Memorial On Behalf of The Petitioner (State)

K.K.
LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
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XIII K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CAMELOT
Criminal Appeal No. ______/2017

State of Erehwon...Petitioner
Elizabeth BennetRespondent
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 5
ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................ 6
WRITTEN PLEADINGS ............................................................................................................... 7
I.
SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. ................. 7
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNETS CONVICTIONS UNDER
SECTIONS 351-A, 421-A, AND 210-B OF THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE. ....................... 9
A. Bennets Actions Support Her Conviction Under Section 351-A of the Camelot Penal
Code, As She Intentionally Promoted Enmity Between Various Communities. .................. 10
1. Bennets actions were directed to definable groups and communities, and therefore
fall within the purview of 351-A. ..................................................................................... 12
2. Bennets Conviction Should Be Reinstated Because She Acted With the Intent to
Promote Enmity Between Groups and Disrupt Public Tranquility. ................................. 12
3. Bennets Conviction Under 351-A Was Proper Because Her Actions Resulted in
Civil Unrest and Public Disharmony. ............................................................................... 14
B. The Facts in the Record Readily Support Bennets Conviction of Sedition Under
Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code. .......................................................................... 15
1. Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Reinstated Because She Possessed
Bona Fide Intent to Incite Disaffection Towards the Government. .................................. 17
2. Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Upheld Because Her Actions Had the
Tendency of Promoting Violence Towards the Government. .......................................... 18
C. Bennets Conviction Should Be Upheld Under 210-B Because She Conspired with
Other Hogwarts Party Members to Commit The Offenses Detailed in 351-A and 421-A. .. 19
1. Bennet engaged in an agreement to further criminal objectives with Fun Toosh,
Rebello Gonsalves, and other members of the Hogwarts Party........................................ 20
2. Bennet possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of criminal conspiracy 21
3. Bennet committed an actus reus by encouraging her supporters to destroy the
government. ...................................................................................................................... 21
III.
THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE IT IS AN
APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND THE FACTS

OF THIS CASE. ....................................................................................................................... 22
PRAYER ....................................................................................................................................... 26
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTIONS
Indian Const. art. 19
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 2381 (2012)
18 U.S.C. 2385 (2012)
Camelot Pen. Code 210-B
Camelot Pen. Code 241-A
Camelot Pen. Code 351-A
Indian Pen. Code 121
Indian Pen. Code 124A
Indian Pen. Code 153A
CASES
Abrams v. United States, 210 U.S. 616 (1919) (USA)
American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (USA)
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported)
(India)
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India)
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India)
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA)
Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958) (USA)
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (USA)
Debi Saran v. The State, 1995 (1) SCR 344 (USA)
Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India)
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (USA)
Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India)
Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (India)
Hemalatha v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India)
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (USA)
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (USA)
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (USA)
Ingraham v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (USA)
Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court,
26/3/2015) (India)
Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 27 All 649 (1927) (India)
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (India)
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India)
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (USA)
Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India)
Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India)
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Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (USA)
Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK)
P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India)
Queen Empress v. Balquanqaddhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 (India)
R v. Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK)
R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK)
Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 (India)
Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (India)
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (USA)
See United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal. 1988) (USA)
State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, AIR 1952 SC 329 (India)
State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 579 (India)
State of W.B. v. Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785, 1995 SCC (1) 684 (India)
Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (India)
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (USA)
United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (USA)
United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 921 (2d Cir. 1957) (USA)
United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (USA)
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India)
MISCELLANEOUS
Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941. 624.
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions (2015).
Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty (Aug. 2015),
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.
NOLOS PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2009)
RUSSELL ON CRIME, Vol. 1 (11th ed. 1964).
Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. 1.5 (2d ed.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 1, 2015, a protest broke out in the famous grounds of Erehwon, during which
30,000 people began shouting slogans and burning public property. These destructive actions
resulted from a speech by Elizabeth Bennet (Bennet or Respondent), a leader of the
Hogwarts Party, a minority political party in Camelot largely dominated by students. In her
speech, Bennet called for the listeners to take action, overthrow the government, and break it to
pieces:
This cannot be tolerated! We must rise in rebellion against these dirty
leeches on our mind and its thinking process. These corrupt people
who have sold our country now want us to pawn our minds. This will
not happen, brothers and sisters! Together, we will overthrow the
government! Break the government to pieces, if need be, to uphold the
ideals contained in our beloved constitution. We will be the divine
destruction which shall vaporize the deep seated root and ensure our
beloved country has a more refreshing start! I am ready to lay down
my life for you my beloved fatherland! Are you ready too?
Thirty thousand people attended this speech, including 3,000 Hogwarts Party members.
The day after Bennets speech, 200,000 people gathered near the Parliament and the iconic
Camelot gate and remained there for two days in protest. Moreover, thousands of people
harassed government officials by tracking government quarters in Erewhon and giving them
teddy bears to mock their loyalty to the current Camelot government.
The beginning of this political turmoil started in April 2015. Immediately after the
Camelot and Erehwon elections in which Bennet was elected to Parliament, she tweeted a picture
of herself with the Genghiztan flag. Because Camelot has long standing acrimony and engaged
in two wars with Genghiztan, this photo upset many people.
Therefore, Mr. K.F. Panda
(Panda), the Chief Minister of Erehwon, asked for a public apology from Bennet to ease the
tensions. He also tweeted that Bennet and the Hogwarts party had forgotten the blood shed by
Camelot soldiers in the Genghiztan wars. Instead of apologizing, however, Bennet created a new
campaign in late May 2015 entitled Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government.
The Prime Minister of Camelot, Mr. Puddy Jedi, issued a statement on June 4, 2015,
three days after Bennets speech, attempting to ease tensions of Camelot and asking both Bennet
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and Panda to restrain from raising any more tensions in the country. However, the following
day, as a result of the public discord and destruction caused by Bennets speech, a complaint was
filed against Bennet and two other members of the Hogwarts Party under Sections 421-A, 351-A,
and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code and a First Information Report (FIR) was registered.
Panda held a press conference calling for justice, affirmative action, and the need to restore faith
in a strong nation.
Despite Bennet and the Prime Ministers attempts to call into question the
constitutionality of Section 421-A by quoting Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi, a final report was
filed and the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons to all the accused. The trial court
found all the accused guilty for violating Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot
Penal Code. Bennet was sentenced to death for her violation of Section 421-A. Bennet appealed
and the High Court of Erehwon acquitted her of all charges. This Court granted the States
Petition by Special Leave.
ISSUES RAISED
I.
Whether Section 421-A is constitutional and should be upheld?
II.
Whether the State made out the offenses under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of
the Camelot Penal Code against Elizabeth Bennet under the facts of this case?
III.
Whether the death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition
and should be imposed in this case?
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WRITTEN PLEADINGS
It is humbly submitted that,
I.
SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

