The Dynamics of Secession

Author(s): Michael Hechter

Source: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1992), pp. 267-283
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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 ActaSociologica
(1992)35:267-283

The Dynamicsof Secession

MichaelHechter
Departmentof Sociology and Udall Centerfor Studiesin Public Policy,
The Universityof Arizona

This paper presents an analysisof secession based on rationalchoice premises.From

these premises, secession is seen to be the outcome of a series of collectivedecisions
made by regional leaders and populations,and by the leadersand populationsof host
states.Thisemphasison collectivedecisionsservesto differentiatesecessionfromanother
processthat leads to the formationof politicalunits- the fragmentationof host states.
TMeanalysisexplainswhy secessionhas been sucha rareoutcomein modem historyand
suggeststhat it will continueto be rare in the foreseeablefuture.

MichaelHechter,Departmentof Sociologyand UdallCenterfor Studiesin PublicPolicy,

The Universityof Arizona, Tucson,Arizona85721, USA.

1. Introduction Whatare the originsof secession?Under

To the benefit of mapmakersand officials
of a spate of newly minted governments,
secessionismhas re-emergedas a force to
be reckoned with in world politics.' The
demiseof the Soviet Union, Yugoslaviaand
Czechoslovakiaand the establishmentof
smaller, more ethnically homogeneous
states in their stead cannot but help whet
the appetitesof secessionistsin the United
Kingdom,Canada,Spain, Sri Lanka,India
and other states.
Secessionism is a demand for formal
withdrawalfrom a central political auth-
orityby a memberunit or unitson the basis
of a claim to independentsovereignstatus
(Wood 1981: 110). As such it is different
from separatism, which aims at no such
withdrawal,and from the liberationmove-
ments of colonies, which are not sub-units
of host states. Secession is successfulwhen
this withdrawalis accordedrecognitionby
the host state and by others in the inter-
nationalcommunity.2Typically,secession-
ists desire to establishtheir own new state,
but not always; irridentistsdesire to with-
draw from the host state so as to join
anotheralready extant state.
? Scandinavian Sociological Association, 1992
267
what conditions does it actually occur?
Shouldthe constitutionsbeing designed in
today'snew states includea provisionfor a
right to secede?3 It is difficult to answer
questions of this sort without a theory of
secession, but Wood's (1981: 107) com-
plaint about the absence of such a theory
remainsvalid to this day. This essay begins
to redress this deficiencyby proposingan
analysis of secession based on rational
choice premises (Friedman & Hechter
1988).
From these premises, the process of
secession can be thoughtof as comprising
two separateelements:first,the population
of a given territorymust make a collective
decisionto secede, and, second,the leaders
of the host state must make a collective
decision that the net cost of ceding the
territoryin question is negative. On this
basis, secessionmustbe distinguishedfrom
the consequencesof the fragmentationof a
host state, for when this occurs no such
collective decisionsneed be made.
Yet our difficulties in understanding
secession are not merely theoretical.
Although the topic now commandsmuch
interest,the data requirementsfor a causal
analysisof secession are steep. In order to

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illustratethe natureof this problem,I must
briefly digress frcomthe paper's central
theme.
2. Evidentiaryproblems in the
study of secession
At least three quite differenttypes of data
are requiredto understandthe dynamicsof
secession: (1) data on the territorialpopu-
lation's preferences with respect to
secession, (2) data on the socio-economic
compositionof thispopulation,and(3) data
describingthe factors relevant to the host
state leaders' benefit/cost calculus with
respectto secession. Only the second kind
of data are plentiful.
Direct evidence of the extent of a popu-
lation's secessionist sentiment is seldom
available.It can, however,be inferredfrom
newspaperrecordsof secessionistcollective
actions (demonstrations, strikes, and so
forth), election results, and/or samplesur-
veys. Unfortunately,such evidencehas not
yet been assembled into a data file of
secessionist events for even a single
country,let alone a numberof them (in the
mannerpioneered by Tilly 1978).
Electoral evidence about the numberof
voters for secessionist parties in democ-
racies is more readily available.Yet many
secessionistmovementsarenot represented
by legitimatepoliticalparties- due either
to the openness of the state to political
mobilization,to the natureof the electoral
rules, or to the size of the movement.4
Further,since regionalinterestsare some-
times promoted by national parties, the
electoral returns for regional parties are
only a very imperfectindicatorof political
regionalism.5
Sample surveys, the last source of evi-
dence on regionalsentimentfor secession,
have their own drawbacks.6 Whereas
secessionistmovementsarealwaysconfined
to limitedterritoriesand populations,most
surveys are based on nationallyrepresen-
tative samples. Since sample surveys are
very expensive to carry out, decisions to
undertake them are never made lightly.
Except where separatistparties are estab-
lished, the only agency that has an interest
in assessingthe intensityof secessionistsup-
port is a state security agency; however,
268
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even if its assessmentis accurate(and this
is a heroicassumption,givenpeoples'reluc-
tanceto answerhonestly),this information
is likely to be classified.The upshot is that
few sample surveys speak directly to the
social bases of secessionism. Linz (1985)
and Diez Medrano (1989) on Spain, and
Pinard& Hamilton(1986) on Canadaare
exceptions.
Muchbetterevidenceis availableon the
soo-economic composition of relevant
populations,for thiscan generallybe found
in publicdocumentslike the census. While
both types of evidence are necessary to
understandsecessionistdynamics,datafiles
that combinethese evidentiarysources do
not exist. Finally, I am awareof no study
that describesthe actual decision-making
processof the leadersof the host state that
leadsto the grantingof secession(like Alli-
son 1971).
Because of these evidentiaryproblems,
mostof whatwe do knowaboutsecessionist
movements comes from individual and,
occasionally, comparative case studies.
Comparativecase studies, however, are
inadequatefor a causal understandingof
secessionistdynamicsbecausetheylacksuf-
ficient controls. Wheneverthe bulk of its
populationsharesa commoninterest,a ter-
ritory is at risk of becoming secessionist.
To understandthe conditions that breed
secession we must consider not only the
few successfulcases of secession, and the
greaternumberof near-misses(suchas the
US South and Biafra), but also regions at
risk of developingsecessionistmovements
that have not done so (like many of the
Swiss cantons). There is, however, insuf-
ficient appreciation of this sampling
requirement.7
In sum,the existingevidenceprovidesan
insufficientbasis for the causal analysisof
secession. Constructing a list of deter-
minantsof secession that seem to be con-
sistent with the historical record (some
derivedfromevidence, some derivedfrom
appropriatedeductivetheories)is the best
thatcan be done at the presenttime. There
is no reliableway of assessingthe relative
efficacy of these different causal factors,
however.
 REGIONAL
POPULATIN
LOW HIGH
GROUP GROUP
IDENTIFICATIO IENTCATION
I\ikados
LOW DEGREE OF HIGH DEGREE OF
COLLECTIVE COLLECTIVE
ACTION ACTION
INTEGRATIONIST
SUPPORT
STRONG:
NO SECESSION
Figure 1. Overall model of secession.
3. Secessionist dynamics: an
analysis
Secession may be considered as the out-
come of fourseparateprocesses(see Figure
1). The first involves the establishmentof
collective agreement about the existence
and boundariesof a territorialsub-unitof
the existing host state that will be termed
the 'region'. Regions are the units at risk
of secession, but what constitutesa region?
Does any contiguous block of land within
the state comprise a region? Not at all.
Regions are territories in which a large
majorityof the populationhas a common
interest in seceding from the host state.
This common interest need not be over-
riding,nor does it precludethe existenceof
other interests that militate against
secession.
The second processis the familiarone of
collectiveaction. Underwhatconditionsdo
regional populations form social move-
ments or politicalpartiesto press for their
common interests?
Next comes the social bases of
secessionism.Clearlythe residentsof some
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I. The prob of
Rego-l Group
Re. eoui
CoReg
Akv e cm
SECESSIONIST . t i u
SUPPORT support
IV. Response of
WEAK: Host State
SECESSION
regions are more content to remainin the
given state than others. What inclines
regionalmovementsor partiesto demand
secession ratherthanpursuetheir interests
withinthe bosom of the host state?
Last, and all too briefly, I consider
decisions made by the rulers of the host
state. Secessioncan occuronly when rulers
conclude that it is less costly to relinquish
sovereigntyover the region than to main-
tain it. What factorsmight be responsible
for their decision to accede to secessionist
demands?
3.1. The problemof regionalgroup
identification
Perhapsthe key fact to consideris that the
spatial distributionof secessionist move-
ments is highly skewed at any given time,
as well as over the course of history (Levi
& Hechter 1984). Under what conditions
do people concentrated in certain ter-
ritories of a state conceive of themselves
as a potential nation while others never
conceive of themselves in this way? Any
explanationof the spatial distributionof
secessionistmovementsmustbeginwiththe
 REGIONAL REGIONAL
ECONOMIC CULTURAL
SPECIALIZATION DISTINCTIVENESS

