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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA

VENTURA, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA vs .GREGORIA
VENTURA, G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

Facts: Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased

Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and
surviving spouse of deceased Gregorio Ventura. On the other hand, appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with
his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees
was denied by the deceased in his will, but lately ruled by the lower court to
be the deceaseds legitimate children.

Later, it was held that the appellees were preterited in the said will of the
deceased. Thus, making it an intestate proceeding in which Marias
appointment as executrix was removed.

Issue: Whether or not Marias removal as executrix is proper and correct.

Ruling: Yes. The removal was proper and correct.

Under our law, the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious. Further, it is provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court that if no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;...

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and
Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's
property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). As decided by the
lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they
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are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura,

namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests. Therefore, the removal of Maria Ventura is proper and correct.

CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME

VILLAMOR, RAFAELA RETUYA, SOFRONIO VILLAMOR, PILAR
SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO VILLAMOR, CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS
OR and GUADALUPE CEDEO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-
41508 June 27, 1988

Facts: This petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XL declaring null and void the Project
of Partition in Special Proceedings Nos. 262-C and 343-C executed on
December 7, 1946, the "Order" of April 14, 1948 which approved said Project
of Partition,the "Auto" of November 25, 1953 which closed and terminated
the two (2) administration proceedings and which authorized the delivery of
seven (7) parcels of land to Ireneo Villamor and Paula Villamor, and the
extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the petitioners herein on
July 28, 1969.

It appears that Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castaeda had eight (8)
children, namely: Rufino, Barbara, Florencio, Casimira, Brigida, Braulia,
Margarita and Eugenia. Only Barbara Cortes and Rufino Cortes had issues
and descendants.

Barbara begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes, who
died on June 12, 1909 left two alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes
Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor.

Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one Sixta Ceniza. Born to them
were five children and only Nicanor Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel
Maria Cortes, died as a monk of the Carthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain on
August 28, 1969, was the last of the direct descendants of the Barbara
Cortes line.

On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died
single on January 29, 1967 and without issue. Ireneo Villamor married one
Bersabela Perez. Said marriage was blessed with five children, namely:
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Candelario, Bartolome, Sofronio, Eleuterio and Marcos, all surnamed

Villamor, the petitioners, herein. Ireneo Villamor died on April 21, 1966.

Several settlements of estates and partitions happened.

It appeared that in the settlement of Bartolomes estate, the brother of

Nicanor, Fr. Diosdado Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named
administrator.

Also, the Aministratrix of Fr. Nicanors estate, Daniela Urot Ceniza, questions
the validity of the partition which adjudicates several parcels of land to the
deceased Paula Villamor and Ireneo Villamor.

Issue: One of the issues raised in this case is that whether or not the
appointment of Fr. Diosdado Camomot as the administrator of Bartolomes
estate is proper.

Ruling: Yes. The appointment of Fr. Diosdado Camomot as the administrator

of Bartolomes estate is proper.

Under Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it provides that in case the
persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent
or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other
person as the court may appoint.

In this case, although it was quite intriguing that Fr. Nicanor Cortes did not
assert his other relatives to administer Fr. Bartolomes estate but rather
made Fr. Diosdado Camomot as the administrator. However, the court itself
affirmed and bestowed the power of administration to Fr. Diosdado Camomot
as it swa that he was competent and willing to serve as an administrator.
Therefore, despite the presence of some nearest kin, the court in its
discretion may appoint someone stranger to uphold the best interest of all
parties in the administration of ones estate.

Comparative Analysis: It can be viewed that the nearest of kin must be

preferred as the administrator of ones estate. However, the court, in its
discretion, may disregard that rule if the court sees that such nearest kin will
not serve the best interest of all parties so a stranger may be appointed as
an administrator.

LUIS L. CO vs. HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 160671, April 30,
2008

Facts:
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Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed as special co-administrators

of the estate of petitioner's father, Co Bun Chun, by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati on March 4, 1998. However, upon motion of other heirs,
petitioner's appointment was set aside, whereby petitioner nominated his
son, Alvin Co, in his place, which was granted by the court. However, four
years later, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the appointment
of Alvin because of the several criminal cases filed against the latter.
Petitioner files petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in revoking Alvin Cos appointment as
special administrator.
Ruling: No. The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Alvins appointment as special co-administrator.

Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is

not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules,
at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the
court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence; it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The special
administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate,
especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.

In this case, the trial courts judgment on the issue of Alvins removal as
special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure
whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ
of certiorari. Therefore, the petition for certiorari will not prosper.

