B.

QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS

therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of

the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

2. Spouses Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la Hotel, G.R. 190601 (n)

RCPI v. Verchez, et al. enlightens:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie,
a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory
force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability
for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract
confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to
preserve the interests of the promissee that may include
his expectation interest, which is his interest in having the benefit
of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed, or his reliance
interest, which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused
by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made; or
his restitution interest, which is his interest in having restored to
him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed,
agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for
society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of
every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of
another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due
diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to
excuse him from his ensuing liability. (emphasis and underscoring
in the original; capitalization supplied)

2. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1996)

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it was a
breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of
third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment
under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not
ejected." And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train,
when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there
was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," and the Supreme Court of
South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper.
3. Singson v. BPI, G.R. L-24837
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or
quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have
repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his firstclass accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was
held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the
latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort".
4. PSBA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84693

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that
upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains

a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was
awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the
petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's
liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there
is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America
S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was
already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to
say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis
supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white
man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the
public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit
Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as
constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the
former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non of the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot
be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous
student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have
been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures
installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out
a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission
of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
5. Fabre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within the purview of Art.
2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral
damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross
negligence amounted to bad faith.
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not
stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory,
much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to
allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such
[23]
causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover
twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff
there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that
the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and
distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.
PARTIES; NATURE OF LIABILITY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS
1. Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But
such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of thespes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he
was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he

appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed
at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

be directly sued by a third party this will result in a violation of the

principles underlying solidary obligation and insurance contracts. (emphasis
supplied)
NEGLIGENCE
A. CONCEPT

2. Singapore Airlines Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107356

2. United States v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-10563

The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was the natural and probable
consequence of the separate tortious acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article
2176 of the Civil Code, Rayos is entitled to be compensated for such damages.
Inasmuch as the responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors, liable for a
quasi-delict is joint and several, and the sharing as between such solidary debtors is
pro-rata, it is but logical, fair, and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount
awarded to the Rayos spouses and already paid by SIA, instead of totally
indemnifying the latter.

But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his
engine, when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track,
unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot which
would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such person could not, or
would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may
properly be required of an engine driver under such circumstances is that he give
warning of his approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured
that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train.

5. Perena v. Zarate, G.R. No. 157917

Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to secure the
expeditious transportation of passengers and freight which the public interest
demands. If engine drivers were required to slow down or stop their trains every time
they see a pedestrian on or near the track of the railroad it might well become
impossible for them to maintain a reasonable rate of speed. As a result the general
traveling public would be exposed to great inconvenience and delay which may be,
and is readily avoided by requiring all persons approaching a railroad track, to take
reasonable precautions against danger from trains running at high speed.

As earlier stated, the Pereas, acting as a common carrier, were already presumed to
be negligent at the time of the accident because death had occurred to their
passenger. The presumption of negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the
burden of evidence on their shoulders to establish that they had not been
26
negligent. It was the law no less that required them to prove their observance of
extraordinary diligence in seeing to the safe and secure carriage of the passengers to
their destination. Until they did so in a credible manner, they stood to be held legally
responsible for the death of Aaron and thus to be held liable for all the natural
consequences of such death.
6. Vda. De Maglanoa v. Consolacion
However, we cannot agree that AFISCO is likewise solidarily liable with Destrajo.
In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the opportunity to
resolve the issue as to the nature of the liability of the insurer and the insured vis-avis the third party injured in an accident. We categorically ruled thus:

4. Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, G.R. No. L-29889

Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings,
the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their
guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A need,
therefore, exists for the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep such
devices in good condition and in working order, or to give notice that they are not
operating, since if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace.
5. Wright v. Manila Electric, G.R. No. 7760

While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity
against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the
insurer, however, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts
against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held
solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The
liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on
tort.
In the case at bar, petitioner as insurer of Sio Choy, is liable to respondent
Vallejos (the injured third party), but it cannot, as incorrectly held by the trial
court, be made "solidarily" liable with the two principal tortfeasors, namely
respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. For if petitioner-insurer
were solidarily liable with said, two (2) respondents by reason of the
indemnity contract against third party liability under which an insurer can

As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the
conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober
he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible
to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of
the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and
falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition;
and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen
while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
speculation and guesswork.
6. People v. De Los Santos, G.R. No. 131588

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised

Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his
degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should
have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing
the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own
testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward;
and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed
due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by
slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would
mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming
from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at
the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he
was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
7. Martinez v. Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage
were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he
had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he
had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which
they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time
and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the
horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day
of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the
day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive
or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a
time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by
society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen
and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or
injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense
militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima
facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which
the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff
before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the
injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.
8. Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 10073, 10074, 10075

