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Adoption
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within
the
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which
was
eventually
aforementioned Resolution.
denied
in
the
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charged
in
the
No.
7,
dated
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The
continuing
deliberate
violations
of
Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975),
Circular No. 7 (dated 23 September 1974) and
Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January
1988) for the years reported in Atty. Sanglay's
report, and their belated discovery boggle our
minds. The irregularities should have been easily
discovered by the respondent Judge either
because the fact that a case has not been
properly raffled off is at once discernible on the
cover of the records and on the first page of the
original of the initial pleading (complaint,
information, etc.), or because plain common
sense would have told him that something was
wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases
of the same class had been "assigned" to his sala.
That he had failed to appreciate the physical
evidence or, at the very least, exhibit surprise at
the unusual number of cases is quite amazing.
Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of
the doubt and conclude that he had no interest
whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to
him and that he only loved to work more than the
others. Given the circumstances of this case, we
cannot merely cut him some slack and assume
good faith on his part; he deserves no such
treatment. As the investigating Justice himself
assessed the situation:
. . . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from
April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but
were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26
(except 3) under respondent Judge Gines.
Respondent Judge Gines, must know, under the
above Supreme Court acts, at a simple glance on
the cover of the rollo and the first page of every
such record, whether a case was assigned to him
after going through raffle or not. . . . From January
1987, when respondent Judge Gines was
appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge
had received unraffled cases, considered them
and decided them. He had done so, apparently,
not because he was a maniac of a worker, nor
because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge
accept additional cases for study and decision, in
addition to his regular load, without any benefit
or consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso
loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.
The
irregularity
and
violations
of
the
aforementioned
administrative
orders
and
circular could not have been committed so
blatantly, brazenly and openly for an unusually
long period of time if the respondent Judge did
not have the cooperation of some of the court
employees. We therefore agree with the
investigating Justice that such support and
cooperation were extended by subordinates who
likewise had something to do with the raffle of
cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of
participation, either by commission or omission,
of respondents
sustained.
Flores
and
Lacsamana
are
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material
allegations
application/petition, a
issued.
of
facts
DECISION is
in
the
forthwith
ANA
JOYCE
S.
REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY.
PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of
Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in
his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING,
ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and
ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the
Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12,
2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No.
204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of estate
on the ground that petitioner must first prove
that she was legally adopted by the decedent,
Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L.
Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and settlement of estate
of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui,
Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed
that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of
Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos,
Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising,
Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
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Subsequently,
the
RTC
issued
a
Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring
resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc.
No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal
case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the
parties were enjoined from dissipating or
disposing any or all of the properties included in
the estate of Elena Lising without order from this
Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent
Motion to Appoint Special Administrator 22 before
the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedents
universal estate. It was prayed therein that the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
appointed special administrator as he was "an
experienced and able person in the management
of properties" and is "honest, impartial,
competent and acceptable to the majority of the
interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found
probable cause to charge petitioner with
falsification of public documents per resolution
dated January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed
the said finding to the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents
motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration on the grounds that the branch
clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the
task of special administrator, and that Atty.
Saguyod was appointed without being required to
file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the
petition should be dismissed because she is the
sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on
November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the
Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
complaint
against
petitioner.27 Undaunted,
Chichioco filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged
co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in a property
belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco
alleged that petitioner converted the basement of
Lisings residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution
on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of
which reads:
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above resolution which was denied by the RTC on
November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also
issued a resolution dismissing respondent
Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal
case.30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002
resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said
resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to
possess and use the decedents property, title
over which automatically passed on to her upon
the latters death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a
bond and submit an inventory of the decedents
estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc.
No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal
by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457
constituted res judicata as to the former. There
was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption
and she consequently remains to be the sole heir
of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there
was no need for the appointment of an
administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial
court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge
Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in
appointing his branch clerk of court as special
administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, 33 the
appellate court reasoned that such act could
engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedents
estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply
with the requirements of a bond and inventory
and could not therefore take control and
possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss
Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No.
53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did
not operate as res judicata to the former. It was
also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before
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DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed
and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple: who,
between
petitioners
and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the
decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and
the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of
the decedents.
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remaining
properties
3.
