ensures the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession.

The
constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on the constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. As the
practice of law is a privilege vested with public interest, it can best
discharge its public responsibilities through collective action.
Collective action can only be done through an organized body. To
compel a lawyer to be a member of an Integrated Bar does not
violate his constitutional freedom to associate because integration
does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. Integration only provides an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member. Also, an Integrated
Bar serves to elevate the educational and ethical standards of the Bar
with the goal of improving the quality of th e States legitimate
interest. Even assuming that a lawyer is compelled to join the
Integrated Bar, it is still a justified compulsion as it is an exercise of
the police power of the State in regulating and controlling the legal
profession. Also, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate
the Bar includes the authority to integrate it.

LEGPROF CASE LIST III

THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(CANONS 7-9)
IN RE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR
FACTS:
In 1970, the Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration (CBI) to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar. In 1971, the Congress passed HB 3277 (An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor).
President Marcos signed it and it became RA 6397. In 1972, the CBI
submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation to ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The Report, alongside the
proceedings in Administrative Case 526 and the views and
sentiments of the Board of Consultants and the Philippine Bench and
Bar, prayed for such integration.

NOTE:
This case falls under Canon 7 but this Canon is not explicitly provided
for in the case. However, the relation can be seen. Canon 7 provides
that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. In
using the word shall, this Canon makes it mandatory for all
lawyers to: (1) uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and (2) support the activities of the Integrated Bar. In being a member
of the Integrated Bar, a lawyer has certain responsibilities, which, if
complied with, will uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. Therefore, it is neither unlawful to have a Bar Integration
nor be a member of an Integrated Bar.

ISSUE/S:
WON the integration of the Bar is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The integration of the Bar is constitutional.
RATIO:
The CBI Report defines the Bar Integration as the official unification
of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines, requiring
membership and financial support of every lawyer as sine qua non to
the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys. It is based on the recognition that a lawyer is an officer of
the court. It improves the position of the Bar as an instrument of
justice and rule of law. It fosters cohesion among lawyers and
1

by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Atty.

Nisce, on the one hand, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel
for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. Atty. Nisce's
bill amounted to P216,127.74. In violation of the prohibition against
"campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government,
Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor
and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his
office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza
with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to
Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity. Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that
she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who
promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of
ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues
of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the
member for whom payment is made.

IN THE MATTER OF INQUIRY INTO THE 1989

ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On June 3, 1989, the IBP held its election however, the winning
candidates were not allowed to take their oath of office on July 4,
1989 due to some reports received by some members of the Court
from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings
and the adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by
the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president
of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the
officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting,
all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit
such activities. The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the votes of
delegates as early as April 1989. Atty. Nisce admitted that he went
around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting
their votes, and securing their written endorsements. The records of
the Philippine National Bank show that Sec. Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr. Of the DENR borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank
for his Bicol Cabinet Officers for Regional Development Assistant,
ndersecretary Antonio Tria. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and
Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP
national officers on June 3, 1989. Atty. Nisce admitted having bought
plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned
Oscar Badelles, a voting delegate, to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets from Iligan City to Manila and back. Atty. Paculdo alleged that
he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn,
which served as his headquarters, to be occupied by his staff and the
IBP delegates. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills. The delegates
and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza
Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked
40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. The total sum of P316,411.53 was
paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed

ISSUE/S
WON the candidates violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through their in campaigning for the election.
HELD
Yes. The three candidates employed means that are contrary to the
IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the said By-Laws.
RATIO
The setting up of campaign headquarters by Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo in five-star hotels; the better for them to corral and entertain
the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of
the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of
Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the
formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other
elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or
Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of
nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of
2

1. Deceit Atty. Cristal-Tenorio has been falsely representing

herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio, who has a prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious
means, Atty. Cristal-Tenorio and Felicisimo Tenorio were able to
obtain a false marriage contract, which states that they were
married on Feb. 10, 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil
Registry of Manila and the NSO proved that no record of marriage
exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between
the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children. But in
the birth certificates of their other two children, another date and
place of marriage are indicated (Bukidnon and Feb. 12,1980).

rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the

presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some
members of her ticket; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost
him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls
and lawyers to distribute their campaign materials on the convention
floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of
labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates in exchange for their support; the
pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop"
from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these
practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the
whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants
in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the
ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and
the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes"
and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code
of Professional Responsibility).

2. Grossly Immoral Conduct Atty. Cristal-Tenorio caused the

dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati
City Councilor Divina Jacome. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio would openly and
sarcastically declare to her employees the alleged immorality of
Councilor Jacome.
3. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
(1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband,
who is NOT a member of the Phil. Bar (CANON 9);
(2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit,
which led to the filing of an estafa case against her;

CAMBALIZA V. CRISTAL--TENORIO

(3) threatened Cambaliza with the statement Isang Bala Ka

Lang to deter her from divulging her illegal activities.

DOCTRINES:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Cristal-Tenorio DENIED all allegations against her. She said she
was legally married. She did not disseminate the libelous affidavit. On
the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of
said document. Additionally, the estafa case has been dropped and
that she did not say the Isang Bala ka Lang statement. Atty. Cristal
Tenorio said that the case was filed by Cambaliza to get even with
her. She terminated Cambalizas employment after receiving
numerous complaints about extortion with the promise of processing
their passports and marriages to foreigners. Likewise, this disbarment
complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire
the Cambaliza should they initiate this complaint, which they did and
for which they were re-hired.

FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment was filed with the IBP. Ana Cambaliza,
a former employee of Atty. Ana Cristal- Tenorio in her law office,
charged Atty. Cristal-Tenorio with deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
Grounds:
3

2. The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card

of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by Atty. CristalTenorio as Chairperson

In addition, Atty. Cristal-Tenorios law office is registered with the

Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship.
Hence, she has no partners in her law office. (CANON 9)

3. Order by the MTC in a criminal case wherein Felicisimo R.

Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even
moved for the provisional dismissal of the case IBP
recommended that Atty. Cristal-Tenorio be reprimanded.
IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty from
reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for 6
months.

In Cambalizas reply, she submitted

(1) the letterhead of Cristal Tenorio Law Office where the
name of Felicisimo Tanorio is listed as senior partner.
(2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group I.D. signed by Atty.
Cristal-Tenorio as Chairperson where her husband is
identified as Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio. Her husband even
appeared in court hearings. (CANON 9)

ISSUES:
Upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of
Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, Atty. CristalTenorio admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer,
but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a
lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. CANON 9)

1. W/N IBP should have acted on the disbarment case

notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint by Cambaliza
2. W/N Atty. Cristal-Tenorio should be suspended
HELD/RATIO:

In addition, declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on

12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that
their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late
registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General marriage were merely an oversight.

1. YES.
The IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by Cambaliza. SC quoted from another case:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be

Cambaliza filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after realizing

that this disbarment case arose out of a misunderstanding and
misappreciation of facts. She is NO LONGER INTERESTED in
pursuing this case. IBP did not act on this Motion. (IMPORTANT)
Report of the IBP: IBP found Atty. Cristal-Tenorio guilty of the
charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicismo
Tenorio, in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence:
1. The letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner
4

policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited

to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained.
Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit
his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.

suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant

or his withdrawal of the charges.
2. YES (IMPORTANT PART)
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation
as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of
that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court
in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a
law office for the general practice of law. Such acts constitute
unauthorized practice of law.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF

LAW BY BENJAMIN DACANAY
FACTS:
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical
help. In order for him to take advantage of Canadas free medical aid
program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225
of the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the
same year, he returned to the Philippines and he now intends to
resume his practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he

holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein,
abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.

