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Barandon, Jr. Vs Ferrer, Sr. (2010)

Atty. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the IBP Commission on

Bar Discipline seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law,
or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Ferrer, Sr.
Contentions of Petitioner:

Respondent, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that

contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
Respondent filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon for the
alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly
falsified was a notarized document. The latter was not even a signatory
to the document.
at the courtroom, before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently
Atty. Barandon
(Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamily
a. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang aboga
do na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur
, hindi kayo taga-rito)
with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act, but now faces a disbarment charge for
sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness and libe.
When Atty. Barandon declined to falsify the daily time record of the
respondent repeatedly
inflammatory language.
That respondent met an accident where they collided with a tricycle,
resulting to the injuries of the tricycles passengers, but respondent did
not help them and prevented an eye witness to report the same to the

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to

Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for

examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats
against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrers clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
The offended party in the falsification case vouchsafed that
her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
That the threatening remarks in the courtroom, the MTC Daet was
already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps
to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his

Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations

that Atty. Ferrer was drunk
That the cases filed against him were still pending.
That petitioner is in the act of forum shopping

IBP-CBD submitted a report recommending the suspension for two years of

Atty.Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on
record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced
the penalty of suspension to only one year. Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for
reconsideration but the Board denied it. Then a petition for review.
WON the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner
erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree
with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and
the Investigating Commissioner. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel. He violated more specifically Rule 8.01 of
the CPR.
Respondent made such imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence
that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the
same. Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow
lawyer in his reply with motion to dismiss.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of
the legal profession at all times.
Evidently, he uttered these (Katong tagalog na naa sa taas) with intent to
annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence
of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in
court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds
that he has been accorded due process. Here, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless
pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.


Penalty: The court affirmed the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
on suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year, effective
upon his receipt of the decision.

only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation
for his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with
more severely in the future.


Complainant alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III
was conferring with a client in the PAO in Antique, a woman approached
them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the
group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing
was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano
Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and
his client, saying, Why do you settle that case? Have your client
imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake. (translated)
Complainant asked respondent to calm down but the latter refused and
even continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani as well as the client. He then
again asked respondent to leave Atty. Salvani alone, and respondent did
but went back at it again. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant
went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting
anyone from interfering with any activity in the PAO.
Complainant went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he
heard respondent Pefianco saying: Atty. Alcantara said that he would send
me out of the PAO, what an idiot. (translated) Then, upon seeing
complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated his
statement for the other people in the office to hear. Complainant asked
respondent to leave the office but the latter resented this and started
hurling invectives at the former and even took even took a menacing
stance towards him.
Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office,
tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came
to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so,
respondent tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, Gago
ka! Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow and
complainant was not harmed.
Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been
murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He also
claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the womans case,
complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of
the PAO. He claimed that 2 security guards also came to take respondent
out of the office. He also said that it was complainant who moved to punch
him and shout at him, Gago ka!
Respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he
violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He failed not

Canon 8, CPR admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,

fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to
uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly
and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times.
His meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty.
Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even
so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband
had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case
because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should
realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to
demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the
criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being
pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those
who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and
Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office because they
heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been
summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent
ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down
the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he
chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another
PENALTY: Considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the
amount of P1,000 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in
the future will be sanctioned more severely.
39: Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149,
August 17, 1994
Facts: This is a disbarment case failed by Cerina against Atty Lim. What
happened was complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a promissory note
and a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks
which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US
pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be
irrevocable until her loan is fully paid. Cerina likewise executed a special
power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post
office. About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed
the post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for
injunction against Cerina. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as


counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado
appeared for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not
bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to allow Yap to withdraw the
pension checks. They also entered into a compromise agreement without
the participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they
agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments. The
compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerinas debt to
Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
Contention of Petitioner: Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment,
alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking assistance,
advice and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty.
Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the
pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would
only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about
the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to
court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already
took care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented from exhibiting
fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without
authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat.
Contention of Respondent: Atty. Lim argued that Cerinas counsel had
abandoned her and it was upon her request that he made the compromise
agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her
lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she
could not pay his attorney's fees.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Lim violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics
and Rule 1.01, Rule 8.02 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professioal
RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her
the reasons enumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty.
Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement.
Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the
alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel. Instead, even assuming
that she was really abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity
to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the
compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and
prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is unbecoming a
member of the legal profession.
Penalty: Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
Recommendation of IBP CBD and BOG: not specifically mentioned in
the case
40. Cambaliza, complainant v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio, respondent
Sidenote: Cambaliza former employee of Atty. Cristal-Tenorio in
her law office
NATURE: verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), charging Atty.
Cristal-Tenorio with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of malpractice and grave misconduct under
the Code of Professional Responsibility


On the charge of deceit

falsely representing herself
to be married to Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a

husband were able to
obtain a false marriage
contract but Certifications
from the Civil Registry of
Manila and the NSO prove
that no record of marriage
exists between them.

different dates and places
of their marriage.
As to grossly immoral conduct

the respondent caused the

dissemination to the public
of a libelous affidavit
derogatory to Makati City


she married Felicisimo R.

Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February
1980 in Quezon City, but
when she later discovered
that their marriage contract
applied for late registration
on 5 April 2000. She then
presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage
contract issued by the Office
of the Civil Registrar General
and authenticated by the
NSO. The erroneous entries
in the birth certificates of her
children as to the place and
date of her marriage were
merely an oversight.

On the contrary, it was

caused the execution of said

complainant and her cohorts

are the rumormongers who
went around the
city of Makati on the pretext of
conducting a survey but did so to
name and reputation.


malpractice or other gross

misconduct in office

respondent (1) cooperated

in the illegal practice of law
by her husband, who is not
a member of the Philippine
husband was listed as a
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
law office; the husband
was likewise identified as
Group identification card
signed by the respondent
respondent's husband even
hearings.); (2) converted
her client's money to her
own use and benefit, which
led to the filing of an estafa
case against her; and (3)
complainant and her family
with the statement "Isang
bala ka lang" to deter them
activities and transactions.

she neither formed a law
partnership with her husband
nor allowed her husband to
appear in court on her behalf. If
there was an instance that her
husband appeared in court, he
did so as a representative of
her law firm.

But upon cross-examination,

when confronted with the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office bearing her signature,
she admitted that Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but
he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a
lawyer, are named as senior
partners because they have
investments in her law office.


Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get even with her.


IBP-CBD complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, respondent was found guilty of the charge of
cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.

10 IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
11 SC agree with IBP-BoG. Six months suspension and warning.

Affirmed the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

13 Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation
of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
14 In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the
unauthorized practice of the legal profession.


15 Atty. Cristal-Tenorio admitted that the two people she listed as senior partners are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. That is a blatant misrepresentation.
16 The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is
to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not
to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
17 41. Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente
18 Petitioners claim:
Contention of Complainant
19 Noe-Lacsamana alleged that she was the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso).
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of the said civil case was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment
case where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. NoeLacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes
collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa
was not a lawyer. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as
Busmentescollaborating counsel which recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. The IBP Board of
Governors, in its resolution, adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD
Contention of Defendant
21 Respondents claim: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela
Rosas employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine
Macasieb(Macasieb), Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
Decision of Commission on Bar Discipline
23 In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no
proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so
that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
24 The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271
IBP-Board of Governors
26 The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmentes suspension
to six months.
Supreme Court
28 Agrees with the ruling of the IBP.
29 Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
30 In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
31 Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in
2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted
that Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
32 Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284
and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the
NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. There are other pleading/cases that Busmente failed to impugn the authenticity of his signature.


33 Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire
about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides that clearly showed that Busmente
was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
34 Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente
should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
37 42. TAPAY V. BANCOLO, A.C. NO. 9604, [MARCH 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 1-10
39 . It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration received an Order from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and
corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them.
Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the Complaint was not his.
Thus, Atty.Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the said signature. This affidavit was used by Tapayand Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavit byRichard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. The case was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner.
Contention of Complainant

they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.

the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.

