Physical Injuries
suffered by the heirs of the victims of
Capuno vs Pepsi Cola
Facts:
The case arose from a vehicular
collision which occurred on January 3,
1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved
were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven
by Jon Elordi and a private car driven
by Capuno. The collision proved fatal
to the latter as well as to his
passengers, the spouses Florencio
Buan and Rizalina Paras.
Elordi was charged with triple
homicide through reckless imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga (criminal case No. 1591).
The information was subsequently
amended to include claims for
damages by the heirs of the three
victims.
while the criminal case was pending,
the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouses and their heirs filed a civil
action, also for damages, against Pepsi
and Elordi.
This case ended in a compromise.
During the pendency of criminal case,
the Capunos commenced a civil action
for damages against Pepsi and Elordi.
Elordi was later acquitted. The civil
case was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether the action is for recovery of
damages
Ruling:
There can be no doubt that the
present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict,
which action must be instituted within
four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil
Code). Appellants originally sought to
enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is,
under the provisions of the Penal
Code, when they intervened in the
criminal case against Jon Elordi. The
information therein, it may be recalled,
was amended precisely to include an
allegation concerning damages
the accident for which Elordi was
being prosecuted. But appellants'
intervention was subsequently
disallowed and they did not appeal
from the Court's order to the effect.
And when they commenced the civil
action on September 26, 1958 the
criminal case was still pending,
showing that appellants then chose to
pursue the remedy afforded by the
Civil Code, for otherwise that action
would have been premature and in
any event would have been concluded
by the subsequent judgment of
acquittal in the criminal case.
The term "physical injuries" in Article
33 includes bodily injuries causing
death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623,
Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other
words, the civil action for damages
could have been commenced by
appellants immediately upon the
death of their decedent, Cipriano
Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or
thereabouts, and the same would not
have been stayed by the filing of the
criminal action for homicide through
reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on
September 26, 1958, or after the lapse
of more than five years.
Corpuz vs Paje
Facts:
On December 23, 1956, a passenger
bus of the Victory Liner Transportation
Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje,
collided within the municipality of
Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven
by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the
latter's death and in physical injuries
to two other persons.
An information for homicide and
double serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje in the Court First
Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of
Clemente Marcia reserved their right
to institute a separate civil action for
damages.
Felardo Paje, was found guilty and
convicted of the crime charged in the
information. Said defendant appealed
the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals.
While defendant's appeal was pending
decision in the Court of Appeals,
Clemente Marcia's heirs, namely, his
widow, Laura Corpus, and their minor
children, instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a separate civil action
(Civil Case No. 6880) for damages
based upon the criminal act of
reckless imprudence against Felardo
Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., defendants,
praying that said defendants be
ordered to pay jointly and severally
the amounts of damages claimed by
the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje
reversing the appealed judgment and
acquitting the appellant after finding
that the reckless imprudence charged
against him did not exist, and that the
collision was a case of pure accident.
Issue:
Whether the ground that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence
charged against him did not exist, and
that the collision was a case of pure
accident.
Ruling:
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless
imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil
action, that is, of an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages,
which shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution and shall be
proved only by a preponderance of
evidence.
Said article mentions only the crimes
of defamation, fraud (estafa) and
physical injuries. Although in the case
of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R.
No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this
Court held that the term "physical
injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil
Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be
borne in mind that the charge against
Felardo Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and
not for homicide and physical injuries.
In the case of People vs. Buan, G.R.
No. L-25366, March 29, 1968, Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the
Supreme Court, said that the "offense
of criminal negligence under article
365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the
substance of the offense." It is,
therefore, clear that the charge
against Felardo Paje was not for
homicide but for reckless imprudence,
that is, criminal negligence resulting in
homicide (death of Clemente Marcia)
and double physical injuries suffered
by two other persons.
As reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code, there is no independent
civil action for damages that may be
instituted in connection with said
offense. Hence, homicide through
reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general
rule that the acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal action is a
bar to his civil liability based upon the
same criminal act notwithstanding
that the injured party reserved 2 his
right to institute a separate civil action
(Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the
language of the Rules of Court (Rule
111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the
defendant on the ground that the
criminal act charged against him did
not exist, necessarily extinguished
also the civil action for damages based
upon the same act.
