Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
November 1984
Nikhil Desai
5308 MacArthur Blvd. NW
Washington, DC 20016
USA
- i -
CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Annexes
A 1.
A 2.
List of Experts
B.
Bibliography
. .... 91
(c) In absolute quantities, the oil importing developing countries would have
a higher burden of oil imports in 1995 than in 1980, despite the fact that
their oil production is projected to increase much faster than in the past
(5.5% versus 0.3%) and that their oil consumption is projected to grow much
slower than in the past (2.6% vs. 4.9%) and, also, at a much slower rate
relative to those of the other fuels.
The share of i::he -oil importing
developing countries in the total world traded oil will also significantly
increase;
(a) Consumption of each of the four major primary energy sources (hence total
primary energy as well) in the developing countries grew faster than the world
average or than in the industrialized countries (the IMEs, in Table 1) for the
1970-80 period and will continue to do so over the projected period. As a
consequence, the energy consumption of the developing countries is
increasingly more important in the global energy balances;
I. The Context:
- 1 -
- 2 -
1. Whereas the observations noted above have been extracted from the World
BS'nk (1983a,b) it is largely a matter of the convenience of obtaining
consistent data sets and because the projections are of the most recent
vintage. As far as the author can tell, the overall thrust of the World Bank
projections is in line with those from other sources. See DOE/EIA (1984 ) or
OECD/IEA (1982).
For what now appear to be 'focredible' projections, see
Choucri (1982) or IIASA (1981). Whether these latter projections could have
been considered 'credible' even at the time they were published is a matter of
the reader's discretion and tolerance.
1973
1976 1979
---
1980
1982
1995
165
204
15
22
406
343
306
50
55
754
463
357
64
70
953
542
405
77
93
1119
641
500
103
121
1365
653
502
109
131
1396
667
545
121
147
1480
935
940
324
396
2595
772
654
308
139
1872
1623
685
606
228
3142
1936
657
715
276
3584
1887
669
691
335
3582
1995
712
734
408
3850
1804
760
724
427
3714
1578
762
674
467
3480
1705
1185
875
835
4600
1090
1274
379
176
2918
2326
1495
848
319
4987
2848
1537
1024
385
5793
2947
1629
1083
477
6135
3223
1786
1213
595
6817
3054
1835
1232
632
6752
2840
1881
1249
691
6661
3355
2821
1930
1423
9525
DCs
A.
Oil
Coal
Gas
P.E.
Total
IMEs
B.
Oil
Coal
Gas
P.E.
Total
c.
1960
World
Oil
Coal
Gas
P.E.
Total
Table
1.
- 4 -
1980
1995
TWh
TWh
1980-95
Fossil-thermal
of which, oil
gas
coal
Subtotal
342
64
393
799
25.9
4.9
29.8
60.5
257
321
1346
1925
7.3
9.2
38.4
54.8
-1.9
11.4
8,6
6.0
Primary electricity
of which, hydro
nuclear
geothermal
Subtotal
500
18
3
521
37.9
1.4
Neg.
39.5
1289
262
34
1585
36.7
7.5
1.0
45.2
6.5
19.6
17.6
7.7
Total
1320
100.0
3509
100.0
6.7
- 5 -
A.
Shares
1980
Total, mtoe
of which,
Power, %
Non-power,%
Oil
Coal
653
502
13.1
86.9
19.6
80.4
TPE
Oil
109
1396
935
14.7
85.3
23.6
76.4
6.9
93.1
1995
Gas
Coal
TPE
940
324
2595
35.8
64.2
24.8
75. 2
33 . 8
66.2
1995
1980
Memo:
Nuclear/TPE, %
Total primary electricity/TPE
B.
Gas
o-:3
2:5
9.3
15.3
Oil
Coal
Gas
Total fossil
Total primary
Source: Tables
Non power
2.9
2.7
6.6
8.6
11. 4
6.0
6.7
l and
3.2
3.2
2.
Total
2:4
4.3
7.5
3.8
4.2
- 6 -
----------------------------------------------------------------2. See INFCE (1980) and various OECD/NEA or USDOE/EIA publications over the
period 1980 - 82.
- 7 -
- 8 -
Nearly all the developing countries have so far depended upon the
industrialized countries for imports of nuclear technology, equipment and
materials and will continue to do so - to varying extents - for many years to
come. (3)
In this respect, the developments relating to nuclear energy among
the IMEs and their export policies have had and will continue to have a
decisive influence upon the nuclear power plans of the developing countries.
Again, it is the lMEs whose nuclear programs figure most prominently at the
global level - roughly 85% of nuclear electricity ever generated by end-1983
has been so in the IMEs, which also had roughly 83% of the world total nuclear
capacity and will have more than 70% of such total in 1995 according to the
author's projections.
The IMEs also remain the most important markets for
NPPs and materials over the foreseeable period.
And yet, the developments in the IMEs in the last ten years have also
been mixed and uneven.
Their nuclear capacity grew from about 37 GW to some
149 GW from end-1973 to end-1983 and will further grow to about 291 GW (next
of retirements) by 1995.
At the same time, more nuclear capacity has been
cancelled or indefinitely postponed than was added during this period, and
nearly a half of the capacity to be added between 1984 and 1990 is what has
been delayed from their scheduled starts in the 1974-83 period rather than
from new orders during that period. Average net NPP ordering rate since 1979
has been about ~ and will probably average 4 - 5 GW per year over 1985 1988.
Plant leadtimes have varied from eight to over sixteen years; national
average lifetime capacity factors range from the low of 37% to in excess of
80%.
Again, the measure of 'loss' in gener.ation due to construction delays
shows that in the 1974-83 period these countries also 'lost' an amount of
electricity (4211.5 TWh to 6016.5 TWh, depending upon the capacity factors
assumed) comparable to what they did get during this period (about 5200 TWh)
or what they ever got (about 5800 TWh).
The difficulties - NPP ordering and completion rates, construction costs,
operating performance - have been the most severe in the US, the birthplace of
nuclear energy in both its forms, where every plant ordered since end-1973 has
been cancelled; there have been no new orders since 1978 nor are any expected
until the very late 1980's or the early 1990's depending upon whose judgement
one subscribes to.
Recently, even the Atomic Industrial Forum of the US
concluded that, "Nuclear power cannot at this time be considered a viable
option on which to base new electrical capacity in the U.S." (AIF, 1984)
However, NPP ordering rates have also slowed down dramatically in the
other IME~. Even in France, where 26 net new NPPs were added during this
period (next only to the US, where l18 units were added) and 26 more are
expected to be added by 1990 (again, next only to the US, which would add 43),
ordering rates have declined from about 6 units per year during the 1970's to
2 units per year since 1982 and would remain so or drop to one unit per year
----------------------------------------------------------------3. Exports from the USSR to the developing countries have been small and
limited to a few countries - NPPs to Cuba and DzO (heavy water) to India and
Argentina.
- 9 -
at least until 1987 /8, while the state-owned utility, EdF, carries on its
massive nuclear construction program - currently spending about 40 billion FF
a year - with the long-term debt of some 188 billion FF and interest charges
in excess of operating income. (The figures are for 1983, when EdF also made
a loss of over S billion FF; its accumulated deficit is now about 23 billion
FF.)
Of course, for the developing countries or the IMEs, i t can be thought
that the recent trends are of little significance over the long term; if a
plant takes fifteen instead of five years to build, well, it will generate
electricity five years later; if a plant costs two, three, or five times as
much as was originally esimated, well, it might still be cheaper over the long
term than the alternatives; if few plants are ordered recently, well, some day
many more will be ordered. The atom - to borrow the popular characterization
of nuclear energy - is commonly thought the necessary and inevitable energy
resource to which the world must turn to, sooner or later.
Nuclear energy has long - at least since the day a nuclear weapon was
used, and in fiction since 1914 - been considered the energy resource of the
future.
And the promise of a new source of energy - based first on the
available uranium resources of the world into the converter reactors, then
reprocessing the spent fuel to get plutonium and using it with uranium-238 or
thorium-232 to get more plutonium or uranium-233, providing a virtually
inexhaustible energy resource - has been so great that the considerable
success so far - some 180 GW of nuclear capacity by end-1983, projected to
increase to more than 400 GW by 1995, worldwide - is not only disappointing in
terms of earlier expectations but also of lowered expectations and receding of
the horizons.
By end-1983, the atom had produced about 6800 TWh (equivalent to 1700
mtoe) of electricity worldwidej this was about a quarter of the total primary
energy consumption of the world in a single year of 1980.(4) By 1995, nuclear
electricity production might be about 600 mtoe-equivalent (per year), or
between 6 and 8 percent of the total primary energy supplies of the world.
In 197 S, the IAEA projected total worldwide nuclear capacity of some
2600-5300 GW by 2000; by 1983, the projection was reduced to 576-851 GW.
(IAEA, 197Sa and 1983b respectively.) Fo-r WOCA (S), INFCE in 1980 projected
4. Of course, about 1700 mtoe-equivalent of atomic energy also lies buried in
the nuclear weapons aresenals of the world. (Assuming that the nuclear weapon
arsenals of the US and the USSR have an aggregate yield of about l 5000
megatons of TNT-equivalent as cited in Sagan (1984), pp. 260, that the other
weapon arsenals total about 2000 megatons, and using the conversion factor of
l mtoe to 10 megatons TNT-equivalent. SE~e SIPRI (1984) for the US and the USSR
strategic nuclear weapons stockpile data. By the late 1980's, the US and the
USSR nuclear weapons stockpile could grow to more than 20000 megatons.
Of
course, not all of the energy in the nuclear weapons is from uranium or
plutonium, which have a yield of about 17 kilotons per kg; the fusion fuels deuterium, tritium, and lithium-6 - have yields of about SO to 150 kilotons
per kg. See Morrison (1983)).
(continued)
- 10 -
Table
4: Growth of Nuclear Power - Number of Power Reactors and Their
Aggregate Capacity (Net MW)
Additions,
197~3
Errl-1973
No.
K.J
No.
Developing
727
IMEs
104
37,236
IDMEs
18
\.XED
126
Additions,
1984-90
Errl-1983
MV
00.
Mo]
1995
No.
M.]
00.
Mo]
6652
15
7379
20
14,371
49
32,349
' 137
114,066
228
149,075
123
124,306
344
290,927
3,561
29
18,883
46
22,224
38
31,173
117
89,216
41,524
177
139,601
289
178,678
181
169,850
510
412,490
Source: Table
8: author's calculations based upon data in
Nuclear News (1984) and estimates based upon other general information
(such as from news articles in trade journals) country-by-country.
Further,
(a)
(b)
(c)
- 11 -
Table
1973
1974-83
cumulative
1983
Lifetime
to end-1983
1995
Developing
2.2
137.6
35.7
145.3
170-198
IMEs
177.0
5165.7
807.5
5938.8
1514-1766
EENMEs
11. 7
637.0
109.4
735.4
469-547
World
190.8
5940.3
952.6
6819.5
2153-2511
Sources: 1973 to 1983 data from DOE/EIA (1983b) and Nucleonics Week
(Jan. 26 1984). with 5% deduction to convert gross to net. Lifetime
generation data-author's calculations. Projections for 1995 are based
on aggregate capacity projections in Table
4; in the case of
developing countries. these projections differ from those of the World
Bank in Table
2.
- 12 -
- 13 -
Table
6: Specific Long-term Nuclear Power Plans of Developing
Countries (excluding plants under construction). Installed capacity
(net or gross MW).
Country
Algeria
Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
China
Rector Type
PWR
PHWR
N.A.
PWR
PWR
II
Cuba
Egypt
India
Iraq
Israel
S. Korea
Libya
Pakistan
S. Africa
Taiwan
Pt-.'R
PWR
PHWR
PHWR
PWR
LWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
LWR
PWR
II
Thailand
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Total
N.A.
N.A.
PWR
1990-95
1 x 600
2 x 600
1 x 300
2 x 1245
2 x 450
1 x 900
3 x 440
4 x 950
3 x 235
600
1200
300
2490
900
1 x 600
1 x 950
4 x 900
2 x 440
2 x 900
l x 1000
2 x 950
2 x 1200
1 x 900
1 x 1000
l x 1000
600
950
3600
880
1800
1000
1900
2400
900
1000
1000
26,345
1320
1900
705
1995-2000
l x 600
l x 600
600
600
4 x 1245
4980
6100
N.A.
4 x 1200
7 x 235
10-12 x 500
4800
1645
5000-6000
3 x 900
l x 1000
2 x 1000
2700
1000
2000
l x 1000
3 x 1000
1000
3000
32,82533,825
Sources: IAEA (1983b) and DOE (1983a). In case of China and India, use
has been made of some recent announcements. Overall only such
information as has been reported in the sources has been used;
occasionally, press announcements are made declaring much higher target
than the specific plans here may suggest. It is assumed that Mexico at
this time has no specific plan and its aborted 1981/2 program will not
be revived in the near future. Indonesia and Portugal have also been
. planning nuclear programs, the exact status of which is 'unclear. In the
case of China, Qinshan (Project 728 - 300 MW) and Guangdong (2 x 900 MW)
are excluded from here. The plants under construction have been
excluded. N.A. ~ Not Available.
- 14 -
time of this statement India had but four small NPP s which, taken together,
have been down for a longer period than they have operated. In an even more
optimistic tone, the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission has said
that a target of 350 GW FBR capacity in the next century has been set for
India. ( 7)
Assuming that atomic energy organizations are not, strictly speaking,
government-subsidized organs to provide humor, such projections ought to be
taken seriously.
They reveal a stronger belief in the promise of nuclear
energy as the "salvation resource" - to expand energy supplies, to provide a
substitute for reliance upon alternative fuels, and to do so cheaply - as
compared to other possible alternatives. Concerns over future energy supplies
and their costs or over security needs are legitimate, but one needs to ask
which strategies might be appropriate, in what contexts, and at what costs.
Specifically, the question to be asked is, in the foreseeable period, which in
the current contexts of uncertainties cannot be in excess of ten to fifteen
years, what strategies in regard of nuclear power are likely to be followed by
the developing countries, under what conditions they might be appropriate, and
what costs they might involve.
Energy/economic questions are only a part of the story of the history and
the probable futures of the nuclear power programs in the developing
countries.
Considering that by the time many of the developing countries
started their nuclear energy programs (in the case of India, as far back as
1948), the energy/economic basis of such programs was at best doubtful, and
that - apart from the acquisition of technologies and materials for nuclear
power plant construction and operation - there are other aspects of their
nuclear programs (relating to the fuel cycle activities) which have a larger
international political connection, it is useful to examine the international
political influences on the nuclear energy programs of the developing
countries.
- 15 -
- 16 -
Atoms for Peace - the speech, the ensuing programs - also established
international transfers of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful
uses. Exactly ten years later, in 1963 - the same year a US utility made the
decision to purchase a NPP solely on the basis of estimates of comparative
eco~omic advantage - the first NPP to a developing country (India) was sold.
The era of 'commercial' nuclear thus began at the same time both in the US
domestically (12) as well as for the developing countries.
Other developing countries also began NPP construction in the subsequent
ten years - Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia, which
accepted the US LWRs, as also Argentina, Pakistan and India (subsequent to the
two US BWRs), which accepted the PHWR designs of German or Canadian variety.
The reasons behind reactor-type and supplier choice appear to be political
(including the desire to be independent of US enrichment services) and
strategic (for a subsequent potential use for military purposes) as well as
energy/economic (India planning to build its extensive nuclear energy program
on the basis of domestic thorium to be used in Th-232/U-233 breeders, for
example).
For about twenty years after the Atoms for Peace speech, the world
transfers of nuclear technology and materials were gradually and to a large
extent liberalized.
The US had by then acquired great commercial and
political leverage in the nuclear power programs of other countries - because
of the success of its LWR technology, its near-monopoly in the uranium
enrichment services market, and at a broader scale, its position and role in
the world economy and polity.
As for its position on the issue of weapon
proliferation, the US policy had been based on a belief in its ability - as
also of the other supplier nations, among whom only Canada had until 1974/5
been commercially successful - to keep the 'atoms for peace' separate from
'atoms for war' by reliance upon a set of multinational agreements (the most
important of which was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, entered
into force in 1970) and related bilateral agreements. The implicit assumption
was that inspection of safeguarded facilities would provide sufficient timely
warnings about potential diversion to proscribed uses and that the US unilaterally or in concert with other nations - would have sufficient capacity
advantages.
12.
A historical note - the first application to electricity generation
occurred on December 20, 1951 at a small, experimental breeder reactor (thus
establishing for .the first time the feasibility of breeding) in Idaho, US; the
fir~t regular nuclear power station (5MW size) started in the USSR on June 20,
1954; the first such station (50 MW size) in WOCA began in the UK in 1956; the
first in the US was the Shippingport plant (60 MW), which began in 1957. The
USSR and the UK plants were used apparently for military purposes, at least
partially, as was the first research reactor in a developing country (India)
which began in 1956. (It is useless to argue whether the Indian explosive was
a bomb or a 'peaceful' nuclear explosive.) The Shippingport plant in the US,
while apparently not used for military purposes, was under the ownership of
the USAEC (and its successors), not of civilian entities.