Under this assignment the appellant's main effort is being to the demonstration of the
fact that there was a custom established among automobile drivers of Manila by
which they habitually drove their cars over railroad crossings in the manner in which
the automobile was driven by defendant's servant on the occasion in controversy. To
prove that custom counsel presents the evidence of the president of the defendant
company, Mr. Bachrach, who testified on the trial that all of his drivers, including the
one in charge of the car on the night of the accident, operated cars in that manner
and that it was the custom among automobile drivers generally. Counsel also cites
the testimony of the witness Palido, living near the scene of the accident, who
testified that, as a general rule, automobiles passed over the railroad crossing without
changing speed. This testimony was corroborated by the defendant company's driver
who had the automobile in charge at the time of the occurrence. Basing himself on
this alleged custom counsel contends that "When a person does what is usual and
customary, i. e., proceeds as he and others engaged in a like occupation have been
accustomed to proceed, the action cannot be characterized as reckless, nor, strictly
speaking as negligent." To this the obvious reply may be made, for the moment
admitting the existence of the custom, that a practice which is dangerous to human
life cannot ripen into a custom which will protect anyone who follows it. To go upon a
railroad crossing without making any effort to ascertain the approach of a train is so
hazardous an act and one so dangerous to life, that no one may be permitted to
excuse himself who does it, provided injury result. One who performs an act so
inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge behind the plea
that others have performed the same act safely.
14. Makati Shangri-La Hotel v. Harper, G.R. No. 189998
Premises Liability Rule
A premises liability lawsuit holds a property owner responsible for any damages
arising out of an injury on that person or entity's property. In all states, owners that
occupy a property must make a reasonable effort to maintain a safe environment for
visitors to it. Failure to keep the property safe for visitors results in "premises liability."
https://www.justia.com/injury/premises-liability/
15. Philippine National Bank v. Santos, G.R. 208293
Other industries, because of their nature, are bound by law to observe higher
standards of diligence. Common carriers, for example, must observe "extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of [their]
passengers" because it is considered a business affected with public interest.
"Extraordinary diligence" with respect to passenger safety is further qualified as
"carrying the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances."
Similar to common carriers, banking is a business that is impressed with public
interest. It affects economies and plays a significant role in businesses and
commerce. The public reposes its faith and confidence upon banks, such that "even
the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life's savings to the bank of
his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some
interest for him." This is why we have recognized the fiduciary nature of the banks'

functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for the exercise of their
functions.
16. Dela Torre v. Imbuido, G.R. No. 192973
Neighborhood Rule
"[M]edical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professionalwhich has caused bodily harm." In order to successfully pursue
such a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this case, "must prove that a health
care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient."
20. Isaac v. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc, G.R. No. L-9671
A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by
the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left
side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the
window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this
reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of
appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is
guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill
with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided
as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only
victim of the collision.

2. Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate court, 157 SCRA 1 (1988)

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of
the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do.
C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but
will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new
Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position
taken by appellant in this case.
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a
railroad voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any
other part of his body through the window of a moving car beyond the outer
edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact with
objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an
injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained. (10 C.
J. 1139)
Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes,
from his cigar, thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance
beyond the side line of the car to bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree
standing beside the track; the force of the blow breaking his wrist. Held, that
he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Malakia vs.
Rhode Island Co., 89 A., 337.)
B. NEGLIGENCE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE

1. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil 397

The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new
Civil Code. The first article provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done."
Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the second article, this
obligation is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. In addition, we may quote the following
authorities cited in the decision of the trial court:
"The rule is well settled that the owners of resorts to which people generally
are expressly or by implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary
care and prudence in the management and maintenance of such resorts, to
the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors" (Larkin vs. Saltair
Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac. 686).
"Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron,
resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the
fault of the patron, he is not, however, in any sense deemed to be the
insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his
premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any
presumption of negligence" (Bertalot vs. Kinnare. 72 Ill. App. 52, 22 A. L. R.

635; Flora vs. Bimini Water Co., 161 Cal. 495, 119 Pac. 661). Thus
in Bertalot vs. Kinnare, supra, it was held that there could be no recovery for
the death by drowning of a fifteen-year boy in defendant's natatorium, where
it appeared merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the shallow end
of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes later was discovered
unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all efforts to
resuscitate him being without avail.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we
find supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the
expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived
where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped
his forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was
stunned, and which to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have received
instructions in swimming. He knew, or have known that it was dangerous for him to
dive in that part of the pool."

D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
(1) RES IPSA LOQUITUR

(P200,000) as moral damages in favor of respondents and against petitioner is just

and equitable

10. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)

As the so-called captain of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that
those under him perform their task in the proper manner.

(1)(d) Statues and ordinances/administrative rules

5. Tison v. Spouses Pomasin, G.R. No. 173180
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited
from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers
license,i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land
Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8
which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded
therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.