ISSUE:

Atty. Cristal-Tenorio admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio

Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan,
and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the
first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. That is a blatant
misrepresentation.

Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of

law.
HELD:
YES. Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so
delicately affected with public interest that is both a power and duty of

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
5

the state to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.

b) the payment of professional tax;

Any breach by a lawyer of any of the conditions makes him unworthy

of the trust and confidence which the courts and client repose in him
for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The rules of court
mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty one years of age, of good moral Character
and a resident of the Philippines.

c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory

continuing legal education; this is especially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

The constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and consequently the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. The practice of law is a privileged denied to
foreigners.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a

member of the Philippine bar.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of

naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
acquired pursuant to RA9225. This is because all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine
bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. He must first
secure from the court the authority to do so.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his
practice of law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can
resume his practice of law, to wit:
a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
6

xxx xxx xxx

AC NO. 2033: E. CONRAD AND VIRGINIA BEWLY

GEESLIN V. ATTY. FELIPE NAVARRO

I wish to respectfully inform your good office that

I bought a few lots on installment basis from Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as
evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and
0519 and a "Contract of Sale".

AC NO. 2148: ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR.

AND ATTY. EULOGIO RODRIQUEZ V. ATTY.
FELIPE NAVARRO

Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative

of the said company claim that although there is
a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No.
1425 on the property being sold, the case is
almost won in their favor and are just waiting for
your final decision within a couple of months or
even less.

[CONSOLIDATED CASE: FULL TEXT]

PER CURIAM:
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas,
1
Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 and by spouses E.
2
Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross
misconduct.

In this connection, I am respectfully writing you

this letter in order to bring to your attention this
transaction and to protect my rights in the event
that any unfavorable circumstances may arise in
the future.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and
Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on
April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice
3
of law during the pendency of these cases.

xxx xxx xxx

Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution
dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter
to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of
sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of
attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution reads as
follows:

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of
February
14,
1975
and
September
13,
1976
in
G.R.
Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of
Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports
were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous
transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are
sustained by the evidence of record.

L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid

Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The
court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975
of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments
(copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro, counsel for respondents) and
RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to
inform him of the status of the cases at bar.

I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are
reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for
short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B.
Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975
which reads as follows:

It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C.

Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation
herein on installment basis to the public (among
them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue
of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No.

8321, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,

Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of
Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein
petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name and
that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf
that 'the case is almost won in their favor' (see
Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED
FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said
letter with its attachments to the Solicitor General
under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for
investigation of the existence of sufficient ground
to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66
Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for
suspension or removal from the office of attorney
and for appropriate action.

existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.

Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for appropriate
action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the
Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said letter and all
its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated
January 13, 1976 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest
activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has
previously been reported to the Supreme Court
as selling properties titled in the name of this
Company.

Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is

directed to communicate in the premises with
Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of
Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor,
Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who
under letter of June 10, 1974 on file in
Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to
make available documents in their possession
showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of
properties titled in the name of other persons,
involving a total selling price of P75 million and
down payments of almost P 0.6 million.

We have just secured a new "subdivision plan"

of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots he is now
selling to the public include those titled in the
names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente
Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty.
Navarro has thus expanded his activities despite
recent detention by the Military. As could be
seen from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to
be the owner of that huge property (actually titled
in the name of the Madrigals and this Company)
bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos
Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez
Avenue, comprising approximately of 260
hectares.

On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the

Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B.
Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the
circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated
January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The
letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same
was returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had
moved to another address.

As reported in our previous letters to the Court,

Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000
hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in
virtue of his handling the case of some squatters
on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal
owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. He contends that whereas his
squatters-clients occupy only about a hectare, he
has become, in virtue of his contract of legal
services' with them, the owner of thousands of
hectares of land as these are allegedly0 covered
by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell
these properties.

On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General

Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting
him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by
respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco
Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the

Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions,

for instance, cover properties already with
buildings and other improvements. He has
nevertheless been quite successful in selling
portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the
De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country
Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus
operandi is described in this Company's letter
complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero
Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for
ready reference.

the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it
emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of
eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31,
1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering
the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent
NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas
stated as follows:
After due consideration of the evidence adduced
by both parties, this Court finds that most of the
documentary evidence submitted by defendants
are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to
defendants claim of ownership over 10,000
hectares of land when the area of the property
subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700
square meters. This Court also believes that the
above-mentioned claims of defendants are
untenable.

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for

only after a brief lull he is now again openly
selling titled properties of other persons. We
have provided more than sufficient documentary
evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General
and we hope that formal administrative charges
can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him
from further perpetrating a large scale fraud
upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question

is evidenced by the issuance in her name, since
1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It
is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. After the
expiration of the one-year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which
it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case
of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558;
Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands,
50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis
Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957;
Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53
O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).

Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.

COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents,
most of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and
3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil
cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely
identified the various documentary exhibits presented by the
complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a
certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called
HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2
hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to
eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of
these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other
eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the
twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by
respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent
NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of

Defendants' claim that they became owners of

the land in question by adverse possession is
without merit considering that title to land
becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No.
496 provides that no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs.
Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered

cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and

notorious possession. Registered title under the
Torrens System cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is notice
to the World. All persons must take notice. No
one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda
vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court

is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail
the validity of said title in this proceeding, which
is for recovery of possession. Any attack on the
decree of registration of title must be direct and
not by collateral proceeding. The title which may
be issued in pursuance of said decree cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged or
diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda,
et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of
Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664,
May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing
the decision of the trial court where the
registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and
consequently was denied the right to constitute
his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by
the Court is untenable in the light of the theory
that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly
attacked. That issue can only be raised in an
action instituted expressly for that purpose".
(See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon.
Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347,
November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs.
Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).

Further,
defendants
recognized
plaintiffs
ownership over the property in question when
they filed a petition with the People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation wherein they sought the
latter's intervention for the acquisition of the
property and for the subdividing thereof into
small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In
said petition defendants not only named the
plaintiff as the owner of the property in question
but they also indicated therein her title to the
land as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of
the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote
hereunder the pertinent facts and data
concerning the property in question in
defendants' petition submitted to the General
Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the

Supreme Court, it is our opinion that there is no
need to discuss the merits of the reasons
claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null
and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos.
8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382,
8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).

1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong,

Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco,
Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law
Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro

decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent
NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the
complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:

4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic

copy): 15043

Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a

parcel of land containing an area of 12,000
square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna,
Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and
more particularly described in, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of

5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos.

12,700 square meters(Exh G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929

10

Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan

attached to the complaint as Annex A.

The Court has read copy of this decision of our

Branch XV and observed findings of facts too
ponderous to be ignored.

xxx xxx xxx

That case before Branch XV directly assails the
nullity of the proceedings leading to the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as
an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No.
1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as
well as the original certificates of title issued as
consequence thereof.

It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings

have been filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City
against several persons occupying other parcels
by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership,
where decisions have been rendered in favor of
said Partnership. In order to forestall executions
of these decisions defendants in said ejectment
cases filed class suit before this Court by the
occupants of the land which was heard and tried
before Branch XV in which the Director of Lands
was impleaded as a party-defendant. The
decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made
part of the evidence of these defendants in the
herein eleven cases for whatever the same may
be worth as aid in the determination of the merits
of the issues raised herein.

