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SULU RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 148267
August 8, 2002
FACTS:
A petition filed by respondent (Sulu Resources Development
Corporation]) for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No.
MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner
Armando C. Carpio filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto,
alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo,
Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a
preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on
his properties. After due proceedings were held, the Panel of
Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR
rendered a Resolution that Armando C. Carpio is hereby upheld.
Accordingly, the properties of CARPIO are ordered excluded from
the area of PMPSA-IV-131 of SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and the area not covered by the adverse claim as
subject to mining locations in accordance with existing laws, rules
and regulations. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to
the Mines Adjudication Board. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondents failure to comply
with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the
assailed Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim.
Citing Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The
adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely
administrative in nature. Under RA 7942, the settlement of
disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements,
and surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires
shall pertain exclusively to a Panel of Arbitrators in the regional
office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
whose decisions are appealable to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Under Section
79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the MAB as well as its
decision or order shall be final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the
Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme
Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals,
or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as
contended by herein petitioner.
HELD:
Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative
actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because,
unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In
Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have
appellate jurisdiction over Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) decisions and orders, but the review of such
decisions included questions of fact and law. At the very least
when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to
have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present
case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional
duty of the judiciary.
There are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that [n]o law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent. On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides
that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a
petition for review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an
expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to
which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases involving a
review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates
only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and
vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved parties right to appeal
is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have a remedy
and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy. The Revised Rules
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other private
individuals.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos
Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor
of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959.
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a
pit that discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and
6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following
grounds:
(1)
the Information were duplicitous as the Department
of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act;
(2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were
not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of
the Information took place; and
(3)
the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.
MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Information for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC
of Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. The
RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners
Respondent MAB
ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area
subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of
Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not
emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for Mines.
Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x x x the
Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has eventually
surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was
confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be
outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks
and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by
petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has
clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in
its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining
operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest
reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen.
Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest
established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps
the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly
prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining
operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by
law, closed to mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area
covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining
activities.
There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by
Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of
the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining
activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral
agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established
under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that
pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire
mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and
December 1, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining
claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired
under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was
issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining
claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the
approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining
lease application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a
reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not
waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this
Court.
On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails
Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it
amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already
been declared as its own private and exclusive property in final
judgments. The respondents, on the other hand, allege that
petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to
fully exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether
constitutional.
or
not
Presidential
Decree
No.
1214
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.
is
April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated
in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the
municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land
has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133)
over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested
Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991
Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act.
The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR
Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also
authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining
areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining
contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66,
declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land
open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to
the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No.
369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the
challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The
terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed
thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale
miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the
DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.
RULING
1. No, the assignment of EP 133 violated its terms and
conditions and Sec. 97, PD 463. Section 97 is entitled,
Assignment of Mining Rights. This hints that before
mining rights namely, the rights to explore, develop and
utilize are transferred or assigned, prior approval must be
obtained from the DENR Secretary. An exploration permit,
thus, cannot be assigned without the imprimatur of the
Secretary of the DENR.
While Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been repealed by
Executive Order No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former
law nonetheless remains applicable. Hence, the transfer or
assignment of exploration permits still needs the prior approval of
the Secretary of the DENR.
In addition, the terms of the permit was violated. Condition
Number 6 categorically states that the permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of MMC or its duly authorized agents.
While it may be true that SEM, the assignee of EP 133, is a 100%
subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter.
2. No, SEM does not acquire aver or prove that its mining rights
had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill
of 1902 was still the operative law.
It is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired
mining rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same
bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-
Article XII, Sec. 4: It is only after the specific limits of the forest
lands shall have been determined by the legislature will this
constitutional restriction apply. SEM does not allege nor present
any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute
determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. In
addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that
prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an
environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining
operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order
to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and
to resolve the health and peace and order problems that beset
the area.
There is nothing contradictory between the two. Proclamation No.
297, a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly
balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection, jibes with the constitutional policy of preserving and
protecting the forest lands from being further devastated by
denudation. In other words, the proclamation in question is in line
with Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, as the former fosters
the preservation of the forest environment of the Diwalwal area
and is aimed at preventing the further degradation of the same.
4. Yes, RA 7942 is the applicable law. Proclamation No. 297,
declaring a certain portion of land located in Monkayo,
Compostela Valley, with an area of 8,100 hectares, more or
less, as a mineral reservation, was issued by the President
pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, also known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 7942 authorizes the President to establish mineral
reservations
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, ET. AL. VS. HONORABLE JOSE
ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. NO. 156052
FACTS:
MARCH 7, 2007
ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or
not
HELD:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the
area which many were put into danger, the Manila Municipal
Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property and
health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities.
The court ordered the transfer of Pandacan Terminal within a non
extendible period of 90 days. The life of the people shall be the
utmost priority of the government in terms of its security, though
the business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot
sacrifice its people.
HELD:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard
and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad
grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants
of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
RICHARD HIZON vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
FACTS:
Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for
supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing
by "muroami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B
Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP
FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17)
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So
was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering
twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually
however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan
River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an
accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition
thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the
same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975,
the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to
be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot
be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the findings of the courta quoand
granted the petition for registration of the subject property but
excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of
ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by
the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their
course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of
petitioners' own tract of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land
under the principle of accretion
HELD:
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion
is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers
as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used
to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own
tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is
not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea
bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain,
the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long
as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is
reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express authorization granted
in due form by a competent authority."Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power
to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the
sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the
cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard
services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive
or legislative department has already declared the disputed land
as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent
thereto.
People of the Philippines versus Renerio P. Vergara,
Ernesto T. Cuesta Jr., Pedro G. Dagao and Bernardo P.
Cuesta,
G.R. No. 110286
FACTS:
April 2, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court committed grave abuse of authority when
it completely ignored the testimony of Emilio Linde.
HELD:
No. Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant
that it was another unidentified group of fishermen who threw the
bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish. It was obvious,
however, said the trial court, that the statement of this defense
witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at all been
on board the fishing boat in the company of the accused at the
time of the incident. Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of
the four accused completely missed to mention Linde. The court a
quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused at the
witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit
belief.
Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense. Appellate
courts seldom would subordinate, with their own, the findings of
trial courts which concededly have good vantage points in
assessing the credibility of those who take the witness
stand. Nevertheless, it is not all too uncommon for this Court, in
particular, to peruse through the transcript of proceedings in
order to satisfy itself that the records of a case do support the
conclusions of trial courts.The Court is convinced that the trial
then asked Baillo and Boyatacto attend to the same. When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to
Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR
Strike Force Teamand taken to its office where they were received
by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty. RTC found them guilty.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is
punishable.
HELD:
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D.No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting
and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authorization; and(2) Possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. "The
Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents. As a special law, the nature of the offense
is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. "However, the prosecution must prove that
petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" the
timber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found."
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive
possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents.
Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement,
delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any
competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession
of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the
repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential. Petition denied
OLYMPIO REVALDO Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170589
April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession
of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992,
Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any
legal document as required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage
and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC
rendered judgment on 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense
charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that motive
or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of
the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal
liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that
the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police
officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have
been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the
police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they
went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in his
possession lumber without the corresponding license
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is
admissible in court
HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the
lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioners house. The
lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the
FACTS:
Petitioners husband Juancho Saldima was employed for
twenty nine years as a route helper and salesman for the
Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc. during the
annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed
with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have cancer of
the lungs and died after few months. Azucena, the wife of Juancho
is now claiming for the benefits of her husband from the company
and the SSS. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this
petition was therefore filed.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D.
626
HELD:
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Because the
facts of the case showed that the cause of Juanchos death was
his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay at
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