5. Perla Campania de Seguros, Inc. v. Spouses Sarangaya, G.R. No. 147746

Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur
[18]
unless there is negligence. Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames
spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this
case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the
evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have
[19]
employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
8. Cantre v. Go, G.R. No. 160889
We note, however, that petitioner has served well as Noras obstetrician for her past
three successful deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for
damages due to negligence in the practice of her profession. The fact that petitioner
promptly took care of Noras wound before infection and other complications set in is
also indicative of petitioners good intentions. We also take note of the fact that Nora
was suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened, such that saving her
life became petitioners elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all
these could not justify negligence on the part of petitioner.
Hence, considering the specific circumstances in the instant case, we find no grave
abuse of discretion in the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Further, we rule that the Court of Appeals award of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the
mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist
between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be
proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole
or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling
in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligenceper se, arising
from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did
not attempt to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to
the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence
appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove
the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclists own liability.

IV. DEFENSES
A. PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY

3. Fernando v. Court of Appeals 208 SCRA 714

We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the
care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:

B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured,

and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant.

2. Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon, 452 SCRA 285

Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a
motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared
therein that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to
be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In Raynera,
the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own negligence in bumping the
rear of the trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as
he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer truck therein did
not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of
vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden
left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
C. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
4. Rodrigueza v. Manila Railroad Co.

V. Vicarious Liability
A. Parents and Guardians
3. Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if
we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and
the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house
stood upon this ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course;
and at any rate there is no proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the
railroad's property in the act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly
is that the company, upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving
the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have
been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the
defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed position, he
undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires
occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary
care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result
from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate
and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right
to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent man.

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

F. FORTUITOUS EVENT

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family.

1. Gotesco v. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18 (1992)

It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants
that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the

"ARTICLE
x

101.

Rules

regarding

civil

liability

in

certain

cases.

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages
is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor

transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the
absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto
of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage
has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property
in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil
liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

4. Jose v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 118441-42

Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence
[14]
of their employees. As held in Poblete v. Fabros:
[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of
the law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed
negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of
presumed negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent
superior, where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to
be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the last
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the
responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages
(12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond
with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by
a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family
Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility
of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33
For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall
apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
B. Owners and Managers of Enterprises/Employees
The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and
extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary
object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and control of the truck,
acted with fault or negligence. We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to
the injury since it safely and permanently installed the electricity post beside the
52
street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., we imputed vicarious
responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose barge rammed the bridge, also an
immovable and stationary object. In that case, we found it highly unusual for the
barge to hit the bridge which had adequate openings for the passage of water craft
unless Luzon Stevedoring Corp.s employee had acted with negligence.
The finding that Bautista acted withnegligence in driving the truck gives rise to the
application of paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the employer
vicariouslyliable for damages caused by his employees within the scope of their
assigned tasks. In the present case, Josefa avoids the application of this provision by
denying that Bautista was his employee at the time of the incident.
Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations
with Bautista in the absence of proof that his truck was used without authorization or
53
that it was stolen when the accident occurred. In quasi-delict cases, the registered
54
owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. The
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was
being driven on highways or streets. The purpose of motor vehicle registration is
precisely to identify the owner so that if any injury is caused by the vehicle,
55
responsibility canbe imputed to the registered owner.

In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered
owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of
[16]
the car. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee
or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously
liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was
"the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he
was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized
driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of
Juanita Macarubo.
Common Carrier

The minute the COC is in an accident, it is liable only upon BOC filed by the
passenger, presumption of negligence
This does not only apply to QC. If COC was hit by another car, no
presumption of negligence.

8. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 172122

To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the
employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the
selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as
[12]
to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the
supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their
breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
[13]
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence
on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and
Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In the case of
petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests

and psychological examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but
not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that
petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during
the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars
on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he
attended before the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in
1984.

while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-incharge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon
the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.

9. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. Court of Appeals

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his
day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be
enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is
in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's
subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the
execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case
of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is
no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory
control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."

First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute
was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
[3]
injury. Petitioner says that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
[4]
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that
the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased [its]
[5]
maneuverability. However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to
discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.
22. Ramos v. COL Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed
to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming
of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of
which complaint is made.
Theory of Imputed Negligence cuts both ways

Ordinarily invoked against the defendant

Negligence of the plaintiffs employee was imputed to the employer
(Proximate Cause) then plaintiff cannot claim for damage (2179)
Contributory negligence also applies

F. Distinguished from Subsidiary liability under the RPC

1. Carpio v. Doroja

As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for
recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the
decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such
subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent
case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following
pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay
an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended
party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that
the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity
awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent
action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the
heirs of the victim."

