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Administrative Law defined

Administrative Law defined


The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and determines
competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual remedies for the
violations of his rights.
Effect of Marriage to Alien on Citizenship
Effect of Marriage. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.
Natural-born Citizen
Natural-born Citizen. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with the Constitution shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
The People of the Philippines
The following are the citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship, unless by the act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Territorial Subdivision
Territorial Subdivision of the Philippines. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Philippines are the autonomous regions, provinces, subprovinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.
National Territory
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Agency of the Government

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms
of local government.
Rationale for the enactment of the new Administrative Code; preambular clauses
of the law
Rationale for the enactment of the new Administrative Code; preambular clauses of the law
WHEREAS, the Administrative Code currently in force was first forged in 1917 when the
relationship between the people and the government was defined by the colonial order
then prevailing;
WHEREAS, efforts to achieve an integrative and over-all recodification of its provisions
resulted in the Administrative Code of 1978 which, however, was never published and later
expressly repealed;
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative
Code which incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles and rules of governance; and
WHEREAS, a new Administrative Code will be of optimum benefit to the people and
Government officers and employees as it embodies changes in administrative structures
and procedures designed to serve the people;
Tecson vs. Comelec
Facts: Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by
claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail
the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the
basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a
Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme
Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in
1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in
1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage
had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
BENGSON
vs.
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

HRET

and

CRUZ

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An
Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET

rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: YES. Petition dismissed.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

TABASA VS CA
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father
became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th
Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport
has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges
against
him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with

the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or
detained
by
the
BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore,
is
not
an
undocumented
alien
subject
to
deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only
person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her
Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor
children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied
in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The
privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing
of the petition for repatriation.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
G.R.

No.

135083,

26

May

1999

[Dual

Citizenship;

Dual

Allegiance]

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the
ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the
United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano
for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with
dual
citizenship
are
disqualified
from
running
any
public
position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the
local
position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship
per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts: In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and private
schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic
pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and
her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove
from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the
students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily
flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made
by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their
conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan
Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the list in the
school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who
opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to
be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did
not answer to their letter.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they
do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools
violates right receive free education.
Held: The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV).
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right
to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose
a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag
and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark
period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby
annulled and set aside.

LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA


FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza over a parcel of land
containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and
Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters
for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil
Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts of
lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same parcel of land,
with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502 square meters,
in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000 square meters.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it appears that
defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of time that
overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE,
leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for
durations of time that also overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the
reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity, these
defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground
that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled
by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only
valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is
concerned.
Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never
been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff
and defendant CAA which should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado
was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed
by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the
consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the
Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.
After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has
therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28, 1966
because of the cancellation of Contract A;

3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still
valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the
Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract
pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager
has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and
Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however
denied.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for
Review on certiorari.
ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid
contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its
cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil
(CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of lease
between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
YES
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to
serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the
provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such
eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event,
such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and
conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the
Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract
B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was
made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that
the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain
that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the
President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director of CCA who could validly cancel the
contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the

Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of
the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or
cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract A
which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the
implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer
necessary if not redundant
NOTES:
1. It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was effective, a
subsequent billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in effect waived or
nullified the rescission of Contract A.
The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed it
transpired, after the cancellation of Contract A is obviously an error. However, this Court
has already ruled that the mistakes of government personnel should not affect public
interest.
2. Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract A, claiming that Contract B
was a mere sublease to Mobil Oil and requires no prior consent of CAA to perfect the same.
Citing Article 1650 of the Civil Code, they assert that the prohibition to sublease must be
expressed and cannot be merely implied or inferred.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non- necessity for a
prior consent interprets the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Contract A to refer to an
assignment of lease under Article 1649 of the Civil Code and not to a mere sublease. A
careful scrutiny of said paragraph of Contract A clearly shows that it speaks of transfer of
rights of Rosario Leveriza to the leased premises and not to assignment of the lease.
2. Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to Contract A that
Mobil Oil would be the owner of the gasoline station it would construct on the leased
premises during the period of the lease, hence, it is understood that it must be given a
right to use and occupy the lot in question in the form of a sub-lease.
In Contract A, it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner) who will manage
and operate the gasoline station. The fact that Mobil Oil was mentioned in that contract
was clearly not intended to give approval to a sublease between petitioners and said
company but rather to insure that in the arrangements to be made between them, it must
be understood that after the expiration of the lease contract, whatever improvements have
been constructed in the leased premises shall be relinquished to CAA. Thus, this Court held
that the primary and elementary rule of construction of documents is that when the words
or language thereof is clear and plain or readily understandable by any ordinary reader
thereof, there is absolutely no room for interpretation or construction anymore.
3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA
cannot execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease
over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, citing the Revised
Administrative Code, which provide that Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code,
such contract of lease must be executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.


On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the
authority to lease real property belonging to the RP under its administration even without
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is
expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which
reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general control and
supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the
following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International
Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties as: (b) to enter into, make and
execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or
entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways,
and easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus
acquired and any other real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold
without the approval of the President of the Philippines.
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act
776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of the lease in Contract
C is real property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into
Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or
contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity
duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by
law expressly vested in it, which in this case is RA 776.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director)
of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the
RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and
discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any
personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary.
(The exception, however, is the sale of properties acquired by CAA or any other real
properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of the Philippines.)
The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other
transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the Director
of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications in the execution of Contract C.
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction
mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject,
and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions
are not applicable; that specific statute prevails over a general; and that where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
specially should prevail.