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TORTS AND DAMAGES

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

JOSUE ARLEGUI vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES GIL AND
BEATRIZ GENGUYON.
[G.R. No. 126437. March 6, 2002]

FACTS:
The object of the controversy is a residential apartment unit (no. 15)
located at the corner of Romualdez and Kalentong Streets in Mandaluyong
City.The said property was formerly owned by Serafia Real Estate,
Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as Serafia), a company owned by
Alberto, Alfonso and Simeon, all surnamed Barretto, and their siblings Rosa
B. Ochoa and Teresita B. Alcantara. For more than twenty (20) years, unit no.
15 was leased by Serafia to the spouses Gil and Beatriz Genguyon. In a letter
dated March 26, 1984, the Genguyon spouses, along with the other tenants
in the apartment building were informed by Alberto Barretto that Serafia and
its assets had already been assigned and transferred to A.B. Barretto
Enterprises.
The tenants formed an organization called the Barretto Apartment
Tenants Association. They elected officers from among themselves to
represent them in the negotiations with A.B. Barretto Enterprises for the
purchase of their respective apartment units. Among those elected were
Josue Arlegui as vice-president and Mateo Tan Lu as auditor of the
association.
Sometime thereafter, believing that negotiations were still ongoing, the
Genguyons were surprised to learn on January 23, 1987 that the unit they
were leasing had already been sold to Mateo Tan Lu. This notwithstanding,
the Genguyons continued to occupy the subject premises and paid the
rentals therefor.
The following year, or on July 7, 1988, the Genguyons were informed that
Mateo Tan Lu had sold the subject apartment unit to Josue Arlegui. Not long
thereafter, they received a letter from Arleguis lawyer demanding that they
vacate the premises.
For their part, the Genguyon spouses filed Civil Case No. 58185 against
the Barrettos, Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not a constructive trust existed between private respondents
and Tan Lu.
2.Whether or not Tan and Arlegui breached the trust reposed to them.
3.Whether or not Sps. Genguyo are entitled to damages.
HELD:
1. There was a trust created by law in favor of spouses Genguyons. The
spouses had fiduciary dependence on the officers who wing the were
conducting negotions in their behalf, that same (officers) would act with
goodfaith in relation to the trust and confidence reposed in them.

2. Tan Lu and Arlegui breached the trust reposed to them. By acquiring


for themselves the subject property without informing the spouses of the
progress of the negotions, or of their desire to purchase the said property.
Mateo Tan Lu and Arlegui did not act with the candor and honesty expected
to them.

3. There is no doubt that because of Tan Lu and Arleguis violation of the


trust and confidence reposed in them as officers and negotiators in behalf of
the tenants-members of the Association, damages have accrued upon
spouses Genguyons for which they must be indemnified. Article 19 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines exhorts the citizens in the correct exercise
of rights and performance of duties in this wise: Art. 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This
principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus
summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong).

The acts of Tan Lu and Arlegui directly violate the principles enunciated
in Art. 19 which declares that every person must practice justice, honesty
and good faith in his dealings with his fellowmen. That there was a valid pact
or agreement among the Association members and their entrusted officers
charged with the negotiations, is an accepted fact. As two of the three
entrusted officers charged with the negotiations, Tan Lu and Arlegui fall
within the purview of Art. 19 which is also implemented by Art. 21, New Civil
Code, a sequent of Art. 19, which declares that [A]ny person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
CLASSIFICATION OF TORTS

TORTFEASOR

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RITA


GUECO TAPNIO, CECILIO GUECO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

[G.R. No. L-27155. May 18, 1978]

FACTS:

Philam gen as surety, issued a bond in favor of Tapnio, to secure the


latters obligation to PNB Php 23371.79 plus 12% interest. Philam gen paid
the amount to PNB and seek indemnity from Tapnio. Tapnio refuse to pay
alleging that he was not liable to the bank because due to the negligence of
the latter, the contract of lease with Tuazon was rescinf=d which amounts to
Php 2800. Tapnio mortgage his standing crops and sugar quota to PNB.
Tapnio agreed to leased the sugar quota, in excess of his need to Tuazon
which was approved by the branch and vice president of PNB in the amount
of Php 2.8 picul. However, the bank directors disapproved the leased stating
that the amount should be Php 3 per picul, its market value. Tuazon ask for
reconsideration to the board which was not acted upon by the board, so the
lease was not consummated resulting to the loss of Php 2,800 which could
have earned by Tapnio. The trial court and CA ruled that the bank was liable
to Tapnio, hence the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PNB be held liable to Tapnio.


HELD:

A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for


torts, because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a
principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same
whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and
whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the
authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he
expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of
a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is
committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from
the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the
directors as the governing body.

I.CONCEPT OF FAULT

There is fault when a person acts in manner contrary to what should


have been done. The acts, the necessary care and precaution vary according
to the matter involved.
II.CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE

HEDY GAN y YU vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. L-44264. September 19, 1988]

FACTS:

In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy
Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila.
While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two
vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following
the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by
the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there
was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which
tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached
the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with
the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man
who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him
against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the
parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of
it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front,
the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck
sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old
man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gan was negligent therefore liable.


HELD:

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing


an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another
is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the
duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence.

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule.


"Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence."

Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not
guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.

THE UNITED STATES v. TEODORO JUANILLO.

[G.R. No. 7255. October 3, 1912. ]

FACTS:

Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the
town of Pavia to Santa Barbara, Province of Iloilo, at about 4 oclock on the
afternoon of April 23, 1911, by being struck by an automobile, of which the
appellant was the chauffeur. The contention of the prosecution is that the
death of the deceased was due to the reckless driving of the appellant, while
counsel for the defense insists that the unfortunate occurrence was purely an
accident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juanillo is guilty of negligence.