- 17 -
- 18 -
reprocessing should begin and at what pace the 'transition' towards the
'plutonium economy' involving the use of breeders should be pursued.
The
debate was also linked to those over the role of the US in international
nuclear trade and safeguard regimes, as also - in this case in many other
countries as well - to the debates over global energy options, over regional
security/strategic considerations, and over the future of 'north-south'
relations.
The changes in US policy in the 1976-78 period - whereby it sought to
define proliferation as the capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive
rather than actual manufacture or testing of it, to impose restrictions on the
'sensitive' dual-purpose technologies even when they were covered by
safeguards, and, finally, to restrict further US nuclear exports only to the
NPT-signatory countries (16) were remarkable not only in that they signified
reversal of the past policies but also the very image of nuclear energy - for
which, after all, the US had been the most prominent and the most successful!
salesman.
(There were similar changes during that period in the nuclear
export policies of Canada - the other, somewhat less successful - salesman.)
They appeared to recognize the basic conflict - some may say, incompatability
between 'atoms for peace' and 'atoms for war'.
As such, they also
essentially admitted that 'partial' safeguards - such as applied to specific
facilities which may use equipment or material supplied by the exporting
nations, unlike the 'full-scope' safeguards, which cover all nuclear
facilities, as required by the NPT - were of little value.
In as much as only the US (and Canadian)" policies (17) prohibited nuclear
exports to countries which had not signed the NPT or otherwise accepted 'fullscope' safeguards, they should not have caused any substantial impact on the
nuclear power programs of the developing countries, whether they had signed
the NPT or not, and indeed there is little evidence that any formal exercise
of the export control policies of supplier nations has done so so far. (18)
still is) undertaken largely at the government expense, there are questions of
'government programs' relating to specific nuclear energy issues.
16.
For a description of the US export policies as defined by the NNPA
(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), see Warren H. Donnelly's article in
SIPRI (1979) or Potter (1982). At the meetings of the London Supplier Group,
the supplier countries have also agreed on a set of 'guidelines' they may
choose to follow in nuclear exports. However, the range of products that may
be 'dual-purpose' is very wide - ranging from special metals to apparently
common inqustrial computers - and it is not possible to even know what exactly
(s being controlled, what is being exported, by whom and to whom. See US GAO
(1983c), where paragraphs after paragrphs are 'deleted' or 'classified'.
17.
The US policy is based on - though it sometimes conflicts with legislative requirements; it is not clear to the author whether the Canadian
policies have such requirements.
18. A country wanting to purchase a nuclear power plant and, where necessary,
fuel in the international market - without accepting full-scope safeguards could do so from any country other than the US, Canada or the USSR.
(The
USSR, while not requiring full-scope safeguards, does require that the spent
fuel be returned.) Australia also requires full-scope safeguards. There are
(continued)
- 19 -
- 20 -
"(A)ggregate demand for oil, not to mention its price and the seriousness of
interruptions in international commerce, including the likelihood of war over
oil, may well depend to a substantial extent on the development of nuclear
power." (Smith and Rathjens, 1981, pp. 891)
Seen from today's vantage point, such contentions appear to be
untenable. Not just the temporary ban on domestic civilian reprocessing and
the temporary postponement of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project but
even the massive cancellations of nuclear power plants in the US have made but
a slight and marginal impact on the US oil consumption; in any case, after the
decisions of 1976/7 were reversed, the reprocessing plant was mothballed and
the breeder project abandoned. For the OECD countries as a group, the share
of oil in electricity generation has dropped from over 25 % in 1973 to about
13 % in 1982, while some of it due to displacement by nuclear power, but not
due to any new projects begun after 1978. By 1990, it would fall to about 10
% and by 2000 to about 5 % depending upon the overall growth of electricity
generation and upon the pace of current plans for non-oil capacity additions
which, as noted before, has if anything been dramatically slower than in the
past in the case of nuclear.
At the aggregate primary energy consumption
level, oil use in electricity generation was about 7 %- in 1973, about 4 % in
1982, and may fall to about 3 % in 1990. (22)
Although there is room for
qualifications and arguments, it seems reasonable to judge that if the price
and availability of oil are the main strategic concern, and in as much as
nuclear electricity can only displace relatively very small quantities of oil
used in power generation, such a role for nuclear power is essentially absent
- beyond the current plans - over the foreseeable period. (23) In fact, even
if the nuclear plans implicit in such projections - such as the OECD's nuclear
projections for Italy - were to be only partially met, the effect on aggregate
oil consumption and on the world oil markets would be practically nil. And
all this, while the breeder commercialization programs are being postponed
worldwide and the reprocessing activities delayed or sharply curtailed.
proliferation of nuclear weapons is against its interests, whether or not it
were to lead to increased risks of nuclear warfare.
Notice also the
implication that by forgoing nuclear fuel reprocessing - whose need for
expanding energy supplies can only be in the very long term - the US may be
forgoing the option of expanding its nuclear energy supplies; the cheaper way
to expand the nuclear energy supplies would be to simply build more nuclear
power plants, against which no US government has ever argued, rather than to
go the rou~e of reprocessing and the breeder.
21.
Another variant of such an argument is "the industrialized countries
shou1d use more nuclear power so as to free up oil for the developing
countries".
22.
The projected values here are based on OECD/IEA (l 984c) with some
adjustments for and rough assumptions about the OECD countries which are not
members of the IEA (France, Iceland, and Finland). The historical values are
from OECD/IEA (1984a).
23.
Whether the nuclear capacity recently installed and planned to be
installed by 1995 would have overall displaced substantial amounts of oil and
if so, economically, can only be answered when this capacity has run its
lifetime.
- 21 -
In the author's view, the oil supply and price changes of 1973/74 played
only an indirect and perhaps 'rationalizing' role for the decisions about
nuclear power. It is plausible to believe that oil price increases in 1973/74
- f~llowed by increases in the price of coal as well - changed the generation
economics; however, it is less plausible to believe that these increases were
thought to be of permanent nature around that time. Given the rapid increases
in the use of oil in power generation over the preceding ten or so years - in
some cases (such as France) the result of the decisions of the governments
which later made a massive commitment to nuclear power - some of the countries
were indeed bearing a high burden of oil price increases via their effects on
electricity generation costs (but in this respect, the proportionate final
cost increases being smaller than, say, in the case of direct use of petroleum
products such as gasoline, diesel or fuel oil for heating).
However, in as much as NPPs took - even by 1974 - six to eight years to
build, the perceived economic benefits could have been realized only that much
later.
What is more plausible is that some of the decision-makers - in
governments and in utilities - saw the drastic changes in generation economics
as a way to push for ambitious nuclear power programs; After all, despite the
high hopes of rapidly commercializing nuclear power and of acquiring a large
share of the electricity generation markets, nuclear power had progressed very
slowly in all countries except the US by 1974. (In the US, all the NPPs that
are built or still under construction were ordered before 1974). Comparative
generation economics were only a part of the reasons for such a slow growth;
however, the changes in generation economics, combined with the fears of
directed supply cutbacks (such as embargos, which could not and cannot work
effectively), in the period after 1974 lowered the barriers against nuclear
power expansion. (Such was probably the case in Western Europe and Japan, but
also in some of the developing countries such as Brazil or Iran). This is not
to say that comparative economics played no part in the spurt of NPP ordering
that occurred after 1974 - indeed they did, and may have been a more dominant
factor in some countries than in some others; what may also be true is that
even without the oil price increases of that magnitude, some of the countries
would have pushed forward with nuclear power in any case. The projections for
nuclear capacity by 1990 or 2000 were, further, probably as much guided by the
need to rationalize the breeder commer.cialization programs as by careful
analysis of electricity demand growth rates and nuclear penetration rates of
the electricity generating markets.
(Such hypotheses cannot be proved;
indeed, to paraphrase a Dr. Herbert Taylor, there is no need to ascribe to
conspiracy . that ~hich stupidity would suffice to explain.) (24)
Since one of the primary rationale about nuclear power programs was the
concern over oil consumption growth rates, availability, and price, let us see
what has happened over the ten years.
Total world primary energy consumption has for the first time in post-war
history declined for three consecutive years, 1979 annually to 1982, and has
remained practically unchanged in 1983; world oil consumption has for the
24.
- 22 -
first time declined for four consecutive years. Dividing the 1970-82 period
in four convenient three-year slices, total primary energy (TPE) consumption
as well as oil consumption grew at (average annual growth rates of) 5.1 % and
7 .O % respectively between 1970 and 1973 (only slightly slower than in the
preceding ten years); at 1.9 % and 1.1 % respectively between 1973 and 1976;
at 3.6 % and 3.0 % respectively between 1976 and 1979; and, at -0.8 % and -2.4
% respecively between 1979 and 1982.
(From Table 1.1; the growth rates are
even lower if only 'WOCA' - i.e., developing countries and the IMEs - is
considered; inclusion of China in this definition is unlikely to affect the
aggregate WOCA rates very much.) Except for the year 1976, when the world TPE
consumption and oil consumption grew 5. 7 % and 7 % respectively over the
preceding year (though after two years of virtual stagnation), neither has
achieved a year-to-year growth rate of 4 percent in any year in nearly ten
years now.
For all the oil produced between 1974 and 1983 (about 210-215 billion
barrels), which was about 40 % higher than in the preceding ten-year period
(about 150 billion barrels between 1964 and 1973) or 70 % of the oil ever
produced up to 1974 (about 300 billion barrels), and about 34 % of the (known
proved) reserves of some 620 billion barrels at end-1973, world reserves of
oil stood higher at the end-1983 (about 678 billion barrels) than at end-1973,
as they were for every year since 1973.
Indeed, in 1982 (or for that matter 1983, since the change from 1982 to
1983 was very small) the world oil consump-tion was neatly equal to that in
1973 and its total primary energy consumption only about 15 % higher.
The
share of oil in the total primary energy consumption, which had been
increasing right up to 1973, was about 13 % lower in 1982 (as compared to
1973), continuing the declining trend since 1973 where for every year except
1976 (over 1975) this share has been lower than in the preceding year. OPEC's
share in world oil production was down to 35.4 % on 1982 (and further down to
less than a third as of mid-1984) as compared to 54 % in 1973, again
continuing the year-to-year trend since 1973 with the exception of 1976. Its
share in world oil exports, which was as high as 73.9 % in 1974 was down to
52.1 % in 1982 and rough estimates put it at about a half or less as of mid1984. The real price of oil has been falling (though the extent of such fall
in non-US currencies has been smaller due to the appreciation of the dollar)
for about four years now, and might still fall further. (25)
There are various explanations for the slower - or in some cases,
.negative - growth rates for primary energy consumption and oil consumption
over the last ten years, among them lower economic growth rates, shifts in the
structure of aggregate and sectoral output, increased end-use efficiency, and
substitution away from oil.
It is this last factor, particularly in power
generation, which interests us here. Table 7 provides selective data on the
composition of primary fuel input in some IMEs and developing countries. It
is seen that only Japan and Italy among the major IMEs
(in 1982) and
Argentina, Mexico and South Korea among the major developing countries (in
----------------------------------------------------------------25. The numbers here are based on primary data from the World Bank, BP (1984)
and deGolyer and McNaughton (1983).
- 22a. -
Total (TWh)
Coal
IMEs:
USA
Japan
FRG
France
Canada
UK
Itlay
Percentage Distribution
Fossil Thermal
Primary
Nuclear Geothermal
oh
Gas
Total
Hydro
Year: 1982
2419.4
581.1
366.9
278.6
390.2
272.2
184.4
Develo~:
Year: 1980
Argentina
Brazil
China
India
S. Korea
Mexico
37.0
137.0
300.4
110.9
36.8
64.0
52.7
11.0
62.5
23.9
18.3
71.8
13.5
6.5
43.2
4.7
9.3
2.6
9.5
50.9
15.3
13.6
10.1
1.9
2.4
0.5
6.5
74.5
67.8
77 .3
35.I
23.3
81.8
70.9
13.1
14.6
5.4
25.8
67.7
2.1
25.4
4
3
64
50
7
36
7
17
20
60
10
81
53
86
59
34
90
19
42
5
39
79
50
12.4
17.6
17.3
39.0
9.0
16.2
3.7
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
5
9
Sources: For the IMEs, OECD/IEA (1984a): for the developing countries,
World Bank (1983a).
- 23 -
1980; data for Taiwan are not available) had a high share of oil in
electricity generation.
In the case of Italy, Japan, Argentina, and South
Korea, this share would decline as the non-oil capacity (a large part of it
nuclear in the case of Japan and South Korea) under construction is brought on
line.
Unless electricity demand were to rise unexpectedly and rapidly, in
which case oil-based capacity might need to be used more heaviliy or extra
oil-based capacity may need to be revived or built anew, there is little
competition between oil and nuclear generation over and above the current
plans.
(Even in the countries which do remain substantially dependent upon
oil-fired generation over the next ten to twenty years, it is not generally
obvious that nuclear power would be the most economical choice.) In fact, as
electricity demand in many cases has failed to grow as rapidly as anticipated
earlier,
nuclear
power
is
substituting
coal-fired
capacity
already
installed.
Whether over the long term, such would have been economically
advantageous remains to be seen. (26)
The experience on the other side of the issue, particularly relating to
the developing countries - whether controls on nuclear exports - particularly
of enrichment or reprocessing technology - have curbed nuclear weapon
proliferation is mixed, and this is because of the inherent limitations of the
export control regimes.
On the one hand, neither technology has spread via
authorized commercial channels beyond the countries which had them or had
contracted to have them by 1974; on the other hand, many of the countries
which in the Anglo-American jargon were called 'proliferation-risk' have
achieved nuclear weapon capability via such technologies or may do so within
five years.
(Argentina and Pakistan, with their recent announcements of
enrichment plants under construction, without safeguards; Brazil, with its
recent announcement to build a larger enrichment plant, with safeguards; South
Africa, whose enrichment plant is not under safeguards; and Israel, with a
reprocessing plant, not under safeguards. The latter two countries are widely
suspected to have manufactured nuclear weapons already.)
The experience of the connections between civilian and military nuclear
energy programs is also mixed.
No other nation since 1974 has made an
official weapon test (though it is alleged that South Africa made one or two
secret tests), no terrorist has gained access to special nuclear material or
nuclear facilities with the intention of sabotage (though in 1981 Israel did
26.
The situation is that with both nuclear and coal-fired capacity
originally built for base-load generation, it is still cheaper to operate the
nuclear power plants at a higher load factor - if possible - than the coalfired plants; this drives up the generation costs from coal-fired power plants
and also for the utility as a whole. Had a smaller volume of nuclear capacity
had been built, the overall costs would have been lower.
(This argument
applies in as much as a large part of the recent additions have been nuclear,
as has been the case in France, for example.
France has the option of
exporting its electricity surplus; however, in a situation such as Brazil's where the overcapacity involves hydro - there are no choices but to push for
increasing sales and bear the high capital costs if the plants are not
operated at an economic load factor.
- 24 -
----------------------------------------------------------------27.
All but one of the 'production reactors' in the US are not for
electricity generation and hence 'dedicated' to the weapons program. There is
one reactor, however, which is dual-purpose; it is owned by the USDOE and
hence not 'civilian'.
In the UK and France, power reactors which do
contribute to the weapons program are owned and operated by the national
atomic energy authorities and are hence not 'civilian'. The last production
reactor in France was shutdown earlier this year; the French have not ruled
out the possible use of some of the plutonium produced in the new breeder
reactor - the SuperPhenix - which is indeed 'civilian'. As mentioned in an
earlier footnote, most enrichment and reprocessing plants are 'dual-purpose'.
- 25 -
----------------------------------------------------------------28.
- 26 -
- 27 -
29. Thus in some countries, the Atomic Energy Commissions own and operate all
the nuclear facilities (including the power plants) directly; or partly own
the supply industries such as the fuel industries, the NSSS (Nuclear Steam
Supply System) manufactureres or transport companies specializing in nuclear
materials; or in some other countries, the utilities own such businesses and
the utilities themselves are in turn owned by the government. In France, for
example, the CEA owns COGEMA, which owns the reprocessing plants and partly
owns the Eurodif enrichment plant; the CEA and the EdF both have shares in
Framatome, the NSSS vendor, which in turn owns Fragema, along with COGEMA. In
the US, the DOE is in charge of both the civilian nuclear energy policy and
research work as well as of the production of nuclear weapons.
(At least
recently, the 'defense' part of the DOE budget has been higher than the
'civilian' part.)
The USDOE also owns the uranium enrichment plants and
undertakes the program of disposal of nuclear wastes from both civilian and
military activities.
Most of the operational work of the DOE is done by
private :f..ndustry contractors, which operate the dual-purpose facilities as
well as the military facilities and are again the leaders in the civilian
nuclear markets.
The same companies that build the civilian power reactors
also build the military production reactors or the naval propulsion reactors.
Uranium companies sold and sell uranium to both the civilian industries as
well as to the weapons programs.
30.
