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Facts:
G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a odomestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of owning
and holding shares of stock of different companies. Private respondent, National Mines and Allied
Workers' Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC). MMC was incorporated by the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank on account of their foreclosure of the
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporations assets. Later, DBP and PNB trasferred it to the
Natonal Governmen for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset. On
October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent of MMCs shares and financial claims.
These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. Upon signing of the Purchase and
Sale Agreemen and satisfaction of downpayment, GHI immediately took possession of the mine site
and its facilities and took full conrol of the management and operation of MMC. Almost four years
thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter eventually filing with the
NCMB a notice of strike. Labor Secretary Quisimbing declared that the lay-off implemented was
illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off
workers with payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new CBA. Then
the Acting Secretary of DOLE, Arturo Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a
partial writ of execution (Brion Writ). The writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs resident manager
resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, the then DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas ordered the
issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).
Respondent acting sheriffs and the members of the union as well as several armed men implemented
the Sto. Tomas Writ and levied on the properties of MMC. Due to this, the trial court issued ex parte a
TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the application for a writ of injunction. NAMAWU's
separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the dismissal of the case were
denied. Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was
granted by the appellate Court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should take judicial notice.
Held:
Yes. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining
Corporaton vs. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and Namawu, in which we upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we
acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization
Trust vs. G Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of
stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said
purchase. The two cases provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party
with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban vs. Espina,
we held that in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that
are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so
clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have taken judicial
notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and
conclusions therein.
Corinthian
Gardens
vs.
Spouses
Tanjangco
Facts:
Spouses Tanjangco owned Lots 68 and 69 at Corinthian Gardens, which is managed by
Corinthians. Spouses Cuasos owned Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangco lots. Before the Spouses
Cuasos constructed their house, a relocation survey was necessary. Corinthian referred Engineer
Democrito De Dios. Before, during and after the construction of house, Corinthian conducted ocular
inspections to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to Manual of Rules and
Regulations. After the Cuasos constructed their house employing CB Paraz as builder, their perimeter
fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69. Tanjangcos demanded Cuasos demolish the perimeter
fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit for
Recovery of Possession with Damages. Cuasos filed a 3rd Party Complaint against Corinthian, CB
Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The RTC ruled in favor of the Tanjangcos and stated that the wall encroached
on the land of the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters. It further ruled that the Cuasos were builders in
Good Faith and gave the Tanjangcos option to sell and Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching
portion of the land. After appeal, the CA reversend and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the
Cuasos were in bad faith and held that Corinthian, CB Paraz and Engr. De Dios are all found negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not Court should take Judicial notice.
Held:
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine
the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that
indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property.
This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below.
Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable
given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the
petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
require proof. There is no basis for believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint
Stipulation that Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-rated VAT
transactions would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice. The judicial admissions of the CIR
are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal.
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to
the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
move on when he could have gone up to CA or SC to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against
him and the other accused. They raised the DNA issue before CA but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals
court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. Considering the accuseds lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time. Webbs documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was
in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together.
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
Issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
People vs Umanito
Facts:
The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito appeald the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant,
AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, identified as BBB. In view of that fact,
as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not
Umanity is the father of BBB is a great determinative of the resolution of the appeal. Due to this, the
Court resolved for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgaed New Rules on DNA
Evidence. The RTC of Bauang, La Union, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the
Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the case for hearing to ascertain the feasibility of
DNA testing. After the hearing was conducted, the DNA testing was held. The DNA sample from the
accused was taken at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008. After the RTC
ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination, the case was set for hearing on the
admissibility of the result of the DNA testing. At the hearing, the prosecution presented Mary Ann T.
Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the NBI who testified on the examination she concluded. She declared
that based on the findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares
is the biological father of BBB. The defense did not interpose any objection, hence the exhibits were
admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of the DNA examination is admissible.
Held:
Yes. The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in
analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards used in modern technology. The NBI DNA
Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in the country which maintains a
multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is manned by
qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the
expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemist, has undergone training on the aspects of
Forensic Chemistry for (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemist of the NBI and has been
continuously attending training seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled
more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
Section 6 A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that If the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. Disputable presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. The disputable
presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by
other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA
testing.
go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi. PO2 Gregorio positively identified
accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting. The text
messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messages also referred to Kua Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a
hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused. During the follow-up operations,
the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who
were all named in the text messages. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi
driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin,
one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death. The context of the messages showed that the accused
were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in
his taxicab.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them. The killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.
Siringan was privy to the parties actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an
acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondents own
testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the
statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee. When she
was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants cellphone and which reflected
her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not
remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
Ang vs. CA
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262. The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took
when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On
Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008.
Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the obscene picture
sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated
by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Jose vs. CA
Facts:
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, petitioner Manila Central Bus
Lines Corporation's (MCL) bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford
Escort car driven by John Macarubo on McArthur Highway in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. As
a result, the car was severely damaged while its driver, Jose Macarubo and its lone passenger, Rommel
Abraham, were severely injured. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later.
His lone passenger, Rommel Abraham survived but he became blind on the left eye. He also sustained a
fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face which caused him to be hospitalized for a
week.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a civil case against MCL and
Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela. The spouses, Jose and Mercedes
Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, also filed their own suit for damages against MCL
alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered
owner of the Ford Escort, on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the
"authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter in turn filed a counterclaim for damages against
MCL for damage to her car. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on the third-party complaint
against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL actual damages and attorney's fees. Rommel
Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the trial
court erred in disregarding Rommel Abrahams uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to
the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3)
which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the
vehicles could have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was
overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was
negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver Armando Jose.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not physical evidence prevails over testimonial evidence where the physical
evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the witnesses; case at bar and whether or
not evidence not formally offered cannot be considered.
HELD:
Yes, Physical Evidence Prevails over testimonial evidence. The trial court was justified in
relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased
and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of
truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or
rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions,
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, where the
physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown
in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen
minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham's self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided
because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the
opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham's testimony, the photographs show quite
clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of
the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway,
with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203's lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the
portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as
the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus
203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates
the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite
lane occupied by the Ford Escort.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene
of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the
Ford Escort's lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented
in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the
sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider
any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Case Digests on
Evidence
Submitted by:
Laguio, Ysrael P. Jr.
I.D. 2012400107
Submitted to:
Atty. Rico Quicho