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Emmanuel

Pelaez vs Auditor General



In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat
of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section
3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any
such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present,
still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by
the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.


ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the
authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include
the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but
it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8
other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities
of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained;
however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as
a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a
province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being
created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed
in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province,
once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a
legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly
create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what
ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district ofMaguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29,
2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of
Maguindanao.

However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province
with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for
that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art.
X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow
the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation
to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional,
provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of Congress can
create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House
of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of
the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution,
the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones.Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law
enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as
part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC,
242 SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created
it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised
by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20,
Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the
ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.

ROGELIO BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC DIGEST G.R. No. 176970



This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that
Republic Act No. 9371- the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements is unconstitutional.
FACTS:
House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City
of Cagayan De Oro was filed by Cong. Jaraula on October 10, 2006 which eventually became RA No. 9371
which increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. The constituents of each district
would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod on May 2007 elections.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC asking for the nullification of
R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801
which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371
and Resolution No. 7837.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of
representation..
ISSUE:
1. WoN A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or
does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?
2. WoN R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

HELD:
1. A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance
with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core
provision Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays
Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman,
FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to
Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation
in the House of Representatives.
2. To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman
and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two
legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two
congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. In terms of services for city
residents, this easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only

250,000 constituents as against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district
now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a
greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each
congressman and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose
fewer numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice
the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total
number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the
presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

With regards to equality of representation, The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be
the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. The
August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows that barangayscomprising Cagayan de
Oros first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.TheConstitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. In fact, for cities, all it asks is that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand shall have one representative, while ensuring representation for every province regardless of
the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the
Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require their division,
merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite
some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

OR

Facts: Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino

Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence
two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de
Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily
means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.


ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the
criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale
of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists.


Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of
HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter
intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress.
Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not
lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present
constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another
government position

HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935
Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the
highest degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly
shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an
overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he
want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

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