HELD:

Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a


relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary
care under the circumstances. The operator of an automobile is bound to
exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway
and commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to the use of such
vehicle. He is obliged to take notice of the conditions before him, and if it is
apparent that by an particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an
injury, it is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if within reasonable
care and prudence he can do so. In determining the degree of care an
operator of an automobile should use, when on the highway, it is proper to
take into consideration the place, presence or absence of other travelers, the
speed of the automobile, its seize, appearance, manner of movement, and
the amount of notice it makes, and anything that indicates unusual or
peculiar danger.

Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the powerful


machine, capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was
bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers,
who had a common right to the highway. A driver of an automobile, under
such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers
of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction,
and further more, it is absolutely under the power and control of the some
extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow
down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It is
probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or
person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to
understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the
automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile
driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and
prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances. The appellant
was aware of and is chargeable with the knowledge that the deceased and
his companions were simple country people and were lacking in the capacity
to appreciate and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a
high rate of speed, and he was bound to enlarge to a commensurate extent
the degree of vigilance and care necessary to avoid injuries which the use of
his machine mademoreimminent.

The negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in his


failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from
the collision. He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the deceased and
his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a
speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. Great care was
due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling
along the highway. When one comes through the highways with a machine of
such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use great
care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more
dangerous than a street car or even a railway car. These are propelled along
fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be safe is to keep off the
track. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual, and for
this reason is far more dangerous to the traveling public than either the
street car or the railway train. We do not feel at liberty, under the evidence,
to say that this defendant was free from reckless negligence. In failing to so
check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of him to
give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he
knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would
collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence but reckless negligence
in a marked degree.
III. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH JR.

[GR NO. L-12219. MARCH 15,1918]

FACTS:

December 12,1912,, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La


Union; the plaintiff was riding his pony over the said bridge. Before he had
gotten half wasy across, the defendant approached from the opposite
direction on automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per
hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew
his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two successive blasts, as it appaers to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of road.
When he had gottennear, then being no possibiloity of the horse getting
across the bridge, defendant quickly move on to the right; but in so doing
the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened abd turned its body across the bridge. The horse fell and its rider
thrown off with some violence. As a result, the horse died; Picart received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required attention
for several days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant in manuevering his car in the manner


described guilty of negligence as give rise to civil obligation to repair the
damage done.

HELD:

Defendant Smith is liable. The control of the situation had passed


entirely to the defendant, it was his duty to either stop the car or to take the
other side of the bridge, as there was no other person on the bridge. When
the defendant exposed the horse and the rider to such danger he was in the
eyes of law, negligent.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence n a particular


case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not
then he is guilty of negligence.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference


to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before hi. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
FAUSTO BARREDO vs.SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO

[G.R. No. L-48006 . July 8, 1942]

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia
and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On
July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor
of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and directly responsible
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

HELD:
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create
an action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal
law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased vs. REGINALD HILL, minor,
and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor.

[G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977]

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged criminally for
the killing of Agapito Elcano, son of plaintiffs Elcano spouses. At the time of
the killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was living with his father
Marvin and receiving subsistence from him. Reginald was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill coupled
with mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action for
damages against Reginald and his father arising from the killing of their son.
The case was dismissed by the lower court and plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was whether the father of the
minor who was already married but living with, and receiving subsistence
from said father was liable in damages for the crime committed by the minor.

ISSUE:
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald
in the criminal case.

HELD:
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil
negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law. It results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article 2176 is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration
of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.

Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is


demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason


behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. On the other hand the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does
not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can
give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while still a minor,
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the
parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our
considered view, Article 2170 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident
that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become subsidiary to that of his son.
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO
vs.THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO
VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL.
[G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973]

FACTS:

Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital,


hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference. August 4,
1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the
national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger
bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro
Tumala. Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization. Garcia et al. filed an action for
damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless,
grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car. RTC:
Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation
of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict
despite having a criminal action.

HELD:
The decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case the essential averments for a
quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of
the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the
collision
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice
and the fault or negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver
to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Petitioners never intervened in
the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused. It is, therefore, evident that by the
institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case,
and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. Petitioners
have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the
law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the
failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the
action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

PORFIRIO P. CINCO. v. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of


the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON.
LORENZO B. BARRIA, City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch,
ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO.
[G.R. No. L-33171. May 31, 1979]

FACTS:

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City


Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito,
the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto,
a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether of not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
HELD:
There can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action. Tnature and character of his
action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. The separate and
independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section
3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently.In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been
instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter. Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that
it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. The word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done.

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding


Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO
TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR.

[G.R. No. L-32599. June 29, 1979]


FACTS:

October 22,1969, 4oclock in the afternoon, a three-way vehicular


accident accident occured along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
The case against truck driver Montoy, Criminal Case was for causing damage
to the jeep owned by Salazar , in the amount of Php 1,604. The case against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar Criminal Case for causing damage to the Mercedes
Benz of the petitioner (Php 8,890). July 31,1970 the CFI of Bulacan finds the
accused Freddie Montoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence and sentence him to pay Php
972.50 and indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount as actual
damages. Accused Salazar is acquitted. August 22,1970 after the criminal
case, petioner filed a civil case against Salazar and Timbol. Saptember
9,1970 Timbol (truck driver) filed Motion to dismiss for it is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal case. September 12,1970 Judge dismissed the
complaint against Timbol for it is barred by prior judgment. Petitioner sought
before Court the review of that dismissal. January 30,1971 upon motion,
Judge also dismissed complaint against Salazar. The reasoned that while it is
true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 could be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense in which it
arose, NRC requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in
the criminal action; otherwise the same would be barred pursuant to Sec. 2
Rule 111. Petitioner Motion for reconsideration was denied, Judge suggesting
that issue be raised to a higher court for decisive interpretation of the rule.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the Civil Case is barred by prior judgment of the


criminal case.