This Honble Court should uphold Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code as
constitutional and re-instate Bennets convictions because it imposes reasonable restrictions on

speech intended to protect the existence of the democracy itself. As an initial matter, it is unclear
specifically which rights the Camelot Constitution protects. However, even assuming does it
protect the freedom of speech and expression, Section 421-A is still constitutional because the
fundamental right to free speech is not without limits. With the right of the individual to speak
his mind comes the power of the government to impose reasonable restrictions on this right.1
For example, the Indian Constitution, which guarantees its citizens the right to free expression,
specifically limits this right by allowing the government to impose reasonable restrictions in
the interests of the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement.2 Similarly,
Justice Holmes noted in a seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that even the most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic.3 Thus, it is important to look at the goals of the restriction and the interests it protects
before declaring a statute unconstitutional merely because it places any limits on speech.
Security of the state is an important government interest that justifies some restrictions on
speech. Every State, whatever its form of Government, has to be armed with the power to
punish those who, by their conduct, jeopardise the safety and stability of the State, or disseminate
such feelings of disloyalty as have the tendency to lead to the disruption of the State or to public
disorder.4 For this reason, several democratic countries, including the United States and India,
have sedition statutes that are still in effect.5 In fact, the Indian Supreme Court, in reviewing a
statute with striking similarity to Camelots Section 421-A upheld its sedition statute,
recognizing the importance of national security and public order.6 The Court interpreted Section
124A to criminalize only conduct that intends to incite violence or public disorder and concluded

1
See, e.g., Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 2; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 2.
3
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
4
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).
5
Indian Pen. Code 124A; 18 U.S.C. 2385 (2012).
6
2
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that the statute strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest
of public order.7 Since this landmark decision in Kedar Nath Singh v. Bihar, several individuals
have been convicted under Indian Penal Code Section 124A.8 In 2011, the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, reiterated the Supreme Courts decision in Kedar Nath and affirmed the conviction
of petitioner under Section 124A for possessing minutes, documents, and pamphlets of an
organization advocating a rebellion against the government.9
Similarly, in upholding 18 U.S.C. 2385, which prohibits individuals from advocating
overthrow of the government, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, No one could conceive that it is
not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force
and violence.10 The court upheld the statute because it aimed to prohibit advocacy, not peaceful
political discussion, and therefore, it did not violate the U.S. Constitution.11 These decisions
highlight that democracies consistently uphold sedition statutes similar to Section 421-A.
Moreover, when interpreting any statute, courts favor interpretations that avoid
constitutional issues.12 This is commonly known as the canon of constitutional avoidance or
constitutional doubt.13 In Kedar Nath, the court noted, It is well settled that if certain provisions
of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another
interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former
construction.14 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court explained federal courts duty is to interpret
statutes in a way that does not violate the constitution.15 [W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.16

7
Id.
See, e.g., Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 (266) ELT 193 (Chhattisgarh High Court);
Hemalatha v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India); Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh,
Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported) (India).
9
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported).
10
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
11
Id.
12
See Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends at 23 (Dec.
19, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
13
Id.
14
15
16
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California,
155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
8
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This Court should uphold Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code as constitutional
because it places reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech in order to protect the vital
government interest of ensuring public order.
Section 421-A(a) prohibits words or
representations that bring or attempt to bring hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards the government.17 This language is almost identical to that of Indian Penal
Code Section 124A.
The Indian Supreme Court has consistently upheld Section 124As
constitutionality and this Court should do the same here.
Additionally, Section 421-A(c)
prohibits anyone from exciting someone to overthrow the government.18 This subsection is
similar to the U.S. statute which has also been upheld in order to protect the democracy. This
Court should do the same. A government unable to protect itself against sedition would be
reduced to anarchy.19 Therefore, Camelots sedition statute also includes Section 421-A(b),
which prevents showing the government has been misled in its measures.20 Given Camelots
relatively recent independence and establishment as a democracy,21 the nations security is
especially important and Section 421-A should be declared constitutional on its face.
At the very least, however, the Court should interpret Section 421-A narrowly to avoid
constitutional issues. Parliament intended to punish those who threaten the peace and safety of
Camelot, a valid legislative goal. If this court finds a broader interpretation of Section 421-A
would be unconstitutional, it should follow the courts approach in Kedar Nath, in which the
court interpreted Section 124A to only reach words intended to incite violence or public disorder.
Even under a narrow interpretation, such as this, Bennets actions still fall within the permissible
grounds of the statute and this Court should reverse her acquittals.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNETS CONVICTIONS UNDER

