Whereto Transhumanism?

: The Literature Reaches a Critical Mass

Author(s): Nicholas Agar
Source: The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2007), pp. 12-17
Published by: The Hastings Center
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4625740
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ESSAYS

When last I checked the Web site of the WorldTranWhereto

shumanistAssociation,an organizationformed to agitate
for transhumanism,I learnedthat it had a global membershipof 3,744. But transhumanistsare not the philoTranshumanism?
sophically marginalized, technology-obsessed Trekkies
that this number might suggest.Transhumanistthinkers
presenttheirview aboutwherewe should be headedwith
a keen awarenessof how we might get there.Their opponents, not they, tend to be the ones guilty of arguing
a
from caricaturesof the technologiesin question.
With the publication in the last few years of several
books on transhumanism,a decent transhumanistliterature has now been amassed.Those setting out this literature include the Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom,
who directsthe Futureof Humanity Institute at Oxford
BY NICHOLAS AGAR
Universityand maintainsthe influential"Transhumanist
FAQ";James Hughes, executive director of the World
TranshumanistAssociation,whose syndicatedtalk show
Radioputs the case for transhumanismon a
ranshumanism
is, accordingto its proselytizers, Changesurfer
movement
that
afthe "intellectualand cultural
weekly basis; Gregory Stock, author of the book Refirms the possibility and desirabilityof fundadesigningHumans,which saw him pitted in public fora
againstFrancisFukuyama(whose book, Our Posthuman
mentally improving the human condition through apFuture,also published in 2002, warned of the threat to
plied reason,especiallyby developingand makingwidely
humans and human nature from the new genetic techavailabletechnologies to eliminate aging and to greatly
enhance human intellectual,physical,and psychological
nologies); the science journalistRonald Bailey,who arforward
to
descendents
look
Transhumanists
gues for a libertariantake on posthumanizingtechnolocapacities."'
who are posthumans,"futurebeings whose basic capacigies; and Simon Young,who combines advocacyof transhumanismwith composing and playingthe piano.4
ties so radicallyexceed those of presenthumans as to be
Intellectual movements are often given unity by a
no longer unambiguouslyhuman by our current stansharedsenseof who the enemy is. Transhumanistsdeclare
dards."2These posthumans may be "resistantto disease
their most implacablefoes to be a group of thinkersthey
and impervious to aging," have "unlimitedyouth and
call "bioconservatives"or, more insultingly, "bio-Ludas
far
above
"reach
intellectual
and
any
heights
vigor,"
dites." Prominentamong the bioconservativesare Leon
are
above
other
as
humans
human
current
prigenius
for
have
"increasedcapacity pleasure,
mates."They may
Kass, Francis Fukuyama, Bill McKibben, and Jeremy
love, artisticappreciation,and serenity"and "experience
Although there are differences between them,
Rifldkin.
these thinkerssharea desireto keep us and our near denovel states of consciousnessthat currenthuman brains
scendents human, even if this means keeping us and
cannot access."3Posthumansmay go so far as to escape
them dumb, diseased,and short-lived.They identify the
the limitations of physicality by uploading themselves
onto computers.
technologiesthat enthuse transhumanistsas distinctively
threateningto our humanity.

The

Literature

Critical

Reaches

Mass

The LiteratureReachesa CritiNicholasAgar,"WheretoTranshumanism?