D. Teachers and Heads of Establishment

3. Amadora v. Court of Appeals
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their nonobservance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion
for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has
already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owneroperator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being
the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award

was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes
incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only
after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after
execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
3. Bantoto v. Bobis
The first alleged error, predicated upon the lack of allegation in the complaint that
driver Bobis was insolvent, is without merit. The master's liability, under the Revised
Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the
discharge of their duties, is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter. Article
103 of the Penal Code prescribes that:
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employees,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a
condition precedent. In truth, such insolvency is required only when the liability of the
master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment
against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely
imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the
servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons
subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the
servant's (principal obligor's) properties if he can not "point out to the creditor
available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the
amount of the debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between
the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter
who is in a better position to determine the resources and solvency of the servant or
employee.
As to the second error assigned, the same is non-prejudicial, if at all committed.
Supposing, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibits "A" and "B", the execution and the
sheriff's return, in the criminal case were not admissible at the trial of the case against
the master, they would certainly be material and admissible when issuance of a writ
of execution of the appealed judgment is demanded. It is well to move here that
this Court has ruled that in the absence of collusion the judgment convicting
and sentencing the servant to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the master or employer (Martinez vs. Barredo,
81 Phil. 1). Anyway, since Bobis, the driver, was also a defendant, the writ of
execution issued in the criminal case to enforce the civil indemnity, and its return
without satisfaction, are not irrelevant evidence in the action against him and his
employer.
Anent the third error, we agree with appellant, that, as the case was predicated upon
the sentence of conviction in the criminal case, the award of exemplary damages was
improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as person
subsidiarily liable, can not incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any
more than a guarantor can be held responsible for more than the principal debtor
(Cf. Civil Code, Article 2064).

4. Solidum v. People, G.R. No 192123

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that
he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon
the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice
cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made
between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual
and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the
operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional
activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak
to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of
exculpation, if he could.
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of
infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res
ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the
injury was probably caused by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn.
App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the
application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953).
See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case Res Ipsa Loquitur 24:10 (1972). The
evidence presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for
application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute closing of the patients air passage
and his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under
these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was
negligent. There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind
does not suggest that death would not be expected without negligence. And there is
no expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila
Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case,
a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training,

care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least
the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice
that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the
profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below
such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice
actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against
unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the
physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty
of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical
malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications
must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just
verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like
an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care
and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
37
general practitioner.

VI. Primary Liability

A. Possessors/Users of animals
1. Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also
20
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of
death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that
she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to
exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so
be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also
contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as
they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for
whatever she might have done to the animal.
2. Pascual v. Ford, G.R. No. 220667

We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him
from civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable
because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the
factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to
Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the
anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused
the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly
liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do
so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But
the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to
attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any
department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs
49
labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a
public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in
50
charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of
Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on
Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an
employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due
to his being insolvent.

The case of Nutrimix Feeds Corporation v. CA 32 provides that the following must be
present before a manufacturer or seller may be held liable for any damage caused by
the product:
first, proof that the product in question was defective;
second, the defect must be present upon the delivery or manufacture of the
product; or when the product left the seller's or manufacturer's control; or when the
product was sold to the purchaser; and
third, the product must have reached the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition it was sold. (emphases supplied)
Pascual did not present proof that the vehicle was defective upon its
manufacture. The alteration in the vehicle's rear axle after the vehicle was sold is a
substantial change in the vehicle's condition.
Hence, the FMCI, as manufacturer, and the FGPI, as seller/distributor,
cannot be held liable for any damage caused by the vehicle's defect.
We also find that the strict liability in torts is not applicable against the FMCI
and the FGPI. Pascual cites the California Supreme Court Case of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 33 to support her claim on the applicability of strict liability
in torts. According to Greenman:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being. . . . The purpose of such liability is to

insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 34 . . . Implicit in the machine's
presence on the market, however, was a representation that it would safely do the
jobs for which it was built. 35 (emphases supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that foreign decisions, such as the Greenman case,
are not controlling in this jurisdiction but are, at best, only persuasive. 36 The
Greenman case, however, is not even persuasive for purposes of the present case
because its facts are different and cannot apply squarely to the present case.
Greenman involved a purchaser who bought a defective power tool rst
hand from a retailer. 37 On the other hand, the present case involves a second-hand
vehicle which was bought from an unidentified person.
Even assuming that the Greenman case is applicable, the FMCI and the
FGPI are not liable because their representation as to the vehicle's weight capacity is
limited. The vehicle will safely do the job for which it was built subject to the vehicle's
weight capacity. The alteration of the vehicle's rear axle to carry more weight beyond
thevehicle's capacity is outside the FMCI's and the FGPI's representation of its
product.
D. Municipal Corporation

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and
tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of
asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer
not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
respondent. Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the
item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also
accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked
about the circumstances of payment,.
6. Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, G.R.88694
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to
vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While
petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of
private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as
to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
7. Marites v. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show by a clear preponderance of evidence as
required in civil cases that respondents have acted in wanton and gross bad faith and
injustice in instigating the criminal suits against petitioner to entitle him to the
damages he now seeks. Where the actions are filed in good faith, no penalty should
be imposed thereon.

