PNB VS CA 83 SCRA 237

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

83 SCRA 237 [G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978]
Corporate Law: Liability for Torts
FACTS: Rita Tapnio owes PNB an amount of P2,000.00. The amount is secured by her sugar
crops about to be harvested including her export quota allocation worth 1,000 piculs. The
said export quota was later dealt by Tapnio to a certain Jacobo Tuazon at P2.50 per picul
or a total of P2,500. Since the subject of the deal is mortgaged with PNB, the latter has to
approve it. The branch manager of PNB recommended that the price should be at P2.80
per picul which was the prevailing minimum amount allowable. Tapnio and Tuazon agreed
to the said amount. And so the bank manager recommended the agreement to the vice
president of PNB. The vice president in turn recommended it to the board of directors of
PNB.
However, the Board of Directors wanted to raise the price to P3.00 per picul. This Tuazon
does not want hence he backed out from the agreement. This resulted to Tapnio not being
able to realize profit and at the same time rendered her unable to pay her P2,000.00 crop
loan which would have been covered by her agreement with Tuazon.
Eventually, Tapnio was sued by her other creditors and Tapnio filed a third party complaint
against PNB where she alleged that her failure to pay her debts was because of PNBs
negligence and unreasonableness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tapnio is correct.
HELD: Yes. In this type of transaction, time is of the essence considering that Tapnios sugar
quota for said year needs to be utilized as soon as possible otherwise her allotment may
be assigned to someone else, and if she cant use it, she wont be able to export her
crops. It is unreasonable for PNBs board of directors to disallow the agreement between
Tapnio and Tuazon because of the mere difference of 0.20 in the agreed price rate. What
makes it more unreasonable is the fact that the P2.80 was recommended both by the
bank manager and PNBs VP yet it was disapproved by the board. Further, the P2.80 per
picul rate is the minimum allowable rate pursuant to prevailing market trends that time.

This unreasonable stand reflects PNBs lack of the reasonable degree of care and
vigilance in attending to the matter. PNB is therefore negligent.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because
generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort
committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a
natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial
person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which it
expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural
person, a corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members
acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body.

PSI VS CA 513 SCRA 478

Professional Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
513 SCRA 478 [G.R. No. 126297 February 11, 2008]
Corporate Law: Liability for Torts
Facts: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of
medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the
sigmoid. On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City
Hospital performed an Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the
malignancy on her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of
certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband,
Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr.
Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation
and closed the incision after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as indicated by the
assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said it is a natural consequence of the
operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad and her
husband went to the US to seek further treatment and she was declared free from cancer.

A piece of gauze portruding from Natividads vagina was found by her daughter which was
then removed by hand by Dr. Ampil and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it
didnt. The pains intensified prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina a foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vagina. A recto-vaginal fistula had forced stool to excrete through
her vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Fuentes are liable for medical malpractice and the PSI for
damages due to the negligence of the said doctors.
Held: Yes. No. Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete
until the sponges are properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or
other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima
facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so
inconsistent with due care as to raise inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the elements are duty,
breach, injury, and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to
remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the
incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil
breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further
examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the
proximate cause of Natividads injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still
missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina established the causal
link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such
injury was his deliberate concealment of this missing gauzes from the knowledge of
Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:
1. Occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant;
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care, and;
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant
Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the Control and management of the thing which
caused the injury.
Under the Captain of the ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation.
The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.
The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the
members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable
effort to monitor and over see the treatment prescribed and administered by the physician
practicing in its premises.

Consolidated Bank VS CA
Consolidated Bank vs. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 138569 September 11, 2003]
Corporate Law: Corporate Negligence, Culpa Contractual
FACTS: Private respondent, L.C. Diaz instructed his employee, Calapre, to deposit in his
savings account in petitioner bank. Calapre left the passbook of L.C. Diaz to the teller of
the petitioner bank because it was taking time to accomplish the transaction and he had to
go to another bank. When he returned, the teller told him that somebody got it. The
following day, an impostor succeeded in withdrawing P300,000.00 by using said passbook
and a falsified withdrawal slip. Private respondent sued the bank for the amount withdrawn

by the impostor. The trial court dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed the decision
of the trial court and held the bank liable.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C.
Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the
Regional Trial Court. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and
dismissing the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable solely for the amount withdrawn by the impostor.
HELD: No. The bank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual. The
contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simple loan. Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising
from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. The bank
is liable to its depositor for breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence or
culpa contractual.
The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any
person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the
passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership
of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. This doctrine
is not applicable to the present case. The contributory negligence of the private
respondent or his last clear chance to avoid the loss would not exonerate the petitioner
from liability. However, it serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the private
respondent. Under Article 1172, the liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances. In this case, respondent L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory
negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of petitioner bank should be reduced.
In PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, the Supreme Court allocated the
damages between the depositor who is guilty of contributory negligence and the bank on
a 40-60 ratio. The same ruling was applied to this case. Petitioner bank must pay only
60% of the actual damages.