SECTIONS 351-A, 421-A, AND 210-B OF THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE.
The Camelot Supreme Court should overturn the High Courts acquittal of Bennet
because the facts in the record provide ample grounds to reinstate her convictions. Bennets
speech and actions demonstrate that she had clear intent to promote enmity among the citizens of
Erehwon and Camelot, and she ultimately succeeded in her goal. Not only did Bennets speech
create hatred among the citizens of her country, it also promoted disaffection towards the

17
Camelot Pen. Code 241-A(a).

Camelot Pen. Code 241-A(c).
19
20
Camelot Pen. Code 241-A(b).
21
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 1.
18
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government itself. Additionally, Bennet furthered her disruptive plans by criminally conspiring
with other members of the Hogwarts party. It is therefore imperative that the Camelot Supreme
Court reinstates her convictions under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal
Code.
A.
Bennets Actions Support Her Conviction Under Section 351-A of the

Camelot Penal Code, As She Intentionally Promoted Enmity Between
Various Communities.
The ability to openly exchange ideas and opinions is the hallmark of a democratic
society. Yet most democracies, even those with constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech,
impose certain limitations to ensure that overreaching rhetoric, imbued with prejudice, vitriol,
and malignant intent, does not threaten the wellbeing of its members. Section 351-A of the
Camelot Penal Code represents one such measure, and given the facts of the present case, it is
clear that Bennets actions exemplify the type of conduct that 351-A seeks to prevent:
incitement, masked as political discourse. It is therefore imperative that the Camelot Supreme
Court reinstates the High Courts conviction first because Bennet intentionally promoted enmity
between different groups of people, second because she possessed a bona fide intent to commit
actions that prejudice harmony between different communities, and third because she succeeded
in causing unrest among different groups of people.
Camelot Penal Code Section 351-A is broken into three subsections, covering conduct
ranging from inspiring hatred between communities, prejudicing public tranquility, and using
violence to create fear among communitiesall with the aim of maintaining harmony across
Camelots various communities.22 Like Camelot, many common law countries have also enacted
legislation in an attempt to cultivate peace and unity across diverse facets of society. The U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, has confirmed the need to curtail certain types of speech. In
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court ruled that the government may punish public speech in cases
where the statements are intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and that such
acts were indeed likely to occur.23 The U.S. Supreme Court has also upheld certain convictions
where the defendants words or expressions were determined to pose an imminent danger to
other people. 24

22
See Camelot Pen. Code 351-A.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
24
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 210 U.S. 616 (1919) (holding that convictions were warranted where
defendants tossed flyers out of windows across New York City in an attempt to incite others to take up arms against
23
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Further, India has enacted a statute that bears striking resemblance to Section 351-A of
the Camelot Penal Code.25 In interpreting this law, the Indian Supreme Court has declared that a
showing of mens rea,26 or intent to incite, is required when determining if an individual is guilty
of promoting enmity among different groups.27 Similar mens rea requirements also appear in
judgments from the United States and England.28
In order to demonstrate that an individual intended to cause discord or promote enmity
among different groups, courts consider the circumstances surrounding the questionable speech
or actions. 29 A few strongly worded statements taken out of context cannot sufficiently
demonstrate mens rea.30 In the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan, the Indian Supreme Court made a
determination of the petitioners intent by considering the overall language of the book and the
circumstances in which the book was written, not just the questionable passages.31
Some Indian High Courts have gone as far as to declare that a clear showing of intent is
not necessary to convict someone under the public enmity statute, so long as there is a showing
that the questionable language used was of a nature calculated to promote feelings of enmity or
hatred, such that a person must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act.32
That is, a court may infer the existence of mens rea simply because a reasonable person would
have known that their actions or statements were likely to cause discord.33 Indeed, the Allahabad
High Court applied identical reasoning in the case of Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, and
found that although the author claimed he had no offensive intent, the overall language of the

war efforts); Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that leaflets directing young men to fight the war
draft posed a clear and present danger to society).
25
See Indian Pen. Code 153A.
26
The Latin phrase mens rea is translated to mean guilty mind, or criminal intent in committing an act. Nolos
Plain-English Law Dictionary.
27
The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A
IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State
Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India). See also Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. (1997) 7 SCC 431
(India); Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court, 26/3/2015) (India);
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
28
See, e.g. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (first U.S. case to advocate the intent
standard for incitement cases); R v Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK) (holding that the inciter must intend the others to
engage in the behavior constituting the offense); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 50.
29
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India).
30
Id.
31
Id. See also Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India) (examining all circumstances
surrounding petitioners isolated remarks and finding an overall absence of intent or malicious aim]; Debi Soren and
others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India) (viewing petitioners comments in context of political goals revealed
no intent to create enmity).
32
Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (1970) (India).
33
See id.
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book was of such a nature that enmity between Hindus and Muslims would be the inevitable
consequence, thereby supporting conviction under Section 153A.34 Further, under the standard
articulated in Gopal Vinyak Godse, the natural or probable consequences of speech may be
considered in light of the class of people towards whom the language was directed in addition to
the state of feelings between the different classes or communities.35
1.
Bennets actions were directed to definable groups and communities,

and therefore fall within the purview of 351-A.
Bennets actions fall within the ambit of Section 351-A of the Camelot Penal Code
because they were directed to discrete, definable groups of individuals. Subsection (1) of
Camelot Penal Code 351-A prohibits any words that promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will towards
groups characterized by religion, raceor any grounds whatsoever. 36 As such, different
political parties could readily be encompassed by Section 351-As catchall phrase, or any
grounds whatsoever, as they are themselves distinct groups.
Here, the factual record
demonstrates that Bennets inflammatory statements inspired enmity between the Hogwarts
Party, the Crouching Tiger Party, the Vanity Fair Party, and their respective supporters, thereby
subjecting her actions to the scrutiny of 351-A.37
2.
Bennets Conviction Should Be Reinstated Because She Acted With

the Intent to Promote Enmity Between Groups and Disrupt Public
Tranquility.
The facts in the record clearly demonstrate that Bennet acted with the intent and purpose
of promoting enmity between her followers, the Hogwarts Party, and the other political parties
within Camelot.
Global precedent mandates a showing of mens rea in order to sustain a
conviction under incitement or hate-speech statutes, which can be determined by considering all
circumstances surrounding the questionable acts.38 An examination of Bennets inflammatory
remarks, within in the overall context of her deliberately contrarian campaign, reveals a
definitive intent to create tension among different communities. First, unlike the case of Balwant
Singh, Bennets comments cannot be considered casual slogans, that were only raised a few

34
Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 27 All 649 (1927) (India).