Madeja vs Caro
Facts:
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of
homicide through reckless imprudence
for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy. The complaining
witness is the widow of the deceased,
Carmen L. Madeja. The information
states that: "The offended party
Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right
to file a separate civil action for
damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending,
Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A.
Japzon for damages in Civil Case No.
141 of the same court. She alleged
that her husband died because of the
gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The
respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Whether the civil action against Dr.
Japzon may proceed independently of
the criminal action against her.
Ruling: Yes.
Regarding the meaning of Physical
Injuries in Article 33, the Court said:
The term "physical injuries" is used in
a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but consummated,
frustrated and attempted homicide.
The Article in question uses the words
'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical
injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because
there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein,
so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in
their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that
the terms 'physical injuries' could not
have been used in its specific sense as
a crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, for it is difficult to believe that
the Code Commission would have
used terms in the same article-some in
their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the
term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries, bacause
the terms used with the latter are
general terms. In any case the Code
Commission recommended that the
civil action for physical injuries be
similar to the civil action for assault
and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must hove been
accepted by the Legislature when it
approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been
to establish a civil action for the bodily
harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault
and battery, as the Code Commission
states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that
of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or
even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)
Bonite vs Zosa
Facts:
On the 24 of September 1968,
Florencio Bonite was hit by a truck
driven by private respondent. As a
result of which, Bonite died on that
same day. A criminal complaint for
homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed by the surviving
heirs (now petitioners) against the
respondent Abamonga. Petitioners
through their counsel, as private
prosecutor, actively participated in the
prosecution of the criminal case
against the accused.
After trial on the merits, the court
acquitted the accused for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On 28 December 1970, petitioners
filed an action for recovery of
damages against the same accused
for the death of Bonite, with the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
16th Judicial District, Branch III. The
court a quo dismissed the complaint
for damages on 25 February 1971. In
its ruling, the court held that since the
plaintiffs did not reserve the right to
file and independent civil action, and
the fact that they have been
represented by a private prosecutor in
the prosecution of the criminal case,
the action presently filed by the
plaintiffs is already res adjudicata.
Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the
same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil
action for damages, under Article 29
of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by
petitioners' failure in the criminal
action to make a reservation to file a
separate civil action and by their
active participation in the prosecution
of such criminal action.
Ruling:
Civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case, where the acquittal is based on
the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Civil
action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted and
requires only a preponderance of
evidence. This is pursuant to the
express provision of Article 29 of the
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the criminal case
for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was dismissed on the
ground that the guilt of the accused
was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Clearly, petitioners have the
right to file an independent civil action
for damages
The court held that the petitioners
may also base such separate civil
action for damages on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Acquital of the accused
from the charge of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, is not a bar to a
subsequent civil action for the
recovery of civil liability, arising not
from criminal negligence, but from
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has
been held that Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, in referring to "fault or
negligence" covers acts "not
punishable by law" as well as acts that
may be criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed to recover
damage in both scores (delict and
quasi-delict).
Article 29 of the Civil Code does not
state that the right to file an
independent civil action for damages
(under said article) can be availed of
only in offenses not arising from a
tortious act. The only requisite to file a
civil action from damages is that the
accused must have been acquitted in
the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt. When the law does
not distinguish, the court should not
distinguish.
Dulay vs CA
Facts:
An altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela,
the security guard on duty at the said
carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A.
Dulay, widow of the deceased
Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and
in behalf of her minor children, filed on
February 8, 1989 an action for
damages against Benigno Torzuela
and herein private respondents
Safeguard Investigation and Security
Co., Inc., and/or Superguard Security
Corp. alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.
Issue:
Whether filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is
far better than merely making an
express reservation.
Ruling: Yes.
Pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA
(120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed
thereunder are ex-delicto. However,
the term "physical injuries" in Article
33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death
(Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965);
Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94
[1955]). It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide
(Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case
(supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must
be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in
Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Custodio et al vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property
behind the properties of spouses
Cristino and Brigida Custodio and
spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos.
