Dissertation (Final)

M.Phil.
Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Candidate number: 434955
An investigation into the economic role of

temple isqu endowments in the NeoBabylonian period
Word count: 12 599
Page 1 of 79
M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

1 Table of Contents
1
Table of Contents .................................................................................................. 2
List of abbreviations: ............................................................................................. 3
Introduction: .......................................................................................................... 6
3.1
Research questions: ....................................................................................... 6
3.2
Outline: .......................................................................................................... 6
3.3
Overview of previous scholarship: ................................................................ 7
3.4
The object of study: ....................................................................................... 8
Approaches to ancient Mesopotamian economics: ............................................. 14
The economic role of temples in the Babylonia before the Neo-Babylonian era:
17
The temple irku in the Neo-Babylonian period: ................................................ 27
Isqu in the Neo-Babylonian period: .................................................................... 40
The responsibilities and rewards of isqu offices: ................................................ 49
Conclusion: .......................................................................................................... 58
10
Bibliography.................................................................................................... 62
11
Texts Cited: ..................................................................................................... 74
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2 List of abbreviations:
Abbreviation: Full title:
2R Texts published in Rawlinson H. C. [et al.] The Cuneiform Inscriptions of
Western Asia [Book]. - London : British Museum, Department of Egyptian
and Assyrian Antiquities, 1861-1884. - Vol. II (Rawlinson, et al., 18611884).
BBS Texts in Armstrong J. A., Cole S. W. and Gurzadyan V. G. Dating the
Fall of Babylon: A Reappraisal of Second-Millennium Chronology
[Book]. - Chicago : The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago,
1998.
BE Texts in Hilprecht H. V. The Babylonian Expedition of the University of
Pennsylvania [Book]. - Philadelphia : Department of Archology of the
University of Pennsylvania, 1904 (Hilprecht, 1904).
BM Objects from the British Museum.
Brm Birmingham City Museum object number.
CAD Gelb I. J. [et al.] The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the
University of Chicago [Book]. - Chicago : The Oriental Institute of the
University of Chicago, 1958-2010.
CBT Texts in Figulla H. H. Catalogue of the Babylonian tablets in the British
Museum [Book]. - London : Trustees of the British Museum, 1961-. - VIII
(Figulla, 1961-).
Page 3 of 79

Dar. Texts published in Strassmaier J. N. Die Babylonischen Inschriten im
Museum zu Liverpool nebst andern aus der Zeit von Nebukadnezzar bis
Darius [Book]. - [s.l.] : Leipz, 1937 (Strassmaier, 1937), pertaining to the
reign of Darius.
Ezida Texts published in Waerzeggers C. The Ezida Temple of Borsippa:
Priesthood, Cult, Archives [Book]. - Leiden : Nederlands Instituut voor het
Nabije Oosten, 2010 (Waerzeggers, 2010).
Fs Jacobsen Texts published in Abusch T. Riches Hidden in Secret Places: Ancient
Near Eastern Studies in Memory of Thorkild Jacobsen [Book]. - Winona
Lake : Eisenbrauns, 2002 (Abusch, 2002).
MKT Texts published in Neugebauer O. Mathematische Keilschrifttexte
[Book]. - Berlin : Springer, 1935. - II (Neugebauer, 1935).
Nbn. Texts published in Strassmaier J. N. Inschriften von Nabonidus, Knig
von Babylon (555-538 v. CHR.) von den Thontafeln des Britischen
Museums [Book]. - Leipzig : E. Pfeiffer, 1889 (Strassmaier, 1889).
Nr. Jursa M. Neu- und sptbabylonische Texte aus den Sammlungen der
Birmingham Museums and Art Gallery [Journal] // Iraq. - 1997. - Vol.
LIX. - pp. 97-174 (Jursa, 1997).
N-T Text field numbers of tablets excavated at Nippur (in Chicago and
Baghdad).
Page 4 of 79

OIP 122 Texts published in Weisberg D. B. Neo-Babylonian Tablets in the Oriental
Institute Collection [Book]. - Chicago : The University of Chicago, 2003
(Weisberg, 2003).
RIME Texts published in Frayne D. The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia,
Early Periods [Book]. - Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 19902008. - IV (Frayne, 1990-2008).
UET Texts published in Gadd C. J. [et al.] Ur Excavations Texts: Royal
Inscriptions [Book]. - London : The Oxford University Press, 1928. - Vol. I
(Gadd, et al., 1928).
YOS Texts published in Yale University Yale Oriental Series [Book]. - New
Haven : Yale University Press, 1915- (Yale University, 1915-).
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3 Introduction:
3.1 Research questions:
Mesopotamian isqu endowments, conventionally translated as prebends, were
remunerations issued by temples to certain office holders. Previous scholarship on
isqu endowments has focussed on the movement of these endowments between
individuals, their valuation, and, in the case of sales, the social standing of buyer and
seller (for a summary of this literature, see section 3.3). The reasoning behind the
ancient valuation is less clear. I will here attempt to define the isqu endowments
issued by temples in the Neo-Babylonian period in economic terms, and thereby
assess the motives behind their valuation, issue, and acquisition.
As a starting set of hypotheses, the value of isqu holdings could be seen as a product
of three sources. Firstly, value derived from the free exercise of economic laws upon
the goods and services the holder provides for the temple and the scale and stability
of the demand of the temple. Secondly, value from an artificially maintained
economic model implemented by the temples. Thirdly, value from social norms and
expectations of benefits from temples to the elite, within a wider system of mutual
patronisation and enfranchisement.
3.2 Outline:
This introductory chapter will provide some background to Neo-Babylonian isqu
endowments and the types of source available to examine them. The following
chapter will explore the methodologies available for the study of ancient economies.
Chapter 5 will describe the history of the Babylonian economy, from the Early
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Dynastic period to the Neo-Babylonian period under discussion here, focusing
particularly on the role of temples.
Chapter 6 will concern another economic temple institution in the Neo-Babylonian
period, that of irku workers, highlighting in particular recent scholarly trends that
examine the social role of the temples. Though irku and isqu deal with contrasting
social groups, it will be argued that they both come from the same socio-economic
approach of the temples. This thesis will be defended with a more thorough
examination of the isqu institution in chapters 7 and 8. The first of these will
concern evidence for how isqu endowments were viewed, the latter will collect
further data about how this worked in practice.
The aim here will be to develop an overall picture of all parties involved in each isqu
endowment and their particular stake. As such, a wide range of documents must be
considered, from sale records, to isqu receipts, to business or private documents
relating to the performance of related duties. These will help define the asset
acquired and therefore explain the valuation of the isqu. With this map of the
stakeholders in place, the concluding chapter will assess the overarching intent
behind the issue and acquisition of isqu endowments and their economic role.
3.3 Overview of previous scholarship:

This study concerns ancient economic history. Polanyi (1977; 1971; 1957) was
perhaps one of the most influential scholars in this area. His work has formed the
basis for much subsequent discussion about the nature of ancient economies and our
access to them today (Dale, 2013; Robertson, 1993; Silver, 1983). Liverani (2005)
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approaches the ancient Mesopotamian economy from an Assyriological standpoint.
This literature will be discussed in chapter 4.
Important works on Neo-Babylonian administrative and legal documents include
Jursa (2010; 2005) and Holtz (2014; 2009). The published archives of the Egibi
(Wunsch, 2000; 2000; 1993; 1993) and Nappau (Baker, 2004) families provide
much insight into the business practices of wealthy families in the period, including
isqu owners. Neo-Babylonian temple archives have been published for the E-zida
(Waerzeggers, 2010) and E-ana (Zettler, 1992).
There have been several previous studies of Neo-Babylonian isqu sales (Pirngruber,
et al., 2011; MacGinnis, 1991/1992; Beaulieu, 1993), and case-studies of related
issues (Frame, et al., 2011; Arnaud, 1973). This thesis will build upon these, seeking
for a broader understanding of the economics of isqu endowments, as well as
incorporating the analysis of the editors of the major archives.
The phenomenon of irku has been the subject of recent research by Kleber (2010)
and Wunsch and Magdalene (2014). Dandamaev (1984) has also treated irku in his
study Slavery in Babylonia. Such material will be discussed in chapter 6.
3.4 The object of study:

The object of study is the institution of isqu endowments issued by temple
institutions in the Neo-Babylonian period and locale, hereafter abbreviated to
unqualified isqu. The investigation proceeds from certain assumptions about the
general nature of an isqu, which can be illustrated by the following sample text, BM
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92792 (CBT 7), an inheritance agreement from the Nappau family archive, dated to
the twelfth year of Nabonidus (c. 543 BC):
o. 1 up-pi A.LA1 GI.UB.BAME LTU-[-]-tu

DI-DIGIRAMAR.UTU-MU-UM DIUM-DIGIR+AG DUMUME DIo. 2
DIGIRAG-D-NUMUN
o. 3 A LSIMUG a-ha-me i-zu-zu

1(LIMMU) SLA NINDA 1(LIMMU) SLA KA SAG UDU.NTA
o. 4
A.GI6ME pa-ni DIGIR30 .GI.NU.GAL
o. 5 a-mi-i U+MIN-ME ina GI.UB.BA pa-ni

o. 6
DIGIRka-ri-bi
pa-pa-a DIGIRAMAR.UTU dan-nu-tu4 KA SAG
o. 7 pa-ni DIGIRza-ri-qu an-nu- A.LA DI-DIGIRAMAR.UTU-MU-UM

o. 8 3(DI) SLA NINDA 3(DI) SLA KA SAG pa-ni DIGIRi-ha-ra
o. 9 6(DI)- ina GI.UB.BA pa-ni DIGIRka-ri-bi
o. 10 pa-pa-u DIGIRAMAR.UTU an-nu- DI+UM-AG
DI-DIGIRAMAR.UTU-MU-UM
u DIUM-DIGIR+AG man-nu L.BAR-
o. 11
-tu
Akkadian, zitti for A.LA.