COMMON COMMON
PRODUCTION CONSUM"POION
INTERESTS INTERESTS

CROSS-CUCTING ORPORATARCHICALE
PRODUCTION & CULTURAL
CONSUMPTION DIVISION OF
R IN-MIGRATION
IDENTE
RESTICATION
Figure 2. ModelorregonalgoupidOFeCOMtETING
/ \ ! :~~~~~ROUPS
SOCIAL SOCIAL
STRUCTURES STRUCTURES
INHIBITING PROMOTING
Ij!LERAC10 INTERACTION EXISTENCE OF

HIGH ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ IGT

GROUP
IDEINTI FICA TI ON

Figure 2. Mfodelfor regionalgroup identification.

factthatregionalpopulationshavedifferent dependenton the regionaleconomy com-

levels of interest homogeneity (see figure
2).
The inhabitantsof a given territorymay
havea commonalityof interestwithrespect
to matters of production, mattersof con-
sumption, or a combinationof both. Pre-
sumably,commonalityof interestbasedon
productionis greatest to the degree that a
territorialeconomy is uniquelyspecialized
in the productionof particulargoods and
servicesin a given state. Economicspecial-
ization, in turn, is partlya functionof fac-
tors such as the differencesin geographical
endowmentsof differentterritories-some
regions are blessed with ample mineral
resources, others have locational advan-
tages with respect to long-distancetrade,
others are well suited for agriculturalpro-
duction; partly a function of central state
policies; and partly a function of cultural
factors, such as the skills of the regional
laborforce. This uniqueproductivespecial-
izationautomaticallygives people who are
moninterestswithregardto the pricingand
supply of inputs (save for labor inputs),
as well as the distributionand pricingof
outputs.These interestsoften lead to pol-
itical demands for tariffs and other pro-
tectionistmeasures,as well as demandsfor
particularkinds of labor policies.
To oversimplify an extremely compli-
cated example, the ante-bellumAmerican
South had an economy that was largely
drivenby exportsof primaryproducts,but
the Northeasterneconomydependedmore
on the productionof manufactures.These
differencesin productionled to differences
in the demandfor protectionistlegislation
(the Northeasttended to be in favor, the
Southtendedto be against)as well as labor
legislation(the Northeasttended to favor
free labor, the South tended to favor
slavery).One readingof the CivilWar(but
of coursenot the only suchreading)is as a
conflict to determine which kind of pro-
duction interest would determine sub-