2.Whether or not the Civil liability under Articlt 2177 requires


reservation.

HELD:
1. It is settled a rule that for the prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsquent case , the following must concur: 1. It must be a final judgment; 2.
It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and identity of cause of action; 3. It must be judgment on the merits;
4. There must be, between first and second actions, identity of parties,
identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action. The first three of
res judicata are present but not of identity. Petitioners cause of action
against Timbol in civi case is based on quasi- delict.

2. Petitioners cause of action being based on quasi-delict, the case may


proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of the result of
the criminal case. As provided in the Garcia case there is no need for
reservation to the criminal case.
IV. TORTS VS. CRIME

FAUSTO BARREDO vs.SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO

[G.R. No. L-48006 . July 8, 1942]

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia
and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On
July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor
of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and directly responsible
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

HELD:
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create
an action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal
law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
V. TORT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT; INSTANCES
WHEREIN A BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY GIVE RISE TO
A TORT:

JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

[G.R. No. L-12191. October 14, 1918]

FACTS:

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the
plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in
the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of
charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose
from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing
the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo
station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate
gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several
coaches. the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet
came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at
once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as


the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform


where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary
season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the
station for the shipment to the market.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD:

The Manila Railroad Co. Is liable for damages. Alighting from a moving
train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are
doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility
of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or
feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons
were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
lit. The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of
employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of
carriage].

But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in
the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured. The liability arising from extra-
contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that
is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS.

[G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966]

FACTS:

Rafael Carrascoso is a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48


Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28,
1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class",
but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first
class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
seat to the white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
the plane.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Carrascoso entitled to damages.

HELD:
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood
in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose."The willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict.

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BANK OF THE


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as
President of the said Bank, defendants.

[G.R. No. L-24837. June 27, 1968]

FACTS:

Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment


had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat
and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said
judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its
failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served
upon BPI in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-
Abrilles credits against the Bank were concerned. Upon receipt of the said
Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the
Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without
further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was
merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al,
prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the
plaintiff in that case. Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian
C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the
Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then
wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account
therein had already been garnished and that they are now constrained to
close his credit account with them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or the existence of a contract between the parties bars a


plaintiffs claim for damages based on torts.

HELD:

The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent
recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been
illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a
seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from
the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters part, for, although the
relation between a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and
nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. In view,
however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was
remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and
his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of
nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum
of P1,000, in addition to attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to
vindicate plaintiffs rights.

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. ANTONIO R. DE JOYA.

[G.R. No. L-25172. May 24, 1974]

FACTS:

Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of


the Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors 1 that an employee,
Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in
television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal. Nevertheless, in
September 1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a
company director, inquired about the trip and was assured by the respondent
that Taylor's expenses would be defrayed not by the company but by other
parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the respondent in a memorandum.

While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor


continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries
appeared in vouchers prepared upon the orders of, and approved by, the
respondent and were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks for the
employees of the corporation. The petitioner signed three of these checks on
November 27, December 15 and December 29, 1953. The others were
signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer)
who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him
letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed
P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies.

On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the
court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the
total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its
knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied
the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the
company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he
had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip which was for
the company's benefit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict .

HELD:

It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of


Appeals should be upheld. The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in
particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon
the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace
Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of
Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the unauthorized disbursements of
corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice
payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite
distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to the
damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact that he was
occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The
existence of a contract between the parties, as has been repeatedly held by
this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the
other and the consequent recovery of damages.
VI. TORT THROUGH INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT

C. S. GILCHRIST vs.E. A. CUDDY, ET AL.,JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and


MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA

[G.R. No. L-9356. February 18, 1915]

FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that on the 24th of April
he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered
on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day. A few days prior to this
Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in
Manila, saying that he had made other arrangements with his film. The other
arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo and his partner for
P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these
parties from showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May. Gilchrist filed
for injunction against these parties. Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for
damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist.

HELD:
Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for damages though they do not
know Gilchrist identity. Judgment is affirmed. Cuddy was liable in an action
for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt. The mere
right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing
Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights. Everyone has a right to
enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and
credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference,
disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of
competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by contract or
otherwise is interfered with. Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was
a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no
malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal
liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. The liability
of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to
violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been
one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the
Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or
omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall
be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article
which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. An
injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where
equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights
between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where
material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated
in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will
not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party
and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law.
Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason
of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film
Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to
estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would
likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. So
far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned,
which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which
Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances
justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court. The
remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition,
though such competition would involve the violation of a contract.
VII. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH JR.

[GR NO. L-12219. MARCH 15,1918]

FACTS:

December 12,1912,, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La


Union; the plaintiff was riding his pony over the said bridge. Before he had
gotten half wasy across, the defendant approached from the opposite
direction on automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per
hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew
his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two successive blasts, as it appaers to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of road.
When he had gottennear, then being no possibiloity of the horse getting
across the bridge, defendant quickly move on to the right; but in so doing
the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened abd turned its body across the bridge. The horse fell and its rider
thrown off with some violence. As a result, the horse died; Picart received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required attention
for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant in manuevering his car in the manner
described guilty of negligence as give rise to civil obligation to repair the
damage done.