Complainants attached a Report dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the lettercomplaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person.

that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass
and persecute innocent people.

They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Contention of Defendant

Respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo.

that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.

However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law

that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious
and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence.

that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Commission on Bar Discipline
43 Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
IBP-Board of Governors


The Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent
Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom
the practice of law for one (1) year. HAEDCT
46 However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.
Supreme Court
48 The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively
liable. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of
his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
51 Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not
delegate it to anon- lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of his knowledge,information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a
pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed
against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for disciplinary
54 The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of
Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.
56 Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

This case involves a controversy over Attorneys Fees for legal services in the CIR.

61 - On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged a complaint agains t Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair
labor practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act.
62 - On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it became final on March 1963.
63 - On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute the backwages of the complainant workers
64 - Atty. Fernandez filed a Notice of Atty.s lien amounting to 25% of their money claim (PhP79, 755.22). -He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but
Arsenio Reyes(member sa union) requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%.
65 - Meanwhile, CIR decided the appeals still in favour of the petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the
cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez.
66 - Atty. Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision contending that:


1 CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys
fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIRs authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a
case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said courts jurisdiction;
67 2) the award of 25% as attorneys fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
69 - Atty. Carbonell said that the verbal agreement entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.s Fees shall be divided equally by him, Atty.
Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNIONs president.
70 (There are matters in the case regarding the CIRs jurisdiction but the one related to legal ethics is the issue on the attys fees. Pero sa part sa jurisdiction,
the SC said nga naa juy jurisdiction ang CIR bec. to direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in
multiplicity of suits)
NO (Dili pwede mag apil2 sa attys fees si Union president kay dili sya atty.). The court struck down the alleged oral
agreement that the UNION President should share in the Atty.s Fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents
should share in the attorneys fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service and
responsibility.The UNION President is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement
whereby a UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.s Fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. (Note Rule
74 SO, Sayop ang CIR when it said in its order and affirmed by the courts en banc resolutions that the attys fees of 25% shall be SOLELY given to Atty.
75 The case is hereby remanded to the CIR with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of ATTY. FERNANDEZ and ATTY.
CARBONELL in the amt. of P19,938.81(or 25%) herein awarded as atty;s fees for both.
76 44. QUE vs ATTY REVILLA (A.C. No. 7054/ Dec 4, 2009/ SC EN BANC)

78 Complainant Que: accused Atty. Revilla before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline of committing the following violations of the provisions of the CPR and
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Respondents abuse of court remedies and processes to assail and overturn the final judgments of the MTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer by repeatedly
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. They Also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the case.


-by filing a petition for certiorari before CA

-2 petitions for annulment of title before the RTC
-petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC
-and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC

Forum-shopping by filing the subject case
Lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts when the respondent asserted falsehood in the MOR of the dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by
the respondents to cover up his lack of preparation and deceived his clients(squatters).


Willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico, the previous counsel of the
respondents clients.

Unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, 3 already deceased;

Willful and fraudulent appearance in the petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

respondent of represented 52 litigants when no such authority was given to him.

86 Respondent: declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged in Metro
-He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the
late Atty. Catolico. He filed the petitions complained of to protect the interests of his clients in their property based on valid grounds such as lack of
jurisdiction and fraud committed by the Atty. Catolico and the complainant that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the
complainant but is a forest land.
-His allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in
open court (regarding the imaginary order alleged)
-Denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court. The 52 litigants were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified
his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that 31 out of 49 of the litigants who signed
the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. And also denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines.
The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients.
-He did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted
in good faith in his dealings with them and claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Uy had an axe to grind
against him.
-the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was
filed against him by Atty. Uy.
-The present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are
marginalized members of the KDC.
94 Findings of the Investigating Commissioner:
A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not
encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.
The unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC
The act of the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory
relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.
The respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to
Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge which were untrue.
Regarding the unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the
authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. Only the Solicitor General can institute an
action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on
behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
95 Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline: Adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
and recommended:
96 -Suspension from the practice of law for 2 years then later to 1 year (MOR).