36
Camelot Pen. Code 351-A.
37
See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem.
38
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India); Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.
(1997) 7 SCC 431 (India); Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court,
26/3/2015) (India); Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); R v Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK).
35
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times.39 Rather, Bennet made public, provocative statements on behalf of the Hogwarts party
on at least four separate occasions.40 Moreover, the entirety of Bennets campaign, entitled
Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government, is a flagrant indication of her intent to
create public humiliation on the part of her opponents.41 Thus, the present case is readily
distinguishable from other cases, like those of Manzar Sayeed Khan and Debi Soren, where the
petitioners questionable writings or remarks were isolated, and a thorough examination of
overall context revealed no underlying goal to promote hatred.
Further, Bennets mens rea is evidenced by the fact that she continued promoting public
enmity even after being publicly warned by the Prime Minister of Camelot himself.42 By issuing
a press statement in which he asks Bennet not to continue raising tensions in the country, he is
unequivocally putting Bennet on notice that her actions have caused disharmony and promoted
hatred.43 In spite of this, Bennet declared that the Hogwarts Party will continue its struggle.44
Ultimately, Bennets intent to promote enmity is demonstrated by examining her own
declarations, imbued with violent mens rea: [w]e must rise in rebellion against these dirty
leeches on our mind and its thinking process[t]ogether we will overthrow the government!
Break the government to pieces, if need be [w]e will be the divine destruction which shall
vaporize the deep seated rot45 Indeed, her language indicates an us versus them, mentality,
urging fellow members of the Hogwarts Party to rise in revolt.
However, even in the event that this Court finds Bennet lacked a clear showing of mens
rea, she is nevertheless culpable under 351-A because her statements and actions were of such a
nature that she should have known that they would result in hatred and chaos. In the case of
Gopal Vinayek Godse, the Bombay High Court noted that if speech or writing is so patently
inflammatory that a reasonable person should have assumed that discord would result, malicious

39
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).

See Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2 (endorsing the sentiment that the current governments are a bunch of
useless war-mongers, and then expressing statements suggesting Camelots citizens were inferior to Genghiztans);
3 (referring to members of the government and opposing political parties as dirty leeches on our minds and its
thinking process, and as corrupt while advocating to overthrow them); 5 (declaring that the Hogwarts party will
continue its struggle).
41
42
Id. at 4.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 5.
45
Id. at 3.
40
13
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intent may be inferred.46 Similarly here, Bennet, an educated woman, must have known that her
statements would disrupt harmony and promote enmity across political lines. No reasonable
individual, for instance, could genuinely believe that creating a campaign entitled Mock and
Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government would not create ire and tension among her
followers and the people the campaign was attempting to mock.47 Moreover, any educated
citizen of Camelot, let alone a political leader, would be aware of the countrys acrimonious and
bellicose history with Genghiztan.48 By publicly deriding her fellow countrymen, declaring that
Genghiztans citizens are healthier, more hard-working, and better educated than Camelots,
Bennet must have known that her statements were of a nature to inspire disharmony, particularly
among the soldiers who risked their lives to defend Camelot.49
Here, the facts demonstrate that Bennet intended her statements to result in public unrest.
Moreover, even if this Court finds that there was not sufficient evidence to support a clear
showing of mens rea, Bennets culpability under 351-A may nevertheless be inferred from the
brazen nature of her actions.
3.
Bennets Conviction Under 351-A Was Proper Because Her Actions

Resulted in Civil Unrest and Public Disharmony.
Bennet not only intended to commit the offenses outlined in section 351-A, she
succeeded in doing so. Subsection (1)(a) of 351-A proscribes words that promote or attempt to
promote disharmony or feelings of hatred between different groups or communities.50 Here,
Bennet clearly violated this provision when she publicly praised Genghiztan at the expense of
Camelots citizens, as this likely resulted in feelings of ill will between the Hogwarts Party and
all soldiers who fought bravely to defend Camelot against Genghiztan.51 The entirety of her
speech on the Grounds of Erehwon can also be seen as promoting enmity between the Hogwarts
Party and any politician currently working for Camelots government.52 Additionally, subsection
(1)(b) proscribes acts that are prejudicial to, or are likely to disturb public tranquility.53 Bennets
rally, in which 30,000 people gathered on hallowed ground in Erehwon and proceeded to attack

