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Summary1
Prepared
by
Rod
Broadhurst
with
the
assistance
of
Ben
Chapman-Schmidt.
Final
version
completed
6.6.2013.
1
2
The
conveners
thank
Ms
Carrie
Li
and
the
Department
of
Applied
Social
Studies
for
the
administrative
assistance
provided
for
the
symposium.
3
Prof
Zhang
also
presented
co-authored
papers
with
Prof
Chin,
KL
(Rutgers),
who
was
unable
to
attend.
Regretfully
scholars
from
the
Chinese
Peoples
Public
Security
University
were
also
unable
to
attend.
1
before
the
time
of
Sun
Tzu,
and
that
we
need
to
consider
cyber
security
as
an
integral
component
of
national
security.
Furthermore,
our
definitions
of
organised
crime
are
outdated
and
ignore
new
organisation
forms
such
as
botnets,
which
can
create
an
organisation
of
unwitting
accomplices,
swarms
and
enhance
state-sponsored
crime.
He
argued
that
the
current
conceptualisation
of
both
online
organised
crime
and
state
sponsored
organised
crime
are
inadequate,
and
needed
more
attention.
In
the
Q&A
and
discussion
that
followed
it
was
recognized
that
cyber-attacks
had
already
been
used
alongside
traditional
warfare.
Among
the
problems
facing
law
enforcement
was
a
lack
of
resources
for
combating
cyber-crimes,
most
of
which
were
dedicated
to
child
pornography.
The
second
presentation
was
Professor
Michael
Levis
Organized
Financial
Crime
and
Corruption
and
Their
Control
in
Asia:
Current
Issues
and
Future
Prospects.
He
was
concerned
that
the
term
financial
crime
had
become
so
broad
that
it
included
everything
from
market
abuses,
money
laundering,
the
financing
of
terrorism
and
nuclear
proliferation,
and
transnational
bribery.
He
also
challenged
the
reliability
of
the
available
data
on
financial
crime
since
numbers
are
often
generated
to
conform
to
bureaucratic
needs,
and
reports
are
often
hampered
by
patchy
responses,
time
lapses
and
double
or
under
counting.
Financial
crime
itself
needs
to
be
considered
more
broadly
as
the
result
of
structural
forces,
and
law
enforcement
is
but
one
of
many
responses.
Beyond
these
problems,
Prof.
Levi
also
took
issue
with
the
lack
of
consistency
with
which
the
term
organised
crime
is
applied,
as
well
as
the
question
of
whether
Asia
is
a
coherent
region
for
analysis.
Building
on
this
point,
discussants
noted
that
some
activities
which
are
viewed
as
corruption
in
a
North
Atlantic
context
may
just
be
the
customary
way
of
doing
business
in
other
regions,
which
points
to
a
need
to
view
crime
through
the
context
of
the
culture
in
which
it
occurs.
Also
discussed
was
the
question
of
the
potential
benefits
of
organised
crime,
since
some
crimes,
such
as
online
piracy,
can
actually
generate
a
net
social
benefit.
This
is
an
area
deliberately
ignored
by
policy
makers
but
which
researchers
should
investigate.
The
third
presentation
by
Assistant
Commissioner
Albert
Ho
from
the
HK
Customs
and
Excise
Department
provided
an
example
of
an
investigation
of
marked
oil
smuggling
(over
600
million
litres
over
nine
months)
between
the
mainland
and
HK
involving
masters
of
ships
engaged
in
cross-border
trade.
Mr
Ho
noted
that
since
1997
when
Hong
Kong
returned
to
China
that
smuggling
activities
had
diversified,
outward-bound
smuggling
had
increased
and
this
was
driven
by
mainland
demand.
He
also
noted
that
small
loosely
organised
crime
groups
were
common
but
some
well-organised
syndicates
connecting
HK
and
the
mainland
had
been
observed.
Money
laundering
of
the
proceeds,
however,
occurred
in
HK.
He
also
reported
on
the
joint
actions
taken
by
the
relevant
PRC
and
HK
authorities
and
noted
the
interesting
case
of
a
Shenzhen
court
operating
to
gather
evidence
from
ships
masters
incarcerated
in
China
according
to
the
laws
of
HK
in
response
to
a
letter
of
request
from
a
HK
court.
Evidence
obtained
was
then
used
in
HK
court.
Prosecutions
in
HK
resulted
in
five
main
players
being
charged
with
conspiracy
to
export
un-manifested
cargo
and
money
laundering
involving
US
370
Million
with
some
HKD
30
million
assets
restrained
(note
an
abstract
of
this
presentation
is
not
available).
Professor
Sheldon
Zhang
delivered
two
presentations,
both
on
papers
he
had
co-written
with
Professor
Ko-lin
Chin.
In
his
first
presentation,
The
Heroin
Retail
Market
in
Kunming,
Professor
Zhang
discussed
how
drug
trafficking
in
Kunming
was
a
simple
process
that
2
differed
considerably
from
that
of
the
United
States.
The
drug
trade
was
not
associated
with
mafia-like
groups,
and
generally
conducted
either
alone
or
with
a
partner,
with
drugs
supplied
for
cash
on
delivery.
There
is
also
very
little
violence
between
drug
dealers.
Following
this
presentation,
Professor
Zhang
presented
Women
in
the
Heroin
Trade:
A
Niche
Market
Perspective.
He
noted
that
there
had
been
limited
empirical
work
on
women
in
organised
crime,
as
it
was
believed
that
a
combination
of
a
higher
capacity
for
violence
among
males
and
homosocial
reproduction,
along
with
prevailing
gender
norms,
had
kept
women
from
joining
organised
crime
groups.
However,
of
those
arrested
for
drug
trafficking
offences
in
this
prison
study,
one
quarter
were
women.
Although
there
were
notable
differences
between
female
drug
traffickers
and
male
drug
traffickers,
including
women
being
more
likely
to
work
with
family
members
and
to
cite
family
pressures
as
their
reason
for
entering
the
drug
trade,
this
figure
nevertheless
represents
considerable
female
involvement
in
a
normally
male-dominated
world.
Professor
Zhang
hypothesised
that
this
may
be
a
result
of
a
lack
of
street-level
dealing
and
the
absence
of
violence
may
have
helped
de-gender
the
marketplace.
In
the
discussion
that
followed,
questions
were
asked
about
whether
there
was
any
link
between
drug
dealing
and
prostitution.
It
was
also
asked
if
the
lower
female
incarceration
rate
might
not
reflect
gender
profiling
by
police,
and
a
reluctance
to
search
women
that
could
be
responsible
for
a
higher
demand
for
(less
at-risk)
female
drug
traffickers.
Professor
Wing
Lo
and
Sharon
Kwok
presented
on
Triadization
of
Young
People
and
Quasi-
Legitimate
Opportunity
Structure
in
Macau.
Professor
Lo
presented
statistical
analysis
that
showed
triad
influence
had
an
impact
on
rates
of
juvenile
delinquency
in
Hong
Kong
and
Macau.
He
explained
this
as
occurring
through
a
process
of
triadization
so
that
young
persons
are
absorbed
into
triad
societies
first
through
a
Dai
Lo-Lang
Tsai
(big
brother
and
follower)
relationship
and
then
gradually
adopt
triad
norms
and
values
through
internal
sanctions,
routine
activities
and
participation
in
illicit
activities.
Prof.
Lo
used
this
process
to
explain
the
long-term
survival
of
the
triad
societies.
Ms.
Kwok
then
took
a
closer
look
at
the
situation
in
Macau,
where
working
in
casino
VIP
rooms
as
part
of
the
bate-ficha
system,
offered
jobs
with
good
pay
and
flexible
hours
without
any
academic
requirements
for
young
men.
However,
entry
into
these
jobs
is
by
referral
only,
and
triad
reputation
is
crucial
in
winning
the
trust
of
the
casino
management.
In
this
case,
triad
membership
is
primarily
an
economic
opportunity,
with
the
relationship
between
Dai
Lo
and
Lang
Tsai
transformed
from
a
sworn
brotherhood
to
a
contract
between
employer
and
employee.
Furthermore,
the
VIP
room
is
a
legitimate
business
and
the
legality
and
profitability
of
gambling
in
Macau
keeps
violence
to
a
minimum;
as
a
result,
becoming
a
triad
to
work
in
the
bate-ficha
system
represents
a
quasi-legitimate
opportunity.
Eric
So
followed
these
presentations
with,
Triadization
and
Professionalization
of
Young
Drug
User-Dealers
in
Hong
Kong.
Mr.
Sos
research
was
in
process
but
he
observed
that
the
Dai
Lo-Lang
Tsai
(big
brother
-
follower)
relationship
could
lead
to
drug
dealing
because
that
relationship
brought
with
it
the
connections,
opportunities,
knowledge
and
techniques
of
this
illicit
trade.