cal Mass,"HastingsCenterReport37, no. 3 (2007): 12-17.
12

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

May-June2007

Human and Posthuman

us that posthumansare "no

The TranshumanistFAQtells
our current stanhuman

by
longer unambiguously
dards."5This leads to the questionsof what our currentstandardsfor humanity are and whether they should be trusted.
One of history'slessonsis that seemingdifferentdoes not suffice to make someone nonhuman.Europe'sage of exploration
led to many encounters between humans who struck each
other as so strangeas to belong to differentspecies. If we are
to avoid mistakeslike these, we need definitionsof humanity
and posthumanitythat look deeperthan appearances.
Francis Fukuyama thinks
that we should acknowledge
genes as markingthe boundaries
of humanity. He says "every
member of the human species
possesses a genetic endowment
that allows him or her to become a whole human being, an
endowment that distinguishesa
human in essence from other
types of creatures."'The idea
that one is human by virtue of
possessing a genome that gives
rise to traits typical of humans
may correctly classify posthumanizing technologies that
work by modifyinggenes. But it
seems to misclassifyposthumanizing technologies that work
without modifying genes. A descendant of ours modified with
multiple cybernetic implants,
after the fashion of the Borg
from Star Trek:The Next Generation,may be posthuman at
the same time as being geneticallyindistinguishablefrom humans.
Lee Silverimaginesa futurein which geneticallyenhanced
GenRich people become so differentfrom unenhancedNaturalsthat interbreedingis no longerpossible.7I suspectthat the
idea of reproductiveisolation may be a more promisingdefinitional starting point than the possession of a human
genome. Accordingto the biologicalspeciesconcept, a species
is a collection of individualsthat interbreedor are capableof
doing so and do not breedwith individualsbelonging to differentbiologicalgroups.Posthumanitywill have arrivedwhen
we have beings whose enhancementsisolate them reproductively from humans. Breedingbetween posthumansand humans may be physiologicallyimpossiblebecauseof genetic or
cyberneticalterations.Or it might simply be the case that we
find each other so profoundlyrepellentthat interbreedingis
mutually unthinkable. We can imagine that this repulsion
could be much more profound than that resultingfrom the
racistthinkingto which humansseem susceptible,creatingre-

productivebarriersthat are more enduringthan those racism

occasionallycreates.
This account of posthumanitymay be vulnerableto counterexamples,but it should at least serve as a working definition. Scientistsoften begin investigationsof unfamiliarphenomena equippedwith definitionsthat they expectto modify
as they find out more. Although a more complete understanding of the posthuman condition may lead to an improved definition, the idea of beings reproductivelyisolated
from humans by their enhancementsshould serve to get debate underway.
Evolutionary Humanism

Youngclaimsto find
Simon
support for transhumanism

Transhumanists
are not

from evolutionarytheory,8and
he goes on to suggest that another term for transhumanism
is "evolutionary humanism."
Young'sintuition appearsto be
that since evolution is taking
humans toward posthumanity
anyway,it can'thurt to give it a
push. For him, evolution is essentiallya processof "complexification." He says that as conscious products of the evolutionary process,we humans are
imbued with a "Will to
Evolve."9It is the Will to Evolve
that gives rise to a moral imperative to become posthuman.
Young chides bioconservatives
for wanting to leave humanity
"astatic speciesgoing nowherefast-forever."''
Attempts to extract moral claims from the evolutionary
process are risky, and these risks grow when dealing with
somewhatpoetical interpretationsof the evolutionaryprocess
such as Young's.Accordingto a more prosaicdefinition, evolution is simply change in gene frequencies.While they do
hope to ban certainways of controllingthe human gene pool,
bioconservativescertainlydo not seek keep the human gene
pool entirely static. A global ban on posthumanizingtechnologies would leave our species subject to the same evolutionarypressuresfor changeas always.
Evidenceof the dangerof drawingmoralconclusionsfrom
evolutionarypremisescomes from the fact that, while Young's
poetical interpretationof evolution presentsposthumanityas
its goal, one could just as easily look at the evolutionary
processand extracta bioconservativemoral.Although change
is essentialto the evolutionaryprocess,it is, paradoxically,antitheticalto evolutionarysuccess.A speciesfails in evolutionary terms by going extinct. One way to go extinct is to have
no descendents.But anotherway to go extinct is to have descendentsthat areso differentas to count as differentspecies.

marginalized,technologyobsessedTrekkies.
They
presenttheirview about

wherewe shouldbe headed

with a keenawarenessof

how we mightget there.