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 sequent legislationby dominatingthe state
(Moore 1964). As this example implies,
regionswith mixedeconomiesare less likely
to manifestdistinctiveproductioninterests.
To some degree regional production
interestsmaydetermineconsumptioninter-
ests as well. Evans-Pritchard(1944: 18-19)
showshow the consumptioninterestsof the
Nuer flowed from a pastoral production
system, which in turn was shaped by the
ecologicalcharacterof the Nuers'territory.
For the most part, however, the major
determinantof commonconsumptioninter-
ests resides in the linguistic, religious and
culturalcharacteristicsof a region'sinhabi-
tants.8 An individual'sbirth into a given
culturalgroup tends to determine(at least
initially) a whole set of preferences with
respect to consumption.9 Thus, many
Hindusare revolted by the prospectof eat-
ing meat; Americans are unwillingto eat
dogs and cats; many Jews are repelled by
pork; Quebecois prefer that their children
(and those of non-Englishspeaking immi-
grants)be schooledin the Frenchlanguage,
and so forth.
Simpleas this distinctionis between pro-
ductionand consumptioninterests, it con-
tains some importantimplicationsfor the
geographical distribution of secessionist
movements. To the degree that regions
have unique economic specializationsand
culturalcompositions,theirchancesof dev-
eloping secessionist movements are
enhanced. Further,regions that have both
distinctive economic interests and dis-
tinctivecultureshave the best prospectsof
developingsuch movements.
Sometimes interest commonalityis also
imposed upon groups by the host state in
the form of corporate rights (Van Dyke
1985). In a famousexamplefrom the Otto-
man Empire, the major religious groups
had self-governingcommunitiescalled mil-
lets.Eachmilletwasstrictlysegregatedfrom
the Muslimsand retainedits own civil laws,
traditions,languageand traditionalleaders
(Lewis 1968; Karpat 1973). Corporate
rightsexist among the indigenouspeoples
of Canadaand the United States and - in
the form of AffirmativeAction policies -
among certain racial and ethnic groups in
the US. Naturally, when individual legal
statusis defined by membershipin a given
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corporategroup,this producesa clear basis
for the developmentof interestcommonal-
ity.
To this point I haveconsideredobjective
interestsalone. Yet it is quite possible that
people in a given region might have com-
mon objectiveinterestsbut fail to be aware
of the fact. Peoplehavingcommoninterests
must recognizethemselves as membersof
a particulargroup - in the case under
consideration, a group sharing the same
territory- for identity-formationto occur
(Reed, 1982: 11-32).
In order to develop such identification,
individualswith common objective inter-
ests mustbe able to communicatewith one
another (Deutsch 1961). To some degree
the ability to communicate already is
impliedby the existence of economies and
cultures, for first and foremost these con-
cepts presuppose the existence of social
networks. Yet the shape and contours of
socialnetworkscanbe affectedby a number
of different kinds of barriers to com-
munication.Topographicalfeatures- like
high mountain ranges or river valleys
often channelcommunicationin particular
directions.So do a host of social and cul-
tural factors, such as differences in
language, religion and state policy (see
Horowitz 1985: 149 on the effects of col-
onial policy on the developmentof ethnic
identity). Further, some network struc-
tures - closed, circular ones, for
example - permit greater flows of com-
municationthando others- such as open,
string-likestructures(Burt 1980; Wellman
& Berkowitz1988; Ziegler 1990). On this
account,physicaland social structuresthat
promote communicationshould be posi-
tively associatedwith prospects for group
identification.Thus, the nucleated settle-
ments of the FrenchMidi are much more
likely to promotesuch group identification
thanthe scatteredsettlementsof the Breton
countryside(Brustein1988).
Beyond the questionof barriersto com-
munication,the literaturepoints to a num-
ber of other social structuraldeterminants
of group identification.To this point, it
has been assumedthat the inhabitantsof a
territoryhave a common productiveand/
orconsumptioninterest.But the morecom-
plex the society is, the more likely the
 region will be economicallyand culturally
heterogeneous. If so, it stands to reason
that populations with cross-cutting pro-
ductive and/or consumptioninterests are
less likely to develop corporate identities
than those whose interests are mutually
reinforcing(Blau & Schwartz1984).
Consider two industrial regions of a
mythical Moslem-controlled state each
made up of Hindus and Moslems, whose
regional populations have different con-
sumption interests. In Region 1, both
owners and managers, on the one hand,
and workers, on the other hand, are as
likelyto be Hinduas they areto be Moslem.
In Region 2, any given owner and manager
has a .95 probabilityof being Moslem, and
any given worker has a .95 probabilityof
being Hindu. The populationof Region 2
tends to have overlappingproductiveand
consumption interests; it exemplifies an
extremely hierarchicalculturaldivision of
labor (Hechter 1975; 1978). Group identi-
fication is much more likely to arise in
Region2 thanin Region 1 on accountof the
differentialstratificationof the two cultural
groups.'0
If we assume that both Hindusand Mos-
lems prefer to be owners and managers
ratherthan workers, then we have a basis
for the development of conflict between
membersof the two groups.When Hindus
feel that no matterhow diligentlytheywork
and how well they behave they have no
prospectsof becomingownersor managers,
the Moslems' ability to control them (for
example, by serving as gatekeepers for
entryinto highlyvalued jobs) will be mini-
mized." In this kind of social structure,
Hinduswilltend to envy Moslemsandcovet
their positions; Moslems, on the other
hand, are likely to fear Hindus. The in-
migrationof large numbers of culturally
distinct workers willing to work for low
wagesin a regionaleconomyalsocanstimu-
late groupidentityamongthe workersthey
are likely to displace (Olzak & Nagel
1986). 12
3.2. The problemof regionalcollective
action
Regional populations develop distinctive
social identities through the mechanisms
discussedabove. But does the mere exist-
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ence of suchan identityhaveany necessary
implications for subsequent collective
action?The literatureis sharplydividedon
this point.
For decades,scholarsof racialand ethnic
groups (the kinds of groups that often
