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TANADA v.

ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of
herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused
by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO
agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative
power. That the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign
trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country
is bound by generally accepted principles of
international
law,
which
are
considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be
performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral

obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on


the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in
fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among
nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty
right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise
of authority. As to determine whether such exercise
is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the
said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal of membership should this be the
political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty.
WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. Its
alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected officers, make their free
choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Lawyers

league

vs

aquino

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their


petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
of tlie present government. All the eleven members
of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in
G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better

Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et


al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for
Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory
Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

Enrile vs morales
In April 1982, Morales and some others were
arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan
St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion
punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they
were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the
right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right
to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail.
Respondents countered that the group of Morales
were already under surveillance for some time before
they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest
done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital
offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with
respect to persons at present detained as well as other
who may hereafter be similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
for all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the
natural consequence is that the right to bail for the
commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the
offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone
of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after
the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just
as an individual has right to self-defense when his
life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension
of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to
hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against
it and commit acts that endanger the States very

existence. For this measure of self-defense to be


effective, the right to bail must also be deemed
suspended with respect to these offenses. However,
there is a difference between preventive and punitive
imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court
or the trial of such charges already filed becomes
protracted without any justifiable reason, the
detention becomes punitive in character and the
detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable
in this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC
reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what
they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review;
Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of


justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute
a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
89 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive
Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take
Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out
Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria


Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to
celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding
the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally
which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which CachoOlivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO
5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that
the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred
that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen
argued that the issue has become moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is
constitutional.

David vs GMA

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly


constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo


members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle

The issue cannot be considered as moot and


academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned

PP. It is still in fact operative because there are


parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its
declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has
no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance
between
the
NPA
and
the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations,
the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated
cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speechrelated conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended
for testing the validity of a law that reflects
legitimate
state
interest
in
maintaining
comprehensive
control
over
harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered
harmful
and
constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial

overbreadth are entertained in cases involving


statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to
a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power
Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution,
GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for
the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion
has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is
vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in
PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power
is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the

Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a


Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president
can only take care of the carrying out of laws but
cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power
Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng


Mga Bayani ("LNMB").
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense
Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and formally
assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacanan
Palace.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C.
Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army
regarding the Funeral Honors and Service for
President Marcos.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such


restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the


petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with the Court.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to


carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

ISSUES

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a


Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law
declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by
the president.
Marcos burial: Ocampo vs. Enriquez (majority
opinion digest)
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973; Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman vs. Executive Secretary Salvador
C. Medialdea, G.R. No. 226097, November 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential
Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former

1) Whether the respondents Secretary of National


Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed
memorandum and directive in compliance with the
verbal order of President Duterte to implement his
election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB?
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the
assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws?
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover
ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their
cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the

Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a


soldier and former President to interment at the

they failed to show that they have suffered or will


suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the

LNMB?

interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have


waived the burial of the remains of former President
Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an
agreement with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures
by which his remains shall be brought back to and
interred in the Philippines?

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They


merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be
interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.

RULING
The petitions must be dismissed.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar,


failed to disclose the direct or potential injury which
they may suffer as a result of the act complained of.
Their interest in this case is too general and shared
by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the
rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe
them with requisite legal standing.

Procedural issues
Political question
The Court agrees with the OSG that President
Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question
that is not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise
of his powers under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment
of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public
domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of


transcendental importance. At this point in time, the
interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and
declared a national shrine would have no profound
effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
our national life considering that more than twentyseven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years
after his ouster have already passed. Significantly,
petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and
imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional
rights.
As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman
Lagman, they failed to show that the burial of Marcos
encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

promote national healing and forgiveness. There


being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's
decision on that political question is outside the
ambit of judicial review.

CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the


Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771
and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Locus standi

FACTS

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions


for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because

On 13 June 2002, the Government of the


Philippines, acting through the Department

of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical


Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102)
with
Japan
Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite
surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Taon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX
converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development,
and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm.
offshore the Taon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around Taon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine
the
areas
underwater
composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project,
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration
well. Since the same was to be drilled in the
marine
waters
of
Aloguisan
and
Pinamungajan where the Taon Strait was
declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
requirements under Presidential Decree No.
1586 (PD 1586), entitled Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System,
Including Other Environmental Management
Related Measures and For Other Purposes.
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area
Management Board (PAMB) of the Taon
Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where
it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and
favourably recommended the approval of the
latters application for an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII
granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Taon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008,
JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan
town.

On 17 December 2007, two separate original


petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the
Resident Marine Mammals which inhibit
the waters in and around the Taon Strait,
joined by Stewards Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and friends seeking their
protection. Also impleaded as unwilling copetitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the
petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock,
non-profit, non-governmental organization
established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives
of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities
of
Aloguinsan
and
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey
showed that there is a drastic reduce
in fish catch by 50-70% attributable
to the destruction of the payao or
the artificial reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents
is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to
its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having
violated Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, considering that
there is no general law prescribing the
standard
or
uniform
terms,
conditions, and requirements for
service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from
entering and fishing within a 7kilometer radius from the point where
the oilrig was located, an area grated
than the 1.5-kilometer radius
exclusion zone stated in the Initial
Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late
Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo
Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Taon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a
Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield

Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine


agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations
are:
- The Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards have no legal
standing to file the petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since
SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21
June 2008.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING

which shall contain a brief


description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the
case within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all
affected baragngays copies of
said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A.
No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003
shall be governed by their
respective
provisions.
(Emphasis supplied)

1. No. The Court makes clear that the moot and


academic principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Despite the termination of
SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to
resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls
within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege
that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution,
the environmental and livelihood issues
raised undoubtedly affect the publics
interest, and the respondents contested
actions are capable of repetition.

