CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

CASE DIGEST

STONE VS MISSISSISSIPPI
FACTS:
In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi Agricultural,
Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to run a lottery for
the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed
lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the Society were arrested in
1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by the provisions of
their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had
repealed the grant.
Question
Did Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant?
Conclusion
A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was
valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the people and
future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to bargain away
the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that threatened the
public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are property rights, not
governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the
governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be
revoked by the will of the people.

STONE VS MISSISSIPPI
101 US 814
FACTS:
- The legislature of Mississippi passed an act, approved on Feb 16 1867, entitled an
Actincorporating the Mississippi Agricultural and Manufacturing Aid Society. Its provisions
involve,to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates of subscription which
shall entitlethe holders thereof toany lands, books, paintings, antiques, scientific
instruments or apparatus,or any other property or thing that may be ornamental, valuable,
or usefulawarded to themby the casting of lots, or by lot, chance or otherwise.
-Constitution of the State: adopted in convention May 15, 1868; ratified by the people on
Dec 1,1869; July 16, 1870-legislature passed an Act enforcing the provisions of the
Constitution of the State of Mississippi; Constitution of the State declares that the
legislature shall never authorize any lottery; nor shall the sale of lottery-tickets be allowed;
nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be
sold.-The Attorney-General of Mississippi filed charges against John B. Stone and others
alleging that they have violated the aforementioned provision of the Constitution; that they
have been carrying on a lottery or gift enterprise within said county and State under the
name of The Mississippi Agricultural and Manufacturing Aid Society-The defendants (Stone,
et.al.) aver that they were exercising the rights, privileges, and franchises conferred by their
charter, and that they have in all things complied with its provisions.
Issue: WON the legislature of a State can, by the charter of the lottery company, defeat the
will of the people (Constitution) in relation to the further continuance of such business in the
midst.
Ruling: The Court held that the respondents be ousted of and from all the liberties and
privileges, franchises and emoluments, exercised by them under and by virtue of the said
Act which was annulled with the enactment of the 1868 Constitution.
RD: The legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State. Irrevocable grants of
property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the supreme authority to make
laws for the right government of the State; but no legislature can curtail the power of its
successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of police. Furthermore,
police power extends to all matters affecting the public health or the public morals. It cannot
be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise of this power.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police
Power
FACTS:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that
it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls
in the Pasay city market.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919
FACTS:
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila
and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as
such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip
of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has
the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor
the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the
land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE:
W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD:
Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question,
within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

PEOPLE VS FAJARDO
104 PHIL 443
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a
building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be
destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located
along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or
beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but
again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been
living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance
and
subsequently
convicted.
Hence
this
appeal.
Issue:

Whether

or

Not

the

ordinance

is

valid

exercise

of

police

power.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness
of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless
of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect,
be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it
is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must
give
appellants
just
compensation
and
an
opportunity
to
be
heard.

REPUBLIC VS CASTELLVI
58 SCRA 336

FACTS:
After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The
owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to
occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor
upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public
use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2)
for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it
to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.