underpin regional collective action) have
been dividedinto two maincamps:instru-
mentalists and primordialists (Rex &
Mason1986offera recentsurvey).Whereas
instrumentalistsregard racial and ethnic
groupsas fundamentallysimilarto all other
groups - and thereforecapable of being
analyzedin terms of the rationalinterests
of their participants- primordialistsview
these groupsas constitutinga world apart.
Primordialistsarguethat, because racial
and ethnic groupsare formedon the basis
of kinshipandculturalsimilarity,the bonds
that tie their memberstogetherare incom-
parablymore emotional and intense than
those emanatingfrommereassociationsof
interest.13 In consequence,the membersof
such groupsare muchmore likely to act in
self-sacrificingways than the members of
interestgroupsand voluntaryassociations.
It is truethat the historicalrecordis replete
with stories of nationalist martyrs from
Masadato the presentday. Despite the fact
thatthey knewthey wouldbe apprehended
and perhapseven executed, a small group
of Irishnationalistsstill participatedin the
Easter Rebellion. Likewise,leadersof the
Balinesecommunitypreferredto kill them-
selves ratherthansubmitto Dutchcolonial
rule (Covarrubias 1974). Primordialists
wonder how this kind of collective action
can be explained on the basis of purely
instrumentalmotivation.
Manyof these writerssee racialand eth-
nic groups as qualitativelydifferent from
groupsthat ariseon the basisof other kinds
of interests. According to Geertz (1963:
109-10),
of blood,speech,custom,andso
congruities
on, are seen to havean ineffable,andat times
overpowering,coerciveness
in andof them-
selves.Oneis boundto one'skinsman,one's
neighbor,one's fellow believer,ipso facto; as
the result not merely of personal affection,
practical necessity, common interest, or
incurredobligation,butat leastin greatpartby
virtueof some unaccountableabsoluteimport
attributedto the verytie itself .. For virtually
 every person, in every society, at almost all
times, some attachmentsseem to flow more
from a sense of natural- some would say
spiritual - affinity than from social inter-
action.
Although it is seldom made explicit, one
implication of this line of argument is that
free riding is much less prevalent in pri-
mordial than in instrumental groups.
Because the basis of group membership is
ascriptive rather than voluntary, instru-
mental rationality supposedly plays a much
smaller role in the dynamics of this kind of
collectivity.
There remain 'non-rational' elements of
explosive power and tenacityin the structure
of nations and the outlook and myth of
nationalism.These elements,I wouldcontend,
stem from the profound historical roots of
the myths,symbols,memoriesandvaluesthat
definethe ethnic substratumof manynations.
These are elements that manyof us, including
manysocial scientists,would prefer to ignore
but we do so at our peril. The conflictsthat
embitter the geo-politics of our planet often
betraydeeper roots than a clash of economic
interestsand politicalcalculationswould sug-
gest, and manyof these conflicts,and perhaps
the most bitterand protracted,stem fromjust
these underlyingnon-rationalelements. Their
persistence,and intensificationin the modern
era suggest a long future for ethno-national-
ism, and an increasinglyviolent one, if we fail
to addressthe real issues in the formationof
nationsand the spreadof nationalism.(Smith
1989:363)'4
Yet most of these writers are unconvincing
because they fail to provide comprehensible
mechanisms of collective action. A notable
exception is Horowitz, whose book Ethnic
Groups in Conflict attempts to provide the
primordialist position with just such a
mechanism (based on the experimental
social psychological research of Tajfel 1981
and Turner 1987). Horowitz (1985: 181)
sees the cause of ethno-regional collective
action as lying in
the disparagingevaluations of group worth
to which [many ethnic] groups were subject,
evaluationsthat led them to want to do some-
thing to retrieve their self-esteem. The par-
ticipationof non-elitesin [ethnic]conflict,hard
to explain on the the basis of narrowgroup
'interests,'is easy to explain on the basis of
individuouscomparison.Since the individual
'sense of identity is the feeling of being a
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worthyperson becausehe fits into a coherent
and valuedorder of things,'ego identitydep-
ends heavily on affiliations.A threat to the
valueof those affiliationsproducesanxietyand
defense. For this reason,people often express
hostilitytowardthose who create uncertainty
about the correctnessof their own behavior
and that of the groupsto which they belong,
and they often do so out of all proportion
to the characterof the threat that presently
confrontsthem.
Even if we grant that social movements
built on the basis of primordial attachments
can under certain circumstances attain an
intensity and level of personal commitment
that, on the face of it, defies explanation in
terms of rational calculation, these cir-
cumstances are extremely rare. Primor-
dialist logic thus fails to explain empirical
variations in collective action. Horowitz
(1985: 147) himself sees the basic problem
when he admits that social categorization
theory would predict far more nationalism
than the historical record reveals. There-
fore it seems unwise to dispense entirely
with assumptions of individual rationality
and the free-rider hypothesis.
Once individual rationality is counten-
anced, however, then group identification
can no longer be regarded as a sufficient
condition of collective action. The problem,
of course, is that many of the goals that
ethnically conscious actors might desire
(whether dictated by an interest in produc-
tion, consumption or both) are collective
goods that, despite their value, will not
be produced at optimal levels by rational
actors. If free riding is less prevalent in
primordial than in instrumental groups,
perhaps this can be explained by systematic
social structural differences in these kinds
of groups, rather than by social cat-
egorization processes. Group members are
likely to engage in collective action only
when they are both highly dependent and
subject to social institutions that encourage
monitoring and sanctioning by their peers
(Hechter 1987a; 1990). Since institutions
that facilitate monitoring and sanctioning
are far from universal (Hechter & Kana-
zawa forthcoming), collective action - as
represented, for instance, by the founding
of a separatist political party - is a highly
problematic outcome (see Figure 3).
 LOW FREEDOM HIGH FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION OF ASSOCIATION
INSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
HOSTILE TO NEW FAVORABLE TO
POLITICAL NEW POLITICAL
PARTIES PARTIES
LOW REGIONAL HIGH REGIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL INSTITIONAL
AUTONOMY
LOW
PATRONAGE
PROSPECTS
3 GOVERNMM
Figure 3. Modelfor regionalcollectiveaction.
Otherinstitutionalstructures,suchas the
lawsandelectoralrulesof host states(Shep-
sle 1991), also affect the ease of interest
articulation,as well as the foundingof new
political parties. For example, unlimited
freedom of association lowers the cost of
the foundingof new parties.Since freedom
of association is more limited in France
thanin the United Kingdom,Britishethno-
regionalpartieshave faredbetterthantheir
Frenchcounterparts(Hechter& Levi 1979:
267-70). Likewise, proportionalrepresen-
tation, constituency elections and other
electoral rules encourage the founding of
new parties(Levi & Hechter 1985). Just as
institutionsthat lower the cost of political
articulationdo not foreordainthe founding
of new parties, so new parties(not necess-
arily secessionist ones) can arise in the
absenceof these favorableconditions:after
all, some secessionist movements are
underground.
Yet even if the host state allowsfor maxi-
mal political articulation,secessionist par-
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AUTONOMY
HIGH
PATRONAGE ... . .
PROSPECTS HIGH
\ * ~~~TRANSFER
MEMBERSHIP IN
REGIONAL
PA RTY
ties face another major impediment. Their
manifest aim condemns them to difficulties
on at least two separate counts. In the first
place, the parties cannot easily convince
prospective members that the attainment
of territorial sovereignty is a realistic pros-
pect, since information about how difficult
it is to secede is common knowledge. In the
second place, if territorial sovereignty is
regarded as a good, then it is clearly a public
good and, as such, is subject to sub-optimal
provision (Olson 1965). If secessionist par-
ties are to survive, they must offer their
members goods that are both private and
much more readily attainable than sov-
ereignty. These subsidiary goods constitute
the incentives necessary for the growth of
the party. But since these goods are scarce
and costly to produce, attaining them is a
severe obstacle to the secessionist move-
ment.
Sometimes these private goods can be
provided by other organizations whose
initial rationale has nothing to do with
274
secession.'5The most importantgood that
can be provided is a job. An important
source of jobs derives from the region's
institutionalautonomy. A comparisonof
Scotland and Wales is illustrativein this
respect. Wales was incorporatedinto the
United Kingdom in 1536 entirely on
England's terms, and thus with no legit-
imacy for its cultural institutions. In
contrast, Scotland's incorporationin 1707
providedfor the maintenanceof distinctive
Scottish legal, educational and ecclesi-
astical institutions, and thus for culturally
specificjobs.
To the degree that a secessionistpartyis
able to offer its adherents the prospectof
receiving patronage- especially govern-
ment jobs - this may serve as an appealing
incentivefor prospectivemembers.Patron-
age prospectsare largelydeterminedby the
constitutionalstructure of the host state.
Federalsystemsand devolutionof adminis-
trationto the regional or local level put a
whole host of jobs at risk of capture to a
secessionist party. The new Spanish con-
stitutionoffers a case in point. Among the
powers granted to autonomous regions in
Spain are controls over regional govern-
mental institutions, local governments,
public works and transportationsystems,
agriculture,livestock grazing, the use of
wilderness areas, environmental protec-
tion, irrigation systems, fishing rights,
economic development policy, cultural
patrimony and the promotion and regu-
lation of tourism (Greenwood 1980). A
third source of private goods is pro-
vided in the form of transfers from the
host government to regional authorities
(Davies 1989).
Even when all the precedingconditions
are met and the ethno-regional group is
capable of engaging in collective action,
however, it is by no means clear that
secession will be regarded as a desirable
outcome.
3.3. Social bases of secessionistmovements
Whatvalue do secessionistmovementsrep-
resent for their adherents (see Figure 4)?
Why might the inhabitantspreferself-rule
to the rule of the host state? One way
to get at this question empiricallyis by
analyzingthe socialbaseof separatistmove-
275
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ments.16 Thereis a highdegreeof consensus
in the literaturethat the primarybasis of
support for secessionist movements, like
that of most other kindsof political move-
ments, is found among white- collar and
service sector employees (Rogowski 1985:
376).
Why might the middle class form the
social basis of secessionism? Despite our
inabilityto predict confidentlywhat kinds
of people have a preferencefor territorial
sovereignty(or for anyotherstateof affairs,
for thatmatter),some plausibleguessescan
be madeif we simplyassumethat everyone
is interested in attaininggreater personal
welfare than less - provided, of course,
thatthispursuitalone does not compromise
other argumentsin theirutilityschedules.17
Since territorialsovereigntycan lead to
privategoods as well as bads, people whose
materialwelfare does not depend on the
maintenanceof ties between their territory
and other partsof the host state should, on
this account, tend to be more favorable
to secession than others.'8 As the fate of
industrialworkersis more likely to depend
on extra-regionalmarketsthan that of free
professionals,governmentemployees and
workersin serviceoccupations,this is likely
to be one reasonwhy supportfor secession-
ist movements is predominantly found
among white-collar and tertiary sector
employees.
Tlhedispensationof patronageresources
also has implicationsfor the social base of
secession. Given that the supplyof patron-
age resources is highly limited, these
resources can be allocated to only small
numbersof people in the movement. And
these people generally have to be able to
masterthe socialskillsnecessaryto function
in a bureaucraticenvironment. This is
another reason why the participants in
secessionistmovementsare predominantly
middleclass.19
Further,people who desire to live in a
state dominated by co-religionists (an
importantfactorin the successfulseparatist
movementsof Eire, Israel and Pakistan),
or by the speakersof their native language
(as in Quebec), are likely to favor separ-
atism,at least in part, because they expect
that their labor market position will
improvethereby.
 POLMCAL
PARTY