2. Jimenez v. City of Manila

8. Marsman & Company v. Ligo, G.R. No., 198643
In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the
defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the
Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former.
VII. Special Torts (Human Relations)
A. Abuse of Rights and Contra Bonus Mores
5. California Clothing, Inc. v. Quiones, G.R. No. 175822, October 23, 2013
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid
or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific
Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were
raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the
natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective
beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item
purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by
petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a
mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the
proper forum.

In this jurisdiction, the term 'malicious prosecution' has been defined as 'an action for
damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein.' While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has
been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the
defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
The fact that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case is acquitted of the criminal
charge precisely places the prior finding of probable cause in issue, which must be
determined in the malicious prosecution case. If the plaintiff was acquitted for reasons
other than lack of probable cause, then certainly the malicious prosecution case
cannot prosper. Thus, petitioners are correct in arguing that acquittal does not
disprove the existence of probable cause. However, they are mistaken in concluding
that respondent's acquittal was based on failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and not lack of probable cause. As a matter of fact, respondent's acquittal was
due to lack of evidence, which presupposes lack of probable cause.
As against Iledan's denial, respondent's declarations and Mercado's testimony
deserve weight. Iledan was prompted by hatred, malice and bad faith in deliberately
initiating a baseless action against respondent, Mercado and their colleagues, with
the solitary purpose of humiliating and harassing them and ultimately causing their
removal from Marsman. It must be recalled that Iledan was the recipient of the
supposed telephone tip from Miguel, whose identity and existence is exceedingly
questionable since he was not presented in court. Relying blindly on Iledan's

supposed information, Marsman immediately sought NBI assistance without the

benefit of tackling the matter internally in order to make sikre that the tip was reliable
in the first place. When respondent was illegally arrested in the presence of Iledan, no
protest was heard from petitioners as a measure of concern for one of their longserving employees. They allowed respondent and his colleagues to be humiliated and
shamed before a press conference, where their photographs were taken and
published indiscriminately in several newspapers as members of a supposed
syndicate which sold Marsman's bad medicines - even before their guilt or innocence
could be preliminarily or finally determined. Respondent was then illegally detained in
an NBI detention cell for at least 10 days, where he experienced untold suffering. All
these culminated in a false criminal charge and respondent's dismissal from
Marsman.

Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage
done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondentdrivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondentdrivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under
Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person,
but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of
another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer. The
appellate court did not err, given the circumstances of this case, in awarding
damages to respondent-drivers.

10. Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. 14628

1. Everett Steamship Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 122494

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and
the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338
of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we
find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate
with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

the right of a party in the same situation as respondent here, to recover for loss of a
shipment consigned to him under a bill of lading drawn up only by and between the
shipper and the carrier, springs from either a relation of agency that may exist
between him and the shipper or consignor, or his status as stranger in whose favor
some stipulation is made in said contract, and who becomes a party thereto when he
demands fulfillment of that stipulation, in this case the delivery of the goods or cargo
shipped. In neither capacity can he assert personally, in bar to any provision of the bill
of lading, the alleged circumstance that fair and free agreement to such provision was
vitiated by its being in such fine print as to be hardly readable. Parenthetically, it may
be observed that in one comparatively recent case (Phoenix Assurance Company vs.
Macondray & Co., Inc., 64 SCRA 15) where this Court found that a similar package
limitation clause was printed in the smallest type on the back of the bill of lading, it
nonetheless ruled that the consignee was bound thereby on the strength of authority
holding that such provisions on liability limitation are as much a part of a bill of lading
as though physically in it and as though placed therein by agreement of the parties.

12. Baksh v. CA, G.R. No., 97336

C. Judicial Vigilance

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault."

E. Disrespect of Persons

14. Petrophil Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 122796

Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondents good name even though they
are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires, [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct.

In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual
context above described, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While
Petrophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to
injure private respondents. In BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260,
272 (1998), we held that there is abuse of a right under Article 19 if the following
elements are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad
faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. We find all these three
elements present in the instant case. Hence, we are convinced that the termination by
petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz calls for appropriate sanctions by way of
damages.

2. Manaloto v. Veloso, G.R. No. 171365

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and
reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good
name.This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as
actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct.

4. St. Louis Realty Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 46061

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit
its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio
had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily
exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
F. Dereliction of Duty
2. Tuzon v. CA, G.R. No. 9017
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system,
where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of
his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak." 7 Official inaction may also be due to
plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service.
According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 8 the provision presupposes that
the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to
malice or inexcusable negligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is justly
punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the complainant has
sustained.