In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court,

among other things, found that while the decision
in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April
25, 1905, the survey of the property subject
matter of therein application was not made until
June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some one year
after the decision. It found no proof of initial
hearing of the application for registration being
published as required by law without which the
Land Registration Court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the case. Said decision also
made inference that since the survey of the
property was not made until a year after the
rendition of the judgment the technical
descriptions appearing in the original certificates
of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree
No. 1425, could not have been those appearing
in the notice of initial hearing, if any. Publication
of accurate technical description being an
essential jurisdictional requirement which cannot
be dispensed with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and the
decision and decree and titles issued arising
therefrom null and void.

As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch

XV plaintiff therein assailed the validity of Decree
No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and
the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon
which the decree was based as also null and
void. The Court sustained the herein plaintiffs
claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and
void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3)
all original certificates of title issued by virtue of
and pursuant to the judgment in GLRO Rec. No.
917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all
transfer certificates of title derived from the
original certificates of title declared void under
No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and
77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful
owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575
(or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so
forth.

The same decision of Branch XV also made its

findings that James Ross who was said to have
penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917,
never was a judge of the Court of Land
Registration at the time the decision was
supposedly rendered because the Gaceta
Official for the year 1905 does not show that
James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land
Registration Court or that he was ever appointed
in that capacity. Furthermore, the Court found
that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court on

11

April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree

and he signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court
even found the supposed decision in that
proceedings missing and made its conclusion
that since the decree which was supposedly
issued by a person who was not the Clerk of
Court at the time and which decree did not
contain the description of the property ordered in
the decision to be rendered because the survey
of the property was only made some one year
later and that said decree cannot now even be
found, the decision rendered therein is void for
lack of jurisdiction.

shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in

Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379,
8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by
respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's
title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a
new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in
the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321,
8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687
and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and
hereby ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of
the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
and in view thereof issue new certificates of title
in favor of the defendants subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe
Navarro in accordance with the terms of the
"Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado"
which is quoted in hisex-parte motion for
clarification and/or modification of the decision.

Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of

facts are too ponderous to be ignored. It is
indeed a truism that a void original certificate of
title cannot be the source of a valid transfer
certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the
eyes of the law, inexistent and cannot give
source to any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in
said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch
XV of this Court are also the defendants in the
herein eleven cases in which their properties are
also involved. Since the case before Branch XV
directly assails the nullity of the proceedings by
virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged
title of the plaintiff over the parcels of land
occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a
derivative from such decree, it is the considered
opinion of this Court that until and unless the
decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed
or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to
order the herein eleven defendants in these
eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they
occupy and on which their respective houses are
built has become premature. It goes without
saying that if said decision of Branch XV will be
finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final
and executory, all the claims of rights to
ownership and possession of properties
embraced in the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917
and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute
nullities. Possessions by actual occupants of all
these properties had better be maintained until
after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)

As so modified the decision stands in all other

respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro
issued the following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had
occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case
was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch
XV of this Court that the certificate of title
emanating from the proceedings in GLRO
Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs
title happened to be one of them. The Court
opined that until said decision is reversed the
actual occupants had better be maintained in
their possessions of the land.

12

Pursuant to the same order the motion for

reconsideration and new trial was set only for
reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.

decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was
not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to
the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in
the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:

The Court now understands that the decision of

Branch XV is now under review by order of our
Appellate Court.

LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

It has also come to the understanding of the

Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to
be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely
affects the interests of other persons and entities
like the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a
derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425
from which Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of
land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever
orders or decisions are made in this case cannot
be made to affect the said company. Decisions
and orders can only affect parties to the case.

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS

INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT
RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND
LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG,
SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON
CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971
REITERATING
AND
REPEATING
THE
DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL
ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425
ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED
BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS
OF
THE
UNDERSIGNED
HAS
AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that

the order dated June 21, 1971, must be
reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the
decision of Branch XV is now being the subject
of further proceedings and (2) because it has the
effect of adversely affecting the interest of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which
is not even a party herein.

But to every possessor in good faith there comes

a time when he is considered a possessor in bad
faith. When the owner or possessor with a better
right comes along, when he becomes aware that
what he had taken for granted is at least
doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in
support of the adverse contention, good faith
ceases. The possessor may still believe that his
right is more secure, because we resign
ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our
vanishing hopes, but when the final judgment of
the court deprives him of the possession, all
illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs.
Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and
Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil
Code).

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June

21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision
dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the
ejectment of the present occupants of the land
as stated in the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the

land of another, loses what is built, planted or

HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the

defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the

13

sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil

Code)

execution by calling through the following

telephones:
xxx xxx xxx

HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE

UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND
SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER
THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF
HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO
DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR
REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD
FAITH FOR:

BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN

THEMOTORCADE
OF
OUR
PEOPLE'S
VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE
PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG,
SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON
CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY,
SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE
WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES
STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG,
RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT
NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL
MIDNIGHT.

The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored

principles of the law of property. One of those is
the principle of accession whereby the owner of
property acquires not only that which it produces
but that which it united to it either naturally or
artificially. Whatever is built, planted or sown on
the land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
land. Where however, the planter, builder or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability
of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after the payment of the
proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay
the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is
allowed to exercise the option because his right
is older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil.
598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs.
Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).

(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of
properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels
of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
(hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the
lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose
titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to
allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS
caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17,
1971 the following:
WARNING

So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors

in bad faith as we are ready to ask for the
execution of the decision pursuant to law and
avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires
that those involved may please make some kind
of arrangements with the undersigned before

SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW

In reply to numerous inquiries received by
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership with
reference to an advertisement published in the

14

Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly

affecting the validity of all original certificates of
title and transfer certificates of title derived from
Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a
party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26,
1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court
and therefore ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM
DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY
AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled

"Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin
ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in
favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for
the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of
the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over
the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk
of Court of the said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of
the Ruiz decision reads as follows:

The public is hereby requested to be wary of any

person selling lands and/or rights to lands
belonging to and in the name of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership.

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing,

the Court hereby declares and/or orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
917 are null and void;

The public is also warned to be wary of

MISLEADING adverstisements and/or persons
basing their rights to lands of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership on such
"decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to
be "final and executory."

2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or

fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title issued
by virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in
G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425
were utter nullities;

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

4. That all transfer certificates of title derived

from the original certificates of title declared void
under No. (3) above, particularly but not
exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null
and void;

After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent

NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS
and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent
NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly
sustained by him on account of his failure to consummate
thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above
notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions,
the locations of which overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS
(marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).

5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated

lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the
herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them
being as indicated in Exhibit P;

On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed

these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and
the libel cases, the complainants also presented documents
relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265,

6. That the defendant Partnership cease and

desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the
enjoyment and peaceful possession of their
respective landholdings;

15

7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding

Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon.
Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II,
City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their
agents, representatives and any and all persons
acting in their behalves, refrain and desist
absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding
with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos.
1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and
II-13921 filed by the herein defendant
Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;

2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente

917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant
Company:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them
from the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967,
with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession
thereof to defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

8. That the case be dismissed as against

defendant Director of Lands;

(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any

person or persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be in
possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and
remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs
expenses;

9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the

plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the
plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and

(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's

fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from
defendant company, with interest; and

Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby

dismissed for lack of merit.

(6) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).

The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the
approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for
immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by
the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the
motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del
Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana CastroBartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara,
granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of
Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.

ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On

November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to
enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence. The
case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3,
1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge
Ruiz who was separated from the service by the President of the
Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as against the
plaintiffs:

On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a

decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

1. Dismissing the amended complaint;

16

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted.