46
48
Id. at 1.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Camelot Pen. Code 351-A(1)(a).
51
52
See id.
53
See Camelot Pen. Code 351-A(1)(b).
47
14
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and burn public property, easily falls within the realm of this provision.54 The rally and its
subsequent results further violate subsection (1)(c), which prohibits the organization of any
movement in which participants are likely to use criminal force or violence, causing fear and
insecurity among different groups.55 Bennets charge to the Hogwarts Party, resulting in a mob
of 200,00056 members staked outside the Parliament of Camelot, in addition to the stalking of
Camelot government officials to shame them for their alleged childish support, readily qualify
as acts that inspire fear and insecurity under subsection (1)(c).57
United States precedent has imposed more stringent requirements in determining if
speech or actions may be considered incitement. In the present case, Bennets actions meet this
heightened standard. Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg, an individual
must not only intend for his statements to disrupt public harmony, the statements must actually
result, or be very likely to result, in the imminent disruption of harmony.58 Here, the factual
record clearly demonstrates that soon thereafter Bennet made her inflammatory rally speech,
members of the Hogwarts Party mobilized the public to riot, shouting slogans and attacking and
burning public property.59 As such, Bennets intent to create public unrest was accomplished
after her speech, resulting in clear violations of subsections (a) through (c) of section 351-A.
B.
The Facts in the Record Readily Support Bennets Conviction of Sedition

Under Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code.
In the Indian Supreme Courts seminal decision in Kedar Nath, it emphasized the notion
that citizens of a democratic society are entitled to criticize their governments with an ultimate
goal of enacting positive change.60 Statements that encourage violent governmental overthrow,
however, do not further this goal, and should be restricted as necessary to maintain the safety and
security of the State. The factual record of this case provides ample evidence that Bennets
statements were not made with the aim of enacting positive, lawful change within the Camelot
government. Rather, Bennets sedition conviction under Section 421-A should be reinstated first
because she possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of sedition, second because she

54

See Camelot Pen. Code 351-A(1)(c).
56
The record is unclear. There was a minimum crowd of 200,000 but the record indicates it could have been as
many as 2,000,000 people.
57
58
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
59
60
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).
55
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effectuated this intent and successfully excited disaffection towards the government of Camelot,
and third because her statements were directed to the government in its entirety.
Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code proscribes words that bring, or attempt to bring
disaffection or hatred towards the government or show that the government is mistaken in its
measures.61 Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, outlining the offense of sedition, is nearly
identical to Section 421-A in the Camelot Penal Code. 62
In interpreting their respective
statutory offense of sedition, the Indian Supreme Court has declared that a finding of mens rea is
imperative to support a conviction.63 Echoing the Bombay High Courts sentiments in QueenEmpress v. Balquanquaddhar Tilak, the Indian Supreme Court has declared, if a man excites or
attempts to excite feelings of disaffection, great or small, he is guilty under the section.64
The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath declared that tendency to disturb public order is also
crucial for conviction under Indias sedition law.65 This understanding is said to derive from
English law, which similarly holds that a tendency to create tumult or disorder is an essential
element of sedition.66 The United States has similarly echoed this sentiment in Brandenburg v.
Ohio and Schneck v. United States, where the Supreme Court articulated that words must not
only be spoken with the intent to incite hatred, they must be likely to result in imminent
violence.67
In determining whether particular statements were indeed made with the intent to excite
disaffection or contempt towards the government, precedent dictates that courts should consider
the circumstances of each particular case and the manner and the occasion in which they are
mentioned.68 For example, in The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi the Indian Supreme Court
considered a scenario in which certain individuals distributed pamphlets that included language
allegedly advocating for governmental overthrow.69 In addition to the offending passage, the

61

See Indian Pen. Code 124A.
63
64
Queen Empress v. Balquanqaddhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 (India); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,
1962 AIR 955 (India).
65
66
RUSSELL ON CRIME, Vol. 1 at 229; R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK).
67
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
68
P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India). See also State of Bihar v. Shailabala
Devi, 1952 AIR 329 (India); Debi Soren and ors. v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India).
69
"Labourers, raise now the cry of revolution. The heavens will tremble, the Universe will shake and the flames of
revolution will burst forth from land and water. You who have been the object of exploitation, now dance the fearful
dance of destruction on this earth; truly, labourers, only total destruction will create a new world order and that will
62
16
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Supreme Court viewed the entire pamphlet and considered the fact that the materials were
distributed to highly impressionable audiences of laborers.70 The Court ultimately determined
that the overall language and circumstances surrounding the pamphlets did support conviction.71
Finally, in the context of sedition statutes, courts have differentiated politicians from the
government itself. [T]he expression the Government established by law" has to be
distinguished from the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration.
Government established by law is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the
State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted.72 The severity of
sedition is characterized by its nature as an offense against the State; similarly disapprobative
comments against a few individuals would be far less likely to put the security and safety of an
entire nation at risk.73
1.
Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Reinstated Because She

Possessed Bona Fide Intent to Incite Disaffection Towards the
Government.
Global legal precedent has firmly established the need to demonstrate mens rea in order
to support a sedition conviction, and the factual record here demonstrates that Bennet did posses
the requisite intent. Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code proscribes words that bring or
attempt to bring hatred towards the government, or show that the government is mistaken.74 In
order to determine whether Bennet intended to bring the government into contempt, the
circumstances surrounding her statements must be considered. Here, she is seen chastising the
Camelot government publicly on multiple occasions, declaring that they are drunk on power,
narrow-minded, and intellectually lazy.75 These statements do not appear in isolation, however:
her entire political campaign is entitled Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government,
which is plainly indicative of her intent call the government and its measures into disrepute,
violating 421-A. Further, and perhaps most egregious, Bennet addressed a crowd of 30,000,
comprised mainly of students, commanding them to take up arms against the government, to

bring happiness to the whole world." 1952 AIR 329.
70
See id.
71
See id.
72
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chattisgarh, Crim App. No 86 of 2011 (India); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of
Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).
73
74
75
See Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2, 3, 5.
17
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break it to pieces, and to be its divine destruction.76 It is significant that Bennet directs her
statements to impressionable young adults, because as demonstrated in the case of Shailabala
Devi, it is important to consider the audience being addressed in determining whether there was
mens rea. Just as laborers the were found to be susceptible to the distribution of pamphlets in
Shailabala Devi, the students here are young, and likely more open to radical ideals. 77
Considering the circumstances surrounding Bennets comments, it is clear that she possessed
definitive intent to bring the government into contempt.
It is also significant to note that Bennets statements all reference the government
generally, and at no point makes mention of any politician. As such, it is easily understood that
Bennets statements were directed at the the Government established by law, not any particular
individual.78 Had these actions been aimed at specific people working in a governmental
capacity, Camelots sedition statute may not have applied. 79
Here, however, Bennet is
unequivocally addressing the entire government, thus subjecting her to punishment under 421-A.
2.
Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Upheld Because Her