May-June2007

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

13

For example, the dinosaur species Archaeopteryxis undeniably extinct even though birds,which might be descendeddirectly from Archaeopteryx,are found on every continent.
Youngworriesthat humanitymay be headednowhere.But by
protectingus from the technologies of genetic modification,
bioconservativesmay be interpretedas strivingto protecthumanity againstevolutionaryfailure.I imagine that most bioconservativeswill find this evolutionaryparsingof their position unfamiliar-indeed, those whose bioconservatism is
basedon religiouspremisesarelikelyto rejectit outright-but
it does suggest that facts about evolution support no view
about the moral advisabilityof posthumanity.
Procreative Liberty and Transhumanism
much debated notion of procreativelibertymay offer
The
a less
fanciful route to

posthumanity.
philosophically
Transhumanistsare foremost among those arguing that parents should be free to use genetic technologies to enhance
their children'scharacteristics.GregoryStockproposesthat we
view the technologiesthat will enable the selectionof modification of our genetic constitutions as germinal choicetechnologies." Ronald Bailey indicates his liberalleanings in his
selection of the title LiberationBiologyfor his defenseof transhumanism.12His form of liberalismis of the libertarianvariety. He combines defenses of individual choice regarding
posthumanizingtechnologieswith skepticismabout a role for
the state.JamesHughes'sfusion of transhumanismwith social
democracy differs; he emphasizes individual freedom but
wants to allow the state to correctinequalitiesin accessand to
discourage individuals from making bad choices.13 Despite
their differences,these writersare unified by a confidencethat
the choiceslicensedby procreativelibertywill eventuallymake
us posthuman.They predictthat parentsfreeto enhancetheir
children'sintellects, physicalconstitutions,and life expectancies will choose to do so.
But the connection betweenposthumanityand procreative
libertyis less obvious than transhumaniststend to assume.For
example, transhumanists present IVF as a forerunner of
posthumanizingtechnologies.'4But there is a differencebetween a technology that gives children to people suffering
from infertility and technologies of genetic enhancement.
imply a
Being free to have childrendoes not straightforwardly
to
in
that
freedom to change them ways
happen pleaseyou.
Although John Robertson, the most prominent advocate of
procreative liberty, does defend genetic enhancement, he
thinks that it should be recognizedas an extensionof procreative libertyratherthan among the core interestsprotectedby
it.15
Advocates of enhancement as a procreativeliberty and
transhumanistshave a common foe. Bioconservativesdisplay
the same hostility towardthe suggestionthat prospectiveparents should be free to enhance their childrenthat they do toward transhumanism.One reasonfor this opposition is that
they, like transhumanists,think that a freedom to enhance
But there is actunecessarilytakes us towardposthumanity.16
14