Veterans
Application
for
Pension
or
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of
the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA
Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in
Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had
any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina
Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what
was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the
intervenor-respondent
Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According
to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which
was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children.
Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit
that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the
death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-
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ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao,
the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo
Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood
relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a
motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein),
the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married
but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents
herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia
was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and
the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of
evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa
substituted
for
her
sister,
Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal
which was denied on the ground that the record
on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which
was
dismissed
by the
Court
of
Appeals.31 However,
on
motion
for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself
and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the
interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners
assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors failure to file the
record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the
appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed
must be followed. However,
circumstances, a delay in the
may be excused on grounds of
to do certain acts
under exceptional
filing of an appeal
substantial justice.
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Acting
on
the
appeal,
the
Court
of
Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the
Court
of
Appeals
amended
its
earlier
decision.36 The
dispositive
portion
of
the
amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
partition among themselves the intestate estate
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the
proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon
his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts
of administration of the subject estates and to
turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining
to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and
posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia)
actual
administration
of
the
estates
in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice of the administrators qualification
and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of selfadjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the extent of
the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.
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this
matter
is
the
following
be
is
SECTION
1. Extrajudicial
settlement
by
agreement between heirs. If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
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ZOILO
ANTONIO
VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD
ALLAN
KELLEY
POE,
a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
Adoption
March 3, 2004
x-----------------------------x
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO
X.
FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on
those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly
by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or
by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all
of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship
is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office
of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to
face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161434
x-----------------------------x
Page 25
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Thus
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Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Proof of Paternity and Filiation
"Original
document
must
be
produced;
exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x
xxx
xxx
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xxx
x x x.
vs.
Court
of
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"x x x
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xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mangahas
Declarant
DNA
"Parentage
will
still
be
resolved
using
conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that
the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
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xxx
xxx
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xxx
xxx
No Costs.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143989
ISABELITA
S.
LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to
as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most
less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take
into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the
tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the
warmth, love and support of the couple who
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years,
Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting
Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided
to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made
all the more intense than before the feeling of
affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping
with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to
"Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later.
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she
averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to
change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband
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Philippines,14gave
immediate
statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In
1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention
of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State
Party to the Convention, accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No.
8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in
his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No.
8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family
Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process 15 that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand
but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. 17 Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is
a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and
perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to
adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603)
allowed
an
adoption
to
be
sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial
court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code
of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
that the case should be dismissed for having
been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without
being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. The
petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the
court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition,
without being joined by her husband, according
to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both
aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29
July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken
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OF
DECISION
SO ORDERED."4
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
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shall
bear
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree
annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Middle Name
shall
x x x"
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees
that
drafted
the
Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the childs mother as
his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees,
the
members
approved
the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a
difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the
fathers surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he
would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants
to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child
chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied
that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the
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law prohibiting
by her natural
middle name her
reason why she
DIWATA
RAMOS
LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
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WHEREFORE,
it
is
hereby
ordered
that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from
all legal obligations obedience and maintenance
from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the
children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody
is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between
the children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect
the corresponding changes/amendment in the
birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
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A In Italy, sir.
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A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD
Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had
been under the care and custody of their
maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov.
2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the minor
children financially, even during the time that
they were still living with their natural parents.
Their mother also sends financial support but
very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors
Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model
to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and
concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her
mother and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3
children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they
had a happy and comfortable life. After the death
of her husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing support for
them. However being ashamed of just depending
on the support of her husbands relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy
and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she
entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of
her mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a
married man from Tarlac. They became live-in
partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario
who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his
marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from
P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents
who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a
month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and
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other
paternal
relatives
are
continuously
providing support for most of the needs &
education of minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently
sever
their
mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her
mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems.
Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal
amounts as compared to what her affluent inlaws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter. 42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children.
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the
latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if
they are given to an adopting parent. 43 Again, it is
the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to
rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos
Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to
prove. The joint written consent of petitioners
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in
Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document notarized
in this country it needs to comply with Section 2
of Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Section
2.