On
the
other
hand,
while
membership
in
a
triad
society
was
not
essential
in
becoming
a
drug
dealer,
some
connection
with
triad
members
was
necessary,
because
these
connections
were
essential
in
building
a
trusted
network
and
were
necessary
to
protect
ones
drug
supply
and
enforce
contracts.
Mr.
Sos
work
also
found
a
high
level
of
cooperation
between
groups,
who
shared
resources
and
resolved
disputes
through
3
negotiation.
He
also
noted
a
high
level
of
drug
use
among
dealers,
who
were
apparently
permitted
to
use
drugs
except
heroin,
and
that
young
user-dealers
could
continue
both
their
drug
use
and
business
even
while
on
probation.
During
the
discussion
of
these
three
presentations,
a
probation
officer
in
the
audience
expressed
surprise
at
finding
that
drug
use
was
common
while
on
probation,
but
noted
that
at
present
probation
terms
did
not
allow
for
restrictions
on
movement
or
association,
which
would
be
necessary
to
curb
drug
dealing
during
this
period.
An
additional
discussant
suggested
drug
testing
for
those
on
probation,
which
is
also
not
currently
occurring.
Discussants
also
asked
Ms
Kwok
whether
the
operation
of
legitimate
services
by
triads
and
a
low
level
of
violence
meant
that
they
did
not
adhere
to
Gambettas
definition
of
mafias
as
groups
whose
primary
business
was
protection,
or
whether
the
underlying
threat
of
violence
was
still
a
crucial
factor
in
the
success
of
triads
in
the
bate-ficha
system.
Professor
Federico
Varese
presentation
was
largely
based
on
his
chapter
on
Chinese
organized
crime
in
his
book
Mafia
on
the
Move
(Princeton
2011).
In
his
presentation
the
conception
of
how
such
crime
groups
move,
colonise
or
transplant
their
activities
from
one
place
to
another
was
the
focus.
Prof
Varese
noted
that
he
was
sceptical
about
the
role
of
the
HK
and
Taiwanese
triads
in
the
development
of
organised
crime
groups
in
China.
Transplantation
of
mafia,
he
noted,
was
likely
to
be
a
difficult
to
establish.
However,
it
was
apparent
that
their
linguistic
and
financial
resources
enabled
them
to
be
engaged
to
a
high
degree
but
may
have
precluded
the
capacity
to
offer
protection,
especially
if
competing
against
elements
of
the
state.
Thus
a
key
questions
raised
by
Professor
Varese
was
who
can
acquire
this
protection
and
what
is
the
relationship
between
the
central
state
and
the
periphery
or
provinces
in
managing
or
suppressing
such
activities.
As
noted
by
the
discussants,
policing
in
China
is
not
highly
centralised
and
is
largely
funded
through
local
taxes
and
subject
to
local
resource
limitations
and
can
thus
vary
in
integrity
and
capacity
across
place.
Further
the
collusion
between
organised
crime
and
the
role
of
protective
umbrellas
may
be
iterative
and
may
have
developed
over
considerable
time.
Also
one
discussant
noted
that
many
organised
crime
groups
in
southern
China
did
not
have
triad
connections
and
that
even
in
Hong
Kong
where
traditional
triad
groups
had
long
operated
other
crime
groups
had
also
emerged
with
wider
associations
to
other
regions
of
China.
Wang
Peng
presented
next
on
his
research,
Extra-legal
Protection
in
China:
State
weakness,
guanxi
and
the
rise
of
mafias.
Looking
at
the
case
of
Chongqing,
Mr.
Wang
found
that
guanxi
(reciprocal
relations)
undermined
the
criminal
justice
system
in
two
ways,
by
facilitating
the
buying
and
selling
of
public
offices,
and
by
allowing
criminals
to
create
mutually
beneficial
networks
with
officials.
He
also
found
that
both
individuals
and
governments
made
use
of
underground
police
to
handle
debt
collection,
protect
actors
in
illegal
markets
and
to
offer
dispute
resolution
services
for
demolition
projects.
These
groups
skirted
the
law
and
avoided
police
crackdowns
by
engaging
in
soft
violence,
that
is,
achieving
goals
through
harassment,
humiliation,
blame,
threats,
stalking
or
coercion
while
avoiding
direct
violence.
In
the
discussion
that
followed
Mr.
Wangs
presentation,
questions
were
asked
about
the
Red-Black
mafia.
There
was
also
discussion
about
the
recent
events
in
Chongqing,
since
the
anti-mafia
campaign
that
had
generated
much
of
his
data
had
been
conducted
during
the
tenure
of
Bo
Xilai,
a
man
now
charged
himself
with
serious
criminal
conduct.
4
Prof.
Broadhursts
presentation
focused
on
the
problems
of
suppressing
organised
crime
in
China
and
the
growing
problem
of
collusion
between
some
state
and
party
(CCP)
actors
and
organised
crime.
Following
on
from
Wang
Pengs
account,
the
so-called
red-black
problem
had
become
a
leading
challenge
to
state
and
party
legitimacy.
The
scandals
of
corruption
murder
and
abuse
of
power
associated
with
the
arrest
of
politburo
member
Bo
Xilai
and
police
chief
Wang
Lijun
were
illustrative
of
the
scale
and
depth
of
the
influence
of
crime
groups.
Whether
this
now
amounted
to
signs
of
a
kleptocracy
was
open
to
debate;
however
the
reforming
elements
in
the
state
had
identified
serious
gaps.
He
also
noted
the
absence
of
systematic
research
on
crime
and
corruption
in
China
by
the
Chinese
Academy
of
Social
Sciences
and
that
the
piecemeal
nature
of
law
reform
with
respect
to
organised
crime
had
hampered
the
effectiveness
of
counter-measures.
Criminal
procedure
reforms
effective
in
2013
placing
human
rights
protection
as
the
most
important
principle
(excepting
corruption
and
national
security
matters)
were
in
tune
with
a
soft
power
approach
to
social
management
that
may
gain
some
traction.
The
procedure
law
also
provided
for
witness
protection
and
other
measures
that
would
help
the
prosecution
of
such
groups.
In
short,
the
appetite
for
a
full-scale
comprehensive
reform
on
the
law
on
organized
crime
as
well
as
current
practice
was
present,
given
the
failure
of
piecemeal
and
reactive
reforms.
Following
Professor
Broadhursts
presentation,
two
doctoral
students
from
the
Australian
National
University
presented
on
their
research
projects.
Ben
Chapman-Schmidt
presented
on
Transnational
Crime
and
the
Globalised
Sex
Industry
in
Tokyo,
a
research
project
that
he
proposed
would
focus
on
human
trafficking,
human
smuggling,
the
economics
of
the
sex
industry
and
organised
crime.
His
primary
research
question
was
what
are
the
international
financial
flows
involved
with
the
sex
industry
in
Japan,
and
the
extent
that
profits
are
captured
by
criminal
actors.
He
proposed
to
use
both
existing
estimates
of
financial
flows
and
interviews
with
women
working
in
the
sex
industry,
criminal
actors,
law
enforcement
agents,
NGO
workers
and
men
that
purchase
sex.
Sharon
Kwok
then
presented
her
thesis
topic
Tor
Dei
Triad
territory,
dominancy
and
monopoly.
She
defined
Tor
Dei
as
a
variable
concept
that
can
refer
to
a
geographical
territory,
a
functional
territory
(a
licit
or
illicit
business),
a
functional
territory
within
a
geographic
territory,
or
the
person
who
claimed
the
rights
over
such
a
territory.
She
noted
research
gaps
around
questions
of
power
and
monopoly,
competition
and
conflict
in
the
market
environment,
and
collaboration
for
dominance
in
the
market.
In
examining
these
research
gaps,
she
proposed
to
interview
relevant
parties
and
court
cases
related
to
triad
societies.
Discussion
focused
on
the
methodological
difficulties
involved
in
these
projects,
given
the
potential
inaccessibility
of
subjects,
as
well
as
the
difficulty
in
verifying
any
data
provided.
Professor
Dina
Siegel
presented
on
Asian
Organized
crime
in
the
European
Union.
She
noted
an
increase
in
the
number
of
police
reports
on
Asian
organised
crime
in
the
EU,
as
well
as
the
presence
of
six
major
Chinese
organised
crime
groups:
14K,
the
Wo-group,
Sun
Yee
On,
Red
Sun,
United
Bamboo
and
Big
Circle.
These
groups
were
engaged
in
human
smuggling,
human
trafficking,
extortion,
drug
production
and
trafficking,
counterfeiting,
cigarette
smuggling,
match-fixing
and
illegal
trading
in
traditional
medicine
and
endangered
species.
However,
in
looking
at
whether
these
activities
were
being
committed
by
groups
embedded
in
migrant
communities
or
by
overseas
groups
acting
independently
of
the
migrant
communities,
she
also
found
considerable
variance
from
one
activity
to
next.