The exceptions are (1) Soviet supplies of power reactors and fuel to
Finland; of research reactors or fuel to Egypt, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Argentina
(small quantities of research-grade enriched uranium), Indonesia, China, and
Libya; of heavy water to India and Argentina; and, sales of enrichment
(continued)
- 28 -
services to some Western European utilities; and (2) Canadian sales of power
reactors to Romania. The extent of trade in uranium between EENMEs and WOCA
is not known.
India and Pakistan have both been recently mentioned as
potential customers for Soviet power reactors and fuel. Finland may purchase
one more plant from the USSR.
- 29 -
- 30 -
only country where such experience is substantially longer than ten years; the
developing countries, which in any case account for less than 5 % of the total
WOCA experience in Table 12 have had but three reactor-years of operating
experience with the 'current generation' reactors (all of which is in Taiwan).
( c).
Almost 90 % of the nuclear electricity ever generated was obtained
during the last ten years. In fact, if only the electricity consumption of
uranium enrichment activities is taken into account, it was only after end1973, and probably around 1976, that the world began to obtain first 'net'
amounts of electricity from the atom. (32) As mentioned earlier in section
(I), i f we regard that construction de!lays result in a 'loss' of generation
which has to be made up by non-nuclear generation (or worse still, result in
supply interruptions) and chat unplanned outages (or an accident such as at
Three Mile lsland-2 plant in March, 1979 or, in some minor cases, deratings of
capacity) result in similar loss, more electricity has been 'lost' than ever
gained from the atom. Apart from the energy impact of such losses, the two
factors - long construction leadtimes and lower than anticipated capacity
factors - have also played a major role in reversing or lowering the economic
advantage of nuclear power plants. (The TMI-2 accident has had a considerable
role in reducing the PWR capacity factors in recent years; exact details for
the US are not available up to the date.
For an earlier calculation of
worldwide effects, see Evans (1982)).
(d). Most of the reactors completed in the 1974-83 period have been LWRs only 18 out of the 148 units in WOCA were non-LWRs, including 6 AGRs in the UK
and 7 CANDUs in Canada. This is a reflection both of the US domestic market all but one of the reactors completed in the US during this period were LWRs as well as the dominance of the LWR technology elsewhere in the world. Such
dominance was not pre-ordained; as late as the late 1960's - when the nuclear
bandwagons started in the US - or the early 1970's - when elsewhere - the US
salesmanship played a major role in such victory. This dominance is by now
firmly established as can .be seen from the reactors under construction.
(e).
Sizes of power reactors of all types have been increasing nearly
everywhere.
More than a half of the total installed capacity in WOCA is in
the reactors 901 MW (gross) or larger. Most of the reactors in the 201-500 MW
size, or in the 501-900 MW size are relatively older than the later generation
of reactors; reactors completed in the last five years and those under
32. This observation is based on the data on electricity consumption of the
US enrichment plan.ts over 1943-83 made available to the author by Mr. David
Reist~r
of the Institute for Energy Analysis (Oak Ridge Associated
Universities) and on some assumptions about the non-US enrichment activity. If
these assumptions turn out to be invalid - though it appears unlikely that
data on electricity consumption of enrichment plants in the USSR or China can
be obtained - the date of first 'net' electricity mentioned here may need to
be changed.
However, the US enrichment plants alone had consumed more
electricity by end-1973 than that generated by all the nuclear power plants
worldwide up to that time. The fact that quite a bit of enrichment work was
done for weapons programs or for building up inventories does not matter, if
it was only useful energy output one was concerned with.
- 31 -
construction are overwhelmingly larger than 900 MW. The US and West Germany
were the first countries to start builiding reactors of more than 1200 MW
size; by 1983, one such reactor had entered operation in the US and four had
in West Germany.
France has recently decided to increase the size for
additional PWRs to 1400 MW. Among the reactors under construction, there are
12 units in the 200-500 MW size range; 2 FBRs, 1 HTR, 6 Lndian CANDUs, 2 Cuban
PWRs and 1 Chinese PWR. With the possible exception of the Cuban reactors,
none are produced from an established product line (i.e., the rest are
'custo!Ir'built'). There are 31 reactors under construction in the 501-900 MW
range; most of those close to the lower end of the range are units ordered
several years ago; with the possible exception of the Canadian CANDUs, this
product line is also essentially closed.
Product lines can be retooled to
offer different sizes, but at a considerably higher cost.
There is by now
neither the market, nor any willing supplier, for reactors smaller than 800900 MW.
As the outstanding orders are filled, i t is doubtful whether the
suppliers will long be able to offer even 900 MW LWRs or 600 MW PHWRs. It is
quite likely that within a few years - if i t is not already the case - the
only commercially available reactors will be LWRs of 1-1.3 GW and PHWRs of
800-900 MW.
As we shall see later, such sizes may make a revival of the
nuclear markets in times of uncertainty more difficult and the nuclear
industries may have to rethink their technological options.
(f). NPP lead times have been longer than planned for and in many cases have
been increasing over time.
Total leadtimes - defined as the difference
between year of order and commercial startup - have varied from 6 to 15
years.
If we exclude countries which built less than 3 plants in either of
the periods January 1974 to December 1978 and January 1979 to December 1983
(33), average total leadtimes have varied between 6 and 9 years in the first
period and between 7 and 12 years in the second period. For the plants under
construction (and which were originally scheduled to enter commercial
operation by December 1983), they would have varied between 9 and 16 years.
Average construction leadtimes - defined as the difference between month of
construction and of commercial startup - have varied between 60 and 122 months
and between 72 and 120 months for the two time periods respectively; for the
plants under construction, they would have varied between 57 and 160 months.
As a result, average delays - defined as the difference between commercial
startup date originally planned for and actually attained or currently planned
for - ranged from 0 to 49 months and from 15 to 72 months in the past and
would have ranged 21 to 89 months for the plants under construction.(34)
(g).
NPP capacity factors have been generally lower than the theoretical
maximums (about 85-90 % for LWRs, about 90-9 5 % for CANDU s) and lower than
those. generally planned for (7 5-85%). Comparison of capacity factors across
countries and over the years is complicated by the variety of influences on
33. The distinction is made so that the effect of the Three Mile Island - 2
accident in the US as well as some other countries does not confuse the
aggregate data.
34. The figures for delays are not capacity-weighted. All the numbers cited
are national averages for countries which built or would have built 3 or more
NPPs in the corresponding periods; plant-level variation is much greater.
- 32 -
- 33 -
- 34 -
602
951
654
727
7
Yugoslavia
Total
Taiwan
3,867
615
4
2,785
7,379
615
l
15
3,llO
4
15
14,371
1,814
2,999
IO16
8,04013,840
49
32,349
615
6,924
1,844
620
I ,:JJS
9.266
2,124
1,800
l!80
2,100
3,116
l,627
115
1995
11
2-4 2,IXX>-4,000
654
IO
440
2
l,844
125
5,476
660
l,790
S. Africa
I
l,234
660
2,159
I ,l!00-3,600
l,IKX>
2-4
620
125
556
004
440
1,245
~1995
202
Committed
MlftfOM.1
for ~letim
19'-95
Philippines
Pald.<1t.an
Hex:l.co
S. Korea
India
F~t
440
Q1ha
935
JOO
Argentina
Chim
600
1984--90
1,871
lhl-1983
335
1983
Brazil
1974-82
692
~.
l.lm-1973
: Growth of l'luc.Je.;ir
l'level~
Table 8
Vl
8
1
495
1,073
440
1,020
19,073
37,236
37,963
29
35
104
JOO
Netherl.ards
Spa:fn
!>Wrlen
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S.
Total
Total llXJ\
Range
20
1,728
Japan
127
120
45
560
Italy
5,344
2,170
900
103,685
99,818
40,350
2,750
920
21
17
17,033
14,248
2,927
600
900
5,935
9
43
1,940
8,648
60,848
149,075
156,454
4
33
77
228
243
138
123
7,305
IO
2,890
887
930
495
12
16,600
1,285
25
II
9,806
26,188
26
7,410
2,210
3,450
14,872
12
35
13
~1983
6,240
1,794
1983
875
8,156
17,170
19
2,210
4
7
3,100
m;
2,817
2,516
10
197~
2,550
France
F:lnland
Canada
Belg11111
Austria
I>s
~1973
l,000
138,677
124,306
47,690
5,740
942
2,100
4,629
I0,880
2,004
11,941
~0.700
5,00511,605
~12
15-24
25-40
10,688
13,687
II
17
(2
388
24,14540,745
(3704!0
344
119
26
342,000)
312.~
320,294
290,927
109,858
11,542
2,882
9,405
12
5
7,519
495
36,368
2,879
22,925
64,)68
2,2!0
1,506
5,450
1995
IO
16,10526,905
1,100
1,800)
2,000
2
48
23
6,255)
(5
62
7,CXXl11,200
5R
1,213
3,883
l,230
2,6(X)
22
6,310
1,762
AdcUtimal
for c~lettro
by 1995
7
2
CommJ.~t" ed
1990 - 95
2,000
1984--90
'
23
121,178
154
41,524
126
World
17.493
27
18
Total
3.561
13,533
2,640
181
178,678
289
18.423
J8
22,224
46
15
32
31,173
169,850
23,827
24
17.424
1,390
1,040
2
34
440
950
1,320
3
1.906
800-
505
49,03267.623
66
4~
25,058
ll7
24,87826,878
2426
1,640
3
11,371
l,760
4
400.605
89,216
71.374
1. 7fJJ
81
1,830
5
5,280
12
23.998
2.880
5,572
1995
22
24
____Ey 1995
Addit:l.roal
for ~letiro
1990-95
6,665
(JJO
l,320
880
1,906
Cq~!tted
1984-90
440
440
18
2.941
15
IBSR
Ralllnia
l\>Lanl
Hur~ry
1.830
l,320
510
(DR
880
880
IIO
1. 7fJJ
F.rd-1983
1.760
1983
1974-82
Czechoslovalda
&lgaria
mw.s
&d-1973
"
- 38 -
Table
CountrI_
Belgium
Canada
France
FRG
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
CaEacitl'.
(NW)
No.
1
3
109
543
150
10
4
1
1
-1
10
-2
-
USA
India
Total
Bl: 2000
(Incremental)
No.
ca2acitl'.
(MW)
2
2
10
478
1490
67
410
(MW)
341
3
1
1
819
50
153
11
89
679
20
6
2846
2205
1
5
9
2
350
1272
4739
420
22
1590
40
7506
24
8144
UK
Bz: 1995
(Incremental)
CaEacitz:
- 39 -
Table
PWRs
EENMEs
WOCA
Installed
Under construction
Total
BWRs
WOCA
EE't-l'MEs
'!:_/
PHWRs ll
Other
WOCA
EENMEs WOCA
EENMEs
115
24
62
19
47
21
96
39
32
18
14
211
53
94
37
61
29
1/
II
- 40 -
2~500
l-lX:A
Installed
c.apacity
Under C:OOStruction
c.apacity
Total
c.apacity
501-900 Mol
:a:A
1201 +MY
901-1200 Mol
EEN1Es
VlX'A
EF1Es
\.rrA
EFl-M'.s
46
22
89
76
12
16091
9255
62756
600
74890
12000
6324
65
29
51
66465
4500
121!
15 !:.!
31 ~
2 21
3415
6670
21870
1320
67641
2900)
58
37
120
141
41
19506
15925
84626
1920
142531
41000
SS
72789
4500
Jj
Gross capacity data are taken from IAEA; in a few cases where gross
capacity datum is not available, net capacity datum is used. IAEA
data in some cases differ significant ly fro m those i n Nuclear News,
Nuclear Engineering International, or Nucleonics Week, and
sometimes even the IAEA 1 gross' number is smaller than the
Nuclear News 'net' number. Varying definitions probably account
for such differences.
:f_/
3/
!:_/
~./
../
- 41 -
Country/Size
Argentina
India
s. Korea
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
Total
Belgium
Canada
Finland
France
FRG
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S.
Total
Grand Total
201-500 MW
No.
ReactorYears
1
4
49
3
10
5
16
15
8
16
14
18
68
10
12
11
37
172
62
36
41
--
901+ MW
No. ReactorYears
Total
Reactor Years
9
40
5
1
2
1
1
1
7
1
1
501-900 MW
No.
ReactorYears
(Operating power
1
2
5
9
1
4
15
78
5
27
42
2
53
2
8
6
1
9
11
4
30
19
13
25
93
13
73
75
20
134
10
14
56
6
45
.45
1
49
404
19
115
459
96
714
41
183
1356
508
100
..729,.. 43....
186
142 3
===
====
==z
9
40
5
11
1
67
221
581
- 42 -
DeveloE..!!!S.
Argentina
Brazil
India
Pakistan
S. Korea
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
Total
1973
1983
1974-83
(inclusive)
Lifetime
to end-1983
2.4
0.2
2.7
0.2
8.5
18.0
3.7
21.9
0.3
25.9
2.7
23.5
56.9
6.4
21.9
0.3
33.2
3.4
23.5
56.9
6.4
2.2
35.7
137.6
145.6
11.0
11. 3
3.0
9.0
1.1
6.2
2.0
5.9
26.6
83.5
22.9
50.4
16.6
137.0
61.5
5.5
101. 2
3.4
10.2
38.5
14.8
47.5
298.0
111.8
307.8
64.5
528.7
377.4
37.0
466.7
35.3
73.6
226.2
105.4
365.5
2364.7
111. 8
336.0
64.5
587.5
419.6
67.1
602.1
38.3
88.8
229.8
120.2
615.7
2657.3
177.0
807.5
5165.7
5938.7
11.1
10.4
5.8
10.9
2.3
80.0
60.3
23.4
74.3
2.3
476.9
60.3
23.4
81.0
2.3
568.4
11. 7
109.4
637.2
735.4
1.8
0.4
--
IMEs
Belgium
Canada
Finland
France
FRG
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
Total
EENMEs
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
USSR
Total
17.4
0.2
0.3
- 43 -
(b)
(c)
Total
lead time
(years)
Construction
length
(months)
Delays
in Comm. op.
start up (months)
Average
Average
Avera ge
7. 0
13.0
114 .o
13.0
148.0
1
4
14.0
15.5
154.0
159.5
88.0
88.3
9.0
9.5
94.0
80.5
28.0
10.0
18.0
132.0
114.0
11.0
110.0
30.0
8.5
100.00
17.0
3
2
9.0
9.3
9.0
78.0
80.7
72.0
36.0
36.7
37 . 0
10.0
98.0
49.0
Developing
Argentina
(a)
(b)
72.0
24.0
46.0
Brazil
(c)
73.5
India
(b)
(c)
S. Korea
(a)
(b)
Mexico
(c)
Philippines
(c)
S. Africa
( c)
Taiwan
(a)
(b)
(c)
Yugoslavia
(b)
Table 14 (continued)
IMEs
- 44 -
Belgium
(a)
(b)
(c)
3
2
2
7.0
8.5
10.0
63.3
94.5
84.0
12.3
35.0
34.0
Canda
(a) (b)
(c)
3
4
5
9.3
11.5
12.6
69.7
92.5
106.6
0
29.3
31.8
Finland
(a)
(b)
1
3
8.0
8.3
71.0
83.3
11.0
23.3
France
(a)
(b)
(c)
2
24
5
7.5
7. 1
9.2
77.0
72 .4
85.0
23.0
15.5
20.8
FRG
(a)
(b)
(c)
3
4
9
6.3
8.5
12.9
70.3
93.3
129.8
15.7
46.0
80.2
Japan
(a)
(b)
(c)
13
7
2
6.8
8.1
10.5
59.8
74.4
57.0
9.2
19.1
54.0
2
4
11.0
12.3
111.0
107.0
72.0
69.5
5
4
2
6.8
10.3
10.5
69.2
97.8
69.5
9.2
33.3
27.5
1
1
6.0
11.0
71.0
129.0
24.0
72.0
(a)
(b) .
1
7
12.8
19.0
16.3
121. 8
210.0
155.9
49.0
170.0
88.9
8.4
12.1
15.0
84.7
120.2
139.0
35.9
71. 7
88.0
Spain
(b)
(c)
Sweden
(a)
(b)
(c)
Switzerland
(b)
(c)
U.K.
. ( c)
U.S.
(a)
(b)
35
13
(c)
44
- 45 -
PWRs
No. of Units
U.S.
France
Japan
FRG
Canada
Sweden
Switzerland
Belgium
Finland
Spain
48
23
Load Factor
No. of Units
PHWRs
BWRs
Load Factor No. of Units Load Factor
23
56.1
54.8
56.0
56.2
71. 2
12
4
61.0
44.1
2
3
3 2/
22
38.3
75.1
75.1
75.6
36.8
7
l
65.1
80.5
2
1
62.7
62.0
11
80.1
Source: U.S. Congress, OTA (1984), in turn from Nuclear Engineering International,
October, 1983.
Notes:
l_/
]j
Limited to three major reactor types and to countries with at least 3 such nuclear
power plants in operation for more than a year by 1983. Thus excludes U.K., Italy
and Netherlands. For developing countries, see Table.
Load factors calculated on moving-average basis; plants operating less than a
year as of July 1983 excluded. Plant load factors weighted by plant rated
capacity (gros~ MW) to get country and reactor-type averages.