ISSUE: WON the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct

HELD: Yes, except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation.
100 Abuse of court procedures and processes:
102 -Respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the
MTC and RTC.



the respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final
judgments of the MTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction and got dismissed by CA because for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTC over the ejectment case.

Notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case before the RTC.

The respondent successively filed two petitions for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case but got
dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.

After the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of
forest land.

The persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients.

Thus, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure
and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

105 Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping:

Respondent violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR, and rule against forum shopping, which constitute abuse of court processes to
degrade the administration of justice, wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure, and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

The respondents subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling
using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions.
108 Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts:

Respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
In the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought when
he in fact, he connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat.
The respondent alleged that no second MOR or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered
both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void. These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition
for annulment.
The respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to
circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
The respondent also committed falsehood in his MOR of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court
and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002. The scheduled hearing was actually for the respondents application for temporary
restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss. Despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took
advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims.
Thus, respondent is liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the CPR for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the
court. And also he violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law. His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how
demanding his duties to his clients may be. In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court. The respondent also
failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the CP which obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with
truth and honor. The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what
the above rule expressly prohibits.


111 Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers:


Respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the CPR, which obligates a
lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
114 Unauthorized appearances:

Respondent represented parties twice without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for
annulment of title.The respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other
15 individuals did not.

In the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in
actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its
authority and consent. He signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.

Thus, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. A lawyer may
not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.
117 The Respondents Defenses: No merit in the respondents defenses.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. The respondent acted in bad faith in
defending the interests of his clients from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the
execution of the final judgments.

The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims.

On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in his
1st disbarment case filed against him by Plus Builders (kibali ikaduha ni niya nga disbarment case). The exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his
client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. The lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

Regarding respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. Atty. Uy
is only the counsel in this case. Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent (ikatulo nga disbarment case). The purpose of a
disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of
justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court.
120 Conclusion:

The appropriate action is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice
which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. This is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the
same nature which is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility.

Respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

123 45. Hueysuwan v. Florido, A.C. No. 7054, 4 December 2009
124 FACTS: Administrative Complaint for the Disbarment of Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual Removal from the Roll of Attorneys for
violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus CA Resolution/Order in and outside a court of law. Furthermore,
respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
125 Contentions of the Complainant:


Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately
from each other.


They have 2 children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, 5 years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., 3 years old both of whom are in her

She filed a case for annulment of her marriage with respondent. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of
marriage which is pending before the CA.



In the middle of December 2001, respondent went to her residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor
children be surrendered to him.


He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed
by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged CA resolution but respondent failed to give it to her.

Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.


In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied
by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children.
He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be NBI agents.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police.
At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by NBI agents, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.
Complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on the condition that he would not take them away from
Tanjay City.


In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were
staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged CA resolution.

Complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 from the CA stating that no such resolution
ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

144 Defense of the Respondent:

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic.


145 Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 3 years with a warning that another offense of this
nature will result in his disbarment.

146 Recommendation of the IBP-BOG:

IBP BOG adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased
to six years.

