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PAKISTAN

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN


STAGE I
(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)

REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

South Asia Region, Agriculture and Rural Development

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB
AWB
CARW
CIF
DCO
EDO
FAO
GDP
GOP
GOS
HANDS
ICZM
IUCN
LBOD
MAF
NCHD
NGOs
NIO
NRSP
OFWM
PEPA
PFF
PMU
RBOD
SCDRP
SRSP
SPO
SUPARCO
TMA
WAPDA
WWF

May 2005

Asian Development Bank


Area Water Board
Creation of Assets for Rural Women
Community Investment Fund
District Coordination Officer
Executive District Officer
Food and Agriculture Organization
Gross domestic Product
Government of Pakistan
Government of Sindh
Health and Nutrition Development Society
Integrated Coastal Zone Management
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
Left Bank Outfall Drain
Million Acre Feet
National Commission for Human Development
Non Governmental Organizations
National Institute of Oceanography
National Rural Support Program
On Farm Water Management
Pakistan Environment Protection Agency
Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum
Project Management Unit
Right Bank Outfall Drain
Sindh Coastal Rehabilitation Project
Sindh Rural Support Program
Strengthening Participatory Organizations
Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Organization
Tehsil Municipal Administration
Water and Power Development Authority
World Wildlife Fund

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PAKISTAN
REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN
STAGE I
(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)
REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Executive Summary ................................................................................................. v
I. Background ...................................................................................................

II. Introduction..................................................................................................

III. Results of Mission Analysis of Available Data .......................................... 10


IV. Findings of the Mission................................................................................ 21
V. A Restatement of the Problem and the Objectives .................................... 29
VI. Developing Strategy...................................................................................... 31
VII. Recommended Strategy............................................................................... 35
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................... 39
IX. Next Steps ..................................................................................................... 42

Annexes
Annex 1. Persons Met by the Mission...................................................................... 46
Annex 2. References ................................................................................................. 49
Annex 3. Program for World Bank Mission............................................................. 53
Annex 4. Concepts in Tidal Link Design.................................................................. 56

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List of Tables
Table 1. Decisions and Actions of the Government in Response to Damages
to LBOD .................................................................................................
Table 2. Content of SMO Monitoring Reports .........................................................
Table 3. Content of NIO Annual Physical Monitoring Report ..............................
Table 4. Earlier Salinity Measurements in the Tidal Liink Area (mS/cm) ...............
Table 5. Number of Birds Recorded in the Annual Waterfowl Census by SWD .....
Table 6. Selected Parameters from the Analysis of Sugar Factory and KPOD
Effluent ....................................................................................................

10
11
12
25
26
27

List of Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7a
Figure 8a
Figure 8b
Figure 9
Figure 10

Bed Level Longitudinal Section at the Tidal Link...................................


Cross Section at RD-125 as Compared to Design Section......................
Measured Water Current al RD-93 (NIO, 2004) .....................................
Boundary Condition.................................................................................
Tidal Levels at RD-93 (NOI, 2004).........................................................
Water Salinity at RD-30 (NOI, 2004) ......................................................
Salinity in Dhands Area (NOI, 2004) ......................................................
24-Hours Rainfall Frequency ..................................................................
Monthly Rainfall Frequency Analysis .....................................................
Salinity Evolution in Dhands Area (NOI, 2004) .....................................
Tidal Link Channel--Typical Cross Sections ...........................................

13
13
14
14
15
15
16
18
19
25
59

List of Maps
Map 1:
LBOD Outfall System.............................................................................. 2
Map 2:
Schematic Diagram of LBOD Outfall ..................................................... 43
Map 3-6: Satellite Images of the Indus Delta .....................................................43-46

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PAKISTAN
REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN
STAGE I
(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)
REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS
EXECUTIVE S UMMARY
LBOD Stage I project was executed during 1984-1997 to relieve water logging and
salinity in 1.27 million acres in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, and Nawabshah Districts. The
project included a Tidal Link Canal to carry the saline drainage effluent from a spinal
drain 42 km across the coastal zone to the Arabian Sea in view of the international and
environmental dimensions of the Rann of Kutch. Soon after completion some of the
banks and weir structures in the Tidal Link failed mainly because of the silty loam
material of the soil in the area used in the construction which is highly sensitive to flow
velocity which scoured the bed and breached the embarkments. In 2001 a WB fact
finding mission concurred with the government that the damages were beyond repair.
In July 2003 storms resulted in extensive damages and losses in the Lower Badin
District in the vicinity of LBOD which galvanized the Government of Pakistan and the
population in the Badin District to find and implement a solution to this problem.

The World Bank organized a mission in March 2005 to review the present conditions at
the outfall and identify the possible alternatives to mitigate the damages and secure the
benefits of LBOD. The mission concluded that the Tidal Link carried a flow at least
two times the design discharge of 4,400 cusecs during the floods of July 2003. A
combination of factors that caused damages and loses in the lower basin were identified
by the mission: a) the storm that affected the area combined with a typhoon and sea
high tide; b) water coming to the area from the irrigation canals and irrigation refusals;
c) breaches occurred in the upper LBOD basin; d) lack of maintenance in the LBOD
system; f) institutional weakness and lack of preparedness for an emergency flood
management. These conditions were not foreseen at design stage.

Sea water was no t expected to penetrate more than 19 km from its outlet upstream into
the Tidal Link, to an area about 11 km downstream of the Cholri Weir. At present both
tidal fluctuations and sea water intrude into the dhands and KPOD, and the drainage
and environmental functions of the Tidal Link portion of the LBOD outlet is impaired.
The result is that there is now an open connection between the dhands and the Tidal
Link, exposing the dhands to tidal fluctuations, sea water intrusion, sedimentation, and
excessive drainage during low tide. A small tidal creek type system of drainage
channels has now developed in Cholri Dhand, which is closest to the Tidal Link. No
tidal fluctuations are evident in Sanhro and Mehro Dhands.
May 2005

During the July 2003 storm, Badin received 218 mm of rain and Nawabshah in the
upper part of the LBOD basin received 191 mm. LBOD canals were overtopped and
numerous breaches occurred, in part because farmers in the upper LBOD basin cutting
the banks of the drains to hasten the drainage of rain water from their fields. Equally
important, the discharge into KPOD and the Tidal Link Canal were more than twice the
design discharge, resulting in severe scour of the Tidal Link Canal as well as breaches
in both its right and left embankments. As a result local people have felt the LBOD
outfall scheme increase the vulnerability of their already fragile livelihood system.
The present conditions of the outfall system do not provide the hydrological,
environmental and social functions that were originally considered at the design phase.
The LBOD can now be described as a new river that is forming an estuary and is an
integral part of creek formation into the coastal area. The Tidal Link has invited the sea
to approach the land and now the tidal fluctuations are visible. This process will
continue, and its progress is difficult to predict. Adapting to this new process requires
continuous hydraulic and environmental monitoring in a learning by doing approach.
The mission believes that the present actions taken by the Government, namely repairs
to parts of the drainage system and lowering the DPOD weir, are considered
appropriate for those site conditions, but do not constitute a comprehensive and
sustainable solution. Other actions should be further analyzed before implementation.
The mission recommends a combination of hard structural measures and institutional
soft actions to address these objectives. Most of the agencies concerned with some
aspect of LBOD drains and the Tidal Link have undertaken missions to examine the
conditions on the ground, and have made proposals, including so called immediate
measures, to alleviate the situation. A comprehensive strategy or plan to solve the
current problems has not yet been prepared, particularly a plan that wo uld respond the
wide range of challenges and objectives.

In view of the mission estimate that a 24 hrs storm event similar to that experienced in
July 2003 has a 56% probability of occurring in a five- year period, the mission
recommends to initiate without further delay the implementation of the institutional and
structural following proposed actions:
1. Develop and agree in a Flood Management Plan to compliment the
emergency contingency plan proposed by the Badin DCO;
2. Establish a professional O&M program for the main drains and outfall
system;
3. Implement the World Banks proposed concept for a the livelihoods relief
and improvement program in the coastal areas of Badin and Thatta;

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4. Re-design the outfall system, considering the alternative proposals identified


by the mission to reduce the flood risk problems and the impact of the discharge
of saline effluent.

Reinforcement of the LBOD right embankment, and the construction of


escapes from the left bank of the Spinal Drain and KPOD in the
direction of the Thal using to the extent possible the ancient Dhoro
Puran river bed. Install flap-gates in the drains discharging into LBOD
drain.

Diversion of the Seerani drain and other Kotri drains into the dhands.

Possible connection of the Pateji and Mhero dhands

Construct a gated structure at the DPOD and KPOD to control the flows
in both directions.

Analyze the location of the tidal control structure in the KPOD and
possible control structures in the drains.

The proposal to extend the drainage system by studying LBOD Stage II & III in light of
the present outfall conditions of the outfall should be postponed until the existing
problems are adequately address and solved. Moreover, the strategy to manage the
storm drainage in the upper basin needs to be organized and tested. This approach
would avoid aggravating or increasing social unrest, vulnerability and anxiety in the
Badin District that might result from a decision to go ahead with premature studies at a
time when people participation is most needed.
Given the complexity of the system and its present evolution and dynamics, the
proposed physical interventions require continuous monitoring as a part of the learning
by doing process, and the collection of data essential for adequate analysis of problems
and options. These studies and follow up actions, if the Sindh Government agrees, will
be included in the Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project presently in advance stage
of preparation.

May 2005

vii

May 2005

viii

PAKISTAN
REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN
STAGE I
(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)
REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

I. BACKGROUND
1.

Beginning in the 1960s, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) undertook a major


program to provide drainage to relieve water logging and salinity in the 18 million
hectares irrigation system in the Indus River plain. By the early 1980s it became clear
that a sustainable and environmentally sound strategy was needed to permanently
remove the accumulating salt in the basin. The first stage of the strategy was to
develop the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) in Sindh near the tail end of the Indus
irrigation system. The Rs44,924 million (US$1, 021. million) 1 LBOD Stage I project
would relieve water logging and salinity in 1.27 million acres in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar,
and Nawabshah Districts, and the eastern part of the Badin District, and would include
a Tidal Link Canal to carry the saline drainage effluent from a spinal drain 42 km
across the coastal zone to the Arabian Sea (Map 1) 2 . The World Bank Implementation
Completion Report of June 1998 reported that the economic benefits and performance
of LBOD Stage I Project under normal circumstance and within the target area of these
three districts as well as eastern Badin is positive and substantial. The World Bank
Implementation Completion Report (ICR) estimate of economic rate of return at the
forecasted completion date of 2002 was 13%3 in comparison to the World Bank
estimate of the opportunity cost of capital in Pakistan at that time of 12%. However,
within a short time of completion of the Tidal Link Canal, problems of erosion in the
canal and deterioration of the Cholri Weir began to appear.

The total estimated cost of the project at appraisal in November 1984 was US$635.7 million.

Maps, Charts, Figures and Tables, unless they appear in the text, are located at the end of the report.

The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) mission estimated that unquantifiable benefits (for
example, non-farm benefits such as storm water drainage or the multiplier effects of the projects
substantial employment benefits) that were not included in this estimate of the economic IRR could
increase the IRR to 15-20%.

Map 1: LBOD Outfall System

Kotri Basin (Left Bank, Fuleli, Pinyari Canals)

Source: Panel of Experts Drainage Master Plan, November 2004


2.

Continuation of the erosion of the Tidal Link Canal bed and banks, destruction
of the Cholri Weir intended to protect environmentally important coastal zone areas,
and the penetration of tidal fluctuations and sea water upstream to where it could
threaten ecosystems and the drains, was worsened and accelerated by major storms
associated with the southwest monsoon in 1999 and 2003. Overloading of the LBOD
drains during the July 2003 storms worsened the impact of the heavy rain that caused
widespread damage. Although the Tidal Link continues to function, its many breaches,
changes in canal cross section, and movement of the tides and seawater into the drains
and dhands have called into question the long term sustainability and functionality of
the LBOD outlet works. Moreover, it became clear after the 2003 storm that LBOD
outlet system could not handle or be secured against the effects of the large volume of

May 2005

storm water runoff that results from the large, intense monsoon season rain storms like
those that have occurred recently in this region in 1994, 1999 and 2003.
3.

Purpose and objective of the mission. After the July 2003 storms, which
resulted in extensive damages and losses, the Government of Sindh and the Federal
Government were anxious to find a strategy to secure the benefits generated from
LBOD Stage I Project in its upper reaches and prevent the recurrence of damages in the
outfall from such events. The concerned agencies at Federal and Provincial level
undertook studies and site visits and presented proposals for action by the Government.
The Provincial Government the 30 of September, 2004 in the meeting held to present
the conclusions of the Drainage Master Plan, asked the World Bank to organize an
International Panel of Experts (POE) to review the hydrologic, ecological, water quality
data that had been gathered since 1999, to assess the current performance of LBOB and
the Tidal Link and identify the associated problems, and to recommend a course of
action to the Government. The World Bank sent an official request to the Federal
Government on November 8, 2004 to inform about the objectives of the mission and
prepare the necessary arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the mission with
the participation of the different government agencies involved in the LBOD Stage I
Project. The mission wants to acknowledge the full support given to the mission and the
full access to the information ready available. Nevertheless the efforts genuinely
displayed some information was not accessible in the offices visited and will require a
detail search in the future, particularly in view of the further analysis of the missions
proposed actions
The POE4 undertook a mission to Pakistan from March 7 to March 2005. The
mission visited Islamabad, Karachi, Hyderabad, Badin and Thatta to learn about the
project area and review the LBOD outfall system performance since its completion.,
and to discuss the issues with government officials, technical staff of the concerned
agencies and Institutes, local government officials, stakeholders in the project area
including fisherman and farmers, and NGOs5 . Government and non-government
officials and technical experts were extremely generous with their time and provided
considerable data and background information and reports to the mission. The World
Bank Country Office, the PC of NDP, the staff and management of the Irrigation and
Drainage Authority (SIDA), and the Additional Secretary, Sindh Irrigation and Power
Department (IPD), provided important lo gistical support and substantive guidance to
the mission. The mission is very grateful to all these officials and experts for their
hospitality and assistance. The mission initial findings were presented to the Minister of
Irrigation and Power Mr. Nadir Leghari on Friday 18 of March.
4.

The POE consisted of Dr. Fernando Gonzalez, Mission Leader and water management expert; Dr.
Javier Aparicio, coastal engineering expert; Mr. Santiago Funes, social and institutional expert; and
Dr. Walter Garvey, environment and water resources expert.