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o. 12 pa-na-at2 GI.UB.BA- ik-ka-al
o. 13 ki-na-a-a-tu4 AD--nu a-ki-i A.LA--nu
r. 1 it-ta a-a-me i-pa-la-u
r. 2 a-na la e-n-e -a-ri 1(DI)+enTA.M3
r. 3
Lmu-kin-nu
o. 1
o.
Tablet of the division of temple-enterer isq of Marduk-umu-iddin and Iddin-nabu,

sons of Nabu-ban-zeri, descendant of Nappau, set up together.
pant, a specific portion of the offerings often contrasted with maaktu (meat
portion), but likely differing depending upon isqu type (Waerzeggers, 2010 pp. 308313).
3
The determinative TA.M is distributive in meaning, but indicates an uncertain
form, possibly iltna (von Soden, 1995 pp. 118, 71d), as supported by the writing
1(DI)+en-aTA in Dar. 154, o. 7, p. 36, below. The numeral 1 is vocalised iltn
(from itn) in the absolutive (von Soden, 1995 pp. 112-114, 69). The translation
of this line as So that there may be no changes, each a document understands
ari as part of the predicate. Alternatively, ari could be taken as the object of
en, rendering So that the document cannot be changed, one each. Either way, the
stock phrase is abbreviated in some fashion, as might be expected of legal pro forma.
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o. 4 Four silas of meal, four silas of good beer, the rams of the shrine before Sin of the
o. Eginukal, five-sixths of the isqu before Karibi of the shrine of Marduk, and a vat of
7 beer before Zariqu: this is the share of Marduk-umu-iddin.
o. 8
o.
Three silas of meal, three silas of good beer before Iara, and one sixth of the isqu
before Karibi of the shrine of Marduk: this is the share of Iddin-nabu.
10
o. 11
o.
Of Marduk-umu-iddin and Iddin-nabu, the one of the temple administratorship4

shall have disposal over the first part that isqu.
12
o. 13 They shall honour the gifts of their father between themselves according to their
r. 1 divisions.
r. 2 So that there may be no changes, each a document.
r. 3 Witnesses:
First, one can note that isqu endowments are regular payments of some form from
the issuing temple to the holder (o. 4-6). Further, each isqu was related to some
position of the holder within the temple, whether in name only or actual practice (o.
1). Accordingly, each isqu was connected with some responsibility or service owed
to the temple, whether in name only or actual practice, as made explicit in the sample
text (o. 11f.). Documents of sale show that isqu endowments were considered to
4 L
.BAR--tu
for angtu (MacGinnis, 1991/1992 p. 94). Abstract noun from
ang, see note 12.

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hold some financial value independent of a single relationship between an issuing
institution and a particular individual. This may also be seen in the fact that an isqu
could be passed on to another upon death (o. 1). Finally, I also assume that there is
no necessary connection between isqu so defined and etymologically linked
phenomena from this or another period.5
Philologically, Akkadian isqu is derived from the verb esqu, to make a drawing,
to incise a relief, in the D-stem, meaning to apportion (lots), to draw (Gelb, et al.,
1958 p. 331f.). It is written logographically as GE.UB, making it equivalent to
Sumerian cast lot [wood] (Gelb, et al., 1960 p. 202). This reading is given in the
lexical text AR-ra = ubullu, 1.21, found on copies 2R 39, 4, BM 76522 (CBT 7),
BM 76482 (CBT 7), and MKT 1, 29, all dating to the Neo-Babylonian period.
GE.UB may be used, like the English word lot, to refer either to the abstract
concept of fate as an apportioned lot or to the concrete portion of property or a
commodity being allotted. It is commonly found in literary texts (9 of 20
transliterated attestations in CDLI), both in its concrete and more abstract sense. For
example, line 152 of the Lament for Nippur (CDLI Literary 000381) reads sag-zu zizi-i ge-ub-ba-za ul-e3, He will fix it forever as your lot that you shall lift your head
high.
The Sumerian word is also employed in administrative contexts (6 of 20
transliterated attestations in CDLI). Here, too, it may be found in multiple senses:
as a lot to decide inheritance (for example, Fs Jacobsen 2, 153-154), or with the
distribution of goods (for example, UET 3, 274). It is this latter group that is most
relevant to the present purpose. Out of five cases (one Early Dynastic IIIb, three Ur
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Only factors internal to the Neo-Babylonian corpus will be used to further define
what is or is not an isqu, including, but not limited to, the Akkadian words used to
describe phenomena. The conventional English translation of isqu as prebend6 has
therefore been avoided, so as to avoid delineations of phenomena based upon
external, modern factors. In the conclusion, the appropriateness of this translation to
the phenomenon of isqu endowments will be assessed.
III, and one Old Babylonian), only the Early Dynastic text lacks clear association of
the ge ub with a deity or temple. It may be concluded that the Sumerogram, late
though it may be, refers to an older practice sharing at least some characteristics. It
is unlikely, however, that this represented the same economic institution. Such a
connection may only be safely made after GE.UB in these periods has been
independently treated (see chapter 5).
6
The Oxford English Dictionary defines prebend as a) Originally: the estate or
portion of land from which a stipend is derived to support a canon of a cathedral or

collegiate church, or a member of its chapter (more fully corps of the prebend)
(obs.). In later use: the tenure of this as a benefice, or the right to an equivalent
share in the revenues of such a church; a prebendaryship. Now chiefly hist. b) The
portion of the revenues of a cathedral or collegiate church granted to a canon or
member of the chapter as his stipend. Also (quot. ?1504) in extended use: a fee
(obs.). Now hist. (Oxford English Dictionary, 2007).
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4 Approaches to ancient Mesopotamian economics:

The three initial hypotheses outlined in section 3.1 are loosely drawn from strands in
the scholarship of the economic history of Mesopotamia, particularly the work of
Polanyi and those who have engaged with his work. Coming from an economic
perspective, Polanyi distinguished three transactional modes in economic activity
(Polanyi, 1971): market exchange, redistribution, and reciprocity. He held that, to
varying degrees, different cultures exhibited different modes. The traditional domain
of economic theorists and historians was limited to the market exchange paradigm of
nineteenth century capitalism (North, 1977 p. 706), whereas Polanyi maintained
economists must look beyond this to properly understand other economies, both
ancient and modern.
Polanyi applied this framework to ancient Mesopotamia, and saw there very little
evidence for the influence of market forces (Polanyi, 1957 p. 16), such as supply and
demand. Instead, the redistributive and reciprocal elements came to the fore: the
substantivisation of cultural and social factors. For example, centrally fixed prices
not only nullified competitive markets, but also provided a foundation for
redistribution of disparate goods across the whole society. Reciprocal arrangements,
such as gifts, provided considerable economic transactions to reinforce social
relations. In Polanyis view, notions of social rights and obligations shaped ancient
economic life in a way profit-mindedness did not (Polanyi, 1977 p. 74).
The scope of Polanyis overarching hypotheses, from ancient Mesopotamia to
twentieth century Europe and beyond, naturally left his specific conclusions
concerning particular societies open to criticism from specialists. In the case of
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Mesopotamia, for example, Polanyi claims it possessed neither market places nor a
functioning market system of any description (Polanyi, 1957 p. 16). This
necessitated discounting early profit-driven ventures such as those in Kane (Dale,
2013 p. 168) as state-centred acquisitions of needed goods.
The focus on non-capitalistic transaction modes can sometimes seem highly
idealistic, as when Polanyi writes of gainless transactions and regulated
dispositions, as legitimised by law, [which] opened up a sphere of personal freedom
formerly unknown in the economic life of man (1977 p. 74). For such an economic
model to be plausible, its categories surely must distance themselves from moral
overtones on the part of the observers.
Yet much of his insight has been rightly retained. However big the portion of
private, profit-driven activity, its impact on most people must be considered slight.
Dale writes, In archaic societies, those who depended for their livelihoods upon
incomes generated through buying and selling on markets were greatly outnumbered
by peasants whose access to a plot of land, or communal rights thereto, insulated
them from any meaningful market dependence (Dale, 2013 p. 162). Even Polanyis
most outspoken critic, Silver, must admit that high transaction costs in the ancient
world restricted modern economic forces (Silver, 1983 p. 796). Given the scarcity of
large financial structures and instruments (Dale, 2013 p. 172) and the recognition
that loans and investment were conventionalised by legal or social factors to fixed
terms and rates (Jursa, 2010 p. 791), it is necessary for Assyriologist to look beyond
the categories inherited from modern capitalist economic theory.
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Many now favour a middle road. Such is clear from the reception of Silvers critique
(Silver, 1983; 1985) of the substantivist project7 (Robertson, 1993), or in Liveranis
treatment of the relation of private and state elements in Karum Kane:
trade agents got silver and/or processed materials from the central agency,
and had to bring back after six months or a year the equivalent in exotic
products or raw materials by fixed exchange values. But the merchants
activity once they left the palace was completely different: They could
freely trade making the maximum personal profit
(Liverani, 2005 p. 53f.)
It is from this theoretical context that the subsequent investigation proceeds, asking
which transactional mode best fits Neo-Babylonian isqu endowments.
Such a view embeds the economy into social relationships (Maucourant, 2001 p.
150).
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5 The economic role of temples in the Babylonia before

the Neo-Babylonian era:
The position of temples within early Mesopotamian economies has received much
attention since the influential work of Deimel and Schneider (1920). The essence of
Deimels position may be taken from his statement that das ganze Wirtschaftsleben
der damaligen Zeit ausgesprochen Tempelwirtschaft war (Deimel, 1931 p. 78).
Examining documents from Early Dynastic Laga, Deimel saw a particularly
Sumerian political and religious philosophy that recognised the gods (and thereby
the temples) as owners of the land, to be employed to the general benefit of the
divine household, including its dependant workers. Ultimately, this system was
open to abuse, especially when die Tendenz der mchtigen Priesterfamilien dahin
ging, die Tempelgter zu skularisieren (1931 p. 78). Thus reforms such as that of
Uru-KA-Gina were necessary, and ultimately, in his view, Sumerian civilisation
succumbed to moral decline under Semitic Akkadian influence.
Apart from the idealisation of Sumerian culture over Akkadian culture, several
other criticisms of Deimel have been raised. First, Deimel seems to have
overestimated the real economic share of the cult. Foster (1981 p. 228) and Liverani
(2005 p. 49) both credit Diakonov with first objecting that the temples were not
actually the sole land owners in Laga, but rather were important players amid others
(Diakonov, 1959). Private and state holdings in the period have been increasingly
recognised (Foster, 1981 p. 230; Gelb, 1971). Further, some of the holdings
identified by Deimel as of the temple seem rather to be state institutions garbed in
religious rhetoric. Foster writes:
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The Household of Bau, as Deimel reconstructed it, was probably not a
temple but a short-lived administrative innovation instituted by
Uruinimgina. The households archives cannot be used to demonstrate the
existence of a temple state.
(Foster, 1981 p. 240)
It should be noted that, in contrast to Gelbs focus on the private economy, Cripps
has more recently suggested that at least some ostensibly private land transactions
were concerned more with the movement of specific rights devolved from higher
institutions than absolute transfers of ownership (Cripps, 2006). Likewise, Dahl
writes of the Ur III period, There are no references to private individuals
performing agricultural work, or to the work done by free-men on their own fields,
or by hired workers on private fields (Dahl, 2002 p. 333). Yet both scholars
highlight the central importance of the secular state (Cripps, 2006 p. 176; Dahl, 2002
p. 331), over against any notions of a temple state.
It may also be objected against Deimels position that the so-called reform texts of
Uru-KA-Gina play too large a role in this reconstruction (Foster, 1981 pp. 230-237).
There are difficulties in applying these unique texts to the whole of ancient Sumer
(Gelb, 1967 p. 7; 1971 p. 139), for which Deimel at least expresses mild reservations
(Deimel, 1931 p. 72f.), and some challenge in deeming the genre reliable for
gleaning socio-economic data.
The socio-economic role of Neo-Babylonian temples therefore cannot be explained
as a product of, or departure from, earlier economic monopolies on the part of the
cults. However, we see in the theological expression of administration of Uru-KAPage 18 of 79