A ~~~~~~~WINDFALLS AND E*IXISTENCE OF

/ \ ~~~~~RESOURCES FOUND . *ALTrERNATIVE
/ \ / ~~~~~IN REGIONAL . ' MAtRKETS
\ / 1~~~~~~TERRITORY , . (EEC, tic.)
HIGH REGIONAL
>
~~~~~~~~~.
LOW REGIONA ..... .
..............I.......
.... ........ ........
DEPENDENCE ON DEPENDENCE ON/
HOST ECONOMY HOSI' ECONOMY/

/PERCEPTION OF
/HOBST STATE'S
WEAKNESS
<(wr Ioss; economic

STR ONG
SUP?PORTFOR
SECESSION

Figure 4. Mlodel of support for secession.

This kind of reasoning would appear to
hold a fortiori among those whose very
livelihoods depend on the existence of sep-
arate cultural institutions. Yet, so long as
the continued existence of these distinctive
regional institutions is not challenged by
the host state, the incumbents in culturally
specific jobs may have no direct interest in
secession. In this way, host states whose
institutions effectively grant multicultu-
ralism legitimacy may be more vulnerable
to regional political parties than others, but
less vulnerable to secession because the
elites in these regions have a greater stake
in the status quo than those in regions with
a hierarchical cultural division of labor.20
The preceding propositions are based on
the assumption that people will desire
secession only if they expect to profit per-
sonally from this state of affairs. Note that
this idea carries the implication that support
for secession is independent of the level of
regional economic development or exploi-
tation.21 Nationalist demands surrounding
separatist claims following the discovery of
oil in Biafra and Scotland are best under-
stood in this light.
Finally, like all other forms of collective
action, a secessionist party is most likely
to succeed when it is believed already to
command the support of a critical mass of
followers (Schelling 1978). For secessionist
movements in particular, this belief hinges
on popular perceptions of the weakness of
the host state.22 Unexpectedly heavy losses
at war and economic collapse both help
foster a perception of the host state's weak-
ness. Weakness of a host state is encour-
aging to secessionist parties for two quite
different reasons. On the one hand, it
reduces the economic benefits of regional
incorporation. On the other hand, it
reduces the host state's capacity to repress
secessionist mobilization.
The great burst of secessionist activity
that occurred during the waning days of the
USSR shows that the host state's economic
and political weakness are linked. By
undermining the Communist Party's pol-
itical monopoly, the perestroika reforms
allowed secessionist parties to form and
flourish in regions that formerly had been
effectively controlled by the center (Fur-
tado & Hechter 1992; Zaslavsky 1992). But

276

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 POLMCALLY
MOBILIZED REGION
WIT A
SECESSIONIST PARTY
PARTY IS PAR is
NON-MILITANT MILUTANTAND
ARMED
REGION IS REGION OF LOW
STRATEGICALLY STRATEGIC
VITAL VALUE
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
SIDES WITH
HOST STATE
HOST STATE IS
STRONG
Figure 5. Model for host state's costs of maintaining territorial integrity.
the impetus for these decisive reforms
clearly came from a crumbling Soviet econ-
omy. Even so, the dissolution of the Soviet
state did not occur until the failed coup of
1991 discredited the Communist Party and
led to its outlawing.
3.4. Factorsaffectingthe host state's
willingnessto cede controlover the
secessionistterritory
If thereis one constantin historyapartfrom
the universalityof death and taxes, it is the
reluctanceof states to part with territory.
Land is the pillar of the state; it provides
tax revenue, a labor force, mineral and
other geographicallybased resources, and
it is often vital for defense. For all of these
reasons, it is axiomatic that, when rulers
contemplate changing state borders, their
fantasies are expansionist and not con-
tractionist.Whereasmany new states were
formed in the wake of the fragmentation
of multinationalempires (such as Austria-
Hungaryand the USSR) and in the wake
of decolonization, the key fact about
secession is that it is among the rarest of
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INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
SIDES WITH
REGION
HOST STATE IS
WEAK
major political outcomes. Pure secession,
which occurs when a highlyeffective state
permitsa secessionistterritoryto withdraw
from its embrace, has only occurredtwice
in the twentiethcentury:whenNorwayleft
Sweden in 1905, and when Irelandleft the
United Kingdom in 1922. (Bangladesh's
separationfromPakistanprobablydoes not
qualify,because the Pakistanistate cannot
be considered to have been highly effec-
tive.)
Why, then, does pure secession ever
occur?To say that rulerswill cede territory
only when the net benefit of doing so is
positiveis a truism.An answerto this ques-
tion requiresthe specificationof factorsthat
are most likely to enter into the rulers'
benefit/cost calculations. Even if faced
(ratherimprobably,giventhe above analy-
sis) with a highly mobilized secessionist
movement, rulers still have a variety of
possible reactions that stop short of
secession.
They can offer secessionistleadersincen-
tives by rewardingthem with good jobs
contingenton abandoningtheir supportof
277
secession. The regime also may promise,
and perhaps even provide, other kinds of
resources (such as development projects)
to the region so as to persuade rank-and-
file membersof the secessionistmovement
thattheircore interestslie with maintaining
a tie to the host state.
Constitutionalreformsare a more costly
response to secessionism. They can help
forestallsecession either by providingfed-
eralism, devolution and other institutional
changesthat effectivelygive greaterauton-
omy to the territory(this is ongoing with
respectto the statusof Quebec in Canada),
by or institutingadministrativeredistricting
that inhibitsthe secessionists'potentialfor
collectiveaction(as occurredin Nigeriaand
India - see Wood 1981: 126).
If all else fails, repressionis likely to be
the state's last resort. Its efficacy,however,
depends on at least three kinds of factors.
First, geographic: the larger and more
mountainousthe secessionistterritory,the
more difficult it is to control militarily.
Second, military:the militarycapacity of
the host state relative to that of the
secessionistterritorydepends not only on
the secessionists' equipment and training
(Do they have an army?If so, how effective
is it?), but also on each population's
morale,which directlyaffects conscription
rates and soldiers' combat performance.
For example, it is far more difficultto con-
script an army in a population that has
recentlyexperiencedhigh rates of military
casualities,than in one that has enjoyed an
extended period of peace. Last, geopol-
itical: how are third parties in the inter-
nationalsystem likely to react to the host
state's repressivemoves?
For the most part, geopolitical factors
tend to militate against secession. In the
first place, as the origins of most current
states are multinational, almost all host
statesthemselvesface potentialsecessionist
movements. It is not too difficultto con-
clude that supporting secessionist move-
ments elsewhere might help stir up
unpleasantproblems at home. This pro-
vides the leadersof states with an incentive
to collude by universally discouraging
secession. In the second place, supportfor
a secessionistmovementnecessarilycomes
at the expense of relations with its host
278