A list of organizations and officials that met with the mission is given in Annex 1 and the detail
program mission is given in Annex 3.

May 2005

II. INTRODUCTION
The LBOD Stage I project 6 . The area served by LBOD was proposed by the
Government of Pakistan because of the acute problems of salinity and waterlogging
which severely affected the productivity, income and livelihood of the population living
in this area. The Badin District in the lower LBOD basin consists of extremely flat land
that is traditionally exposed to extensive inundation during heavy rain because of low
infiltration rates and slow runoff (this cond ition prevails to a somewhat lesser degree in
many areas of the upper basin as well). The natural drainage is also impeded in the
monsoon season by the high tides and extensive flooding of the coastal zone, which is
the natural outlet for this slow and shallow overland flow. The upper basin of LBOD,
Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas Districts in central Sindh Province receive
irrigation water from the Indus River by means of the Sukkur Barrage and the Nara and
Rohri canals. The purpose of the LBOD scheme was to relieve water logging by
lowering the water table and remove saline water from this irrigated area. The LBOD
Stage I project7 provided drainage tubewells and tile drains to lower the water table and
collect saline water as well as new and remodeled surface drains to collect and transfer
this saline water to a new spinal drain8 . The accumulated discharge of the spinal drain
was connected downstream to two older drains 9 (Map 1): Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain
(KPOD) (a drain built to collect saline discharge from numerous small drains in the
Kotri basin of eastern Badin District and carry this drainage discharge into Pateji Dhand
and the Rann of Kutch); and the Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain (DPOD) (an old natural
channel thought to be a remnant of an ancient Indus River channel that flowed into
Shakoor Dhand near the Rann of Kutch). This brought the brackish and in some cases
saline agricultural drainage water of LBOD Stage I Project to the edge of the coastal
zone a wide, flat plain consisting of mud and partly salt encrusted flats, shallow
depressions some of which are lakes perennially filled with brackish to hyper-saline
water, and a zone of active tidal creeks that connect this plain to the sea.
5.

This report does not contain a complete description of the LBOD Stage 1 project. A full description
can be found in the World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR), June 1998, Report No.
18037

In 1980 the GoP proposed to the Bank the LBOD project which covered 10 districts served by
Sukkur
Barrage, in view of the financial and time constraints the project was divided in
different stages. Stage I project included the priority districts of Nawabshah, Sanghar and
Mirpurkhas Districts. Stage II and III were intended to extend the coverage to the other Districts.

The Project also provided important irrigation improvements including the remodeling of two major
canals, construction of an off-channel storage reservoir, and watercourse lining and land leveling.

The bifurcation of the Spinal Drain flow was made just upstream of the connection with KPOD by
means of an uncontrolled broad crested weir located in a side channel excavated in the left bank so
that a portion of the spinal drain discharge would be diverted through the Dhoro Puran Link to the
Dhoro Puran, an moribund natural channel that empties into Shakoor Dhand.

May 2005

6.

Shakoor Dhand and the Rann of Kutch lie astride the Indian-Pakistan border.
The Sindh dhands10 (lakes) lie entirely in Pakistan and are generally connected to the
Rann of Kutch especially at high tide. Since the 1960s, when the Kotri Basin drains
(which lie west of the LBOD basin) were built to discharge into the dhands they have
become an important local fishery, and a waterfowl habitat of international importance.
Portions of two of the Sindh dhands (Sanhro and Mehro) have been declared Ramsar
sites, and the Rann of Kutch, which also contains a large Ramsar site partly in Pakistan,
is included on the WWF list of the 200 globally most important biodiversity hot-spots.
The natural pattern of surface drainage and overland flow, especially of storm runoff,
from this coastal and near-coastal zone in Badin District is south and southeastward
towards the Rann of Kutch. To avoid discharging LBOD through KPOD directly into
this environmentally sensitive international wetland, a Tidal Link Canal was built 42
km southwestward across the dhands and the Rann of Kutch from KPOD to the nearest
active tidal creek, Shah Samado Creek. The Tidal Link Canal was isolated from the
Rann of Kutch and the dhands by high embankments. An 1800 ft weir, called the
Cholri Weir, was built where the Tidal Link Canal passes through Cho lri Dhand in
order to attenuate high water levels in the Tidal Link Canal during high tide by
allowing water to flow into the dhands during this period, and to protect the dhands
from excessive drainage during low tide when the water would flow back into the Tidal
Link Canal. Since sea water was not expected to come closer than about 11 km
downstream of the weir, the negative effects of the intrusion of the much more saline
sea water would also be minimized. The outlet works of LBOD thus consist of the
DPOD, which discharges through the Dhoro Puran natural channel into Shakoor
Dhand, the enlarged KPOD drain, the Tidal Link Canal connected directly to the sea,
and the Cholri Weir.
The National Drainage Program (NDP). The National Drainage Program11
(NDP) was launched in 1998 to improve the efficiency of the irrigation and drainage
system in Pakistan. NDP was deliberately frontloaded with institutional and policy
reforms and backloaded with an investment program. NDP represented a major
change in the water resources development strategy in Pakistan shifting the priority
from physical interventions to emphasize the need to improve management of the
existing infrastructure. NDP financed the completion of irrigation improvement works
including the remodeling of the Nara and Jamrao irrigation canals, and water course
improvements including lining and precision land leveling. Numerous existing drains
and drainage structures in the LBOD and Kotri basins were rehabilitated to take care of
the deferred maintenance, and operation of the drainage tubewells improved. NDP
7.

10

11

There are four important dhands in this part of the Sindh coastal zone: Sanhro, Mehro, Cholri, and
Pateji. These shallow lakes and lagoons are inter-connected at high tide in the wet monsoon season
when most of the eastern coastal zone is a vast shallow water body. Sanhro and Mehro Dhands
contain Ramsar sites. Shakoor Dhand, is a shallow depression in the Rann of Kutch south and east
of the Tidal Link that has no direct link to an active tidal creek (WAPDA Note, undated).
The National Drainage Program was financed by the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Its
was estimated to cost US$785 Million at appraisal.

May 2005

financed the monitoring program including the work of the National Institute of
Oceanography and the SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO) of WAPDA as well as
an extensive research program and a number of critical policies and planning studies
including the National Drainage Master Plan (DMP) that is now under preparation. At
the request of the Government the Bank organized a Panel of Experts to provide
recommendations for the implementation of the Plan. At sub-project level
Environmental Scoping and Screening Procedure was developed and applied to all
NDP investments. This Procedure played a major role in steering NDP investments
away from environmental sensitive areas and costly land acquisition problems.
Although the World Bank components of NDP have been completed, the JBIC and
ADB components have been extended. In particular, with ADB assistance the long
delayed implementation of the LBOD Environmental Management and Monitoring
Plan (EMMP) is about to be implemented 12 . Substantial progress was made under NDP
to increase the participation of farmers in the operation and maintenance of the
irrigation and drainage system. In Sindh, this process has supported the emergence of
local leaders such as elected members of Area Water Boards (AWBs) and elected
officers of Farmer Organizations (FOs) who have played an active and constructive role
in the LBOD debate that continues to the present.
8.

Summary of issues associated with the operation of LBOD, KPOD and DPOD
drains and the Tidal Link. LBOD drain passes through the eastern part of Badin
District and discharges to the KPOD and DPOD spinal drains. The eastern portion of
Badin District, which encompasses the coastal zone namely the Talukhas of Badin,
S.F. Rahu and Tango Bago suffered prolonged flooding and extensive damage during
the July 2003 storms.
9.

The Tidal Link Canal bed and banks were constructed with the soil obtained
from the canal excavation and consisted mainly of silty loam in which scour and
erosion processes are highly sensitive to flow velocity. The design phase of the Tidal
link Canal included both physical and mathematical model studies, for a more detailed
description of concepts in design see Annex 4. These analyses determined that tidal
fluctuations would be felt all the way up the Tidal Link Canal form Shah Samando
Creek to a point somewhere near the terminus of KPOD, but sea water was not
expected to penetrate more than 19 km upstream to an area about 5 km downstream of
the Cholri Weir, the main connection between the Tidal Link and the dhands. At
present both tidal fluctuations and sea water intrude into the dhands and KPOD, and the

12

The Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), the focal point for implementation of the
LBOD EMMP, has submitted a PC-I to the Government to finance the functioning of an
Environmental Management Unit (EMU) that has been operational within SIDA since 2003. The
EMU will be responsible for implementation of this program. A PC-II to finance the associated
studies and monitoring program has also been submitted to the Government. The EMU will
coordinate implementation of the program in collaboration with a number of cooperating Sindh
agencies, universities and organizations with experience and expertise in the relevant areas ensuring
that a shared knowledge base is developed along with the human resources to sustain the program
over the long term.

May 2005

drainage and environmental functions of the Tidal Link portion of the LBOD outlet are
impaired.
10.

The Cholri Weir was constructed in the right bank of the Tidal Link Canal
where it crossed the dhands to prevent damage to this area that could be cause by tidal
fluctuations. Within months of the completion of the weir, erosion around the structure
became evident. Despite attempts to repair this damage, monsoon storms in 1998 and
1999 led to the complete destruction of the weir due mainly to scour of its foundation
and erosion of its abutments. The result is that there is now an open connection
between the dhands and the Tidal Link, exposing the dhands to large tidal fluctuations,
sea water intrusion, sedimentation, and excessive drainage during low tide. A small
tidal creek type system of drainage channels has now developed in Cholri Dhand,
which is closest to the Tidal Link. No tidal fluctuations are evident in Sanhro and
Mehro Dhands.
11.

Upstream, LBODs canals were designed to carry the relatively modest


quantities of agricultural subsurface drainage with about 4 ft of freeboard. Design
criteria assumed that these drainage sources would be cut off (tubewells and tile drain
sump pumps would be turned off) so that the canals would be free to carry runoff from
rainfall. However, the design criteria provided an available capacity to drain a 125 mm
rainfall of 5 days duration in a 5 days period. During the storm of the July, 2003, Badin
received 218 mm of rain and Nawabshah in the upper part of the LBOD basin received
191 mm. LBOD canals were overtopped and numerous breaches occurred, in part
because farmers in the upper LBOD basin cutting the banks of the drains to hasten the
drainage of rain water from their fields. Equally important, the discharge into KPOD
and the Tidal Link Canal were more than twice the design discharge, resulting in severe
scour of the Tidal Link Canal as well as breaches in both its right and left
embankments.
12.

The mission received several comments from local people, especially those who
live in the lower LBOD basin in Badin, and a number of experts which do not agree
with the LBOD outfall scheme. For example, the report of the Panel of Experts,
reviewing the national Drainage Master Plan (DMP) noted that during their recent visit
to Badin that drainage issues play an important role and are heavily debated in the area.
Local people believed that the LBOD outfall design cut across rather than following the
natural drainage pattern. They felt its orientation southwestward would expose the
structures to the persistent high winds, wave action and high tides that occur in the area
during the southwest monsoon. As a result local people have felt the LBOD outfall
scheme would increase the vulnerability of their already fragile livelihood system.
13.

Response of the Government GOS Technical Review Committee. After the


damages to the LBOD outfall system in 1999, the Government of Sindh appointed a
high- level Technical Committee in early 2000 to review available project documents
and monitoring data, inspect the facilities in the field, and recommend actions to be
taken. Among the Committees key findings and observations were: 56 breaches in the
southern and northern embankments of the Tidal Link; severe erosion of the Tidal Link
canal banks; evidence of scour of the canal bed and erosion of a considerable part of the
berm on top of the canal embankments; most of the northern embankment along with
May 2005

the entire berm was eroded away; the section of the channel has been widened
considerably in several places; the Cholri Weir had been destroyed; and the water level
in the Dhands had been lowered and Cholri Dhand drained by tidal fluctuations in the
Link. The judgment of the Committee was that the Tidal Link was continuing to
function and the ongoing channel evolution would stabilize sometime in the future with
a section that would generally follow the current alignment. However, in light of the
uncertainties concerning the factors governing the ongoing changes within the Tidal
Link, and the uncertain viability of conventional mitigation options, the Committee
recommended that no repair should be carried out in Tidal Link as damages done by
cyclone are beyond the repair limit, and that surveys and monitoring should be
continued.
14.

World Bank Fact Finding Mission. In March 2001, the World Bank organized
a Fact Finding Mission to understand the technical details, system performance and the
damages to the Tidal Link; also to understand the possible technical, environmental and
social consequences, and to suggest to the Government of Sindh further steps to be
taken. The mission concurred with the view of the GOS Technical Committee that the
no-action recommendation of the committee is justified not only because the damage
is beyond repair by conventional methods, but also because the scour of the channel
bed and erosion of the embankments are still active under the influence of the
uncontrolled tidal flow through the tidal link and flow to and from Rann of Kutch and
the Dhands. The mission believed these conditions would render any attempt to repair
the damages useless using conventional methods until such time as there is more
knowledge of the processes underway in the Tidal Link area. The mission stressed that
intensive monitoring of the physical and environmental conditions in the Tidal Link
area should be continued to provide a basis for formulating further action. This
included continuation of the hydrologic and hydraulic monitoring being carried out by
the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), water quality and LBOD Stage I Project
operational monitoring by the WAPDAs SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO),
and full implementation of the Environmental Monitoring and Management Plan
(EMMP) prepared for LBOD Stage I Project in 1998 (which included extensive study
and monitoring of ecological, fisheries, avifauna, water quality and hydrology, and
socio-economic conditions in the dhands and the wider Tidal Link area).
15.

GOS Environment Committee. In July 2001, the Government of Sindh


appointed an inter-agency Committee to formulate an environmental package for
rehabilitation of affected areas of the Tidal Link. After reviewing the situation on the
ground and discussion with local stakeholders, the Committee recognized that the Tidal
Link and the coastal wetland through which it passes is of strategic national and
provincial importance, but could say little of a specific nature about the actual
environmental damages since no data was available except for a few baseline studies
carried out in 1996 and 1997. The Committee recommended in October 2001 that a
permanent institution be set up under the Managing Director of SIDA, staffed by multidisciplinary specialists, to carry out the analysis of the monitoring data and coordinate
the activities of cooperating agencies.
The Committee agreed with the
recommendations of the Technical Committee and the World Bank Fact Finding
Mission for additional monitoring and data collection including water quality
May 2005

monitoring. The Committee recommended improvement of the roads in the area and
improvement of communications systems that would enable more rapid and effective
response to disaster and crisis events. The Committee recommended that stakeholder
participation be increased in any future activities to ensure social acceptance of plans
and measures, and that any future proposed actions be subject to an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) in accordance with Sindh EPA regulations including an
ecological risk assessment.
16.