- 46 -
Size
(MW,
Supplier
Comm.
start
gross)
Capacit;t: Factors
1982
1983
Cum.to 1981
1981
Lifetime
Output
to end
1983
(TWh
~ross)
Argentina
Atucha-1
Embalse
357
649
PHWR
PHWR
Brazil
Angra-1
637
PWR
India
TAPS-1
TAPS-2
RAPS-1
RAPS-2
MAPS-1
210
210
220
220
220
South Korea
KoRi-1
Wolsung-1
KoRi-2
KWU
AECL
6/74
9/83
81.1
1985
BWR
BWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
GE
GE
AECL
AECL
DAE
10/69
10/69
12/73
4/81
2/84
50.9
51.5
36.1
595
679
650
PWR
PHWR
PWR
w
w
4/78
4/83
/83
60. l
AECL
Pakistan
KANUPP
137
PHWR
CGE
12/72
28.0
Taiwan
Chinshan-1
Chinshan-2
Kuosheng-1
Kuosheng-2
636
636
985
985
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
GE
GE
GE
GE
12/78
9/79
10/81
10/82
Yugoslavia
Krsko
664
PWR
/83
South Africa
Koeberg-1
964
PWR
Fram
/84
90.0
59.8
80.5
22.39
.24
N.A.
N.A.
60.5
30.3
2.6
22.5
43 .o
57.l
56.3
73.4
63.6
18.97
3.2
2.5
19.2
7.0
19.0
3.54
87 .3
75.2
52.4
80.3
51.1
80.0
77.4
56.7
60.8
22.14
20.37
10 .91
6.53
43.1
50.8
27.8
o.o
53.l
13.13
13.44
6 .1
2.29
6.73
Sources: IAEA (1983b) and Nucleonics Week (various late January issues).
Cumulative capacity factor to end-1981 refers to full calendar year capacity
factors after the first year of operation; these data are from IAEA, which
does not give information on Taiwan.
- 47 -
Table 4.1
OECD/NEA
(1984a)
U.S. DOE/EIA
( l 983c)
(Range)
IMES
Belgium
Canada
Finland
France
FRG
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S.
(Subtotal)
Developing
Argentina
Brazil
China
Cuba
Egypt
India
S. Korea
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
S. Africa
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
(Subt:-otal)
5.5
15.0
2.2
64.4
22.9
2.9
36.4
0.5
7.5
9.4
2.9
11.5
109.9
291.0
5.5
15.6
3.2
68.9
28.l
12.9
46.1
0.5
9.2
9.4
2.9
15.0
122.0
339.3
1.6
3. 1
2.1
0.9
1.8
2. 1
9.3
1.3
0 .1
0.6
1.8
6.9
0.6
1.6
3.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.8
N.A.
N.A.
32.3
N.A.
5.5
13.7
2.2
51.5
18.9
4.8
32.l
0.5
7.0
9.4
2.9
12.3
113.0
273.8
1. 6
1.8
2.3
4.7
0.9
3.9
13.6
3.7
0.7
1. 2
3.5
8.8
7.3
16.6
2.8
- 68.3
- 25.S
- 5.7
- 45.3
- 1.2
- 10.0
- 10.4
- 3.8
- 14.9
- 127.0
- 338.8
N.A.
N.A.
0
2.7
9.1
1.3
0.3
0.6
2.9
6.6
1.2
N.A.
- 48 Table 17 (continued)
Greece
Iran
Israel
Portugal
Turkey
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Total
32.3
N.A.
1.
0.3
N.A.
0
0
0
0 .3
0. 2
0.8
N.A.
The OECD/NEA projections are from two different sources; for the
IMEs. they are from OEOD/NEA (1984a) which has more recent, and
lower, estimates than OECD/NEA (1983d) which has been used for the
developing countries here. The former lists three developing
countries - the OECD members Greece, Portugal and Turkey. for whom
its estimates of 1995 nuclear capacity are O, 1.9 and 3.2 GW
respectively.
- 49 -
the 'supply' industries are neatly segregated between the EENMEs and WOCA;
most of the developing-country nuclear business has been within WOCA; and,
because information on the supply industries in the EENMEs is not available,
the discussion will be confined to WOCA.
The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Industry
The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) consists basically of the
'nuclear' part of a NPP - reactor vessel, steam generators, coolant pumps/pump
drives, in-core instrumentation, and other related components. (The 'reactor
plant equipment' includes several other items.) The NSSS itself does not form
a major part of the total NPP costs; estimates in the US put the NSSS cost at
less than 10 % of the base costs or about 5 % of the total costs of a NPP.
However, it is the NSSS industry (as also the architecture/engineering
industry) which is crucial to the technological/market futures of nuclear
power. We shall focus our discussion on the major NSSS vendors here.
These vendors, in turn, have in the main been outgrowths of the
conventional electrotechnical industry.
In the US, Westinghouse and General
Electric expanded into NSSS business from their conventional base of
combustion turbines, turbine generators, motors, and electrical distribution
equipment
via the work performed for the US military nuclear program.
Babcock and Wilcox (B & W) and Combustion Engineering (C-E) involvement in the
NSSS business grew from their base in fossil steam boilers and, again, via the
involvement in the US military program.
The Japanese, German, and Swedish
vendors also had a previous base in the conventional electrotechnical
industry. In Canada and the UK, the NSSS vendors have had a somewhat diffuse
organization, with a central entity (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited - AECL, a
Crown Corporation in Canada, and various companies in the US now under the
umbrella of National Nuclear Corporation
NNC) serving as the main
contractor, covering many subcontractors for various components manufacture.
In France, the NSSS vendor Framatome has been a subsidiary of a heavy
is their more direct links with the nuclear fuel cycle activities rather than
with electricity generating market alone.
40. In as much as weapons and other military programs also place demands upon
many of these 'supply' industries, their impacts should also be covered.
However, quantitative information on the military nuclear programs is
difficult to come by. In the case of uranium mining and milling industries in
W.OCA, it is thought that the impact of military programs would be minor or
negligible since large inventories of natural or enriched uranium for
potential use in military programs already exist with the NWS (except possibly
China). In the case of the US, uranium requirements for the military programs
over the next few years would be low since much of the plutonium for new
weapons can be obtained from the retired weapons and though the HEU (highenriched uranium) requirements for the naval reactors could increase, this
would be but very small as compared to the civilian reactor requirements.
Also in the US, there are dedicated reprocessing plants for military programs
and no civilian reprocessing plants. However, the effect of military programs
on the NSSS industry can be fairly substantial, particularly in the US.
- 50 -
engineering and steel firm Creusot-Loire (with interest at various times been
held by Westinghouse, the French CEA, and now EdF). [For a detailed review of
the NSSS vendors' organizational structure, see Lonnroth (1982) and Walker and
Lonnroth (1983)].
On a plant by plant basis, sometimes the entire NSSS is provided by a
single vendor, while sometimes the components are provided separately by
different vendors, including other companies who do not by themselves have the
capacity to build the entire NSSS. The decision to go one way or the other is
usually made by the customer and the architect/engineer. In addition to the
NSSS-vendors themselves, there is usually a group of 'sub-tier' companies
which are subcontracted by the vendors to provide engineering assistance or
component manufacture.
Table 18 provides the data on distribution of major types of power
reactors among the NSSS vendors in WOCA. It is seen that Westinghouse has had
a lion's share of all PWRs and GE even higher of all BWRs; their shares would
be higher still if all the orders, rather than just the reactors completed or
under active construction, were covered .
Most of the other PWR vendors are
former or current Westinghouse licensees; C-E and B & W developed their PWR
technology independently; B & W has had partial owenership of the BBR of West
Germany. Among the BWR vendors, again, most have been or are GE licensees or
have had technical cooperation agreements with GE.
For PHWRs, AECL is the
major supplier; the Canadian General Electric (CGE) has supplied PHWRs under
AECL contracts, and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had developed
the CANDU technology based upon past agreements with AECL. The sole exception
for PHWRs is Siemens, which developed a non-CANDU PHWR in-house.
Table 19 gives information on the recent experience and the current
status of twelve NSSS vendors in WOCA. The 'netting out' of cancellations and
indefinite deferrals admittedly gives a biased picture in terms of the amount
of business actually received or the amount of work actually performed,
because in many such cases some amount of component manufacturing work was
completed before cancellations or deferrals. Further, such netting also gives
an impression that some of the less active vendors may have technologically
fallen behind, in that in the absence of active business - particularly for
the US vendors - the amount of technfcal innovation work may also have
declined, though such is not the case. (41) Besides, hopes of order revivals
has also helped continue such innovation work.
Table
indi~ated that
expected to be small.
The
industry, where no orders are
least. (Under some scenario,
one or two units before 1990
been placed since 1978 and as
41.
In the US, for example, component manufacture work has continued at a
fairly brisk rate so far, and the general impression is that such work including the technological changes required because of more stringent
regulatory requirements - has faciliated technical innovation.
- 51 -
Country
Number of Reactors
Domestic
Installed
Export
France
31
27
20
1
us
10
---Under Construction--Domestic
Export
PWRs
Westinghouse (b)
Framatome (c)
Combustion
Engineering
Mitsubishi
KWU (d)
Babcock &
Wilcox
Siemens (d)
Other ( e)
us
Japan
FRG
7
3
us
8
4
FRG
See note
Total (f)
24
27
13
4
5
2
8
6
2
2
90
23
74
20
25
14
13
7
5
2
2
2
3
2
5
3
2
46
16
26
12
2
2
11
(2)
BWRs
General Electric (g) us
Sweden
ASEA-Atom
Japan
Toshiba
Japan
Hitachi
KWU (d)
FRG
AEG (d)
FRG
Other (h)
See note
Total
PHWRs
AECL ( i)
CGE
Siemens ( d)
KWU (d)
Other (j)
Total
Canada
Canada
FRG
FRG
14
17
- 52 -
Table 18 (continued).
a. Excludes types of reactors other than conventional LWRs and PHWRs.
excludes plants shutdown (including the Austrian one), cancelled and
indefinitely postponed.
b.
Also
- 53 -
( b)
Domestic
Export
0
0
0
0
10
42
us
Westinghouse
General Electric
C-E
B & W
10
1973
1973
1973
1970
(5)
(l)
(3)
(2)
1978 (2)
1973 (2)
N.A.
N.A.
France
Framatome
( f)
1980 (2)
(f)
(f)
(f)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
( f)
1980 (l)
Japan
Mitsubishi (d,e)
Hitachi (e)
Toshiba
10
3
6
FRG
KWU (g)
UK
NNC (h)
1980 ( 2)
N.A.
Sweden
ASEAAtom
1975 (l)
1974 (l)
1974 (l)
1981 ( 1)
77
31
Canada
AECL
Total (i)
Sources: Information compiled mainly from Nuclear News (1984) and Nuclear
Engineering International (1983) but also from other sources which forms the
basis for Table 18.
- 54 -
Table 19 (continued)
a. Includes only the commercial power reactor types in WOCA, i.e., LWRs,
PHWRs, GCRs/AGRs.
Some of the NSSS vendors also manufacture research and
military (for naval propulsion mainly; to the author's knowledge, no new
production reactors have been built in recent years) reactors.
b. Excludes some of the vendors who have already dropped out of the market
(General Atomic, Allis Chalmers in the US; Brown Boveri in FRG).
c. Thus excludes plants cancelled or indefinitely postponed. Also excludes
Kaiseraugst (Switzerland), Sayago (Spain) and Carroll County (US) - which are
still maintained on the Nuclear News roster but whose future is unclear. Such
'netting' gives a bleaker picture of the NSSS vendors' business than was
actually the case, since on many of the cancelled or indefinitely postponed
plants, orders for NSSS equipment had been placed and fulfilled. On the other
hand, as importing countries acquire increasing capability for local
participation, the value of the export orders for the major contractor/vendor
has been gradually declining.
d.
Cumulative orders for 1974-83 include those for Tomari-1 &2 and Ikuta -3.
e. Excludes the Monju FBR whose construction was authorized in 1983; Toshiba,
Mitsubishi, and Fuji are expected to work jointly on it. Some foreign vendors
may also participate.
f, New domestic orders are expected to come annually for Framatome and at
least two of the Japanese vendors; KWU is also expected to continue receiving
orders as some of the plants seriously delayed during the 1974-83 period move
on through licensing and ordering process.
g. The KWU is a subsidiary of Siemens, formed in the late i960's out of a
merger of AEG and Siemens nuclear divisions.
h.
i. Also excludes four orders in Belgium - Doel 3 & 4 and Tihange 2 & 3 which were placed in 1974-75 with the two consortia ACECOWEN and FramACECO
- 54a -
..
19a
Tabler~ Us Nuclear Power 1953-1983
Year
Orders, gross
SubseguentlI caneelled7ind-
Orders 1 net
Year-end
Installed
CaEacitI
Annual
Generat ion
finitel~
~oned
No.
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967(a)
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
No.
MW
No.
MW
MW
60
60
2
1
465
175
2
1
465
175
1
1
65
72
1
1
65
2
5
630
3,018
2
4
630
2,556
7
20
31
15
7
14
21
38
38
462
4,475
16,526
26,462
14 ,018
7,203
14,264
20,957
41 t 313
43,319
2
3
3
1
12
27
29
1,462
2,386
2,947
583
11,671
29,162
32,650
1974
1975
1976
1977
l 978(b)
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
34 40 ,015
4,148
4
3
3,804
5,040
4
2,240
2
34
4
3
4
2
40,015
4,148
3 ,80"4
5,040
2,240
Total
-
-
72
7
20
28
12
4
13
9
11
9
4,475
16 ,526
24,074
11t632
4,256
13 ,681
9,286
12,151
10,669
--
--
No.
MW
1
1
1
2
3
4
7
60
60
60
260
435
700
910
Neg.
0.2
0.2
0.5
1.7
2.3
3.2
9
10
885
901
1t798
1,763
2,730
4,040
5,088
8,467
13, 171
20,051
3.3
3.7
5.5
7.7
12.5
13.9
21.8
38.1
54.1
83.5
29,207
36,885
40, 542
47,013
49,957
51,082
52,937
52,937
57,921
601848
114 .o
11
10
10
13
16
21
27
36
44
53
57
65
68
70
72
72
74
77
Twh
172.5
191.1
250.9
276.4
255.4
251.1
272.7
282.8
292.1
2611 .o
- 54b -
Tablel9a: (continued)
For orders, USDOE/EIA 1982a; for year-end capacity, various sources. For
generation, USDOE/EIA 1984a. Capacity and generation data here may differ
slightly from other sources used elsewhere in the paper due to differences in
definitions and coverage.
(a) TMI-2, ordered in 1967, operated for less than four months before the
accident; it has been taken out of the 'net' numbers here. One interpretation
could be that this was a 'cancellation' by God.
(b) The two reactors ordered in 1978 - Caroll County l & 2 - have not been
cancelled yet nor 'indefinitely' postponed. They are now scheduled for
operation beginning in the early next century, and there is no specific plan
for their construction; hence, they have been treated here as effectively
'cancelled'.
- 55
42.
The cancelled NPPs which had a substantial amount of equipment
manufactured and delivered represent a valuable inventory for possible sales
to foreign customers of the US.
It is estimated that this inventory of
nuclear equipment and material 'in storage' is about 25 to 30 CW-equivalent.
Some of this inventory will have been used by the early 1990's for replacement
on in-service plants, but a large part of it would still be unused.
In the
current atmosphere in the US, the owner utilities have little interest in
maintaining the inventory, since the plants for which the orders were placed
will most likely never be revived and even if they were, some of the equipment
might not prove acceptable anyway.
Considering that no new NPPs will be
ordered in the near future, the chances of selling parts of this inventory to
other domestic utilities are also slim.
If, on the other hand, a large
quantity of it were offerred for overseas sales at distress prices, it could
have a profound impact on the US - as well as other countries' - supply
industries. So far, it is reported that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
and the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPPS) have tried to interest
the Chinese in their mothballed NPPs.
Whether such efforts will succeed
remains to be seen. One could ~dvance a proposal similar to the 'PL-480' under which the US transferred large quantities of food at subsidized prices
and special payment arrangements - for the NPPs; however, the US as well as
the non-US vendors would probably protest against such an arrangement.
43.
One major vendor has recently started major layoffs and closing of the
plants, and has not been active in the export market recently.
Another,
minor, vendor started winding down about five years ago and is no longer
considered active in the market.
Problems for the US NSSS industry were
foreseen by some astute observers as far as ten years ago; see Joskow and
Baughman (1976), and Lonnroth and Walker (1982, originally prepared around
1978).
- 56 -
- 57 -
and one Taiwanese order went to Westinghouse; two South Korean orders went to
Framatome; and, one Argentine order to KWU. GE, which had the second largest
number of export orders for the entire WOCA up to 197 3, has not landed an
export order anywhere since then. (Construction starts for the 1974/75 orders
for va ldecaballeros 1 & 2 in Spain were delayed until 1980 and both are now
practically cancelled).