HELD:

Defendant Smith is liable. The control of the situation had passed


entirely to the defendant, it was his duty to either stop the car or to take the
other side of the bridge, as there was no other person on the bridge. When
the defendant exposed the horse and the rider to such danger he was in the
eyes of law, negligent.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence n a particular


case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not
then he is guilty of negligence.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference


to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before hi. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-
Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC,
all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA
BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS,
Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and
Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-
BUSTAMANTE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO
DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO.
[G.R. No. 89880. February 6, 1991]

FACTS:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred


between a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda
passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear
seat.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died
as a result of the injuries they sustained.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger
bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due
to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted
from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,
which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or
pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the
hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck
skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby
residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court has properly and legally applied
the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case despite its own finding
that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto Montesiano was admittedly
negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in the
presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction.

HELD:

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent


Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance
as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of
the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability.

Pursuant to the new policy of this Court to grant an increased death


indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, their respective awards of
P30,000.00 are hereby increased to P50,000.00.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. THE


INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO.

[G.R. No. L-65295. March 10, 1987]

FACTS:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m.


private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he lived in
1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation.
During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two"
of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by
and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e.,
on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which
Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck
was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that
evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work
scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed
that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too
late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First


Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause
of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance shall be applied.

HELD:
The conclusion drawn from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He
was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that
was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. Nonetheless, we
agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was
a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the
one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is
quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car
with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.

Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to


determine whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors
that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the
nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and
gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased
diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by
the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is
to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To
accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the


comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru


her personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE,
EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO.

[G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.]

FACTS:

At about 7:00 oclock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and
Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin
Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way
to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. The group, numbering fifteen (15)
persons, rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also
the registered owner thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio
Capayacan to deliver some viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San
Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching the
highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a
speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a
speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and
Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while
the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively
damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time
on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently
remained in hiding. All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein
private respondents settled the case amicably under the "No Fault" insurance
coverage of PANTRANCO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear shall be applied against the
jepneey driver.

HELD:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident
which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of
the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,
supra]. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver, petitioner claims that the
original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident
and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident. It is petitioners
position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the lane
of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney
towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to himself or
his passengers.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance"
finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid
an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance
that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane
upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As held by
this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own
side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching
vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane
of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not
return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by
anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of
the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver Ramirez at the time of
the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the steering
wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepneys lane because there was a
steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is
belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was enough
space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger .
VIII. DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY


[G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907]

FACTS:
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron rails
from a barge to the companys yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke
his leg when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell on him. It appears
that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of the track that gave with the
weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak state of the rail but did nothing
to repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantics defense was
that Rakes injuries were caused by his own negligence in walking alongside
the car, instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were told to do.

ISSUES:

1.Whether Rakes was negligent.


2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes.
HELD:
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors when he
walked alongside the car instead of in front or behind it.
2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes will not totally bar
him from recovering anything from Atlantic, although the liability of the latter
will be mitigated as a result of Rakes contributory negligence. This is
because although Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the primary
cause of the accident was still the weak rails which Atlantic refused to repair.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining
factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemedequivalent for his own imprudence.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, may be
understood in two different senses: either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between
two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which cannot be
presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising
from the already existing obligation.

BERNAL and ENVERSO vs.J. V. HOUSE et.Al


[G.R. No. L-30741. January 30, 1930]

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was
held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious celebration.
After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, accompanied
by two other persons passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The
little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and
her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so
frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into
the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch
coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot
water.The Child was brought to the hospital but later on died. Dr. Benitez,
certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and
that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of
the chest & abdomen". The trial court found that the company was negligent
but dismissed the case having ruled that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory
negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff (Enverso) was guilty of contributory


negligence.

HELD:
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.
There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child
and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its
strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

IX. DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO


[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]

FACTS:

On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to
repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said media agua,
Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of
the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of
the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution of
Magno was that of the electric wire of the company.

HELD:

It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not
the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latters length of 6 feet.

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS,


GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL.

[G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993]

FACTS:

This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate


complaints for damages filed against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before
the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to
recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-
27 October 1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam
(Hydroelectric Plant) as a consequence, members of the household of the
plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were
washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October
1978.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the
now respondents (Rayo et. Al.,) was the negligence of the petitioners (NPC,
Chavez).

HELD:

From the mass of evidence extant in the record,it is so hold that the flash
flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters but by stored
waters suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to
the morning hours of October 27,1978.

It is declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by
the private respondents herein was the negligence of the petitioners, and
that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the
affected municipalities, was insufficient. The petitioners were guilty of
"patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in
the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the
opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all
but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and
carelessness."
X. DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR

THE SPOUSES AFRICA vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC.

[G.R. No. L-12986.March 31, 1966]

FACTS:
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service
station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the
hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring
houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their
owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second
as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire. Caltex and Mateo Boquiren were sued
for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor apply.

HELD:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies. . The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and
Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. Boquiren was an employee of Caltex. The
employees negligence was the cause of the fire which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen.
THE UNITED STATES vs.MARIANO CRAME
[G.R. No. L-10181.March 2, 1915]

FACTS:

That on or about the 10th day of February, 1914, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Mariano Crame, being then and there the
chauffeur of a motor vehicle, did then and there unlawfully, with reckless
imprudence and in violation of the regulations, conduct and drive the said
motor vehicle along Calle Herran in said city without using reasonable care
and diligence to prevent injury to persons and property and without paying
any attention to the pedestrians occupying and crossing said street, thus
colliding with, running over, and by his neglect and imprudence in the
management and lack of control thereof, causing the said automobile guided
and conducted by the said accused as aforesaid, to knock down, drag, and
run over the body of one George B. Coombs, a private in the United States
Army, who was then and there occupying and crossing the said Calle Herran,
thereby causing injuries, wounds, and bruises upon the person of the said
George B. Coombs, which said injuries, wounds, and bruises have deranged
the mental faculties of the said George B. Coombs and have incapacitated
him, the said George B. Coombs, from further performance of his duties as a
soldier of the said United States Army.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused to
Coombs.