The National Drainage Master Plan (DMP). At a request of the GOP the WB
organized a POE to review the DMP from August to November 2004. The Panel
observed that the DMP contains a good and clear overview of the past developments
with respect of drainage developments. The approach, which is based on drainage
basins, is useful. The Drainage Atlas promised to be an excellent publication and
presents the most relevant drainage information available in the country. The Panel was
critical in terms of the proposals presented in the DMP, regarding the physical
interventions, salt balances, Initial Impact Environmental Assessment and particularly
objected the Trans Boundary Outfall Drain (TBOD). The Panel recommended that the
TBOD option may not be considered anymore. The Panel visited Sindh Province and
conducted a practical training in the DRAINFRAME methodology and organized a
stakeholders consultation in Kotri Basin and made recommendations to develop a
Drainage Development and Water Management Plan for this basin. The Panel prepared
terms of reference for this study and the Government of Sindh agree in the proposed
methodology and the time-framework to finalize it. The report of the POE of the DMP
was available for the Outfall of LBOD mission and was an useful element in the
preparation of this report.
17.

Recent actions taken by the Government. The losses suffered in the Badin
District during the 2003 rainfall, galvanized the Federal and Provincial Governments
into action. As of 20th August 2004 the Government has decided upon a number of
actions in connection with LBOD and the aftermath of the 2003 events. These decisions
provided a substantive framework for the Mission. They were made available to the
members of the mission before it began its work in Pakistan. Table 1 synthesizes the
main decisions and actions that have been taken.

May 2005

Table 1. Decisions and Actions of the Government in Response to Damages to LBOD


Measure

Decision

Study of alternative disposal locations in Thar desert (east of the


LBOD spinal drain) for diversion of storm water

analysis and eventual


implementation after
review

Study of the construction of a gated structure either on spinal drain or


DPOD

analysis and eventual


implementation after
review

Slashing off of the fixed weir on DPOD (to lower the invert of the crest
of the weir)

Implemented

Reinforcement of at least 10 km of the right bank of Sirani drain, of the


KPOD up to RD 38

under construction

GoS to strengthen institutions as Irrigation and Power Department and


SIDA in revamping of the irrigation system and lining of the water
courses in future

to be implemented

Better coordination among concerned departments to avoid


discharging [17,000 cusecs of Fuleli canal??] into KPOD during heavy
down spur

to be implemented

Redesigning LBOD spinal drain for a 50 years return period of 150


mm rainfall Preparation of a proposal, if feasible, to be submitted to
the GoP

to be implemented

Ensuring that farmers upstream LBOD would not be allowed


breaching the infrastructure

to be implemented

Improved pre-monsoon arrangements better coordination between


provincial departments and the Irrigation Department

to be implemented

Regularly monitoring of high tide in the Tidal Link and other


geographical changes

to be implemented

Provision to SIDA, as an apolitical institution, of expertise, manpower,


funds, machinery and equipment for LBOD operation and maintenance

to be implemented

Seawater intrusion
recommendations

technical

to be implemented

Planning Commission to evaluate the LBOD Stage-II proposal in


consultation with WAPDA and GoS on priority basis

to be implemented

May 2005

and

tidal

effects:

analysis

and

10

III.

RESULTS OF M ISSION ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA

18.

Physical monitoring information available to the mission. The Mission had


access to a considerable amount of new data which is still in the process of being
analyzed by the Pakistan Authorities. Nevertheless, as the discussion below points out
there remain important data gaps that will impede needed analysis and decision making.
The mission had no access to topographic maps of the region, the topography of
Shakoor Dhand, or complete rainfall data and storm analysis except for the 1994 storm.
19.

WAPDAs SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO) annually publishes


extensive LBOD Stage I Project monitoring data that concerns primarily groundwater
and internal drains. The general content of the SMO reports is summarized in Table 2.
Physical data related to the Tidal Link are mainly available in the Annual Physical
Monitoring Report of the National Institute of Oceanography (carried out under
contract to the SMO), which contains results from monitoring campaigns made from
1999 to 2004. Table 3 shows the type of data collected and reported by NIO form their
annual physical monitoring of the Tidal Link.

Table 2: Content of SMO Monitoring Reports


1

Groundwater Table Monitoring

Hydrologic Monitoring of Drainage and Scavenger Tubewells

Interceptor Drains Monitoring

Tile Drains Monitoring

Soil Monitoring

Water Quality Monitoring

7.

P e r f o r m a n c e T e s t o f 4 4 4 D r a i n a g e T u b e w e l l s w h i c h a r e recently installed in
Mirpurkhas Component of LBOD Stage I Project area

8.

Water Quality of the above said tubewells

9.

Soil sampling of the above area according to the specification in previous


MOU

10.

Observed Depth to Watertable for installing piez ometer pipe of the said area

11.

Detail monitoring and survey of Chotiari Reservoir discharge, water quality


and environmental studies of the area

12.

Depth to watertable survey of the Chotiari Reservoir area for installing lines
of piezometers

13

Detailed Monitoring of Tile Drain by installation of piezometers close to the


drain to find out the impact of filter efficiency of the tiles. Soil type and its
physical chemical characteristic considerably effect the design and drainage
efficiency of the drain

14

Detailed Monitoring of Interceptor Drain by installation of piezometers close


to the drain to find out the impact of filter efficiency of the interceptor drain.
Soil type and its physical chemical characteristic considerably effect the
design and drainage efficiency of the drain

May 2005

11

Table 3 Content of NIO Annual Physical Monitoring Report


1.

Meteorological Observations (1999-June 2004)


1.1 Temperature and wind speed
1.2 Surface Water Temperature (1999-June 2004)

Oceanographic/Hydraulic Observations (1999-June 2004)


2.1 Water Currents (1999-to June 2004)
2.2 Tidal Levels (1999- June 2004)
2.3 Water Salinity (1999-June 2004)
2.4 Suspended Load (1999-June 2004)
2.5 Survey of Dhands (1999-June 2004)
2.6 Bathymetry (1999-June 2004)
2.6.1.1. Bed Level Cross-Section Survey
2.6.1.2. Bed Level Longitudinal Section Survey

20.

Analysis of information concerning the performance of the Tidal Link. From


cross- and longitudinal sections reported by NIO, erosion is observed all along the
Tidal Link and in KPOD, particularly near the discharge of the Tidal Link Canal into
Shah Samando Creek (Figures 1 and 2). The most severe changes in the longitudinal
profile of the channel are observed in the breached zone, downstream from RD 38
(Figure 1). Both measured data and computer simulations suggest that maximum
velocities in the Tidal Link are around 1.2 m/s (Figures 3 and 4) at the time of NIO
measurements. This velocity is greater than the permissible velocity of the loam
material forming the channel, which should be less than 0.9 m/s for silt loam. Velocities
caused by ebb flows were even greater than when the Tidal Link was recently built.
Therefore, the channel cross sections and longitudinal profile are continuously
changing, due both to erosion produced by the above mentioned high velocities and the
relatively high load of sediments brought from upstream sections. Erosion is especially
intense at the outlet of the channel to the Shah Samando Creek. It is likely that these
high velocity flows were the primary cause of the Cholri Weir failure in 1998.

May 2005

12

-5

-5

-10

-10
DEC. DEPTH 2002

-15

HEIGHT (m)

HEIGHT (m)

BED LEVEL LONGITUDINAL SECTION FROM RD -56 TO RD -93 AT THE TIDAL LINK
DURING SEPTEMBER 1998 AND DECEMBER 2002 BY ECHOSOUNDING

-15

SEP. DEPTH 1998

-20

-20
-56

-58

-60

-62

-64

-66

-68

-70

-72

-74 -76
RD'S

-78

-80

-82

-84

-86

-88

-90

-92

Figure 1

RD-125
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
-2.00
-4.00
-6.00
-100

100

200

300

400

500

Figure 2. Cross section at RD-125 as compared to design


section (NIO, 2004)

May 2005

13

Figure 3 . M e a s u r e d w a t e r c u r r e n t a l R D -93 ( N I O , 2 0 0 4 )

Boundary Condition a=-1.5 m


6

Velocity (m/s)

5
4
3
2
1
0
600

1600

2600

3600

4600

5600

6600

7600

Main channel distance (m)


Q=850 m3/s

Q=500 m3/s

Q=350 m3/s

Q=250 m3/s

Figure 4. Boundary Condition

May 2005

14

20.

The mission concluded from the data available that the tidal influence extends
considerably upstream in the Tidal Link and into KPOD. NIO reports that the tidal
amplitude at RD -93 (see Figure 5) is about 2 m. Moreover, during October 1999 the
tide levels recorded at RD 22 were 1.4 to 2.46 m, and during November December
1999 the tide levels recorded at RD 21 were 0.31 to 1.84 m (NIO, 2004). NIO further
reports that the influence of tidal fluctuation is noticeable up to RD +2, within KPOD
and near the outfall of Seerani drain into KPOD.
TIDAL LEVELS AT RD -93 DURING 07 TO 11 -02 -2001
5
Height (m)

HEIGHT (m)

HEIGHT (m)

0
00:00

08:00

16:00

00:00

08:00

16:00

00:00

08:00

16:00

00:00

08:00

16:00

00:00

08:00

16:00

HOURS

F i g u r e 5 . T i d a l l e v e l s a t R D -9 3 ( N O I , 2 0 0 4 )

21.

Another indication of the extent to which the tide has penetrated the Tidal Link
is salinity. According to NIO (2004), the high saline sea water from Shah Samando
Creek which previously was detected up to RD -125 and RD -95 has now extended up
to RD -38 and possibly beyond. Figure 6 shows a clear influence of the tide cycle on
the salinity as far from Shah Samando Creek as RD -30. The mission noted that in
Pateji Dhand, formerly the outfall of KPOD, salinity is extremely high, around 68,000
ppm (Figure 7), due to high evaporation in the area and the fact that this dhand does not
currently receive water from any drain nowadays while the other dhands do.

Water Salinity at the Tidal Link Drain at RD -30


During 04 to 07-07-2000.
60

Salinity (ppt)

SALINITY (ppt)

SALINITY (ppt)

55

50

45

40

35
12:00

07:00

13:00

19:00

05:00

11:00

17:00

07:00

13:00

HOURS

Figure 6. Water salinity at RD -30 (NOI, 2004)

May 2005

15

22

20
)g.
e
D
42
18
0f
se
tu
ni
m
(e 16
du
tit
aL
14

12

10

32
.

34

36
38
40
Longitude (minutes of 68 Deg.)

Figure 7 . Salinity in Dhands area

42

44

46

(NOI, 2004)

22.

The Tidal Link left bank is attacked from the Rann of Kutch by tides and storm
surges, and is directly exposed to wave action generated by strong storm and southwest
monsoon winds and waves in the zone of influence of tides (Map 3). These factors .are
especially amplified during high storm surges, such as those produced by the 1999
cyclone and the 2003 storm13 .

13

There is a high time variability involved in the process at the outfall area. Water quality and water
levels in the Dhands have hourly variations with the tide, monthly seasonal variations and annual
differences with the droughts. The comparison among the different measurements or satellite images
taken at different times could proved misleading.

May 2005

16

23.

The mission concluded that the Tidal Link carried a flow much greater than the
design discharge. Interviews, presentations and the reports of the LBOD consultants
(1984 and 1994) indicate clearly to the mission that the LBOD channel design
discharge was set considering only drainage rates of 1.5 cusec/sq mile or 1.4 mm/day
(this number changed for different project areas), leaving a free board of around 2 ft .
This would correspond to a design capacity of 2400 cusecs and a maximum carrying
capacity of 4440 cusecs corresponding to a 125 mm rainfall of 5 days duration, which
would result in flood duration of 5 days. The disposal of storm water into the surface
drainage was to be limited using control inlets sized assuming a ponding depth of
around 1 foot and discharge restricted to 1.8 cusecs. Analysis of available data indicates
that the maximum discharge experienced in KPOD and Tidal Link in 2003 was around
10,000 cusecs that resulted from rainfall of 218 mm recorded at Badin, which occurred
after two other storms earlier in the same month. July 2003 resulted in the largest
monthly rainfall recorded at Badin station in 67 years. From statements made by
several officials, it was assumed in the design of LBOD canals that the channel system
would not be allowed to carry base flow during heavy rainfall, but the Mission found
that it was not the case during the 2003 storms. Not only was base flow present in the
system but irrigation water refusals were also diverted directly to the drain system and
additional inlets were provided by farmers breaching the embankments.

24.

Assessment of changes and conditions using remote sensing. The LBOD and
Tidal Link are quickly becoming both a new river and an upstream extension of the
Shah Samando Creek. Satellite images (Map 3-6) show that several tidal fingers have
developed around the channel from breaches left by past floods and cyclone events. It is
expected that this situation will continue to develop until a new equilibrium is achieved
in which sediment load carried by the tidal wave and upstream flow is compensated by
sediment detachment brought about by the ebb phase of tide. Existing tidal fingers have
also extended further in the northern direction and in some cases have joined those
connected to the Tidal Link. Satellite images also show a reduction of the surface area
of the Dhands, although it is not clear whether this effect has been due to changes in the
Tidal Link or, as reported anecdotally by many people, to drought conditions. Apart
from that, satellite images show small changes in the overall coastal plain and
geomorphology during the last few years (Map 3-6). IMTA will provide more detail
information and confirm this assessment as part of the on-going work performed by the
Institute for this mission.
25.

Analysis of storm conditions in the LBOD basin. The Mission had access to a
limited amount of rainfall data. There are eight storms at least as intense as the 1994,
1999 and 2003 storms in 67 years. From these data a simplified frequency analys is of
annual maximum 24 h and monthly precipitation at Badin Station was made. The

May 2005

17

results are shown in Figures 8a and 8b 14 . For a rainfall duration of 24 hours, the 2003
storm has a return period of 6.6 years. This implies a probability of 56% of having at
least one similar or grater storm to occur in a period of 5 years. With respect of the
monthly rainfall, the graph shows a return period of 67 years. Factually the July 2003
monthly rainfall is the highest recorded rainfall in Badin.

