
whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labo is valid.
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs.
COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on
Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer
applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the
latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not
affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner,
now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to
inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code,
the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the
implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I
just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection
on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the
creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a
territory. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would
be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in
said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly
affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the
parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent

COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105120. September 4, 1992.]

SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG

PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ILOILO PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents.

Jiz, Jiz, Andrada & Gellada and Santos B. Aguadera, for Petitioners.

Juanito M. Acanto for himself and for other intervenors.

Leonardo E. Lozano for petitioner-in-intervention.

RESOLUTION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the act of
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the voters of the subprovince of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-governor of the province of Iloilo
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the second district of the
province, in the recently conducted May 11, 1992 local and national
elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a duly registered
and accredited political party, through its Iloilo Provincial Chairman, co-petitioner,
Simplicio Grio. Grio was also the official candidate of the party for the position of
governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian, claimed to be a registered
voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo.
The sub-province of Guimaras is composed of three municipalities, namely, Buenavista,
Jordan and Nueva Valencia, with a combined voting population of fifty thousand
(50,000), more or less. These three municipalities also constitute a part of the second
district of Iloilo, with the municipalities of Pavia, Leganes, Sta. Barbara, New Lucena,
Zarraga, Alimodian, Leon and San Miguel composing the remaining municipalities
constituting the entire second district. In the previous elections, the voters from the
municipalities comprising the sub-province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the
provincial officials of the entire province of Iloilo.
On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code came into effect (Sec. 536, R.A.
7160). Section 462 thereof called for the conversion of existing subprovinces into
regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
in the areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section likewise directed the
holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with the national elections following the
effectivity of R.A. 7160.

The first national elections conducted after the effectivity of R.A. 7160 was the recently
concluded May 11, 1992 elections which was also held simultaneously with the local
elections. Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the Comelec conducted a plebiscite for
the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province simultaneously with the May 11,
1992 elections.
On April 15, 1992, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 2410 providing for the rules and
regulations governing the plebiscite to decide the question on the conversion of the subprovince of Guimaras into a regular province. Section 3 thereof provided that all
registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and in the sub-province of Guimaras, who
are qualified to vote for the provincial officials thereof in the May 11, 1992 elections,
were qualified to vote in the plebiscite. The ballots used for the three (3) municipalities
of the sub-province of Guimaras and the entire province of Iloilo were provided with
appropriate spaces at the bottom for this question:chanrobles law library : red

PLEBISCITE QUESTION
Do you vote for the approval of the conversion of the sub-province pursuant to Section
462 of Republic Act No. 7160?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by the
Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain any space or
provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo, of which the subprovince of Guimaras was a part.
On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, herein petitioners
filed the instant petition far certiorari. Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent
Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed
the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice
governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the
second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed
providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a full-fledged
province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the subprovince shall no longer
be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote against its
conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said sub-province.
Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed to inform the candidates and
the voters of such disenfranchisement.
On May 14, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission
on Elections and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City to cease and desist
from canvassing and proclaiming the results of the election for the office of the
governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We
also ordered the public respondents to file their comments.
On May 29, 1992, public respondents filed their comment through the Office of the
Solicitor General. On June 9, 1992, the petitioners filed their reply to public respondents
comment.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On June 17, 1992, We lifted the temporary restraining order.
On June 22, 1992, Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the office of the governor of the Province of Iloilo and who
allegedly ranked number two behind the frontrunner Arthur Defensor, filed a motion for

leave to intervene and for admission of her petition in intervention which was attached
to the motion. Zulueta alleged the same allegations as those presented in the main
petition and claimed that she has an interest in the matter of the main petition because
the same is crucial and determinative of whether or not she would win for the office of
governor. We admit herein the said petition for intervention and resolve the issue she
raised therein in this decision considering that it is the same issue raised in the main
petition.
Still another motion for intervention dated June 25, 1992 was filed by Rodolfo Legaspi
and Richard Garin, Juanito Acanto and Alberto Javellana, Grace Fernandez and Pablito
Araneta, and Nerio Salcedo and Antonio Teodeco, candidates for members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first, third, fourth and fifth districts of Iloilo,
respectively. Apparently, unaware of the lifting of the restraining order, they alleged in
their motion that they were unduly prejudiced by the temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on May 14, 1992 because the issue presented in the main petition had no
direct effect on them or their election and they prayed for the lifting of the said
restraining order.
On July 9, 1992, We issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention filed by
Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and Tedoco because
We had previously lifted the temporary restraining order and considering that they were
not directly affected by the principal issue in the main petition (p. 126, Rollo) which
involved only the positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.
On July 8, 1992, the petitioners filed another motion to admit Amended Petition with the
Amended Petition attached thereto. The original petition was amended to include as
petitioners, Evelyn C. Jiz another candidate for member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.
The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of the
1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). It provides in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 462. Existing Subprovinces. Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into
regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
in the said sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite
shall be conducted by the Comelec simultaneously with the national elections following
the effectivity of this Code.
"The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be
represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the original districts out
of which said new provinces or districts were created until their own representatives
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified.
"The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular
provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the
offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their
terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by
appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors
shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned
herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the
position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet
been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vicegovernor and the other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, all of whom shall
likewise hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the next regular
local elections and qualified.