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state.23Givengeopoliticalrealities,the net
benefitto be gained by courtingsecession-
iststendsto be negative.24Sometimesinter-
nationalsupporthelpssustainan otherwise
untenablestate (as Omrcanin1976 argues
with respectto Tito's Yugoslavia).
Severalof these factorscameinto play in
accounting for Norwegian and Irish
secession.Norwayinitiallybecame subject
to Swedish rule as the result of an 1813
agreement among the United Kingdom,
Russiaand Sweden. Swedenwas promised
Norwayas compensationfor its loss of Fin-
land to Russiaif it helped the allies defeat
Napoleon. Pursuant to the agreement,
Denmarkhanded over the govemance of
Norwayto Swedenone yearlater.Sweden's
interestin Norwayinitiallywas basedon its
fear of Russianexpansionand was stimu-
lated by Russia'saggressivenessin Finland
(Derry 1979:272). Separatistsentimentin
Norway grew during Swedish rule,
however,andby 1905it hadbecomealmost
universal: a referendum on Norwegian
secessionpassed by 368,208 to 184, with a
turnout of 84 per cent of the electorate
(Omrcanin 1976: 10). The referendum
resultsleft Swedishrulerswith a quandary.
Owing to Norway'sphysicalsize and top-
ographyandto Sweden'ssmallpopulation,
military repression was an unattractive
option. Swedish defense would be more
vulnerableif most of its militaryresources
wereexpendedoccupyinga hostileNorway
than if Swedenhad a friendlyNorwaythat
was responsible for its own security.
Further,the occupationof Norwaywould
be difficult,not least because, during the
years immediatelyprior to independence,
Norway had strengthenedits military by
buyingnew field artilleryandbuildingforts
on the Swedishfrontier(Denfy 1979:270).
Further,Sweden'sdominationof a hos-
tile Norway was an obstacle to Scandi-
navianregionalcooperation.By consenting
to Norway's independence, this obstacle
was removed and Scandinavian leaders
then were able to cooperateas equal part-
ners in establishing the Nordic Inter-
parliamentaryUnion (1907) and subse-
quent internationalinstitutionsthat bene-
fited the entire Nordic region (Hancock
1972:255-6). Last, Sweden'sdecision may
have been influenced by international
 pressure. Norway had made successful
efforts to attain foreip support, and its
decisionto establish a monarchymay have
allayed fears about its future instability
(Larsen 1948: 273).
Ireland'sincorporationin Great Britain
lasted from 1801 to 1922. As in Norway,
Irish support for nationalismgrew during
this period - especially after the Easter
Rebellion in 1916 - and the nationalists
also developed a military capacity. The
Britishstate had many militaryadvantages
in Ireland relative that of Sweden in
Norway, however. The size and geography
of Ireland made occupation feasible, and
the English already had been engaged in
the occupation of Ireland during much
of the late nineteenth century, anyway.
In addition, English military resources
far exceeded Sweden's. Why then did
England accede to the secessionists'
demands?
After the end of World War I, British
public opinion did not support a war in
Ireland(Hachey 1973: 23-25). Continuing
violence there was underminingthe war-
weary public's support for the Liberal
government (MacDonagh 1968: 88). The
government recognized that this lack
of public support precluded an all-out of-
fensive or a prolonged occupation
(Beckett 1966: 451).2 In addition, many
prominentpeople - includingthe King of
England and the Archbishop of Can-
terbury - objected to the government's
Irish policy and this helped set the stage
for negotiationsin June 1921.International
opinion, particularly in the US, also
inclined the government towards conces-
sion.
Finally, England retained some control
over the new Irishstate and kept total con-
trol over Northern Ireland. Although the
Irish nationalists sought an independent
unpartitionedrepublic,they were forcedto
accept a compromise. Ireland was given
statusas a Dominion in the BritishEmpire,
rather than outright independence. And
Irelandhad to give up Ulster, the six coun-
ties of NorthernIreland.Irelandremained
subjectto Englandin manyways:England
kept control of certain Irish harborsthat
had been essential to its survivalduringthe
war (MacDonagh 1968: 91; Beckett 1966:
279
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453); England retainedultimate appellate
jurisdicationof court cases (MacDonagh
1968: 91), and also reserved the right to
approve the new Irish constitution
(Macardle1965: 818).
Thus the ultimate settlement between
England and Ireland was a compromise.
Englandprotected itself from the costs of
Irish secession by maintaining close
ties. The significance of these ties is
revealed by the events that followed the
signingof the treaty.Violence brokeout in
Ireland between those who still wanted a
fully independentrepublicand those who
acceptedthe treaty'sterms.To some Irish,
the treatyperpetuatedIreland'ssubjection
to England. Of course, the ties between
Irelandand England- like those involving
other Commonwealth countries - have
changeddramaticallyover time.
Recenteventsin the BalkansandEastern
Europe have underscored the historical
contingencyof the role of geopoliticalfac-
tors in state formation.26In certain his-
torical conditions geopolitical forces
promotethe fragmentationof states. Frag-
mentationis most likely to occur when the
host state has been defeated in war and
is compelled to accept new and undesired
territorialboundariesas a conditionof sur-
render. During the post-Yalta detente
betweenthe US andthe USSR - otherwise
knownas the cold war- non-intervention
in internalpoliticswasa guidingprincipleof
internationalrelations(for reasonsspelled
out in part by Wallerstein 1992). This
principletended to deny secessionistsany
hope of third-partyinterventionon their
behalf. Now that the American-Soviet
detente is no longer operational, third-
party intervention has been on the rise.
The most importantinstanceis Germany's
decision to recognize the sovereignty of
Slovenia and Croatia. This move, which
was ultimatelyresponsiblefor recognition
of these new states by the EuropeanCom-
munity and a reluctant US, would have
been unthinkabletwo short years ago.2?
4. Conclusion
Despite currentheadlines,most of the new
states formed in the past two years have
been the productsof fragmentationrather
 thansecession.It has long been appreciated
that secession is a highly improbableout-
come (Young 1976:460-504). This analysis
revealswhy it has been so improbableand
why it will continue to be improbable in
the future. Few regionshave the structural
requirements for the development of a
secessionistmovement. Those few that do
must be capable of developing political
organizationscapable of overcoming the
free-riderproblem- a problemthat is far
more severe in the case of secession than
many other political agendas. Even when
solutions to the free-riderproblem are at
hand, it is not even clear that secession is
an outcome that most self-identified
secessioniststhemselves sincerelydesire.
The final reason for the improbabilityof
secession is that the host state is far from
powerlessto protectits territorialintegrity.
If the secessionistterritoryis large and/or
mountainous, if the regime has too few
discretionaryresourcesto providethe nec-
essary incentives, and if constitutional
reforms are either difficult to enact or
regarded as insufficientby the territorial
population,then and only then is the host
state forced to contemplate acceding to