24 h Rainfall, Badin Station


300

250

Rainfall, mm

200

2003
150

100

50

10

20

50

100

Return period (years)

Figure 8a: 24-hour Rainfall Frequency

14

The reduced variate R shown in Figure 8a and 8b is related to the return period T by the equation
T

R = ln ln

T 1

May 2005

18

Monthly Rainfall Badin station, mm


350

300

2003

Rainfall, mm

250

200

150

100

50

20

50

0
1

10

100

Return period (years)

Figure 8b: Monthly Rainfall Frequency Analysis


26.

Environmental monitoring. Having brought LBOD drainage water through


KPOD to the edge of the coastal zone, the designers of this scheme were faced with
major dilemmas. They were seeking a safe, sustainable and environmentally sound
place to dispose of the salt and other pollutants in the drainage water. The coastal zone
in this part of the Indus plain is a vast, dynamic and complex wetland with large areas
of global ecological importance, and economically valuable resources especially
fisheries. Its consists of shallow lakes (dhands) formed in numerous depressions, broad
mud flats that often have a salt crust, and a dynamic delta region that consists of
numerous active tidal creeks that connect the upland areas of the coastal zone to the
sea. Despite its harsh appearance, scientists who have visited the area report that it is
ecologically rich, and a major, high quality habitat for resident and migratory birds and
waterfowl that arrive along the Indus flyway. The coastal zone is also shared with
India, the border actually coming within sight of the lower KPOD canal. Throughout
the 20th century, major changes were made in the hydrology and sediment load of the
Indus River, and it is generally agreed, by knowledgeable specialists carrying out
studies in the Indus delta region, that this has set in motion macro- level change
processes within the delta and this coastal zone about which there is inadequate
knowledge at present on which to base the formulation and implementation of effective
management plans. The Indus Treaty which basically allocated three Eastern Rivers to
India and three Western Rivers to Pakistan allowed this country to develop its water
May 2005

19

resources and the expansion of the irrigated water supply capacity from 67 MAF to
104, including the construction of Tarbela and Mangla dams. The benefits for Pakistan
have allowed the country meeting the basic needs of its populatio n and double the
irrigation acreage. Of particular concern are the problems of the deltaic areas of Sindh.
The country is now engaged in studying the environmental flows required to maintain
the ecological and productive functions of the estuary.
27.

In view of the international dimensions of the Rann of Kutch, and the economic
and ecological importance of the dhands, the designers decided to transport the LBOD
discharge through a new canal directly to an active tidal creek where the flow would be
diluted and discharged to the sea during low tide. Measures were implemented that
would protect the valuable dhands (Cholri Weir), and the canal was designed (high
embankments topped by a berm) to withstand the forces it would encounter (wind and
waves) as it crossed the Rann of Kutch. However, very little real data and information
were available on which to base the formulation of additional environmental and
ecological management measures. In 1997 baseline studies of the fishery (Univ. of
Jamshoro) and avifauna (Zoological Department of Pakistan) of the dhands along with
a socio-economic assessment of the fishing community (Univ. of Jamshoro) were
carried out to add to the physical monitoring data being gathered by the NIO and the
SMO (hydraulics and salinity among other things). The Environmental Monitoring and
Management Plan (EMMP) for LBOD Stage I Project, prepared by the consultants in
1998, stressed the implementation of a well designed monitoring program that would
build the knowledge base and help authorities to spot adverse trends and formulate
mitigation measure. Unfortunately this EMMP could not be implemented due in large
part to the disputes between GOS and WAPDA, and the lack of a committed
institutional focal point in Sindh that could persuade policy makers of the importance of
providing the necessary resources and financial support such a program requires.
Fortunately NIO monitoring of salinity in the dhands and the Tidal Link have continued
from 1999 to June 2004 (discussed in the next chapter).
28.

The monitoring system in place is still limited and does not fully help to
understand thoroughly the impacts that have occurred and the mitigation measures to be
implemented. A more sustained effort in monitoring and data collection is needed to
face today GOS challenge to mitigate the damages to the outfall system, to fully
understand the long term changes (over the last 50 years) in the coastal zone that appear
to have affected the dhands and to define the mitigation measures to be implemented.
29.

Socio-economic information. The Mission received detailed information from


the World Bank team preparing a Proposal for Livelihoods Improvements: Badin and
Thatta Districts. The ongoing study provided most of the social-economical data and
related information used by the POE. As pointed out by the authors, extreme weather
events and natural disasters as well as a generally poor natural resource endowment
have persistently plagued the coastal areas of Sindh, especially Badin and Thatta
Districts. Reports prepared by UN Agencies suggest that the impact of natural
calamities in this area has been severe for the low income and vulnerable groups, and
resulted in a disruption in livelihoods and increased their vulnerability.

May 2005

20

30.

However despite emigration and the difficult living conditions to which the
people of this area have been confronted with, the coastal population of Badin
increased from 450,000 in 1998 to an estimated 520,000 in 2005 (15.5% in 7 years,
meanly from natural growth). The extreme climatic events of the last four years
including continuous droughts and two major storms have affected this area, and have
become the center of discussion in the Sindh society. The people of the area have
demonstrated considerable resilience and coping capacity over the years particularly
during these extraordinary circumstances.
31.

Notwithstanding the favorable and important repercussions of the drainage


provided in the upper areas of the district, the system has not significantly benefited the
lower rural areas in coastal Badin tha t have some access to land. At the tail end of the
irrigated area, having access to degraded cultivable land, people are living in fragile
conditions. Farming is an underdeveloped and increasingly risky activity, because of
uncertainties of the availability of water, which as usual depends on the volume not
used in the higher parts of the system. Because of increased population pressure over
diminished natural resources, fishing in the dhands is also an unstable base for rural
livelihoods. The capacity of ol cal households to own and maintain a few heads of
livestock is also limited. Most of the households in the coastal tazims are more foodinsecure than other neighboring areas.
32.

Several investments in agro- industry in recent years have increased employment


in the zone. Nevertheless recent WB diagnostic in the area reports that 70% of the rural
population is earning less than Rs. 4,000 ($70) per month.
33.

Concerning basic services, clean water and electricity, schooling and health, the
improvements, if any, have not been significant so far. An increased vulnerability has
worsened poverty conditions for the population in the area.
34.

As per the events in July 2003 local elected authorities firmly indicated to the
Mission that the amount of water received at the lower Badin was unprecedented. The
main reasons, in their views were: the additional volume collected by the drainage
system at the higher lands and the performance of the outfall system.

IV. FINDINGS OF THE M ISSION


35.

The dynamic context of the LBOD scheme. The present conditions of the
outfall area are quite different form the ones observed when LBOD outfall system was
in the stage of preparation and before it started operations. With the information
available to the mission about the initial state of the area, key changes are now
recognized in the topography, batimetry and cross sections of the Tidal Link and the
KPOD. There are also important deviations from the original project estimations of the
salinities, velocities and water levels at several places.

Since well before the contribution of the LBOD Stage I Project, the Indus Delta
has been in a complex and delicate transition from the original equilibrium to a

May 2005

21

new state, with serious perturbations due to the drastic changes in the Indus
River hydrologic and sediment regimes. Increased water use in the Indus River
basin mainly for the expansion of irrigated agriculture has changed the water
flow and the sediment load that had built the delta over geologic time.
According to the National Oceanographic Institute, the fragile equilibrium
among tidal and litoral currents, river flow and sediment transport has been
drastically changed. The river was dry during last years kharif season below
Kotri barrage. The observed changes at macro scale have been interpreted by
some experts (interviewed by the mission, including scientists from the Institute
of Oceanography), as a shrinking of the Indus delta. This seems to be confirmed
by the finding of purely oceanic origin organisms in the tidal creeks by the same
scientists. NIO scientists and others studying the Indus delta also believe that
the estuary, which is the most productive part of this delta, has also shrunk with
negative impacts to livelihoods, commercial activities and fisheries,.

Construction of agricultural drainage in the lower part of the Kotri basin


changed the equilibrium of the dhands especially Sanhro and Mehro since the
1960s, creating new ecosystems in some cases. The salinities in these drains,
reported by the LBOD Stage I Project EMMP Report (1998), were much lower
than seawater salinities, especially during the rainy season. This contributed to
the establishment of brackish or estuarine conditions with lower salinity in these
dhands, resulting in the reported high productivity and favorable bird habitat.
This condition has been changed as Figures 7 & 9 amply demonstrate.

The combined effects of runoff from heavy rainfall and the tide, brought higher
velocities than the erosion limits for the soil material in the Tidal Link. These
effects have widened the original excavated channel to more than double the
original design width. They have also increased dramatically the depth of the
Tidal Link up and within KPOD. The new section and slope in the Tidal Link
have changed the anticipated tidal effect in the outfall resulting in marine water
intrusion in the drains and dhands, and tidal fluctuations much grater than
estimated in the original design.

Furthermore, the Tidal Link and its embankments altered the previous
streamflow pattern in the tidal area of the dhands. The new pattern modified the
water velocities in the dhands and caused erosion and siltation that are difficult
to quantify with the present information. The breaches that resulted from the
failure of the Cholri Weir and the embankments concentrated the flow in some
areas facilitating new connections from the dhands and the Tidal Link to the sea.
The combined effect is facilitating the drainage of the dhands and increasing the
amplitude of the tidal fluctuations in KPOD and its connected drains up to about
RD 80. These conditions were not expected to extend into KPOD during the
design phase.

36.

Why did the Cholri weir and the Tidal Link embankments fail? The report
describing this original design (Delft Hydraulics, 1989) considered scouring a distant
event, predicted an annual dredging requirement of 70,000 m3 and even suggested the
May 2005

22

purchase of dredging equipment and the construction of a dredger service depot at Ali
Bandor. The original geometric setup of the Tidal Link Canal has suffered
considerable changes because of the flows produced by the 1999 and 2003 storms. A
preliminary analysis of the recently collected data suggests that the stable slope is
different from that adopted in the original design.
37.

The mission did not have access to precise written information including
observation notes about the causes of the failure of the Chori weir and the
embankments of the Tidal Link. Nobody was at the site during these events, but it is
clear that the causes were different for the weir and the embankments. Damage to the
weir began within a few months of its completion, and it failed in 1998 and 1999
probably from scouring of the foundation along the canal bed and from water flowing
over the crest of the weir. The embankments failed in 1999 probably from the
combined effect of scouring in the Tidal Link Canal bed and banks due to high
velocities, overtopping (due to storm flow in the channel greater than the design flow)
and the wave action in unprotected slopes during high tides. Any alternative
considering future rehabilitating the TL should consider these adverse site conditions in
designing the new structures.
38.

Were the 1999 and 2003 rainfall events too rare to be considered the basis for
the design of the system?. The accumulated rainfall in July 2003 is the record highest
for any given month. Severe 24 hour duration storms, similar to the one of the 24 hrs
duration of July 2003 storm, occurred in 1994 and 1999. A similar storm will occur in
the next 5 years with a probability of 56% (8 similar 24 hrs storms have occurred in the
last 67 years). Of course, in the 80s when the studies were prepared the 1994, 1999 and
2003 storms have not been recorded. In any event, the principle underpinning the
design criteria was to control the water inflow to the drains in the farmers fields. It is
clear that the changes observed in the delta are caused by a combined effect of the
LBOD Stage I project and the extraordinary events in 99 and 2003. River and coastal
systems do not usually change during ordinary conditions. They incur substantive
change during large storms and floods. In deltas, like the one of the Indus, they tend to
deposit sediments along the bed until a large storm or flood occurs. During large
extreme events one can expect to have more changes tha n in many years of relative
small storms and flows.
39.

What will be the future equilibrium condition? Can we predict a future


equilibrium of this very complex system? The system is still evolving (even under a no
action alternative) and it is difficult to have a clear vision about what new equilibrium
state of the area would be. It appears that the erosion pattern will continue upstream
into the drainage system forming a wider and deeper channel and widening the
connection to the sea (see figure on evolution of cross sections and bed profile). Under
these circumstances the tidal effect would continue traveling upstream the present
position into the drainage system and the dhands would have a more direct connection
to the sea with a probable reduction of their area. This trend could lead to form a new
small estuary that would have a base flow from subsurface drainage and storm flows
during the rainy season.

May 2005

23

40.

Behavior of the LBOD drainage system. The Badin District in the lower
LBOD basin consists of extremely flat land that is susceptible to extensive inundation
during heavy rain because of low infiltration rates and slow runoff (this condition
prevails to a somewhat lesser degree in many areas of the upper basin as well). The
natural drainage is also impeded in the monsoon season by the high tides and extensive
flooding of the coastal zone, which is the natural outlet for this slow and shallow
overland flow. The LBOD spinal drain and its associated collector drains were
designed to carry agricultural and subsurface drainage. The designers assumed that
these sources of water would be cut off during heavy rainfall, so that the canal and its
full free board of 4 ft could be used to carry runoff from heavy rain. However, this
capacity could drain a total of only 125 mm of rainfall over 5 days with a 5 days flood
duration with inlet controls to 1.8 cusecs and ponding depth of one foot. Larger
amounts of runoff that would result from larger rainfall would have to be stored on the
farmers land for longer periods. However, two things happened during the particularly
heavy rainfall experienced in July, 2003: first, except from most of the tubewells, the
baseflow of agricultural drainage water was not cutoff and it continued to flow into the
drains; second, farmers in the upper LBOD basin quickly cut the drain embankments to
allow their field to drain more rapidly increasing the amount of runoff flowing into the
drain and increasing the discharge; and third, diversions into the irrigation canals was
not stopped leaving them full and causing several breaches when additional water
entered the canals from the rainfall. During such periods farmers commonly allow flow
in their water courses 15 to go directly to the drains since their field are being inundated
by the heavy rain further increasing drain discharge. The resulting high discharges
overloaded the LBOD system downstream causing numerous canal breaches that
poured water into the already clogged drains and compounded flooding in eastern Kotri
Basin and Badin District. During the mission visit, the affected population reported
damages from breached canals and informed about the rapid rise in water levels that
caused severe damage in this area.
41.

Environmental damages. The only new data of real relevance to environmental


damages in the dhands area is the salinity data collected by NIO. Data on the evolution
of salinity in the dhands at 18 stations over the period 2001 (after the 1999 cyclone) to
2003 (after the 2003 monsoon storm) are shown in Figure 9. Salinity contours covering
the four Sindh dhands for the period 2001-2003 is shown in Figure 7. In 1998 the
LBOD consultants EMMP Report summarized the salinity data available at that time
from surveys carried out between 1983 and 1989 (the time of the first environmental
assessment of LBOD Stage I Project) and 1997, as shown in Table 4.