Gina that the property of the gods could be thought of as socially beneficial: that
claiming broader social benefit for it was a valid move in this social language game.8
In such a view, the economic participation of the cult has socio-religious, as well as
pragmatic, foundations.9 This connection remains evident no matter how spurious
and propagandistic the attempt was, and will be revisited in the discussion of later
periods.
Moving from Early Dynastic Laga to Babylonia during the Ur III and Isin-Larsa
periods, van Driel cites the archival material from Nippur as suggesting the
existence of a property owning group of families [associated with the temple] with
hereditary prebendary rights and of people specialising in trade and in the
exploitation of agricultural property (1995 p. 396). Van Driel seems to deem
usufruct of temple land as the marker of prebendary rights. However, he states
Employing a Wittgensteinian interpretation of theological statements practices
within a system, rather than labels attached to metaphysical objects (Wittgenstein,

1958; 1966). In this case, administrative practices are justified through religious
language.
9
This may be further underlined if one were to accept Lamberts view of such names
as Uru-Inim-Gina as incorporating URU as a theophoric element: invoking the

gods society as a hypostasis of the god or goddess themself (Lambert, 1992 p.
257). Such names, however, seem to be absent from Ur III records (Widell, 2003 pp.
178-182), and rare in the extreme, so one must remain aware of the temptation to
universalise a particular theological vision. It is quite possible that Lambert was here
only extrapolating from the ideology he saw in the reform texts.
Page 19 of 79

that rights to temple offerings are also evident for this group of people (van Driel,
1995 pp. 396, 398), something already mentioned as holding for Neo-Babylonian
isqu endowments (BM 92792 (CBT 7), o. 9). It is only in this latter respect that the
temple endowments during the Ur III period appear unique, for land grants were
made to state officials by the state (Dahl, 2002 pp. 335-338).
The evidence for the use of cultic offerings as payment during the Ur III period is
scarce, however. Van Driel cites 4 N-T 191 (Zettler, 1992 p. 156f.), which contains
the lines:
o. ii 1` []+5 sila3 ninda gur

o. ii 2` []sila3 gur-ra
o. ii 3` []+4.3.5.3 13 sila3 du gur
o. ii 4` [] sa2-du11 ka zi-ga-didli
o. ii 5` u3 ka e e3-ta ere-a
[further commodities from unspecified sources, here omitted]
o. iii 5` sag-nig2-ga-ra-kam
o. iii 6` a3-bi-ta
o. iii 7` 4 du gur
[Further expenses here omitted]
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o. ii 1` - sila bread, sila flour, sila bran gur, the sa-du,10 various beer
o. ii 5` distributions, and beer and grain coming from the sanctuary,
o. iii 5` This is the total.
o. iii 6` From this amount, four bran gur,
There are two possible reasons to infer the redistribution of sacrificial goods from
this text. First, there is the sa2-du11, equated in AR-ra = ubullu I.33 with the
etymologically linked sattukku (Landsberger, 1957 p. 11). This is the usual word for
the regular cultic offerings. However, it is used to refer to regular deliveries or
supplies more generally in non-cultic contexts, translated in CAD as allotment or
sustenance (Brinkman, et al., 1984 p. 198). Sigrist, writing of temple sa2-du11 in
the Isin-Larsa period, describes the phenomenon as un change ou transfert de
commodits qui se fait de manire rgulire, constante, sans tre command par un
ordre administratif spcifique (Sigrist, 1984 p. 189), connecting the temple
phenomenon to secular equivalents. This therefore cannot be considered the decisive
argument here.
Second, the phrase e3-ta ere-a, whilst probably referring to goods from the shrine
of Enlil (Zettler, 1991 pp. 106, note 12), should not be taken as implying a literal
transfer. Such an understanding is based upon the interpretation of sag-nig2-ga-ra
(o.iii.5`) as capital (Zettler, 1991 p. 106), rather than the total projected production
goals (Englund, 1991). This latter interpretation of sag-nig2-ga-ra is to be
10
Discussed below in this chapter.

Page 21 of 79

preferred, as other accounts show anything remaining to the sag-nig2-ga-ra was
carried over as a deficit (la2-ni) into the next accounting period (Englund, 1991 p.
259). Therefore, it would seem that some cultic expenses were deducted from the
goods redistributed by the temple to its personnel, rather than the workers receiving
such themselves. One cannot conclude from these documents that the personnel
partook of the sacrifices themselves, as was later the case.11 Without this link, it is
harder to accept Sigrists conclusion that Les allocations seront donnes au dieu
pour tre par la suite redistribues aux diffrents personnels du complexe
conomico-cultuel (Sigrist, 1984 p. 189). There is no ground to support a
distinction between royal and temple workers or to give sa2-du11 any cultic
connotations.
Given that at least some land grants had comparable financial value to rations (Dahl,
2002 p. 335) and that granted lands were audited for surplus and deficit (Dahl, 2002
p. 337), the focus in the Ur III period seems to have been firmly on delegated
agricultural production, not the conferring of status. Temple endowments of
subsistence land were frequently connected to cultic offices (van Driel, 2002 p. 46).
Whilst these endowments may have been more prestigious and exclusive than other
sources of income, land usufruct was not a definitive factor in this. The absence or
relative scarcity of land grants in Neo-Babylonian isqu endowments (discussed in
greater detail in chapters 7 and 8) therefore does not necessarily represent a stark
departure.
11
See chapter 8.
Page 22 of 79

In the Old Babylonian period, both palace and temple economic bodies continue to
be designated by the word btum, house (Regner, 1979 p. 251). Both types of
institution controlled large parts of the economy, perhaps even to the exclusion of
private enterprise (Regner, 1979 p. 251). Regner suggests that the size of
ammurabis state household upon his death, without the introduction of more
complex models of delegation like that of the Ur III state, contributed to the collapse
of the fledgling Babylonian empire (Regner, 1979 p. 252). That is, the model of
economic households under one pater familias was a norm here stretched to breaking
point. Regardless, the importance of the royal household as an economic power was
significant. Harris has even suggested that the Old Babylonian royal house
attempted to subordinate temple households, especially during the reign of
ammurabi (Harris, 1961). Seals of various ang12 describe their owners as a
servant of the king from the ninth year of amu-iluna onwards, and not before
(Tanret, 2010 p. 214). However, Harris relies primarily on the evidence of these
seals, and the identification of royal or temple judges presiding over different types
of legal case (Harris, 1961 p. 119f.), both of which factors may be more changes in
form than in underlying power structures.
It seems reasonable, however, to maintain that larger states favoured royal houses
more than smaller ones, as the temple households were necessarily localised in a way
that royal authority was not. One may note in this regard van Driels observation of
an institutional contraction (van Driel, 2002 p. 44) among the temples in the Old
12
Described by CAD as chief administrator of a temple (Brinkman, et al., 1989 p.
377).
Page 23 of 79

Babylonian period. The first attestations of the sale of cultic offices (van Driel, 2002
p. 46) may also be connected. The increasing commodification of cultic offices,
particularly of the highest offices, further implies the subordination of temple
authorities to royal authority (van Driel, 2002 p. 41). The possibility of royal
intervention led to formal inheritance arrangements that are otherwise unnecessary in
well-established dynastic contexts. Imperial power, whether Babylonian, Assyrian,
or Persian, made local cultic dynasties less certain, and a matter for greater legal
documentation. When the temple households of the Neo-Babylonian empire are
considered, this power dynamic will be of some significance.
The Middle Babylonian period is under-studied and under-published. However, van
Driel seems correct in asserting that the gap in evidence should not be used to imply
an abrupt change in social, political, or economic trajectory (van Driel, 2002 p. 47).
The kudurru inscriptions, stelae recording (usually royal) land grants, are perhaps the
exception to this lack of evidence. From these, a similar correspondence to the
earlier periods between temple and non-temple administration and service may be
seen. Land ownership and usufruct is predominantly either through the royal house
or a temple household. The set of obligations and rights was largely similar
regardless of the household to which one belonged. Dependants of a temple were
exempted from many obligations to the king, such as ilku13 service. This may be
seen in the curse formula of one such kudurru from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I,
BM 90858 (BBS 6) (King, 1912 pp. 121-127), which is a grant to a ang of Sippar:
13
A form of corve labour (Gelb, et al., 1960 pp. 73-81).