1. Lim v. De Leon, 66 SCRA 299 (1975)

While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his
superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light
of the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for
damages.
3. Silahis International Hotel v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087
As for petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union
office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the
office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual
28
intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the
following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
VIII. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
1. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915)

4. Torio v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 29993

The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a
town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We
upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on
the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting
as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing
it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
G. Unfair Competition
1. Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris, G.R. No. 195549
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the
extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term
coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his
employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a
competitors contracts, or any malicious interference with the latters business.
H. Violation of Civil/Political Rights

Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise,
industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition; but he
has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or
annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of
like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by
contract or otherwise is interfered with
6. Lagon v. CA, G.R. No. 119107
While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of
the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure
of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious.
He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no
suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and
watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire
property's title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even
the registry of property had no record of the same.
According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there
was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have

acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.

unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there
was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have
acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. "Injury" is the
legal invasion of a legal right while "damage" is the hurt, loss or harm which results
from the injury.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is

justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution
(Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for
the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must
be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings
before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted.

7. Go v. Cordero

5. Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 145391

Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. In the
case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals, we held that to sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference
cannot be justified. We further explained that the word "induce" refers to situations
where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or
intimidation.

Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a
crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and
the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended
party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled
to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly
reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these
instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal
8
prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these
exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred
from intervening in the estafa suit.

Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such act may not be
deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives. The attendant circumstances, however, demonstrated that respondents
transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the
expense of Cordero. Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero
had worked hard to close the deal for them to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT
25, closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel sold, attended to their
concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go, Landicho and
Gos family members. But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and
Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel,
Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero their
"commission" or "cut" from Corderos earned commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25.

True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities - one for estafa and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a
bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has
sustained only a single injury
6. People v. Bayotas
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

IX. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMES

1. Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., G.R. No. L-78911-25
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big.
22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the
offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

Situation: Criminal case was filed today and offended party reserved the civil action.
Criminal case was prosecuted and the accused was convicted by final judgement.
The private offended party filed the civil case and during its pendency of the civil
case, the accused dies.
JLo: the civil case will not be extinguished because the condition sine qua non that
the alleged offender be convicted is fulfilled. Criminal liability has attached and civil
liability will arise. Heirs will be substituted under Rule 3, Section 16.

If Quasi-delict, file against the executor or administrator

10. Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210

If Breach of Contract, file against the estate.

Classes of Civil Liabilities

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
*This goes against Casupanan v. Laroya. To reconcile this, Bayotas was ruled under
the 1985 rules of court where any kind of civil action is deemed instituted with the
criminal case. This is no longer the rule in the new Rules of Court. Thus, Casupanan
is controlling.
9. People v. Lipata, G.R. No. 200302
Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a
separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased
appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as
claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. The civil action which
may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the
decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the
rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate
civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for
filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the
present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain
financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of
action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos
death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate
amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar
cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in
cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil
liabilities on the part of the offender. If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused
may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex
delicto). This particular civil liability due the offended party is rooted on facts that
constitute a crime. Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense
charged. It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability
based ondelict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established
by preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil
liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil
liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as
a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d)
quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles
32 and 34 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil
31
Code. For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil
Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action
independently of the criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a
violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other
than the criminal law. Such civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action, subject however, to
the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission.
Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an
enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In particular, the focal issue in the present
petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her
civil liability, which is principally based on contract and the corresponding
damage Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these
circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks were presented beyond
the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were no longer
relevant
11. Sanchez v. Far East Bank

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.

petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject
petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession
is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

"If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment
of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public
document against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago
Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own
action on the administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the private offended party may
appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. But this
recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial courts judgment falls under any of
the three categories stated in Salazar.

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the
existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and
issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well
as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may
be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this

Court against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in
abeyance, thus:

14. Quiambao v. Osorio, G.R> No. 48157

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
1
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending
and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the
criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the
former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak
of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject
petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the
pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had
prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment
case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended
by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the
pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to
petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly

forged by respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77
[Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is
necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of
First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that
litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall
3
inform the Court about such decision."
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question
to an administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so
considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events occuring
during the pendency of this petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein
reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that the
intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of Agrarian Reform had
promulgated a decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affiriming the
cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private respondents.
With this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too
evident to need further elaboration.
15. San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative
agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the administrative case
for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be
determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the

criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
22
accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
23
conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided
in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial
question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was
pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
24
criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not
be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
25
exclusive and original.
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a
prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in
the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal
complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of
the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal
case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of
a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms
26
agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific
27
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract. The remedy
has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents
wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly"
the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
29
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the
suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well
as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with
its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand
the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether
or not BF Homes directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20
TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for
should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the
20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in
the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the
criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question
to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question
is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime
have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution
has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through
30
a non-criminal suit.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Principles behind Prejudicial Question

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or

rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of
rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil
Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to
reciprocal obligations, such that a partys breach of the contract equated to a tacit
resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as
in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific
28
performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.