Although the petition was filed in


2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has
been consistently held that rules of procedure
may be retroactively applied to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights
in rules of procedure.

2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in


environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases allow for a citizen
suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file
an action before our courts for violation of
our environmental laws on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature:

Moreover, even before the Rules of


Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the
SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name
of generations yet unborn based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.

Section 5. Citizen suit. Any


Filipino
citizen
in
representation of others,
including
minors
or
generations yet unborn,
may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon
the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order

It is also worth noting that the


Stewards in the present case are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides in part:

The President may enter


into
agreement
with
foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or
financial assistance for
large-scale
exploration,
development,
and
utilization of minerals,
petroleum,
and
other
mineral oils according to the
general
terms
and
conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions
to the economic growth and
general welfare of the
country. In such agreements,
the State shall promote the
development and use of local
scientific
and
technical
resources.

Hence, safeguards were out in place to insure


that the guidelines set by law are
meticulously observed and likewise eradicate
the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that
the President has authorized or approved of
the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87,
it is required that the Petroleum Board, now
the DOE, obtain the Presidents approval for
the execution of any contract under said
statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality
of SC-46 vis--vis other pertinent laws to
serve as a guide for the Government when
executing service contracts.

The President shall notify


the Congress of every
contract entered into in
accordance
with
this
provision, within thirty days
from
its
execution.
(Emphases supplied)

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the


Taon Strait is an environmentally critical
area, having been declared as a protected area
in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.

The
disposition,
exploration,
development, exploitation, and utilization of
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD
87) or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that
PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory
to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of
such contract, renders it null and void.

Public respondents admitted that


JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior
to the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required
the drilling of the exploration well. This
means that no environmental impact
evaluation was done when the seismic
surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic
surveys are part of the management plan of
the Taon Strait, such surveys were done in
violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

SC-46 appears to have been entered


into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover,
public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.

While PD 87 may serve as the general


law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource in the present case may
be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS
area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in
the Taon Strait, no energy resource

Service contracts involving the


exploitation, development, and utilization of
our natural resources are of paramount
interest to the present and future generations.

exploitation and utilization may be done in


said protected seascape.

measure. it merely notices the international


community of the scope of our maritime space.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August


16, 2011

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the


legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent
and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A.
5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be
compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime
of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law
for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under
Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea
lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of
islands would weaken our claim over those
territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or
loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA
9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are


subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover,
RIOP is a customary international law, no modern
state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover,
the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the
UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed
100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to
include them, well breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Arigo
vs
Swift
Case Digest GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014
Full Text
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran
aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a
marine habitat of which entry and certain human
activities are prevented and afforded protection by a
Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the

petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan


with TEPO from the SC.

imperium bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the


court over their persons.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their


capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy. As
petitioners argued, they were impleaded because
there was a waiver of immunity from suit between
US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held


liable for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs
Yes. The US government is liable for damages in
relation to the grounding incident under the
customary laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and
caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latters internal
waters and the territorial sea.

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and


post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology since these events caused and
continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding
the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they
sought a directive from the SC for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding
incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some
VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its
consent to be sued through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit
applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners
claim, the US government could not be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who have control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any
judgment against these officials would require
remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State
Immunity in correlation with the principle of States
as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non

Although the US to date has not ratified the


UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy,
the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the traditional uses of the
oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted
that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime
of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance
by the US of customary international rules on
navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters
and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to
bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##

Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of
Environmental Laws Must be Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even
common law is improper considering that it is the
VFA which governs disputes involving US military
ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had
over the respondents for being immuned from suit,
there is no way damages which resulted from
violation of environmental laws could be awarded to
petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides
that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
VFA to a US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via
a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is
Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US
as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the US government. The VFA
being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by
its terms and provisions. A petition under the Rules
on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to
assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
Veterans Federation Party v.
[G.R.
No.
136781. October
Facts:

COMELEC
6,
2000]

COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives


from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system as
members of the House of Representatives. Upon
petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2%
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system on the ground that under the Constitution, it
is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely
and
all
the
time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of
its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
FORMULA

FOR

determination of total number of party-list


representatives = #district representatives/.80 x
.20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes


of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of


concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats
for
concerned
party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation
are actually represented in Congress. This intent can
be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of
"representation."
Under
a
republican
or
representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful
local
representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party
be
determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners,
the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by
the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as
the
first
party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number
of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able
to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number
of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest


Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as
the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department and AFP
officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept.

29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec.


Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon,
requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept.
29 in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various
issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the
request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464,
effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order,
Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate
that the executive and AFP officials would not be
able to attend the meeting since the President has not
yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent,
Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the
AFP officials invited, attended the investigation.
Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue:

The heads of departments may, upon their own


initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464
as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry


vested in Congress.

In aid of Legislation:

Ruling:

The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of


legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the


Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any


of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours


is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent


in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. And where
the legislative body does not itself possess the

requisite information, recourse must be had to others


who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation,
there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
executive privilege. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only
to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be
exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes
E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the
requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator
Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their
absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of
the lack of consent from the President under E.O.
464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter
assumes that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by the executive
privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely
declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464
in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is

not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of


providing precise and certain reasons for the claim,
it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her
consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on
a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide
the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed
calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the
lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President
nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of
the official to appear before Congress and may then
opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel
his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections
2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a)
are however valid.