"All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said subprovinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in office in
accordance with the civil service law, rules and regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library
We have carefully examined this section of the 1991 Local Government Code and We
observed its incompleteness and inadequacy to govern all or any eventuality. It should
be remembered that the law should take into consideration the decision of the populace
to be affected by a change in its political set-up. As it is worded, Section 462 completely
addresses an eventuality where the people of both the original district and the people of
the new district to be created agree to the proposed creation of the latter. The law
provides that, "After the effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the
position of governor of the newly created province through appointment, if none has yet
been appointed to the same (as hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vicegovernor and the other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those affected by
such conversion, what does the law say? The law states only the following in case of a
negative vote: "The incumbent elected officials of said sub-provinces converted into
regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy
occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from
expiration of their terms of office in case a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall
be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their
successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite
mentioned herein and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under
the present set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial
positions shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law
however, failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the subprovince shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent or
whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular province
shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held
simultaneously with the plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in the plebiscite prevailed, these votes
shall not be considered. If however, the "No" vote prevailed and the voters of Guimaras
were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into
consideration. The Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the
plebiscite decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The
Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the 1991 Local
Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is
ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial
officials through appointment until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials
of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide
that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by
a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by
registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.chanrobles
law library
However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the Commission on
Elections had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts actually
obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the
subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of
Guimaras into a regular province. The total "Yes" votes was 283,224 as against 42,524

"No" votes (p. 34, Rollo). In this event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already
did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor for the newly created province
of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of
R.A. 6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically
independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a
special election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the
purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.
ACCORDINGLY,
the
petition
is
DISMISSED
academic.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

for

being

moot

and

G.R. No. 182701

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
July 23, 2008

x -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution[1] and (2) Omnibus Order[2] of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as
Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition[3] before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for
any public office. In his Answer,[4] petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino
and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.[5] He returned to
the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner.[6]
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition
for disqualification, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is
GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running
as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his
Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able
to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present
petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,[8] petitioner argues that his filing of a
certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are
substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil.[9] Lopez was born of
Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result,
she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also
considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by
re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225[10] in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in
the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC
observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough
to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that
a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the
provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before
an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear
and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.
In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as
proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission
to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of
respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this
Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the
Philippines.[11] (Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge
the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a
disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[12]
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on
the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of
Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by
the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit
should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to
state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought
about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did
not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the
present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land
area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under
court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They
did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could

decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed
city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary
disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an
act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering
these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No.
7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that
the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained,
i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks
to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around.
This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall

exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the
duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided,
The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members
of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from
serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the
new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts
the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms
previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same
position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous threeyear consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners
conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati
shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to
the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as
implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national
elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay GuadalupeViejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative
district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the
1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said
case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of
the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be
denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In
the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring
a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation.
To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly
mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should
be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

G.R. No. L-28113

March 28, 1969

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO

BALINDONG, petitioners,
vs.
PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN
MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG
ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR LAO. respondents.

L. Amores and R. Gonzales for petitioners.

Jose W. Diokno for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents
are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan
was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15,
1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and
sitios 1 of the latter municipality.
The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to
restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their
respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 3
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1)
that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by
vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power
to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it
gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against
section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over
local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In
short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment."
On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition,
nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this
case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan
is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before
this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed,
and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five
years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto
corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired

into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.
It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and
that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government.
4 But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation
is at least a de facto corporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de
facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or
directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests ate affected
thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by
their conduct from doing so. 6
And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto
corporation. As earlier stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was organized
before the promulgation of this Court's decision in Pelaez. 7
Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of
validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute
is subsequently declared unconstitutional.lawphi1.et
This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States.
Thus, some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter
creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de facto corporation where there
can be no de jure one, 8 while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is
binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional. 9
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the
absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases
holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can
exist under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the
invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other valid acts or in the
constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created....
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where
there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least
an authority in potentia by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative
propositions that there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute that
plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de
facto municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply
the imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a
mere usurper....
As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which
seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation
may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time
by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation
can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by
the general laws or constitution of the state.

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially,
such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity
of which is apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de
jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.10
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite
the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be
made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was
organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make
it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in
question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed,
in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 11 this Court granted a similar petition for
prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo
on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in
1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had
acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de facto municipal corporation did not
arise in that case.
In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an
invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done
by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity
because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact
which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank: 13
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three
(33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and
avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to
the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders because the latter have taken away from the former
the barrios composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were
allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created
if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act
of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality
or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be
created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of
the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority
to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot
be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and
no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been
brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed
executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate
any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required,
merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
(Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be
divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice
of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict
the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts
so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby
affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular
Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims,
has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and
prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing

and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order
to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake
of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to
carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is
"strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2,
1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn,
May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it
(Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential,
to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of
the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only
the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes
more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act
No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the
public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated
therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1
of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be
transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned,
even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section
68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil.
726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare"
and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues
involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no
binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and
streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular
Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers
related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially
and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question
"(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether
incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a
question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033,
1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of
legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine
whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs.
Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and
frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the
same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute
(In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to
declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon
petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to
be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or
authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be
incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on
certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof,
insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition
"ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will
be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the
proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or
not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and
whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board
shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same
(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).

Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is

concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite
relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3
of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to
approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial
associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not
designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will
not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said
Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims
of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of
that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for
the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We
think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is
"virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative
power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads
to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68
were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public
welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the
powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of
the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the
legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to
pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him
to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act
Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal
council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed

thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an
ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had
it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or
to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a
new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater
than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President
less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite,
by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has
over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a)
that "not all the proper parties" referring to the officers of the newly created
municipalities "have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is
premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties
do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or
elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on
behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official
investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661,
Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said
local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government.
Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on
any of the executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in
connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to
judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders
creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual
operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures

incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General
Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent
would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in
the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.