Actions Had the Tendency of Promoting Violence Towards the
Government.
Here, Bennet not only made inflammatory statements with the intent to inspire contempt
against the government, she succeeded in doing so. The Indian Supreme Court and the House of
Lords have held that the acts or speech in question must have the tendency to disturb public
order.80 The U.S. Supreme Court has further held that words spoken with the intent to incite
hatred must also be likely to result in imminent violence.81 Bennets actions meet all the above
standards, because soon after she publicly castigated the Camelot government at the rally on
the Grounds of Erehwon, attendees began to attack and burn public property.82 Moreover,
thousands of people also began stalking members of the government with the ultimate aim of
deriding them for their allegedly childish behavior.83 Bennets statements therefore not only
had a tendency to disturb public order, they did result in violence and destruction. Ultimately,

76

State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi. 1952 AIR 329 (India).
78
79
80
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India); R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK).
81
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
82
83
See Id.
77
18
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the offenses under 421-A have clearly been made out against Bennet, as the facts demonstrate
she intended to bring the government into contempt, and with her statements she succeeded in
creating violence and public disorder.
C.
Bennets Conviction Should Be Upheld Under 210-B Because She Conspired

with Other Hogwarts Party Members to Commit The Offenses Detailed in
351-A and 421-A.
Even in the event that this Honbe Court finds that the offenses in 421-A and 351-A have
not been made out against Bennet, it should still find that there were ample facts to convict her of
conspiracy to commit those offenses under 210-B. Here, Bennets conviction of criminal
conspiracy should be reinstated because first she made a conscious agreement with other
members of the Hogwarts Party to engage in criminal behavior, second because, as discussed in
Parts II.A.2 and II.B.1 supra, she possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the offenses laid
out in 351-A and 421-A, and third because she committed an actus reus in furtherance of these
objectives.
Camelot Penal Code Section 210-B indicates that an individual may be found guilty, and
punished severely, if they conspire to commit an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment.84 Most common law countries require prosecutors to prove a series of elements
in order to convict someone of criminal conspiracy:85 there must have been an understanding
between multiple people, with the objective being an illicit goal, and the individuals then must
act in some way to further or enable the conspiracy.86 It is commonly understood that a
conspiracy requires an agreement.87 The highest courts in the U.S. and U.K. have continually
held that the essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.88 An
agreement does not need to be formal or in writing: any indication that there was a meeting of
the minds is sufficient. 89 Given the inherent difficulty in finding concrete proof of an

84
Camelot Pen. Code 210-B.

See Iannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770; See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Mathuri and ors
v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India).
86
Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK)
87
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). See also Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672 (conviction for conspiracy
under federal conspiracy statute cannot be sustained unless there is proof of an agreement to commit [the charged
offense]); Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK).
88
United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that conspiracy should be found only the
agreement reflects a specific intent to commit a crime); Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK).
89
See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984); American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328
U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
85
19
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agreement, courts use circumstantial evidence as proof.90 Thus, in order to prove the existence of
a criminal agreement, courts must examine all relevant facts and circumstances to draw an
inference.91
The accused individual must have also possessed a mens rea to be found guilty of
conspiracy.92 The mens rea element of this offense is characterized by specific intent,93 which
means that the accused cannot merely plan to engage in general lawless action: they must intend
to commit a particular offense. 94 Moreover, an individual must commit an actus reus 95 in
furtherance of the ultimate criminal goal. Indeed, no one is punished for the harboring merely
of a criminal intent. There must be an act giving adequate expression to the intent.96 Thus, the
actus reus element, or the overt act, requires proof of some action undertaken with the goal of
effectuating the objective of the conspiracy. A qualifying act may be something as brazen as
attempting to execute the crime itself, or something less obvious, like preemptively purchasing
the materials needed to commit the offense.97 The Indian Supreme Court has noted that, in order
to determine whether an act was motivated by a conspiracy, a court must take into consideration
all relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge [of] the natural consequences
of the action.98
1.
Bennet engaged in an agreement to further criminal objectives with

Fun Toosh, Rebello Gonsalves, and other members of the Hogwarts
Party.
Bennet did not act alone when she planned to promote enmity among groups, or incite
hatred towards the government: she had the support of Mr. Rebello Gonsalves, Mr. Fun Toosh,
and the entire Hogwarts Party. The record indicates that Bennet was not the only one charged
with the offenses in 421-A, 351-A, and criminal conspiracy. In fact, she was arrested, tried, and