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

ally a significantgap between the two views. Classicalliberals

do not presentthemselvesas marketingany particularview of
human excellence.Ratherthey defend institutions that allow
individualsto make their own choices about how to live. Liberal pluralism about the good life carriesover to decisions
about what to view as an enhancement.The many different
views about which is the best life lead to equallymany views
about what modificationsto children'sDNA actuallyenhance
them. Liberalsaskonly that our choicesbe consistentwith our
children'swell-being.17
Transhumanistsdifferfrom liberalsin havingdefiniteviews
about the kinds of procreativechoices that prospectiveparents
should be making-they should be taking the first steps toward posthumanity,choosing, if possible, to have children
who are much smarter,healthier,and longer-livedthan ordinary humans. While liberals would protect the choices of
prospectiveparentswith posthumanvalues,they also want to
protect the choices of parentswho lack such values. It is not
hard to think of choices that would excite transhumanistsat
the same time as being widely rejectedby parentsallowed to
altertheirchildren'sgenomes.There seemsa big difference,for
example,betweengeneticallyalteringJohnny so that he is ten
IQ points smarterthan he would otherwise be, and making
him smarterthan his parentsto the same extent that they are
smarterthan primates.The prospectof being viewed by one's
child as permanently in the "da-da"stage of development
would be a prettyterrifyingprospectto many mums and dads.
Transhumanistsmay accept that some people may appeal
to procreativeliberty to justify rejectingposthuman options.
Transhumanistsmerely want to defend their own right to
make posthuman procreativechoices. Furthermore,they do
not envisagethe arrivalof posthumanitywithin one generation. Rather,they see its arrivalas more gradual.Successive
generationswill enhancetheir offspringin ways that arecompatiblewith a healthy relationshipbetween parentand child,
taking us to posthumanityperhapsover the course of a few
centuries. But it is unclear whether liberalswould countenance even this more gradualapproach.Those who defend
enhancementas procreativeliberty think that it establishesa
presumptionin favorof permittingenhancementthat may,on
occasion, be overturnedby conflicting moral considerations.
The idea that procreativeliberty can be overriddendoes not
set it apartfrom other liberties.For example, the freedom of
speech permits one to advocateone's politicalviews. But the
harms that resultfrom racialvilificationsuffice to cancel the
presumptionin favorof this freedomeven if the only way you
can presentyour politicalviews is by engagingin racialvilification.
One much-discussedpossible harm is an exacerbationof
social inequalities.Opponents of enhancement predict war,
slavery,and genocide as humans face off againsttheir genetic
superiors.iiIf the harms resultingfrom racialvilificationsuffice to cancela presumptionin favorof the freedomof speech,
it is easy to imagine that a significantrisk of war, slavery,and
genocide might override-or at least significantlyrestrictthe presumptionin favor of a freedom to enhance. Hughes'
May-June2007

democratictranshumanismprovidesa partialresponseto this

concern. He would subsidizeaccess to posthumanizingtechnologies for people who could not otherwiseaffordthem. But
liberalsshould not be concerned only with problems of unequal access.Many people will reject the technologiesof enhancementeven if they have accessto them. Religiousfundamentalistshave a vision of the good life that excludesgenetic
enhancement.If they act on thatvision, they will exercisetheir
procreativelibertyby rejectingeveryopportunityto genetically enhance their offspring. Defenders of procreativeliberty
will defend the right of each successivegenerationof religious
fundamentaliststo make this choice.
Suppose that the freedom to
enhancewill createlargeinequalities. Nick Bostrom and Ronald
Bailey find strife and genocide
unlikely results. Bostrom expressesconfidence in the power
of the laws and institutions of
modern societiesto preventslavery and slaughter.19Presumably,
this confidence carries over to
the laws and institutionsof postmodern societies.Baileyfinds reassurancein the global spreadof
liberalinstitutionsthat he thinks
will prevent posthumans from
victimizing genetically inferior
humans, just as they prevent
technologicallysuperiorhumans
from exploiting technologically
inferiorones.20One could question Bailey'sfaith in the powerof
liberal institutions to protect
technologically inferior people.
But even if this is conceded, there are reasonsto doubt that
liberalinstitutionswill preventgrim outcomes.
If bioconservativesare right, then liberal democracyitself
may be under threat. Fukuyamamakes the point that liberal
social arrangementsare founded on a rough empiricalequality of citizens.21Peopleof varyinggifts acknowledgeeach other
as citizens because they understand that relations between
them aremutuallybeneficial.On one view, our mutual recognition as citizens depends on our mutual recognition as potential contributors.We can imagine that supremelyintelligent posthumans may see no value in liberal social arrangements that include those whose ancestorshave rejectedthe
path of genetic enhancement. Humans won't be acknowledged as citizensbecausethey will be viewed as havinglittle to
offer.If we arefortunate,posthumansmay accordus the same
moral status that we should grant chimpanzees-a statusthat
fallswell short of citizenship.