HELD:
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE MORE THAN SUSTAINED.
The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was very close to him
is strong evidence of inattention to duty, especially since the street was wide
and unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from which a person can
dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the street was also well-lighted, so there is
no reason why Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached the
position in the street where he was struck down.
The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by any of the witnesses.
Moreover, it would have obscured his vision only for a moment. Besides, it is
the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle on public streets
and highways to use due care and diligence to see to it that persons who
may be crossing behind the moving vehicle are not run down by them.
It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the right-hand side of
the streetwhen the accident happened. According to the law of the road and
the custom ofthe country, he should have been on the left-hand side of the
street. According to witnesses there was abundant room for him to drive on
such side.
There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part of Coombs. At the
time he was struck, he had a right to be where the law fully protected him
from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving at
the time of injury. There is no evidence to show that the soldier was drunk at
the time of the accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not
negligence, nor does it establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. If ones conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and
prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. Where, in a criminal
prosecution against the driver of an automobile for running down and
injuring a pedestrian crossing a street, it appeared that at the time the injury
was produced, the injured person was where he had a right to be, that the
automobile was being driven on the wrong side of the street, and no warning
was given of its approach, it was properly held that there was a presumption
of negligence on the part of the driver and that the burden of proof was on
him to establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his
negligence.

PEDRO T. LAYUGAN vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT.

[G.R. No. 73998. November 14, 1988]


FACTS:

Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,


alleging that on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya,
the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with
Plate No. SU-730 which was parked along the right side of the National
Highway; that defendant's truck bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven recklessly
by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured
and hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and the
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated
so he had to use crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he supported his
family sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family is now being
supported by his parents and brother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not THE THE DOCTRINE OF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" is applicable in


the case.

HELD:

It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of
Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It
follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent
Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence
of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error.

Res ipsa loquitur as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:

The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that


defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality
causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident
was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be
inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of
accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of
alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d
133, 155. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under
exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence
was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.

The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable
to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on
the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall
be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence
as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury
complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence
clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions
will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the
circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no inference of
defendant's

Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180,


paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

XI. DOCTRINE OF PRESUMED NEGLIGENCE

MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs.ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al.,

[G.R. No. L-29745.June 4, 1973]

FACTS:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-
appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey,
semi-concrete edifice

The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400
square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters
in width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-
escape ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on
the wall .

At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in
a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the
institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing
the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!'
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the
registrar, tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the
time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not
get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across
the street. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the
instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students the
above admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three students in
order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was
near the stairway, stood up and tried with outstretched arms to stop the
students from rushing and pushing their way to the stairs. The panic,
however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the
few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.

Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was
over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tegue was presumed negligent and that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez.

HELD:
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference
that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to
be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will
be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.

The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes


negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the
state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect
to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed,
when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard
is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence
of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has
been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would
have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the
subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate
that injury would result from such violation. As thus projected the violation of
the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be
the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes
which produced the injury complained of.

XII. INSTANCES WHEREIN INJURED PARTYS OWN ACT CAUSES THE INJURY

IGNACIO DEL PRADO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.


[G.R. No. L-29462.March 7, 1929]
FACTS:
the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City
for the conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of November 18,
1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in charge of
car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the
accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza
Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and
letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a
moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had
proceeded only a short distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del
Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being made from
the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and
the movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front
entrance of the car at the moment when the car was passing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not del Prado own act causes the injury.
HELD:

The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident


and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.It is obvious that the
plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the
proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury
was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A
person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury
from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot
fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in
view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is
planted safely on the platform. Again, the situation before us is one where
the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of
the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the
proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be
analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party . The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the
accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO


[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]

FACTS:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to
repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said media agua,
Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of
the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of
the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remoquillos own act causes the injury.

HELD:

The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media
agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have
been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both
hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms
with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. It is clear
that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the
electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution. In view of all the foregoing, complaint filed
against the Company is dismissed.
XIII. EFFECT OF MINORITY
DAVID TAYLOR vs.THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
COMPANY
[G.R. No. L-4977.March 22, 1910]

FACTS:

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel


Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual
interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in
wandering about the company's premises. They walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the
cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each
has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of
the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find,
hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After
crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9
years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then
made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires
into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break
the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not
find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the
cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when
the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel
had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to
such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not minority affects liability .
What are the effects of minority.

HELD:

As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general
rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The
care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests the
doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve
defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be
attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his
entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or
invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said
to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he
undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point,
which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the
doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid,
although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous
cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the
plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender
years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature
or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail
to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and
indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the
very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the
ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability
will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the
age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may
be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under
the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of
the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively
presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain
responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of
much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his
own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the
provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to
be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible
therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8
and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose
which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14
may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may
consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females
of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O.,
No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the
sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be
true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.

XIV. DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2197 DAMAGES MAY BE: MANTLE

AGUSTINO B. ONG YIU vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and


PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.