In
discussing
these
findings,
discussants
debated
the
meaning
of
the
words
Asian
organised
5
crime,
particularly
when
discussing
groups
operating
in
Europe.
Furthermore,
questions
were
raised
about
whether
fear
of
outsiders
on
behalf
of
law
enforcement
officers
was
driving
an
overestimation
of
the
presence
of
outside
organised
crime
groups
among
the
Asian
diasporas
in
Europe
and
elsewhere.
Dr
Paola
Campanas
presentation
gave
an
example
of
the
kind
of
transplantation
that
might
occur
as
in
the
case
of
the
long
established
role
of
the
Calabrian
Ndrangheta
in
Australia.
He
explored
this
groups
activities
in
Australia,
especially
its
involvement
in
the
fresh
produce
market
and
cannabis
cultivation
businesses.
Drawing
on
Prof
Vareses
work
on
the
mobility
of
mafia
and
his
own
previous
work,
he
distinguished
between
trading
and
governance
as
the
principle
characteristic
of
mafia-like
groups.
He
briefly
described
the
Italian
Mafias
activities
in
Asia
drawing
on
21
cities
in
the
Asia-Pacific
region.
Thailand
was
noted
as
a
haven
for
fugitives
while
China
acted
as
a
trading
partner
for
the
Neapolitan
Camorra
groups
involved
in
smuggling
counterfeit
goods
into
Europe.
Julie
Ayling
presented
on
Responding
to
organised
crime
in
Australia
and
Japan.
She
noted
that
the
major
organised
crime
groups
in
Australia
(outlaw
motorcycle
gangs
[OMCGs])
and
in
Japan
(the
yakuza)
were
both
involved
in
similar
activities,
from
drugs
and
violence
to
blackmail
and
the
infiltration
of
legitimate
businesses.
Their
primary
difference
was
that
the
OMCGs
are
social
pariahs
but
in
Japan
the
yakuza
have
metastasized
into
the
economy
and
enjoy
pseudo-celebrity
status.
This
difference
has
affected
enforcement
responses,
for
while
both
countries
have
passed
laws
specifically
targeting
organised
crime
groups,
in
Australia
these
laws
target
groups
directly,
but
in
Japan
they
target
facilitators
and
criminal
activities.
She
notes
that
policy
cannot
be
simply
transplanted
from
one
society
to
another,
but
that
policy
makers
can
look
to
other
regions
to
see
what
has
and
has
not
worked
there.
Following
this
presentation,
discussants
generally
debated
whether
outlawing
OMCGs
and
the
Yakuza
would
be
appropriate
and
also
if
Australian-style
anti-association
laws
would
benefit
Japan
by
disrupting
yakuza
structures,
or
whether
these
laws
would
force
the
yakuza
underground
and
make
regulating
their
activities
more
difficult.
A
number
of
matters
arose
in
discussion
during
the
symposium
that
are
briefly
noted
in
point
form
as
follows:
whether
a
distinct
Asian
form
of
organised
crime
was
identified;
the
need
for
greater
conceptual
rigour
when
defining
and
discussing
organised
crime;
whether
the
main
role
of
mafia-like
groups
was
governance
or
trading
in
illicit
commodities
and
services;
the
combination
of
legal
and
social
tools
that
might
best
counter
the
more
harmful
effects
of
organised
crime
on
social
and
economic
development
;
the
relative
importance
of
corruption
in
the
expansion
of
crime
groups
and
in
general
the
role
of
states
or
semi-state
actors
in
the
promotion
of
illicit
markets
and
crime
groups;
6
how
particular
cultures
shape
the
legal
and
social
response
to
criminal
groups
and
organised
crime,
and;
the
role
of
social
learning
in
the
continuance
of
crime
groups
such
as
the
HK
triads.
Finally,
this
short
summary
of
the
presentations
and
discussion
only
reflects
partially
the
matters
raised
and
debated
in
both
formal
and
informal
sessions.
The
symposium
concluded
with
a
short
meeting
about
the
best
means
to
further
debate
these
and
other
issues
that
had
been
raised.
There
was
also
an
intention
to
develop
draft
papers
and
presentations
to
article
length
papers
with
a
view
to
publication
in
a
journal
special
edition
or
anthology.
Abstracts
The
extent
to
which
organized
criminal
use
of
the
Internet
poses
a
threat
to
national
or
international
security
depends
upon
two
basic
definitional
issues:
1)
what
is
security?
and,
2)
what
is
organized
crime?
This
essay
addresses
these
issues,
and
then
proceeds
to
a
discussion
of
situations
in
which
security
has
been
threatened,
or
is
likely
to
be
threatened,
by
organized
cybercriminal
activity.
The
increasing
pervasiveness
of
digital
technology
makes
its
continuing
exploitation
for
criminal
purposes
inevitable.
Some
of
these
may
threaten
security,
but
others
not.
The
essay
argues
that
conventional
definitions
of
organized
crime
are
too
narrow,
and
are
stuck
in
the
20th
century.
They
tend
to
be
based
on
traditional
terrestrial
activities
such
as
protection/extortion,
violence,
corruption,
and
the
profit
motive.
These
definitions
tend
to
overlook
the
fact
that
the
organization
of
criminal
activity
has
changed
markedly
with
the
growth
of
digital
technology.
The
essay
notes
seven
examples
of
online
criminal
groups,
whose
activities
and
motives
are
quite
diverse.
These
include
the
paedophile
ring
W0nderland,
the
hactivist
group
Anonymous,
and
the
piracy
conspiracy
called
Drink
or
Die.
The
objectives
of
these
three
organizations
were
not
financial,
but
rather
entailed
the
sexual
gratification
of
members,
political
protest,
and
notoriety
within
the
piracy
community,
respectively.
Public/private
criminal
partnerships
are
by
no
means
unique
to
the
digital
age.
State
engagement
with
criminal
actors
has
included
efforts
by
the
US
Central
Intelligence
Agency
to
enlist
organized
criminals
in
an
attempt
to
assassinate
President
Fidel
Castro
in
the
early
1960s,
the
collaboration
of
the
Green
Gang
with
authorities
of
the
French
Concession
in
Shanghai
during
the
1920s
and
1930s,
and
the
use
of
criminals
by
the
former
South
African
7
government
to
assist
in
circumventing
economic
sanctions
and
in
neutralizing
anti-Apartheid
activists
during
the
1980s.
In
recent
years,
states
(or
their
proxies)
have
engaged
in
a
variety
of
activities
in
cyberspace
that
appear
to
have
violated
the
laweither
their
own
domestic
law
or
the
law
of
some
other
state.
The
cyber
attacks
on
Estonia
in
2007
and
against
Georgia
the
following
year
appear
at
least
to
have
been
encouraged,
if
not
orchestrated,
by
the
Russian
state.
In
2013
cyber
attacks
against
South
Korean
communications
and
computer
systems
were
alleged
to
have
been
launched
from
North
Korea.
A
significant
program
of
cyber
espionage
apparently
originating
in
China
has
been
directed
at
the
Dalai
Lamas
organization
and
against
government
and
industry
sites
in
the
United
States.
For
its
part,
the
United
States
reportedly
engaged
in
cyber
sabotage
resulting
in
the
destruction
of
centrifuges
at
the
Iranian
nuclear
enrichment
facility
at
Natanz.
None
of
the
alleged
perpetrators
have
acknowledged
responsibility
for
the
activities
in
question.
The
essay
also
cautions
that
perceptions
of
national
security
are
not
always
objective.
Fears
may
be
unrealistic,
or
concerns
over
national
security
may
be
voiced
cynically
in
order
to
enhance
the
powers
and
resources
of
state
agencies.
National
security
threats
may
also
be
invoked
to
limit
individual
liberties.
Not
all
organizations
acting
illegally
in
cyberspace
may
be
regarded
as
threats
to
national
or
international
security.
Some
activity
is
unquestionably
annoying,
offensive
in
the
extreme,
and/or
harmful.
There
are
online
activities
which,
if
writ
large,
might
conceivably
weaken
the
integrity
and
economy
of
states
and
thus
come
to
be
regarded
as
security
threats.
Online
paedophilia,
no
matter
how
heinous
or
distasteful
one
might
regard
it,
does
not
occur
on
a
scale
at
which
a
nations
economy
or
social
fabric
is
damaged.
Nor
is
it
likely
ever
to
do
so.
The
software
and
entertainment
industries
in
the
United
States
have
sought
to
make
the
case
that
information
piracy
costs
the
domestic
economy
millions
of
dollars
in
lost
profits,
and
has
a
chilling
effect
on
entrepreneurialism
and
creativity
world-wide.
However,
the
US
economy
is
sufficiently
diverse
that
its
future
strength
will
depend
on
other
factors.