The export market could have increased in two ways - either the ordering
rate in the countries which had already ordered NPPs could be increased, or
new countries could be induced to purchase them. In the f~rmer case, expected
further orders from Iran, Brazil and Mexico did not materialize (nor from the
Philippines, Spain, Yugoslavia, or South Africa); in the latter case, only one
country entered the international market as a new customer - Romania. (45)
Continuous flurries of interest, and occasional rushes towards announcing of
bids, had not produced a single customer - from among Egypt, Turkey,
Indonesia, Portugal or Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Bangladesh, Israel, Thailand - as
of mid-1984. (Some of these cases, as also that of China is discussed in the
next section.)
The export market race - with the vendors, construction contractors and
architect/engineers as well as the ambassadors, ministers, prime ministers and
presidents in the running - had by 1982 become crucial to the vendors for
their short-term viability. As the domestic order situation has not improved
(or has, in fact, worsened) since, winning a single export order - whether or
not it is profitable to the particular vendor or the home country in question
(whose government, after all, would arrange for subsidized financing and
credit guarantees) - is by now a question less of maintaining or increasing
market share or of furthering government-to-government commercial and
strategic interests, and more of plain survival.
In the longer term, the
outcome of the export market race could have significant effects on the nature
of the future world NSSS industry, as also on the international nuclear
commerce and non-proliferation regimes.
Table 20 provides speculative estimates of the WOCA reactor export
markets.
The first two columns are of Walker and Lonnroth (1983), an
excellent study of the prospects for the civilian nuclear (specifically, NSSS)
industries in WOCA; the next two columns present this author's estimates for
the same period (1983-87), and the last two columns present this author's
estimates for the 1983-90 period.
This latter period is chosen partly to
extend the horizons of the forecast, partly because this author has by now had
about two more years of information than Messrs. Walker and Lonnroth had, and
----~------------------------------------------------------------
45.
Even the Romanian orders - for two CANDUs from AECL - were practically
inactive until about 1982/83, when a new financing arrangement including
further credit guarantees and barter trade had been worked out. One probable
reason for the Romanian purchase of CANDUs is precisely the same as in the
case of some of the developing countries in the past, namely a desire to be
(or to show to be) independent of the probable supplier of LWRs and enrichment
services, in this case the USSR.
The CANDUS, and as such Canada, may also
have been considered a politically safer choice - in terms of the perceived
reaction of the USSR - than the Western LWRs and their suppliers.
- 58 -
1983-87 inclusive
Walker &
Author
Lonnroth (1983) (b)
Low
High
High
Low
Industrialized
Europe ( c)
Developing
Europe (d)
Developing
Asia (e)
Developing
Latin America (f)
Developing
Africa (g)
1983-90 inclusive
Author
Low
High
10
11
11
12
18
Total develoEing
(Av. GW/yr) (h)
2
(0.4)
23
(4.6)
8
(2.0)
19
(3.8)
11
(1.4)
30
(3.8)
(LO)
32
(6.4)
9
(1.8)
20
(4.0)
16
(2.0)
40
(5.0)
d.
e.
f.
h.
i. Total is slightly lower than the sum of individual groups in the 'high'
case on the presumption that a 'high' case is unlikely to be obtained across
the board.
- 59 -
partly because - in this author's judgement - the present problems of the NSSS
industries will continue at least until 1990.
Note that while the author is somewhat more optimistic at the lower end
of the range - partly due to the inclusion of China and partly to have a 'best
worst' scenario, he is also considerably pessimistic at the higher end, i.e.,
the 'best best' scenario.
If the author's judgement is correct, this means
that in the aggregate, the export markets do not offer much of a hope to the
vendors.
Three
industry:
implications
follow
from
the
discussion
so
far
of
the
NSSS
(a). The NSSS industries will pass through a period of retrenchment and
consolidation, the nature and the magnitude of which will depend upon
the length of time it takes for routine orders to resume and, once such
orders resume, on the volumes and average rates of ordering. With the
current LWR market, whose current supply capacity is between 25-35
GW/yr. (although the latent, 'readily available' capacity is about 30-40
GW/yr., a margin which would be lost more or less permanently in the
next two to four years), if reactor ordering rates reach only about 10
GW/yr. by 1988, the supply capacity might fall to about 15-20 GW/yr by
the early 1990's. If the orders are coming from export markets, there
would be an increasing trend towards forming partnerships and consortia
involving more than one vendor, architect/ engineer and from more than
one or two countries. As a result, the NSSS industry would become more
'multinational' in character. There may be economic and technological
implications of such retrenchment and consolidation which are as yet
difficult to point to. (46)
(b). The US NSSS industry may gradually lose whatever market leadership
it currently enjoys in the international market.
The extent of such
loss and and its effects, however, depend upon where the additional
orders come from, when, and the reasons behind such a loss.
It is
unlikely, at the same time, that such a loss would be drastic and/ or
sustained over a long time (unless the export market more or less
collapses or ends altogether). For example, if the export orders over
4~.
Thusf for example, it is said that at an ordering rate of only two units
per year, the cost of Framatome reactor will increase by 15-20 % (Nuclear
News, July 1984, pp. 67). A similar estimate for the US would be meaningless,
given the overall cost explosion in recent years and that there would at best
be two orders per year for the next four or five years (all from the export
market).
Further, the vendor home-country financing agencies might be less
enthusiastic about giving a higher share of financing than the shar~ that
country's indsutries may have in the total package. And, whereas in the past,
LWR sales usually bore the stamp of the USNRC requirements - a standard
against which LWR designs were judged - this will be less the case in the
future.
- 60 -
the next five years were to come largely from the developing countries
(China, Egypt, Portugal, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, possibly
Yugoslavia and Israel), it is plausible to argue that the US Departments
of State and Commerce (along with other arms of the US government) would
apply pressures upon - or assist in financing for - some of these
countries with which the US has strong commercial or strategic ties to
place their orders with the US vendors. (47) Or, if the export market
were to be on the low side of the estimates of the author in Table 20,
it is difficult to see what long-term effects of any great significance
any vendor's loss or gain in the export market could follow. Only in
the extreme case of a single vendor - or a group of vendors from a
single country - winning more than SO % of whatever export market there
may be over the next six or so years can the repercussions on the future
of the international nuclear industry be said to be great; in the
author's judgement, such an event is not likely.
(c).
The competition over export orders may lead to the weakening of
the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This could
occur in two forms - one, in as much as the cur rent regime is USinspired (48) and US-dominated, a major loss of export market would
loosen the US grip on the regime; and two, as countries other than the
Western countries (including Japan and Australia) enter the nuclear
(equipment as well as materials and technology) export market (as some
of the developing countries - Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South
Korea - have or are thought to be planning for), the Western control
over the regime would weaken.
In the first case, it is not clear
whether the countries other than the US would be willing to change 'the
rules of the game' or would be capable of doing so. In fact, in as much
as some of these countries will be in a position to define the future of
the international non-proliferation regime, it is not even clear whether
this is a position they want to be in and if and when they are in such a
position, whether they would want to differ significantly with the US.
The latter case
- over a longer term - is much more of a problem.
Indeed, in such a case, the objectives of and the strategies for nuclear
non-proliferation may need to redefined or, in an extreme situation such as when accompanied by regional nuclear arms races - may become
irrelevant altogether. (49, 50)
47.
One particular possibility that worries the US industry (and some
sympathetic observers) is that of Japan entering the market. Although Japan
has so far refrained from doing so, one Japanese vendor has recently agreed to
supply some reactor components to China and has joined Westinghouse in
submitting a bid in Turkey.
Whereas Japan may be in a position to claim
technological superiority - if not now, within the next ten years - it does
not have the strategic/military clout the US has and to the extent that such
considerations play a part in NPP orders, it may be at a disadvantage.
48. Ignoring for simplicity the role of the USSR, since it has only a limited
trade with the NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapons States) and is reported in any case
to require more stringent safeguards conditions than most other supplier
countries.
(continued)
-01
1.. ..:
- 62 -
- 63 -
Table
Countrr
us
Canada
France
Gabon
Namibia
Niger
S. Africa
Australia
Others(b)
Total(c)
1973
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
10,200
3 '710
1,616
402
162
9,800
5,790
2,097
1,408
2,339
1 ,609
3,360
356
393
14,810
6,817
2,725
1,100
3,770
3,629
4,800
706
303
16,807
6,739
2,635
1,033
4,038
3 ,880
6' 186
1'561
549
14,800
7 ,802
2,650
1,020
3,970
4 '361
6' 135
2,860
364
10,331
8 ,048
2,880
970
3,777
4,260
5,818
4,470
775
7,885
7 ,311
3,529
980
3,719
3,421
6,080
3,016
486
19 '773
28,852
38,660
43,428
43,962
41,329
36,426
---
948
2,735
---
Source: BP (1984). Data are slightly different from those in UN (1983) for
ISIC 230252M and from those in OECD/NEA (1983d). Definition of WOCA according
to the source.
a.
u3o8
- 64 -
Table
us
Canada
S. Africa
Australia
Niger
France
Gabon
Others
Total
1985
1990
1995(A)
1995(B)
10,400
11 ,500
6,326
3,800
4,000
3,900
1,500
12,200
12,100
6,463
3,300
4,000
3 '900
1,500
14,000
9,900
6, 118
5,000
4,900
3 '900
1,500
18,700
14,200
10,657
5,000
N. A.
3 '900
N. A.
46,600
49,357
50,501
75,490
Source: OECD/NEA (1983d), except for Niger, where the estimate for 1995 was
later revised by OECD/NEA. For 1995, (A) refers to the short-term projections
based in most cases on existing and committed projects; (B) refers to
existing, committed, planned and prospective projects. All production
capability is to be supported by the Reasonably Assured Resources (RAR) and
Estimated Additional Resources - I (EAR-I) categories (as of l January 1983)
recoverable at costs of US$ 130/Kg. U or less. Definition of WOCA.according
to the source.
- 65 -
Table
Country
At price
(per Kg U)
us
Australia( a)
s. Africa
Canada
Brazil
Niger( a)
Namibia
Subtotal
--------
< $80
131.3
314.0
191.0
176.0
163.3
160.0
119 .o
1254.3
RAR
$80-130
275.9
22.0
122.0
9.0
16.0
444.9
--------
Total
< $80
$80-130
30.4
369.0
99.0
181.0
92.4
53.0
30.0
854.8
26.6
4.8
0.3
1.3
o.o
10.9
37.0
4.7
27.0
26.0
18.8
15.7
169.1
4.5
4.5
99.9
67.5
42.6
39.0
23.3
27.0
26.0
23.3
23.3
269.0
Others(b)
44.3
30.4
Total (a)
1467.7
57 5 .2
11 .3
EAR-I
407.2
336.0
313.0
185.0
163.3
160.0
135.0
1699.2
France
India
Sweden
Gabon
Denmark
Algeria
Argentina
Spain
Subtotal
56.2
31. 7
2.0
18.7
--------
--------
52.2
25.0
48.0
48.0
Total
82.6
394.0
147.0
229.0
92 .4
23.0
196.2
53.0
53.0
1051.0
6.25
14.6
43.0
8.3
16.0
32.9
19.3
43.3
9.6
16.0
7.0
7.0
45.0
88.2
7.0
7.0
133.2
74.7
14.5
23.4
37.6
2042. 9
914.3
307.8
1221.8
o.o
- 66 -
us
France
Australia
Canada
India
Brazil
S. Africa
Others(a)
Total
(In 1983$)
Sele~t_ed
Years (Current
Pre-1977
1979
1981
729.8
(1966-76)
139.6
101.0
385.6
180.3
56.7
61.2
33.0
70.S
43.0
so. 7
N.A.
92. 7
(1971-76)
53.0
110.s
85.2
34.5
7.7
N.A.
1983
(Planned)
N.A.
1977-1983
(Cumulative)
1,718.0
372.0
169.0
(1977-81)
543.2
17.0
(1977-79)
117 .o
114 .3
12.5
24.1
18.8
19.2
4.3
5.3
166.0
7 5 .o
64.2
38.4
N.A.
1,359.3
709.6
481.2
189.9
N.A.
913.4
496.4
189.9
N.A.
77 .2
N.A.
- 67 Table
(A).
Country/Group
Annual Quantities
1985
us
1995
--
--
2000
Cumulative Quantities
(Since 1957)
1985
2000
14.8
17.8-20.2
21.0-25.4
136.4-141.5
398-433
Other OECD
20.1-22.3
29.7-36.0
30.6-40.2
182-190
595-682
Other WOCA
1.8-2 .4
5.3-7.3
7. 5-9. 9
11.1-13.2
78-103
Total WOCA
36.6-39.6
52.7-63.4
59.1-75.5
330-344
1071-1217
(B).
Countri:/GrouE
--
1985
us
Annual Quantities
1995
2000
9.1-9.5
12.0-13.2
13.4-15.9
Other OECD
11.7-12.9
18.1-21.9
19.3-24.9
Other WOCA
o. 9-1.3
2.8-4.0
4.4-5.8
Total WOCA
21.7-23.7
32.9-39.0
37.1-46.7
(C). Spent Fuel Discharges. (Thousand Metric Tons Heavy Metal or MTHM)
Annual
Country/GrouE
Dischar~
--
--
Cumulative Discharges
(Since 195 7)
1985
2000
1985
1995
2000
1.3
2.5-2.7
2.9-3.2
10.6
45.6-48.2
Other OECD
3.0-3.1
5.9-6.6
6.3-7.6
22 .0-22 .2
100.0-109.6
Other WOCA
0.2
0.9-1.0
1.4-1. 9
1.1
12.3-14.8
Total WOCA
4.5-4.6
9.3-10.3
10.6-12.8
33.7-33.9
157.8-172.6
us
- 68 -
to be published shortly.
The author suspects that the revision would bring
the annual uranium requirements for 1995 low end - which would be comparable
to those corresponding to the author's single point estimate of 1995 installed
capacity in Table 8 - to the estimate of production capability by 1990 or 1995
(A) in Table 22.
While this may give an impression that existing and committed uranium
projects might just about be enough to meet annual demands by 1995, such is
not the case. For one, 1995 annual requirements do not translate into annual
new demand because of the existence of the large quantities of stockpiled
uranium.
In WOCA as a whole, uranium production has always exceeded annual
demand.
As of end-1983, about 180,00.0 tons of uranium were in officially
disclosed government and private stockpiles; in addition, about 70,000 tons of
undisclosed stockes are held by various governments. (54) Even at the lower
figure of 180 ,000 tons, the stocks are enough to meet annual power reactor
requirements for about five years; even if annual production falls below
annual requirements - as is expected to be the case beginning 1985 - the
existence of such large stocks would continue to exercise downward pressure on
prices for quite some time. (55) By 1990, most if not all of the uranium for
the NPPs listed in Table 8 would have been contracted for; if it appeared then
that a possible shortfall of production relative to demand might occur by, say
about 2000, some of the closed mines can be reopened, some deferred projects
can be revived, and of course new projects can be planned.
It is possible
that as production costs rise, prices may begin to rise in real terms around
1995,though the margin of such an increase would depend upon the anticipations
about nuclear capacity growth over the long term. (56) From today's vantage
point, it is not at all clear whether substantial real increases in uranium
prices may begin around 1995, 2000, or 2025. (57, 58)
54. Between 1942 and 1965, about 246,000 tons of uranium were produced; about
80-90% of it went to military programs, though some of it has not been used
for weapons (or military reactor fuel) purposes and is in the government
stockpiles.
Up to end-1983, a total of about 700 ,000 tons of uranium were
produced; about 37 percent this production was actually used in nuclear power
plants; excluding the military use, about- 220 ,000 to 240 ,000 tons of uranium
are in the government and private stockpiles as of 1984. (Author's estimates
based on various fragmentary pieces of information.
The OECD/NEA reports
about 170,000 tons of officially disclosed stocks as of January, 1983.
A
small part of these stocks are in the form of enrichment tails.)
55. The storage and carrying costs of uranium stockpiles is among the items
that do not show up in annual generating costs of nuclear electricity.
56. Prices may also rise because of government restrictions on international
trade (such a reimposition of import controls by the US government) or because
of cartelization.
57. As late as four years ago, there were concerns about the availability of
uranium in the short term - i.e., whether enough production capability could
be established to avoid further increases in prices - as well as in the longterm - i.e., about the physical resource base.
Some of this concern might
have been overplayed, combined with fantastic projections of installed nuclear
capacity, in order to establish a case for the breeder technology.
!!ASA
(1981) took the 1978 estimate of US uranium resources of 1. 7 m.i llion (at less
(continued)
- 69 -
- 70 Table
Country/
Owner/Operator
Location
us
USDOE/Union
Carbide
Oak Ridge, TN
USDOE/Union
Carbide
Paducah, KY
USDOE/Goodyear
Atomic
Portsmouth, OH
Total
GDP
Op.
GDP
Op.
Op.
GDP
27.0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
USDOE/
Portsmouth, OH
1943
GCP
2.2
(Upto 8.8)
AGCEP
(4.5?)
U/C
1987?
(Planned)
USSR
Siberia; exact
GDP
location unknown.
(Available for exports to WOCA)
France
CEA
Eu rod i f
UK
UKAEA
Urenco
7 - 10
Op.