[G.R. No. L-40597. June 29, 1979]

FACTS:

On August 26, 1967, petitioner was a fare paying passenger of respondent


Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), on board Flight No. 463-R, from Mactan Cebu,
bound for Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend the trial of Civil Case No.
1005 and Spec. Procs. No. 1125 in the Court of First Instance, Branch II,
thereat, set for hearing on August 28-31, 1967. As a passenger, he checked
in one piece of luggage, a blue "maleta" \The plane left Mactan Airport,
Cebu, at about 1:00 o'clock P.M., and arrived at Bancasi airport, Butuan City,
at past 2:00 o'clock P.M., of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner claimed his
luggage but it could not be found. According to petitioner, it was only after
reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended to by the porter
clerk, Maximo Gomez, which, however, the latter denies, At about 3:00
o'clock P.M., PAL Butuan, sent a message to PAL, Cebu, inquiring about the
missing luggage, which message was, in turn relayed in full to the Mactan
Airport teletype operator at 3:45 P.M. that same afternoon. It must have been
transmitted to Manila immediately, for at 3:59 that same afternoon, PAL
Manila wired PAL Cebu advising that the luggage had been over carried to
Manila aboard Flight No. 156 and that it would be forwarded to Cebu on
Flight No. 345 of the same day. Instructions were also given that the luggage
be immediately forwarded to Butuan City on the first available flight . At 5:00
P.M. of the same afternoon, PAL Cebu sent a message to PAL Butuan that the
luggage would be forwarded on Fright No. 963 the following day, August 27,
196'(. However, this message was not received by PAL Butuan as all the
personnel had already left since there were no more incoming flights that
afternoon.

On September 13, 1967, petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for


damages for breach of contract of transportation with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch V, docketed as Civil Case No. R-10188, which PAL
traversed. After due trial, the lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad
faith and with malice and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages in
the sum of P80,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, attorney's fees of
P5,000.00, and costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Agustino Ong Yui is entitled to an award of moral


and exemplary damages.

HELD:

From the facts of the case, PAL had not acted in bad faith. Bad faith means a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It was the
duty of PAL to look for petitioner's luggage which had been miscarried. PAL
exerted due diligence in complying with such duty.

In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith,


petitioner is not entitled to moral damages.

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental


anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act of omission.

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for


awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. In contracts, as provided


for in Article 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages can be granted if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner, which has not been proven in this case.

The liability, however, of PAL for the loss, in accordance with the stipulation
written on the back of the ticket, is limited to P100.00 per baggage, plaintiff
not having declared a greater value, and not having called the attention of
the defendant on its true value and paid the tariff therefor.While it may be
true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless
bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger
regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is
what is known as a contract of "adhesion", in regards which it has been said
that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of
contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not
entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.

ARTICLE 2199, ARTICLE 2200

GEO. W. DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES


AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET AL.,
[G.R. No. L-13505. February 4, 1919]

FACTS:
DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39
PHIL587
FACTS:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated
herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4,000.
They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias title to
the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title
issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out
that the property measured 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she
initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole
tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount
and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for
specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to
Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos
(Recoletos), was a religious corporation, which owned an estate immediately
adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that
Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and
ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily
subject to the influence of other people. Father Sanz knew of the existence of
the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire
tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the
ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance
of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery of
the Torrens title. Daywalt claims that because of the interference of the
Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the
sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar mill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for damages.
HELD:
Recoletos is not liable, defendant believed in good faith that the contract
could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be
carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was
prompted by no mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered
the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence
and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But the idea that
they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire
to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the
land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff cant be
credited.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot
become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the
contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. Hence, in order to
determine the liability of the Recoletos, there isfirst a need to consider the
liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from
Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special
damages which were notwithin the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the
subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to
Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable.

FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL., vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

[G.R. No. L-22415. March 30, 1966]


FACTS:

Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No. 2 of Pan American


World Airways hereinafter otherwise called PAN-AM from Tokyo to San
Francisco on May 24, 1960 were made with
PAN-AM on March 29, 1960, by "Your Travel Guide" agency, specifically, by
Delfin Faustino, for then Senator Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his
son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter, Mrs. Alfredo
Montelibano, Jr., (Milagros Lopez Montelibano). PAN-AM's San Francisco head
office confirmed the reservations on March 31, 1960.

As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines on


May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo at 5:30 P.M. of that day. As soon as they
arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine Embassy
to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations
for that evening's flight. For the given reason that the first class seats therein
were all booked up, however, PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister
Busuego that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in
that trip as first class passengers. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first
class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo
office, but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for
them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight unless they
took the tourist class therein.

Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against
PAN-AM on June 2, 1960 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lopez et al is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

HELD:

It is well to state at the outset those rules and principles. First, moral
damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil Code). Second, in addition to
moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). And, third, a written contract
for an attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).

At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of


its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been
cancelled. An additional indication of this is the fact that upon the face of the
two tickets of record, namely, the ticket issued to Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. on
May 21, 1960 and that issued to Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., on May 23,
1960 , the reservation status is stated as "OK". Such willful-non-disclosure of
the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood and
not simply the erroneous cancellation itself is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above-stated, in
this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.

First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach


in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet
they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to
be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them,
only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to
travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as
such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual
undertaking.

Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and
therefore his humiliation. Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were
travelling as immediate members of the family of Senator Lopez. As such
they likewise shared his prestige and humiliation. Although defendant
contends that a few weeks before the flight they had asked their reservations
to be charged from first class to tourist class which did not materialize due
to alleged full booking in the tourist class the same does not mean they
suffered no shared in having to take tourist class during the flight.

In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to


sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by
defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find it just to award P75,000.00
as exemplary or corrective damages.

The award in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, are the following: (1)
P200,000.00 as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs, thus: P100,000.00
for Senate President Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez; P50,000.00 for his wife
Maria J. Lopez; P25,000.00 for his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; and
P25,000.00 for his daughter Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; (2) P75,000.00 as
exemplary or corrective damages; (3) interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on the moral and exemplary damages aforestated, from December
14, 1963, the date of the amended decision of the court a quo, until said
damages are fully paid; (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) the costs.

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL. vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.