15

Generally there are not sufficient controls to prevent canal flows from entering the distributaries, minors, and
watercourses, and even if there were, there is generally not sufficient escape capacity to handle the very high
discharges that would result if water is not taken in the distributaries. Hence, timely decisions to reduce
diversions into the irrigation canals, is a critical part of the overall response to heavy rain and flood risk
management.

May 2005

24

Table 4. Earlier Salinity Measurements in the Tidal Link Area (mS/cm)

Location
Mehro Dhand
Sanhro Dhand
Cholri Dhand
Pateji Dhand
Tidal Link channel
Rann of Kutch
Shah Samando Creek
Open Sea

1983-89

Jan-Feb 1997

4.3-12

1.5-8.7

4-15
15-77
15-80
NA
5.5-80
5.5-?
54

1.7-11.8
7.7-20
18-38
10-25
15-170
NA
54

Surface Water Salinity in Dhands


Area

50

45

Salinity
(ppt)
40

35

30
Salinity (ppt) January 2001
Salinity (ppt) January 2002
Salinity (ppt) December 2002
Salinity (ppt) December 2003

25

20
1

1
1

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

35

Dhand
Stations

Figure 9. Salinity evolution in Dhands area (NOI, 2004)

42.

Only Pateji Dhand had persistently high salinity in both the 1980s and in 1997,
and the NIO data indicates that that is also the case today. The hyper-salinity of the
Rann of Kutch is remarkable, and indicates that it may be influencing salinity in the
Tidal Link and the dhands where it flows through the existing breaches in the Tidal
Link Canal left bank. Comparison of the above table with Figures 7 & 9 demonstrates
clearly the substantial increase in salinity throughout the dhands since 1997. Up to
1997 at least, salinity conditions remained very favorable for the basically brackish or
estuarine ecosystem that had developed over the years in the dhands. At present,
salinity conditions range from those typical for sea water to the hyper-saline Pateji
Dhand (Figure 7). The anecdotal evidence seems to conflict over whether the dhand
surface area has shrunk, or the depth has substantially decreased because of the direct
connection between Cholri Dhand and the Tidal Link. Other than the obvious intrusion
May 2005

25

of sea water into Cholri Dhand, it is therefore difficult to say what the primary causes
are of this drastic change in salinity. But the effects are evident: a major decrease in
birds and waterfowl, absence of the distinctive vegetation and other fauna that existed
in the shallower areas of the dhands, and a major decrease in the yield specie
composition of the fishery.
43.

Changes in the number of birds in the two Ramsar sites located in Sanhro
Dhand (Jubho Lagoon) and Mehro Dhand (Nurri Lagoon) respectively as recorded by
the Sindh Wildlife Department (SWD) in their annual census is summarized in Table 5.
Little or no trend is indicated by the Nurri Lagoon data but the data for Jubho Lagoon
shows a substantial decline. The total combined number of birds in the two adjacent
and inter-connected lagoons also shows a substantial decline of about 46% between
1990 and 2002.
Table 5. Number of Birds Recorded in the Annual Waterfowl Census by SWD16
Year
1990
2001
2002

Jubho Lagoon
68,548
24,448
13,712

Nurri Lagoon
71,335
43,115
50,997

44.

The analytical problem is that there is not sufficient data to understand the
current water balance of the dhands in terms of both water quantity and water quality,
and hence to determine what are the primary causes of these changes and how any
imbalances could be corrected or their effects mitigated. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the flow in the two major Kotri drains that discharge into Sanhro and Mehro
Dhands, the Karo and Fulelli drains respectively, have greatly diminished because of
the shortage of irrigation water but there is no measured data to support this. The
mission observed very heavy pollution in the Karo Gungro drain reported to be caused
by wastewater discharges from sugar mills and towns in the sub-basin (though piped
sewerage system coverage in area is thought to be very low). The 1998 LBOD Stage I
Project EMMP Report compared water quality data collected by LBOD drains in 1994
for sugar factory effluent with similar data at two points along KPOD. This
comparison is shown in the Table 6. KPOD used to discharge into the more isolated
Pateji Dhand but this source of brackish water has been diverted into the Tidal Link. It
seems from the available data therefore, that the major influences on the water quantity
and quality balance has shifted to evapotranspiration (ET) and sea water intrusion with
a consequent increase in overall salinity.

16

As shown in the Drainage Master Plan POE Report, Annex II, after Shahid Amjad and Samina Kidwai,
Freshwater, brackish water and coastal wetlands of Sindh: Status Paper, Karachi, NIO.

May 2005

26

Table 6. Selected Parameters from the Analysis of Sugar Factory and KPOD Effluent

Analysis

Sugar
Factory
Effluent
Dark brown
Pungent
6.4

Color
Odor
Ph
Electrical
Conductivity
480
(mS/cm)
Total Solids (mg/l)
142,000
Chemical Oxygen Demand
12,693
(COD) (mg/l)

KPOD Effluent
@ RD 84
Colorless
Odorless
7.6

KPOD Effluent
@ RD 21
Colorless
Odorless
7.4

685

624

396

5000

580

340

45.

Social perceptions of the LBOD system and the events of 2003. From the
perspective of most of the concerned stakeholders, LBOD did not fulfill expectations in
the lower Badin. Introducing the Districts Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and
Flood/Rain 2004-2005 it is said that Although Government has provided maximum
relief and other agencies have also substantially contributed. but area and population
affected is of such a large scale that people are still not satisfied.
46.

Fishermen and farmers interviewed at their villages vividly described the


succession of events in 2003 and alluded to the deterioration of the local livelihoods. A
vision for the future could be extracted from them, altogether with needs and demands
for relief and immediate support.
47.

To some extent the population in the area is accustomed to the impact of


climatic calamities but worrying increased because of uncontrolled floods in the future.
These communities are expecting more efficient and expeditious early warning,
preparedness and relief support.
48.

Fishermen are aware on the need for a strengthened organization concerning


access to resources and markets, and started a process in that direction. Employment,
basic services, better communication infrastructure, improved access to water in
agriculture are the longstanding needs in the perception of rural population in coastal
Badin.
49.

The impact from the heavy rains in 2003 seems to have galvanized the opinion
of an important part of the local population in Badin and the neighboring district of
Thatta. It is however evident that civil society concerns on the outfall structures
emerged pretty soon after the Tidal Link inception (i.e. Sindh Chamber of Agriculture
and Sindh Abadgar Board on 15/02/1996).
50.

The mission had the opportunity to receive a number of well articulated queries
from representatives of the civil society organizations active at district, provincial and
national level. Some of the expressions were in line with queries submitted to the
World Bank Inspection Panel. However some representatives of farmer groups also
informed the mission of the benefits derived from LBOD in both agricultural

May 2005

27

productivity and in the time the floods recede from their lands, which was usually 2
months while in the July 2003 storm it was only 10 to 15 days.
51.

A number of elected representatives at the level of Union Council and Nazims


presented extensively their views to the mission; elected representatives broadly
coincided on the need for de-linking the Tidal link and the KPOD drain, some of them
emphasized that local communities would not accept any further expansion of the
LBOD system to northern areas, nor they would permit any civil work at the disposal
level contrary to the natural flow of the run-off in the coastal plain. In general there is a
consensus in most of the proposals to discharge the LBOD storm drainage into the
former course of the DPOD.
52.

The mission noted that member farmers of the Area Water Board organized
under NDP enjoying credibility in the area and affected by the floods, underscored the
positive benefits of the LBOD Stage I Project in the agricultural sector as well as the
need to further improvements and corrections in the outfall structures. Other farmers
pointed out the lack of discipline and organization in some parts of the drainage
system that opened free course to the water in their plots cutting the drains, thus
originating an unexpected increase in the flow to the lower areas.
53.

President Musharraf stated in 2004 that [] people of Badin and Thatta had
suffered a lot because of the absence of the proper floodwater disposal system. [That]
the primary objective of LBOD system was to save the people of Sindh from adverse
effects of the extraordinary rains. [That] the people of Sindh have, therefore, lost faith
in LBOD. The President instructed the Army and WAPDA, SIDA and the IPD of
Sindh to start the implementation of the actions presented in Table 1. The President
visited the area shortly after the mission departed and personally stated the commitment
of the Government of Pakistans solution to the problems following detailed analysis
and recommendations from the concerned institutions at the federal and provincial
levels.
54.

The present institutional setup and its consequences.


Reflecting on its
discussion with a wide variety of stakeholders, the mission identified the following
issues: i) weaknesses in operation and maintenance of LBOD Stage I Project major
components, particularly but not exclusively at the outfall level; ii) need to improve the
structural and non structural components in the flood management arrangements at all
levels; iii) unexpected behavior of the drainage users, particularly farmers located in the
upper levels of the system that deteriorated the infrastructure and contributed, to an
additional and non expected run off; iv) insufficient arrangements concerning
preparedness and information in connection with flood rela ted disasters; and v)
insufficient arrangements to organize and implement the immediate relief activities.
55.

The mission concluded that the institutional arrangements and capacity to


address events such as the heavy rains that occurred in 2003 were not adequate and that
a number of institutional-related issues should be improved. The process of transfer of
operation and maintenance responsibilities from the central level to the provincial
SIDA should be completed, so as to reduce the risk of discontinuation of crucial

May 2005

28

activities and record valuable knowledge. It is important for the Province to reduce the
uncertainties in the availability of financial resources for the sector.
56.

Government is committed to solve the problems and has developed a series of


proposed remedies to the outfall structures referred in other parts of this report.
Officials are fully aware of the difficulties emerging from institutional weaknesses and
indicated the need for a rapid and efficient completion of the ongoing process of
devolution and decentralization, as well as strengthening the capacity for operation and
maintenance of the drainage system at all levels.

V. A R ESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE OBJECTIVES


57.

LBOD Stage I Project has had positive results in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, and
Nawabshah Districts, and in eastern Badin District. It has increased agricultural
production stimulating the development of agro- industries in the basin. However,
institutional weaknesses persist in the capacity of the system to perform efficiently
under storm events, including increased flood risk downstream in Badin District. There
are also impacts related to expansion of the area affected by tides and sea water (for
example, measured salinity at RD-30, Figure 6, just downstream of where KPOD joins
the Tidal Link varies between 40 and 50 ppt), and increased salinity in the Dhands
located in the Sindh portion of the Rann of Kutch (measured salinity in the Dhands,
Figure 7, varies from 35 to 68 ppt).
58.

The Dhands. Salinity has increased in the dhands (Figures 7 & 9). The open
connection between the Tidal Link and the dhands has introduced significant tidal
fluctuations at least in Cholri Weir, and caused the gradual silting of this Dhand. A
tidal creek type drainage network has developed where the erstwhile Cholri Weir was
located; facilitating rapid and excessive drainage of Cholri Dhand at low tide (it is not
known how far this effect extends into the dhands). The increased salinity of the
dhands is probably caused by a combination of decreased flows in some of the Kotri
drains (Kora and Fuleli) that flow into the Sanhro and Mehro Dhands, diversion to
KPOD (which collected the eastern Kotri drains and emptied into Pateji Dhand) into the
Tidal Link, and the inflow of some sea water through the open connection with the
Tidal Link. Evaporation may also be a more important part of the water balance of the
dhands than in previous times. The mission observed that the dhands may now be
under threat from pollution by sugar factories and other polluters upstream on the
drains that outfall into the dhands.
59.

Runoff from heavy rainfall. The storm drainage capacity was overwhelmed
during the July 2003 storms that occurred in the area. Subsurface drainage is now
improving the conditions and the sustainability of the irrigated agriculture of the LBOD
basin. But it presented major problems in parts of the LBOD basin and large areas of
the Kotri basin in Badin District in July 2003 due to a combination of factors: i) the
high intensity of the rainfall; ii) storm drainage of such magnitude was not considered
in the design of the drainage that was primarily constructed to manage subsurface
drainage flows; iii) inadequate operation of canal and drainage structures; iv)
May 2005

29

uncoordinated and lack of preparedness of institutions; v) lack of maintenance of


relevant structures; and vi) farmers behavior providing additional outlets to the drains.
60.

The Tidal Link Canal. The Tidal Link Canal, which constitutes the most
important part of the LBOD outfall has been submitted to higher stress than originally
expected, especially during the storm events of 94, 99 and 2003. Cholri weir and the
embankments of the Tidal Link failed and are at present in a state beyond repair. This
failure was partly due to design issues and the magnitude of the storm flows being well
beyond the design parameters and criteria. The end result is a completely changed
outfall condition leading to a process that is forming a new estuary configuration. This
ongoing process has widened and deepened the Tidal Link sections and increased the
tidal fluctuations and the penetration of sea water much farther upstream in the Tidal
Link Canal than was thought to be possible at the time it was designed. This process is
still active and evolving, and appears to be moving upstream into KPOD.
61.

The challenges ahead. The problem today is to define near term and long-term
effective and cost efficient alternatives that contribute to meeting the following
objectives:

Diminish the flood risk of the lower basin in Badin District area for villages and
agricultural land,

Ensure that local officials are prepared to act locally in a coordinated, effective
and timely manner in case of an extreme event like the one in July 2003, to
diminish economic losses and prevent loss of life of the local population

Contribute to improved livelihoods in the lower Basin District.

Improve the safety and security of the LBOD drainage system

Improve the capacity of Dhoro Puran (DPOD) to act as an effective component


of the LBOD system,

Limit sea water intrusion and tidal fluctuations in the Kotri drains along KPOD,
and within KPOD itself

Restore salinity conditions and limit the influence of tidal fluctuations and
sediment accumulation in the Dhands

Control the estuary development process in the outfall and limit its adverse
effects.

May 2005

30

VI. D EVELOPING A STRATEGY


62.

Summary of the options available. The mission recommends a combination of


hard structural measures and institutional soft actions to address the objectives
described in paragraph 60. Most of the agencies concerned with some aspect of LBOD
drains and the Tidal Link have undertaken missions to examine the conditions on the
ground, and have made proposals, including so called immediate measures, to alleviate
the situation. A comprehensive strategy or plan to solve the current problems has not
yet been prepared, particularly a plan that would respond the wide range of challenges
and objectives outlined in the previous chapter.
63.