1950?
Op.
1960?
Op.
1979
1957?
1981?
1983/4
(3 - 5)
Pierrelatte
GDP
Tricastin
GDP
Capenhurst
Capenhurst
--(ibid)-
GDP
GCP
GCP
o.4-0.5
0.2-0.4
1.0-2.0
Op.
Op.
U/C
Karlsruhe
JN
0.5
Op?
GCP
GCP
0.2-0.4
1.0-2.0
Op.?
U/C?
1981?
GCP
GCP
o.5-1.0
1.0-2.0
Planned
Planned
1991/5
2000
JN/Helikon
0.2-0.3
Op.
GDP
o.5-2.0
Op.
0.3-0.4
10.8
FRG
Netherlands
Alme lo
-(ibid)-
Uren co
Japan
~outh
Afr-ica
Valindaba
China
26:
- 72 Table
27:
Contract Offers
Effective Date
of price
Price (c)
$/SWU
(Current $)
Jan. 1, 1968
Feb. 22, 1971
Nov. 14 , 19 71
26.00
28.70
32.00
36.00
42 .10
53.35
59.05
61.30
74.85
88.65
98.95
110 .oo
130.75
138 .65
1, 1984) (e)
Prices (d)
$/SWU
$/SWU
(Current $) (1980 $)
(FY)
Costs
$/SWU
(Current $)
1971
34 .01
26.71
49.65
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
31 .31
31.75
37.06
44 .17
54.39
30.49
32.53
36.99
46.36
60.30
54.45
54.86
57.35
65.76
81.27
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
61.44
101.51
100.97
138.68
187.78
174.65
181.79
68.23
84.29
95.60
120.58
112. 81
135.39
143.90
86.92
99.99
104.37
120.58
102.93
116.51
119.22
Year
153.00
157.00
135.00
Source: From various USDOE and USGAO sources; constant price series based on
the author's calculations.
a. USDOE as well as its predecessors, USAEC and USERDA. The USAEC was
authorized in 1964 to sell enrichment services, beginning in January 1969;
financial statements were published only beginning Fiscal Year 1971 (ending
June 30, 1971). In 1976, the US government changed its fiscal year to end on
September, 30th. It is not clear which of the FY listed her e includes the
July 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976 period .b. Refers to the price DOE offered in its contracts as of that date. As of
end-1983, DOE had three different types of contracts active; in January 1984,
a new type of contract (USC, see below) was offerred.
c. Strictly speaking, these are average revenues and differ from the contract
price in effect as of that year because of old contracts.
d.
- 73 -
tJ
The USDOE enrichment enterprise has run into problems for two reasons.
First, the demand for its enrichment services has dropped, because of
secondary market sales and because of increased competition from the French
Eurodif sales to European - as well as to some US - utilities and from the
Soviet enrichment sales to some European utilities. (60) For the (US Fiscal
Year) 1984-88 period, the USDOE is reported to have already lost about 9 .4
million SWUs of work (equivalent to about $1.3 billion of business) due to the
secondary market transactions; if such transactions increase, as is likely to
be the case, the USDOE could lose more than $4 billion of business over these
years. Secondly, the USDOE has been building an enrichment plant based on the
gas centrifuge technology whose investment cost is estimated as about $10
billion. (61)
Faced with the substantial overcapacity, the USDOE has also
59.
At various times, there has been talk in the US of transferring
enrichment business to the private sector.
Around 1973/74, two groups of
companies - one comprising of General Electric and Exxon Nuclear, the other of
Bechtel, Union Carbide, and Westinghouse - considered building enrichment
plants; by around 1976/7, these plans were effectively cancelled.
60.
One reason for increas-ed competition from Eurodif in recent years is
simply the appreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the French Franc. Another is
that Eurodif could be understating its costs of enrichment services
production.
It is also possible that Eurodif gets a discount on its
electricity purchases from EdF.
USDOE has recently 'threatened' to file
dumping charges against COGEMA, Inc. - the US subsidiary of COGEMA. It is not
clear if anything will come of such threats.
The USSR has reportedly been
offering enrichment services at '10 % less than the US price' to any willing
customer.
61. Another problem for the USDOE is that with lower than planned utilization
rates for its gaseous diffusion plants, it is having to pay 'capacity charges'
penalty for the electric power it contracted for but no longer needs.
By
1992, the cumulative penalties alone would reach about $1.2 billion. For a
discussion of USDOE's costing and pricing method, see USGAO (1983a, d;
(continued)
- 74 -
advanced the date for selection of the 'next generation' of technolog y between adv anced gas centrifuge and laser isotope separation - to 1985.
(Originally, both the technologies were to be developed; however, neither may
be needed for a long time yet and the R & D costs of both together are thought
to be unjustifiable.)
In the aggregate, WOCA surplus of enrichment capacity will persist until
at least 1995 as can be seen from the Table 25 estimate of enrichment services
requirements and the Table 26 estimates of available enrichment capacity by
1995.
Estimate of the cost of enrichment services for the plants currently
operating or under construction is difficult to make, because of the presence
of various types of contracts and of the secondary market, on the one hand,
and uncertainties about USDOE enrichment pricing on the other.
Table 27
provides historical data on USDOE enrichment costs and prices.
Table 25 also gives estimates of annual production rates and cumulative
quantities of spent fuel from WOCA NPPs (revised estimates will be published
soon by the USDOE/EIA). Originally, the expectations were that the spent fuel
will be reprocessed to recover useable uranium as well as plutonium; the
uranium and some of the plutonium could be used back in the converter power
reactors, and the rest of the plutonium would have been used in the
breeders.
However, with the current and anticipated uranium prices,
reprocessing as well as the breeder have become uneconomical options. In the
US, after the government ban on reprocessing and on continuation of the Clinch
River Demonstration Breeder Reactor Project (CRBR) was lifted in 1981,
continued technical uncertainties and lack of economic justification of
reprocessing led to the cancellation of the commercial reprocessing plant, and
escalation in capital cost estimates led to the cancellation of the CRBR as
well (both occurred in late 1983). Hence, as far as the US is concerned, both
commercial reprocessing and breeder reactor 'demonstration' are postponed
indefinitely, perhaps well beyond the lifetimes of the NPPs currently
operating or under construction. As a result, direct disposal (or placement
in Monitored Retrievable Storage facility) of the co!IIInercial spent fuel would
take place.
Reprocessing and breeder programs in other countries have also been
delayed, though the belief in the necessity of both continues. Table 28 lists
most of the reprocessing plants in the world, and Table 29 lists all the
breeder reactors in the world. Technical experience with commercial LWR fuel
- which accounts for the majority of total spent fuel - has so far not been
satisfactory (62), and in any case the economic rationale for reprocessing has
-~-------------------------~-------------------------------------
1984b). The USGAO estimates that the USDOE will lose about $3.3 billion over
the next ten years with the $135/SWU price ceiling the latter has proposed
under the Utility Services Contract.
This is because the USDOE estimates a
volume of about 191 million SWUs demand, which will likely not be realized,
thus driving up the unit costs above the ceiling sales price.
62. Most of the reprocessing done to date has been for the low burn-up fuel
from dedicated production reactors (graphite-moderated and heavy-water) or
from power reactors of GCR type (some of which are 'dual-purpose'). GCR spent
fuel cannot be stored for long periods and has to be reprocessed. However,
(continued)
- 75 -
Table
Countr~
Location
Owner/Operator
Fuel
Type ( b)
Ca2acit~
( c)
MTHM/Yr
Status
( d)
Startu2
Year
..!:!._ (e,f,g)
USDOE/
Westinghouse
Hanford,WA
USDOE/
Savannah River, SC
DuPont
(Two plants)
USDOE/
INEL, ID
Exxon
Nuclear Fuel
Services
General Electric
Allied General
West Valley, NY
Op.
1983
Op.
Op.
Oxide
130-300
Morris, IL
Oxide
300
(1972)
See note
Barnwell, SC
Oxide
1200-1500
See note
1966
USSR
No information available
France (h)
CO GEMA
CO GEMA
CO GEMA
COG EMA
CO GEMA
Marcoule
Marcoule
Marcoule
La Hague
La Hague
COG EMA
COGEMA
La Hague
La Hague
Metal
Metal
MOX
Metal
Metal/
Oxide
Oxide
MOX
250
800
0.25-2.0
60
400-800
Op.
U/C
Op.
Op.
Op.
800
2.0-5.o
U/C
U/C
Metal/
Oxide
70
Oxide
16-40
1958
1985?
1966
1976
1991
1991 -
Belg_ium
Eurochemic (i)
Mol
1966
(1974)
FRG
Karlsruhe
DWK (j)
Gorleben
Oxide
350
(1980)
Planned
Tokai-Mura
Takai-Mura
Oxide
Oxide
200
730
Op.
Planned (k)
1970
1991/2
Jaan
1976
1995
- 76 -
Table
28: (Continued).
UK (1)
UKAEA
BNFL
BNFL (m)
BNFL (n)
Sellafield
Sellafield
Sellafield
Sellafield
Metal
Metal
Oxide
Oxide
1500-2500
100-300
1000
Op.
s
U/C
1952
1964
1972
1991
China
No information available
India
DAE
DAE
Trombay
Tarapur
Oxide?
Oxide
20-60
(May restart)
100-125
Op.
1982
- 77 -
Table
28:(continued)
- 78 Table
28:(continued)
64.)
k. Originally (until around 1983), the plant was planned to be of 1090 MTHM
per year size.
1.
m.
n. Originally (in the mid-1970's) the plant was planned to be available for
operation in the early 1980's.
- 79 -
Table
Country_
Name/Location
~
Thermal
Power
MWt
Electric
Power
MWe
Coolant
( b)
Date of
Status
Order/
(c)
Construction
Start
Na/K
1947
Type
( d)
(e)
EBR-1 (f)
INEL Site, ID
1.4
0 .15
(1951-64)
EBR-2 (g)
INEL Site, ID
62.5
20.0
Na
N.A.
(1963)
Fermi-1 (h)
Lagoona Beach, MI
200
60.9
Na
1955
(1966-72)
UK (i)
Dounreay-1
Highland
72
15
Na/K
1955
(1963-78)
Dounreay-2
Highland
600
250
Na
1966
(1977)
France (j)
Phenix
Gard
563
250
Na
1967
(1974)
Greys-Melville (k)
(SuperPhenix)
I sere
2900
1200
Na
1972
U/C
(1985)
58
20
Na
1965
(1979)
U/C
(1987)
FRG
KNK-2
Karlsruhe
SNR-300 (1)
Kalkar
736
300
Na
1969
714
280
Na
1983
Ja.E.an
Mon ju
Tsuruga
U/C
(1991)
- 80 Table
29: (continued)
India
FBTR
Kalpakkam
N.A.
15
Na
1968
U/C
(1985/6)
60
12
Na
1963
USSR (m)
BOR-60
(1971)
BN-350 (n)
1000
350
Na
1963
(1973)
BN-600
1480
600
Na
1967
(1980)
Sources: Information compiled from various sources, including Nuclear
Engineering International (1983), Nuclear News (1984), IAEA (1983b), SIPRI
(1979), and Grathwohl (1982), quoting a study prepared for IIASA. In
addition, various USDOE publications, Lanouette (1983), the 1982 Annual Report
of CEA (France), and JAERO (1982) were also used.
a. Excludes the following fast reactors with no electrical power Clementine, Los Alamos, US (0.025 MWt, mercury coolant, operated 1946-53);
Rapsodie, Cadarache, France (40 MWt, sodium coolant, operated 1967-82,
shutdown due to a discovery of containment leak); Joyo, Oarai-Machi, Japan
(100 MWt, sodium coolant, operating since 1977); Brasimone, Italy (130 MWt,
sodium coolant, under construction since 1969 and now scheduled to become
operable in 1988); and, BR-1 (shutdown), BR-2 (shutdown), and BR-5 (operating)
in the USSR. Also excludes the FFTF (Fast Flux Test Facility) in the US.
b.
Na - Sodium; K - Potassium.
- 81 Table
29:(continued)
a civilian 'prototype' reactor with 375 MWe (gross) size was announced in 1972
and cancelled in late 1983 after about $1.~ billion of expenditure, due to
unavailability of funds - about $2-5 billion more to complete. (The original
estimate was $500 million.) As far as the author can tell, these estimates do
not include interest costs, since the project was largely funded out of
government appropriations. The costs of terminating the project are estimated
at about $172 million. Another breeder reactor - abbreviated PLBR in one of
the sources - of 1200 MWe was once considered to follow the CRBR and has now
been shelved. The USDOE breeder program continues however, with the
expectations of developing new concepts and designs. Finally, the
Shippingport reactor - the f irst US 'commercial-scale' nuclear power reactor first operated as a PWR (between 1957 and 1965 with a 60 MWe core and then
between 1965 and 1974 with a 90 MWe core) and then (between late 1977 and late
1982) as a LWBR (with a 60 MWe core) for the USDOE. It was not a 'fast'
reactor, but a 'breeder' reactor nonetheless.
f. The EBR-1 was the first reactor authorized by the USAEC; in a trial run on
December 21, 1951, it generated the world's first tiny amounts of electric
power from nuclear energy and was the first to demonstrate, in July 1953, the
feasibility of breeding. It operated with a plutoniunrbreeding core from
November 1962 to December 1963. The reactor - which sufferred a partial
meltdown of the core - another world first, on 29 November 1955 - was
decommissioned in 1964 and then dismantled. Its site is now a US national
historic landmark.
g. The EBR-2 reactor is a major irradiation facility for the USDOE's LMFBR
program. As such, it operates to test various fuels for breeding rather than
to breed extra fuel.
h. Fermi-1 went critical in 1963 but did not start routine operation until
1966. It also sufferred an accident the same year, leading to partial core
damage. The plant was restarted in 1970 and operated intermittently until
1972 when it was shutdown permanently. Its vessel is thought be impossible to
dismantle for about another fifty years.
i. A 1300-MWe FBR - abbreviated as CFR - was planned at one time, but has now
been postponed until the early or late 1990's. The Dounreay-2 FBR has
operated at an overall capacity factor of 9.3 % through 1983.
j. The next step in the French FBR program was to be a 1500- MWe 'commercial'
reactor - termed SuperPhenix II - design work on which maY. begin in 1986.
Originally, the plans were to build two or three of these reactors, but now it
is not clear if and when even one will be built. EdF and the CEA have created
an advanced FBR study group to examine the future of the FBR program.
k. The SuperPhenix is built by a consortium of European utilities - NERSA in which EdF has a majority holding. The French have not ruled out potential
military uses of the plutonium from the Superphenix. Capital costs of the
SuperPhenix have been cited variously at between 15 and 20 billion FF; the
author has not been able to get information about its financing.
1.
The SNR-300 plant, the latest cost estimate for which is about 6.8 billion
- 82 -
Table
29:(continued)
considerable financial support from their governments. West Germany also has
plans since about 1972 for a 1300 MWe FBR; however, it is highly doubtful if
utility participation and financial support for it can be arranged in the near
future.
m.
n. The BN-350 plant was planned to be used for water desalination (New York
Times, 17 July 1973); it is not clear if it was or is being used for that
purpose.
e~
63. Based on some reported estimates as follows: France (UP-3, 800 tons per
:,tear, FF 19.2 billion); West Germany (Gorleben, 350 tons per year, DM 4
billion); the UK (THORP, 67 S tons per year in the first stage, 1.8 billion
pound~); and Japan (Takai-Mura, 730 tons per year, 700 billion yens).
64. Capacity information on reprocessing plants is difficult to come by and
in any case may not matter much, since effective capacity has been much lower
than 'design' capacity in many instances. The La Hague plant is curious in
that it s capacity for LWR fuel reprocessing was originally (in 1976, at the
time of startup) stated to be 800 tons per year. After the plant failed to
operate at anywhere close to the full capacity, as Makhijani (1982) reports,
its capacity was retroactively derated to about 350-400 tons per year.
- 84 -
would again be about as much higher or more, depending upon the capacity
factors utilized.
France is apparently rethinking its plans for the next
FBRs.
Until very recently, two or three more FBRs (of 1500 MW each) were
planned to be built by the year 2000, when rising uranium prices and reduction
in FBR construction costs were thought to make the FBRs commercially
competitive. Probably only one more FBR will be built, and possibly none at
all until after 2000. In West Germany, the SNR-300 FBR, ordered in 1969, is
now scheduled for start in 1987; the current estimate of its costs is DM 6.8
billion (about $2. 7 billion, at 1983 exchange rates).
Japan last year
authorized construction of a demonstration breeder reactor; however, there is
no
specific
timetable
for
FBR
commercialization.
Finally,
FBR
commercialization plans have been indefinitely postponed in the UK. (65)
Finally, Table 30 gives information about the status of activities
relating to spent fuel management in WOCA as of 1982 or, in some cases,
1983. It is seen that most of the IMEs - as well as Arge.ntina, Brazil, India
among the developing countries - have plans for reprocessing of spent fuel and
for a FBR-based strategy.
