Michael Arthur Santiago

Administrative Law

Saturday 9AM-12NN

DANILO E. PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 123169
November 4, 1996
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of
Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed
by the registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in
view of petitioner's opposition. In a resolution dated January 5, 1996,
the COMELEC re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996;
hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section
74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic
Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years
thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK
election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had
for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not an SK election is considered as a regular local
election.
Ruling of the Court:
No.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such
elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during
the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK
election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from
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May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase

"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no
recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.

REYNALDO O. MALONZO vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 127066
March 11, 1997
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May
8, 1995, winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year
into his term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question
when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang
Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting
a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the
City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for
the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96,
expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the
initiation of recall proceedings against him. The COMELEC found the
petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in
order.
The Petition, in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the
institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of
the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the
questioned Resolution.
Private respondents Liga ng Mga Barangay filed their
Comment on December 6, 1996, alleging that all the requirements for
the holding of a recall election were duly complied with and that the
petition is therefore without basis.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not a recall election was validly made.
Ruling of the Court:
Yes.
The pertinent provisions of law, as regards the initiation of the
recall process, are Sections 69 and 70 of R.A. 7160:
Sec. 69. By whom Exercised. The power of recall for
loss of confidence shall be exercised by the
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registered voters of a local government unit to which

the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process.
(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall
assembly or by the registered voters of the local
government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in
every province, city, district, and municipality which
shall be composed of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) City level. All punong barangay
sangguniang barangay members in the city;

and

xxx xxx xxx

The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay
captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code.
It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the
absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It
just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in
the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the
majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the
resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation
reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the
Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened
and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City
of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit.

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Michael Arthur Santiago

Administrative Law

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KAPISANAN NG KAWANI NG ERB v. COMMISIONER FE B. BARIN

G.R. No. 150974
June 29, 2007

Facts of the Case:

RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry

Reform Act of 2001), was enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26
June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB
and the creation of the ERC.

At the time of the filing of this petition, the ERC was composed of
Commissioner Fe B. Barin and Deputy Commissioners Carlos
R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B. Butalid, and Mary Anne
B. Colayco. The Commissioners assumed office on 15 August 2001.
On 17 October 2001, the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the
selection and hiring of ERC employees.
On 5 November 2005, the petitioner, herein known as KERB,
sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB members
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objection to the Commissioners stand that Civil Service laws, rules and
regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement
of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the
ERB or change the ERBs character as an economic regulator of the
electric power industry.

Fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its

members, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition of the selection and appointment of employees of the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) by the ERC Board of
Commissioners.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not RA 9136 is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court:
Yes.
All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the Constitution.
A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an
officer or tribunal to which the power to create the office has been
delegated by the legislature.
The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of
legislative intent. There should not be any controversy if there is an
explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38 of RA 9136
explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its
related positions is different from removal of an incumbent
from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive
concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an
abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no
tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee
of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the
other hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions
subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their
positions.
A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it
must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith
when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does
not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees. Abolition of an office may be brought about by reasons of
economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit
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constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Where

one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with
similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void
abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding
office.
In the case at hand, The ERC has new and expanded
functions which are intended to meet the specific needs of a
deregulated power industry. There is no question that, because of the
expansion of the ERCs functions and concerns, there was a valid
abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERBs allegation that
there
is
an
impairment
of
the
security
of
tenure
of
the ERBs employees.

OSMUNDO G. RAMA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-44484
March 16, 1987
Facts of the Case:
During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of
Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as vice-governor and Pablo P. Garcia,
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Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valerians S. Carillo as members of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990
which appropriated funds "for the maintenance and repair of provincial
roads and bridges and for the operation and maintenance of the office
of the provincial engineer and for other purposes."
To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish
around thirty positions. Aggrieved by these turn of events, the
employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions for
mandamus, damages and attorneys fees aimed at the annulment of
Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and the recovery of damages.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990
null and void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the
positions abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56
petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries. The
CA affirmed the lower court's decision with the modification that
respondents were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their
"individual and personal capacity" P1,000.00 moral damages to each of
the petitioners considering that the case involved a quasi-delict.
Hence, this petition.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages.
Ruling of the Court:
Yes.
Municipal officers are liable for damages if they act
maliciously or wantonly and if the work which they perform is
done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public
duty. A public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and
good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for
wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil
Code) or for wilfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Article 21,
New Civil Code).
For their part, the dismissed employees are entitled to damages
because they have suffered a special and peculiar injury from the
wrongful act. Justice demands that they be recompensed for the
predicament they were placed in, apart from the back salaries which
they are entitled to as a matter of right.
Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became
the governor of Cebu, he reinstated most of the dismissed employees
through provincial board Resolution No. 392 cannot erase the fact that
he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution No. 990. His subsequent
benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage suffered by
the dismissed employees during their period of unemployment.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO v. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
G.R. No. 78239
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February 9, 1989
Facts of the Case:
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City, and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto appealed
her conviction to the Supreme Court which subsequently affirmed the
same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December
21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance
for resolution. The Finance Ministry then ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Upon
referral to the Office of the President, however, the latter ruled that
Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on
the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said
absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her
previous conviction.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be restored to her former
post without the necessity of a new appointment.
Ruling of the Court:
No.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. t makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
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the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his

eligibility for appointment to that office. Public offices are
intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