X. Damages

1.
2.

Avoid multiplicity of suit

Avoid conflicting decisions

A. In General
1. Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 117103
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain
to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven.

To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. In no

instance may the trial judge award more than those so pleaded and proven. Damages
cannot be presumed. The award there of must be based on the evidence presented,
not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote,
speculative and nonsubstantial proof. Article 2199 of the Civil Code expressly
mandates that "[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved."
Damages, after all, are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant.
n some instances, the Court awards the cost of medical procedures to restore the
injured person to his or her former condition. However, this award necessitates expert
testimony on the cost of possible restorative medical procedure. In Gatchalian v.
Delim, the Court, reasoning that a scar resulting from the infliction of injury on the
face of a woman gave rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante,
granted P15,000 as actual damages for plastic surgery. It bears emphasis that the
said amount was based on expert testimony.
Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party
failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans), the rule requires that said person
produce the "best evidence of which his case is susceptible.
The bare and unsubstantiated assertion of Francia that she usually earned P200 a
day from her market stall is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized
income for the eight-month period that her arm was in plaster cast. Her testimony that
was their lessor who filed their income tax returns and obtained business licenses for
them does not justify her failure to present more credible evidence of her income.
Furthermore, after her ten-day confinement at the San Pablo Hospital, she could
have returned so her work at the public market despite the plaster cast on her right
arm, since she claimed to have two nieces as helpers. Clearly, the appellate court
was correct in deleting the award for unrealized income, because of petitioner's utter
failure to substantiate her claim.
Under the Civil Code, an award of attorney's fees is an indemnity for damages
ordered by a court to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any
of the cases authorized by law. It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless
the two have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. The Court has established a set standards in fixing
the amount of attorney's fees:
(1) [T]he amount and character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time and
trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the
amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule
that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not.

B. Actual Damages
1. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. CA, G.R. o. 107518
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the
plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally,
the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or
essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use
during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profitearning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its
owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this
means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing
and pending engagements.x x x.
x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case
virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that
value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of
its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value
thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement
which it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is
the `capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the
abstract but in view of the actual circumstances, without, of course, taking
into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the
loss. [Underscoring supplied].
16. Catuiza v. People, G.R. No. 20455
Appellant's third claim is predicated upon the second paragraph of Article 2206 of
said Code. This article reads in full:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be
at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.

The case at bar comes under the first subdivision of this Article. Its second
subdivision is not in point, for the award made in the decision appealed from is in
favor of the "heirs" of the deceased, to which the first subdivision refers, whereas the
second subdivision applies to persons entitled to support from the deceased who are
not his heirs.
32. Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72 (1963)
Is the award of actual damages proper? While the prayer by the respondents in their
"Answer" mentions only exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
therein also is a plea for "such further relief ... as this Honorable Court may deem just
and equitable." This prayer may include "actual damages", if and when they are
proved. It is to be observed that in the course of the trial, defendants introduced
evidence of actual damages; yet petitioners failed to object to such presentation.
Consequently, the unalleged but proved matter of actual damages may be considered
by the court. The trial judge mentioned such damages. And the Court of Appeals,
without going into specifics, approved the award, and declared explicitly that the
evidence sustained it. In this Court appellees quoted without contradiction portions of
the oral evidence in support of the judge's findings. So, the matter being factual, we
must, in the circumstances, affirm the appellate court's assessment of actual
damages.
MORAL DAMAGES
6. Kieruff v. Court of Appeals (1997)
The spouses aver that the disfigurement of Lucila's physical appearance cannot but
affect their marital right to "consortium" which would have remained normal were it
not for the accident. Thus the moral damages awarded in favor of Lucila should be
increased to P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for her husband Victor who
also suffered "psychologically." A California case, Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, is cited as authority for the claim of damages by reason of loss of marital
consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations.
The Courts notes that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common
law view first enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not
recover for the loss of her husband's services by the act of a third
party. Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no
longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her
spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is
immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to
the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.
Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16
months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when the husband was
struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe. The wife testified how her
life had deteriorated because her husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the
home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how
her social, recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived
her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her husband's pain,
mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had

trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her
damages for loss of consortium.
Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral
damages to Victor and/or Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium," however, cannot be
properly considered in this case.
Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before
Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. His wife might have
been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right
to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had
failed to make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again,
we emphasize that this claim is factual in origin and must find basis not only in the
evidence presented but also in the findings of the Respondent Court. For lack of
factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.
10. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ramos
for the award of moral damages to be granted, the following must exist: (1)
there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or
psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3)
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award for damages is predicated on any of the
[35]
cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, although the respondent was not the loan applicant and the
business opportunities lost were those of Ramdustrial Corporation, all four requisites
were established. First, the respondent sustained injuries in that his physical health
and cardio-vascular ailment were aggravated; his fear that his one and only property
would be foreclosed, hounded him endlessly; and his reputation as mortgagor had
been tarnished. Second, the annotation of notice of levy on the TCT of the private
respondent was wrongful, arising as it did from the petitioners negligent act of
allowing the levy without verifying the identity of its judgment debtor. Third, such
wrongful levy was the proximate cause of the respondents misery. Fourth, the award
for damages is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code, particularly, number 10
thereof.
13. Philtranco Service Enterprise v. Paras
As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated
on a breach of contract. This is because such action is not included in Article 2219 of
[5]
the Civil Code as one of the actions in which moral damages may be recovered. By
way of exception, moral damages are recoverable in an action predicated on a
breach of contract: (a) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
[6]
[7]
provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, (3), of the Civil Code; and (b)
[8]
where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in
[9]
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Although this action does not fall under either of the exceptions, the award of moral
damages to Paras was nonetheless proper and valid. There is no question thatInland
filed its third-party complaint against Philtranco and its driver in order to establish in
this action that they, instead of Inland, should be directly liable to Paras for the
physical injuries he had sustained because of their negligence. To be precise,
Philtranco and its driver were brought into the action on the theory of liability that the

proximate cause of the collision between Inlands bus and Philtrancos bus had been
the negligent, reckless and imprudent manner defendant Apolinar Miralles drove and
operated his driven unit, the Philtranco Bus with Plate No. 259, owned and operated
[10]
by third-party defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. The apparent objective
of Inland was not to merely subrogate the third-party defendants for itself, as
[11]
Philtranco appears to suggest, but, rather, to obtain a different relief whereby the
third-party defendants would be held directly, fully and solely liable to Paras and
Inland for whatever damages each had suffered from the negligence committed by
Philtranco and its driver. In other words, Philtranco and its driver were charged here
as joint tortfeasors who would be jointly and severally be liable to Paras and Inland.
As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the
third-party defendant must be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive
law on which the right of Inland to seek such other relief through its third-party
complaint rested were Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
3.
Paras loss of earning capacity
must be compensated
In the body of its decision, the CA concluded that considering that Paras had
a minimum monthly income of P8,000.00 as a trader he was entitled to recover
compensation for unearned income during the 3-month period of his hospital
confinement and the 6-month period of his recovery and rehabilitation; and
[29]
aggregated his unearned income for those periods to P72,000.00. Yet, the CA
omitted the unearned income from the dispositive portion.
The omission should be rectified, for there was credible proof of Paras loss
of income during his disability. According to Article 2205, (1), of the Civil Code,
damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury. Indeed, indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered (actual damages or damnum emergens) but
[30]
also the claimants lost profits (compensatory damages or lucrum cessans). Even
so, the formula that has gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net
earning capacity; hence, the entire amount of P72,000.00 is not allowable. The
premise is obviously that net earning capacity is the persons capacity to acquire
[31]
money, less the necessary expense for his own living. To simplify the
determination, therefore, the net earning capacity of Paras during the 9-month period
of his confinement, surgeries and consequential therapy is pegged at only half of his
unearned monthly gross income of P8,000.00 as a trader, or a total of P36,000.00 for
the 9-month period, the other half being treated as the necessary expense for his own
living in that period.
It is relevant to clarify that awarding the temperate damages (for the
substantial pecuniary losses corresponding to Parass surgeries and rehabilitation and
for the irreparability of Inlands damaged bus) and the actual damages to compensate
lost earnings and costs of medicines give rise to no incompatibility. These damages
[32]
cover distinct pecuniary losses suffered by Paras and Inland, and do not infringe
the statutory prohibition against recovering damages twice for the same act or
[33]
omission.

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
2. Lemoine v. Alkan
The evidence refers simply to the fact that plaintiff might have obtained like
employment in the same locality; but it does not show at what rate of wages. There is
nothing in the record showing the wages of a particular position or the usual wages
paid in such employment. We understand it to be the rule that before defendant can
take advantage of the failure of plaintiff to obtain like employment, it must appear: (1)
That it is like employment, (2) that it is in the same locality; (3) that it is under
substantially the same conditions; and (4) the wages which he could have earned.
We are of the opinion that defendant has successfully established the first three
conditions; but, on the other hand, he has utterly failed to established the fourth. It is
clear that the court cannot allow any sum in reduction of damages unless it has been
proved; and it not appearing of record how much plaintiff could have earned in like
employment, it is impossible to determine the sum which must be deducted from the
damages proved by plaintiff.