Considering that the date by which reprocessing,
recycling, and the use of breeder technology could become economically
advantageous keeps receding - indeed, it is impossible to say any specific
date by which they could become so ,... it is disturbing that many of these
countries have not yet planned any specific program for the possible
65.
It is interesting to recall the enthusiasm about the breeder about
fifteen years ago in the words of Glenn Seaborg, then-Chairman of the USAEC:
"If we can learn even to make full use of the energy that breeder reactors
will bring us, we may in time be able to use incredibly large amounts of this
energy to create new matter and to rebuild, reshape and reuse all
matter Eventually we might use matter and energy, time and space, like
building blocks There would hardly be such a thing as waste; hence there
would be relatively little pollution. Almost everthing would be recycled and
reused or returned to nature in a near-natural form and distributed so as to
maintain a balanced environment." Heady stuff, but scarcely less so than that
in his reference to the work of Alvin Weinberg at the time - "at a cost of
about 4 mills per KWh it is economical to produce aluminum via nuclear power;
at about 2.5 mills, the direct reduction of iron ore through electrolytic
hydrogen becomes economical; at 2 mills, it (would be) possible to produce
magnesium metal at today's cost of aluminum; at 1 mill, pipeline gas could be
produced from coal; at somewhere below 1 mill general purpose heat and (the
production of) gasoline from coal at a price competitive with current
petroleum processing" - this ?f course before the price of oil went up.
(Seaborg, 1970, pp. 151). At the time, Seaborg said, "(T)he LMFBR R & D cost
will .be in excess of $2 billion through the year 2020 for the AEC. Assuming a
1984 introduction of the commercial fast breeder, the gross benefits to this
nation from electrical energy savings in the 35-year period thereafter, to the
year 2020, are estimated to be more than $200 billion in terms of 1970
dollars.. The savings over the 35-year period would amount to the energy
equivalent of 400 billion tons of coal". (ibid., pp. 14). For analyses of the
USAEC claims about the breeder, see Chow (1975) and Cochran (1974).
For
critiques of the British and the French breeder programs, see Sweet (1982),
Finan (1982), and Collingridge (1984),
- 85 -
Table
A. Industrialized Countries
Belgium:
Reprocessing; recycling of Pu to LWRs and/or FBRs. Current and nearterm - foreign reprocessing; long-term - domestic reprocessing. Some
reprocessing done domestically in the past. Unreprocessed spent fuel stored
at site. No AFR storage capacity planned. m.w immobilization capacity
planned. No time-table for HLW disposal.
Canada:
Current - long-term retrievable storage at site; long-term - geologic
disposal or domestic reprocessing. Pu recycling in PHWR.s possible, but
unlikely. Conversion to Th/U-233 PHWR strategy also possible. Some AFR
capacity in existence. No time-table for m.w iannobilization or disposal.
Finland:
Current - Soviet fuel returned; Swedish fuel - foreign reprocessing or
geologic disposal. No time-table for m.w immobilization or disposal.
France:
Current - domestic reprocessing; recycling of Pu to FBRs. Unreprocessed
fuel stored at site. HLW immobilization capacity in existence; reprocessing
wastes, solidified or otherwise, to be stored indefinitely. Permanent disposal
planned; no time-table.
FRG:
Current - some domestic reprocessing; some foreign reprocessing.
Unreprocessed fuel stored at site. AFR (dry) storage capacity under
construction. Recycling of Pu in FBRs. m...w immobilization capacity
planned. Technical evaluation of geologic disposal of spent fuel, without
reprocessing, under way. Permanent disposal facility may be available
by 2000.
Italy:
Current - interim storage at site; some foreign reprocessing. Long-term
- domestic reprocessing planned. Recycling of Pu in LWRs and/or FBRs. No AFR
storage planned. m...w immobilization capacity planned. No time-table for
permanent disposal.
- 86 -
Table
30:(continued)
J a pan:
Current - interim storage at site; some foreign reprocessing, some
domestic reprocessing. Long-term - larger domestic reprocessing capacity
beginning in the early 1990's to 2000. Recycling of Pu to LWRs, FBRs and
possibly ATRs. No plans for AFR storage. HLW immobilization capacity
planned. No time-table for permanent disposal.
Netherlands:
Current - some foreign reprocessing. Unreprocessed spent fuel stored at
site. A participant in the Eurochemic project in the past.
Spain:
Near-term - foreign reprocessing; long-term - domestic reprocessing.
recycling plans unclear. Unreprocessed spent fuel stored at site. AFR
storage under study. No time-table for HLW iannobilization or permanent
disposal.
Pu
Switzerland:
Reprocessing contracts signed with foreign companies, who may also keep
some of the HLW. Plans for Pu recycling unclear. Unreprocessed fuel stored
at site. Permanent disposal facility may be available by 2000.
UK:
Current - reprocessing of domestic metal and MOX fuels; long-term reprocessing of foreign oxide fuel by early 1990's and of domestic oxide fuel
by late 1990's (if Sizewell-B is authorized). (Spent metal fuel cannot be
stored unreprocessed for a long time, unli~e the oxide fuels.) Stockpiling of
separated Pu for eventual (after 2000?) FBR use. (Military use not ruled
out.) Indefinite (50 years or more) interim storage of HLW planned; HLW
immobilization plant either at advanced stages of planning or under
construction. No time-table for permanent disposal.
us
Reprocessing indefinitely postponed; near-term prospects for FBRs nil.
Currently most spent fuel stored at site; some shipped to other sites. AFR
storage may be planned. Direct disposal of civilian spent fuel, possibly
along with military HLW, in geologic repositories beginning 1998 or later.
- 87 -
Table
30:(continued)
B. Developing Countries
Argentina:
Current - at site storage; long-term - domestic reprocessing.
recycling in PHWRs planned.
Pu
Brazil:
Near-term - at site storage; !on-term - domestic reprocessing.
China:
No civilian power reactor spent fuel or reprocessing wastes yet; has
off erred to receive spent fuel from some Western European utilities for longterm storage or permanent disposal. Industrial capabilities for such tasks
are unclear; no information available on waste management experience so far.
India:
Near-term - at site storage; some domestic reprocessing of non-powerreactor spent fuel done so far. Strategies for the use of separated Pu
unclear; an experimental FBR may begin by 1985. Long-term - domestic
reprocessing; recycling of Pu in FBRs. HLW immobilization capacity in
existence; indefinite interim storage of solidified HLW. No time-table for
permanent disposal; a repository may be available by around 2000.
South Korea:
Near-term - at site storage; long-term plans indefinite.
Pakistan:
Near-term - at site storage; long-term plans unclear.
Taiwan:
Near-term - at site storage;
plans indefinite.
mediu~term
Sources: Information compiled from Shemilt and Sheng (1983), Raudenbush (1983)
and other diverse sources.
- 88 -
- 89 -
US ones.
Further, i f the plans for breeder commercialization of these
other countries are not particularly successful - thus effectively also
removing the economic justification for reprocessing - they will have to
reexamine their current strategies for spent fuel and HLW management
which, seen from today's vantage point, appear to be guided more by the
influence of past technological momentum than by economic rationality.
(d)
The weakening of the rationale for the use of reprocessing and the
breeder technology also strengthens the case for a 'technical fix'
approach of non-proliferation strategies as advocated by the previous US
administration and by the Ford-Mitre report (NE.PSG, 1977). Whereas some
specific countries which were then judged to be 'proliferation risk' Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan - would have acquired nuclear weapons
capability by use of domestic enrichment/reprocessing facilities over the
next few years, the current situation nonetheless supports a case for
restricting a further spread of these technologies over the foreseeable
future. No prospective sales or transfers of such technologies have come
in the recent past, and it is fruitless to speculate whether they will in
the near future; however, a strengthening of the export controls on such
technologies would be entirely justifiable and needs to be pursued
further.
- 90 -
time in the situation might be reversed; the problem is, one cannot say when.
might be reversed; the problem is, one cannot say when.
- 91 -
only
few
reactors
most
of
them small
have
been
- 93 -
- 94 -
- 9 -
Fuel (actual)
0 & M (actual)
Capital (estimated)
Total (estimated)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
2.85
2.46
9.15
14.46
3.22
2.95
10.53
16.70
3.92
4.25
14.03
22.20
4.99
5.69
14.00
24.68
5.46
6.23
14.40
26.09
6.19
8.24
17.57
32 .oo
6.31
9.02
18.02
33.35
15.5
32.9
11.2
5.7
22.7
4.2
% increase, year-to-year
- 96 -
average, much higher capital costs than the plants completed as recently as
1980 enter into operation, the nuclear disadvantage is expected to widen and
remain.wide until such a point in time when coal costs start escalating again.
(74) No meaningful data on comparative generation costs of LWRs vs. coal is
available outside of the US, though the author suspects that if nuclear
advantage has persisted in any of these other countries (partly because of
high~r coal costs than in the US), it would shrink or indeed be reversed over
the next few years.
The matter of historical comparative costs is of limited use in planning,
and one needs to turn to hypothetical estimates for the future.
One such
recent estimate by OECD is given in Table 31.
Note that among the cases
presented, nuclear is cheaper than coal only in the combination of a 6-year
leadtime for nuclear and base coal price of $55/MT. Varying assumptions and
methods would give varying results. Thus, for example, the base capital cost
estimate for nuclear in this Table are likely to be about 55 % of a reference
cost estimate in the US (75), whereas the corresponding estimate for coal is
likely to be about 65-85 % of a reference cost estimate in the US.
Plant
leadtime of 6 years for nuclear is about the most optimistic, while that of 10
years is not the most pessimistic. The capacity factor assumption of 65 % for
both nuclear is also fairly optimistic; it is quite likely that on average,
74. Another reason nuclear generating costs have been lower than otherwise is
that the nuclear fuel costs have not risen as much as anticipated as late as
five years ago.
However, many of the plants which have recently gone into
operation or are under construction are covered by uranium and enrichment
service purchase contracts which are costlier than the current market
situation would imply, so that generation costs from these plants - plagued as
they are by significantly higher capital costs than originally anticipated would be even higher. Utilities which cancelled their NPPs under construction
have become uranium sellers in the secondary markets; it is not clear whether
their losses would be counted on their existing NPPs.
The buyer utilities
would of course benefit from such sales, whose effect would show up on the
generating costs from their operating NPPs.
75. Reference capital cost estimates in the US vary region by region, though
for a 'middletown' location, base costs (i.e., excluding escalation and
interest during construction) were estimated at $1822/KW in January, 1983
dollars in one recent study (Bowers, et al., 1983); revision of the same
database upon which that estimate was based now gives a figure of $2036/KW in
January, 1983 dollars. Given the trends in reference capital cost estimates
in the US, the author estimates that the next round of revisions would yield a
figure of about $2200/KW in mid-1984 dollars.
A USDOE estimate of capital
costs (excluding interest during construction) for the US nuclear power plants
under construction as of 1982 gives a range of $1331-$4160/KW in 1983 dollars;
of the plants under construction as of mid-1984, the range is likely to be
around $1800-$5000/KW in mid-1984 dollars. As far as the author can tell, not
much (certainly not as much as in the case of nuclear, even which is limited)
work has been done in the US about coal capital costs in recent years, so it
is not possible to refer to actual experience. Reference estimates for coal
power plants in the US suggest a base cost figure of around $1000-$1300/KW in
January 1983 dollars.
- 97 -
Nuclear, PWR
Size
2-1100 MW
A.
Assum.E.tions
--- 1200 - 6
30
65
10
10
30
65
10
Not
30
65
10
given
30
65
10
30
65
10
38
38
55
55
19.2
5.0
22.0
46.2
19.2
5.0
26.3
50.5
29.7
5.0
10.0
44.7
36.0
5.0
10.0
51.0
19.2
5.0
15.2
39.4
19.2
5.0
18.1
42.3
- 98 the large LWRs would achieve only about 60 % capacity factors over their
lifetime.
(This is largely a matter of opinion.
Some large LWRs have had
much higher capacity factors, and some of the specific reasons for the lower
capacity factors so far for some other large LWRs may not obtain in the
future; only experience will tell for sure.)
Debates over hypothetical estimates of comparative costs go back to the
days before any nuclear electricity was generated (see Isa rd and Lansing,
1949, pp. 226-228) and would continue for years to come. (76) Let us perform
some calculations of hypothetical estimates and see the effects of varying
assumptions. To begin with, the major contributors to nuclear relative cost
increases in recent years have been (a) much longer leadtimes than coal
plants; indeed, much longer than those estimated at the beginning of the
planning period for nuclear; (b) overall inflation, and particularly real
(i.e., net of inflation as measured by various indices) (77) escalation in
nuclear material, equipment and labor costs in construction; (c) high interest
rates, both nominal as well as real; and (d) disappointing experience with
nuclear capacity factors.
Whereas the quantitative evidence behind each of
these statements is available only for the US, it is the author's impression
that other countries differ only in degree and not in kind.
The precise
magnitudes of the impacts have differed not only across countries but, in a
country such as the US, across utilities, but concern about them is
nonetheless general and will probably remain so for a while. It is difficult
to say whether the past experience will be repeated, it is equally difficult
to say whether it will not.
If at all, it is more likely that different
countries would repeat each-other's experience rather than their own in the
past.
In the examples that follow, we will adopt an approach generally
favorable to nuclear costs and yet trying to be realistic. Let us assume base
76. At the time, various nuclear cost estimates ranged from about 4 mills/KWh
to 14 .5 mills/KWh.
Much has changed since, yet it appears that the spread
among plant-wise nuclear generation costs (for plants of all types, sizes, and
age) in the US is currently about the same magnitude, i.e., by a multiple of 3
to 4.
For US plants under construction as of 1982, the capital cost
(including interest during construction) spread was estimated as $1275$4100/KW (as-spent dollars); under some reasonable assumptions about capacity
factors, production costs and fixed charge rate, the spread in total
generation costs when these plants enter into operation would again be of
about the same magnitude. As these figures suggest, it is just plain folly to
make an 'authoritative' estimate of comparative costs.
77. It will be noted here without further comment that precise estimates of
real increases in nuclear capital costs are fraught with conceptual problems
and are a matter of controversy. See Bowers, et al., (1983) and USDOE 1984f
for one view, and Komanoff (1981) for another. These sources use different
measures of capital costs and different methods for deflating, neither of
which are satisfactory; in the author's judgement, the relevant figure for
planning purposes is likely to lie in the range 5-10 % p.a. (i.e., over and
above general inflation rate as measured by the GNP deflator). The USDOE/EIA
is expected to conduct a study on the subject over the next year or two.
I '
- 100 -
Case A
(Nominal escalation rate for base capital costs 5 % p.a.; nominal interest
rate 10 % p.a.)
4
6
8
10
24.8
45.9
71.6
103.0
Case B
(Nominal escalation rate for base capital costs 10 % p.a.; nominal interest
rate 15 % p.a.)
4
44 .1
87.7
148.0
232.5
8
10
Case C
(Real escalation rate for base capital costs 5 % p.a.; real interest rate 5 %
p.a.)
4
6
8
10
16.0
28.6
43.0
59.4
- 101 -
Nuclear
Coal
Ratio
lSOO
1000
l.S
1788
30
70
1.63
1094
30
70
5
18.97
11 .61
1.63
3
10
2392
0
10
1160
25
60
10
so .14
60
10
22.88
(ii)
Plant lifetime, years
Average capacity factor
Real discount rate, % p.a.
Unit capital costs, mills/KWh
30
30
SS
lS
7S.61
15
31.03
30
30
7S
SS
23.68
lS.66
Case B
Construction period, years
Real escalation rate for
capital costs, % p.a.
Real interest rate, i. p.a.
TCIC, $/KW
2.06
(i)
(iii)
Plant lifetime, years
Average capacity factor
Real discount rate, i. p.a.
Unit capital costs, mills/KWh
3S
2.19
6S
2.44
s
1.51
Note: Unit capital costs calculated via applying a Capital Recovery Factor
appropriate to the assumed discount rate and plant lifetime to TCIC and then
dividing by total energy produced.
- 102 -
assumptions can
illustrative.
be
created,
of
course.
Those
given
here
are
merely
- 103 -
(b)
Similarly, a variety of specific combinations of detailed assumptions
about uranium ore price, enrichment service price, fuel fabrication price,
fuel burnup characteristics, treatment of fixed fuel costs can produce the 10
mills/KWh figure used in Table 34. Such details are not of major significance
in illustrative calculations, since minor variations one way or another tend
to cancel out in the aggregate or make a marginal impact upon total fuel
costs.(82) The figure cited here is in line with other recent estimates such
as Table 31. It is assumed that nuclear fuel costs will not increase in real
terms over the projected period; the uranium markets will firm up, to be sure,
and the price of uranium will rise in real terms from the current contractaverage of about $30/lb. (or $66/kg.) but a combination of other factors such as improved burnups - can counter such price increases. (83)
(c) The implicit assumption in unit coal costs is for a heat content of 22
million Btus per ton and a heat rate of 9700 Btus/KWh (i.e., about 35 %
efficiency).
Some other combinations of coal price, heat content and heat
rate can also produce the figure of 22 mills/KWh (see, for example, Table 32).
(d)
0 & M costs again can be broken down into various components, and
specific assumptions made about each. Here we assume that the 0 & M costs are
81.