90
See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986
(India) (assessing criminal intent behind an act by considering unlawful conduct was the dominant intention which
prompted the entry.)
91
Id.
92
United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2003); State of W.B. v. Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785,
1995 SCC (1) 684 (India); State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 579 (India).
93
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).
94
See id. (holding that speeches made at a protest that advocate rioting did not amount to specific intent because
they amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time).
95
Actus reus, translated from Latin, means guilty act. Nolos Plain-English Law Dictionary.
96
Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941. 624, 628.
97
See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 921 (2d Cir. 1957) (defendants convicted of criminal conspiracy for tax
evasion after they were found altering IRS statements); See United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal. 1988)
(evidence that defendant purchased only nonexplosive components of bomb still resulted in conspiracy conviction).
98
Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India).
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found guilty along with Rebello Gonsalves and Fun Toosh, both members of the Hogwarts
Party.99 The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that an agreement need not be formal, and can be
merely a meeting of the minds;100 the Indian Supreme Court has also held that circumstantial
evidence may be used to prove the existence of such a scheme.101 It can therefore be presumed
that Bennets speech, planned rally, and subsequent disruptive protests were accomplished with
the help of these two individuals, in addition to the rest of the Hogwarts Party. 102 The
circumstances surrounding their joint arrest and the overall nature of Bennets political regime,
which relied on the support and dedication of her followers, points directly to an understanding
among Hogwarts Party members, thereby constituting an agreement.103
2.
Bennet possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of criminal

conspiracy
As discussed throughout this Memorial, and particularly in Parts II.A.2 and II.B.1 supra,
all of Bennet actions have been characterized by deliberation and intent, proving that she
possessed the necessary mens rea to be found guilty not only of the offenses outlined in 421-A
and 351-A, but also conspiring to commit these acts under 210-B.
3.
Bennet committed an actus reus by encouraging her supporters to

destroy the government.
Bennet is guilty of conspiring to promote enmity and commit sedition because she took
affirmative steps to effectuate discord. Common law precedent requires that an individual
knowingly act in some way to further the objective of a crime in order to be found guilty of
conspiracy.104 Here, Bennets statements at the rally readily meet this requirement. By standing
in front of tens of thousands of supporters and vocally encouraging the overthrow of the
government, Bennet acted affirmatively with the aim of both promoting enmity between
different groups of people, and bringing the government into contempt.105 Indeed, these acts
were crucial to the successful execution of her planned uprising.

99
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5-6.

See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984); American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328
U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
101
Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India).
102
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5-6.
103
See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem 2-6.
104
See Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958); Yates, 354 U.S. 254 (1957).
105
100
21
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As such, this Honble Court must find that, at minimum, Bennet conspired to commit the
offenses outlined in sections 351-A and 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code because she not only
schemed with others to help realize her intended civil unrest, but she also acted with the
deliberate aim of achieving this goal.
III.
THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE IT IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition and should be
imposed in this case because Bennet was the mastermind behind a plan that threatened the safety
of Camelot. The only way to ensure that she will be prevented from inciting violence and
anarchy in the future is to sentence her to death. Though the death sentence is considered an
extreme punishment, it maintains widespread use throughout countries across the world.106
Ninety-six countries still have the death penalty as a possible punishment for certain crimes,
including both the United States and India.107 In fact, in 2015 alone, the United States executed
28 people and sentenced 52 more to death.108 Though India executed only one individual in
2015, 75 people were sentenced to death.109 Further, after a comprehensive review of the use of
the death penalty in India, the Law Commission of India did not recommend abolishing the death
penalty completely.110 In fact, it concluded that there was still great concern for abolishing the
death sentence for terrorism-type offenses that affect national security. 111 These statistics
indicate the death penalty is still widely used in democracies and is a necessary punishment for
some crimes, especially for offenses that affect national security.
Sedition, in particular, is a serious offense and imposition of the death sentence is
therefore appropriate for some offenders. In India, sedition is classified as an offense against the
state, similar to treason.112 Sedition is a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason,
and it frequently precedes treason by short interval.113 Though death is not a punishment for

106
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 65 (2015).

Id.
108
Id. at 13.
109
Id. at 25.
110
Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 217 (Aug. 2015),
111
Id.
112
113
Id.
107
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sedition in either India or the United States, it is for treason,114 indicating that crimes against
society that threaten the security of the nation are serious offenses for which an extreme
punishment is appropriate.
In deciding which cases fit the extreme category justifying the death penalty, it is
important to look at the nature of the crime and any aggravating circumstances.115 In India,
courts have not been consistent in determining which factors make a case so exceptional as to
warrant the death penalty.116 However, several themes from various decisions indicate that age,
the nature of the crime, level of planning, and possibility of reform are factors to consider.117
The most recent execution in India was that of Yakub Radul Azak Memon, one of the men
responsible for the 1993 Mumbai bombings.118 In sentencing him to death, the court considered
aggravating factors such as his significant role in planning the attack, that it was an act of
terrorism, and that he chose a crowded area with lots of victims.119
Additionally, age and education are other sentencing factors courts consider before
imposing the death penalty. The younger the offender, the less likely the death sentence seems
appropriate.120 Similarly, courts may consider less-educated offenders as less culpable. For
example, in Memon v. State, the court considered the working-class and low education levels of
the ten appellants who planted the explosives as mitigating factors, indicating they were not
masterminds but rather subservient minions.121
These factors are also relevant to the likelihood of reform. If an offender seems likely to
reform his ways, the death sentence does not seem like an appropriate punishment. In Bariyar v.
State, the Indian Supreme Court noted that the death penalty is allowed when other options are
foreclosed, meaning the sentencing aim of reformation can be said to be unachievable.122 The