Page 24 of 79

II.26
II.27
II.28
II.29
II.30
II.31
II.32
ma-ti-ma a-na ar-kat U4ME

lu-u i-na DUMUME DIab-ban lu-u ma-am-ma a-nu-um-ma
a a-na a-kin-u-ti a na-marKI i-ak-ki-nu
lu-u ki-pu-ut na-marKI TA e-er ra-bi ma-la ba-u-u
IRIME a DIkar-zi-ia-ab-ku
a LUGAL i-na i-lik na-marKI u-zak-ku-u
LUGAL u DIGIRME-u la ip-tal-u-ma ut-te-ru-ma il-ka il-tak-nu
When in after days either a son of abban or whoever else is set at the
governorship of Namar, or as an official of Namar, small or great though
II.26 they be, regarding14 the cities of Bit-Karziyyabku, the ones the king
II.32 cleared (uzakk) from the ilku of Namar, does not respect the king and
his gods, overturns15 this, and sets an ilku

Temple dependants received royal exemptions. Such an understanding leaves open
the possibility of a temple, as a dependant or vassal of a king, being obligated to
provide goods or labour. The Old Babylonian designation of the ang of many
temples as a servant of the king, along with the documented provision of corve
labour by the temples in other periods (Waerzeggers, 2010 pp. 345-351), suggests
this may be the case. Such resources obviously came from the dependants of the
14
Accusative of respect (von Soden, 1995 pp. 247f., 147).
15
Lit. returns.
Page 25 of 79

temple household, but did not go from these to the king directly. This is summarized
by Paulus:
Die Stadt erhob Abgaben, die zumeist durch die Verwaltung der Provinz an
den Knig flossen. Wurde eine Stadt an eine Gottheit verschenkt, wurde sie
von der Abgabenleistung an die Provinz freigestellt und die Abgaben flossen
nun direkt an den Tempel der Gottheit. Dabei nderte sich kaum etwas an
der Verwaltung der Stdte, sondern lediglich am Empfnger der Einnahmen.
(Paulus, 2010 p. 197f.)
In summary, whilst temple economies seem to have dwarfed private enterprise in

most periods, the relation to the palace economies is far less certain and perhaps
more fluid. A strong state administration, such as in the Neo-Babylonian period,
could exert a greater influence over the temples. However, the basic structures
remain the same, with dependants of the temple household coming under temple
authority and temple land and property being used to provide for them. In many
respects, temples were therefore equivalent to private households in relation to the
king. Yet their vast size and access to resources gave them far greater power and
influence so that they could at times rival the royal household in economic power.
Page 26 of 79

6 The temple irku in the Neo-Babylonian period:

Whilst the temple economies operated with the same systems as their secular
counterparts, there are some points of departure. irku, a term designating a person
gifted to a temple (Brinkman, et al., 1992 pp. 40-48), is one such example. It has
been recently analysed by Kleber (2010) and by Wunsch and Magdalene (2014),
who each discuss the socio-religious dimension that the temples bring to bear upon
the primarily economic relationship between institution and worker. I hope in the
present study to develop a similar approach for isqu endowments, viewing a irku
and an isqu as different expressions of the same economic outlook, and therefore this
chapter will treat irku in some detail.
The majority of records concerning irku workers take the form of oblations of
private slaves, in inheritance documents or official transfers of ownership (Wunsch,
et al., 2014 p. 340). Just as a slave may be inherited by an heir, they might also be
donated to a temple. YOS 7, 17 (Dandamaev, 1984 p. 473), a document from Uruk
dating to the reign of Cyrus, illustrates this:
o. 1
o. 2
o. 3
o. 4
o. 5
DI-DIGIRAG-EME-bul-TIN
DI-DIGIRAG-MU-GIN
A-
A L.MA DIGIRMA
MUNUSbul-a-a DUMUMUNUS-su
DI-DIGIREN-GI A DIKUR-i
DAM- ina u-ud lb-bi--nu
Page 27 of 79

o. 6
o. 7
o. 8
o. 9
o. 10
o. 11
o. 12
o. 13
o. 14
o. 15
o. 16
o. 17
DIE-MU
L qal-la--nu
a-na DIN ZIME--nu a-na DIGIR15

id-din-nu-u u4-mu ma-la
DI-DIGIRAG-EME-bul-TIN
MUNUSbul-a-a
DIE-MU
bal-u[-nu]
i-pal-l--nu-tu
ina u4-mu ina i-mat it-tal-ku-u

DIE-MU LIM-ki
DIGIR15 i-u-
da-ba-ba an-na-a
in-nu- DIGIRa-nu DIGIR15
Z- liq-bu-
Page 28 of 79

Nabu-ae-bulli, son of Nabu-uma-ukin, descendant of Supuru of
Ninurta and Bula, daughter of Bel-uallim, descendant of Kuri, have, in
o. 1
o. the gladness of their own hearts16 given the slave A-iddin to Itar for
8
their prosperity in life.17
o. 8 As long18 as Nabu-ae-bulli and Bula live, A-iddin will respect them.

o.
11
On the day they go to fate,19 they will offer20 A-iddin as a sirku21 of
o. 12
o. Itar.
14
May Anu and Itar pronounce the obliteration22 of the one who changes
o. 15
o. 17 these words.
Once with the temple, irku workers performed manual labour for their institution,
generating food and clothing for both the dependants of the temple and for part of its
16
Or, of their free will, for ina d libbunu.
17
Understanding DIN as the D infinitive bullui. Lit. to make alive their lives.
18
Lit. (regarding) the full day, mu mal (accusative of respect (von Soden, 1995
pp. 247f., 147)).

19
That is, die.
20
Lit., bear.
21
Reading LIM-ki as irki (Brinkman, et al., 1992 p. 106). Alternatively, read
imki as a phonetic variation on irki (Dandamaev, 1984 p. 469).

22
Z- for elqu, lit. his loss.

Page 29 of 79

cultic activity or even representing the temple in military levy (Wunsch, 2015).
irku workers have therefore been seen as a type of slave: see, for instance, Arnaud
(1973 p. 153) and Westbrook (2004 p. 101).
The status of a irku, however, differs from slavehood. Firstly, it seems that most
private slaves did not perform such labour, but rather worked as domestic servants
(Baker, 2001 p. 23). Secondly, legal documents refer to a irku as a mr ban
conventionally, if problematically, translated as free person. Indeed, irku oblates
where given a uppi mr banti, tablet of free status, before they could become a
irku (Kleber, 2010 p. 102). YOS 7, 17, cited above, appears to be one such tablet.
Wunsch and Magdalene develop a distinction between manumission and
emancipation (2014 pp. 340-344). Manumission is associated with the uppi mr
banti. These tend to use the D-stem verb zukk, to cleanse, or the G verbal
adjective zak (fem. zaktu), (one) cleansed, in statements that absolve the owner
of all rights of ownership over the person. The term is seen by Kleber, Wunsch, and
Magdalene as having no religious or ethical reference: to be translated cleared
(from private claims) (Kleber, 2010 p. 101).
In the Neo-Babylonian period, zak is used as a synonym of irku in the case of
freed slaves. Such persons possessed a uppi mr banti, and were therefore free, as
shown explicitly in the court case OIP 122, 38 (Weisberg, 2003 pp. 170-172), where
a man uses his uppi mr banti to protect his freedom:
o. 1
DI-DIGIRi-tar-AD-UR
L za-ku- DIGIRINNIN UNUGKI a-na
Page 30 of 79

LDI.KUDME
o. 2
o. 3
o. 4
o. 5
o. 6
o. 7
o. 8
o. 9
o. 10
o. 11
o. 12
o. 13
o. 14
o. 15
DIku-ra- LUGAL TIN.TIRKI LUGAL KUR.KUR iq-
bi
um-ma i-na ITIE MU SAG NAM.LUGAL.LU
DIku-ra-
LUGAL TIN.TIRKI LUGAL KUR.KUR DIar-ra-bi DUMU- NA4

DI-DIGIRUTU-TIN-i
u MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat --ti[-u]
a-na DI-DIGIRIGI.DU-MU-D A- DImar-duk-a iq-bu-

um-ma MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat a-at-ka DUMUMUNUS-su
DIar-ra-bi a-na DIGIRi-tar-AD-UR qal-li-i-ni
a-na -u-tu i-din DI-DIGIRIGI.DU-MU-D ki-i pi-i
DIar-ra-bi u MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat --ti-
MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat
a-at-su a-na -u-ti
id-di-nu DIar-ra-bi u MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat

--ti- IM.DUB DUMU ba-nu-ti-ia ik-nu-ku
i-na IM.DUB-ia i-u-ru um-ma DIGIRi-tar-AD-UR
DUMUME MUNUS-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat la-pa-ni
Page 31 of 79

o. 16
o. 17
o. 18
o. 19
o. 20
o. 21
o. 22
o. 23
o. 24
o. 25
o. 26
r. 1
r. 2
23
DI-DIGIRi-tar-AD-UR
Lza-ku-tu
tu-ul-lad[]23
DIGIRINNIN [UNUGKI]
it-ti [X X X DI]ar-ra-bi u MUNUS[-DIGIRin-nin-na-e-i-rat]

[] er-ret DIGIRa-num u DIGIRi-tar[]
IM.DUB DUMU ba-nu-ti-ia i-u-ru e-nin-ni
i-na 9(DI)TA MU.AN.NAME r-ki 3(DI) DUMUME
la-pa-ni-ia tul-du
DAM DIar-ra-bi
IM.DUB DUMU ba-nu-ti-ia tak-nu-ku r-ki

mi-tu-tu DIar-ra-bi mu-ti- a-na K.BABBAR
a-na DI-DIGIRa-num-E-MU DUMU- DIil-la-a
ta-ad-di-na-an-ni-ma rit-ta-a it-ti
p- di-i-ni
This gap is reconstructed by Roth as tu-ul-la-du DUMU ba-ni-i, she will bear
as freeborn (Roth, 1989 p. 482), although Weisbergs collation suggests there is

insufficient space for this (Weisberg, 2003 p. 72). Regardless, it seems little of the
sense has been lost.
Page 32 of 79

o. 1
Itar-ab-uur, zak of Itar of Uruk, spoke to the judges of Cyrus, king of
o.
Babylon, king of the lands, thusly:
3
o. 3 In Addaru of the first year of the kingship of Cyrus, king of Babylon, king
o. of the lands, Arribi, the son of ama-uballi, and Itar-eirat, his wife, spoke
7 to Nergal-um-ibni, the son of Marduka, thusly:
o. 7
Give Itar-eirat, your sister, the daughter of Arrabi, to Itar-ab-uur, our
o.
slave for a wife.
9
o. 9
Nergal-um-ibni, according to the words24 of Arrabi and Itar-eirat, his wife,
o.
gave Itar-eirat, his25 sister, for a wife.
12
o. 12
o. Arrabi and Itar-eirat, his wife, sealed my uppi mr banti.
13
o. 14 They wrote in my tablet thusly:
24
Lit. mouth.
25
Referring to Nergal-um-ibni.
Page 33 of 79

o. 14
Itar-ab-uur and the children that Itar-eirat shall bear to26 Itar-ab-uur27
o.
are28 zaktu29 of Itar of Uruk.
17
o. 18
Further, Arrabi and Itar-eirat30 wrote the curse of Anu and Itar31 in
o.
my uppi mr banti.
20
Now, in the ninth year,32 after Itar-eirat had borne three children to me,
o. 20
Itar-eirat, the wife of Arrabi, the one who sealed my uppi mr banti, after
r.
the death of Arrabi, her33 husband, gave me to Anu-a-iddin, son of illa, for
1
silver.
26
lapni, late preposition with the sense of ana pni, before (lit. to the face of).
Compare Hebrew ( Brown, et al., 1907 p. 816f.).

27
The phrase with waldu, to be born, constructed here with a double accusative
(von Soden, 1995 pp. 245f., 145).

28
A nominal sentence (von Soden, 1995 pp. 223-225, 126), with or without the -
nu pronoun restored by Roth on o. 17 (Roth, 1989 p. 482).