Indeed,
one
could
argue
that
piracy
allows
citizens
of
less
developed
countries
to
benefit
from
access
to
products
that
they
would
otherwise
be
unable
to
afford.
Theft
of
credit
card
and
banking
details,
were
it
to
occur
on
a
larger
scale,
would
certainly
impede
commercial
activity,
with
corresponding
harm
to
a
states
economy.
For
the
time
being,
however,
online
fraud
appears
manageable.
Technologies
of
information
security
continue
to
be
refined,
and
tech
savvy
members
of
the
public,
at
least
in
developing
countries,
are
able
to
protect
themselves.
As
far
as
organizations
are
concerned,
it
appears
that
the
greatest
threats
to
national
security
are
posed
by
states
themselves,
either
singlehandedly
or
in
collaboration
with
skilled
amateurs,
or
sophisticated
cybercriminals.
With
an
increasing
number
of
states
around
the
world
developing
an
offensive
cyber
warfare
capability,
this
trend
appears
likely
to
continue.
Organized
Financial
Crime
and
Corruption
and
their
control
in
Asia:
current
Issues
and
future
prospects
8
Professor
Michael
Levi,
Cardiff
University
This
paper
examines
the
definition
of
financial
crime
and
international
trends
in
online
and
off-line
fraud
and
money
laundering.
It
applies
a
routine
activities
model
of
criminal
organisation
to
them,
alongside
other
possible
drivers
of
change
(including
corruption)
in
both
crimes
and
their
organisation.
It
reviews
the
extent
to
which
corruption
and
other
financial
crimes
can
plausibly
constitute
threats
to
Asian
and
other
states,
and
what
the
implications
are
of
such
threats
for
patterns
of
financial
crime,
including
spill-over
threats.
It
raises
questions
about
whether
financial
crimes
in
Asia
are
merely
delayed
action
replays
of
patterns
observable
in
the
countries
of
the
Global
North
(or,
indeed,
the
more
economically
advanced
countries
of
Asia),
or
are
likely
to
follow
their
own
path,
modified
by
issues
of
global
interdependence
in
both
financial
services
and
regulatory
controls.
Finally,
it
reviews
the
extent
to
which
anti
organised/financial
crime
measures
are
likely
to
impact
on
the
extent
and
organisation
of
financial
crimes.
Terminology
both
reflects
and
shapes
intellectual
and
policy
categories.
It
can
be
important
to
ensure
that
when
we
use
the
same
term,
it
denotes
the
same
or
at
least
a
similar
thing.
Financial
crime
is
normally
not
a
legal
but
rather
an
administratively
functional
category,
and
has
been
growing
in
use
in
OECD
countries,
though
in
continental
Europe
and
parts
of
Africa,
economic
crime
is
more
common
and
overlaps
extensively.
1. frauds
of
different
types
with
different
victims
(from
wealthy
corporations
and
High
Net
Worth
Individuals
to
the
very
poor
and
from
very
rich
to
very
poor
governments);
2. market
abuse
such
as
insider
dealing/trading
(which
covers
a
range
from
corrupt
relationships
between
investors
and
insiders
to
giving
talks
about
company
prospects
to
some
important
analysts
before
releasing
results
to
the
general
market);
3. money
laundering
(of
all
crimes,
including
domestic
corruption
and,
increasingly,
tax
fraud4);
4. financing
of
terrorism
(mostly
since
2001)
and
(since
2008)
of
nuclear
proliferation;
and
To
the
extent
that
most
crimes
for
gain
lead
to
concealment
or
transformation
of
some
proceeds,
it
is
arguable
that
all
such
crimes
ipso
facto
become
financial
crimes
and
thereby
those
who
facilitate
them
and
the
movement
of
moneys
from
them
are
liable
to
increased
4
Though
countries
vary
substantially
in
how
they
define
tax
fraud.
Switzerland
for
example
restricts
it
to
active
deception
(e.g.
falsification
of
data
in
tax
submissions
made
to
it),
excluding
omissions
and
non-
reporting
of
tax
obligations
elsewhere.
So
if
someone
with
a
Swiss
account
does
not
need
to
file
tax
documents
in
Switzerland,
they
cannot
commit
tax
fraud
there
and
cannot
normally
be
extradited
for
this.
On
the
other
hand,
since
2008,
there
has
been
a
great
deal
of
international
action
on
mutual
cooperation
in
tax
matters
and
in
withholding
tax
arrangements,
though
these
too
are
subject
to
sophisticated
avoidance
mechanisms.
See
de
Willebois
et
al.
(2012),
Sharman
(2011),
Shaxson
(2011)
for
good
contemporary
analyses.
9
risks
of
criminalisation,
at
least
in
principle.
It
may
be
useful
to
regard
financial
crime
and
its
sub-sets
money
laundering
and
corruption
-
as
a
floating
signifier,
a
moral
category
of
illicit
capitalism
which
contains
whatever
pressure
group
politics
succeeds
in
placing
therein,
a
necessary
but
not
sufficient
condition
of
which
is
the
passage
of
criminal
laws
and
regulatory
processes
meeting
evolving
Financial
Action
Task
Force
(FATF)
criteria.
For
example,
anti-money
laundering
legislation
(AML)
must
henceforth
cover
both
tax
evasion
and
the
financing
of
WMD
proliferation
(FATF,
2012).
Collectively,
other
terms
used
to
package
these
diverse
activities
include
threat
finance
(Levi,
2010)
or
illicit
finance,
chosen
by
HM
Treasury
in
the
UK.
In
policing
(and
even
often
in
academic)
practice,
organised
crime
is
distinguished
often
from
elite
corporate
or
individual
crimes
that
are
also
well
organised
but
do
not
involve
the
usual
suspects.
This
can
lead
to
a
narrowing
of
interest
in
what
sorts
of
criminal
activities
are
discussed
by
organised
crime
specialists
and
policing
units.
It
is
not
evident
from
the
face
of
the
document,
but
it
is
fascinating
that
the
only
frauds
discussed
in
the
TOCTA
(2012)
prepared
for
the
UNODC
are
the
counterfeiting
of
products
in
Asia
that
are
exported
to
Europe
and
the
USA,
and
the
sale
of
counterfeit
medicines
from
East
Asia
to
SE
Asia
and
Africa.
These
are
not
indeed
important,
but
it
perhaps
illustrates
the
unconscious
separate
of
white-collar
from
organised
crimes.
Concerns
about
organized
crime
moving
in
on
commerce
are
now
new.
They
date
from
at
least
the
1950s
in
the
US
(Kossack,
1957;
Levi,
2008a).
However,
there
is
a
difference
in
scale
nowadays,
a
factor
that
should
not
be
overlooked
when
critiquing
the
newness
of
the
phenomenon.
We
should
not
be
surprised
that
the
juxtaposition
of
technical
education,
social
engineering
skills
and
poor
economic
prospects
should
stimulate
fraud.
But
in
what
senses
does
this
constitute
a
threat
and
an
organized
crime
one?
See
further,
research
by
Naim
(2012),
and
Glenny
(2007).
It
is
worth
bearing
in
mind
that
Madoff
succeeded
because
he
was
not
the
Mafia
or
associated
with
any
exotic
criminal
names.
In
short,
one
of
the
reasons
we
may
legitimately
be
concerned
about
organised
crime
is
that
it
has
not
just
the
motivation
but
also
the
capacity
to
cause
significant
harm.
Some
large-scale
fraudsters
may
not
have
started
off
with
the
intention
of
getting
and
staying
rich
legitimately,
but
they
have
the
capacity
to
harm
because
of
their
legitimate
faade.
So
Mafia/Triad
type
organised
crime
groups
have
ways
of
pressurising
and
seducing
cooperation
from
law
enforcement,
licit
business
and
politics;
but
they
are
not
alone
in
this
respect.
One
of
the
frustrations
of
writing
about
financial
crime
trends
is
poor
data
availability
(for
reviews,
see
Levi,
2011).
This
is
compounded
when
one
has
to
move
beyond
data
on
the
incidence
and
prevalence
of
different
frauds
and
attribute
them
plausibly
to
particular
sets
of
criminal
actors,
as
is
the
case
here.
Data
sources
used
here
include
international
business
crime
surveys
(mostly
by
the
large
consulting
firms),
payment
card
fraud
data
from
the
card
schemes,
academic
and
UN/NGO
material,
and
criminal
cases/media
reports.
There
is
nothing
wrong
with
using
provisional
data
provided
that
one
is
aware
of
and
makes
explicit
to
others
the
limitations
thereof.
It
is
worth
emphasising
that
the
distanciation
of
place
of
victimisation
from
place
of
offender
residence
is
a
key
characteristic
of
most
outsider
financial
crimes,
especially
those
that
do
not
require
physical
(offline)
meeting
between
offender(s)
and
victim(s).
