2016 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural
features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources
form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded
as an archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos

and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of

Islands (KGI) and Scarborough Shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from
the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region IV-B, Province of

Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough reef, Panatag

Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly
rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of
Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the

Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western
section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

- RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration of the archipelago,
including the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more
compliant with the UNCLOS.

- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for
archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the
Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as regime of
islands. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly
triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles
rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands or naturally

formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. The
principle forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the area because
no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands. The islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.-

- UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions
delineation of internal waters.- Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under
Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49[1]),
the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.

- UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multi-

lateral treaty regulating, among others, sea use rights over maritime zones (i.e. the territorial
waters (12 nautical miles from the baselines), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles from the
baseline), exclusive economic zones (200 nautical miles from the baselines) and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades long negotiation among UN
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

- UNCLOS defines major zones where different standards, rights and rules are
applicable:

- internal waters : all waters landward of the baselines (e.g. low-water line)and all
harbours (Any law in force in the country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
internal waters and the airspace above its internal waters. The right of innocent passage
does generally not exist in the internal waters.)

- territorial waters : the sea within a distance of 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the
baselines (Any law in force in the country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
territorial waters and the airspace above its territorial waters. The right of innocent passage
shall exist in the territorial waters. In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater
vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.)

- contiguous zone : the sea beyond the territorial waters but within a distance of twenty-
four nautical miles (~44 km) from the baselines (Within its contiguous zone and the
airspace above it, the country shall have the right to exercise all the powers which may be
considered necessary to prevent contravention of any fiscal law or any customs, emigration,
immigration or sanitary law and to make such contravention punishable.)

- maritime cultural zone : the sea beyond the territorial waters but within a distance of
twenty-four nautical miles (44 km) from the baselines (Subject to any other law the country
shall have, in respect of objects of an archaeological or historical nature found in the
maritime cultural zone, the same rights and powers as it has in respect of its territorial
waters.)

- exclusive economic zones (EEZ): the sea beyond the territorial waters but within a
distance of two hundred nautical miles (367 km) from the baselines (Subject to any other
law the country shall have, in respect of all natural resources in the exclusive economic
zone, the same rights and powers as it has in respect of its territorial waters.)

- continental shelf : comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer
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edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power of a
nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy
premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground
occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises
belong.

- Kalayaan Island Group

a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
f) RA 3046 (demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State)
g) RA 5446 (reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo
h) RA 9552

- Scarbororough Shoal Philippine Claim Basis:

1. is based on the juridical criteria established by public international law on the lawful
methods for the acquisition of sovereignty. Among the criteria (effective occupation,
cession, prescription, conquest, and accretion), the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) has asserted that the country exercised both effective occupation and
effective jurisdiction over the shoal, which it terms Bajo de Masinloc, since its
independence.

2. The DFA also claims that the name Bajo de Masinloc (translated as "under Masinloc")
itself identifies the shoal as a particular political subdivision of the Philippine Province of
Zambales, known as Masinloc. As basis, the Philippines cites the Island of Palmas Case,
where the sovereignty of the island was adjudged by the international court in favor of the
Netherlands because of its effective jurisdiction and control over the island despite the
historic claim of Spain. Thus, the Philippines argues that the historic claim of China over
the Scarborough Shoal still needs to be substantiated by a historic title, since a claim by
itself is not among the internationally recognized legal basis for acquiring sovereignty over
territory.

3. The Philippine government argues that since the legal basis of its claim is based on the
international law on acquisition of sovereignty, the Exclusive Economic Zone claim on the
waters around Scarborough is different from the sovereignty exercised by the Philippines in
the shoal.

4. President Ferdinand Marcos, by virtue of the Presidential Decree No. 1596 issued on
June 11, 1978 asserted that islands designated as the Kalayaan Island Group and comprising
most of the Spratly Islands are subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines, and by virtue
of the Presidential Decree No. 1599 issued on June 11, 1978 claimed an Exclusive
Economic Zone up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) from the baselines from which their
territorial sea is measured.

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- Key Points on Permanent Court of Arbitrations Verdict on the PH-China Dispute
over Scarborough Shoal: On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal agreed unanimously with
the Philippines. In its award, it concluded that there is no evidence that China had
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources, hence there was "no
legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the nine-dash line. The tribunal also
judged that China had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment", and that it had
violated Philippines sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by interfering with
Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, for example restricting the traditional fishing
rights of Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal.

- Basis of claim over Sabbah: under Section 2 of RA 5446- The definition of the
baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory
of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

- Republicanism

- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by
the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue
Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive privilege -Neri vs.
Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008)

- Because the three great powers have been by constitutional design ordained in this
respect, each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within the
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. Thus, the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and
the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law (Belgica vs. Ochoa).

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and
executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been
disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official
personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and
provide a system of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act.
No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the
exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive
functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro

Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
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 Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).

Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)

Tests of valid delegation:

1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.

- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335,
February 11, 2014- In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative
power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to prevent
the delegation from running riot.

- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by

generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs. Ermita,

462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of
customary law (Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule derived
from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.

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- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 - Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a
result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
"General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a
process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied
in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill
of Rights

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8, 2010- At this

time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlines in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find
basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Xxx Using even the most liberal lenses, these
Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best - de lege refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft
law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amounts to no more
than well-meaning desires, without support of either State practice or opinio juris.

- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted principles of International
Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local

courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to
be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
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should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the
principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the
land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It is
indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.
Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interest.

- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead
allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

- Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014- Conception refers to the moment of
fertilization and the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. Xxx Only those contraceptives that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.xxx ection 7 of RH law which excludes parental
consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had miscarriage is anti-
family and violates Section 12 of Art. II. Also, Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a
fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of
Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

- Arigo vs Swift, GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014- The general rule on states immunity from suit applies
in this case. First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners
claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

- Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any
judgment against these officials would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity in
correlation with the principle of States as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non imperium bars
the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

- The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the

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territorial sea. Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy,
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans,
which is codified in UNCLOS. As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to
join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part
XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has nothing to do
with the acceptance by the US of customary international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio) Hence, non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear international
responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.

- As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned from suit,
there is no way damages which resulted from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to
petitioners.

- In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person charged
with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible
for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan.

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose
taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state of an imperium in
imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise
dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14,
2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of the Philippine territory for independence.

- An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish

durable links. Xxx In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually
been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
Xxx The concept of Association is not recognized under the 1987 constitution.

- Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270- It should be emphasized
that autonomy granted to local governments is not to be understood as independence.

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016- As a matter of law,
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration
is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. xxx Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.xxx Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
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The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. xxx it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.

- Natural born: Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means
that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of
the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and
a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013-
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the State to its citizens, It likewise demands
the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country.

- The act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. Xxx The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens citizenship issue to attack.

- Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007- Naturalization signifies
the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him
or her the privileges of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws, there are three ways
by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473 , as amended;
and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.

- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of
birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate
against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons citizenship may be done
through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen
of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority.

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- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the evolvement from election of
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration
of the right to Philippine citizenship.

- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the
right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

- Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. CA 625- election within reasonable time is 3 years
from reaching the age of majority

- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed
forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing
for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA
8171, the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was
filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No.
125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parents lost their Philippine citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and

registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of
Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite
in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones application for

repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was

originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as natural born Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63,

otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)-
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including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated.

- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The
phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance
(especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with
dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance
contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme

Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship
having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before
running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin
requirements to cases which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized
citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the
present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements
in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles and Mercado
Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public
office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the
candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing
all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Mercado case was
decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet
enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears
to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence
of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a
natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships,
he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
11
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No.
9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No.
9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The
law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must be emphasized that R.A.
No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public
office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso
facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings
in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides
for more requirements.

- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M.
Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave
of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore their
good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited by

the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the
Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a
third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one.
Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person
possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which
in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a
German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala,
which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties
on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm
to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with
Liechtenstein.
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*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989

- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act
No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.
9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes
dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs.
COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the
Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between

legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a
distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative
of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When

citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
1
decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a
persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is a
party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants Philippine citizenship by

administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1,

2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition
of permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation on ones
status as a resident of the Philippines.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law.

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural

requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA 8189
(Voters Registration Act of 1996).

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is

synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines,
as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an individuals
permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a
new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given
time.
1
- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception to the six-
month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual

citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

- Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is synonymous to

domicile, not necessarily with a persons home address. A man may have several places
of residence but has only one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with
no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile for him.

- There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of originthat is, a child follows
the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice
made freely by a person of legal age.

- Domicile of choice imports not only the intention to reside in one fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent for business or
pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return. Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10,
2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question of fact. One intends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus revertendi).

- Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a persons domicile: First,

everyone must always have one of the three kinds of domicile; second, once established, a
domicile remains the same until a new one is acquired; and third, a person can have only
one domicile at any given time.

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an
intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

- Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired the domicile (and
citizenship) of her parents who, according to generally-accepted principles of law, are
presumed to be Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she married an
American and moved to and worked in the United States, she lost her domicile of origin
and followed the domicile of her husband in America. When she and her husband moved
back for good here after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new domicile of

1
choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired it depends, on her clear intention,
conduct and physical presence in the new location.

- In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held that the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the Constitutions residence qualification requirement.
The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos made an honest mistake in writing
seven months residence in her certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period
less than the constitutional requirement of not less than one year for that position.

- Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held that residency is
not dependent on citizenship because even a foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.

- More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a former Filipino who
was naturalized abroad may choose to reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the
reacquisition of citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.

- Said the Supreme Court: [I]n order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur: 1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, 2) an intention to
remain there, and 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.

- Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the abandonment of a
home in Australia, renunciation of Australian citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and settling down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an intent to change domicile
for good.

- Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the use of an
American passport after a renunciation of American citizenship effectively reverses such
renunciation and disqualifies one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship
Law from being elected to a public office.

- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition
of permanent resident status abroad constitutes abandonment of his domicile and residence
in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones status as a
resident of the Philippines.

- But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 have the effect
of restoring his Philippine domicile?

- A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay in the

Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence from the recovered domicile does not
have the effect of removing him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus
manendi et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)

ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

1
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections for
President, V-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general
rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are
prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of
proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by
RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second
test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that
the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in
all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the
past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate
and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public convenience and
welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such
as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed
rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide
the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making
authority under RA No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling the details which Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing
rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect
of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, September

1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate
under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The intent and will
to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is simply
to execute the legislative policy.

1
- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their
effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of
presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. It can
be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers.

- The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-making authority in

implementing and executing constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are
constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11, 2009-
Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a
prerogative of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2,
2009- The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions
of the CHED under RA 7722.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress cannot
validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts.
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and
to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May

4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for
the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends
only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A.
No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums
other than the Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public
disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No.
7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups

- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000;
Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article
of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in
the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA 7941
mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of
all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of
the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3)
1
the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional;
and (4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in
relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.

- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats
for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.

- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-
list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the
55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats
in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional Commission

adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-
list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
1
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and
this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However,
we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

- ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013- In

determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and
is linked to a political party through a coalition.

- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented

or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.

- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track

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record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the marginalized
and underrepresented. Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy
for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and
their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.

- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no specific

provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum population that must compose
legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing
mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly situated.

- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In this case, there is no official
record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the
May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislation district of its own under
Section 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution.

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that Ang
Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards
that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate (1) past subordination
or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic,
attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or
economic powerlessness.
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has been historically
disadvantaged and discriminated against because of negative public perception, and has
even alleged acts of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by
reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that the magnitude of
opposition against petitioners participation in the party list system is, by itself,
demonstrative of the sectors lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed
legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been
languishing in Congress.

- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) The history of the
provision granting Senators and Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
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- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not
necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.

- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression

without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecnoming of a member thereof (Osmea vs.
Pendatun).

- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did not
relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a private
organization merely performing public functions, and that the PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship
may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress.
NRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a
voluntary organization that does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the
government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can
validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the members. The base in computing majority is
normally the total membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply means the greater
number or more than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate.
(Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the
Constitution provides that the Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does
not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The defeated senator (s) in
the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the minority.

- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts

cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a
constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House of

Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not
assume jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not thereby
amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his
case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the
people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and
movement.

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- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of
congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only
invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by
correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague is distinct

from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for
misbehavior as a member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate

validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the
powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in
which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted
into office.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles &
Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications, ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.

- RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. - clearly under law

and jurisprudence, it is the State thru its reps. Designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would
operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible.
(Aug. 23, 2011).

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the congressional

elections, the remedy of those who may assail ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification
or disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002- Since petitioner
(Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second
Division suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was
not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the 2 nd Division.
The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for
the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the
4th District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution
of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his
motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.
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- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election, returns and
qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate
of candidacy.

