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ROMULO DELA ROSA v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116945. February 9, 1996


Facts:
On October 22, 1991, nine (9) separate informations were filed against
petitioner, charging the latter with violation of B.P. Big. 22 before the RTC
upon complaint of private respondent.
At the scheduled arraignment petitioner failed to appear, prompting the
trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The next day, petitioner filed a
motion to lift the order of arrest and for the continuance of his bail bond,
stating that his failure to appear was due to illness. The motion was granted
by the trial court. During the arraignment the petitioner, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. The trial court set hearing, the hearings
set were cancelled at the instance of petitioner, who claimed that he had
not yet secured the services of his counsel de parte.
The cross-examination of witness Antonio was completed and two
additional trial dates were set by the trial court. Again respondent moved for
the postponement due to a previous commitment the same was granted by
the trial court.
On November 17, 1992, counsel for private respondent, in open court,
moved for the postponement of the trial set on that date on the ground that
private respondent had doubts as to his inability to bring out the details of
the transaction. Petitioner objected to the postponement and invoked his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the cases against him by the trial court
was based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and
remand of the same would place him in double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Indeed, the several postponements sought and obtained by petitioner, in
effect, amounted to a waiver or abandonment of his right to a speedy trial.
Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him. Neither does double
jeopardy apply in the instant case. The requisites that must occur for legal
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite
is lacking
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent
Court was therefore proper since it was brought in his own name and not in
that of the People of the Philippines. That the said proceedings benefited the
People is not a reversible error. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of
discretion. There being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the

prosecution of the case may still resume in the trial court, as decided by the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

COMELEC vs. SILVA


G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998
FACTS:
The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some
certificates of canvass, moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against
them. The Chief State Prosecutor, who had been designated by the
Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in
private respondents' request. Eventually, the cases were dismissed. The
COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of
Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was required to comment, he
stated that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the
Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide
by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of
probable cause as against the Private Respondents. Thus, the judges denied
due course to the appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the
prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases,
had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
RULING:
Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to
decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to
represent in it court. The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only
to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This
means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping
the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court.
This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its
deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices.
Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor to oppose
the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as
COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the
determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases
and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed. WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997
of respondent judges are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and respondent
judges are ORDERED to give due course to the appeals of petitioner from
their respective orders.

PEOPLE v VILLALON
G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 521
Facts:
Complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are coowners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682. That
on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after having
in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one
MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear
that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the
said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter of fact
and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in
any acts thereof, nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the
acts of falsification, with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other
deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified
public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from
the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the
knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential
damages. As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on
January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge
Felicidad Carandang Villalon. On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a
notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court
Issue :
Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because
the private respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
Ruling:
As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule
113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of
the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1)
the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the challenged orders of public respondent are
AFFIRMED.

People v. Esparas
73 SCAD 275 (1996)
Facts:
Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of
shabu. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and
was tried in absentia. She was found guilty and was sentenced to death. She
remains at large at present.
Issue:
Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass
death sentence despite her absence.
Held:
Yes, the Court held that its power to review a decision imposing the
death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts.
There, the Court said, mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital
punishment of death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is
wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the
Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and
reports the same to the Court with its recommendation. A decision of TC
does not become final unless and until it has been reviewed by the Court. An
accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the
law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the
end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined.
Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. The 1973
Constitution did not also prohibit death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the
procedure for review of death penalty cases by the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of
review and even expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment"
by the Court. the Court reiterated the rule that escape of a death convict will
not automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal. This is the text and
tone of Sec. 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule. There is more
wisdom in mandating the review by the Court of all death penalty cases,
regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court.
Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State
to take life must be as error-free as possible. An appellant may withdraw his
appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the
law, or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon,
or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice
from the authorities. The Court has the duty to review all death penalty
cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the
Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which the Court has to
discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is the main
concern especially in crimes that that shock the conscience. This principle is
implicit in the Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right,
while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong. counsel
for the accused is given a new period of 30 days from notice hereof to file
the brief of esparas.

USTIANO FLORES v. HON. MOISES F. DALISAY


G.R. No. L-45347. July 13, 1978
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the lower court a notice of appeal seven days after the
promulgation of the decision convicting him of attempted rape. The fiscal
moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it was taken out of time
and that petitioner had already started service of his sentence. Respondent
Judge granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the petition for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
grounds that it was taken out of time, because one week had already
elapsed from the promulgation of the judgment, and that the accused had
already started the service of his sentence.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that, being a detention prisoner without
means to post bail, petitioners return to jail soon after the promulgation of
the judgment did not mean that he started the service of sentence.
Consequently, petitioners appeal was seasonably taken despite his failure to
file immediately any notice of appeal because under the Rules of Court he
had fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment within which to
appeal. WHEREFORE, the trial court is directed to give due course
immediately to the petitioners appeal. In the interest of justice, the Court of
Appeals should give priority to the disposition of his appeal since the
adjudication of this mandamus petition was already delayed. No costs.