Structural options . To facilitate discussion of the structural options presently


available, Map 2 shows a schematic diagram of the LBOD outfall system including the
basic elements of the system and the various options.
A Regulating structure at the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link.
Nearly everyone has a strong feeling that measures should be taken to prevent tidal
fluctuations and sea water from entering KPOD. This would commonly be
accomplished by construction of a gated regulator across KPOD. At high tide in the
Tidal Link the gates would be closed to prevent intrus ion into KPOD. At low tide, the
gates would be opened to allow the water in KPOD to flow downstream into the Tidal
Link Canal. There are several considerations and issues that cast doubt on the viability
of this option. First, a very large structure with many gates would be needed. The two
abutments of the structure in this area appear to the mission to be weak with a
significant risk that KPOD could erode a path around the structure. Second, the gates
of such a structure would have to be operated with discipline for it to be both safe and
effective, and present experience in Sindh suggests that this may not be possible.
Third, measured data are not available as yet to show what the tidal amplitude and
salinity are in the lower reaches of KPOD, and hence whether a structure is really
needed and would provide substantial benefit commensurate with the high cost of such
a structure. The mission believes that if further data collection and analysis
demonstrates the need and value of such a structure, that it should be locate well
upstream of the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link Canal.
B & C Control structures at the bifurcation of the Spinal Drain.
An uncontrolled weir was built in the Dhoro Link in the left bank of the Spinal drain
where it meets KPOD. The purpose of this structure was to allow a substantial portion
of LBOD peak flows (2000 cfs out of 4600cfs) to be diverted through the Dhoro Link
to the old Dhoro Puran River (referred to as DPOD) and thence to Shakoor Dhand 17 .
As an immediate measure the weir crest has been lowered 2.5 ft, and the capacity of the
Dhoro Link increased, to facilitate the diversion of a larger percentage of the peak flow
17

In the LBOD design this was referred to as the diversion of freshwater (storm runoff) flowing in LBOD.
However one would expect the flow (saline agricultural drainage water (baseflow) and storm runoff) to be
completely mixed by the time it reaches the diversion point, though the resulting salinity of the flow would
certainly be lower than the baseflow. The design was based on the operating assumption that the flow from all
tubewells and tile drains would be stopped during a storm..

May 2005

31

of the Spinal Drain. The mission believes that the critical factor in the safety and
security of the LBOD outfall system is the maximum discharge in KPOD, and that this
should not exceed 5-6,000 cfs. Presently there is no data that would support assuming
that a flow greater than about 2000 cfs can be diverted through the Dhoro Puran Link
because of the downstream water levels in Shakoor Dhand and the condition of the
Dhoro Puran River. Hence the maximum allowable flow in the Spinal Drain under
these conditions would be about 7-8,000 cfs. If because of excess storm runoff
upstream in the LBOD basin, the flow would be higher than this limit, escapes must be
built into the left bank of the Spinal drain to reduce the discharge. These escaped flows
could be routed to the upper portion of the ancient Dhoro Puran River so long as the
tailwater conditio ns of the Dhoro Puran Link were not worsened. The point where the
Spinal Drain bifurcates is clearly a critical point in the LBOD outfall system. The
mission believes that two gated structures are needed to ensure operating flexibility and
the safety of KPOD. The first structure (B) would be located downstream of the
bifurcation within the KPOD channel to enable strict control of the discharge in KPOD.
The second structure (C) would be a gated structure in the Dhoro Puron Link
replacing the present uncontrolled weir. The combination of these two control structure
would provide maximum operating flexibility and control of LBOD flows. For
example, not only would gated structure B ensure that the maximum flow in KPOD
was below the limit, but at non peak times, the gates would permit significant flows to
be sustained in the Dhoro Link helping to resuscitate the ancient Dhoro River and
possibly improve groundwater and drinking water supplies in that area (flow
simulations would need to be carried out and detailed water quality data would have to
be available and analyzed to consider this possibility). Provision of uncontrolled
escapes in the KPOD left bank, in addition to those mentioned above for the Spinal
Drain, would enhance the safety of KPOD. In both the Spinal Drain and KPOD, the
height of the top of the right bank must be at least 22 ft based on the missions estimate
of the water surface profile at the point where the flow bifurcates18 . This right bank
must also be strengthened and all zones and points of weakness eliminated, especially
around existing structures where drains enter the main canals.
D & E Measure to protect the Kotri Drains. The intrusion of tidal
fluctuations and saline water into the small Kotri drains that flow into KPOD is a major
concern of farmers in the eastern portion of Badin District (mainly in the Left Bank
Canal sub-basin). Suggestions have been made to provide small gated regulators or
tide gates near each of these drain inlets to prevent back flow into the drain at high tide
in KPOD. Escapes could also be constructed in Seerani drain to divert water into the

18

A preliminary estimation of water levels at DPOD and KPOD/Tidal Link channels was done using
the HEC/RAS program from the US Corps of Engineers. The level at the DPOD/KPOD bifurcation
was calculated assuming a common tide level at the discharge of both channels. Results suggest an
embankments level of about 22 ft around the fork. It should be noted that this is only a crude
estimation of the levels, due to the fact that no topographical information in the zone around Dhoro
Dhand, data on the precise conditions at the outfalls and the discharge coming from upstream at the
Dhoro Puran old river course was available. Also, discharge into Cholri and Pategi Dhands was not
taken into account.

May 2005

32

waste land that separates this drain from the dhands in order to control the water level
in these drains. The same approach might also be an attractive option in some of the
other Kotri drains that outfall into KPOD if they are threatened by high water levels and
there is similar waste land available. So far there is no data available to the mission
that tidal fluctuations or sea water intrusion is a problem in the lower parts of these
drains. If new data showed that the penetration of tidal fluctuations and sea water
actually causes harm, then such structures may be a viable option. However there is
another option. The mission noted that one of the main causes of increased salinity in
the Dhands is the reduction of drain inflow, caused in part by the prolonged drought in
the Indus River basin and the consequent reduction in the availability of irrigation
water. Before the LBOD outfall system was constructed KPOD acted as a collector
drain and carried these drain flows into Pateji Dhand. Diversion of the Kotri drains
that enter (or all of them as before) towards Pateji Dhand, and possibly Mehro Dhand,
would, if the salinity of these drains is generally lower than the present salinity of the
Dhands, contribute significantly to their improvement. A sound analysis is needed to
insure that this action will not evolve in the formation of a new creek.
F - Control of Tidal Link access to the Dhands. One of the most
important and complicated problems arises because of the open connection between the
Tidal Link Canal and the Dhands created when Cholri Weir was destroyed. The
mission believes that reconstruction of the Cholri Weir, even based on a new design,
should not be considered at this time in part because of the still active scour and erosion
processes ongoing in the Tidal Link. Recent remote sensing studies carried out by
SUPARCO on behalf of WAPDA suggest that the main effect of the open connectio n
appears to be the sedimentation of Cholri Dhand and the formation of a tidal creek
within this dhand that facilitates its rapid drainage at low tide. No data or evidence has
so far come to light that these tidal and sediment effects have extended further into
Sanhro and Mehro Dhands where two Ramsar sites exist (Pateji Dhands is isolated
from the other three dhands by low silt barriers). Not enough is known about the
overall water and salinity balance of the dhands to say at this point which are the
dominate causes of the high salinity although it seems sure that sea water intrusion
from the Tidal Link has contributed significantly. Nor can one say for sure whether
recovery of normal drain flows from Karo and Fuleli drains combined with restoration
of the inflow from the other Kotri drains would be sufficient to lower salinity in Sanhro
and Mehro Dhands to levels similar to the past when it was a highly productive fishery
and good waterfowl habitat. Those conditions were more brackish or estuarine with a
maximum salinity of 20 ppt and a significant salinity gradient.
Other Possible options to conserve and improve the dhand ecosystems.
The mission discussed a number alternative measures that might contribute to the
recovery of the dhands.

One obvious option is to construct a low embankment or bund separating Cholri


Dhand from Sanhro Dhand. The viability of this option might be questioned
because of the likelihood of severe wave erosion, but low cost measures might
be formulated to adequately protect the embankment. However, this option
should be viewed as a serious step because it cuts off all opportunity for water

May 2005

33

to circulate between the dhands and it prevents the recruitment of juvenile fish,
shrimp and other fauna. Moreover this option should not be chosen until the
dynamic water balance and patterns of water movement within the dhand
system are well known and a verified model of these dynamics can be used to
assess the feasibility and impact of this option.

19

Second, most experts and the mission agree that increased flow of brackish,
relatively low salinity water into the dhands is the best restoration strategy
assuming this would shift the water and salt balance toward a lower salinity
environment, something that can be determined by a comprehensive monitoring
program designed to provide the data needed to analyze the dynamic water
quantity and quality balance in the dhands. At present studies have begun to
provide data and analysis to support ongoing negotiations concerning the
allocation of Indus River flow to the Indus River and delta below Kotri Barrage.
Should these negotiations prove successful from Sindhs perspective, a
percentage of the flow available should be diverted into the Kotri canals and
drains to the dhands. This would likely have a significant impact on the
restoration process.

Third, experts suggested to the mission a number of non-structural natural


measures that might attenuate the influence of the Tidal Link on the dhands and
in particular slow or stop its progression beyond Cho lri Dhand. A belt of
mangroves generally along in the alignment where Cholri Dhand joins Sanhro
Dhand has been suggested as a way of trapping sediment and attenuating any
tidal pulses or effects that might enter Sanhro Dhand. However, past attempts
to establish extensive mangrove belts or forests in this area of the coastal zone
have not been successful probably because of the soils (they are reported to be
flourishing in the area of Shah Samando Creek though over harvested by local
people). A third possibility is to try to establish appropriate specie of reeds and
other grasses that are well adapted to the prevailing salinities in the shallow
silted area between Cholri and Sanhro Dhands. Such a reed and grass belt would
behave much like a constructed wetland 19 filtering both sediments , pollutants
and nutrients moving from Cholri Dhand to Sanhro Dhand. Care would have to
be taken to not prevent the recruitment of fish fry and young shrimps from the
Tidal Link or the movement of breeding fishes toward the delta and the marine
environment. If the dhands were to begin a slow recovery initiatives would
have to be undertaken to organize fisherman and provide training and awareness

Constructed wetlands have not been tried in Pakistan as a low cost method of treating wastewater or
polluted water. This method possibly combined with other low cost methods should be piloted as a
way of treating the agricultural drainage water (if this would improve the viability of an option such
as diverting LBOD flows into parts of the Rann of Kutch) and in particular, as a method of treating
sugar factory and other wastewater discharges to the drains that threaten the dhands. Global
experience with constructed wetlands and other low cost wastewater treatment options has greatly
increased in recent years, and Pakistan could benefit from this experience since its experience with
command and control regulatory approaches have been unsuccessful.

May 2005

34

to stimulate their management of the fishery by preventing over- fishing and use
of fine mesh nets that take excessive quantities of young fish and shrimp.

The mission believes that for the time being the best strategy is to ensure
increased flow of brackish water into the dhands from the Kotri drains including
the diversion of those drains that currently flow into KPOD, and to intensify the
monitoring of water levels, tides, sediment, bathometry, salinity and drain flows
in the Dhands to improve the understanding of the water balance and to detect
any negative trends that emerge in order to formulate mitigation measures.

64.

Institutional Actions common to all infrastructure alternative options.


Regardless which combination of physical options are selected from possibilities
described above, there are a number of critical institutional actions and steps that must
be taken in all cases. These include:

Prepare a flood management plan including: a forecasting and awareness


system, operation program for canal and drain structures during heavy
precipitation events and a contingency plan to assist local population in case of
an emergency.

Review the design of the system for storm drainage and construct the entrances
to the drains, synthesize the hydrographs at relevant points and review
capacities in critical spots. Introduce a sound storm design analysis using
appropriate models calibrated with past events including the July 2003 storms.

Study the structures to modify present trend and diminish the flood risk to lower
Basin villages and farmers. Consider the natural drainage pattern and the long
evolution of the system at feasibility stage.

Monitor, analyze the data, and learn.

Define a responsible agency with resources (expertise, funds and equipment)


and power to deal with O&M of main drains and outfall.

VII. R ECOMMENDED STRATEGY


65.

Finding a sustainable solution.


The Government of Sindh with Federal
assistance is implementing actions to rehabilitate the system and to solve some of the
problems. In particular; an embankment is under construction to protect low
agricultural land around the dhands, measures to protect some embankments in KPOD
and the Kotri drains are being implemented, and repairs are being made to gates in
outlet structures. There is also progress in preparing plans for the evacuation in case of
floods as well as compensation of persons affected by the 2003 floods.

May 2005

35

66.

However a more consistent and well-defined strategy is needed in order to cost


efficiently and effectively improve the present condition and performance of the
system.
The mission recommends that the Government:

Adopt an adaptive approach that emphasizes learning by doing,

Prioritize actions according to cost efficient solutions,

Encourage peoples participation,

Carefully apply sound engineering practice,

Undertake more coordinated efforts among all agencies,

Provide clear definition of responsibilities, authority and accountabilities,


and

Strengthen coordinated international cooperation.

Learning by doing. The monitoring program is essential to have a final tidal


and drainage system that can work according to the identified objectives. The costal
environment has proven to be a complex and difficult environment with interactions of:
tidal fluctuations, density gradients, sediment transport and a highly variable stream
flow in the rainy season. For example, equilibrium conditions for the new estuary that
is now developing and for the present trend or ultimate result of connections between
the Tidal Link and the dhands are extremely difficult to understand and forecast,
especially with the information now available to the mission. Recent experience shows
that the structures are subject to: wave action, high water velocities and tidal currents
that made them fail soon after their completion. An adaptive approach is therefore
recommended in order to learn at the same time the structures are built. Recording
rainfall, water levels and discharges during floods can give more information about the
real hydrographs along the drains. The mission recognized the efforts of the
Government in getting information through the NIO, but the effort was discontinued
since June 2004.
Cost effective solutions need to be implemented by assigning priorities to
investments considering costs and economic and social and environmental benefits of
the related actions. During the visit to the lower Badin area the mission observed the
works being done to protect the low lands around the Shanro and Mahro dhands and the
stone pitching being installed to protect the right embankment at the end of the Seerani
drain near to KPOD. These works have high investments cost compared with the value
of the property they are trying to protect. An approach is needed to carefully evaluate
priorities, propose schemes and designs, and make the right decisions about the most
efficient allocation of scarce resources and available funds.