Posthuman Values as Human Values

to avoidthis

of

way
possiblefragmentation society
Onewould
be to find something to say to those who insist
that theirconception of the good life is not transhuman.Nick
Bostrom thinks that the values of bioconservativesmay turn
out to be posthuman without their being awareof it. They
may just be ignorant of their desire to genetically enhance
their children.
Bostrom explainsthat "oureverydayintuitions about values are constrainedby the narrownessof our experienceand
the limitationsof our powersof imagination,"continuingthat
"someof our ideals may well be
located outside the space of
modes of being that are accessible to us with our current bioTo show
logical constitution."22
how our valuesmight be covertly posthuman,he enlistsa dispositional theory of value, according to which "something is a
value for you if and only if you
would want it if you were perfectly acquainted with it and
you were thinking and deliberating as clearlyas possibleabout
it."23 The dispositional theory
allows for adjustments of our
valuesin responseto blind spots
in our knowledge. Consider a
music lover who has never listened to Bach'sB-minor Mass.
The Mass may be among his
musicalvaluesif it were the case
that he would enjoy it were he
to be acquaintedwith it. The dispositionalaccount enables
Bostrom to say that posthumanvaluesthat seem beyond our
comprehensionmay neverthelessfall within the ambit of our
currentdispositions.Not even GarryKasparovcould graspthe
basicprinciplesof eight-dimensionalchess,but presumablyhe
would enjoy it werehe fully acquaintedwith it. The samemay
be true for moderatelygifted chess players.If we were to be
properlyacquaintedwith the hideously complex symphonies
produced by posthuman composers, we would find them
beautiful ratherthan unintelligiblerackets.Posthumansymphonies are, therefore,among our musical values. It seems
only rightthat we should seek to modify ourselvesand our descendentsso as to betterappreciatethese things that we value.
But there is something a bit odd about Bostrom'sexpansion of our values.The dispositionaltheory helps us to accept
some things with which we may be unfamiliaras values. But
it also instructs us to reject some of the values that we currentlycreditourselveswith. For example,you may pronounce
yourself a fan of Wagner'sRing Cycle after listening to the
couple of minutes of "Ride of the Valkyries"featuredin the
movie Apocalypse
Now. Yetif exposureto the full fifteen hours

Despiteprotestationsto the
contrary,transhumanists
takepride in achievements
that are meaningless
except

to humanityby reference
suchas writingfine books

defendingtranshumanism.

May-June2007

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

15

would cause you to withdraw your endorsement, then the

Cycle does not belong among your musicalvalueseven if you
think it does. The dispositionaltheory'spropensityto subtract
valuesas well as adding them leads to some awkwardnessfor
Bostrom'sproposed posthumanizing of our values. I find
Bach'sB-minor Mass to be a beautifulpiece of music. But we
can imagine that posthuman appreciatorsof music may find
it trite and so not value it at all. Or perhapsthey will value it,
but only as an inoffensivewee ditty.Both posthumanviews of
the Mass are fine; requiringus to echo them seemswrong.
Bostrom'sapproachmay also lead to some puzzling additions to our values. Our intellectualshortcomingsare not the
only reason we fail to be fully
acquainted with things we
might value. The olfactory capacities of dogs make them
aware of things in slightly off
meat that elude us. Perhapsour
indifferenceto slightly off meat
is just an artifactof our olfactory narrowness. Consider
posthumans whose olfactory
enhancement makes them
awareof all the things that dogs
detect in off meat. They might
deriveas much enjoymentfrom
the smell of off meat as dogs do.
If we are permittedto resistthe
argumentthat the olfactorysuperiority of dogs means we
should acceptsome of their values as our own, then there
seems no reasonwe should have
to admit the kinds of valuesthat
the superiorintellects or senses
of posthumanspermit them to
entertain.