DE JOYA v MARQUEZ
227 SCRA 9 (1993)
Facts:
Manuel Dy filed a criminal case against Hao and Tan for syndicated
estafa. Dy complained that he was enticed to invest in large sum of money in
State Resources Development Management Corporation wherein he issued
several checks amounting to almost P114M and in turn the corporation
issued several checks to Dy where were dishonored due to insufficient funds.
A resolution was issued by Prosecutor Nicdao finding probable cause to indict
petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa and a copy of the
articles of incorporation of the aforementioned corporation named petitioner
as incorporator and director to which they had knowledge of its activities and
transactions. The court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner then filed for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Marquez for estafa.
Petitioner asserts that respondents judge erred in finding probable cause
justifying the issuance of the warrant against him and his co-accused.
Issue:
May De Joya seek relief from court/trial even though he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the Courts jurisdictions?
Ruling:
No, a person is not entitled to seek relief from the Supreme Court nor
from the trial court where he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to
the courts jurisdiction. His continued refusal to submit to the courts
jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the
respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused
under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him.
It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts jurisdiction must
first submit to its jurisdiction.

People v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000
Appeal See: Rule 122 Section 11 (Effect of Appeal by any of several accused)
FACTS:
Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and helper of co-accused
Rodriguez, a mason in the construction of the upper floors of the Far East
Bank and Trust Company - Manila. Both were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank security guard, Matias. On
October 11, 1991, early in the morning, at the FEBTC-Manila, a messenger
discovered the lifeless body of Matias, inside the bank premises. The body
was hogtied with a nylon cord, and bore 32 stab wounds. The chairs and
tables inside the bank were in disarray. The banks emergency exit vault bore
chisel marks. At around 6:00 A.M., SPO3 Mendoza and two other officers of
the WPD arrived after receiving a report on the incident. They interviewed
the bank janitor, a Mr. Cawagdan, and the other security guard, Vargas. Then
they ordered the transfer of the body of Matias to the morgue. The police
found a bloodstained scissors mate inside a podium located near the main
entrance of the bank. The head guard of the bank's security agency also
reported that three .38 cal. revolvers and five 12 gauge shotguns were
missing from the guard rostrum. On October 18, 1991, Artellero and
Rodriguez were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
After due trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding Artellero and
Rodriguez guilty of murder, instead of robbery with homicide. The charge of
Robbery with Homicide is dismissed it being not the proper charge. Both the
accused are acquitted from the charge of Robbery for insufficiency of
evidence. Both appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for
financial reasons.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal taken by Artellero shall affect Rodriguez's
conviction or acquittal despite withdrawal of his appeal
Held: Yes. Although it is only Artellero who persisted with the present appeal,
the well established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws
the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised
by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal
due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Rule 122 Section 11
(Effect of Appeal by any of several accused) (a) An appeal taken by one or
more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter; (b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not
affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from. (c) Upon
perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order
appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party. As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both Artellero and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, Artellero's acquittal, which is

favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter. The decision
of the trial court was REVERSED. Artellero and Rodriguez are ACQUITTED.

Diosdado Mallari vs. Court of Appeals,


December 9, 1996
Facts: There was a standing warrant of arrest against Mallari for homicide. The
police officers received information that Mallari was seen at Sitio 14, Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac. The police
officers went to the said address, surrounded Mallaris house and arrested him. The
police
searched Mallari and found a home-made gun (paltik) with live ammunition.
Mallari was charged and was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. Mallari questioned the factual finding that there was a
standing warrant of arrest against him. He further contended that the absence of
the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search and seizure
unlawful. Corollarily, the handgun and ammunition seized from him
are inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: Was there a valid arrest?
Held: Yes. This is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an instance of an
arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their
possession at that precise moment. Under Section 8, Rule 113: When making an
arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest,
except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to
inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the
arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon
as practicable. The above quoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect
arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. Thus,
appellants arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incidental thereto is
likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.
The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited
arms. The illegality of the search did not make legal an illegal possession
of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty and the taking of the
corpus delicti.