May 2005

36

Peoples participation needs to be stimulated in order to find better solutions


and to induce the cooperation of local authorities and population in the operation of the
system, particularly during high intensity rains and floods. At present there are
uncertainties and anxieties due to the experience during the 2003 flood. In the past,
people did not substantively participate in the design of the project according to their
perceptions, which in turn, were not reflected in the design of LBOD drains. A special
program including a multi-dimensional communications strategy with the participation
of provincial and local authorities is key to have sustainable solutions to the problems
in the system.
Sound engineering practice. Failure of flood control dikes and structures are
dangerous events that can cause extensive damages and losses. Design and construction
need to endure under adverse conditions. The mission was concerned that some of the
remedial civil works under construction by the Government, be subject to more careful
review and supervision; e.g. building an embankment circling the dhands to control
flooding, construction of roads in the lower flats and considering a different type of
gates to control sea water intrusion into the drains.
Coordinated effort needs to be fostered. There are a number of organizations
that need to interact in order to have a balanced project according to the objectives
identified in Chapter V. An important effort by Sindh Government is now underway to
increase coordination among all stakeholders but there is still a long way to go in order
to insure a correct design and effective operation of the system.
Definition of responsibilities and authorities within the framework of the
irrigation institutional reform is needed. At present there is not a clear allocation of
responsibilities and accountabilities of the different organizations acting in the sector.
GoS has made progress in the institutional reform to improve irrigation efficiency and
increase user participation in O&M of the system. SIDA, the AWBs and the FOs are
being formed, but budgets for O&M are not allocated and the abiana collected by FOs
are not been used to improve the irrigation service. In case of heavy rains a
contingency plan needs to be implemented including the control of the discharges of the
barrages and main canals in a real time basis.
International cooperation. Pakistan has established strong links with donors,
NGOs and other international organizations, and the case of LBOD Stage I Project is an
important example. Establishing partnerships with international organizations,
including environmental organizations could contribute to bring the necessary expertise
and funding for the implementation of the actions the mission is recommending. It is
suggested that the necessary studies to resolve the outfall problems of LBOD be part of
the DMP and Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project.
67.

Improving livelihoods in the Badin District. The project proposal for


improving the livelihoods of people in Thatta and Badin Districts, discussed earlier
would promote: i) better access to basic services; ii) higher income generation through
improved production and marketing of saline agricultural crops, fisheries and livestock;
iii) secure access to and better management of natural resources; iv) viable community
organization; v) improved access to education, information, training and better nutrition
May 2005

37

and health. The Mission agrees with the proposal under preparation in the sense that
looking beyond the immediate and medium term problems and their possible
solutions, what appears to be a logical and sustainable proposition is integration of
coastal communities with the rest of the economy. In particular, the POE agrees that
integrating the coastal econo my with the developed areas of the province would be the
way to address the problem in the long run.
68.

Operation and maintenance. The mission recommends to support SIDA to


finalize, as soon as possible, the process of transfer of LBOD Stage I Project operation
and maintenance related responsibilities form WAPDA, and to activate organizational
arrangements as needed. Maintenance and operation activities in SIDA are to be
performed, when necessary, within a collaborative framework at the level of AWBs and
other organizations involved in the management of water resources at the district and
Nazim levels. For instance, as indicated by the existing regulations, Drainage
Beneficiary Groups dully established could help operation, management, improvement
and rehabilitation of the drainage system. Financial resources need to be allocated to
SIDA so as to cover LBOD Stage I Project O&M annual requirements.
69.

Crisis management unit. The unit should be established and empowered to


provide a coordinated timely response to the concerns emerging from the consequences
of the 2003 floods and similar future events, with the aim of reducing the impacts from
floods in the area served by LBOD system. The unit would be responsible for the
preparation, updating and implementation of a Flood management program and for
organizing and supporting the local development of preparedness and response plans,
and effective warning system, and the requisite training and awareness building at all
levels.
70.

Amongst the main issues and actions to be considered by the Crisis


management unit, would be:

Disaster management policy and planning (with special reference to


contingency plans),

District-specific hazard and vulnerability mapping,

Linking disaster management plans and strategies with periodical


development planning aiming at disaster preparedness at village, Nazim and
district level,

Local-specific disaster preparedness and response plans,

Integrated disaster preparedness planning at the district level,

Promotion of collaborative arrangements between government line


departments, local institutions, NGOs, media and at-risk communities for
coordinated and supplementary counter-disaster measures,

May 2005

38

Promotion of community level groups to address disaster preparedness and


relief related activities, and

Promote training for communities and local officials and organizations in


risk areas, NGOs, and in line departments at Nazim, District and provincial
levels to build the disaster response capacity.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS


71.

The present conditions of the outfall system do not provide the hydrological,
environmental and social functions that were originally considered at the design phase.
The LBOD- KPOD can now be described as a new river that is forming an estuary
and is an integral part of creek formation into the coastal area. The Tidal Link has
invited the sea to approach the land and now the tidal fluctuations are visible in the
KPOD. This process will continue, and its progress is difficult to predict. Adapting to
this new process requires continuous hydraulic and environmental monitoring in
learning by doing approach.
72.

The mission believes that the present actions taken by the Government, namely
repairs to parts of the drainage system and lowering the DPOD weir, are considered
appropriate for those site conditions, but do not constitute a comprehensive and
sustainable solution to the problems. The concept of preventing the intrusion of the sea
and tidal influence through the reinforcement of the left bank of the Seerani Drain
should be further analyzed. The proposal to build an embankment encircling the Sindh
dhands should be abandoned. Also the idea of building a gated structure in the KPOD
close to the Tidal Link should be carefully evaluated considering previous experience.
73.

The proposal to extend the drainage system by studying LBOD Stage II & III in
light of the present outfall conditions of LBOD Stage I should be postponed until the
existing problems at the outfall are adequately address and solved. Moreover, the
strategy to manage the storm drainage in the upper basin needs to be organized and
tested.
This approach would avoid aggravating or increasing social unrest,
vulnerability and anxiety in the Badin District that might result from a decision to go
ahead with these premature studies at a time when people participation is most needed.
In any case, a hypothetical implementation of LBOD Stage II or III would imply
increases in the capacity of the present system.
74.

Objectives for performance of the LBOD outfall. Under the strategic approach
described in Chapter VII, the Mission identifies the following objectives that the outfall
should achieve in the a long term:

Secure the drainage benefits of LBOD

Reduce the flood risk in Badin District

Control the sea intrusion in the lower part of the existing drains

May 2005

39

Restore the conditions of the dhands or mitigate the present damages

Control the evolution of the estuary at the outfall and limit its adverse
effects

Improve the livelihoods of the population in lower Badin

Strength the institutional capacity for preparedness in case of emergencies

75.

Recommended actions by the Government of Sindh. In view of the mission


estimate that a 24 hrs storm event similar to that experienced in July 2003 has a 56%
probability of occurring in a five- year period. The mission recommends to initiate
without further delay the implementation of the institutional and structural following
proposed actions:
Develop and agree in a Flood Management Plan to compliment the emergency
contingency plan proposed by the Badin DCO;
Postpone the implementation of LBOD II and III unless and until the existing
problems with the sustainability and performance of the outfall are solved;
Establish a professional O&M program for the main drains and outfall system;
Implement and adequately fund the World Banks proposed concept for a the
livelihoods relief and improvement program;
Re-design the outfall system, considering the alternative proposals identified by
the mission to reduce the flood risk problems and the impact of the discharge of saline
effluent:

Reinforcement of the LBOD right embankment, and the construction of


escapes from the left bank of the Spinal Drain and KPOD in the
direction of the Thal using to the extent possible the ancient Dhoro
Puran river bed. Install flap-gates in the drains discharging into LBOD
drain.

Diversion of the Seerani drain and other Kotri drains into the dhands.

Possible connection of the Pateji and Mhero dhands

Construct a gated structure at the DPOD and KPOD to control the flows
in both directions.

Analyze the location of the tidal control structure in the KPOD and
possible control structures in the drains.

76.

Given the complexity of the system and its present evolution and dynamics, the
proposed physical interventions require continuous monitoring as a part of the learning
May 2005

40

by doing process, and the collection of data essential for adequate analysis of problems
and options. The following table illustrates the problems and proposed infrastructure
hard actions. The options mentioned in the table below are also shown in schematic
diagram of the LBOD outlet system in Map 2.

SEASON
STRUCTURE
DRY SEASON

OUTFALL

PROBLEMS
AND ISSUES

RAINY & STORMY

Drainage - Cholri
Pateji dhands

and Tidal Link and creeks

Salinity - Mehro
Sanhro dhands

and

Options

Divert Seerani & other Monitor


drains to dhands
action

PROBLEMS
AND ISSUES

TIDAL FLUCTUATION

before

taking

Flood risk

Sea water intrusion


DPOD structure
Tidal
structure
location)

DRAINS
OPTIONS

(study KPOD structure

Spinal Drain and KPOD


Right bank; escapes in
Structure in drains (flap left bank; structures in
gated)
drains
Dhoro Puran revival

May 2005

41

IX. N EXT STEPS .


77.

During the final meeting of the mission with the Sindh Minister of Irrigation
and Power Sindh, the mission was able to discuss the next steps that the Government of
Sindh could consider. These included:
Discuss, agree and approve the proposed strategy among the concerned
agencies at the Federal and Provincial levels.
Funding. Considering the long lasting relations of the World Bank with the
Sindh Province and the advanced status of preparation of WSIP 20 , it could be possible
to include the proposed monitoring actions, studies and investigations, designs and
capacity building initiatives identified by the mission in this project. The Government
of Sindh could consider this possible funding or decide among other alternatives and
include its final choice in the Provincial Budget.
An immediate action that can be taken is to extend the SMO monitoring
contract with NIO encompassing an expanded and well design program of data
collection and analysis in the Tidal Link, KPOD, the Rann of Kutch, Shakoor Dhand
and Dhoro Puran, and enter into agreements with IUCN and WWF along with
cooperating Sindh environmental agencies and universities to monitor and study the
affected ecosystems and wetlands in the dhands and Tidal Link area, including field
testing of mitigation measures in the dhands as discussed in Chapter VI.
The IPD needs to define TORs for feasibility studies and design of the
physical interventions proposed above. This step is critical to ensuring timely budget
approvals consistent with the results of feasibility studies;
Finally, a phased and detailed plan of implementation of the approved
actions needs to be organized.

20

Water Sector Improvement Project

May 2005

42

MAP 2 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LBOD OUTFALL


Alternative Measures

LBOD SPINAL DRAIN


Escapes
KOTRI DRAINS
(Karo & Fululi)

SINDH DHANDS
(Cholri, Pateji,
Sanhro &Mehro)

KOTRI DRAINS

Escape
s

Escapes

E Diversion

KPOD

F
SEA

DPOD
(Old Dhoro
Puran River)

A
TIDAL LINK

RANN OF KUTCH
SHANKOOR
DHAND

Map 3

May 2005

43

Map 4.

Map 5

May 2005

44

Map 6

May 2005

45

Annex 1. PERSONS MET BY THE MISSION

Mr. A. Sattar Hindaro, Director Engineering, NDP


Mr. Abdul Hameed Memon, Senior Engineer SMO South WAPDA
Mr. Abdul Haque, NDP Coordination Cell Sindh
Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Abro, Director Technical WAPDA
Mr. Abdul Qadir Qureshi, Superintendent Engineer, Electrification LBOD WAPDA
Mr. Adbul Rehman Mallah, Nazim Union Council Buhgra Memon
Mr. Aija Ahmed, Deputy Director General WWF Sindh
Mr. Aijaz Qureshi, SIDA
Mr. Akash Ansari, N.G..O. Badin
Mr. Akber Bajkani, Director Provincial Coordination Cell, WAPDA
Mr. Ali Mohammad Baloch, Managing Director, SIDA
Mr. Anwer Ali Baloch, Director (SMO) South WAPDA
Mr. Asghar Ali Halipota, Matli
Mr. Asif Chama, Nazim Union Council Khosk
Mr. Aslam Rahoo, Golarchi
Mr. Aslam Rahu, Taulka Nazim Shahced Fazil Rahu
Mr. Bahadur Khan Lund, Abadgar Badin
Ms. Constance A. Bernard. World Bank.
Mr. Fida Hussain Mandro, Nazim Union Council Seerani
Mr. Ghulam Hyder Qureshi, Deputy Director NDP Sindh
Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Abro, Deputy Director Engineering NDP
Mr. Ghulam Qadir Shah, Conservation Manager WWF Sindh
Mr. Habib Ursani, Deputy General Manager Operation, SIDA
Mr. Haji Abdul Ghafoor Nazamani, Chairman Abadgar Board Badin
Mr. Hazi Imayal, Nazim Union Council Thari
Mr. Jahen Khan Chandio, Union Council Kadhan
Mr. Khadim Ali Memon, Additional Secretary, IPM, Sindh
Mr. Khadim Hussain Talper, Save the Cost Action Committee
May 2005

46

Mr. M. A. Sohag, GM (Research and Development), SIDA


Mr. Mahd Issa Mahad, Nazim Union Council Badin III
Mr. Manuel Contijoch. World Bank. TTL NDP & WSIP
Mr. Mir Abdul Qadir Jilani, Badin
Mr. Mohammad Mithal Mallah, FisherFock Badin
Mr. Mohammad Suleman, Abadgar Board Badin
Mr. Mohd Ramzan, Nazim Union Council Lowari
Mr. Moula Bux Mirbahar, General Manager, Operation, SIDA
Mr. Moula Bux Mirbahar. GM (Operation), SIDA
Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Memon, General Secretary Abadgar Board Badin
Mr. Mukeem Ahmed Bhambro, SMO South WAPDA
Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Sohar, General Manager, Research and Development, SIDA
Mr. Musarrat Hussain Khawaja, Badin
Mr. Mushtaque Ali Sangi, Chief Engineer Water, WAPDA
Mr. Mussaral Khoja, Taulka Nazim Badin
Mr. Nazeer Ahmed Memon, Director Provincial Coordinator Cell, WAPDA
Mr. Nazeer Essani, SIDA
Mr. Noor Mohammad Baloch, Consultant
Mr. Pir Hamid Shah, Badin
Mr. Qasim Soomro, SDO, Left Bank Canal Area Water Board
Mr. Qazi Azmat Isa, World Bank. Islamabad Office
Mr. Raghib Abbas Shah, WAPDA
Mr. Riaz Ahmed, Special Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power
Mr. S. H. Niaz Rizvi, Principle Scientific Officer, National Institute of Oceanography
Mr. S. Muozzam Ali, S.R.O., National Institute of Oceanography
Mr. Sadiq Rajper, EDO Revenue Badin
Mr. Salahuddin Abbasi, XEN, Left Bank Canal Area Water Board
Mr. Sardar Kamal Khan, Zila Nazim Badin
Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister Irrigation and Power, Sindh
Mr. Syed Mumtaz Ali Shah, DCO Badin