The order of the respondent Judge dated
February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set
aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara,
granting immediate execution, is hereby revived,
with instructions to the respondent judge to fully
implement the latter order, including the approval
of the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the
necessary writ or writs of execution. The
restraining order issued at the inception of this
action is hereby (sic) permanent.

Firstly, the same was not raised as a

counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only treat
it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove
this claim of damages. Under the same
authorities cited in support of the denial of
plaintiffs claim for damages, therefore, he has
failed to establish what damages he had
suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled
to the injunction prayed for. It follows, therefore,
that the issuance of the restraining order was
proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a
claim for damages.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This court cannot help but end this decision with

a note of admonition and hope. The people who
will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's
acts in question are his buyers, who in all
probability are middle class people who
themselves wanted to make money out of the
apparent sad predicament that defendant had
brought upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of
this court, therefore, that with the advent of the
NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page
and make a fresh start in life.

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by

respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also
with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court
(Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled
properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a
decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

xxx xxx xxx

1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of

plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title over the
land in question;
It having been found that defendant was guilty of
bad faith and fraud in claiming and selling
plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's
fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's
fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and
reasonable considering the extent and value of
the property involved and the nature of the case.

2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining

and barring the defendant, his successors-ininterest, assigns, agents or any person or
persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling
and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of
the lands in question and from asserting any
claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on
or over the said property, directly or indirectly,
adverse to the plaintiff; and

Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss,

alleged that as a result of the issuance of the
restraining order, he suffered damages in the
amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees

in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.

17

SO ORDERED.

KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG

ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG
MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT
MAKARATING

(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).

The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.

Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at

nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa
lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg.
1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin
Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. 699, 875,
917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng
Lupain defunct Court of Land Registration) na
ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na
siyang
pinagbatayan
ng
ipinapatalang
gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga
Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds
ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer
Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng
mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa
at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19
Phil. 324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing
diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa mula't
sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan
ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at
ibang mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na
ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa
animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos.
8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branches I, II, and VI contesting the
genuineness and due execution of Decree No.
1425 of the defunct Court of Land Registration)
upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba
ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man
ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o
mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman
upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan
paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila nang
pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng
sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng kanilang
mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa
mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda
sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang
ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest)
na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang
maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang

On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a

decision in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge
Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable
Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack
of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge
Apostol has now been laid to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and
documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his
testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the
complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the
Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1
to 13, inclusive.
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the
present charges are the same as the charges in administrative
Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro,
respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable
Court deferred action on the said administrative case until such
time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated.
Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and
on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is
the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before
Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands not
occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services
signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n.,
Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which appears on
pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:

18

nasabing lupain kailanmay di naging pambayan

kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng
nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari
na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa
ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin
ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang
ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay
nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa
kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na
kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay
di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs.
Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242;
Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No.
177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit
sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga
nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at nararapat iharap
sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang
Hukuman magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga
titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of
Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang
bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil
sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas
ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas,
maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o
mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira
sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na
titulo na maaring nasa bagay na iyon na
pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari.
Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa
tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao
bilang may-ari kahit na walang karampatang
titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng
sapat na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng
lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang
panahong itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng
pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30)
taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang
pinakamahusay na titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay
hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid
vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring
sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na
sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay
naangkin na nila ang lupain o di kayay gawing
batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang
masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi
ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at
panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng

panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang titulo

kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang
hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang halaga ng
lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil
sa itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive
trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang
lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't
dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di
nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap
na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan
ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa
paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng
rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain
gayong ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at
tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg.
1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng defunct Court of
Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawagawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong
kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000
hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40)
milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay
matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong,
ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat sakop
ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act
No. 942, ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila
sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na
ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng
bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng
Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa
bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at
Mandaluyong
sa
pamamagitan
ng
Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong
Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga
paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o
survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong
ilog ng San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng
agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging
matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta,
Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos
ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng
Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong
pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong
pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng
Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng
agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng
Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang
sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos

19

ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at

pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing
baybay-sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng
sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang
agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa
man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo
(polygon).

ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng

mga
rekord
(transcripts),
pagpapatunay
(certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang
bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng
naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang
nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay na
hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas
ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming
kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng
mga tungkuling iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito,
sumasang-ayon
kami
at
natatalian
o
nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ng
halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa
bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan
sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo
o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang
halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunangbayad
upang ang proyektong
ito
ay
mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling
panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang
halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't
metro kuwadrado ay aming babayaran kapag
naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa
kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa
petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi
kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o
balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) sa
bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay
mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang
taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang
kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa
usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang
aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na
di huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang
bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad sa mga
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa
usaping ito at iyon lamang ang natatanging
sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng
obligasyon
o
tungkuling
bayaran
ang
Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin
ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang
matituluhan nang naayon sa batas. Sumasang-

Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang

mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay
sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena,
Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng
karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang
Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang
sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin
ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak
at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang
matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa
paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ay
nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang
pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising
ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming
minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-ininterest) nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong
kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang
maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng
kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa
bahagi ng lupaing nais naming mapatituluhan sa
ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at
sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng
karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng
kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na
magaganap sa pagpapatitulo ng aming mga
ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o
kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang
ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey)
ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng
mga plano ng mga sukat upang mapagtibay ito
ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands),
paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit'
ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng
pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado
(filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa

20

ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang

sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng
paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa
bawa't metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng
karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na
halaga sa bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10)
o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga
hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay
ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin
nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama
na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito
ngunit kinakailangan magbigay sila ng paunang
bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang
panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan
(monthly installment condition) at magiging
mabisa lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong
katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwanbuwan (monthly installment) na maaring
magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00)
hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat
buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng
lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa
batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang
katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay
isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at
tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at
gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring
manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang
ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang
itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod sa anumang
paraan ayon sa batas.

kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang

pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y lumagda sa
kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa aming
taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin tumupad
sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted
that he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens
titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but
he claims that the titles of said parties are null and void because
they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the
properties sold by him except the contract of legal services which
his clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the
various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he has not
obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the
National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for taxation
purposes the thousands of hectares of prime lands in
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina,
allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly
attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9,
1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the
"25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City
including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July
7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the
Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent
NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still
continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming that
the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been
4
appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977).

SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT

NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG ITO
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming
tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang
ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang
tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa
amin upang kami ay mapagkalooban ng
Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang
lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad
din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda
ng aming mga pangalan na siyang nais naming
pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred,
that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of
admission to the bar be recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of
5
suspension. Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift
6
suspension . Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated

21

August 8, 1980. In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the
8
motion to lift the order of suspension.

b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our

clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of
the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to
the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from
the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The
ownership therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student, knows
that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha
case,supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of
the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal
ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for
facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.

On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for
9
the lifting of the order of suspension which was denied by this Court on November
10
11
13, 1980. He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 but
12
the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981.
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13,
1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was
thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now
13
Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action.

c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title

covering the land subject of the above cases had been declared
null and void in the "final and executory" decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the
title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and
malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending resolution
before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final and
executory."

14

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, respondent Navarro filed his answer
15
with
motion
to
dismiss
on
June
29,
1979. The
corresponding
16
17
reply and rejoinder were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated
October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
18
investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the
following findings and recommendation:

d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases

heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further,
that title thereto having described the land to be part of the
Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim
knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of
Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the
Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when
the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr.
Navarro's representation is false and malicious.

CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged
respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office,
and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately
misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for
the defendants in the following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land
subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his
personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one
Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the
final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in
Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin
vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot
to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru
falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to
Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of
the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as
Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.

e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic
norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the
interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a
timely manner from the decision of the court and having adopted
the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had
influenced his clients into commencing a case before the Tanod
Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously
calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge.
Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the
courts.

22

f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not

stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in
the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al.
'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the
undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as
Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)

Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and Adolfo

Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931
which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.Minerva
C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley
Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the
defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty
(20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their
rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the
law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation
before the courts as stated above.

RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the
undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy of the
complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly
intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in
defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M.
Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad
E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this
writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to
harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of
justice is an act in contempt of court for which complainants and
their counsel is (sic) liable.

3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action

must have been resorted to by the complainants at the instigation
of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of
their God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no
other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against
the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of
the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire,
after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.

2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo

Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law,
legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done
by the undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the
complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against
the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)

Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint,

and in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the Office
of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of
this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges against
him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed
sufficiently proven.

After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out
that respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts
of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder
dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:

The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his

entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did his
bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost
learning and ability.

1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia

B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of America held
TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by
TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco
both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of MetroManila) filed ejectment proceedings before the City Court of

Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the

misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION

23

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148

entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the
practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.

certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring
Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto,
null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set
the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3,
1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The
said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of
respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.

The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the

suspension of respondent from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of
law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirmingin toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge
Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffsappellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del
Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review
on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became
final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were
remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.

19

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent

Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E.
Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148
are:

The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil
Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro
Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment
filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro
in his decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that
until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by
final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's
order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other
persons without the consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for
suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared
null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs.
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326,
8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of
ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated
20
March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Furthermore,
he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services
rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal.

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to
reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title
emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The
Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual
occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the
21
land.
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the
Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and another one was
rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of
Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot
feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31,
1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former
decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he

1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the
original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original

24

stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his
alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.

respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters,
more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro
over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all
the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document
evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer.

2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer
and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his
legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated
September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:

From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended

ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases
whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he
was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of
June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which
is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is
also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide
tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is
not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in
this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions
and orders can only affect parties to the case.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of
integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no
denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed
means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige
and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason
23
of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously
stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise:

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated
June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because
the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further
proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting
the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not even a party herein.

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to

an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained
and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to
be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be
24
exercised.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set

aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated
22
in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied)
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the
inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and
remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the
defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer.
And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as
a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the
above properties.

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of
disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
25
confidence. Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with
his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven
26
him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with
his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of
ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted
that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his

25

27

duty in accordance with his oath. Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the

28
burden of proof rests upon the complainant , and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
29
convincing and satisfactory proof.

correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded
the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients
agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their
favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As
hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the
right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That
respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly
derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21,
1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to
further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants
therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and
indisputably illegal.

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two

administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence
exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment
on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services,
executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases filed
before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in
full in the earlier part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial
court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the
defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff
and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that
31
his title is his contract of legal services. Considering that the effectivity of the
provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the
therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense
is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the
land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas
respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer
absurdity of which he could not be unaware.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely
on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all
these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession
30
must be maintained and respected.

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the
32
present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425 pursuant to the
decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31,
1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26,
1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the
transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the
name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein
respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.

It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing

the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31,
1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at
the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is
precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by
setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He
could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final
determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely
on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify
the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other
persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision
dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become
final and executory.

Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the
order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it
reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the
present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the
ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases.
Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was
merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the
owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration
to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any
ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that
any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of
September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court

In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro,"
herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising

26

properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently
rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent
continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision.
This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation
conducted
by
the
Solicitor
33
General.

It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent
Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open
defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions
reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in
G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a
Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein
questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he
was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his
suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario
Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2,
1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as
counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared,
signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine
Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court
directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in
G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the
Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00
upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he
paid on February 5, 1990.

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of
the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by
the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough
for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio
Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from
Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge
Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted
Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew
that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in
Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of
Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his
awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell
properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
34
Madrigals.

In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro
appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June
11,
1986
and
decided on
December
7,
1986;
(2)
G.R.
No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on
November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo
Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on
February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel
for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records
were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared
before the different courts a quo.

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for
lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be
dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our
resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:

Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of

constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty
to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection
of his oath as an officer of the court.

The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other

things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if
respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice
to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is
deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the
Constitution are granted, are NOTED.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name

is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread
on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.

There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion

of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8,
1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of
his suspension.

27

Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged

are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the
court overruled his petition

JOSEFINA ROYONG V. ATTY. ARISTN OBLENA

DOCTRINE:

After the hearing, the investigators concluded that:

A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts
without incurring any criminal liability;

Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds

to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not
what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.

B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting

with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a
lawyer and
C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in
his application to take the bar.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Royong, the niece of the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape

case against the latter.

W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas
disbarment

In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to

have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident
because Oblena threatened to kill her family.

HELD:
YES. Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape,
seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for
disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to
exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised
even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly
prohibited by statutes.

As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child.

Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had
a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently
removed from the roll of attorney even though the acts of the Royong
before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a
sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the
incident

American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a

good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or
disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as a
ground of disbarment.

The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and

deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a
person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous
relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also
has a legal husband in the province

Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good

moral character when he filed his application to take the bar
28

examination is wrong. Ones own approximation of himself is not a

gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character
is what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.

upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop,
followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied
properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put
up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow the sheriff to
keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were denied by
the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the
certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.
Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition had the
temerity to deny such allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as
counsel for respondent Lo Bu, he did specifically maintain that
respondent filed a motion to recall the writ of execution and followed
by the motion to return the levied properties.

His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having
carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and
his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed
moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs
trust on him.
Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority
in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the
original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law
requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same
offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is
that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Bustamante in denying the facts
alleged in the petition to defend the cause of his client is
commendable.
HELD:
The conduct of Atty. Bustamante is far from commendable. He could,
of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph
of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather
poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter
being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or
even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be
correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points
not previously admitted. That is the most that can be said of his
performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case,
Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course
expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the
disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor
statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the
court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he
should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client,
ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that
admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good
standing in the bar.

COSMOS FOUNDRY WORKSHOP WORKER'S

UNION, ET.AL. V. LO BU, ET.AL.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals for entertaining an Appeal from the Court of
First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly dismissed by the
latter as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to
for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair
labor practice controversy. Said unfair labor practice case was
already passed upon and sustained by the Supreme Court, hence,
cannot be further appealed for being final and executory.
In the petition, it was stated that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent
motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of
execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass
29

HELD:

DR. NORBERTO ALFONSO V. JUDGE MODESTO

JUANSON

NO. It must be stressed that the respondent is not charged with

immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the
judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for
the complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol
continued their extramarital affair. In fact, no love notes were
presented during trial that are dated after the appointment. Proof of
prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative
discipline in this case. The respondent judge may have undergone
moral reformation after his appointment.

FACTS:
Complainant a doctor of medicine by profession filed with this court a
sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent
of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife Sol Alfonso.
Complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent,
Mrs. Juanson who informed him that Sol and respondent judge have
been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love
letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. When he
told this to Sol, she denied it.