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President,
V-President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or

election returns. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been
made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of
ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET

operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara
vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of congressional election
contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

- Tanada vs. HRET, GR 217012 March 1, 2016-HRET lacks the authority to rule
whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate. xxx Under the HRET Rules, the
electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over two types of election contests: election protests
and quo warranto cases. xxx An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or
omissions constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling precincts, and for
the revision of ballots. xxx On the other hand, the eligibility of a member representative is
impugned in a quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural
guidelines on how the COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he or
she is a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
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xxx HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on cancellation cases
promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the power
to review such rulings from the Commission. xxx The jurisdiction of the HRET, as
circumscribed under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the election,
returns, and qualification of the members of the House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot
rule over an election protest involving a non-member. xxx To be considered a member of
the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review
decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506, respectively,
February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are considered as elected members of the
House, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26, 2012- RA 7941
(Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of
party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee and that no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELECs First Division and
COMELEC En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the proper party to submit
CIBACs Certificate of Nomination instead of Perla, who allegedly served as acting
secretary-general. As provided in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also
possesses the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The
power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers, the Court declared

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest
relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is authorized

to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. The changes
must be PERMANENT and do not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard. A political party must have at least two senators to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not
entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming that party-
list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
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nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the
House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation
of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse
to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion
of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject
to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that

appropriations bills original exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments.

- While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from
the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of
the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced
from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously
appropriated by Congress for his office (Pichay v. Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division,
667 SCRA 408).

- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of individual menbers of

Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely
recommendatory in nature and is also recognized that individual members of Congress far
more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable
about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project
(LAMP vs. DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)

- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November 19, 2013- Pork
barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Legislature, although its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it
operates. Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight,
post enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the
principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto the legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriation bills, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process denied the President the
power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight
by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired
public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions,
it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again insofar as it has conferred to
2
the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of priority infrastructure development projects, it has once transgressed
the principle of non delegability.

- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014- the transfer of appropriated
funds, to be valid under section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) there is law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are saving
generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
The following were declared unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments
from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and
without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the GAA; 2) the
cross-border transfers of the savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue
targets for non compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant GAA (Araullo, MR
Feb. 3, 2015).

- The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President the years program
of expenditure for each agency of the government on the basis of authorized
appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall constitute the basis for
fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations
as may be approved by the President. [TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND
SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA), v. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN
BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015]

- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to spend funds made
available by Congress.xxx there was no instance of executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment is prohibited by the GAA, unless there will be an unmanageable government
budget deficit.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any
government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress is
unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether
concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a
procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as part of
the general funds of the government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds
to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent
by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another
appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the
National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by
the automatic appropriation.

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- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
(203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination whether a law has been
violated is not in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of
separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the matter would create the
possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable
controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that
had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to

avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No. 167173,

December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry,
otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through
the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.

- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to punish contempt
is based on the principle of self-preservation as the branch of government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise
the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence
of criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to

withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution
does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized
implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and
functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this
jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the President is

ultimately responsible for military and national security matters affecting the nation. In
the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold
sensitive military and national security secrets from the Legislature or the public.

As the official in control of the nations foreign service by virtue of the Presidents control
of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of
the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role as chief implementer of the
States foreign policy is reinforced by the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and
enter into treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility, the
President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the
Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with considerable
secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its
allies have shared with it.

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the
President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
2
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with his Cabinet and advisers need
to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential
advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive
matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the
President of candid advice.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military,

national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must
be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared
state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of
public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.

The balancing of interests between executive privilege on one hand and the other
competing constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the
courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each
case. This is how conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and the
Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the principles adopted in
PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a
treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of
the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is
made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the
desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether
the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the
ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules.

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- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 180308,
June 19, 2012- the wide latitude given to the Congress in the conduct of legislative
inquiries and would not fault the Senate for approving the resolution on the very same day
that it was submitted. The court also held that the petitioners were invited as resource
persons at the inquiry, and as such, they do not have the constitutional right to
counsel.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of Camilo
Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of
witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts
needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision of law
cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of constitutional
basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of Congress
to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch

whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect

3
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as

limited in its appearance of department heads in the question hour contemplated in
Section 22 of Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to

enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a)
to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita,
ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate
Presi`ent and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be
produced. The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it cal propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes

the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment
in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of
both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner
is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution;
and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words dominant use or principal use
cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president

evolved through case law.
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- It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit
during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this
presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president
even for acts committed during his or her tenure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA
545; Estrada v. Disierto, 356 SCRA 108).

- Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office.
There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative.

- Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the
President extends to the end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his
resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent actually holds office)
and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of
right).

- Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only
during the incumbency of a President.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper to implead President
Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law.

- Former President cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
himself/herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of a
person (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).

- Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing
definitions.

- Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in amparo proceedings.

The president, as commander--in--chief of the military, can be held responsible
or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To hold
someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship
between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about
3
to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof
(Ibid). Commanders may therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of
command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at
least accountability (Balao v. Macapagal-- Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez

vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an
election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is
created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or
Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from
and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by
RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged with the
ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election
returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other
hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether
or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered
with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not,
to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in
whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or

withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos,
253 SCRA 559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with
the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De
Castro, February 12, 2008.

- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain reading of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
"promulgate its rules for the purpose."

- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential
or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out
that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time,
3
the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in
Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution are post election remedies, namely, regular election contests
and quo warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of the President or Vice-President
there can be no contest before a winner is proclaimed.

- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988, August 31, 2010)-
Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised
on the second election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this
case.

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs. Desierto,

March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The
question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political question beyond
the Supreme Courts power of review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure
President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) Constantino vs.

Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the
President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or
alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are
certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which
must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate
the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and
the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that
the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same
exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of
vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established
functions of governance.

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- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista
vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the
constitution by increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC; GR

No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC,
In Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the
Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR
No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)-
the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
term of the outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. Although
Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot
be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional
Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the
Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail. Had
the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

- Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22, 2015-The prohibition under
Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those made by
local executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her
tenure.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim

appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is
effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is
extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no
longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew the
ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005-
The law allows the President to make such acting appointment. The President may even
appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to

fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.
In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It may be extended any
time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first
group refers to the heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public

3
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a
fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards . xxx The President
appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the
law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.

- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of department
manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a third level position and does not
require presidential appointment.

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple positions and
receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB

vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or
certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The chief
executive, under our laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010-

The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief
Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on
the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP)

vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This
authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the
1987 Constitution. The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an
exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which
grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be
that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any
branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
3
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees [is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.

- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 The Presidents power (EO 292) to
reorganize offices outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The DECS is
indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the
Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to
transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its
charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President.
Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities
of DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential
issuance.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential power of
control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is
self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail
the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that the
President shall have control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive
functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of
control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers
in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or
by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means
the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.

- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs. Perez, May 10, 2001)-

The declaration by the President of state of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the
May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine. The
President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3, 2004- The
Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers
pursuant to her calling out power.

- Calling out power of the president. President as Commander--in--Chief has

a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on--the--spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have
any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other
3
 parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power
if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for
disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised (Integrated Bar of The
Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81).

- Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The President does not need
any congressional authority to exercise his calling out power.

- That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with

rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she
has no such authority. Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace
negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-- in--Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander--in--Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence (The
Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402).