Comment: The revocation of Alvins appointment is proper as it serves the

best interest of the parties in the case. There can be no abuse as to the
power of the court because it is clear that the other heirs have no trust and
confidence to him being the special administrator of the estate of Co Bun
Chun.
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Vilma Tan vs Hon. Francisco Gedorio, G. R. No. 166520, March 14,

2008

Facts:
Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo
Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the
decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim
as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake
Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be
appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not
have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the
de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the
legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that
the respondent were illegitmate children).However, upon failure of Vilma to
follow a court order to account for the income of the estate, the court
granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
in their selection of a special administrator.
Ruling:
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refersto the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion
of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail
themselves of the order of preference, they should pursue thea ppointment
of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated
the appointment of a special administrator.
Comment:
The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator since it was shown that Vilma failed follow the series
of directives and extension given to her to account for the estate.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO.

MARCELO PIJUAN vs. MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, G.R. No. L-
21917, November 29, 1966

Facts: In this case, MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA (Mrs. Gurrea) questions
the appointment of Marcelo Pijuan as executor of the estate of Carlos Gurrea,
the formers deceased husband.

It appeared that Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain in
1932, where they lived together until 1945. Carlos abandoned the Manuela
and lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children.
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Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be

his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor
thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter,
or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will.
Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special
administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the
will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an
alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.

Thus, Mrs. Gurrea moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate
of the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Marcelo Pijuan as executor of the

estate of Carlos Gurrea is proper.

Ruling: Yes. The appointment of Marcelo Pijuan as executor of the estate of

Carlos Gurrea is proper.

It is provided in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court that if no

executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the surviving
spouse or the nearest in kin is preferred as the administrator of the estate of
the deceased.

In this case, howeverthe deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document

purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be
said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo
Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent. What
is more, he has expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as
executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed
the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded
by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse
refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that
of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within
the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

Comment: The decision of the Court that the appointment of a stranger as

provided by the will of the deceased is correct because it is the will of the
deceased that his property should be administered by Marcelo Pijuan.
Clearly, when there is a will left by a decedent, the provisions from his will
must be the first to consider.
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FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., vs. SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., G.R.

No. 14904 September 19, 1921

Facts: The subject property was owned by Rufina Medel, as her inheritance
from her unmarried daughter, Anacleta Ortega, who inherited it from her
father, Estanislao Ortega. It turned out that on June 3, 1915, Rufina sold the
property with right to repurchase to Francisco Lunsod. Later, when Rufina
died, Cipriano Medel, brother of said deceased, was the appointment of an
administrator of the property left by her.

On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace
court of San Pablo a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido
Cariaga, the case being docketed there as civil case No. 861. In said
complaint the description of the parcels in question was given and the
plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the three parcels of land mentioned
in the aforementioned document and that on or about June 4, 1916, he was
illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of the possession
thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting
the fruits. These said defendants are the uncles of Anacleta Ortega. In the
intestate proceeding of Rufinas estate, the defendants asserted to exclude
the subject property from the estate of Rufina Medel because the said
property is considered as a reserved property for the relatives within the
third degree of Anacleta Ortgea.

Issue: One of the issues raised in this case is that whether or not the subject
property may be excluded from the property of Rufina Medels estate

Ruling: Yes. The subject property is not part of Rufinas estate.

It is settled that when the ascendant who inherits from a descendant,

whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance
by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use,
enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is
inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or
they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner
of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who
belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise.
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In this case, the questioned property was inherited by Rufina from her
deceased daughter. Clearly, by operation of law, the said property is reserve
to the relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the
property proceeded, who happened to be the defendants in this case,
Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga. Therefore, the property must be
excluded from the estate of Rufina Medel.

Comment: The Court is correct when it ruled that the said property was not
part of Rufinas estate because it is a reserved property for the relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded.

Testamentaria de la finada Arcadia Santos (alias Leocadia).

MAXIMINA MARCELINO, solicitante y apelada,
vs.
ROSARIO ANTONIO Y OTROS, solicitantes y apelantes.

Facts:

After the will of the late Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos was probated by the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, his heirs Felisa Antonio and others
presented, on July 19, 1938, two motions asking one of them to be the
executors or administrators:
1. To submit an inventory of the property, real and personal, comprised in the
estate of the deceased Leocadia;
2. To separate from said inventory the property, real and personal, pertaining
to the conjugal partnership of Leocadia Santos and Modesto Marcelino;
3. To render an accounting of said conjugal partnership from 1905, death of
Modesto Marcelino, to date, and liquidate the same;
4. To designate a day in court whereby petitioners may present evidence on
the existence of a conjugal partnership, the properties of which have been
illegally included and disposed in the will of Leocadia Santos; to the facts of
nonliquidation, but of disposal;