This
has
implications
both
for
national
crime
recording
and
for
10
policing/criminal
justice
processes,
in
principle
(e.g.
questions
of
legal
jurisdiction
and
offence
classification)
and
in
practice
(problematic
reporting
mechanisms,
and
the
need
for
well-functioning
mutual
legal
assistance).
There
will
follow
some
discussion
of
volume
and
value
trends
in
fraud
and
corruption
in
those
countries
for
which
data
are
available.
This
will
include
a
review
of
the
evidence
from
personal
and
commercial
victimisation
and
attitude
surveys
in
Asia
conducted
in
recent
years,
and
the
implications
thereof.
The
paper
will
consider
the
extent
to
which
Asian
trends
are
a
delayed
action
replay
of
US
and
European
trends,
or
whether
the
particular
characteristics
of
some
Asian
societies
are
likely
to
create
different
trends.
Fraud
levels
and
their
organisation
are
affected
by
settings,
with
their
rich
and
varied
opportunities
(reflecting
patterns
of
business,
consumer
and
investment
activities),
the
abilities
of
would-be
perpetrators
to
recognize
and
act
upon
those
opportunities
(e.g.
the
crime
scripts
perspective),
and
their
interactions
with
controls
including
law
enforcement
and
formal
regulation
(touched
only
lightly
upon
here).
Even
in
law
enforcement
circles
(UNODC,
2012;
WEF,
2012),
the
structure
of
groups
is
becoming
less
important
than
analyzing
what
different
individuals
and
networks
of
full-time
or
part-time
criminals
need
from
the
largely
illicit
and
largely
licit
worlds
in
order
to
go
about
the
business
of
fraud
in
their
own
country
or,
increasingly,
elsewhere.
The
dominant
mode
of
thinking
about
serious
crime
for
gain
has
been
the
rational
choice
model.
The
crime
triangle
of
motivation,
opportunity,
and
capable
guardians
can
be
applied
to
many
areas
of
crime,
and
it
is
here
in
human
and
technological
changes
to
these
parameters
that
one
may
search
for
an
explanatory
framework.
The
presence
or
absence
of
crime
networks
known
to
and
trusted
by
the
willing
offender
makes
a
difference
to
crime
capacitation:
an
issue
often
neglected
in
individualized
explanations
of
involvement
in
crime.
Choice
of
crime
type
might
also
be
affected
by
age.
The
paper
will
map
out
changes
brought
about
by
ICT
and
other
features
of
late
modernity
in
Asian
and
Western
societies.
T.
Wing
Lo,
City
University
of
Hong
Kong,
Sharon
Ingrid
Kwok,
Australian
National
University,
and
Christopher
Cheng,
City
University
of
Hong
Kong
Despite
the
wealth
of
studies
examining
the
risk
factors
of
juvenile
delinquency,
few
have
examined
the
impact
of
triad
associations.
The
present
study
investigates
beyond
the
well-
documented
risk
factors
of
juvenile
delinquency,
and
explores
the
predictive
power
of
triad
influence
in
relation
to
the
known
factors,
such
as
family,
school,
and
peers.
The
study
has
two
parts.
Based
on
a
survey
of
a
representative
sample
of
youths
in
Macau,
the
first
part
confirmed
that
young
peoples
associations
with
triad
societies
strongly
predicted
delinquency.
In
the
second
part,
focus
groups
with
youth
social
workers
and
an
interview
with
a
former
VIP
gaming
room
operator
provided
explanatory
information
on
how
young
people
were
triadized
into
the
gaming
and
its
associated
industries.
The
survey
identified
a
causal
pathway
leading
from
a
number
of
delinquent
risk
factors
to
association
with
triad
societies
and
finally
to
juvenile
delinquency.
It
was
the
first
of
its
kind
11
exploring
triad
influence
as
a
mediating
factor.
It
obtained
strong
evidence
that
young
peoples
association
with
triad
societies
has
strong
effects
on
their
delinquent
behaviour.
The
effect
of
triad
influence
on
delinquent
behaviour
was
direct
in
itself
and
it
was
also
mediating
the
effects
of
such
risk
factors
as
family
conflict,
poor
school
attachment,
and
susceptibility
to
negative
peer
pressure.
Although
statistically
these
mediating
effects
were
only
partial,
the
magnitude
was
strong
and
significant
as
reflected
by
the
fact
that
a
large
proportion
of
the
effects
of
these
risk
factors
were
attributable
to
triad
influence.
The
fact
that
more
than
half
of
the
total
effects
of
these
risk
factors
could
be
accounted
for
by
the
indirect
effect
mediated
by
triad
influence
is
highly
implicative.
Moreover,
the
comparison
between
the
2002
and
2012
data
confirms
that
triad
influences
on
young
people
continue
to
last
for
one
decade.
The
findings
thus
provide
an
answer
to
the
question
that
triad
impact
on
young
people
is
tremendous
and
such
impact
is
sustained
over
time,
revealing
that
a
triad
subculture
is
likely
to
exist
in
Macau.
The
qualitative
study
examined
the
potential
mechanisms
by
which
the
triads
may
influence
youth
involvement
in
triad-related
activities,
thereby
facilitating
the
process
of
triadization
of
young
people
in
Macau.
The
data
suggests
that
the
youths
are
triadized
through
a
quasi-
legitimate
opportunity
structure,
which
contains
three
main
components:
(1)
There
is
a
quasi-legitimate
triad
subculture
consisting
of
both
legitimate
and
illegitimate
activities.
Macaus
gaming
industry
has
attracted
triad
societies
into
operating
the
bate-
ficha
system
(which
is
legitimate),
which
is
supported
by
its
associated
industries,
such
as
loan-sharking
and
sex
service
(which
is
illegitimate),
to
meet
clients
specific
needs.
The
situation
can
be
explained
by
Felsons
(2006)
concept
of
crime
symbiosis.
According
to
the
law
of
Macau,
triad
societies
are
illegal
organizations,
but
the
triads
are
symbiotic
not
only
with
other
criminal
activities,
but
also
with
fully
legitimate
activities
or
with
marginal
activities
(Felson
2006:164).
We
term
this
as
quasi-legitimate
triad
businesses
in
which
legitimate
and
illegitimate
activities
are
intertwined
and
mutually
beneficial.
(2)
Non-sensible
and
undisciplined
use
of
violence
is
not
tolerated
in
this
triad
subculture.
Due
to
the
legality
status
of
Macaus
gaming
industry,
maintaining
peace
for
money
making,
keeping
visible
violence
at
bay,
and
making
any
illegitimate
activities
less
visible
to
the
public
and
law
enforcement
are
very
important
to
the
triads.
Whenever
disputes
emerge,
the
triads
prefer
to
smooth
things
out
in
truce
meetings.
Young
people
are
not
allowed
to
achieve
rep
through
violence.
They
are
expected
to
be
smart
and
make
money
by
immoral
wisdom
and
their
impulsive
behaviour
has
to
be
suppressed.
Consequently,
there
is
no
room
for
violent
gangs
to
flourish.
The
unacceptability
of
undisciplined
violence
is
a
common
feature
in
criminal
subculture
(Cloward
and
Ohlin
1960).
In
Macau,
the
quasi-legitimate
triad
subculture
also
requires
harmony
in
the
criminal
underworld.
(3)
Within
the
quasi-legitimate
triad
subculture,
an
opportunity
structure
exists
for
smart
and
disciplined
out-of-school
youths
to
achieve
success
through
a
combination
of
legitimate,
vice
and
wicked
means.
The
employment
is
flexible
and
well-paid,
and
does
not
require
any
sound
academic
qualifications.
As
Leong
(2002:92)
contends,
the
bate-ficha
business
requires
no
professional
qualification
and
involves
low
technology,
the
few
skills
required
are
gambling
skills,
and
perhaps
communication
skills
so
that
they
can
persuade
the
gamblers
to
exchange
more
dead
chips
or
stay
in
the
game
longer.
The
survey
study
12
found
there
is
high
correlation
between
triad
influence
and
gambling
and
between
delinquent
behaviour
and
gambling.
Young
people
under
triad
influence
are
likely
to
be
experienced
gamblers
and
thus
become
the
best
candidates
for
the
bate-ficha
business.
Once
they
possess
the
necessary
skill,
what
they
require
is
only
an
opportunity
to
enter
the
business.
References
Cloward,
R.A.
and
Ohlin,
L.E.
(1960),
Delinquency
and
opportunity.
Glencoe:
Free
Press.
Leong,
A.V.M.
(2002),
The
Bate-Ficha
business
and
triads
in
Macau
casinos.
Law
and
Justice
Journal,
2(1),
83
97.
The
Heroin
Retail
Market
in
Kunming
Professor
Ko-lin
Chin,
Rutgers
University
&
Professor
Sheldon
Zhang,
San
Diego
State
University
In
order
to
understand
the
social
organization
of
street-level
heroin
sales,
we
hired
former
heroin
user/sellers
affiliated
with
a
community-based
rehabilitation
centre
to
conduct
interviews
with
active
heroin
dealers.