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to
the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces
be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation affirm that the
officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the
President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before
Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel
the attendance.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President has full discretion
to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.

- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP 1017 constitutes
the call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP
1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the
absence of legislation, the President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest.

- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency
even in the absence of congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers
requires a delegation from Congress.

- Colmenares, et al. vs. Department vs. National Defense Secretary, et al., GR No.
212426-212244- January 12, 2016- Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
3
rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1) there must be

a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the
delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the
emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state
of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national
emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is different matter. This
requires a delegation from Congress.

- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President of the Philippines as
Commander-in-Chief and that a provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the President is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out
powers under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the President exercises
full supervision and control over the police, a local chief executive, such as a provincial
governor, only exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control
only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, only the President has full discretion to call the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, the Court stressed.

- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The pardoning power of
the President is final and unappealable.

- Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all
his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by
Risos--Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13--211 (DC),
was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC,
that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year
3
 or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be
disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that
he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "he is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights." Risos--Vidal theorizes that former
President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila in he May 13,
2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the
presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the
reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former
President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She invokes
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
(ATTY. ALICIA RISOS--VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.- The text of
Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the
AFP- it extends to all persons who committed the particular acts described in the provision,
and not just rebels or insurgents.

- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is

inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also
read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power
is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was
echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State,
is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is
the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is
(then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the
nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field
of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
where the Court ruled:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

4
 Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and
exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D.
1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its
office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but
for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all
treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It
follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section
21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty
under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as
a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our Constitution, the
power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its
behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ
of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the
writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.

- The terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form executive agreement
that becomes binding through executive action. Om the other hand, executive
agreements concluded by the President sometimes take form of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols. Under international law, there
is no difference between treatises and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their power (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641
SCRA 244).

- An executive agreement, according to the Supreme Court, is a treaty within

the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic
law (Nicolas v. Romulo,578 SCRA 438). Unlike a treaty though, an executive
agreement does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less formal and deals

4
 with a narrower range of subjects (China Machinery and Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA 189). All that would be required for its
efficacy would be the agreement must be between states; it must be written; and it
must be governed by international law (Ibid).

- An executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate
for its ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution,
is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate (Ibid).

- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME- The

power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been
classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation
by the President or by another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf of the
government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia,
187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on
her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.

- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that

local affairs are administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against
local officials administratively.

ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs.
Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper
party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper party).

- A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary
to the assertion of JKG--Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure
of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license
plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate, that the government
shall bear the burden of paying for the project. Every portion of the national
treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and
disbursed. Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement
process cannot be easily brushed off by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille, vs.
Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), et.al., G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally recognized the extent of the
power of judicial review and the great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of the government.

- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24, 2009- Although
the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and
are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of
4
the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such
judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or
executive department is contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the
constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and
executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.

- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the DIRECT
INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result.

- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi

may be waived by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of transcendental importance; of overreaching significance to society or of
paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384
SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449;
LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth
Commission, December 7, 2010.

- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded standing

to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have
standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the third
party cannot assert his constitutional right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless
the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claim.

- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned
with whether the petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have legal
standing. LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.

4
- Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, GR 180771
April 21 2015- The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens
suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to
institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still
entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the
constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and
capable of repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO,
429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC.
SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS.
COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.

- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under
its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269,
June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have

standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter
involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this
Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a
Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of
conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for
resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear,
therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino
citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau
of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or Executive Act-

The doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it
nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. xxx It applies only to cases
where extraordinary circumstances exist and only when the extraordinary circumstances
have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx Its application to the
4
DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)

- As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the
Civil Code, which provides. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non--observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or
practice to the contrary (Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011). The doctrine of operative fact serves as an
exception to the aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as
an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.
It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration (Ibid). The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it (Ibid). The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception
when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that
an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law (Ibid).

- While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The
functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in
the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not
lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled
license to act in performing its duties. (FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA--NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015)

- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs principal function is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the
President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is
not in the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if
the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated
task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named
ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.
4
The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the JBC is preferable and
pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation.
It ruled that the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the
position of Chief Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the selection of
nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the
constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary
Act of 1948, which reads: In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is
removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall
apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.

- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held that the use of the
singular letter a preceding representative of Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The
word Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering the language of the subject
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic
aids such as the records of the Constitutional Commission.

- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create a JBC as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a
holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in
the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a vote
each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution, declared the Court.

- The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member composition serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It further held
that under the doctrine of operative facts where actions prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBCs prior
official acts are valid.

- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as
sole representative of Congress in the JBC and that such is best left to the determination of
Congress.

- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In cases where an
objection to an applicants qualification is raised, the observance of due process neither
negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The
unanimity rule of the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his right to due process.

- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice must be given a
free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court en
banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and
4
benefits they may extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within
the parameters of the courts granted power.

- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
members.

- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom.

- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not the concern
of the Supreme Court- government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government.

- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to change the
venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance
by the courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a
function of the Executive department and not of the judiciary.

- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor
of change of venue.

- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view of the

enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,

Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as
the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the admission to
the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights.

- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010- The Supreme Court
has now the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, pactice and procedure
in all courts, Viewed from this perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

4
WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a persons rights guaranteed and
recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party
and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall
state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national
security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must
show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or
persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making
the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended
for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security
or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice
or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court,
justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

4
- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition for a writ of amparo is
improper remedy to regain parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was
legally put up for adoption.

- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start off with the
basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing
directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to
an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on
appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ
with a separately filed criminal case.

- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to

privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;

- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires that the
petition must sufficiently allege the manner in which the right to privacy is violated or
threatened with violation and how such violation, or threats affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party.

- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission was not unlawful act as that violates
4
or threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the
petitioner to the writ of habeas data.

- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29, 2014- petitioners
have no reasonable expectation of privacy that would warrant the issuance of a writ of
habeas data when their daughters shared the incriminating pictures with their Facebook
Friends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activity, it is necessary that the user in this case, the sanctioned students, should manifest
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or limit its visibility.

Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme
Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the plenary
legislative power. The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires full
payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which
requires only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental law requires mandatory
review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The
Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress. The rule
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court,
before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a procedural
matter.

- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate
Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review
decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no
need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the CA decision.

- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate
under Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating
the legal basis thereof.

- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional mandate that
no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the finding of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

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- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme
Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a minute resolution should be
used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court
explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA,
there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court
agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There is no point in
reproducing or restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate court
affirmed.The constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation
of facts and laws applies to decisions, where the petition is given due course, but not
where the petition is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal basis for
the dismissal.

- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude the
validity of Memorandum Decision which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid
cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.

ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service Commission of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the
power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the responsibility of the
establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the
concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department
agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution grants to the CSC
administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-
career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on
merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement
to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president
with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and
members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a
non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

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- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the CSC has appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service
Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly
with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs
exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.

- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report, no release policy
may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to
fund releases to it may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a general rule, are
governed by the Civil Service Law. But a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created
must be made. If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or special law),
then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are
subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the coverage
of the civil service.

- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government refers to any of the
various units of the government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality or
government-owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit
therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a GOCC, whether
regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is not true either that with respect to money
claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim, an
employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the appointment to the
positions in the Career Executive Service may be considered permanent in which the
appointee enjoys security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued
only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of the officer,
resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the
Constitution.

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- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by indirect method to
terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state,
and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services
may appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme
Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the
CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001- The CSC is
expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil
Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances
when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the
position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by the
nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing
authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino Operations Manager
is not primarily confidential.

- Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary

of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the
constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

- It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section

13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments
or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

- gras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to
the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.

- Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally
apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the
Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show
that his holding of the other office was allowed by law or the primary functions of his
5
position. To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation
was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can
be express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be:
(1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an
acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA
276, 1997)

- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as board member of
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is unconstitutional for impairing the independence
of the CSC, and for violating the rule against holding of multiple government positions as
well as the concept ex-officio positions.

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double compensation not
applicable to pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue
to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair Magdangal Elma
is prohibited under the Constitution from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the
CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more
than one office is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an employee
is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal
intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme Court follows as a
precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no
backwages can be awarded in his favor.

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or
employee, who has been found illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be
reinstated and to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal
dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the time the decision of
exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to
back wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision
exonerating a civil service employee of administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by petitioner
CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the
5
provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par.
11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions
that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the Labor
Code are silent as to whether government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the
CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.

COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such
person completes his term of office which could be seven, five or three years. There must
be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.

- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its

appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC

possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,
Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-
legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the
power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the
sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and
regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the
Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c])
authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and

determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
5
the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power
in the following manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power

of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs
in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of

the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election
offense had possibly been committed could by no means be classified as a purely
ministerial or administrative function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-
judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and
required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the
opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.

- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government

institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses
at the hearings or proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals
who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order
to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when
petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions
regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in
his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such
contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at
that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-
judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers
transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. 10 When the
results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for
various candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before
the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light
5
on the issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or
not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within
the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.

- Grace Poe vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

- The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the
race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility
is to remove the incumbent from office.

- Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does
not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice versa.

- Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8 2016- The minimum

functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are
mandatory. xxx The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail requires the
following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count
their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a VVPAT. The COMELECs act of not enabling this feature
runs contrary to why the law requires this feature in the first place.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:

- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:

xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while Section 3, Article X, on local
government, provides:

Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for . . . the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.]
[Emphases ours
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- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not have the
requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.

- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The COMELEC
correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its
legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority
is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and
function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the
Commission is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.

- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 COMELEC has
jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate
officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample wherewithal and
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment
of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free and orderly honest
elections.

- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010- While the question
of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under
Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to
Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party
membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited
scope of its power over political parties.

- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February 22, 2011)- In
election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition
for certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005- Despite the
silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ
of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do
so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized
by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any
applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not
attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution.
It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the
duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

5
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc does not
have the authority to hear and decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC
Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the
provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the
authority to hear and decide these special cases.

- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly

promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article
IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable
by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2)
to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number
of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in
the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the
regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 Contests involving
elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly order a
manual count notwithstanding the required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the
law authorizing the commission to use an automated election system, if that is the only way
to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the

COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of procedure
relative to the conduct of the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding
the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly,
those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the elections,
should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but
that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.

5
- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987 constitution vests
COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving barangay officials decided by
the trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final orders of a

COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned
before the Supreme Court even via a petition for certiorari.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico-

Corporations covered by the COAs auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a
private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under
Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or
indirectly from or through the government are required to submit to post audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit
government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same
government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private
audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a
COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive
power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies
in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-
controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or
as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer
may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the
government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has
no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on
issues relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body
which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COAs power

over the settlement of accounts is different from power over unliquidated claims, the
latter of which is within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper officer to
withhold a municipal treasurers salary and other emoluments up to the amount of her
alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her
liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or
unnecessary expenditures.

6
- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-
audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph
1, which provides that a post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies.

- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with
the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law
is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly
enlarged by this Court.

- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The appointment of members
of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of
office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot
validly shorten the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as this will
result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of seven years and
who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission;

- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years
is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term
of the departing chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from death, resignation, disability
or removal by impeachment; and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits
officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or
other emoluments from any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA
out of its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.

ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

- Local Autonomy- Local Autonomy means that local governments have certain
powers granted by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by the National
government, but that outside of these, local governments may not enact ordinances
contrary to statutes (Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution, Reviewer, 2011).

- Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16, 2011- LGUs, though
granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

- In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
6
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation,
however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.

- Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to

local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law
may provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power
was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

- "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable.

- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments
are still agents of the national government.

- Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014- At any rate, LGUs
must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not completely severe them
from the national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not
make local governments sovereign within the state. Notwithstanding the local fiscal
autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President
and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of
the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.

- Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While

the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the
national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally funded projects,
facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU. xxx The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in

6
the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it
is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect
to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.

- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was
brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs
significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v.
Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to
their positions in a hold over capacity.

- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,
and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress
was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed
by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix
the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated
three years as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled
in Osmea.

- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is
neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial
board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by
law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.

- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management
of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)

- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months,
or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the
regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs.

COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-
election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
6
does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The
preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes the
three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is
one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of
preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was serving
his third term as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon
winning, assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.

- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall
election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The
period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does

not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to apply, the
local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term
served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of
succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for Francis
Ong, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term
6
in contemplation of the three-term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of
his proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis
Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared
VALID.

- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April
12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the
income requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the ,
explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said increased income
requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA
9009 and that the year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met
the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.

- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function is

limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a
political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA
836).

- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services
with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge
expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and
traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the
increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be
reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).

- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009- MMDA has no
authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of advertisements posted on the structures
of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDAs powers
were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration, and
therefore, it had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police and
legislative power.

- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007- In
light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by
E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
6
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents
terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily
fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona,
252 SCRA 695).

- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED

WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL
BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the 1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. When passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs
shall have a just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be determined by
law; (3) that just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA. (ACORD vs.
Zamora, June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld is declared in contravention of Section 286 of
the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19,
2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy

as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy
of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges
that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The
principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined
precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSISs tax-
exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored
by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of
which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus,
may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela,

represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the
NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from
the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption,
the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of
Cabanatuan.

- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested in
the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies,
no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
6
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An agency of the Government
refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein; while an instrumentality refers to any agency of
the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
and controlled corporations. It had already become, even if it be conceded to be an
agency or instrumentality of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in
view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the
payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.

- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its facilities
and appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment
of real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are
the petitioners corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the operation
of the port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of
ordinary business.

- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and
thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or
the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public
use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and
thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport
Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the
Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government

instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is
that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax.
Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation.
This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.

- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer
claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally
in favor of the national government instrumentality.

- PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27,

2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control
by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.

- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of

6
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a
law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs.
COA, December 3, 2002).

- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may
want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful
local autonomy is ensured.

- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.

ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)

- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI

provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the
impeachment proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of
impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses committed.

- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003-

definition of TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.

- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No.

193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its
contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3,
1995.

- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of
impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.

- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The doctrine of
condonation cannot be extended to reappointed coterminous employees like petitioners as
in their case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the
electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous
precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local
government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and
breed abuse of bureaucracy.

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- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional
law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
(Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C.
Mojica, March 4, 2005).

- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be
allowed.

- OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The

power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts.

- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231, September 4, 2012
January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 providing that the President may remove a
deputy ombudsman is unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over her deputies.

- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear constitutional
design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special Prosecutor is separate from the Office
of the Ombudsman. The inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of
the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the same levels of
constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively suspend,
Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious
import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to
preventively suspend.

- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004- The
power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies
of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving
violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.

- Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did

not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency. xxx While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of
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the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation,
the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding
investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to determine
the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and com
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its
jurisdiction.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675 , June 16, 2006- the
Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.
The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist
watchman, not merely a passive one.

- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals from the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not stay the execution of the
penalty imposed.

- CONDONATION:

- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the respondent is
absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, or suspension for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to
one months salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and unappelable,
subject to judicial review.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015- Rule 65 petitions
for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the Ombudsman should be filed before the
CA, and not directly before the Supreme Court. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong
(March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the
CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."

- The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
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during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may
be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The decision of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant
to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power of the
Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22, 2008
Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.

- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A.
No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school
teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving
them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was
enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be
restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints
against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.

- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally

created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it has been acquired by the
government to perform functions related to government programs and policies.

- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452-

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the
Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty required by law
or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans

vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)

0
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008- It
must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to
petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
7
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land
grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded,
cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the
country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys
protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which
the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to
the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license
is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no
irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral
land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents
only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a
further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the
petition.

- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples
over their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to
negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration
to ensure ecological and environmental protection.

- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the existence of a native
title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time
immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas are also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless
converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may
only be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the government could
not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a law authrizing such sale.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine,
which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to the State

- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable lands of the public
domain, they may not be sold to private corporations which can only lease the same. The
State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private corporations
from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming
lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for
private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they
are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the
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public domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land
thus acquired becomes private land.

- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government owned lands,
as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the
government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even private corporations
can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold
or transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted
to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation
to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.

- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No. 179987, April

29, 2009)- public domain lands become patrimonial property or private property of the
government only upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands, together
with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property
of the public domain begin to run.

- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes that those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act
merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. The possessor is
thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land it covers is declared
alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline
imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.

- Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least 30 years or at least
since May 8, 1947.

- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775, October 8, 2008-
Boracay Island is owned by the State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The
continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the
land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine.

- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court said that
Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified
Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of
trees and underbrushes.

7
- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678, April 24, 2009 The
classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and
secondary classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural lands of the public domain may further
be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under
existing laws, granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban
uses.

- Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The DENR Secretary is
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.

- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While the acquisition
and the purchase of real properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being
contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from the
foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid.

- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a
contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of
public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose
of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens
that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency
not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charterThe Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer and
dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the
special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to
Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once
transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally
transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed
purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we
find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial
property.

- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive
Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain.

7
- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition in the
Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real
property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a
strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and
growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations
only.

- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead patent,
such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes.

- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 Foreign

corporations are confined to technical and financial assistance. The State itself may
explore, develop or utilize the countrys natural resources by entering into the necessary
agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service contracts
with foreign corporations as contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State. Control by the state
must be on the macro level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines,
regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would enable the
government to control the conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain
activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.

- Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy- As settled in

the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were
actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers,
in short, used the term service contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or
financial assistance.

- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated,

et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows
service contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and mineral oils via agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance as provided by law. The Court said that these
agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage
extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State.

- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines
Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area
lies within the full control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in
the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State
through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either directly
7
undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into
agreement with qualified entities.

- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA 517 Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply retroactively to a license, concession
or lease granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or before the
effectivity of the 1987 constitution.

- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that possession,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 The operation
of public utility shall not be exclusive.

- Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both voting control test and
beneficial ownership test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a Filipino
national.xxx The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Thus, 60 percent of the capital
assumes, or should result in, controlling interest in the corporation. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the
voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.

- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February 23, 2015- a
franchise is not required before each and every public utility may operate. There is no law
that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.

- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556 SCRA 742)-
doctrine states that the public utility has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and
proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it does not appear
that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax
exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of
laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's
franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel the certificates of
public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued
legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the terms of their franchise.
As legislative franchises are extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as
the ultimate expression of State policy.

- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under the Constitution,
no franchise shall be granted under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment or
repeal when the public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to alteration by
the power to tax, which cannot be contracted away.
7
- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The constitution is emphatic that
the operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 - The constitution
does not totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when public
interest so requires.

ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)

- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect, it
cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on Human
Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and political rights only either by
government official or private individual.

- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers to the CHR re
violations of human rights.- refer to Section 5- perform such other functions and duties as
may be provided by law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly a
constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal
autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the eviction and
demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not
mean validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.

ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2,

2009- A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA
7722[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction
of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees, and it does not require enrollment,
attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center course
requirements or take the licensure examination.

- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution and the

members of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom
over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner and
even promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to
choose who may teach or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3,
2001).

7
- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The Show Cause Resolution
does not interfere with respondnets academic freedom as it does not dictate upon the law
professors the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. They are
free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. Moreover, it
is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper
procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. The right to freedom
expression of members of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and
the justice system.

- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As enunciated by this Court
in the case of University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of
learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the
Universitys decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic freedom and
constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide
standards for its teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At the end
of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the
university as the employer alone.

- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose
who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong: As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning
are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.
According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence
of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline,
a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the
Education Act of 1982 that students have a right to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down

7
by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)

- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general principles; Phil Agila
Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3, 2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in
the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must
be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if
the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the
liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of
his/her duties.

- UP vs. Dizon, August 23, 2012- The funds of UP are government funds that public in
character. They include income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that
may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds,
subject of the action could not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or
garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had
impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

- COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13, 2009- The COA is an
unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of
its own, Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily
governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent.

- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009- Even
assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its
implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the
valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for Technical
Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health insurance project of the German and
Philippine governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ,
being the equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and
capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental
owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the
Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued,

- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the government itself is the suitor,
as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence
teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a
suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus
opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner
Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its
immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up
its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

7
- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary,
206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the
members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly
abolished.

- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan
political activity, except to vote. They cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the
government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established by religious

groups and mission boards.

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)

- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893,

and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-
AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is
itself a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1,
2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive
can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.

- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a Constituent

Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose amendments or to call a convention. The
grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the effective exercise of
principal power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..

- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in providing

for mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot exercise such
until Congress provides for its implementation.

- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the framers of
the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment
should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The
8
framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature. The essence
of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21

SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not
included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent
powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for amendments, it

does not have the final say on whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an
issue which is clearly subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary in the
ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be validly held together with general
elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece meal

ratification.

- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of amendment/revisions.

UNLESS, the proposed amendments/revisions so provide.

ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)

- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April 11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions show a
marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence
in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of
direct exception.

- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war
on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that
the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a mere training
exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.

- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449-the VFA was
duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United
States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the
United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law.
Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
8
whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are
merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act,
within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between
the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier
agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate
and the United States Senate.

- Saguisag, et al. vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426-212444, January 12, 2016- The President
also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The role
of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive
must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its
territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determination. In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least
shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII
on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article
VIII on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties
and international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of
foreign military troops, bases, or facilities.

- EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities
within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014,
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic
notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to
enter into force in the two countries.

- Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign
relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the
entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section
21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions.

- The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter
subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law,
and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.

- Executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of
Senate concurrence. Xxx Under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations. xxx Executive agreements may cover the
matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments.

- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al., Petitioners - versus

- THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is
not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

8
- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et al. G.R. No.
176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 -
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in
accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered
to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008-
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they
stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or
[local government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals
right to property, the former should prevail,.

- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC,

323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a limitation on government
powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code.

- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, et al.,
GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichays right to due process was not violated when the
IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. IN
administrative proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity for
the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having thte opportunity to explain ones
side.

- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property
nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside
of ones residence maybe revoked at anytime.

- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor
vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended
or revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.

- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;

2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
8
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of
liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs.
Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)

- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23, 2014- Prior notice
and hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial
proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi
legislative or administrative functions.

- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process during the NBI Investigation. The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.

- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, January 21, 2015- there
is no law or rule that requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Equal Protection of the Law

- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict scrutiny
standard, an American constituted construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of
laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.
The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from
its earlier application to equal protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in
Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially
condemnable act- accessing the computer system of another without right. It is
universally condemned act.

- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010-
the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the

8
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is not
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003, Substantive
distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue
of their designation by an appointing authority.

- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot find support in
the equal protection clause of the constitution. It was granted a franchise , subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No.
180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life
and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person
(as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III,
Sec. 2.

- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de
Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.

- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The confiscated items
having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be
considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to
warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a
barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified
only when:

1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there
where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches and
seizures:
8
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella,
395 SCRA 553);
7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and
stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been turned over to the
Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as
evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge
of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the
right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
11. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968;
Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon
reasonable suspicion that a person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas
an arrest requires probable cause that a suspect committed a criminal offense;
12. Armed conflict (war time);
13. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No. 129756-58, January 28,
2000);
14. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a
warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder
because of an ongoing coup;
15. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the exercise of military
powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
16. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson,
GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

WARRANTLESS ARREST

- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by
a fine only. As a corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. xxx
In this case, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
-
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of
the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are

proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a
crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officer.

8
 - PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of immediacy
between the time of the offense was committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If
there was an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime,
a warrant of arrest must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the
presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the
crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an
earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government and agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities

(CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can
issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one
offense.

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED

AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail
as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable
certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized so
that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what
is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be arrested but only if it is
absolutely necessary to do so. You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat
to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional guarantees create these
zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis
of the right to be left alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
8
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has impermissibly intruded into
these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay,
G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights
is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA
7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the
very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.

- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on account of
his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The
invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his
letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the
dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17, 2006- In
evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a
person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008-
Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug testing
for secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and employees of public
and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.

- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let alone is
not an absolute right where the person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.

8
- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the freedom of expression.

- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited commercial

ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right without violating his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.

- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the COMELEC

drastically reduced the airtime within which national candidates and political parties may
air political advertisements on television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.

- RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A.
4200) which prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also:
(a) the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b)
the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the contents thereof either
verbally or in writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if
convicted, ranges from six months to six years.

- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any
mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose,
any communication, message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group
of persons or any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expression-

- 1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The COMELEC may only

regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public
transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act
of ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.

- A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if

the supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech.
Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the

8
messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert
their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.

- It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.

Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

- he prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral regulations

since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted, but
the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites
for a valid content-neutral regulation.

- The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not
necessary to a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated
by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided
for therein. Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws
that would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one
of the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.

- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify
the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553,
569. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant
of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus
if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

B.P. No. 880

SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--

A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly
shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by
law are not covered by this Act.

SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(b) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and

9
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(c) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section
8 hereof.
(d) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
(e) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse
to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental
rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several
policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the
liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases involving
liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of
the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and
actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against
their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.

9
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand,
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists,
not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.

- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely abused his
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP which should have been heard first
on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It found that
Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as
the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereto,

- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election surveys are covered
by the protection to freedom of expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions and
perception of voters as regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voters preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period.The prohibition
imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes
prior restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the
government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.

- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may either be
content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-
neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the time, place and
manner). To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show that the
government has a compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A content
neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an important government interest,
as long as it leaves open alternative channels of communication.

- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008- The acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television stations against playing the Garci
tapes under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and should
be subjected to the clear and present and danger test.

- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No. 170270/GR
No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of the application of the strict
scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to prove
that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.

- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines
9
of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law.

- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

- A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.

- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.
No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge
in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain
of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge
to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States
power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.

9
- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.

- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigant.

- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment,and that claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or
speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.

- American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the
First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not
with regard to the statute's facial validity.

- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least
three cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing
the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal
statute, unlike in the present case.

- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372,
the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under
any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated
special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in
the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-vis Section 4(3)
of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless is
entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of his right without violating the
9
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate
forms of expression.

- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of publication of
exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively
prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election day projections, but also for long
term research.

- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner the
power to screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing the phrase
all television programs. Thus, when the law says all television programs, the word all
covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general
word or expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it
is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.

- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No. 165636, April 29,
2009-The Supreme Court said that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least
with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a G rating for general viewership. The
Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating
Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB may not suspend television personalities, for such
would be beyond its jurisdiction.

- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It must also be shown
that a third party could identify him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:

1. private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty;

2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceeding which are not confidential in nature including any statement
made therein or act performed by public officer.

- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those which are not
actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein
or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing defamatory imputations
which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true reports without any
comments/remarks).

- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

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- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 - members of
Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the
national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.

- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated when it will bring about clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the
State has a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does
not constitute clear and present danger.

- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of religion does not prohibit
imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of registration.

- Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405 SCRA 497-
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards are drawn
from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom
of Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
The State has in effect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and
Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that
moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party list system. Upholding equal protection, the
Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political process, LGBTs have the same interest
in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. As such, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and
they deserve to participate in the party list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a transgression of
AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of the
COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other party-
list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that the
COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of religion, It does not
convey any religious doctrine of the catholic church.

- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information
on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience
is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter

9
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-

- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate to suspension
of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA;
Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.

- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The persons right to
travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the
system of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for
humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No.
141529, June 6, 2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO. MTJ-10-1770-

July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court [personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something;
to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule.

Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is
consummated. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.

- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section 17, Art. XI has
classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.
In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of constitutional
origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on
the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or control of public records have
the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit
access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a
public trust.

- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records may not be
prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

9
 Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15- Congress, via Art.
125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right
to strike does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the procedure under
which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve
at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private
property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance.
And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for
national government infrastructure projects.

- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the
property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303- There are at
least two crucial differences between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule
67. Under the statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974
which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the BIR,
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.

- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012- When the
State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian program,
the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution
which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of
paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the governments
agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the taken property.

- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust account to
provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we struck down as void the DAR administrative
circular46 that provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit in cash or
in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly declared that the
explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or
bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the governments payment of just compensation.

- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the Court determined
that the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was
9
effectively a forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment
been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the
RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed
from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the
property.

- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the Court has allowed the
grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the
just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from the
time of taking.

- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often ruled by this
Court, the award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment
which, in effect, makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to
ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner.
However, when there is no delay in the payment of just compensation, the Supreme
Courthas not hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest thereon for the same is justified
only in cases where delay has been sufficiently established.

- Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The governments

failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot
simply invalidate the States exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property
subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes
upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify
said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken
one of the States inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater
good.nThus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.

- While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation,
the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not
at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of just
compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for
the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and
what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.

- The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only
when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
interpretation of economic policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take
cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists
in the law and jurisprudence.

- For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined
from the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in spite
of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To
continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing
with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
9
- Villanueva vs JBC, GR 211833 April 7, 2015- Discretionary execution of judgments
pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

- It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit the claimants action only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered
by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970).

- The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment

thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a
procedural, matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just compensation prior
to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974,
which specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure
projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the
issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law. Further, there is nothing in RA
No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect. Neither is
retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence,
it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this case.

- RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to
the expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for national government
infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of
right-of-way sites or locations for national government infrastructure projects, the
provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall still govern.

- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin elements of just
compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee
does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of
the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of
property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be
strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an
exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or
least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept,
has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public
necessity the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent
point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation
should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another
1
private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige
landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws. A condemnor
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then
it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so
desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it
pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping
with the idea of fair play

- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to
prove the commitment of the government to allow them to repurchase their land.

- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through
expropriation proceedings may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this
property again to another private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking.

- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to
expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.

- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD
to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its
board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.

- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant
but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the
Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly
interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.

- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle
that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
the payment of just compensation.

- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to
judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community).

- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial), in

any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property owned is
public or otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs.
NAWASA).
1
- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated,

September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that the
State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since
said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just
compensation.

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR
vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 The tax credit given to
commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432
is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since
the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from
private establishments concerned.

- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private
entities may benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized
housing is for public use.

- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government
lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands;
4) lands within the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement program
sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of
Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions
entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on
the exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been
granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair contract.
(Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No. 195540, March
13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem
their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by
reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the
certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise
no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from
its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

1
 Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights

- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay based organizatios in
the nature of watch groups, as in the case of bantay bayan, are recognized by local
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting and the
specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The Supreme Court,
therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.

- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor it
can be considered a formal arrest, by the very nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel
should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
invited for questioning.

- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in
evidence.

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong

vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).

- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court sustained the
admissibility of the sworn statements of the other accused, explaining that the
investigations performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature.

- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body may
at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

1
- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later convicted of
non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA,
266 SCRA 281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is
not available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of
any provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, bail may
be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1)
that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Govt. of USA vs.
Purganan, September 24, 2002).

- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19,
2007 Potential extraditee may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence that the person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes
of the extradition court.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard

- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty for the law to be
upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November
19, 2001).

- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant may not be
sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the information to allege
relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348
SCRA 476).

- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will call into
operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditees
right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court-
it is only then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).
-
- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11, 2014- the burden of
demonstrating political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence.

3. Right to public trial

1
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).

- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE

MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN,
ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in
a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants
or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes
place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the
inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and
public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines outlined therein.
-
- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy trial maybe
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition
of his case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his
right, he is considered to have waived it.

4. Right to face to face confrontation

- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of

plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where
no fault can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all
that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary
investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case
is of simple nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was
violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition
extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative hearings when the

nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like forfeiture of property or dismissal from
employment) and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs.
Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).

- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to
practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456- The right
against self incrimination is extended in an administrative investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held
to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in which punishment is sought
to be visited upon a witness, whether a party of not.
1
- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of documents
sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).

- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the
Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence,
i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in
Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider,
inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended that the
blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of
Art. III of the Constitution.

- The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23
June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt
and that it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination
but as part of object evidence.

- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the
Court held that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination,
the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.

- Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,

photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without
the presence of counsel. In that case, the Court ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. It further stated that the accused may be compelled to
submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is
accused.

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas

1
 Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the death
penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition
because of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA
682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

- The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for non payment of debt
-
- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a civil
debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is
covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused

under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a series
of events prompted the Senate to declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was
neither acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express
consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double jeopardy
must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).

- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case
becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of
not exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years.

- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the
following must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal had express consent of the
accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a
subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of conviction. It
merely approved the agreement between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the
accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
-
- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the offender under both
section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging the offender
under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography constitute double
jeopardy.

- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double jeopardy if the
subsequent information charges the accused with different offense, even if it arises from the
same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense.
1
 Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not
penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction whose retroactive application is
constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered ex-post facto
law as long as it operates prospectively since its stricture would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court doctrines
pursuant to the maxim legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet- the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying circumstance in murder
cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being unconstitutional on

the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law-
Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held no ex-post facto law was
involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of DNA typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas, an ex-post facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. (PP vs.
Yatar, May 19, 2004)
-