[G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973]

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, the Zulueta spouses and their daughter were


passengers aboard PAN-AM plane from Honolulu to Manila, the first
leg of whcih was Wake Island. As the plane landed on the said
island, the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a
stop over of about 30 minutes. Mr. Zulueta having found the need to
relieve himslef, went to the mens comfort room at the terminal
building,but finding full of soldiers, he walked down the beach some
100 yards away. Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the
passengers had boarded the plane, Zueltas abscence was noticed.
The take-off was accordingly delayed and search him was made.
Minutes later, Zulueta walked back towards the ramp of the plane.
The captain and the employees of Pan-Am, with ugly stares
subjected Zulueta to abusive and insulting laguage with highly
scournful reference to him as a monkey. Mr. Zulueta was arbitrarly
not allowed to board the plane and was left at the Wake Island. The
Rizal CFI awarded Zulueta actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Zulueta is entitled to damages


HELD:

The passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They


have the right to be treated by the carriers employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious languange,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

ARTICLE 2205 DAMAGES FOR LOSS OR IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING


CAPACITY

HUGO BORROMEO vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND


LIGHT CO.,

[G.R. No. L-18345 December 5, 1922]

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1920, electric car No. 203 of the defendant
company was running along M. H. del Pilar Street of the city of Manila, and
on arriving at the intersection of that street and Isaac Peral it stopped to
receive passenger. At that moment the plaintiff approached the car with his
two children, 12 and 16 years old, respectively, and putting his two children
on board the car first, he proceeded to follow, but in attempting to board he
fell off and was dragged some distance by the car, one of the rear wheels
passing over his left foot. As a result of this accident, plaintiff's left foot was
amputated, making it necessary for him to use an artificial foot in order to be
able to walk.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant damages for
the injury sustained by him by reason of the accident.

The sum of P5,400 awarded by the trial court to plaintiff as damages is made
up to the expense incurred for hospital, medicine, and physician's fees on
account of this accident.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Hugo Borromeo is entitled to damages for the loss or


impairment of earning capacity.

HELD:

The obligation to indemnify for injury caused by negligence under article


1902 of the Civil Code, includes the two kinds of damages specified in article
1106 of the same Code; to wit, damages for the loss actually sustained and
for the profit which the injured party may have failed to
realized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was chief engineer of
the merchant steamer San Nicolas with a monthly salary of P375, and that
having lost his left foot, thereby necessitating the use of an artificial foot in
order to be able to walk, he can no longer be employed as a marine engineer
on any vessel, and, as a matter of fact, the Collector of Customs has refused
to grant him a license to follow his profession as marine engineer. It also
appears that the plaintiff, who is 45 years old, has been engaged in this
profession for sixteen years (since 1904), and that he knows no other
profession whereby he can earn his living. It is evident that this damage
must also be indemnified. The plaintiff's incapacity to continue in the
practice of his profession as marine engineer has put an end to one of his
activities and has certainly destroyed a source - the principal
source - of his professional earnings in the future. Taking into account the
age of the plaintiff and the salary he derived from this profession from the
exercise of which he has been deprived, we fix this future damage at
P2,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

JUANA SOBERANO and JOSE B. SOBERANO vs. MANILA RAILROAD


COMPANY, through the Acting General Manager, Colonel Salvador T.
Villa; THE BENGUET AUTO LINE, through the Superintendent, Mr.
Casiano Rivera; and SANTIAGO CACCAM, Driver,
[G.R. No. L-19407. November 23, 1966]
FACTS:

In the morning of March 8, 1955 in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Juana Soberano


boarded bus No. 155, with plate No. TPU-5994, of the Benguet Auto Line
(BAL), a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Co. (MRR), driven by Santiago
Caccam, bound for Baguio City. In that trip, Juana brought with her 3,024
chicken eggs to be sold in Baguio City, and some personal belongings which
she needed in that trip. About three kilometers away from Baguio City, along
the Naguilian road, the bus hit a stone embankment, causing it to fall into a
65-foot deep precipice, resulting in death to two of its passengers and
serious physical injuries to Juana and loss and destruction of all her
belongings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juana Soberano entitled to damages for loss or impairment


of her earning capacity.

HELD:

In the case at bar, the nature and extent of the physical injuries suffered by
Juana Soberano and thereafter effects upon her life and activities, are by
three reputable physicians declared that Juana Soberano suffered
comminuted fracture in the left mandible near the articulation, cracked
fracture in the right temporal bone, crushed fractures both scapular, and
fracture in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ribs. As a result of these injuries she suffered
and would continue to suffer limitation of mouth opening, bad approximation
of the jaw alignment which is drawn inside, limitation of neck and shoulder
movements with numbness on the right side of the face and right and left
side of the body, disturbance in vision, and poor mastication resulting in
indigestion. Dr. Poblete further testified that she will be "abnormal and
naturally she could not be expected to live a normal life." Dr. Floirendo
declared that she suffers from pain along the cheeks on both sides of her
face, double vision, and paralysis of the ocular muscles due to partial
disequilibrium of the eye muscles.

No doubt that the resultant physical handicaps would entail for Juana
Soberano a loss of positive economic values. In fact, they will greatly
adversely affect her occupation as a pending merchant which she has been
since 1950 , earning from 1950 to March 8, 1955, when the accident
happened, an average annual net income of about P1,500. It is to be
assumed that had the interruption to her occupation through defendant's
wrongful act not occurred, she would continue earning this average income.
Considering all the facts detailed above, this Court is of the opinion that the
sum of P5,000 in compensatory damages awarded to her for loss of earning
capacity is inadequate; the amount should be increased to P15,000.