Our
data
suggests
that
the
heroin
retail
market
in
Kunming
is
very
different
from
the
American
drug
retail
market.
First
of
all,
drug
dealers
in
Kunming
rarely
sell
drugs
in
open-air
drug
markets.
Second,
heroin
retail
in
Kunming
was
not
related
to
street
gangs
or
organized
crime.
Third,
drug-related
violence
was
almost
unheard
of
in
Kunming,
whether
it
was
systemic,
economic
compulsive,
or
psychopharmacological.
In
sum,
street-level
retail
of
heroin
in
Kunming
was
carried
out
predominantly
by
heroin
addicts
who
relied
on
drug
sale
to
support
their
drug
habits.
Heroin
retail
in
Kunming
is
fragmented,
and
there
is
no
coordination
among
individual
dealers.
Sheldon X. Zhang, San Diego State University and Ko-lin Chin, Rutgers University
Introduction
The
paucity
of
empirical
data
on
female
participation
in
drug
trafficking
or
any
other
organized
illicit
enterprising
activities
is
mostly
due
to
the
fact
that
women
are
traditionally
and
historically
excluded
from
such
activities.
The
low
occurrence
of
women
in
traditional
racketeering
activities
therefore
leads
to
low
research
attention.
A
few
recent
studies
recognized
the
active
roles
that
women
sometimes
play
in
criminal
organizations.
For
instance,
research
on
Chinese
human
smuggling
suggests
that
certain
illicit
markets
may
mitigate
traditional
barriers
to
womens
participation,
namely,
a
totalitarian
regime
and
the
absence
of
open
competition
for
market
dominance.
Similar
market
conditions
are
found
in
the
heroin
trade
in
China.
13
Based
on
a
three-year
field
study
and
a
survey
of
297
incarcerated
of
female
drug
traffickers,
we
found
that
it
was
not
uncommon
for
women
to
participate
in
the
heroin
trade
in
China.
Women
were
found
at
many
stages
of
the
drug
trade,
from
cross-border
trafficking
to
street
vending.
It
appears
that
transporting
and
selling
illicit
drugs
require
few
special
skills,
thus
making
the
trade
accessible
to
just
anyone.
However,
there
are
two
general
prerequisites
for
entry
into
this
marketproper
social
connections
(i.e.,
resources
and
opportunities)
and
sufficient
entrepreneurial
spirit.
Both
qualities
must
be
present
for
any
men
or
women
to
participate
in
the
business,
and
neither
alone
is
sufficient.
Access
to
the
source
of
illicit
drugs
provides
the
opportunity
or
entry
point
into
the
trade
and
the
risk-taking
spirit
encourages
one
to
venture
into
unconventional
business
activities
or
deviate
from
their
expected
gender
roles.
First
of
all,
because
drug
sources
and
client
populations
are
hidden,
one
must
be
placed
in
a
social
network
where
existing
connections
either
already
exist
or
will
emerge
to
facilitate
the
entry.
Data
from
our
prison
survey
appear
to
support
this
observation.
Men
were
far
more
likely
to
enter
the
drug
trade
via
their
friends
than
women,
suggesting
drug
trade
opportunities
are
likely
to
be
found
among
ones
social
friends
or
acquaintances
than
his
or
her
family
members
or
relatives.
Women
often
entered
the
trade
through
family
members
or
relatives,
and
also
cited
need
to
provide
for
the
family.
These
women
were
cognizant
of
the
illicit
nature
of
the
enterprise
and
were
desperate
enough
to
deviate
from
their
traditional
roles
and
gendered
expectations.
Drug
transportation
and
sales
at
the
street
level
is
a
business
with
few
discernible
territorial
boundaries
in
China.
Unlike
gambling
and
prostitution,
where
clients
and
business
activities
are
tied
to
specific
neighbourhoods,
drug
transportation
and
sales
mostly
involve
transient
and
highly
concealed
transactions.
Although
we
learned
of
a
few
neighbourhoods
where
there
were
frequent
sightings
of
drug
addicts
and
drug
sales,
the
vast
majority
of
drug
transactions
to
our
knowledge
were
carried
out
in
untold
street
corners,
nightclubs
and
parks.
The
clandestine
nature
of
the
business
and
the
constant
fear
of
law
enforcement
activities
determine
that
the
drug
trade
does
not
lend
itself
to
well
defined
territories.
In
other
words,
drug
trade
is
normally
carried
out
through
negotiations
between
the
traffickers
or
vendors
and
their
clients
with
few
observers,
thus
limiting
opportunities
for
outsiders
to
intervene.
As
a
result,
we
found
no
evidence
of
open
competition
among
traffickersmale
or
femaleto
control
wholesale
or
distribution
networks.
Without
a
clearly-defined
turf
and
with
most
transactions
based
on
one-to-one
interactions,
the
drug
trade
seems
to
render
gendered
barriers
found
in
other
forms
of
traditional
illicit
enterprises
somewhat
less
salient.
Conclusion
It
should
be
noted
that
drug
trafficking
and
street
vending
are
predominantly
a
male
enterprise.
Womens
entre
into
the
drug
trade
were
much
tied
to
their
personal
networks.
Within
the
drug
trade,
we
believe
women
were
limited
to
lower
level
of
trafficking
and
sales
activities,
but
they
were
not
blocked
from
entering
the
market
in
sizeable
numbers.
Perhaps
the
most
important
feature
of
the
drug
trade
in
southern
China
is
the
absence
of
violence.
Therefore
a
primary
hurdle
for
womens
participation
in
this
illicit
enterprise
is
minimized.
This
obstacle
appears
to
be
mitigated
in
the
Chinese
context,
where
organized
14
crime,
violence,
or
illicit
drugs
attract
nothing
but
the
harshest
response
from
the
justice
system.
Cultural
influences
are
also
significant.
Ideologies
about
the
importance
of
economic
participation
for
women
may
be
more
meaningful
in
the
Chinese
context,
with
the
communist
government
advocating
principles
of
gender
egalitarianism.
Female
participation
in
the
heroin
trade
or
some
other
racketeering
activities
will
likely
increase
as
their
usefulness
becomes
greater
for
partnerships
and
organizations
with
men.
In
a
male-only
or
heavily
male-dominated
underworld,
these
women
must
prove
their
usefulness
for
entry
as
well
as
mobility
within
the
crime
networks.
Our
study
in
China
suggests
that
the
market
environment
is
as
important
for
understanding
gender
stratification
within
illicit
enterprises
as
it
is
for
understanding
the
same
features
in
the
formal
economy.
It
is
our
belief
that
women
are
in
general
playing
a
secondary
role
in
this
illicit
enterprise
and
gender
stratification
was
abundantly
clear,
judging
from
the
differences
in
the
weights
of
the
drugs
seized
and
the
severity
of
sentences
between
men
and
women
in
our
prison
survey.
Nonetheless,
the
nature
of
the
enterprise
does
mitigate
the
obstacles
that
have
traditionally
excluded
women
from
participation.
The
Dark
Side
of
Social
Capital
within
the
Drug
Dealing
Networks
of
Young
User-Dealers
in
Hong
Kong
In
Hong
Kong,
triad
societies
such
as
Sun
Yee
On,
Wo
Shing
Wo
and
14K
have
a
long
history
of
running
drug
dealing
business
in
the
local
Hong
Kong
market.
Local
triad
bosses
who
engage
under
age
youth
to
deliver,
and
trade
in
illicit
drugs
usually
control
street
level
drug
dealing.
In
recent
years,
the
number
of
young
people
involved
in
drug
trafficking
has
multiplied.
The
aim
of
this
study
is
to
examine
the
trust,
norms
of
reciprocity
and
network
structure
of
these
younger
aged
user-dealers
group.
Data
are
drawn
from
semi-structured
interviews
with
30
young
drug
user-dealers
between
January
2010
and
February
2013.
The
study
unravels
the
values
and
norms
of
the
youthful
user-dealers
group.
The
group
helps
facilitate
the
young
offenders
in
forming
trust
and
reciprocity
among
the
group.
The
result
also
reveals
that
triadization
process
of
youth
gangs.
The
study
also
shows
the
cooperation
in
drug
trafficking
between
triads
of
Hong
Kong
and
Mainland
China,
which
also
appears
to
contribute
to
the
increasing
number
of
active
young
drug
dealers
in
Hong
Kong.
Market
Transition,
Extra-legal
Protection
and
Mafia
Transplantation:
The
Case
of
the
Triads
in
China
A
common
view
among
observers
at
the
end
of
last
century
was
that
Hong
Kong
and
Macau
Triads
were
set
to
open
outpost
in
China
after
the
departure
of
the
British.