The passageway leading to Mabasas
house passes through the properties
of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito
and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence
around their property. This effectively
deprived Mabasa passage to his
house. Mabasa then sued the
Custodios and the Santoses to compel
them to grant his right of way with
damages. Mabasa claims that he lost
tenants because of the blockade done
by the families in front. The trial court
ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered
the Custodios and the Santoses to
give Mabasa a permanent easement
and right of way and for Mabasa to
pay just compensation. The Santoses
and the Custodios appealed. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. However, the CA modified
the ruling by awarding damages in
favor of Mabasa (Actual damages:
P65k, Moral damages: P30k,
Exemplary damages: P10k).
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of
damages by the CA is proper.
HELD: No. The award is not proper.
This is an instance of damnum absque
injuria.
There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may
have incurred losses (damage) when
his tenants left because of the fence
made by the Santoses. However, when
Santos built the fence, he was well
within his right. He built the fence
inside his property. There was no
existing easement agreement, either
by contract or by operation of law, on
his property. Hence, Santos has all the
right to build the fence. It was only
after the judgment in the trial court
that the easement was created which
was even conditioned on the payment
of Mabasa of the just compensation.
Santos did not commit a legal injury
against Mabasa when he built the
fence, therefore, there is no actionable
wrong as basis for the award of
damages. In this case, the damage
has to be borne by Mabasa.
People vs. Gambao
FACTS:
Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y
SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y
MULOK are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1)
day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
Accused-appellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
apportioned in the following manner:
the principals to the crime shall jointly
and severally pay the victim the total
amount of P288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim
P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code on several and
subsidiary liability.
Apportionment of Damages
The ruling of this Court in People v.
Montesclaros is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among
all the accused-appellants. The entire
amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the
crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and
actual participation. Hence, each
principal accused-appellant should
shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages
than Perpenian who was adjudged as
only an accomplice.
Gatchalian V. Delim (1991)
FACTS:
July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian
boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay,
La Union bound for Bauang, of the
same province. The bus bumped a
cement flower pot on the side of the
road, went off the road, turned turtle
and fell into a ditch.
Gatchalian got injured with physical
injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger
and later paid for their hospitalization
and medical expenses. She also gave
transportation expense of P12 in going
home from the hospital and they were
made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating
that they are no longer interested to
file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of
the said Thames.
Petitioner was among those who
signed. Notwithstanding the said
document, petitioner filed a claim to
recover actual and moral damages for
loss of employment opportunities,
mental suffering and inferiority
complex caused by the scar on her
forehead.
Delim averred that it was a fortuitous
event.
CFI: dismissed because of the Joint
Affidavit
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Gatchalian is entitled to
damages
HELD: At the time of the accident, she
was no longer employed in a public
school. Her employment as a purpose of transporting construction
substitute teacher was occasional and
episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute
teachers. She could not be said to
have in fact lost any employment after
and by reason of the accident. She
may not be awarded damages on the
basis of speculation or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic
surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person
is entitled to the physical integrity of
his or her body; if that integrity is
violated or diminished, actual injury is
suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as
possible in the condition that she was
before the mishap. A scar, especially
one on the face of the woman,
resulting from the infliction of injury
upon her, is a violation of bodily
integrity, giving raise to a legitimate
claim for restoration to her conditio
ante.
Moral damages may be awarded
where gross negligence on the part of
the common carrier is shown.
Considering the extent of pain and
anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical
injuries including the permanent scar
on her forehead, we believe that the
amount of P30,000.00 would be a
reasonable award. Petitioner's claim
for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in
fact even more modest.
OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS (PHILS),
INC., Petitioner, v. NESTOR N.
BARRETTO, doing business as N.N.B.
LIGHTERAGE, Respondent.
FACTS:
Barretto and petitioner Oceaneering
entered into a Time Charter
Agreement whereby the latter hired
the aforesaid barge for a renewable
period of thirty calendar days, for the
materials from Manila to Ayungon,
Negros Oriental.
Barrettos Bargeman, Eddie La Chica,
executed a Marine Protest, reporting
that the barge reportedly capsized in
the vicinity of Cape Santiago,
Batangas. Barretto apprised
Oceaneering of the supposed fact that
the mishap was caused by the
incompetence and negligence of the
latters personnel in loading the cargo
and that it was going to proceed with
the salvage, refloating and repair of
the barge.