The imputation of the sexual acts upon the incumbent must be

proven by substantial evidence, which is required in admin cases.
This what the complainant failed to do.
However, judge should be held liable for becoming indiscreet.
Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance
of impropriety. Respondent and Sols meetings could incite suspicion
of either the relationships continuance or revival. He violated
Canons 3 and 2 requiring judges official conduct to be free from
appearance of impropriety.

Sol and complainant left for the USA. Sol returned ahead of
complainant. Mrs. Juansosn called up father of complainant and
divulged to the latter the illicit affair between respondent judge and
Sol. The father of complainant engaged the services of a private
investigator who discovered that Sol, after arrival from USA met with
respondent judge at an apartment and stayed there for 3 hours.

Sentence to fine of P2,000.

Complainant upon knowing this, complainant confronted Sol. At first
she denied it but later, however, admitted having an illicit sexual affair
with the judge.

CASTAEDA, ET.AL. V. AGO, ET.AL.

Respondent judge denied the allegations and claimed that they have
been communicating with each other casually and innocently and not
as lovers. He alleges that he came to know of Sol when Sol engaged
his professional services prior to appointment to the office of RTC
judge.

NATURE

ISSUE:

1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the
CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS

Is the judge guilty of the charge of immorality?

1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson

30

1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution;

Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff
advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the
petition; SC affirmed dismissal

enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners.

Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain

sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his

exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.

1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago
failed to redeem
1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of
possession to the properties

A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his

clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what
the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence
despite the patent futility of his clients position.

1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him
in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his
wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by
the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from
registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and
restoring the restraining order continued

It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of
his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his
duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse
the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.

1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin

sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a
similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos
appealed to SC which dismissed the petition

CATALINA ROXAS, ET.AL. V. CA

FULL CASE

Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
injunction.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Petitioners seek the review of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
October 2, 1986 and November 5, 1986 in CA-G.R. CV No. 08119 declaring
appellants' Brief filed by herein petitioners to have been filed out of time and
denying their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE
WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

It appears that in Civil Case No. 3837-M, Branch 132 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff Segundo Roxas'
complaint for reconveyance of title against Andres Roxas and others.

HELD
YES. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners,
long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now

On October 21, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. In the Resolution of

October 25, 1985, the court a quo directed the ventilation of the proceedings

31

in the Court of Appeals as the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period. On January 29, 1986, petitioners were notified by the
respondent Court of Appeals to pay the docket fee and on March 7, 1986,
petitioners were required to file appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof, copy of which was received by petitioners on March 18,
1986.

Hence this petition.

It is the position of the petitioners that respondent court erred in considering
their appellants' brief to have been filed out of time whereas it was filed
before their motion for last extension of time was resolved. Petitioners argue
further that since their motion which prayed for fifteen days extension
counted from notice is in line with the previous resolutions of the respondent
court, then their last motion for extension of time should not have been
denied as there was no intention on their part to delay or prejudice the
appellees

On April 28, 1986, petitioners filed their first motion for extension of time for
thirty (30) days counted from May 2, 1986 within which to file their brief. Said
motion was granted per Resolution of May 7, 1986, counted from notice
thereof copy of which was received by petitioners counsel on May 14, 1986.
On May 29, 1987, petitioners filed a second motion for extension of time for
another period of thirty (30) days on the ground that petitioners' counsel is
suffering from asthma and hypertension and that their brief has not yet been
completely finished in draft form. Per Resolution of June 6, 1986, respondent
court granted the motion counted from notice thereof copy of which was
received by petitioners, counsel on June 23, 1986. Then, on July 21, 1986,
two (2) days before the expiration of the 30-day period granted, petitioners
filed their last motion for extension of time praying for fifteen (15) days
counted from notice.

Petitioners' argument is predicated upon the theory that whenever

respondent court grants their motion for extension of time it was always
made to begin from receipt of notice of the resolution despite their prayer
that it be granted counted from the date prayed for.
The argument is unmeritorious. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 46 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an "extension of time for the filing of briefs will not
be allowed except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for
extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended."
Allowance or denial of motions for extension of time to file briefs is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 2 There is no question that
the discretion vested in the courts whether to grant or not motions for
extensions must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with
a view of substantial justice. 3

On August 25, 1986, before said motion was resolved, petitioners filed their
brief. On October 2, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion for last extension in the resolution which reads as follows:
Before Us for resolution is a "Motion For Last Extension" to file Appellant's
Brief, filed on July 21, 1986 praying for a 15-day extension from July 23,
1986 within which to file appellant's brief.

In the case before Us, it is Our considered view and We so hold that the
Resolutions assailed by herein petitioners are products of respondent court's
sound exercise of its discretion, considering the peculiar circumstances of
this case. Reference is hereby made that from the time of the rendition of the
decision appealed from dated July 19, 1985, up to the time of filing of the
appellants' brief on August 25, 1986, a period of 402 days lapsed or counted
from March 18, 1986, the date of petitioners' receipt of notice requiring them
to file their brief up to the time of filing 160 days lapsed. Examining the brief
filed by herein petitioners it appears however that it consists of twenty-six
(26) pages only with simple narration of facts and discussions of the issues.
4 Any practising lawyer knows that twenty (20) days is more than sufficient
to complete the printing of brief of such length including its proof-reading. 5 It
is known among every practising lawyer that the policy of the Court of
Appeals is to limit the second extension of time to file briefs to twenty (20)
days. Said policy was relaxed further by the respondent Court by giving sixty
(60) days extension on the basis of the plea of petitioners' counsel that he
was suffering from asthma even if said plea appears to be self-serving as it

It appears, however, that while the same remained unresolved, appellant

filed his brief only on August 25, 1986, or 18 days beyond the period of
extension prayed for by appellant. No other motion for extension was filed
thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the appellant's brief is hereby considered filed out of time
and is ordered expunged from the record.
The appeal of plaintiff is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 1
On October 23, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of October 2, 1986, but it was denied per Resolution of November
5, 1986.

32

was not even accompanied by a doctor's certificate. Petitioners abused the

laxity extended them by the respondent Court. They even prayed that the
extension of fifteen (15) days be counted from notice. Lawyers should not
presume that the courts would grant their motion for extension more so to
expect that if ever granted it would always be counted from notice thereof.

residing in Echague, despite having to attend board sessions in

Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as a
notary public and lawyer. The letter subtly offered information
regarding Tagordas office hours, together with an express request
that the recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept land
registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per title.

Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolutions must fail: Let this serve
as warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their own
sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no
cogent reason. It does no credit to their standing in the profession.
More so when they do not file the required brief or pleading until their
motion is acted upon. Not only should they not presume that their
motion for extension of time will be granted by the court much less
should they expect that the extension that may be granted shall be
counted from notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within
the extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only
themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed.

The government, through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with

the Attorney-General, brought this matter to the attention of the Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Tagordas actions constitute malpractice
HELD/RATIO:
YES. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2828 expressly provides that the practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. This is in accord with the Canons
of Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in
1917. Canon 27 of the said document provides that a well-merited
reputation serves as a lawyers most effective form of advertisement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is hereby DENIED for lack

of merit.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE TAGORDA
DOCTRINE:
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust.

While the circulation of business cards is not per se improper,

solicitation through such business cards, as well as through personal
communications is unprofessional. The law is a profession and not a
business. Thus, a lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others.

FACTS:

Due to Tagordas claim of ignorance and remorse, the Court merely

ordered that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one month. It is worth noting that Justice Ostrand dissented, believing
that a reprimand would have been sufficient.

Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third

member of the provincial board of Isabela. He admits that prior to his
election, he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano,
which contains a list of tasks he may undertake as a notary public,
and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to consult with him for
free. Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he
wrote a letter to one of his hometowns barrio lieutenants. The letter
basically informed the recipient of Tagordas intention to continue

THE CARD, TRANSLATED IN ENGLISH, READS:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney

33

Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.
The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated. The counsel for Vinuya,
et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty.
Romel Regalado Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration where theyposited their charge of plagiarism
claiming that "in this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not
only of extensive plagiarism but also of twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition. A statement entitled
"Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was submitted by Dean
Leonen to the Court. The Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature
pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the
Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to
have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the
Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza as represented in the previous copies of the
Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also
appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit signed the Statement although
his name was not included among the signatories in the previous
copies submitted to the Court. Dean Leonen was directed to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of
Canon 10 for submitting, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a
dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law
Faculty Statement. Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did
not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I,
to the Court and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its
retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according
to Dean Leonens account, that there were errors in the retyping of
the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. "Restoring
Integrity I" bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of
Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven
(37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution while
"Restoring Integrity II" does not bear any actual physical signature,

(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost
documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites
for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he
can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague,
Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)
PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THE LETTER, TRANSLATED IN ENGLISH,
ARE AS FOLLOWS:
...
Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my
legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at
home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to
before me as notary public even on Sundays.
...
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio
people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be
informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer
and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the
services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land
titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only
three pesos for every registration.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY

ENTITLED,
"RESTORING
INTEGRITY:
A
STATEMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS
OF
PLAGIARISM
AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
FACTS: For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of
the 37 respondent law professors in response to the Resolution
directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
34

but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37)

members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)".

Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from
this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II.
There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring
Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions.
Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the
facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on
the reason therefor is initself a display of lack of candor. Contrary to
Dean Leonens proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it
appear to the Court that a person or persons participated in an act
when such person or persons did not. The Court is surprised that
someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and
stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at
least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the
Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent
to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only
hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If
Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and
truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, the court sees no reason
why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated
their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before
transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If
it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of
Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able
to secure.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring

Integrity II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual
signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the
body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to
downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two
versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public
manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more
signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He believes that he had not
committed any violation of Canon 10 for he did not mislead nor
misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or
expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement.
ISSUE/S:
WON Dean Leonen violated Canon 10, Rules 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. In due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish the former for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Court as required under Canon 10.
RATIO: CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. To
begin with, the Court said that live public manifesto or not, the
Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in
time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The
value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely
in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the
Statements persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation
and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same.

IN RE PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF

ATTORNEYS BY MICHAEL MEDADO
FACTS:
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed the same year's
bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. On 7 May
1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
35

May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly

because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys
given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It
was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation
practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief [that] since he
ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was
not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer; and the
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado
attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars,
he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. About seven
years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

Medado was made to wait for one year before being allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys

ISSUE:

DOCTRINE:

Whether or not Medado should be allowed to sign in the Roll of

Attorneys.

Unauthorized practice of law is indirect contempt

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise

transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized
practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyers duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to
law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar,
they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.

IN RE JOAQUIN BORROMEO

FACTS:

HELD: Yes (sort of). At the onset, the Court said that Medado has
demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally
filed the instant petition. However, he has committed unauthorized
practice of law the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record. At that point, Medado should have
known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar
because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act
of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the
necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but

has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to
possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal
principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than
this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16)
years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting
legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme
Court.
Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given
him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent
36

himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the

results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of
his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial
proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many
scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as
well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers
ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the
laws, etc.

He stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit,

rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings
which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably
insisting on the application of his own individual version of the
rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite
erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has
insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys
appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court
dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court
employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely
unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

On the contention that he "was exercising his rights of freedom of

speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountability of public officials." The
constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for
repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting
lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the
processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing
them into disrepute and disrespect

RULING:
YES. There can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and
processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper
conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.
Joaquin Borromeo was declared guilty of constructive contempt of
court for repetitiously disrespecting the decisions and resolutions
issued by the courts, and even by issuing a circular containing
libelous and offending accusations (like whimsical ,capricious, and
tyrannical) against the Supreme Court justices and its employees. He
even delivered a letter accusing lawyers of defamatory comments
and insults. This is due to his series of dismissed complaints and
appeals against 3 banks namely Traders RoyalBank, United Coconut
Planters Bank, and Security Bank and Trust Co. from which he
obtained loans with unfulfilled mortgages. In relation to this, he filed
cases against the lawyers of these banks and even against the clerks
of court who signed the minute resolutions of these cases. The
actions reached the alarming number of 50 cases varying from civil,
criminal, to administrative cases. In response, the court answered all
his false alleged accusations through a resolution along with
declaring him guilty of contempt of court.

GUEVARRA V. EALA
FACTS:
On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.
In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000
when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed
that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read I
37

love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. He also noticed

that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at
her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her
work.

marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and

affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)
Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married
woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
(Tucay v. Atty. Tucay)

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent

together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April
22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at
which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later
found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his
wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as
he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing.
He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before

admission to practice law.
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The
Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the
wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."

ISSUE:

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman

constitute gross immoral conduct?
RULING:
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair
was carried out discreetly.

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose

Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and

immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
38

In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job

as Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and
went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G.
Holgado.

CORDOVA V. CORDOVA
NATURE:
Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar

Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own

husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent
Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely
to the public as his wife, using the name Fely Cordova.

FACTS:
Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ
Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova with
immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The
complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline
for investigation, report and investigation.

Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to

establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while
failing to support his legitimate family.

The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified

complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988 a
revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint
against her husband.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant

wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised
that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his
legitimate family to Bislig

On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her
evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several times.
The hearings never took place as she failed to appear.

Respondent would, however, frequently come home from

beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the
support of his legitimate family.

The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even
though notices were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the
commission that she and her husband have already reconciled.

In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a

trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living
with her children in their conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes,
and had taken his younger daughter along with him

In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties
to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss the
complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from either
party since then.

Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the

complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to
take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors:

Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued

to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued
to fail to give support to his legitimate family.

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6

June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were
born.
39

ISSUE:

MANALANG V. ANGELES

WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the
complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case.

FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Atty Angeles for grave
misconduct as a lawyer and he stands charged with infidelity in the
discharge of fiduciary obligations to his clients, herein complainant
Manalang.

HELD
The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out
in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member
of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.

Manalang alleged that they were the complainants in a case for

overtime and separation pay filed against their employer, the Phil
Racing Club Restaurant. Atty Angeles was their counsel. Judgment
was rendered in favor of Manalang, in the amount of P6500.
However,without authority from his clients, Atty Angeles
compromised the award and was able to collect P5500 only.

RATIO
An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he possessed of good moral character. That requirement is
not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar.

Manalang made several demands upon Atty Angeles to turn over to

them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of
30%, but the lawyer refuese and offered to give them only the sum of
P2650.

The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not

limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community.

Atty Angeles, in his defense, stated the he refused because he was

ordered to deduct from his attorney's fees the amount of P2000
representing the amount discounted by counsel of the Phil Racing
Club Restaurant together with sheriff legal fees.
ISSUE:

DISPOSITION:

Whether respondent Atty Angeles should be suspended from the

practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients'
funds.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from

the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court.
The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court
that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he
has clung to.