114
Indian Pen. Code 121; 18 U.S.C. 2381 (2012).

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India).
116
See Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC. 767 (India); see also Law Commission of
India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 109-10 (Aug. 2015),
117
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India); Law Commission of India, Rep.
No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 109-10 (Aug. 2015), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.
118
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 30 (2015).
119
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).
120
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India); Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012)
4 SCC 257 (India). Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 122-23 (Aug. 2015),
121
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).
122
Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (India).
115
23
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court in Md Mannan v. State echoed this consideration when it affirmed the defendants death
sentence because the accused was a menace to society and shall continue to be so and he cannot
be reformed.123
Finally, in addition to aggravating factors, it is also important to consider the penological
goals of punishment. The main justifications for punishment are rehabilitation, deterrence, and
incapacitation.124 When rehabilitation is not possible, as noted above, the accused cannot be
returned to society.125 In that case, sometimes the death sentence is the only way to fully achieve
the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence aims to prevent individuals from offending
through fear of punishment.126 This is strengthened when the punishment is death because
human beings fear dying. 127 Incapacitation attempts to remove dangerous offenders from
society.128 The Supreme Court of India has recognized this need to incapacitate certain offenders
completely: Whenever some infection some infection is spread in a limb, effort is made to cure
the same by giving antibiotics orally and if that does not work, by following second line of
treatment. Sometimes it may require surgical intervention also. However, if the infection results
in infecting the limb to the extent that it becomes gangrene, amputation is the only treatment.129
Though the Law Commission of India cast doubt on the death penaltys effectiveness for
deterrence or incapacitation, it did not recommend abolishment for all crimes.130 This indicates
that the death penalty still serves deterrence and incapacitation benefits beyond that of life
imprisonment. Thus, while the death sentence is an extreme penalty, certain circumstances and
penological goals still justify its use in some cases.
It is important for Camelot to maintain the option of the death sentence for sedition and it
is an appropriate punishment for Bennet under the facts of this case. First, as established above,
Bennet is guilty of the offense of sedition, a serious crime against the nation of Camelot, a newly
independent country. Her speech to overthrow the government clearly falls within the sedition
statute and comes close to treason, a crime for which other countries have imposed the death

123
Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India).

See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. 1.5 (2d ed.).
125
126
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. 1.5 (2d ed.).
129
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (emphasis added).
130
124
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sentence. Camelot must be able to protect itself and prevent anarchy. Thus, it is necessary to
keep the death sentence as a possible punishment for extreme cases such as the present case.
Second, there many aggravating factors here that make the death sentence appropriate.
Bennet is an educated, politically-savvy adult, with great influence over others as a government
official. She is not part of the lower strata of society like the ten appellants sentenced to life
imprisonment in Memon v. State. In contrast, rather than being a mere subservient minion, she
was the mastermind and main participant in advocating overthrow of the government. She chose
a well-known and historic place where she knew lots of people would gather.131 As the leader of
a political party made up mainly of students,132 she used her influence to manipulate these
young, malleable minds to cause public disorder and rebel. Merely planning and assisting in the
attack was enough to sentence the defendant to death in Memon and therefore Bennets
incitement is sufficient to warrant the death sentence here. The fact that no one died on June 1,
2015, does not mean nothing could have happened or could still happen as a result of Bennets
advocacy for violent rebellion. Like the defendant in Md Mannan v. State, she is a menace to
society with no hope of reform.133 She had multiple chances to apologize and ease tensions.
However, even after the complaint was filed, she continued gave a press conference, 134
indicating she feels no remorse or call to reform. All of these factors mandate the death sentence.
Finally, imposing the death sentence here is the only way to fully achieve important
penological goals. Bennet incited a crowd of 30,000 people. An additional minimum of 200,000
people then protested the government. 135 The only way to deter her followers and other
members of the Hogwarts Party from picking up where Bennet left off is to sentence her to
death. Moreover, life imprisonment would not serve the same goal of incapacitation as the death
sentence here because, as evidenced by her press conference after the FIR, Bennet can still speak
out to rebel against the government from prison. She has been given multiple chances to reform,
has not, and now amputation is the only logical treatment.
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the High Courts acquittals, re-instate Bennets
convictions, and impose the death sentence for the offense of sedition.

131

Id. at 1.
133
134
135
Id. at 3. The record is unclear but suggests that it could have been as many as 2,000,000 people.
132
25
URN 1306

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Honble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code is constitutional on its face;
2. The State has made out the offenses against Bennet under Sections 421-A,
351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code and her convictions are reinstated; and
3. The death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the facts of this case and
should be imposed.
And pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Honble Court may deem fit in the
interests of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is humbly prayed,
URN 1306
Counsels for the Petitioner.
26

Memorial On Behalf of The Petitioner (State)

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Memorial On Behalf of The Petitioner (State)

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K.K.

LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

XIII K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CAMELOT

Criminal Appeal No. ______/2017

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. ................. 7

THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNETS CONVICTIONS UNDER

THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE IT IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND THE FACTS

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Therefore, Mr. K.F. Panda

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Whether Section 421-A is constitutional and should be upheld?

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

constitutional and re-instate Bennets convictions because it imposes reasonable restrictions on

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Section 421-A(a) prohibits words or

The Indian Supreme Court has consistently upheld Section 124As

constitutionality and this Court should do the same here.

Additionally, Section 421-A(c)

THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNETS CONVICTIONS UNDER

Camelot Pen. Code 241-A(a).

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennets Actions Support Her Conviction Under Section 351-A of the

See Camelot Pen. Code 351-A.

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennets actions were directed to definable groups and communities,

Here, the factual record

Bennets Conviction Should Be Reinstated Because She Acted With

Global precedent mandates a showing of mens rea in order to sustain a

Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 27 All 649 (1927) (India).

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennets Conviction Under 351-A Was Proper Because Her Actions

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

The Facts in the Record Readily Support Bennets Conviction of Sedition

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

In interpreting their respective

Camelot Pen. Code 421-A.

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Reinstated Because She

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Here, however, Bennet is

Bennets Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Upheld Because Her

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennets Conviction Should Be Upheld Under 210-B Because She Conspired

Camelot Pen. Code 210-B.

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennet engaged in an agreement to further criminal objectives with

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

Bennet possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of criminal

Bennet committed an actus reus by encouraging her supporters to

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5-6.