She should also be awarded the sum of P45.35, representing unrealized


profits from the 3,024 chicken eggs which she brought with her in the trip
and which were destroyed. She brought those eggs to be sold in Baguio City.
She bought them at nine centavos each, was to sell them in Baguio City to
definite customers at an agreed price of ten and a half centavos each, or
with a profit of one and a half centavos per egg.

On the other damages, the lower court rightly denied the claim for moral
damages as far as Jose Soberano is concerned. In case of physical injuries,
moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next
of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary.

With respect to the claim of Juana Soberano for moral damages, the rule is
well-settled in this jurisdiction that in cases of breach of contract of carriage,
moral damages are recoverable only "where the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith" (art. 2220, N.C.C.), and the terms fraud and bad
faith have reference to "wanton, reckless, oppressive, malevolent conduct",
or, in the very least, to "negligence so gross as to amount to malice." (Fores
Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959; Necesito, etc. v. Paras,et al., L-10605-
10606, June 30, 1958).

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING DAMAGES FOR DEATH


OF A PERSON

SOFRONIO G. ALCANTARA, ET AL. vs. PATRICIO SURRO and MANILA


ELECTRIC COMPANY

[G.R. No. L-4555. July 23, 1953]

FACTS:
On November 24, 1945, Surro was a chauffeur of the Manila Electric
Company who, at about 7:50 a.m. of that day, was in-charge of driving
passenger truck No. 50 of said company, along Rizal Avenue of this City of
Manila, north bound; that on that occasion said truck was following
passenger truck No. 55 of the same company; that when both these truck
were approaching the intersection of Rizal Avenue and Blumentritt Streets,
the traffic policemen posted at said intersection ordered the vehicles coming
from the south of Rizal Avenue to stop in order to let those from Blumentritt
to pass; that the chauffeur of Meralco truck No. 55 forthwith stopped his car,
and by so doing enabled one Hermenegildo Co to board the same; that this
man had hardly grasped the hand rails and set his right foot on the first step
of the rear step board of truck No. 55, when truck No. 50, driven by the
accused, closed in and bumped the former truck from behind, with the result
that the front bumper of appellant's truck struck said Hermenegildo Co who
was thus crushed between the two Meralco autobuses Nos. 55 and 50; and
that Hermenegildo Co fell down unconscious and was taken to the Chinese
General Hospital where he died a few minutes later in that day due to
"shock, secondary to severe fracture of the pelvis, of the left leg, with
evisceration of the intestines," caused by the crush. An action for collection
of damages then filed by the heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the factors considered by the lower court in determining


the indemnity under consideration are reasonable and within the realm
sanctioned bylaw and precedents.

2. Whether they had been properly applied to the particular case under
consideration.

HELD:
The factors considered by the lower court in determining the indemnity
under consideration are reasonable and within the realm sanctioned by law
and precedents.

The factors that were considered by the lower court in fixing the indemnity
awarded to the plaintiffs in view of the death of their father are: (1) the
tender ages of the plaintiffs at the time of death ranging from 5 to 13
years; (2) the age and life expectancy of the deceased;(3) the state of health
of the deceased at the time of death; (4) the earning capacity of the
deceased; (5)the actual pecuniary damages; (6) the pain and suffering of the
deceased and the plaintiffs; and (7) the pecuniary situation of the party
liable, as contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 284. It should be noted
that while the lower court elaborated on those factors in an effort to reach a
fair and reasonable conclusion as regards the indemnity to be awarded to
the plaintiffs, not all of them were actually taken into account; only a few
were considered, such as the salary which the deceased would have received
during the years 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949, the physical and moral
suffering of the plaintiffs for the loss of their father, and the expenses
actually incurred as a necessary incident of his death.

The factors considered were properly applied to the particular case under
consideration. The item of P18,000 was arrived at by considering the salary
to which the deceased would have been entitled had he survived the years
1946, 1947,1948 and 1949.

This finding is reasonable considering the life expectancy of the deceased.


The records show that the deceased was 39 years old at the time of his
death and according to the American Experience Table of Mortality, he had a
life expectancy of 28.90 years. Yet, the lower court did not take this duration
as basis, but limited its scope to four years. This action of the court is fair
and reasonable. The rule is that "The introduction of mortality tables is not
absolutely essential to prove the life expectancy of a deceased or his
beneficiary, and if introduced they are not conclusive, and the jury are not
bound by them. The value of these tables when applied to a particular case,
it is said, must depend largely upon other circumstances, such as the state of
health, habits, and the manner of life, and the social condition of the person
injured." (25 C.J.S., 1299-1300.) This is what the lower court has done.
The other items awarded to the plaintiffs such as the sum of P5,000 as moral
and "patrimonial" damages for their physical and moral sufferings, and the
sum of P2,155 as actual expenses, should not be disturbed since they are
supported by proof and precedents.

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A.


QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS

[G.R. No. L-25499.February 18, 1970]

FACTS:

At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class
passenger bus owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-
14871-Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for
Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos,
Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55
o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was nearing the northern approach of the
Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart
filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the
hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the
windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet
long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield
and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact,
fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left
eye and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other
multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to
severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus going in the
opposite direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of
the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal
police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the scene to
investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other
injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought
them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical
assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at
3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to
cerebral injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in in adopting the formula in computing
for the amount of damages.

HELD:

The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors,
namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents
should be fixed.

The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was
concurred in by the Court of Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio
Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years he being over 29 years of
age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his
demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted
in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality.

The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased


person has thereforeno fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been
said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of
a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the
deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.'

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in
fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is
not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has
been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a
purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of
Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon
the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.

At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with
the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private
respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that
said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the
support, they received or would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of
that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own
living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been
consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's
estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or
his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own
living.3 Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire
earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the
beneficiary would have received.In other words, only net earnings, not gross
earning, are to be considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income6 and less living and
other incidental expenses.

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