ple, places,and traditions.The placesthey occupy in our lives

insulate them againstcertain kinds of optimizing reasoning:
You wouldn'tswap your child for another child, even if that
child were manifestlysmarterand betterat sport.Yourattachment to your life partnersurvivesthe recognition that Brad
Pitt or AngelinaJolie might have objectivelygreaterappeal.
You continue to supportyour football team even though you
know it is one of the weakest in the league. It seems to me
that much of the value we place on our own humanity is
local. I value humanity becauseI'm human. I wouldn'ttrade
my humanityfor posthumanityeven though I recognizethat
posthumans are objectivelysuperior.Its being a local value
means that I do not expect the
value that I place on humanity
to be accessibleto posthumans,
just as, pace Bostrom, posthuman values aren't available to
me.
What is it about the local
value of being human that is so
compelling?There seems to me
to be something right about the
bioconservativesuggestion that
our lives are given meaning by
the struggleagainsthuman limitations. For example,there is no
objective property of the universe that instructsus to find it
remarkable that someone can
run one hundred meters in ten
seconds flat. Running one hundred metersin ten seconds is remarkableonly in a human-relative sense: we recognize it as
close to the limit of what is possible for humans. Our admiration for the top sprinters survives the recognition that cheetahs and posthuman athletes
could cover the distancemuch more quickly.The local value
of humanityinformsour relationshipswith others.We choose
to have other humans as our life partnersbecause,in part,we
want our strugglesto make sense to them. We also choose to
have humans as children because, in part, we want our
achievementsto be meaningfulto them.
Universalvaluesare compulsoryin a way that local values
are not. One cannot justifiablyignorethe moralworth of another human being. But one can lack a local value simply by
failing to stand in the requisiterelationshipto the thing that
is a candidatefor valuing.Transhumanistsmay concede that
humanity is a local value for some, but deny that it is for
them. They would point out that someone who lacksany regardfor their humanity is not making a mistakein the same
kind of way as someone who is unconcernedabout the effects
of his actions on morally considerablebeings. I suspect that
many avowed transhumanistsare actuallymotivated by the
local value of humanity, their protestationsto the contrary

Theuniversalvalueof

preventingand curing
diseaseis not inconsistent
with valuinghumanity.
Thereis nothingspookily

posthumanaboutsomeone
reachingold age without
succumbingto cancer.

Humanity as a Local Value

ostrom'sadviceto exploreourvaluesputsus on the right
B path, at any rate. But ratherthan leading us to discover
that we are all covertlytranshumanists,I suspect it may lead
us to better understandour connection with our humanity.
Some of our values are universal.When we identify them
as such we say that they arevaluesfor everyone.Good examples are core moral values. One's moral statusshould not depend on who is makingthe judgment.You area morallyconsiderablebeing irrespectiveof whetheryour spouse or a complete strangeris asking the question. Other values are local.
They depend on who is judging.The valueswe placeon family and friendsare to a largeextent local. A parentcan expect
that you recognizethe moral considerabilityof her child, but
she should not expect you to value him just as she does.
Local values are high on the list of those that contribute
meaning to our lives. We have attachmentsto particularpeo16

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

May-June2007

notwithstanding.Transhumaniststake pride in achievements

that are meaninglessexcept by referenceto humanity.I imagine that they take pleasurein writing fine books defending
transhumanismrather than feeling annoyance they weren't
able to aska time-travelingposthumanto give the subjecta far
superiortreatment.
Insistingthat its value is local helps us to avoid some unpleasant implications of valuing humanity. For example,
is a consequenceof
JamesHugheswarnsthat "human-racism"
bioconservatives'focus on humanity. He says that "humanracistswant to deny citizenship... to posthumans,intelligent
animalsand robots."24But we cannot forgetthat moralstatus
is a universal,ratherthan a local, value.It cannot be denied to
posthumans.
Mistakinguniversalfor local valuesmight explainthe awkwardnessof some bioconservativeclaims. Fukuyama'sdefense
of human natureallowshim to endorsethe use of biotechnology to treator preventdisease.However,havingsaid, "No one
can make a brief in favorof pain and suffering,"he proceeds
to do preciselythat, sayingthat many of "thehighestand most
admirablehuman qualities ... are often relatedto the way
that we reactto, confront,overcome,and frequentlysuccumb
to pain, suffering,and death."25
When it comes to terribledisa
between confronting and
there
seems
difference
eases,
big
overcoming,on the one hand, and confrontingand succumbing, on the other. It would be callous to retainpain and sufferingif we could eliminatethem so that the fortunateamong
us can overcomeand emergewith our charactersdeepened.
We can avoid makinga briefin favorof pain and suffering
by advocatingthe eliminationof horriblediseasesas a universal value.This means recognizingthat the dominant effect of
metastaticcanceris to thwarthuman flourishingratherthan
to deepen the charactersof onlookers and occasional survivors. The universalvalue of preventingand curing disease
does not seem to be inconsistentwith the local value of humanity.There doesn'tseem to be anything spookily posthuman about someone who makes it through to a ripe old age
without havingsuccumbedto cancer.
I cannot pretend to have coveredall of the ways in which
transhumanistscan make their case, for transhumanismis a
movement brimming with fresh ideas. Transhumanistssucceed in making the intuitive appealof posthumanityobvious
even if they don'tyet have the argumentsto compel everybody
else to accept theirvision.