29
Adjectival plural of G verbal adjective zak, here in the substantive.
30
Roth adds DAM-su, his wife, to the restoration (Roth, 1989 p. 482).
31
Roth adds UNUGKI, of Uruk, to the restoration (Roth, 1989 p. 482).
32
Presumably, of Cyrus.
33
Lit. his.
Page 34 of 79

r. 1 He branded my hand.34
r. 1
r. Therefore35 render my judgement regarding Itar-eirat.
2
The slave does not therefore simply change ownership; the texts do not support a
simple dichotomy between slave and free. Rather, each individual owed a different
portion of their productivity and had a vassal-suzerain type relationship with one or
more authority figure (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 337). Thus, corve labour or military
service was expected of ostensibly free individuals, even the very rich and
powerful. This can be seen in Dar. 154, dated to c. 518 BC, from the archive of the
wealthy Egibi family:
o. 1
o. 2
o. 3
o. 4
o. 5
o. 6
DIku-ur-ra-a
A- DID-i A DID-a--DIGIR-i
a-na i-di- it-ti LRINME GIGIGIR

DIEN-A-UM LGAR-UMU EKI a-na IRIELAM-maKI
a-na UGU-i DIi-ir-ku A- DIM-na-a A DIE-GI-BI
il-lak-ku 5(U) GN K.BABBAR -X!{DI} ina 1DI GN bit-qa
DIku-ur-ra-a
i-di- a-di q-it ITIDU6
34
Lit. he wrote (on) my hand, referring to a slave mark (Roth, 1989 p. 483).
35
Lit. moreover.
Page 35 of 79

o. 7
o. 8
ina UMIN DIi-ir-ku ma-i-ir 1(DI)+en-aTA

-a-ri il-qu-
o. 1 Kuurraya, the son of Baniya, son of Bana-a-iliya, will on behalf of irku,

o. the son of Iddinaya, descendant of Egibi, with the chariot force of Bel-apla5 iddin, governor of Babylon.
o. 5- Fifty shekels of silver, eighth-alloy,36 were received by Kuurraya from
o. 7 irkus hand37 as his wage up to the end of Taritu.
o. 7
o. Each38 has taken a document
8
As this text shows, the vassal-suzerain type relationship was vastly different for the
wealthy, who by no means could be mistaken for slaves. Obligations could be
shifted away from the individual vassal. Drawing similarities between the poorest
and richest economic relationships cannot equivocate the large disparities and
injustices, but it can illuminate a common rationale instrumental in supporting them.
36
bitqa, from batqu, to cut (Gelb, et al., 1965 pp. 161-165), used in various
contexts for different divisions. Used with sheqel weights, bitqu denotes an eighth
(Gelb, et al., 1965 p. 277). Here in the accusative of respect (von Soden, 1995 pp.
247f., 147), according to an eighth, hence eighth-alloy.
37
ina qt PN, an idiom simply meaning from PN.
38
See note 3.
Page 36 of 79

For the mr ban, the primary suzerain figure was the pater familias, who in turn
had to fulfil obligations toward the king (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 337f.). Private
slaves were subordinated to mr ban in turn, and were restricted by inheritance and
property law from establishing an independent estate or legacy outside the household
(Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 338). Such obligations render household members
relatively less emancipated the more suzerain figures exist for them.
The status of a irku can be understood in this context. It was common for a uppi
mr banti to place some kind of ongoing obligation to service upon the individual,
as in YOS 7, 17, above. Wunsch and Magdalene interpret this as household
authority: the previous owner having authority over a lower, free dependant. In this
way, the manumitted slave is not emancipated, just like a wife or child of the
family (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 342f.). They can therefore be transferred to another
household, such as a temple as irku, where they have the same manumitted but nonemancipated status. Kleber had earlier likewise concluded chattel slaves were not
frequently manumitted into autonomy (Kleber, 2010 p. 101). Such an approach has
advantages over the view that a uppi mr banti represented an agreement to future
manumissions (Westbrook, 2004), as the legal status does not differ for an individual
without such obligations (Kleber, 2010 p. 103).
Ragen (2006) argues that a irku owed their service to the temple rather than the
king. That is, the familial relations of a mr ban apply, but within a temple
household. A connection to the use of zak in the Middle Babylonian kudurru
inscriptions becomes apparent. In BM 90858 (BBS 6 (above), for example, zak
was used in relation to the clearance of ilku obligations to the king. Likewise, the
Page 37 of 79

obligations on a slave becoming a irku were lifted as the person was transferred to
another authority. Certainly, a irku did enjoy greater autonomy than private slaves,
with greater property rights. For example, in YOS 7, 114 a irku sells a privately
owned slave (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 338). However, a irku had many restrictions
placed upon them by the temple, ranging from their choice of spouse to the owing of
mandattu, compensatory payments to the temple for non-temple work (Kleber, 2010
p. 115). Therefore, it seems that the boundaries between slavery and freedom,
perhaps understandably given the lack of the modern taboo, are not neatly defined.
A irku undoubtedly sits somewhere in the middle.
From this position, Wunsch and Magdalene concluded that the class of irku did not
represent a cultic equivalent of secular slavehood. Rather, it was a socioeconomically distinct class of person taking on the rights and responsibilities of a
dependant of the temple household (Wunsch, et al., 2014 pp. 338f., 342). The food
and clothing they received were not simply rations to keep them alive, nor wages
exchanged for work, but constituted that which is due to a dependant, just as service
was due from them. The status is best described as a kind of legal infancy
(Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 343), where the irku is a technically free person, but lacks
legal capacity and is under the power and protection of a temple household. In this
regard, a irku exactly parallels junior members of a secular household, who are
cared for by and contribute to their household.
Often, the manumitted slave was gifted to a god or goddess in order to provide for
their future, especially in cases where families were unable to keep the slave or did
not find them financially viable (van Driel, 1998 p. 164). Thus, a irku might be
Page 38 of 79

taken on at a financial loss to the temple, as was probably the case with the old and
infirm (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 339; Wunsch, 2015). Whilst some losses might be
offset by imposing the status of irku status upon future offspring (Wunsch, et al.,
2014 p. 340), often this could not be expected of the older irku received (Wunsch,
2015).
There seems to have been a religious, or at least social (van Driel, 1998 p. 165;
Kleber, 2010 p. 104), factor in effect, not only for the dedicator and irku, who may
have thought it pious to contribute to the household of the god or goddess, but also
for the institution in its acceptance of the gift. The temples would take on a new
dependant, using the weight of the divine household to sponsor the irku, be it with
increased autonomy or merely food and shelter (Wunsch, et al., 2014 p. 338f.). The
participation of the temples in this social model brought it wealth and prestige by
creating a vast pool of economically dependent workers. This is in contrast to the
modern model of cultic or religious social involvement as charity, of benefit only
to dependants and deemed good for that reason. The household model, on the other
hand, would be proven true, or religiously validated, only where all its members
were enriched, including the god or goddess at its head. The acceptance by the
temples of manumitted slaves as dependants thereby exemplified this ideal.
Economic participation by the temple household is therefore to be seen as more than
just a necessity for the temple to conduct its cultic affairs. Rather, the temple
maintained religiously and socially conscious versions of secular economic models,
particularly that of the household.
Page 39 of 79

7 Isqu in the Neo-Babylonian period:

An isqu was a share in the wealth of the cult held by a person connected to the cult.
They have been described as a ticket to the priesthood (Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p.
111), with each cultic post connected to an isqu endowment (Waerzeggers, et al.,
2008 p. 14). Any original association with land usufruct disappears in later
periods,39 to be replaced by fixed portions of goods from the estate of the temples.
Thus, in the Neo-Babylonian period, isqu payments were in the consumable
products of the sacrificial cult or in silver. See, for example, BM 92792 (CBT 7),
cited above (p. 9).
It is less clear what functions the isqu holder performed. In general, the isqu offices
were nominally services of direct relevance to cultic performance: brewer, butcher,
singer, or the temple-enterer seen above. In many cases, however, we have direct
evidence of the prebenders hiring others to perform these services (see, for instance,
BM 26513, below). Instances of unpartitioned sub-contracting of material or
practical responsibilities indicate that the temples were not attempting to minimise
costs in the award of an isqu. The temples were happy to routinely pay their isqu
holders and not necessarily the service providers. It must therefore be concluded that
the motivations behind the issue of an isqu incorporated significant elements beyond
the acquisition of necessities or services by the temple.
39
Although there are still some indications that part of some isqu endowments had
land usufruct components during the Neo-Babylonian period (Jursa, 1997 p. 122).
See Brm 1982.A. 1803/2; though this endowment is not explicitly called an isqu.
Page 40 of 79

Social prestige must constitute a significant factor, but its mechanism here is not
straightforward. Throughout the first millennium, isqu endowments became
increasingly divisible and alienable (Cor, 2005 p. 139). During this period, isqu
endowments were regularly divided into small parts, sometimes even being sold in
parts as small as 160 of a day by the Hellenistic era to individuals of increasingly
modest means. Pirngruber and Waerzeggers explain some of this fractionalisation as
due to a change from yearly to monthly rotas (Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p. 114),
making the yearly portion twelve times larger than numerated, but this would still
leave the holder with an increasingly small public cultic role on any given day.
Further, the increasing, if still limited (Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p. 123), mobility of
isqu endowments is surprising if their value is seen as primarily social prestige. The
choice of temples to enter into contract with new isqu holders for predominately
non-economic reasons would be significant for the understanding of the role of the
temples in society.
The focus of the documents on the payments from the temple over service provision
to the temple may be more than the natural bias of the proliferation of sale
documents preserved. As the value of the isqu is essential to those documents, and
that the financial value is not merely a product of the sacrificial portion received but
also the expense of the office, the fact that the expense is not specified in any sale
contract suggests it is not a key consideration in the purchase. It follows that
acquisition with a view to profit for services provided is not the best model.
Yet, given both the mobility of the endowments and the entrepreneurial bent of many
new isqu purchasers, financial motivations cannot be ruled out. Pirngruber and
Page 41 of 79