147 ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
148 HELD: Yes. The assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus which
he filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the PNP of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
149 Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could
easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at
the expense of the truth. Rules 10.01 and 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR
150 Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession .
The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another. By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital
prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
151 Respondents actions constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
152 Penalty: Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 2 years.
153 46. Del Rosario vs. Chingcuangco, 18 SCRA 1156
154 FACTS:
155 Petitioner Leon del Rosario, a leasehold tenant, occupied a parcel of land owned by respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
Said land became the subject matter of litigation between said parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations. On July 12, 1963 said it rendered judgement
(a.) ordering the ejectment of Leon del Rosario from the landholding in question subject to Section 43 and Section 50, paragraph (a), of R.A. No. 119, as
amended by R.A. No. 2263; and (b) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosario the value of the excess rentals received by him for the agricultural years
1961-61 and 1962-63, which was affirmed CA on March 26, 1965.
156 On Oct. 26, 1965, Imperio field with the Court of Agrarian Relations a motion for execution of the judgement. It was opposed by the del Rosario, on the
ground that he has a right of retention over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and improvements, alleging that he is entitled thereto. Writ of
corresponding execution was issued on Dec. 16, 1965. Del Rosario filed a special civil action and on January 8, 1996 a writ of preliminary injunction was
158 Both parties filed petitions for contempt.
159 IMPERIOs petition: that petitioners counsel in direct contempt on the ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority
160 DEL ROSARIOs petition: to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija
(Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen Remigio Baldonado and Romoe Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario from the land in question


notwithstanding the courts preliminary injunction. A supplementary contempt was filed alleging further that Imperio caused the plowing and harrowing or
the landholding and prevented Del Rosario from reaping the crops therein.
161 HELD:
162 Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations was followed. That in cases where the dispossession is authorized by final judgment no
writ of execution shall issue unless upon certification of the corresponding judge that the tenant has been fully indemnified of his claim.
163 IMPERIOs petition for contempt:
164 Petitioners counsel obviously had in mind the courts decisions in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. celestino Abad, L-12147, July 10, 1957. Although he cites as docket
number L-121447 instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the
names of the parties were given correctly, THEREFORE, WITHOUT MERIT.
165 DEL ROSARIOs petition for contempt:
166 He alleged that Imperio disturbed petitioners possession and cultivation of the land, on June 13, 1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on June 27, 1966;
and prevented the petitioner from reaping the second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true, would be a ground for contempt only if at the
time this courts writ of preliminary injunction was issues, respondent courts writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From the sheriffs return,
however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was placed in possession of the land by virtue of the writ of the execution as of Dec. 18, 1965. This
courts preliminary injunction, restraining implementation of the writ of execution, was issued only on January 8, 1966. RESPONDENTS, THEREFORE, MAY
169 FACTS: In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against public principal and teachers for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay.
170 Respondents Conetntion: Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said
criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
171 Petitioners Conetntion: Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: Alberto
Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286). According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme
Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.
172 ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
173 HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268
of the Omnibus Election Code.
174 Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which
were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
175 Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise
provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the jurisdiction
of the regional trial courts.
176 Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.


177 On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The Supreme Court said that the passage cited by
Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum of the court
administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell
Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and not 245 SCRA
286. Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own
words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.
178 Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
179 N VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of
25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED
to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
180 Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
182 OCTOBER 1992
183 Facts: Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay was the lawyer of petitioner. In his Petititon for Review, he claimed that the Court of Appeals rendered an order without
notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty when notice was in fact given. The Supreme Court dismissed the case and ordered Dacanay to
show cause within five (5) days why he should not be disciplinary dealt with.
184 Contentions of Petitioner: Dacanay humbly prostrates himself before the SC, claiming that the line was misquoted by his secretary Alicia A. Castro. They
were handling numerous cases at the time and this must have led to the mistake. Castro corroborated his claim.
185 Ruling: This is a violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved. As stated in
the case of Adaza v. Barinaga, shifting the blame to an office employee is a common and unacceptable alibi. A lawyer has the responsibility to check his
own pleadings. Dacanay cannot be allowed to elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record.
187 DECEMBER 1995
188 Facts: For 3 years, Dacanay sent several pleas to have his disbarment lifted. He initially asserted that Adez Realty, Inc tricked him and his secretary into
including the line. Later, he argued that he was already in his sixties and gives legal assistance to the poor. In 1995, his letters took on an apologetic and
embarrassed tone. He claimed responsibility for his actions and realized how unfair he was to his secretary and the legal profession.
189 Ruling: Disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED
191 49.



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