May 2005

47

Mr. Tahir Qureshi, Director Coastal Programme of IUCN Sindh


Mr. Talpur, NGO Badin
Mr. Tekola Dejene, World Bank Office Islamabad.
Mr. Tufail Ahmed Abro, Assistant Director Operation, SIDA
Mr. Umer Farooq, Retd. Major Abadgar
Mr. Usman Qamar. World Bank Islamabad Office.
Mr. Zaffar Ali Shah, Vice President, Abadgar Board Badin
Ms. Medam Najma Junejo, Member District Council Badin
Ms. Samina Kidwai, Marine Biologist, National Institute of Oceanography

May 2005

48

Annex 2. REFERENCES
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, Terms of Reference for the Formulation of a Drainage Development and Water
Management Plan for Kotri Left Bank Drainage Basin
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ActionAid, National Drainage Program A Curse for Coastal Communities,
Islamabad, 2004
Arcadis BMB, Opinion on the Performance of the Surface Drainage System in Sindh
under Extreme Rainfall in July 2003
Asian Development Bank, Challenges in the Water Sector, a presentation at the
Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 2004
Asian Development Bank, Project Completion Report on the LBOD Project (Stage I),
2000
Delft Hydraulics under assignment by LBOD Consultants. Left Bank Outfall Drain.
Stage 1 project, Pre-design study for tidal link and outfall. 5. Final Report,
1989
District Badin, Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and Flood/Rain 2004-2005,
Badin, 2004
Government of West Pakistan, Irrigation and Power Department, Sukkur Zone. Flood
Drainage Project for Sanghar, Tharparkar & Hyderabad Districts. Project
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Haq, B.L., Milliman, J.D. Marine Geology and Oceanography of Arabian Sea and
Coastal Pakistan, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, 1984
Hussein, M. H., Inception Report Scoping Exercise and DiagnosticStudy on
Livelihood Improvemients in the Districts of Thatta and Badin in Sindh,
December 2004
ICID, The Dilemma in the Humid Tropics: Conflicts in Drainage Needs for Food
Production and the Environment, presentation, 2003
Imtiaz, A., Global Climatic Change and Pakistans Water Resources, w/d
Irrigation and Power Department, Sindh, Comments on Executive Summary Report
and Main Report of the Drainage Master Plan, Karachi, 2004
Irrigation and Power Department, Sindh, Presentation on LBOD, 2004
IUCN Pakistan, Environmental Degradation and Impacts on Livelihoods Sea
Intrusion- A Case Study, Karachi, 2003
IUCN, Sindh Programme Office, Status Paper on Agriculture in Sindh, w/d
Jaffrelot, Christophe, Le Pakistan, Fayard, Paris, 2000
May 2005

49

Junejo, S. A., Improving Water Resources Management in Pakistan, w/d


Kahlown, M. A. et al, Water Resources in Pakistan: Challenges and Future
Strategies, Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources, Islamabad, w/d
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Drainage Network, 1984
MacDonald and Partners in association with National Engineering Services Pakistan
and Associated Consulting Engineers ACE (MMP/NESPAK/ACE). LBOD
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the 1994 Monsoon, Final Report, 1994
MacDonald and Partners in association with National Engineering Services Pakistan
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Stage 1 Project, Review of the Morphology of the Tidal Link, 1995
Memon, A. A., Evaluation of Impacts on the Lower Indus River Basin due to
Upstream Water Storage and Diversion, Salt Lake City, 2004
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Ministry of Water and Power, Pakistan Water Sector Strategy, Islamabad, 2002
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Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 2004
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2002
National Institute of Oceanography. Annual Physical Monitoring Report, Karachi,
2004
Nizamani, Aifaz, et al, Population and Water Resources, w/d
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Country Director, March 2004

May 2005

50

SCARPS Monitoring (South) WAPDA. Physical Monitoring Left Bank Out Fall
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SIDA, IRC, Farmers Organization Brochure, Karachi, 2003
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Sindh Abadgar Board, LBODa Mega Project, but Failure!, Badin, w/d
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Land Ownership in the LBOD Project area: Implications for the Distribution
of Project Benefits, Jamshoro, 1991
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Islamabad, 1999
UNDP, Pakistan, National Human Development Report 2003, Islamabad, 2003
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and Tata Districts, Sindh, Pakistan, Islamabad, 2005 (draft)
May 2005

51

World Bank, Drainage for Gain, Washington, 2004


World Bank, Implementation completion report
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National Experts, Pakistan Drainage Master Plan, Panel Consultation,
Review Report, Delft, 2004

May 2005

52

Annex 3. PROGRAM FOR WORLD BANK MISSION

STUDIES IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF SINDH


(March 7, 2005 March 20, 2005)
Sunday 6 March, 2005
Mission assembles at Serena Hotel, Islamabad
Review of mission program and documents send to the Mission by
MCE
Monday 7 March, 2005
Mission meets at World Bank Office in Islamabad.
Usman Qamar, Tekola Dejene, Qazi Azmat Isa.
Internal Meetings and discussions.
Tuesday 8 March, 2005
1030
Meeting with Mr. Riaz Ahmed, Special Secretary, Ministry of Water and
Power and concerned WAPDA officials (Mr. Raghib Shah and other concerned with
LBOD). Initial discussion of the LBOD and the Tidal Link Outfall issues.
Venue: Ministry of Water & Power, Block A, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad, Tel:
9202335
1430

Meeting with Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Talpur, NGO (Actionaid)


Venue: World Bank Office

Wednesday March 9, 2005


AM

1330

Mission departs for Karachi. Stay at Marriott Hotel.

Meeting with Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister and Mr.

Ashfaq Memon, Secretary of Irrigation and Power Department


Venue: Tughlaq House, Karachi, Tel: 021/9211957
1500

May 2005

Meeting with Brig. Abdul Haque, NDP Coordination Cell and SIDA

53

Venue: National Drainage Program, Planning & Development


Department, Sindh Bureau of Statistics Building, Ch. Khaliquzzaman
Road, Block 8, Clifton, Karachi, Tel: 9205864-65
Thursday March 10, 2005
0930

Meeting with Dr. M.M. Rabbani, , Director General, National Institute of


Oceanography, ST-47, Block-1, Clifton, Karachi, Tel: 021/9251172-8 Dr.
Niaz Rizvi Principal Scientific Officer.

Friday March 11, 2005


AM

Mission travels to Hyderabad (transport requested to be arranged by SIDA/IPD


and WAPDA)

Accommodation: WAPDA Rest house in Hyderabad (GM Water South is requested


to kindly book five rooms at the Rest house).
Saturday March 12 - Tuesday March 15, 2005
Meetings with GM Water South WAPDA, SMO, MD SIDA, Chairman Area Water
Board, district Nazim of Badin, farmers, fishermen and other stakeholders (MD
SIDA is requested to kindly arrange)
Field visits to the LBOD, KPOD, DPOD, Seerani Drain, Tidal Link, Cholri Weir,
dhands (Ramsar sites) areas, Karo Gungro Outfall Drain and Point Zero. Visit to
Thatta District Kinjher Lake, Jamshakro Drain and outfall structure.
Meeting in Badin with Distric Nazim, DCO, Union Council Members of the Lower
Badin Area, NGOs, LB AWB. Ex Eng Left Bank CCA.
(WAPDA South and SIDA, and IPD to kindly arrange)
Mission returns to Karachi
Wednesday March 16 -, 2005
10:00

Meeting with NOI. Dr. Niaz Rizvi

12:00

Meeting with Additional Secretary IPD Khalid Memmon.

1300

Meeting with Dr. Abdul Latif Rao, IUCN Country Representative, 1Bath Island, Karachi, Tel: 5861540-3 and Ms Catherine Mackenzie.

14:00

Meeting with Mr. Ijaz Ahmed, Deputy Director General, WWF, Fortune
Center, Room 606, 6th Floor, Block-VI, PECHS, Shahra-e-Faisal, Main
Nursery, Karachi, Tel: 4544791 & 2

May 2005

54

Thursday March 17,2005


Mission prepares its report.
Friday March 18, 2005
12:00
Joint meeting with Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister for
Irrigation and Power Department, Additional Chief Secretary (Development),
Secretary IPD, MD SIDA, GM (Water) South WAPDA, DG EPA, and other
concerned officials: Mission presents its findings
Venue: Tughlaq House, Karachi, Tel: 021/9211957
Saturday March 19, 2005
10:00

Mission works in finalizing its report and pending activities.

Sunday March 20, 2005:

Mission departs Pakistan

Monday March 21- May 15. IMTA Initiate the study on Satellite interpretation of the
area and hydraulic modeling of the identify alternatives.

May 2005

55

ANNEX 4. Concepts in Tidal Link Design


Review of Channel -Design Concept.
Design Approach
The proposed channel design is based mainly on the three following criteria:
-

The tidal link must be designed as narrow as possible, with a limited hydraulic
capacity to prevent a strong tidal intrusion and to reduce the construction costs;

The tidal link must have sufficient drainage capacity to prevent backing up and
raising of upstream water levels;

The channel must possess a long-term shoaling tendency to prevent progressive


tidal intrusion over a period from years to decades.

The main threat for the feasibility of the tidal link is formed by the presence of the
northern dhands area. This area has an enormous potential storage volume and has to
remain free of tide induced water level variations. Therefore in the design it is
considered of primary importance to prevent long-term scouring (and the dander of
propagating tidal intrusion). This is affected by a relatively wide channel design with
slightly shoaling characteristics. This concept assures a long-term stable drainage
system without the necessity of artificial bottom or bank protection.
Outfall Location.
The proposed outfall location is the Shah Samando Creek near the junction of Jati
outfall drain (see also Figure 3). The choice is based on the shortest connection with the
KPOD in combination with a relatively large tidal creek having sufficient hydraulic
capacity such that the additional tidal volume created by the connection of the tidal link
increases the tidal volume of the existing creek only by an order of percents.
Longitudinal Section
An important criterion for the longitudinal channel slope is the minimum available
water depth of the channel entrance in the outfall area near RD-152. The available
water depth should be sufficient to prevent supercritical flow during any flow
conditions or tidal phase. The erosive velocities should be limited to prevent the
entrance from extensive widening by erosion. Initial erosion will enhance tidal motion
in the drainage system which results again in increasing tidal velocities.
In general it is to be preferred to maintain a constant longitudinal channel slope since
the sediment transport in stable channels is relatively sensitive to bed slope variations.
A stable channel is alluvial material is on in which scour of banks, and changes in
alignment do not occur. The degree of meandering is related to the ratio of natural
May 2005

56

ground level slope to channel bed slope. If this ratio is less than I, the chance of
meandering by scouring banks is negligible and sedimentation processes will prevail.
Regarding the foregoing the choice is made for a continuation of the remodeled KPOD
channel slope of 7,18.10-5 resulting in a bed level of 5.3 m- SPD (17.4 ft SPD) at RD152. This relatively steep slope is advantageous with respect to tidal damping and
necessary to minimize the possibility of meandering.
Channel Cross-section.
From the field survey in the tidal creek area it is found that local bank
erosion/instability can form a potential threat for the cross-sectional stability. For
cohesive banks and berms formed by the deposition of fine material, bank failure
occurs as a slip circle prompted by toe erosion. To reduce the perimeter of the slip
circle it is usual to design a relatively gentle bank slope of 1:3.
Furthermore it is essential in the design to link up with the geometrical characteristics
of the existing channels up and downstream of the tidal link. Generally the width/depth
ratio of a channel is related to the type of bottom material.
Since the soil samples of the creek area and the tidal link alignment show a high
percentage of silt and clay (70-80%), a relatively low width/depth ratio is required. The
cross-section of the smaller tidal creeks have a bed width/depth of 10-15 and have
remained stable for many years. The cross-section from the upstream part of the tidal
link (the remodeled KPOD) has a design width/depth ratio of approximately 20.
With a bed slope of 7,18.10-5 , a constant bed width of 28m (92ft) and side slopes 1:3,
the design width/depth ratio along the tidal link will gradually change from 20 to 11 in
downstream direction.
Southern Embankment.
Along the south side of the tidal link alignment a dike is included in the design with
sufficient height to isolate the Kotri drainage system and the northern dhands from high
storm flood levels from the Rann of Kutch.
In general the essential conditions governing dike construction are: A height adequate
to prevent overtopping, a base-width sufficient for protection against destructive
foundation seepage and a cross-section sufficiently massive for safety against the
massive movement of soil against a slip surface.
The seepage is minimized by the properties of the basic material of the dike, originating
from the tidal link dredge spoil. The cores of the dike are nearly impervious.
Attention has to be paid to failure of the dike slope caused by weathering of the top
layer. In non-monsoon season this top- layer will dray out, forming cracks in horizontal
May 2005

57

and vertical direction. The penetration depth of the depth is 1-2 m (3.3 6.6 ft). This
zone is obviously not impervious. The cracks form a network in the dike, allowing
seepage. Due to the seepage local sliding of the slope surface can occur. To minimize
chances of local sliding a slope of 1:3 is required.
For additional protection against the forementioned soil mechanical failures of the north
slope of the embankment, it is recommended to extend the reservation width from the
toe of the embankment until the beginning of the channel slope to a distance of about
10 times the dike height above local ground level. This criterion results in a maximum
reservation width of 50 m (160 ft) from the lower parts along the tidal link alignment.
The possibility of local channel bank failure, as discuss in paragraph 6.3 also requires
extra berm width. To protect the toe of the embankment against propagating bank
erosion, an overall berm width of 100 m (328 ft) is expected to be sufficient.
For a ground level of 0.00 SPD, the embankment will be:

Design water level of Rann of Kutch

2.65m + SPD

(+8.7 ft)

Consolidation dike

0.70m

( 2.2 ft)

Consolidation soil beneath dike

0.35m

( 1.2 ft)

Weathering of top layer of dike

1.50m

( 4.9 ft)

Expected sea level rise

0.20m

( 0.7 ft)

5.40m +SPD

(17.7 ft +SPD)

In the next figure three typical cross-sectional profiles are shown.

May 2005

58

Figure 10. Nidal Link ChannelTypical Cross-Sections

May 2005

59

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