secessionistdemands.
Received July 1992
Final version acceptedSeptember1992
Acknowledgements
Revised version of a paper originallypresented
at the LibertyFund Conferenceon 'Liberalism,
Federalism,and the Questionof Secession',6-9
December, 1990, Tucson, Arizona. The author
appreciatesthe comments of Debra Friedman
and John Shelton Reed and the researchassist-
ance of Christine Home. The bulk of this
researchwas completedwhile the authorwas a
Fellowat the Center for AdvancedStudyin the
BehavioralSciences. He is gratefulfor financial
supportprovidedby the NationalScience Foun-
dation (*BNS-8700864).
Notes
I Concernsabout secessionappearto come in
waves:the last great groundswellof secessionist
sentimentoccurredin the mid 1970s, and other
periodsfollowedthe conclusionof the two world
warsandthe demiseof the cold war.Thesewaves
appearto be relatedto shiftsin the international
politicalsystem (see below).
280
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2 It is unclear,however, just how many states
in the internationalcommunitymust recognize
the new politicalentity for it to be considered
legitimate.
3 Thisis the contextin whichBuchanan(1991)
inquires about the legitimacy of the right to
secede.
I It is, however, availablefor regions in the
United Kingdom,France, Spain and Belgium,
amongother countries.
I For example, the ScottishLabourPartyhas
adopted many of the programsof the Scottish
NationalPartyin the last decade (Levi 1990).
6 Even apart from the usual methodological
concernsaboutthe validityandreliabilityof such
data.
I Fora discussionof samplingbiasthatplagues
moststudiesin comparative-historical sociology,
see Kiser& Hechter (1991).
8 This is not to deny that substantial con-
sumptiondifferencescan arise within the same
culturalgroup, and even withinthe same broad
social class. Thus Bourdieu(1987) describesin
exquisite detail the varyingconsumptioninter-
ests of differentelite sectors in Frenchsociety.
9 It is also possible that culturalinterestscan
determinethe structureof production,although
the claim is more controversial. Thus some
Americanhistoriansattributethe distinctiveness
of the ante-bellumSouth not to its distinctive
plantation economy, but rather to the pre-
dominantlyCelticheritageof its settlers(McWhi-
ney 1988;Fischer1989).
10For some evidence about the pervasiveness
of the culturaldivisionof laborin less developed
countriessee Horowitz(1985).
1' Note thatno suchdifficultyis entailedin the
Hinducastesystemwhen there is a strongbelief
that reincarnationwill bring about a just redis-
tributionof positions.
12 There is also some evidence that the per-
ceptionof regionalgrievancesis associatedwith
regional group identification(Reed, 1983:70-
94).
13 This differencealso lies at the heart of the
old sociologicaldistinctionbetweengroupsbased
on Gemeinschaftand Gesellschaft.Whereasthe
former tie presumably'drawsits psychological
strengthfrom levels of motivationdeeper than
thoseof merevolitionor interest,andit achieves
its fulfillmentin a submergenceof individualwill
thatis not possiblein unionsof mereconvenience
or rationalassent'(Nisbet 1966:47), the basisof
the latteris purelyinstrumental.Foran argument
that both kindsof groupscan be analyzedin the
same fashion,see Hechter (1990).
14 Whereas those who argue that collective
actionproceedsfromthe existenceof groupiden-
tity like to discount the efficacy of individual
rationality,manyof these writersaresimplycon-
fusedabouthow rationalityassumptionsareused
in social explanation.They seem to think that
the assumptionof rationalityexplainsonly action
thatis consciouslydesignedto optimizematerial
rather than non-materialresources. Far from
claimingthatindividualspossessno well-ordered
utility schedules, these writers merely assume
thatconsumptionintereststend to outweighpro-
duction interestsin the utility schedulesof eth-
nically conscious actors. Why they believe the
utility schedules of ethnically conscious actors
differsystematicallyfromthose of non-ethnically
consciousactors is never made clear, however.
Yet even if this were true, any resultingaction
might still be rational, at least in a technical
sense.
'5 The CatholicChurchin Quebec played just
this kindof inadvertentrole in stimulatingQu&
becois nationalismprevious to 1965 (Hechter
1987b: 420-422).
16 Otherrevealingevidencecould be obtained
by studyingthe timingof separatistmobilization,
but muchless is known about this subject (for a
very preliminaryanalysis, see Levi & Hechter
1984).
17 Some of the argumentsin this section of the
paperare borrowedfrom Hechter (1987b).
18 Thus Pinard & Hamilton (1986) show that
the belief amongFrancophonesthatsovereignty-
associationwould cause economic losses was a
significantdeterminantof No votes in the 1980
Quebec referendum.
19 Note that, once patronagehas been dispen-
sed, incumbents' interest in secession may
decline, for theirwelfaremay not dependon the
attainmentof secession.
' But the reality is likely to be even more
complicated:the same host state can be more or
less multiculturalin the institutionalrealm.Thus
Britain incorporatedboth Wales and Ireland
withoutany concessionsto theirindigenousinsti-
tutions,but the very same state (at a laterperiod
in history) granted considerable institutional
autonomyto Scotland at the time of its incor-
poration.
21 It should be noted in this regardthat ques-
tions about terms of exchange between regions
and host states are seldom easy to answer. Dif-
ferent conclusionsabout these issues can often
be reachedon the basisof differentassumptions
about the value of goods and services that are
not producedin the market.
' This is quite different from perceptionsof
the failingsof a given regimein the host state. In
a democracy,the re-electionof any regimesmay
be problematic in the face of economic
downturn,but in and of itself this has no nec-
essaryimplicationsfor the territorialintegrityof
the state.
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23This is one sense in which the analogy
between secession and divorce holds. When a
thirdpersonunilaterallysupportsone partyin a
divorce,this is tantamountto rejectingthe other
party.
24Of course, the leadersof state X are likely
to support a secessionistmovement in state Y
when they are at warwithY or committedto Y's
destabilization.Thus, Iraq'sinvasionof Kuwait
probably increased the likelihood of covert
Americansupportfor Kurdishinsurgents.
I In June 1921, the British Chief of the
ImperialGeneral Staff wrote, 'Unless England
was on our side we would fail, and if we failed
we wouldbreakthe army...Unless Englandwas
on our side... it would be madness to try and
flattenout the rebels' (Curtis1936:451).
1 For a discussionof the effects of third-party
interventionon state formation,see Suhrkeand
Noble (1977) and Heraclides(1990).
n Some of the reasonsadvancedin the press
for Germany'searlyrecognitionof Sloveniaand
Croatia include the following. Since Germany
itself had recently re-unified by asserting the
right to self-determination, how could it deny the
Slovenes and Croats the same right? Further,
German public opinion was pro-Croat. Last, on
account of its geographical proximity, Germany
would feel the effects of a Balkan war more than
most other EC countries. These reasons would
have been insufficiently weighty in the context
of the cold war, where threats to Yugoslav sov-
ereignty could have threatened American-Soviet
detente.
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