It is worth noting that in the presence of certain institutional
rigidities such as when a utility has difficulty in passing through increases
in production costs to consumers, or in the presence of certain market
imperfections, such as when a utility faces a particularly low cost of
capital, the nuclear option would seem .more attractive even if the argument
(a) above were not met or did not give a very confident answer one way or the
other.
17.
Except in the case of the 'back-end' costs such as for spent fuel
reprocessing (net of the value of recovered fuel), for waste disposal and for
decommissioning and dismantling; it is not possible to make any specific
judgements about what such costs might be ten or thirty years from now.
83. Such seems to be the general opinion; however, urani~m ore costs are but
a part of the total nuclear fuel costs and when the other elements are
considered, particularly the reprocessing or waste disposal costs, and the
fictitious credit for plutonium is removed (since in all likelihood there will
be no economic use of plutonium for at least fifty years to come), it is not
at all certain that nuclear fuel costs will not increase in real terms. Some
part of the fuel costs are also 'fixed' in nature and hence susceptible to the
capacity factors assumed or realized. We shall stick with the assumption of
no real increase in order to be somewhat optimistic about nuclear economics.
- 1 ')4 -
Nuclear
( c)
( b)
( d)
(e)
Coal
( f)
(g)
(h)
1800
1800
2400
2400
1100
1100
1200
1200
30
70
5
30
60
10
30
70
10
25
60
15
30
70
5
35
60
10
30
70
10
35
60
15
50
50
50
50
36.3
41.5
70.6
11. 7
21. 7
20 .8
34 .5
7.3
8.6
7.3
8.6
4.9
5.7
4.9
5.7
Fuel
10.0
10.0
Total
36.4
54.9
Capital
0 & M
- -10.0
- -10.0
58.8
89.2
--
38.6
68.6
57.3
47.7
28.4
10~
simply 3 % per year of the base capital cost for each option.
Table 34 estimates do not fully convey the effects of uncertainties in
comparative costs. Cases (a) and (e) show that with a real discount rate of 5
% and" optimistic assumptions about both nuclear and coal capital costs and
capacity factors, nuclear is about 6 % cheaper; whereas cases (c) and (g) show
that with a discount rate of 10 % and somewhat pessimistic assumptions about
capital costs and capacity factors, nuclear can be about 23 % more
expensive. Other cases are not intercomparable because the 'ground rules' for
nuclear and coal are not identical (differing in assumed lifetimes). I t is
impossible to say how actual experience may turn out.
However, in the
author's opinion, cases (b), (c), (f) and (g) are the most appropriate for a
utility with little previous experience with NPPs - as is the case in most
developing countries. In as much as the coal prices assumed here are, if at
all, on the higher side as compared to recent long-term projections of the
same, it is important to note that the range of nuclear advantage in these
cases extends from plus 5 percent to minus 23 percent.
All the cases presented do not exhaust the possible scenarios, but it is
important to note that nuclear capital costs and operating performance are
more unpredictable than corresponding coal ones and that coal prices are more
predictable - since long-term contracts can be entered into at the time of
planning. Overall, seen f rom today's vantage point, it appears that nuclear
investments would have a higher 'risk margin' (84) than that for coal
investments. To the extent that the estimates in Table 34 are representative
of probable scenarios, it is seen that nuclear costs may differ by a margin of
about 63 percent whereas coal costs by about 44 percent [ignoring cases (a)
and (e) since the assumption of a 5 % real discount rate may be unreasonable
for the developing countries].
As far as the author is able to judge, the
Table 34 assumptions are, i f at all, quite favorable to nuclear costs and
unfavorable to coal costs; reasonable estimates of larger risk differentials
can of course be made. Developing countries with limited or no experience in
NPP construction and operation may do well to assess whether their future
nuclear investments are worth such an additional risk.
Table 35 provides estimates of comparative costs under yet another set
of assumptions, this time in 'current dollar' terms.
In order to achieve
comparability, capital costs for different plants are adjusted to the date of
construction start and all the alternatives are assumed to start operation in
1995.
The basic assumptions here do not exactly correspond to any of the
. cases in Table 34, so the numbers between the two tables are not comparable.
However, it is seen that undt!r the assumptions, nuclear cost range is wider
than that for coal. A comparison of "the 'better/better' scenario - i.e., the
lower costs for both the options - and the 'worse/worse' scenario - i.e., the
higher costs for both the options - suggests that either way the margin is
84.
That is, the ratio of lowest possible achievable costs and the highest
probable costs a utility may have to suffer, even ignoring the possibilities
of longer construction periods than assumed here (as has been the case in many
developing countries) and of prolonged shutdowns in the case of nuclear
plants.
~-06
Nuclear
(A)
( B)
(C)
(D)
1500
1500
1000
1000
7
12
10
15
12
10
15
1989
1985
1991
1989
2117
1500
1500
1464
3416
2524
4988
2391
1984
1665
2747
1883
30
25
60
15
30
70
12
25
60
15
50
50
Assumptions
Base capital cost
(Jan. '85 $/KW)
Inflation rate, % p.a.
Capital cost escalation
rate, % p.a.
Interest rate, % p.a.
Year of construction start
Base capital cost at the
time of construction start
(in then $/KW)
TCIC, in current $/KW, at
the time of commercial
operation start
TCIC (excluding IDC) 11
Plant lifetime, years
Average capacity factor
Nominal discount rate
70
12
6.92
14.68
4.02
8.09
0 & M
2 .86
2. 91
1.91
1.94
Fuel
3.90
3.40
8.58
9.84
Total
13 .68
20.99
14. 51
19 .87
Notes:
TCIC m"Total Capital Investment Costs. Calculation of TCIC via assuming a
simplistic expenditure model as discussed in the text; specific assumptions
are not crucial to the argument; any from among a number of factors can result
in the TCIC ranges presented here. For a discussion of the levelizat1on
methodology, see USDOE 1984f. Some simplifying assumptions have been made here
(such as, no taxes or tax credits, no recurring costs related to investment
costs, etc.). Basic 0 & Mand fuel cost assumptions are the same as in
Table
Nuclear fuel costs and both nuclear and coal O & M costs are
assumed to stay constant in real terms. The reason they differ between
columns here is because of the effect of assumed plant lifetimes and discount
rates in cost levelization procedure.
- 107 -
- 108 -
Table 36: History of Reference Nuclear Power Plant Capital Cost Estimates - US
Experience
as of
Start of
project
Commercial
startup
WASH-1082
3/67
3/67
late '72
134
WASH-1150
6/69
6/69
mid '75
240
WASH-1230
1/71
1/71
1/78
345
WASH-1230 (Rev.1)
1/73
1 /71
1 /78
440
WASH-1230 (Rev.2)
1/73
1 /71
1 /81
500
WASH-1345
1 /73
6/74
1/83
700
WASH-1345 (Rev.)
1/75
1/75
1/85
925
NUREG-0241-44
6/76
6/76
mid '86
1130
EEDB-I
1/78
1/78
1 /88
1500
EEDB-III
1/80
1/80
1/92
3192
EEDB-V
1 /82
1/83
1 /95
5200
Source
Source:
USDOE/EIA (1982b), V. 2, PP 34 for up to EEDB-III; Bowers, et al. (1983) for
EEDB-V. The author's preliminary estimate based on some EEDB-VI figures is
about $5800/KW for 1/95 commercial operation start. 'WASH' refers to
publications of the erstwhile USAEC; NUREGs are published by the USNRC; EEDB
stands for Energy Economic Data Base sponsored by the USDOE.
- 109 -
the
1983 dollars including AFUDC ranged from $1871 /KW to $6134 /KW;
corresponding range excluding AFUDC was $1331/KW to $4160/KW.
Construction
schedule length ranged from 71 months to 187 months; engineering manhours per
KW ranged from 2.3 to 9.9; craft labor manhours per KW ranged from 12 to 27;
concrete requirements in cubic yards per MW ranged from 139 to 588; and, large
bore pipe in linear feet per MW ranged from 99 to 368.
( 87, 88) Other
measures of variations can be given, though these numbers alone suggest the
importance of specific contexts.
(At the low end of the ranges, the US
numbers are lower than or about the same as those claimed in some other
countries, particularly France and Japan.)
Detailed analysis of the data carried out for the USDOE suggested that no
statistically significant trends were found when $/KW figures were regressed
against the areas of general design features (reactor type, size and the
like), 'learning potential', schedule variables, labor requirements and costs,
commodity quantities and financial variables. The direct implication of this
observation is that a quantitative explanation of cost variations is well-near
impossible.
The US data suggest a tantalizing hypothesis - statistically, the US NPPs
completed and under construction make up the largest sample of LWRs to date
(and will probably remain so until the year 2000); these cover a long enough
period and hence a considerable amount of technological and institutional
change; a wide enough array of specific economic and political contexts; a
wide enough variation in designs, sites, type of manpower employed, quality of
construction management; and, a large enough sample of utilities, their
financial and human resource characteristics.
Could it be that the US
experience may provide a statistical view of what may happen elsewhere?
Despite the paucity of data - after all, the developing countries have
very little experience with nuclear power so far - the author feels inclined
to take such a view. The US experience is relevant statistically, precisely
87.
The capital costs cited here give only a partial idea of how much the
utilities have spent in installing nuclear capacity in the US in that some in many cases, the same - utilities also invested and lost a sizeable sum in
the NPPs that they later cancelled. There are no up to date precise estimates
of the losses on cancelled plants (see USDOE/EIA 1983a for data up to 1982);
rough adding up of several numbers suggests the figure to be in the range of
about $20-30 billion.
Estimates of the total 'economic damage' - covering
cancellations as well as cost overruns - run to about $80 billion to $100
billion.
Estimates of total utility capital expenditures in NPPs over the
last ten or so years run to about $150-200 billion (current) dollars,
excluding the amount still to be spent on the plants under construction. The
author's rough guess is that when all the nuclear capacity added since 1974
and to be added from orders before 1974 is counted against the total capital
expenditures on NPPs (including those cancelled), the $/KW figure would turn
out to be around $3000-3500 (current dollars, including AFUDC) average.
88.
A more recent study of the 'most expensive' and the 'least expensive'
NPPs under construction in the US gives a range of $1353/KW to $5122/KW (in
current dollars, including AFUDC) as of early 1984. (Nucleonics Week, 14 June
1984, PP 13)
- 110 -
because of the wide possible variations that have occurred, and will continue
to exist in the developing countries as a group - whether any particular
country has built five NPPs or none; whether the country has the required
infrastructural and manpower facilities; whether the financial situation is
healthy or precarious; whether the projects can be completed competently or
not; whether the NPPs can be operated safely and reliably, whether the
attitude towards nuclear technology is one of requisite caution and respect or
one of exaggerated faith, overconfidence and plain foolishness; whether, to
borrow John Kemeny's phrase, the 'mindsets' are appropriate to use the
technology.
Combine such variations with the uncertainties at one level - whether a
NPP can be built for $2000/KW or $6000/KW, whether it would take six years or
eighteen years to do so, whether it would be operated at 35 % or 75 % capacity
factor (89) - or another - whether electricity demand would grow at 8 % or 15
%, over five years or twenty years, whether $5 billion can be raised from
international financial markets (with or without suppliers' credit guarantees)
or whether even $100 million would be close to impossible, whether the
interest rate would be 10 % or 20 %, whether the domestic currency would
appreciate 20 % or depreciate 1000 %, whether the domestic inflation rate
would be 5 % or SO %, and one has the impression that while some of these
factors make any type of investment, particularly power plant investment,
risky, some others make nuclear investments especially risky. Include further
the possibilities that a country chalks up a plan for not just one or two NPPs
but ten, twenty or more; for fuel cycle facilities; for nuclear engineering
education; for research and development activities; for long-term economic and
political agreements with other countries; for a nuclear weapons program, or
at least an 'option' of a weapons program.
It seems to the author that at
least some of these plans would founder, while some may indeed succeed,
economically as well as politically, at home or in the international arena.
A general case of economic advantage or disadvantage for nuclear power
cannot be made with any precise degree of confidence. The evidence so far is
incomplete, limited in detail and across countries, subject to a number of
qualifications and, above all, uneven. There are some specific indications,
however, that for an investment to be decided upon today (as opposed to some
older decision which is carried forward for reason no other than inertia and
resistance to change), in_the circumstances as prevail now and are expected as
of now for the next ten or so years, nuclear plant investments have a greater
chance of proving uneconomical than otherwise - the margins depending upon
which alternatives are perceived and chosen.
Until such a time when ( i) long and wide enough
obtained with the specific nuclear technologies that the
may consider acquiring (i.e., the 1-1.4 GW LWRs or the
the 0.22 GW Indian CANDU version i f India were
experience
developing
O. 7-0.9 GW
able to
has been
countries
CANDUs or
offer it
89. The ranges cited are not purely speculative; nuclear capital costs cited
for some of the NPPs completed in the developing countries range from $860/KW
(Taiwan, excluding IDC) to $3500/KW (the Philippines), in current dollars
(higher if converted to constant 1985 dollars); for construction leadtimes and
capacity factors, see Tables 14 and 16.
- 111 -
internationally);
(ii)
nuclear technology, particularly the LWR, has
stabilized; (iii) the structure of the future international nuclear industry
has become clearer; (iv) the anticipated 'rethinking' of the nuclear power
technology and institutions in the countries which, after all, pioneered them
- US, Canada, and the UK - has taken place and technological/ institutional
alternatives are examined and decided upon, a large-scale commitment to the
nuclear power technology which has so far has had only a mixed technological,
economic and political record would seem to be unjustified.
Although a
detailed assessment of such arguments as have been advanced so far here would
need to take place at the level of individual countries (and within them), it
is unlikely that the possible costs of 'waiting' would outweigh the potential
costs of making mistakes.
For the developing countries overall
specifically, the group which has embarked upon nuclear power programs of
particular ambitions already - the possible technological, economic, or
political advantages of nuclear power are unlikely to be a very significant
factor in their efforts and plans for modernization, economic growth, or much
whatever else.
Such a conclusion is not radically new; in a way, it is not very
different from one presented nearly 37 years ago by an economics professor
then at MIT:
"It appears unlikely that atomic energy will have a revolutionary impact
- A 1 -
- A 2 -
an economic option - in the short term as well as the so-called 'long' term.
However, very little detailed information is available on the economic side of
the nuclear energy programs of these countries. It is necessary to search and
compile such information, and to develop methods to utilize it and to
interpret the results. Until quite recently not many developing countries had
nuclear energy programs of substantial scale, the particular programs were
relatively young, and the amount of expenditures involved was probably minor
(relative to, say, the cost of a nuclear power plant). However, the scale of
the nuclear energy programs have increased, and greater experience has been
obtained. Over the next five or so years, the pace of further nuclear orders
itself would be slower while at the same time, more operating experience would
be acquired from the plants currently in operation and under construction
(most of which would, hopefully, have been entered into operation over the
next five years). If and when the time comes for further major investments in
nuclear energy programs, a detailed analysis of the experience would serve as
a useful guide.
The author's impression is that in many countries this may
not be possible, as the entities involved - utilities, atomic energy
commissions, other government agencies - regard the specific information
sources - siting studies, feasibility studies, engineering studies, accounts as 'proprietary' or matters of 'national security'.
On the other hand, it
needs to be established that such is indeed the case, i.e., specific
information is not available for independent scrutiny.
(c). Technology Transfer and Adaptation: Little attempt seems to have been
made so far in understanding how the developing countries open and take apart
the 'black-box' of nuclear technologies - what kind of arrangements they make
with technology suppliers; which technologies are more successfully adapted,
and why; how countries build up their own regulatory capabilities; how they
decide upon their nuclear technology policy programs. There appears to be an
assumption, in the case of nuclear power plant design and construction for
example, that a well-developed domestic electrotechnical industry can - over
the span of the construction and operation of some five or so nuclear power
plants - will be able to develop indigenous capability for design and
construction on its own. Such an assumption may be valid in some cases, but
not in some others. Considering that nuclear technologies - particularly, the
NPP technology - change rapidly, and will probably do so even more over the
next ten or so years, it is necessary to examine the experience of the
developing countries in technology transfer and adaptation to be able to judge
what future options these countries may have.
- A3 -
2.
3.
4.
5.
- A 4 -
List of Exper ts
(continued)
(Both Mr. Jacoby and Mr. Neff have been studying the international
uranium industry and the nuclear fuel market over the last ten or
so years; Mr. Neff's book on the subject was published recently and
was not available to the author in time for this paper.)
6.
7.
MT.
Ch~rles Komanoff
Komanof f Energy Associates
451 Broome Street
New York, NY 10013. USA.
(A major critic of nuclear economics in the US; his work on the cost
and operating performance of Westinghouse PWRs in particular
should be of interest to any PWR buyer. Mr. Komanoff's work and some
of his theses do remain controversial, and are not viewed with particular
favor by some other students of nuclear economics.)
d~vPlnrments
8.
9.
10.
::...1j.
- A5 List of Experts
(continued)
in recent years).
11.
- B 0 -
Annex B:
Note:
Bibliography
- B 1 -
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