Waerzeggers conclude from their survey of sales contracts that Prebends did not
circulate freely within the Babylonian society and it would be a mistake to assume
that prebend prices resulted from an open process of competition and negotiation
(Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p. 123). This was partly due to the access an isqu gave to
the cult: an isqu was a prerequisite to priestly function (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p.
13f.), as seen in BM 87298, from the E-zida archive:
o. 1`
DI-DIGIR[]
DI-DIGIREN-SUM-na
o. 2`
A- DI-DIGIRAG-MU-SI.S A DIEGIRME-
DIGIRME
o. 3`
LKU
o. 4`
L.TAM
4-
ME
A- DIGIRNIN.LL a-na DI-DIGIRAG-TIN-i
.ZI-DA A- DI-DIGIRAG-SUM-na
o. 5` A DIku-du-ra-nu iq-bu- um-ma DI[]

o. 6` A- DI-DIGIRAG-EME-MU A LSIMUG DIna-i-id-DIGIREN
o. 7` A- DIla-a-ba-i-DIGIRAMAR.UTU A LSIMUG
o. 8` EN a-gur-ri- 2(DI) SLA NINDA 2(DI) SLA KA.SAG
o. 9` GI.UB.BA LKU4---tu pa-ni
l.e. 1
DIGIRNIN.LL
a-na u4-mu a-a-ta
l.e. 2 id-di-nu-u a-na gu-ul-lu-bu
Page 42 of 79

r. 1 i-na UGU a-a-bi Lmu-kin-ni
o.
, Bel-iddin, the son of Nabu-umu-liir, descendant of Arkat-ilani, temple1`
enterers of Ninlil, spoke thus to Nabu-uballi, atammu40 of the E-Zida, the
o.
son of Nabu-iddin, descendant of Kudurranu:
5`
, son of Nabu-ae-iddin, descendant of Nappau, to whom Naid-Bel, the
o.
son of Labai-marduk, descendant of Nappau, his master of bricks,41 gave42
5`
two sila of bread and two sila of top beer, the temple-enterers isqu before
r. 1
Ninlil in perpetuity, is suited for shaving.43
r. 1 Witnessess:
The entrepreneurial motive might, therefore, be indirect: not to gain two sila of beer,
but to access higher society by being ordained a priest. The amount of bread, beer,
meat, or silver is merely indicative of the position of the priest in the hierarchy.
40
The top administrative position in the temple (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 43).
41
That is, presumably, the head of his division of staff, based upon the corve
production of bricks (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p. 26).

42
iddinu, G preterite with late apocopated third person singular dative suffix.
43
That is, the ubiquitous priestly initiation rite that seems to be the most easily
identifiable sign of ritual purity (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p. 3). Understanding

gullubu as a D (factitive) infinitive, lit. to cause to be shaven, hence initiated.
Page 43 of 79

Yet, another implication of BM 87298 is that functionary office is not the same thing
as isqu ownership. Naid-Bels purchaser must subsequently apply for a post.
Practicing priests had to meet strict standards of physical purity (Waerzeggers, et al.,
2008 pp. 3-5) and descent (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p. 23). This latter led to a
situation where It happened extremely rarely that a prebend [isqu] was sold outside
the original group of prebend owners (Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p. 123). Some
families worked hard to protect their monopolies on particular offices, for example
the Rei-alpi family of the E-zida in Borsippa, who fought in the courts to retrieve an
isqu (see BM 26572 (Ezida 187)) on the rare occasion it was alienated from them
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 284f.). Royal confirmation of new candidates for priestly
office seems to have been required (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p. 18), suggesting a
degree of subordination, as discussed in chapter 5. In BM 26513 (Waerzeggers, et
al., 2008 pp. 26-28), from the same E-zida archive, we see how people could be
excluded because they did not belong to securely established lineages of priestly
descent, even within the extended priestly families:
DI-DIGIRAG-EN--nu
A- DI-DIGIRAG[-NUMUN]-GIN A LSIPA-
o. 1
GUD-ME
o. 2 a-na DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-NUMUN A- DIIBILA-a A LSIPA.GUD.ME
o. 3 E- ki-a-am iq-bi um-ma DUMU MUNUSnar-tu4 a-na-ku
o. 4 ul gu-ul-lu-ba-ka-ma man-za-la-ti-ia
Page 44 of 79

o. 5 ul a-za-zu 20 MU.AN.NAME AD-ka
o. 6 man-za-la-ti-ni it-ta--i-iz
o. 7 en-na at-ta man-za-la-ti-ia i-i-iz-zi-iz
o. 8 mim-ma ina GI.UB.BA-ia lu-uk-nu-ku-ma
o. 9 pa-ni-ka lu-ad-gil
o. 1
Nabu-belunu, the son of Nabu-zeru-ukin, of Rei-alpi, spoke thus to Nabu o.
mukin-zeri, the son of Apla, of Rei-alpi, his brother:
3
o. 3 I am the son of an unmarried woman. I am not shaven,44 nor do I perform
o. my post.45 For twenty years your father performed our post. Now, you will
7 perform my post.
o. 8
o. Let me entrust you46 with something of my isqu that I can seal over
9
44
gullubkma, first-person D stative.
45
manzaltu. On this term, see chapter 8.
46
uadgil, singular voluntative, from daglu, to see. The -stem idiom with
pn-, as here, means literally set before ones gaze, hence entrust (Gelb, et al.,
1959 p. 25).
Page 45 of 79

This also suggests a cultic function was expected of the isqu holder, or their
appointee. Many isqu holders were not cultic practitioners themselves. They
nevertheless chose to retain or even acquire isqu endowments. A similar situation
occurs with absentee isqu holders. Beaulieu, in his study of prebenders registered
with the E-Babbar of Larsa, notes the high concentration of holders living in Uruk
(Beaulieu, 1993 p. 143). Whilst the E-Ana of Uruk and the E-Babbar of Larsa had
close administrative ties at this time (Beaulieu, 1993 p. 137f.), it seems hard to
assume the appeal of such an isqu for residents of Uruk lay in cultic performance.
Rather, the power to nominate a surrogate priest for the isqu may have been be the
attraction. For priestly families, this surrogate could be a relation, for non-priestly
families, the patronisation of a member of an established priestly family may have
been the goal.
The isqu itself, the portion given to the holder by the temple, seems to conform to
the understanding of the divine household developed in the previous chapter on
irku. Namely, in both cases the temple uses the wealth the god generates to benefit
and enfranchise those who incorporate themselves into the divine household. For
isqu endowments, however, the induction could be primarily symbolic: the holders
eating from the table of the deity now and again, rather than receiving daily material
support. Such holders had to pay fees for cult expenses, contributing to the temple
economy as dependants. See, for example, the provision in the transfer contract BM
26513:
o. 18 mim-ma re-i-a-ni gu-ra-a
Page 46 of 79

o. 19 -kur-ru ku-tal-lu a-di la IMDUB
o. 20
DI-DIGIRAG-EN--nu
i-kan-na-ku-ma a-na DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-NUMUN
o. 21 i-nam-di-nu ina UGU GI.UB.BA i-la-a

o. 22
DI-DIGIRAG-EN--nu
ul-tu ram-ni-
l.e. 1 a-na -kur-ru u-ar-ru

Anything that arises as outstanding or due to the temple from the isqu that
o. 18
was accrued from when Nabu-belunu had not sealed this tablet for Nabu l.e.
mukin-zeri and gave it to him must be paid off to the temple by Nabu1
belunu himself.
If the isqu payments exceeded costs, it would make sense for the costs to be
deducted. That they were charged separately suggests the cultic portions were not of
the same character as the fee. The focus on isqu endowments as portions rather
than salaries therefore seems appropriate. The holder receives a symbolic portion of
the daily fare of the divine household. Payments in silver to the isqu holders were
therefore a symbol one stage further removed: that is, symbolic of the divine table.
Here, I believe, lies an important reason to prefer isqu over prebend, particularly as
the latter can be used of land grants from secular institutions (Dahl, 2002 p. 338).
The institutions of isqu and irku seem to show that wealth generation and
redistribution was essential to the socio-religious model of the temples. I do not
mean to invoke a modern socialist ethic here: the temples did not care about income
inequality or the like. Rather, wealth generation for the rich and poor dependants of
Page 47 of 79

the temple materially embodied the blessings of the god or goddess to those who
became their household dependants. That such blessings were either symbolic
gestures to the rich, or that which until recently was viewed as slave labour of the
poorest, serves as a warning against idealisation. Finally, it is necessary to remark
that such shortcomings cannot be said to constitute the moral decay implied by
Deimel, as there is no evidence that any cult, ancient or modern, was or is
substantially much different. However, it may be concluded that economic matters
in the temples were more than just a necessity to support cultic practice.
Page 48 of 79

8 The responsibilities and rewards of isqu offices:

The isqu offices can be seen under two broad categories: producers, such as
butchers and brewers, and support staff, like the temple-enterers and singers
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 329). In general, producers of offerings were remunerated in
various ways though their produce. The process for support staff was therefore
different. They had to rely on the produce of others, those in the former group. This
meant that a tax had to be levied upon the income of the producers, termed tltu,47
which could then be distributed among the support staff.
As discussed in chapter 7, isqu offices could be fulfilled by a person other than the
owner. The contracts of such arrangements are most helpful in delineating
responsibilities and rewards, for they show great variety. From these, several
technical terms may be derived. The manzaltu48 was the performative aspect of the
47
tltu is a general term for revenue, returns (Biggs, et al., 2006 p. 330), applied
to a specific kind a temple revenue since the Middle Babylonian period (Biggs, et al.,
2006 p. 330). Waerzeggers notes that the word is more consistently used in
Borsippa during the Neo-Babylonian period than elsewhere, but sees strong parallels
in the underlying mechanisms (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 336f.). Therefore, the word
tltu will be used in what follows to refer to this phenomenon.
48
Attested, for example, in BM 82766 (Ezida 174), o. 8. From the root izuzzu, to
stand, and attested from Old Akkadian period (Civil, et al., 1977 p. 228), manzaltu
primarily means station and can be used in a variety of contexts. CAD
summarises, 1. stand for an object or image; 2. position, rank (at court), array (of
Page 49 of 79

cultic office (van Driel, 2002 p. 138f.). The terms pinu49 and pintu50 cover
the processing of raw products for the manzaltu (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 177), and in
several cases include the manzaltu itself. This can be seen in BE 8 117 (Ezida 197)
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 654f.) from the Rei-alpi archive connected to the E-zida:
o. 1 U4.MUME GI.UB.BA LSIPA.GU4

o. 2 .ZI.DA DIGIRAG GI.UB.BA
o. 3 DIre-mut-DIGIRAG DUMU- DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-NUMUN
o. 4 A DI-LSIPA.GU4 a-na e-pi-nu-tu
o. 5 TA MU.1U.8DIKAM a-di MU.3U.2DIKAM
o. 6 i-na pa-ni DI-DIGIRAG-eri4-ba K.BABBAR-
o. 7 man-zal-tu4 TA MU.1U.8DIKAM
battle), location (of a star); 3. office, officeholder; 4. service obligation (Civil, et

al., 1977 p. 228). A translation post therefore seems appropriate, connoting
performance of duties as opposed to supplying of goods.
49
Limited to the Neo-Babylonian period (Gelb, et al., 1958 p. 240), this noun from
the root epu, to do, refers to the person responsible to the isqu duties. It is less
attested in this context than the cognate abstract pintu.
50
That is, pinu-ship. Summarised by CAD: repair and maintenance (of a
house), [or] performance (of duties) (Gelb, et al., 1958 p. 240).