HELD:
YES. In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainants were
awarded P6500 for unpaid overtime and separation pay. 30% was
agreed to be paid ot respondent as his attorney's fees. Alleging
difficulties in collecting te full amount awarded, respondent
compromised the award on execution and collected only P5500 from
40

HELD:

the losing party. This compromise was allegedly without authority

from his
clients. Atty Angeles failed to show any such authority.

Yes. By converting the money of his clients to his own personal use
without their consent and for collecting P2000 to be used as a bond
which is not required, Ricafort is undoubtedly guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct therefore the court resolves to
disbar him. RATIO:According to Rule 16.02 a lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him. It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath
pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is
bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is
obliged to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into
his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property
or use it for personal purposes without his clients consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust.

Atty Angeles exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of

his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defence of
their rights.
Suspended for 6 months.

BUSIOS V. RICAFORT
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Businos entrusted Respondent Francisco Ricafort
with money for deposit in the bank account of Businos husband. The
sum of the money is P32,000. Of this amount, P30,000 was for
deposit to the bank account and the P2,000 is the amount Ricafort
asked as a bond for civil case no. 5814 when no such bond is
required.

WILKIE V. LIMOS
Wilkie alleged that on 2 April 2003, he engaged the services of Atty.
Limos regarding his intention of adopting his wifes nephew, Reynal
Alsaen Taltalen.

Instead of depositing the money, Ricafort converted the money to his

own personal use and despite several demands, he failed to return
the same to Businos. Businos is then constrained to file a criminal
case for estafa and a disbarment case against Ricafort. Also, the
P2,000 Ricafort asked for was never used for a bond because no
bond was required of that case therefore he merely pocketed the said
amount. Despite of numerous summons to comment on the
complaint, Ricafort failed to comply therefore it indicates his high
degree of irresponsibility.

Notwithstanding their lawyer and client relationship, on March 30,

2003, Atty. Limos borrowed money from complainant in the amount of
P250,000.00.
When the checks became due, Wilkie deposited the same to his
account at Equitable PCI Bank but to his surprise and dismay, the
checks were returned as they were drawn against insufficient
funds. Despite demands made, Atty. Limos failed to pay her
obligation.

ISSUE/S:

Wilkie decided to engage the services of a counsel who also made a

formal demand to respondent but to no avail. Criminal complaints
were filed against Atty. Limos

WON Ricafort violated rule 16.02 of Canon 16 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility

Wilkie has also withdrawn the adoption case from Atty. Limos who did
not do anything regarding the case despite the lapse of almost a
year.
41

Respondent, a lawyer, issued bouncing checks violates the law and

is subject to disbarment or suspension. Violation of B.P. 22 is
considered a crime involving moral turpitude as this mischief creates
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. Although it does not relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer, however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person. The Court has stressed that
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be
a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

At any rate, the excuses given by respondent cannot exculpate her

from an administrative sanction considering her acknowledgement
that worthless checks were issued by her in payment of the loan.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her.[17] It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order.[18] It also manifests a lawyers
low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.[19]

Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against her
despite due notice and she did not enter appearance either
personally or by counsel nor appeared at the scheduled hearing
dates.
ISSUE:

The respondent has fully paid her obligation to the complainant which
according to the receipts dated July 21, 2005 and August 24,
2005,[29] amounted toP400,000.00. The criminal cases filed by the
complainant have been dismissed and this is the first time a
complaint of such nature has been filed against the
respondent. Under these circumstances, the Court rules and so
holds that a suspension of three months from the practice of law
would be sufficient sanction on the respondent.

WON Respondent should be disbarred or suspended

HELD:
In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,

[16]

we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of which explicitly states:

On a final note, we reiterate that membership in the legal profession

is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.[30] Sadly, herein
respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
NOTE: The Supreme Court (SC) has imposed the ultimate penalty of
disbarment on a lawyer who has become a repeat offender.
In a per curiam decision in AC No. 11246 (Pacao v. Atty. Limos)
promulgated on June 14, 2016, the high court also ordered the name of Atty.
Sinamar Limos stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

CANON 1-- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

42

Limos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing grave

misconduct and willful insubordination when she failed to neither attend the
scheduled hearings nor submit any position paper in the disbarment case
filed against her by complainant Arnold Pacao before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

asserting that the issuance of the Feb. 28, 2006 resolution was
contrary to and violative of the Rules of Court because such
resolution was issued by the judge without first conducting the
requisite pre-trial conference and despite the fact that no formal
offer of exhibits was made by plaintiffs in support of their
allegations.

The SC noted that it was not the first time respondent Limos faced an
administrative case, stressing that she had already been twice suspended
from the practice of law, by this court, in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos and Wilkie
v. Atty. Limos.

Adiong issued a resolution on Feb. 28, 2006 ordering NPC to refund

the amount of P114 million representing the fuel compensating cost,
foreign exchange, and incremental cost charges collected from April
1991 to December 1995; the amount of P176 million representing the
fuel and power cost adjustment and PPA (power purchase
agreement) collected from January 1996 to April 2003; and to pay the
amount of P97.537 million as attorney's fees.

NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT CYRIL DEL
CALLAR V. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG, RTC,
BRANCH 8, MARAWI CITY

The NPC sought a reconsideration of the order alleging that no pretrial was conducted and yet respondent judge already passed upon
the merits of the case.

Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge failed to

conduct a pre-trial conference contrary to elementary rules of
procedure which he should have known all too well considering his
long years of service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in
court procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to
gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty. As to the
allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal
principles in granting the motions for execution pending appeal for
flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular reasons relied upon
by respondent judge for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal
are so unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of
knowledge of respondent judge with regard tothe proper appreciation
of arguments. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by
mere self-serving statements as good reason for the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It
does not even stand on its own. National Power Corporation,
represented its President Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B.
Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8,Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ07-2060. July 27, 2011

NPC's motion, however, was denied by Adiong, on the ground that

before issuing the questioned resolution, full-blown hearings were
conducted and NPC was afforded all the opportunities to present its
evidence and to participate actively in the hearings.
Having done so, NPC submitted itself to the court's jurisdiction and
could no longer claim that no pre-trial was conducted.
Later, Adiong also ordered Sheriff Otto Gomampong to implement the
Feb. 28, 2006 resolution ratiocinating that the same has already
become final.
NPC also complained of Adiong's failure to lay down the basis for
granting the plaintiff's ex-parte motion to release the PPA refunds,
and in awarding the exorbitant amount of P97,537,000 as attorney's
fees.
The complaint said that "while it admits that judges are not to be
administratively charged for acts committed in the exercise of
their judicial functions, respondent judge had acted in violation

FACTS:
The case arose from the administrative complaint of National
Power Corp. (NPC) president Cyril Del Callar against Adiong
43

of elementary rules that was equivalent to intolerable and

inexcusable gross ignorance of the law."

It noted that what Adiong did was a reflection of the moral obtuseness
which rendered him unfit to continue in the judicial office.

ISSUE:
WON Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
The SC said in its decision that:
"we find that the particular reasons relied upon by respondent judge
for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so unreliably
weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent
judge with regard to the proper appreciation of arguments."
"It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial
conference is mandatory and failure to do so is inexcusable. When
the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the
Rules of Court, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law,"
"such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to
conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and
warrants a corresponding penalty."
In February 2008, Adiong meted the penalty of dismissal after being
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct
constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Records showed that Adiong issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) ex-parte arising from a civil case without proper service of
summons or notice to the concerned parties and without conducting a
hearing.
The SC said that Adiong disregarded an SC circular regarding the
raffling of cases when he allowed a member of his staff to
exchange the records of the aforementioned civil case with that
in another branch of the RTC.
44