5. And for such other remedies as this Honorable Court may grant in the
premises.
In the other motion, it was requested that the testaror's will be declared void
in respect of any legacy or interest given in said last will to Calixta Peralta,
daughter of Casimiro Peralta, one of the witnesses to the will.
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In the memorandum dated October 31, 1938, they also asked for the
partition of the inheritance left by the late Leocadia Santos excluding certain
properties that did not belong to her. The court, holding the opposition of
Maximina Marcelina and Calixta Peralta, dismissed the motions by order of
January 31, 1939, on the grounds that they raised questions that should be
addressed in separate ordinary action. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the motions of
the heirs to be declared and ordered as one the executor or administrator of
the estate.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Lower Court committed an
error in dismissing the appellants' motions, since once a will is probated, it is
the duty of the executor or administrator, unless it is a legatee, to submit to
the Court, within 3 months His appointment, an inventory of all assets, rights
and credits that have come into his hands. (Art. 668, Code of Civil
Procedure.) In the inventory must be included half of the property that
corresponds to the deceased. (Art. 685, Code of Civil Procedure). And in
order to find that half of the profits, it must proceed before the liquidation of
the assets, rendering of accounts of the partnership, payment of debts, etc.
Therefore, what was requested in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of one of the
aforementioned motions was in accordance with the law and must be
substantiated in the same proceedings in which the will of the late Leocadia
Santos was probated.
As to the other motion, in which the will is declared invalid in relation to the
legacy made in favor of Calixta Peralta, and as to the memorandum of the
movant with respect to the exclusion of certain properties of the inventory of
the testamentary, the Order can not be upheld either. After paying all the
debts of a testamentary or intestate, the court has jurisdiction to proceed
with the partition and distribution of the inheritance between the interested
parties. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the court may or may not respect
the distribution made in the will, according to whether or not this distribution
is in accordance with the provisions of the law. The power, therefore, to
determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary dispositions, is
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inherent in the jurisdiction of the court when proceeding to a fair and legal
distribution of the inheritance. On the other hand, to declare that an
independent and separate action is necessary for that purpose, is to go
against the general tendency of jurisprudence to avoid multiplicity of
lawsuits, and is, moreover, costly, dilatory and impractical. As to the
exclusion of the inventory of certain properties, although it is true, as a
general rule, that the court, in these proceedings, does not have the power
to decide matters of title to property, we have already stated, however, that
it can do so, on an interim basis, when the purpose is only to determine
whether particular properties should be excluded from the inven
Babao vs. Villavicencio, 42 Phil 421
Facts:
In the proceedings of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes,Maria
Babao, the herein appellee, petitioned the court that an additional inventory
be made of certain properties of the deceased and an allowance be made to
her minor children for their support, pending the distribution of the estate.
These minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased Ignacio
Trillanes. The petition was opposed by the administrator of the estate on the
ground that the said minors are not entitled to support applied for because
Sec.684 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for the support of the
children of the deceased and not of his grandchildren. The lower court
however, hold otherwise and allowed P15 monthly pension.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisional support granted by Sec. 684 of the
Code of Civil Procedure extends to the grandchildren?
Ruling:
The ordinary acceptation of the word hijo or child does not include
nieto or grandchildren. The reference made in the aforesaid section to
allowances as are provided by the law in force in the Philippine Islands does
not have the effect of extending the right to this provisional support to her
petition, whose provision in this point do not, in the opinion of the court,
extend to the grandchildren of the deceased. She cannot invoke the Code of
Civil Procedure because the grandfather against whose estate the allowance
claimed is to be charged is now dead, and therefore the obligation of such
grandfather to give support was already extinguished.
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Comment:
The reference made to Section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
"allowances as are provided by the law in force in the Philippine Islands on
and immediately prior to the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of
extending the right to this provisional support to persons other than the
children of the deceased.

SANTERO vs. CFI OF CAVITE, G.R No. 61700-03

Facts:
Petitioners are children of the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta
Pacursa while private Respondents are 4 of the 7 children by Pablo Santero
with Anselmina. Both sets of children are the natural children of the
deceased, Pablo.
A Motion for allowance filed by Respondents through their guardian, wherein
the ground cited was for support which included educational expenses,
clothing and medical necessities, which was granted.
Petitioners opposed and contended that the wards for which allowance
is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age and are no
longer in guardianship as provided under Rule 83, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in grating support and allowance
to respondents despite the fact that all of them are not minors?
Ruling:
Yes.
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts.
290 and 188 of the New Civil Code. The fact that Respondents are of are,
gainfully employed and married is of no moment and should not be regarded
as the determining factor of their right to allowance. While the Rules of
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Court limit the allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children
of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his or
her children without distinction.
Comment:
Respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares
in the inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the provisions of the New
Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children
the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 which is a procedural
rule.