Page 50 of 79

o. 8 a-di MU.3U.2DIKAM DIda-ri-ia-a-mu LUGAL KUR[ME]
o. 9
DI-DIGIRAG-eri
4-ba
i-na UMIN DI-DIGIREN-it[-tan-nu]
o. 10 u DI-DIGIRAG-it-tan-nu DUMUME DIre-mut[-DIGIRAG]

l.e. 1 ma-ir
o. 1 Days of the oxherd isqu of the E-zida, house of Nabu, the isqu of Remuto. 4 nabu, the son of Nabu-mukin-zeri, descendant of Rei-alpi:
o. 4 The service (pintu51) of such from the 18th year to the 32nd year
o. 6 belonged to Nabu-eriba.
Nabu-eriba has received its silver for its duties (manzaltu), from the 18th year
o. 6
to the 32nd year of Darius, king of the lands from the hand of Bel-ittannu and
l.e. 1
Nabu-ittanu, the sons of Remut-Nabu.
In Borsippa, the term ana nukaribbti (literally, for date-gardening) is sometimes
used as a synonym for an pintu type legal contract (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 444),
referring to different kinds of produce than dates.
Of the manzaltu and pintu contracts pertaining to isqu endowments from the Ezida, BM 29419 (Ezida 1) and BM 109875 (Ezida 26) show a concern only with
producing goods for the manzaltu of another. In this group, the payment to the
pinu appears take the form of provision for a production surplus (BM 29419
51
Here vocalised pintu, an acknowledged variant (Gelb, et al., 1958 p. 240).

Page 51 of 79

(Ezida 1), r. 10f. (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 179)) or even a minor share in the isqu
portion (BM 29453 (Ezida 73)). BM 102033 (Ezida 17), BM 94699 (Ezida 43), BM
29441 (Ezida 50), BM 87271 (Ezida 64), and BM 29453 (Ezida 73) contract out
both production and service explicitly. Here, the isqu goods described as ina pni
PN must refer to received portions, not to offerings provided on the account of, as
can be seen from BM 29453 (Ezida 73) (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 483), belonging to
the archive of bakers at the E-zida from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II:
o. 1 [a-di x]TA MU.AN.NAME

o. 2
GI.UB.BA
LMU--tu
.ZI.DA
o. 3 DIGIRAG U4.1DIKAM ITI-us-su

o. 4 MU.AN.NA 1U ma-za-ar-ri-tu4
o. 5 DI[-DIGIRAG]-EN--nu A- DI-du-nu
o. 6 A DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-A ina IGI DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-A
o. 7 A- DIKI-DIGIRUTU-TIN A DI-pi-DIGIR-ia
o. 8 ul-tu lb-bi a-se-e
o. 9 i-man-da-ad pu-ut
o. 10 qu-ru-bu na-ap-ta-nu na-i
l.e. 1 pu-ut ba-a-lu u ma-sa-naq-ta
Page 52 of 79

r. 1
[DI]-DIGIRAG-GIN-A
na-i
r. 2 [ina] mu-i ma-za-ru-ut-tu4 DI-DIGIRAG-GIN-A

r. 3 [x x] Z.LUM.MA BURU14-
r. 4 a-na DI-DIGIRAG-EN--nu i-nam-din
r. 5
Lmu-kin-nu
For x years, the isqu of baker of the E-zida, house of Nabu: The 1st day of
o. 1
each month of the year, ten bakers baskets52 of Nabu-belunu, son of adunu,
o.
descendant of Nabu-mukin-apli, will go to53 Nabu-mukin-apli, son of Itti3
ama-balau, descendant of epe-iliya.
o. 3 He will measure out from the Ase.54 He shall bear sole55 responsibility56 for
r. bringing near57 the meals. Nabu-mukin-apli shall bear sole responsibility for
1 stoppage58 and punctuality.59
52
mazzarittu, variant of mazrtu, defined by CAD as cultivation or a plot of land
(Civil, et al., 1977 p. 439). In a cultic context related foodstuffs are assumed
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 483).
53
ina pni, lit. on the face of, or before.
54
as (or bt as) is the name of a storehouse in the E-zida where temple supplies for
manzaltu products relating to brewing and baking were kept (Waerzeggers, 2010 p.
60).
Page 53 of 79

r. 2
Nabu-mukin-apli shall give X on a bakers basket, its harvest,60 to Nabu r.
belunu.
5
r. 5 Witnesses:
Nabu-mukin-apli must pay Nabu-belunu per basket of pappasu received. The only
way it would make sense for the pinu to pay the isqu holder per basket is to
assume these were received by the official on manzaltu, presumably not long after he
offered them. On the basis that ina pni PN appears in all contracts without other
forms of payment, it may therefore be concluded that the person contracted for
manzaltu received the isqu portion. In cases where both production and manzaltu
was contracted out, it was usual for the isqu owner to receive little direct benefit,
financial or in terms of social prestige, for the duration of the contract. Some
pintu contracts even had the owner paying more to the pinu than they
received (Jursa, 1999 p. 48). However, the owner retained control of the isqu for
55
ni, absolutive G participle, from na, to bear. Absolutive here used in a
restrictive sense (von Soden, 1995 pp. 97, 62e), hence sole.
56
pt, lit. the forehead of, with use similar to mui (Biggs, et al., 2005 p. 552).
57
qurrubu, D infinitive, from qerbu, to be near.
58
balu, substantivised G verbal adjective, from balu, to cease.
59
masnaqtu (Civil, et al., 1977 p. 326).
60
BURU14 for ebru.

Page 54 of 79

future inheritance or changing family circumstances, thereby preserving family
monopolies.
The income from the sacrificial meal itself is referred to as pappasu, translated by
Jursa simply as Pfrndeneinkommen or prebend income (Jursa, 1999 p. 46).
This is in contrast to the utur gin,61 the allowance of surplus raw materials of the
type processed by the worker (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 303f.).62 The utur gin
therefore belonged to the producer, whereas the pappasu was for cultic service.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the tltu was collected from the pappasu, and distributed
for the like duties of the service personnel. Waerzeggers (2010 p. 330) estimates the
amount of tltu to be about 5% of the pappasu, implying that the total cannot have
constituted a comparable wage, even allowing for uneven proportions of staff.
This is striking given the position of some support staff in the hierarchy; recipients
of tltu include Nabu and the atammu63 (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 332).
The possibility must therefore be considered that pappasu and tltu do not represent
substantial financial payments. The offerings attributable to a single day are food for
one god (secondary gods are mentioned in separate isqu). Such income would be
insufficient to justify the high price in silver. This is conservatively estimated for the
61
Lit. surplus of the regular offerings.
62
For example in BM 94699 (Ezida 43), o. 10 and BM 87271 (Ezida 64), o. 6.
63
See note 40.

Page 55 of 79

bakers isqu of the E-ana at 10 shekels per day (Pirngruber, et al., 2011 p. 126).64 At
such a price, the expected return should be around 400 litres of barley per day
(Slotsky, 1997 p. 52).65 No description of isqu income comes close to such a figure.
Such inflated values justify van Driels assertion that the associated manual tasks of
many pinu seem too tiresome for the isqu-owning class (van Driel, 2002 p. 132).
Admittedly, the pappasu may only be part of the picture. The utur gin may have
represented a more meaningful income. A valuation of this is beyond the scope of
the documentation here considered, but it seems reasonable to presume it did not
exceed by orders of magnitude both standard labour prices and the specified special
incomes. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of an isqu is pappasu rights to the divine
table. The papassu is considered the important element in isqu contracts: the thing
quantified and discussed. These rights to share in the food of the gods, be respected
seniors in the divine household, are the primary concern of the participants. Van
Driel leaves open the possibility of land usufruct continuing as a method of
remuneration into the Neo-Babylonian period (van Driel, 2002 p. 39), as something
implied in contractual exchanges of isqu days. Yet this seems unlikely, or at least
insignificant, given the complexity of the isqu cycle, its divisibility, and the
64
An exact valuation is difficult to determine, given the influence of social factors in
sales normally between family members or those undergoing hardship (Pirngruber,

et al., 2011 p. 125).
65
Working from the median values, following van der Speks criticism of Slotsky
(van der Spek, 2002).

Page 56 of 79

specificity of the shares in foodstuffs described. This factors all suggest a more
modest material value.
Page 57 of 79

9 Conclusion:
Babylonian temples were seen as households of a god or goddess. This conception,
rooted in the vocabulary of bt ili,66 results in an economic model much different
from most cultic institutions today. Seemingly secular activities, like mass
agricultural production, were an important part of what made a temple in
Mesopotamia (see chapter 5). The primary task of private, royal, and divine
households was to provide an economic environment in which that household could
sustain itself and flourish. For temples, therefore, the large economic apparatus was
not merely a necessity to sustain the cult (as perhaps with the financial assets of the
modern Church), but was rather a key part of their function. To some degree, this
may account for the inclusion of administrative staff in purity concerns and isqu
rights alongside the ritualists or clergy whom we might more readily expect (van
Driel, 2002 p. 35).
For this reason, there is much in the economic structure of the temples, including
isqu endowments, that one also finds in contemporary secular institutions. In earlier
periods in particular, the prebendary arrangements involving regular payments from
the central store of a deity (sa2-du11) are theologically significant only in as much as
they show a divine household functioning like a secular one. Here, one sees workers
under obligation to produce for the household and being owed some financial benefit
in return. Neo-Babylonian isqu endowments are a continuation of this economic
66
Lit. house of a god. This, or bt DN, being the usual way of referring to a
temple.
Page 58 of 79

structure. Some financial value can be attached to such arrangements, as the offer
stability backed by a larger institution, but this alone cannot account for the high
value of an isqu.
Yet, the mutual obligation model of the household, common to cultic and secular
contexts, may be used to identify some socio-religious elements unique to divine
households. From the perspective of the institution, its success is tied to the
economic provision for its dependants. That is, the most successful temple will be
the wealthiest and the largest. The provision made by the temple for the people is
the most concrete expression of the provision of the deity for the land. This is just as
important as the display of wealth around the divine image itself. The institution of
irku demonstrates how the temples took on large numbers of often vulnerable new
dependants, securing their future and generating more capital for the temple (see
chapter 6). The provision of isqu endowments for higher status personnel is an
extension of patronisation to established families and a demonstration of the wealth
and health of the divine household. From the perspective of the dependant, an
association with and contribution to a divine household might be seen as affirming
the value of ones work within a wider social context. Again, it must be emphasised
that such interpretations are intended as hypotheses concerning the ancient
justification of socio-economic structures, and not as a modern assessment of those
structures. The security offered to a irku, for example, might well be better
described as slavery to the religious elite, rather than a blessing of wealth from a
deity. However, both isqu and irku provide some evidence of a social dimension to
the economic activity of the temples absent in other sectors and households.
Page 59 of 79