For Bailey'sdefense,see R. Bailey,LiberationBiology:TheScientificand

Moral Casefor the BiotechRevolution(Amherst,Mass.: Prometheus
A TranBooks,2005), and for Youngsee S. Young,DesignerEvolution:
shumanistManifesto(Amherst,Mass.:PrometheusBooks,2006).
5. World TranshumanistAssociation, "TranshumanistFAQ,"
http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.
6. Fukuyama,OurPosthuman
Future,171.
and Cloning
7. L. Silver,RemakingEden:How GeneticEngineering
Will Transformthe AmericanFamily (New York:Harper Perennial,
1998), epilogue.
8. Young,DesignerEvolution.
9. Ibid., 182-84.
10. Ibid.,41.
11. Stock,Redesigning
Humans.
12. Bailey,Liberation
Biology.
MustRespond
Societies
13. J. Hughes,CitizenCyborg:
WhyDemocratic
Human of the Future(Cambridge,Mass.:Westview,
to the Redesigned
2004).
14. For example,Hughes,CitizenCyborg,Bailey,Liberation
Biology,
Humans.
Stock,Redesigning
15. J. Robertson,Childrenof Choice:Freedomand theNew Reproductive Technologies
(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1994).
16. Fukuyama,OurPosthuman
Future.
In Defenseof GeneticEnhancement
17. See N. Agar,LiberalEugenics:
(Oxford,U.K.: Blackwell,2004).
18. See G. Annas,L. Andrews,and R. Isasi,"Protectingthe EndangeredHuman:Towardan International
TreatyProhibitingCloningand
InheritableAlternations,"AmericanJournalof Law and Medicine28,
nos. 2/3 (2002): 151-78.
19. N. Bostrom,"In Defense of PosthumanDignity,"Bioethics19,
no. 3 (2005), 202-214.
20. Bailey,Liberation
Biology,171.
21. Fukuyama,OurPosthuman
Future.
22. N. Bostrom,"HumanGeneticEnhancements:
A Transhumanist
Journalof ValueInquiry37 (2003):493-506, at 495.
Perspective,"
23. Ibid.
24. Hughes,CitizenCyborg,
xv.
25. Fukuyama,OurPosthuman
Future,171.

1. World Transhumanist
Association,"Transhumanist
FAQ,"
accessed
http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/46/,
March27, 2007.
2. Ibid.,http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.
3. Ibid.,http:ll//www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.
4. Ibid.Followhttp:ll//www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA
for
theWebsiteof theWTA.Information
aboutHughes's
radioshowcan
be foundat http:l//ieet.org/index.php/IEET/csr.
Stock's
andFukuyama's
dissonant
canbefoundin G. Stock,Redesigning
takeson posthumanity
Humans:
OurInevitable
Genetic
Future(Boston,Mass.:HoughtonMifFuture:Consequences
flin, 2002) and E Fukuyama,OurPosthuman
ofthe

Revolution
StrausandGiroux,2002).
(NewYork:Farrar,
Biotechnology
May-June2007

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