Oceaneering caused its counsel to
serve Barretto a letter demanding the
return of the unused portion of the
charter payment. However, Barrettos
counsel informed Oceaneering that its
unused charter payment was withheld
by his client who was likewise seeking
reimbursement for the amount he
expended in salvaging, refloating and
repairing the barge.
Contending that the accident was
attributable to the incompetence and
negligence which attended the loading
of the cargo by Oceaneerings hired
employees, Barretto sought
indemnities for expenses incurred and
lost income before the RTC.
Alongside its claim for reimbursement
of the sums expended for the salvage
operation it conducted which was
denied for lack of evidence to prove
the same, Oceaneerings claim for the
value of its cargo was likewise denied
on the ground, among other matters,
that the same was not included in the
demand letters it served Barretto.
The CA reversed on the ground that
the agreement executed by the
parties, by its express terms, was a
time charter where the possession and
control of the barge was retained by
Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a
common carrier legally charged with
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods transported by him;
and, that the sinking of the vessel
created a presumption of negligence
and/or unseaworthiness which
Barretto failed to overcome.
Applying the rule, however, that actual
damages should be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the CA
denied Oceaneerings claim for the
value of its lost cargo and merely
ordered the refund of the money it
paid for the time charter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in
disallowing the claims for actual
damages.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: Actual damages
Actual or compensatory damages are
those damages which the injured party
is entitled to recover for the wrong
done and injuries received when none
were intended. Pertaining as they do
to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement, they are intended to
put the injured party in the position in
which he was before he was injured.
The rule is long and well settled that
there must be pleading and proof of
actual damages suffered for the same
to be recovered. In this regard,
Oceaneering correctly faulted the CA
for not granting its claim for actual
damages or, more specifically, the
portions thereof which were duly
pleaded and adequately proved before
the RTC. While concededly not
included in the demand letters
Oceaneering served Barretto, the
formers counterclaims for the value of
its lost cargo and salvaging expenses
were distinctly pleaded and prayed for
in the answer it filed.
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
PNOC V. CA (1998)
Lessons Applicable: Kinds of Damages
(Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
September 21, 1977 early morning:
M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its way
to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with
the vessel Petroparcel owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine
Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N.
Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at
fault .
Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo
praying for an award of P692,680.00
representing the value of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of
M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at
the legal rate plus 25% as attorneys
fees and later on amended to add the
lost value of the hull less the P200K
insurance and unrealized profits and
lost business opportunities .
During the pendency of the case,
PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted
in place of LSC as it acquired
Petroparcel.
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it
to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing
boat with interest plus P50K attorney's
fees and cost of suit.
CA: affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: W/N the damage was
adequately proven
HELD: YES. affirming with modification
actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for
lack of evidentiary bases therefor. P2M
nominal damages instead.
In connection with evidence which
may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy or incompetency or
admissibility, it is the safest policy to
be liberal, not rejecting them on
doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent,
for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration
of the court.
If they are thereafter found relevant or
competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring
them.
There are two kinds of actual or
compensatory damages:
-loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente)
-failure to receive as a benefit that
which would have pertained to him in
the case of profit-earning chattels,
what has to be assessed is the value
of the chattel to its owner as a going
concern at the time and place of the
loss, and this means, at least in the
case of ships, that regard must be had
to existing and pending engagements.
If the market value of the ship reflects
the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then
nothing can be added to that value in
respect of charters actually lost, for to
do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over.
If the ship is valued without reference
to its actual future engagements and
only in the light of its profit-earning
potentiality, then it may be necessary
to add to the value thus assessed the
anticipated profit on a charter or other
engagement which it was unable to
fulfill.
Damages cannot be presumed and
courts, in making an award must point
out specific facts that could afford a
basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are
borne proven through sole testimony
of general manager without objection
from LSC.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to
considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers
to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to
or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on
the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is `entitled to nominal
damages which, as the law says, is
adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered awarded
in every obligation arising from law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-
delicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded.
Damages in name only and not in fact
amount to be awarded as nominal
damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained
by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such
damages.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance
payments should diminish the total
value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint
considering that such payment is
causally related to the loss for which it
claimed compensation.