These
views
match
considerations
put
forwards
by
several
authors
(such
as
Manuel
Castells)
suggesting
15
that
mafia
groups
intentionally
and
rationally
take
advantage
of
emerging
opportunities
abroad
and
easily
move
there
to
exploit
these
opportunities.
In
this
paper
I
evaluate
empirically
to
what
extent
this
prediction
is
born
out
in
the
case
of
Hong
Kong
Triads
migrating
across
the
border
to
China.
The
paper
is
based
on
interviews
and
a
data
set
of
'organized
crime
groups'
based
in
China
compiled
by
the
author.
In
the
paper
I
show
that
members
and
bosses
of
foreign
triads
are
present
on
the
mainland,
but
have
not
yet
emerged
as
a
viable
mafia
supplying
private
protection.
As
in
other
cases
I
explore
in
my
book
Mafias
on
the
Move
(2011),
mafiosi
did
not
decide
to
migrate
out
of
their
own
free
will.
Their
presence
in
the
new
territory
is
the
unintended
consequence
of
police
action
in
their
country
of
origin,
especially
police
repression
in
Taiwan.
Once
they
found
themselves
on
the
mainland,
they
quickly
realized
that
the
new
China
offered
many
opportunities
to
invest
some
of
their
gangs
funds,
but
they
have
so
far
failed
to
establish
themselves
as
viable
protectors
for
legal
entrepreneurs.
Some
conditions
for
their
success
were
present:
a
language
and
ancestry
in
common
with
the
locals
(Taiwanese
is
similar
to
the
dialect
of
southern
Fujian;
some
Hong
Kong
triads
members
originated
from
Guangdong
region);
the
presence
of
many
new
immigrants
from
other
parts
of
China
who
were
underemployed
or
out
of
work;
and
the
presence
of
new
and
booming
markets,
including
illegal
markets
such
as
gambling
and
prostitution.
Such
a
situation
should
have
generated
a
demand
for
criminal
protection
and
offered
opportunities
for
mafiosi,
local
or
foreign.
In
reality,
though,
the
outcome
was
different
because
a
powerful
protector
was
already
on
the
ground:
corrupt
fragments
of
the
state
apparatus.
Remarkably,
the
jargon
word
for
the
activities
of
the
latter
is
protective
umbrella,
a
clear
indication
that
what
officials
offer
goes
beyond
simple,
one-off
corruption
services
and
encompasses
long-term
arrangements
to
take
care
of
(and
profit
from)
private
entrepreneurs.
This
equilibrium
is
reminiscent
of
what
happened
in
Russia
in
the
1990s.
In
the
Russian
case,
some
criminal
gangs
became
powerful
roofs
for
businesspeople,
although
official
roofs
played
the
biggest
role
in
the
market
for
informal,
illegal
private
protection.
The
case
of
China
indicates
that
few
criminal
groups
have
managed
to
take
on
the
role
of
protective
umbrellas.
Corrupt
elements
of
the
state
apparatus,
such
as
the
military,
police,
and
the
local
administration,
instead
act
as
the
protectors
of
legitimate
businesspeople.
As
I
have
suggested
elsewhere,
it
would
be
an
uphill
struggle
for
an
incoming
mafia
to
dislodge
an
existing
local
criminal
protector,
especially
one
with
the
organs
of
state
power
at
its
disposal.
Since
the
opening
of
the
economy,
illegal
markets
have
also
boomed
in
China:
gambling,
prostitution,
and
drug
trafficking.
For
the
most
part,
it
seems
that
even
in
illegal
markets,
fragments
of
the
state
apparatus
offer
protection.
This
is
especially
evident
in
the
protection
of
prostitution.
Gambling
gives
rise
to
loan
sharking
and
a
demand
to
recoup
debts
incurred
at
the
tables
in
Macau
by
Mainland
Chinese.
In
such
cases,
Macau
triads
may
team
up
with
gangs
on
the
mainland
to
trace
the
gamblers--or
their
family--and
some
of
these
gangs
have
then
expanded
their
business
into
the
collection
of
ordinary,
business
debts.
If
allowed
to
expand
further,
these
gangs
could
develop
into
fully
fledged
mafia
groups
offering
generalized
protection
services
to
whoever
can
pay.
Since
they
enforce
promises
on
behalf
of
foreign
triads,
in
my
view
this
represents
a
potential
mechanism
for
long-distance
16
cooperation
and
the
transplantation
of
foreign
triads
in
China.
Yet
there
is
no
strong
evidence
that
such
transplantation
has
taken
place.
Quite
to
the
contrary,
it
appears
that
local
authorities
have
been
quick
to
outlaw
debt
collection
agencies
and
have
arrested
those
tied
to
triads.
Have
foreign
triads
been
able
to
penetrate
the
lucrative
drug
trade?
The
short
answer
is,
again,
no.
This
work
raises
some
questions
that
cannot
be
fully
answered
at
this
stage
and
would
require
a
separate
study.
It
is
nevertheless
worth
spelling
them
out.
Who
is
allowed
to
acquire
a
protective
umbrella?
On
the
basis
of
the
respondents
suggestions,
it
appears
that
the
protection
industry
is
stratified.
Small
entrepreneurs
are
not
large
and
profitable
enough
to
be
of
interest,
and
therefore
may
be
more
likely
to
enlist
the
services
of
independent
debt
collection
agencies
when
they
enter
into
a
dispute.
Since
the
government
has
moved
to
outlaw
legitimate
debt
collection
agencies,
it
could
in
effect
have
pushed
low-level
businesspeople
into
the
hands
of
now-criminalized
and
unregistered
agencies.
A
second
issue
that
I
have
touched
on
is
the
relationship
between
the
centre
and
periphery.
To
what
extent
can
Beijing
dictate
to
the
provinces
what
to
do
in
terms
of
illegal
activities?
There
are
several
instances
in
which
it
appears
that
the
centre
retains
a
degree
of
control.
When
the
latter
decides
to
arrest
gang
leaders
protected
by
officials,
it
bypasses
the
local
police
and
simply
descends
on
the
city
to
round
up
the
suspects.
In
order
to
avoid
embarrassment
during
high-profile
events
such
as
the
Olympic
Games
or
the
sixtieth-
anniversary
celebrations
for
the
Peoples
Republic
of
China,
Beijing
appears
to
have
been
able
to
tell
the
periphery
to
stop
smuggling
operations,
and
enforce
more
strictly
anti-
prostitution
and
drug
consumption
rules.
And
yet
the
periphery
can
also
bribe
the
centre.
In
order
to
obtain
the
go-ahead
and
funding
for
major
public
works,
local
cadres
can
entice
national-level
officials.
Once
the
project
is
approved,
local
officials
have
plenty
of
opportunities
to
handpick
the
construction
company
and
extract
bribes.
This
system
produces
what
the
Chinese
call
doufu-zha
structures.
The
equilibrium
between
Central
government
and
cadres
in
the
provinces
appears
precarious,
and
deserves
a
full
study
of
its
own.
To
the
extent
that
criminal
gangs
in
the
periphery
overpower
local
power
holders,
they
could
become
the
interlocutor
of
the
centre,
and
China
might
well
develop
pockets
where
mafias
are
entrenched,
like
in
Southern
Italy,
certain
parts
of
Latin
America,
and
the
former
Soviet
Union.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
not
yet
evidence
of
such
a
development.
Leadership
changes
and
recent
events
in
Chongqing
and
have
re-focused
the
way
the
Chinese
state
responds
to
organized
crime
and
corruption.
The
expulsion
from
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
and
the
National
Peoples
Congress
(removing
immunity
from
prosecution)
of
politburo
member
and
Chongqing
party
leader
Bo
Xi
Li
for
serious
disciplinary
charges
(initially
associated
with
his
wifes
Gu
Kailai
arrest
and
conviction
of
the
murder
of
Neil
Heywood)
and
the
conviction
of
the
former
Chongqing
police
security
bureau
head
Wang
Li
Jun
on
variety
of
charges,
including
abuse
of
power
and
...bending
the
law
for
selfish
ends
offer
an
extraordinary
insight
into
the
nature
of
crime
control
practices
in
Chongqing.
Combined
with
the
re-definition
of
organized
crime,
improved
judicial
oversight,
procedural
reforms
and
the
re-assessment
of
strike-hard
style
police
campaigns
are
likely
key
17
developments.
Corruption
control
long
a
focus
of
government
and
party
concern
will
be
tested
in
a
situation
where
a
focus
on
legality
and
social
management
as
a
means
of
addressing
contradictions
in
a
socialist
market
economy.
The
recent
changes
in
the
criminal
law
(notably
Article
294
defining
organised
crime
and
Article
395
on
unexplained
wealth)
and
new
criminal
procedure
law
(effective
January
1
2013)
that
provided
for
respect
for
human
rights
as
the
guiding
principle
are
outlined
with
the
focus
on
how
these
changes
address
problems
of
organized
crime.
