Case number 5

Soliven v Makasiar Nov 14, 1988 G.R. No. 82585

Per Curiam

(Topic on Warrant Issued by RTC)

Facts:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat.
The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was
immune from suit.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC issued a warrant of arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause.

Held: No

Ratio:

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't
required to examine the complainant and the witnesses.

He shall only personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and required the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.

Otherwise, judges would be burdened with preliminary investigation instead of hearing cases.

CASE NUMBER 6

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering

information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After
extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone
booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone conversations which was
then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the
evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that
motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence
is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone

conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction
as evidence against a person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously
asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the
Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion.
Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when
he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did
not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could
be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters
into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it
is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not
areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Governments activities in
electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone conversations constituted
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant
predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

CASE NUMBER 7: ABDULA VS GUIANI

Abdulla vs People

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds,

appellant Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Appellants co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was
found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the temporary
special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before
this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

Issue: Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?

Ruling: No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public
use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed
an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to
under existing civil service laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful
intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellants act of paying
the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with
criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

CASE NUMBER: PEOPLE VS MOLINA

CASE NUMBER 9: ALLADO VS DIOKNO

Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary
named Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado
Jose Allado and Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga,
Hernandez and Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping
and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Based on that
confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the
RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the
search warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also
pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions
were found in the raid including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers
and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of
authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and
issued a warrant of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of
arrests. They claim that Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable cause for him to issue the
warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine the
admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.
Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be
dismissed for lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the
court.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC
from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier
cases resolved by the high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding such, there
is no requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be
granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.

CASE NUMBER 10: ANIAG VS COMELEC

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the
court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the
place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In
the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under
a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been
mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.

(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the
items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive
nature of the said items.

CASE NUMBER 12: COLUMBIA PICTURES VS FLORES

CASE NUMBER 25: PAPA VS MAGO

CASE NUMBER 28: PEOPLE VS BARROS

CASE NUMBER 37: PEOPLE VS INTING

Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant,
Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior
permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case.
Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September
30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court
set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial
Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause
exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause
and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and
honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the
people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial
Election Supervisor.