Social factors play a role in the ownership of isqu endowments, best seen in the
strong family monopolies maintained over many generations at each temple (see
chapter 7). This severely inhibits the effect of market economics on isqu values, and
suggests wages for work is an inadequate explanation of isqu payments. Rather,
access to the divine table was the most important thing. This was achieved through
the circulation of goods provided by isqu holders through the cult, to be redistributed
back to them. Access to temple stores for raw materials and the customary utur gin
(see chapter 8) suggest isqu balances were not quite even (that is, the total withdrawn
exceeded the incoming products67), but redistribution was a key feature. By sharing
in the food of the divine table, cultic functionaries with an isqu would have a special
status contrasting with those whose immediate head of household was not a deity.
Such status, as opposed to food production rights in a more general sense, seems to
better explain the particular familial attachment to certain positions.
In conclusion, the value of isqu endowments in the Neo-Babylonian period owed
more to social and religious factors than economic ones. The primary attraction of
the isqu, and the only part mentioned in many of the texts surveyed, was the portion
of food allotted from the divine table to the individual as a sign of acceptance,
honour, and value within the household of the god or goddess. This system of
household dependency, applicable to most social spheres in ancient Mesopotamia,
had special significance within the cultic setting, having greater connections to wider
society and therefore bringing with it greater prestige. In this way, it is rather
67
With the difference presumably being provided by contributions to the stores by
irku workers.
Page 60 of 79

different to the European prebendary system, where the income lacked such
connotations. The more literal translation of isqu as allotted portion seems
preferable,68 as this highlights the aspect most important: that of the share in the
cultic foodstuffs.
68
Van Driel concludes his discussion of the term prebend with similar
reservations, although he deems it appropriate enough for continued use (van Driel,
2002 p. 33f.).
Page 61 of 79

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Page 73 of 79

11 Texts Cited:
Text:
Description:
Editor:
CDLI link:
Provenance:
Date (BC):
1: 2R 39, 4
AR-ra = ubullu
Rawlinson, R.
http://cdli.ucla.edu/P395476
Nineveh (CDLI)
Neo-Assyrian (c. 911-612) (CDLI)
Nippur (Zettler, 1992)
C.
2: 4 N-T 191
Account of the Inana temple of
Zettler, R. L.
Nippur
3: BE 8 117
Settling of pintu and
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
Darius 32 (c. 490 (Boucharlat, 2013 p. 504))
(Ezida 197)
manzaltu debt upon inheritance
C.
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p.
(r. 21)
553)
4: BM 26513
Hiring out of manzaltu
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
Nabonidus 2 (c. 553 (Holtz, 2014 p. xvi)) (r.
C.
(Waerzeggers, et al.,
38)
2008 p. 26)
Page 74 of 79

5: BM 26572
Litigation concerning isqu
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
(Ezida 187)
ownership
C.
(r. 19f.)
284)
6: BM 29419
pintu contract between a-
Waerzeggers,
(Ezida 1)
nabu-u and Nabu-ittannu
C.
Borsippa
(Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 367)
367)
7: BM 29441
Nukaribbti contract between
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
(Ezida 50)
Nabu-uballi and Nabu-eer-
C.
napati
Cyrus 1 (c. 539) (r. 7)
367)
8: BM 29453
pintu type contract between
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
Nebuchadnezzar II (c. 605-562 (Da Riva,
(Ezida 73)
Nabu-belunu and Nabu-mukin-
C.
2013 p. 196)) (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 483)
9: BM 76482
(CBT 7)
apli
483)
AR-ra = ubullu
Sippar? (British
Neo-Babylonian (c. 626-539) (British
Museum)
Museum)
Page 75 of 79

10: BM 76522
AR-ra = ubullu
(CBT 7)
Sippar? (British
Neo-Babylonian (c. 626-539) (British
Museum)
Museum)
Borsippa (r. 9)
11: BM 82766
Oxherd isqu sale from Nidinti-
Waerzeggers,
(Ezida 174)
nabu to Remut-nabu
C.
12: BM 87271
pintu contract between
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
(Ezida 64)
Labai-marduk and Guzanu
C.
(r. 9)
(r. 9f.)
457)
13: BM 87298
Confirmation of eligibility for
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
Darius (c. 522-486 (Boucharlat, 2013 p.
priestly office
C.
(Waerzeggers, et al.,
504)) (Waerzeggers, et al., 2008 p. 25)
2008 p. 25)
14: BM 90858
Middle Babylonian kudurru
(BBS 6)
with exemption clause
King, L. W.
Sippar
Nebuchadnezzar I (c. 1125 1104

(Armstrong, et al., 1998 p. 109)) (I.1)
Page 76 of 79

15: BM 92792
Division of the isqu of the rib
(CBT 7)
bti
16: BM 94699
pintu contract between Bel-
Waerzeggers,
(Ezida 43)
iddin and Marduk-umu-ibni
C.
Baker, H. D.
17: BM 102033
pintu contract between Bel-
Waerzeggers,
(Ezida 17)
iddin and Marduk-umu-ibni
C.
Sippar? (British
Nabonidus 12 (543 (Holtz, 2014 p. xvi)) (r.
Museum)
10)
Borsippa
c. Nabonidus 5-Darius 28 (c. 550-495
(Holtz, 2014 p. xvi; Boucharlat, 2013 p.
367)
511)) (Waerzeggers, 2010 p. 433)
Borsippa
Cyrus 9 (c. 530) (r. 7`)
367)
18: BM 109875
Isqu contract between Nabu-
Waerzeggers,
Borsippa
(Ezida 26)
balassu-iqbi, Nabu-uuru, and
C.
(r. 6)
Marduk-umu-ibni
19: Brm
Inheritance of temple
1982.A. 1803/2
endowments from a-naiu
367)
Jursa, M.
Sippar (Jursa, 1997 p.
Cyrus 7 (c. 532) (r. 10`)
123)
(Nr. 39)
Page 77 of 79

20: CDLI
Lament for Nippur (composite
Literary 000381
text)
21: Dar. 154
Contract for chariotry service of
http://cdli.ucla.edu/Q000381
Peiser, F. E.
Marduk-nair-apli
22: Fs Jacobsen
Division of inheritance between
2, 153-154
Ur-Suena and Enlil-Massu
23: MKT 1, 29
AR-ra = ubullu
Old Babylonian (c. 1900-1600) (CDLI)
Babylon (British
Museum)
(r. 6f.)
Hallo, W. W.
Nippur (CDLI)
Old Babylonian (c. 1900-1600) (CDLI)
Neugebauer,
Sippar (CDLI)
Neo-Babylonian (c. 626-539) (CDLI)
Uruk (Weisberg, 2003
Cyrus 9 (c. 530) (r. 25)
O. E.
Court case concerning the status
Weisberg, D.
of the zak Itar-ab-uur
B.
25: RIME
Reforms of Uru-KA-Gina
Frayne, D. R.
http://cdli.ucla.edu/Q001124 Girsu (CDLI)
ED IIIb (c. 2500-2340) (CDLI)
1.09.09.01
(composite text)
26: UET 3, 274
Apportioning of GE.UB
Legrain, L.
Ur III (c. 2100-2000) (CDLI)
24: OIP 122, 38
p. 70)
Ur (CDLI)
Page 78 of 79

27: YOS 7, 17
Dedicating of a irku, Aa-iddin
Dougherty, R.
Uruk (CDLI)
Cyrus 3 (c. 536) (r. 8f.)
Uruk (CDLI)
Cambyses 5 (c. 526 (Boucharlat, 2013 p.
P.
28: YOS 7, 114
Sale of the slave of a irku
Tremayne, A.
511)) (r. 20f.)
Page 79 of 79

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M.Phil.

Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

An investigation into the economic role of

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Table of Contents .................................................................................................. 2

List of abbreviations: ............................................................................................. 3

Research questions: ....................................................................................... 6

Overview of previous scholarship: ................................................................ 7

The object of study: ....................................................................................... 8

Approaches to ancient Mesopotamian economics: ............................................. 14

The temple irku in the Neo-Babylonian period: ................................................ 27

Isqu in the Neo-Babylonian period: .................................................................... 40

The responsibilities and rewards of isqu offices: ................................................ 49

Texts Cited: ..................................................................................................... 74

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

3.3 Overview of previous scholarship:

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

3.4 The object of study:

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

o. 1 up-pi A.LA1 GI.UB.BAME LTU-[-]-tu

o. 3 A LSIMUG a-ha-me i-zu-zu

A.GI6ME pa-ni DIGIR30 .GI.NU.GAL

o. 5 a-mi-i U+MIN-ME ina GI.UB.BA pa-ni

pa-pa-a DIGIRAMAR.UTU dan-nu-tu4 KA SAG

o. 7 pa-ni DIGIRza-ri-qu an-nu- A.LA DI-DIGIRAMAR.UTU-MU-UM

u DIUM-DIGIR+AG man-nu L.BAR-

Akkadian, zitti for A.LA.

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Tablet of the division of temple-enterer isq of Marduk-umu-iddin and Iddin-nabu,

The determinative TA.M is distributive in meaning, but indicates an uncertain

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Of Marduk-umu-iddin and Iddin-nabu, the one of the temple administratorship4

for angtu (MacGinnis, 1991/1992 p. 94). Abstract noun from

ang, see note 12.

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

The Oxford English Dictionary defines prebend as a) Originally: the estate or

portion of land from which a stipend is derived to support a canon of a cathedral or

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

4 Approaches to ancient Mesopotamian economics:

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

5 The economic role of temples in the Babylonia before

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Employing a Wittgensteinian interpretation of theological statements practices

within a system, rather than labels attached to metaphysical objects (Wittgenstein,

as Uru-Inim-Gina as incorporating URU as a theophoric element: invoking the

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

o. ii 1` []+5 sila3 ninda gur

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Discussed below in this chapter.

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

Described by CAD as chief administrator of a temple (Brinkman, et al., 1989 p.

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016

A form of corve labour (Gelb, et al., 1960 pp. 73-81).

M.Phil. Cuneiform Studies thesis, Trinity 2016