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JOSEPH PETER S. SISON v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 134096
March 3, 1999
Facts of the Case:
In 1998, while the election returns were being canvassed by the
Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates
were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by
filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The
said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code on the ground of massive and orchestrated
fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and
during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or
canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect.
While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon
City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On
June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution
dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations
therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the
grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth
in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioner in filing
a petition for pre-proclamation controversy was violated.
Ruling of the Court:
No.
A pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections,
founded as they are on different grounds. Under the pertinent codal
provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3)
instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism ,
fraud, or other analogous causes.

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With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note

that the scope of pre-proclamation controversy is only limited to the
issues enumerated under Section 243of the Omnibus Election Code,
and the enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive. However, with
the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested,
the question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a preproclamation controversy is already of no consequence since the wellentrench rule in such situation is that when a pre-proclamation
case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more
appropriate remedy is either a regular election protest or a
petition for quo warranto.

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BAGO P. PASANDALAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 150312
July 18, 2002
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner Pasandalan and private respondent Asum were
candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Lumbayanague, Lanao del
Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 23, 2001, Pasandalan filed a petition before public
respondent Commission on Elections seeking to nullify the election
results in Barangay Cabasaran Barangay Deromoyod Lamin, Barangay
Wago, Barangay Meniros, Barangay Bualan and Barangay Pantaon, all
of Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner alleged that on May 14,
2001, while voting was going on, some Cafgus stationed near Sultan
Gunting Elementary School indiscriminately fired their firearms causing
the voters to panic and leave the polling center without casting their
votes. Taking advantage of the confusion, supporters of Asum allegedly
took the official ballots, filled them up with the name of Asum and
placed them inside the ballot boxes.
The COMELEC decided to dismiss the petition because none of
the grounds relied upon by Pasandalan falls under any of the three
instances justifying a declaration of failure of election.Hence, this
petition to declare a failure of election.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not there was a need to declare a failure on election.
Ruling of the Court:
No.
The Comelec correctly dismissed the petition for declaration of
failure of election because the irregularities alleged in the petition
should have been raised in an election protest, not in a petition to
declare a failure of election.
Based on the Section 6 of R.A. No 7166, three instances justify
a declaration of failure of election. These are:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
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voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,

fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes
What is common in these three instances is the resulting
failure to elect. In the first instance, no election is held while in the
second, the election is suspended. In the third instance, circumstances
attending the preparation, transmission, custody or canvas of the
election returns cause a failure to elect. The term failure to elect
means nobody emerged as a winner.
In the case at hand, the alleged terrorism was not of such scale
and prevalence to prevent the holding of the election or to cause its
suspension. In fact, the casting and counting of votes, the preparation,
transmission and canvassing of election returns and the proclamation
of the winning candidate took place in due course.
The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul
election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to
declare a failure to elect are present. In their absence, the petition
must be denied outright.

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Administrative Law

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EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. v. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA

G.R. No. 150605
December 10, 2002
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the
position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during
the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of
Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la
Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the
COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification against the
petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional
Election
Director
had
yet
to
hear
the
disqualification
case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for
district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed
that petitioner was the winning candidate.
In June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of
indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed
the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes. A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the
counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling
71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain
finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte.
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L.
Benipayo issued a Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes reversing
the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of
respondent Locsin as null and void. Respondent Locsin did not appeal
from this decision annulling her proclamation.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of
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the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350

votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.
[56]
On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of
Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on
September 20, 2001,[60] no action was taken by the House on the
letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, the present petition for mandamus
and quo warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De
Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the
Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of
office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and
against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into,
and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the
basis of a void proclamation.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Ruling of the Court:
Yes.
Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification
through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his
proclamation. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions
of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation
and assumption to office.
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final
judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The
Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition
for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in
office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however,
respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of
petitioners proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a
statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner
through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the
votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Hence, when a
candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the
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election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be
declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate
who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to
misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government.
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar
considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the
elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not
be executed

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