An
instrument
or
document
acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign
country shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1)
an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation,
charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and
that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public
or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The
officer making the authentication shall certify
under his official seal that the person who took
the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was
duly exercising the functions of the office by
virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the acknowledgment was taken,
and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners
legitimate children did not comply with the aforecited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was
introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled
that petitioner was not stable enough to support
the children and is only relying on the financial
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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159374
FELIPE
N.
MADRIAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always
the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the
minor children is not only a thorny issue but also
a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is
the case here. Even the usually technical subject
of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent
Francisca R. Madrian were married on July 7,
1993 in Paraaque City. They resided in San
Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis
Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann,
born on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner
allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their
three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and
subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law
to patch things up between her and petitioner to
no avail. She then brought the matter to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but
this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas
corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act
of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the
education of their children and deprived them of
their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before
the court and to explain why they should not be
returned to her custody.
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xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the
issue of the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody
of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over such petitions:
The
Court
of
Appeals
should
take
cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
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xxx
xxx
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thought
was
negative
for
delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. She could process abstract ideas and
general information. Her attention span was
adequate. There was no evidence of impaired
judgment.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such
as man touching a woman, 2 people on a hi-five ,
2 women chatting, beast, stuffed animal, etc. Her
past reflected on her psyche. There is no creative
process.There were no bizarre ideas.
The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I
get tired for no reason; I feel that I am useful and
needed
(re,
son). There
is
moderate
depression. However, she could still make
competent decisions.
The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her
capacity to adapt to her situation. There is no
evidence of losing control.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL
STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND
showed an individual who presented himself in
the best situation he could possibly be. He is cool,
calm and collected. He answered all my questions
coherently. He is of average intelligence. He was
oriented to person, place and date. His memory
for recent and remote events was intace (sic). His
content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. His attention span was adequate. He
could process abstract ideas, sets of figures, and
general information.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such
as distorted chest , butterfly with scattered color,
cat ran over by a car, nothing 2 people, monster
etc. There
is no central
theme
in
his
responses. There were no bizarre ideas.
The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as
clear as it used to be (most of the time). There
was no evidence of brain damage. There is no
significant affective response that would affect
his rationality.
The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his
capacity to adapt to his situation. He reached out
well to others. He is in very good control of his
emotions.
BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist
of:
1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free
periods.
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ALFONSO
LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-23767
CARMEN
SAN
JOSE-LACSON, plaintiffappellant,
vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
-----------------------------
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SAN
JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-
CASTRO, J.:
These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L24259) involving the same parties pose a
common fundamental issue the resolution of
which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all
the other issues. Thus their joinder in this
decision.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent
spouse) were married on February 14, 1953. To
them were born four children, all alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left
the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila.
She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed
as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter
referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of
their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching
an amicable settlement respecting custody of the
children, support, and separation of property. On
April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated
April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding
6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the
petition, embodying their amicable settlement,
read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963
when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their
conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to
reside in Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject
to judicial approval as required by Article 191 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines the particular
terms and conditions of their mutual agreement
being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby
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such
child
as
will
be
for
its
best
interest permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years
of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or
poverty... (Emphasis supplied).
One last point regarding the matter of support for
the children assuming that the custody of any
or more of the children will be finally awarded to
the mother. Although the spouses have agreed
upon the monthly support of P150 to be given by
the petitioner spouse for each child, still this
Court must speak out its mind on the
insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial
notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and
the steady skyrocketing of prices of all
commodities, goods, and services, not to mention
the fact that all the children are already of school
age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI may
increase this amount of P150 according to the
needs of each child.
With the view that we take of this case, we find it
unnecessary to pass upon the other errors
assigned in the three appeals.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964
and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject
matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated
May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of
G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is
hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in
accordance with this decision. No pronouncement
as to costs.
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
S.
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC
AND
ESTRELLA
ELAMPARO Respondents.
POEC.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
S.
POELLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS
AND
AMADO
D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
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the
the
the
the
for
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To
be
sure,
the
authoritativeness
of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:
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President:
The question in order is the amendment to the
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr.
Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better
to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr.
Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these
cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject
exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate
Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few
to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law
were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother,
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of
the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the
Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was
rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was
the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's
or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong.
They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and
Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in
the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.
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Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation
of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the
right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
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petition
is GRANTED. The
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