The
procedure
law
included
more
broadly
actions
relating
to
OCGs,
theoretically
making
prosecution
easier,
but
relies
on
prosecutorial
will
and
the
adequacy
of
evidence
gathering.
The
amendments
to
criminal
procedure
create
a
presumption
that
illegally
obtained
evidence
(although
not
clear
whether
improperly
obtained
evidence
falls
under
this
presumption)
could
be
excluded
see
Articles
54,
58.
In
addition
provisions
for
witness
protection,
compensation
and
assistance
including
those
at
risk
because
of
testimony
in
OCG
cases
(Article
62)
were
provided
along
with
measures
for
asset
tracing
and
recovery
in
such
cases.
More
controversially
commercial
secrets
and
crimes
relating
to
national
security,
terrorism
or
high
corruption
not
need
to
be
conducted
in
open
court,
and
access
to
legal
representation
severely
limited
(Arts
45,
83,
96).
The
probable
impact
on
practice
and
oversight
is
also
discussed
in
the
context
of
a
brief
overview
of
the
forms
of
criminal
groups
in
China.
Revisions
to
the
criminal
law
are
described
and
the
likely
prospects
of
improved
countermeasures
are
assessed
in
the
context
of
the
key
struggle
to
contain
corruption,
the
growing
risks
of
red-black
collusion
and
the
transformation
of
organized
crime
at
home
and
abroad.
The
author
argues
that
the
apparent
realignment
of
law
and
order
priorities
offer
an
unprecedented
opportunity
for
further
changes
needed
to
strengthen
both
law
and
anti-organised
crime
practices.
The
2011
revision
of
Article
294
which
came
into
effect
in
January
2012
codifies
the
Peoples
Supreme
Court,
Explanation
of
Questions
Related
to
Judging
Cases
of
Organizations
with
Character
of
Black
Society
issued
in
2000.
The
article
defines
the
characteristics
of
an
organization
of
the
character
of
a
black
society
or
of
gangland
nature
as:
(1)
A
relatively
stable
criminal
organization
is
formed
with
a
relatively
large
number
of
members,
and
there
are
specific
organizers
or
leaders
and
basically
fixed
core
members.
(2)
Economic
interests
are
gained
by
organized
illegal
or
criminal
activities
or
other
means,
and
it
has
certain
financial
strength
to
support
its
activities.
(3)
By
violence,
threat
or
other
means,
it
commits
organized
illegal
or
criminal
activities
many
times
to
do
evil,
bully
and
cruelly
injure
or
kill
people.
(4)
It
dominates
a
certain
area
by
committing
illegal
or
criminal
activities
or
taking
advantage
of
the
harbo8ring
or
connivance
by
the
state
functionaries,
forming
an
illegal
control
or
significant
influence
in
a
certain
area
or
sector,
which
seriously
disrupts
the
economic
and
social
order.5
5
Translation
provided
by
Peking
University
Center
for
Legal
Information:
LawInfoChina
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/.
18
Article
294
holds
leaders
of
organizations
of
a
gangland
nature
criminally
responsible
for
actual
offences
committed
(so
vicarious
liability
is
envisaged),
and
enhances
their
punishment
including
the
forfeiture
of
property.
The
revision
also
specifically
punishes
overseas
crime
groups
who
recruit
members
in
the
PRC
with
a
minimum
of
three
years
and
a
maximum
of
10
years,
and
punishes
for
up
to
five
years
state
functionaries
who
harbour
an
organization
of
a
gangland
nature
or
connive
at
such
an
organizations
illegal
or
criminal
activities.
Article
295
was
also
amended
to
punish
those
who
might
instruct
black
society
members
in
the
techniques
of
crime
so
that
even
those
who
are
not
involved
in
an
offence
but
may
be
connected
through
their
teaching
(qua
leadership)
of
criminal
conduct.
Overall
the
approach
applied
to
organized
crime
is
reliant
on
deterrence
and
is
reactive
rather
than
preventative
in
focus.
The
definitions
merge
a
particular
form
of
organization
(large
and
stable)
with
a
variety
of
likely
activities
and
thus
may
confuse
matters
of
form
with
function
and
underestimate
looser
and
more
fluid
networks.
The
need
to
demonstrate
that
the
criminal
group
has
an
organizational
structure
and
can
enforce
rules
on
its
members,
dominates
an
area
or
sector,
uses
violence
and
suborns
officials
will
be
a
demanding
task
unless
the
criteria
are
applied
in
a
versatile
way.
While
the
new
definitions
may
offer
a
clearer
idea
of
what
is
meant
by
organized
crime
the
evidentiary
burden
to
determine
leadership
of
such
a
criminal
organization
is
onerous.
The
limited
capacity
of
some
PSB
units,
especially
with
regard
to
covert
operations,
financial
and
specialist
investigations
and
the
absence
of
Hong
Kong-style
conspiracy
laws
(i.e.
the
anti-
triad
Societies
Ordinance)
will
also
hinder
the
suppression
of
black
societies.
The
continued
over-reliance
of
the
PSB
and
courts
on
confessional
evidence
in
the
context
of
limited
safeguards
for
suspects
may
also
lead
to
ineffective
targeting
of
organized
crime
activities
and
groups.
Implementation
of
the
new
law
may
prove
less
helpful
if
police
and
prosecutors
are
also
restrained
by
the
absence
of
the
witness
protection
programs
envisaged
by
the
criminal
procedure
law,
inadequate
forfeiture
of
property
laws,
and
limited
unexplained
wealth
provisions.
Extra-legal protection in China: State weakness, guanxi and the rise of mafias
Chinese
people
tend
to
use
guanxia
Chinese
form
of
social
networkto
make
up
for
the
lack
of
the
rule
of
law
and
transparency
in
rules
and
regulations.
The
coexistence
of
the
legal
system
and
the
guanxi
network
does
not
necessarily
result
in
a
positive
outcome,
however.
In
other
words,
guanxi
in
contemporary
China
damages
the
performance
of
the
legal
system.
The
revival
of
private
property
and
the
establishment
of
a
socialist
market
economy
require
post-Mao
China
to
enact
legal
reform
and
create
an
effective
legal
system.
How
can
people
in
a
guanxi-based
society
protect
private
property
rights
and
facilitate
trade?
Using
published
materials
and
fieldwork
data
collected
from
two
Chinese
cities
(Chongqing
and
Qufu),
this
paper
incorporates
the
concept
of
guanxithe
Chinese
variant
of
social
capitalinto
the
discussions
of
state
weakness
and
the
rise
of
extra-legal
protection
groups.
Evidence
from
Chongqing
demonstrates
how
guanxi
distorts
Chinas
legal
system
by
facilitating
the
buying
and
selling
of
public
offices
and
promoting
the
formation
of
guanxi
networks
between
locally-based
criminals
and
government
officials.
Chinas
weak
legal
framework
encourages
individuals
and
entrepreneurs
to
employ
guanxi
and
extra-legal
19
protectors
(e.g.
underground
police
officers)
to
protect
private
property
rights,
facilitate
transactions,
and
deal
with
government
extortion.
This
research
contributes
to
three
literatures.
First,
previous
research
examines
the
relationships
between
state
failure
and
mafia
emergence.
Publications
relating
to
the
Sicilian
Mafia,
the
Russian
Mafia,
Hong
Kong
triads,
the
Japanese
Yakuza,
the
extra-legal
protection
in
Bulgaria,
mafia
movements,
prison
gangs,
and
youth
gangs
set
up
a
theory
named
by
Federico
Varese
as
the
property
right
theory
of
mafia
emergence.
Mafias
act
as
quasi-
governmental
institutions
when
the
state
fails
to
provide
fair,
equitable,
and
sufficient
protection
for
the
right-holders
in
the
procedures
concerning
the
enforcement
of
property
rights.
The
existing
research
on
mafia
emergence
has
generally
been
limited
to
examining
the
substitutive
relationship
between
the
state
and
the
mafia.
This
paper
contributes
to
existing
research
by
exploring
the
relationship
between
the
three
independent
systems
of
order
in
the
Chinese
context:
the
legal
system,
guanxi
and
the
mafia.
In
other
words,
it
incorporates
the
concept
of
guanxi
in
the
discussions
of
state
weakness
and
the
rise
of
mafias.
Second,
alongside
the
growing
interest
in
Chinas
economic
and
social
transformation,
the
conception
of
guanxi
has
become
a
popular
academic
topic
over
recent
decades.
Past
research
mainly
focuses
on
two
aspects
of
guanxi:
the
cultural
and
the
institutional
dimensions.
Cultural
scholars
view
guanxi
as
a
specific
type
of
relationship
or
a
unique
strategic
behaviour
deeply
rooted
in
Chinese
culture.
Institutional
theorists
define
guanxi
as
a
Chinese
idiom
of
social
capital
and.
This
paper
is
based
on
institutional
theories
of
guanxi.
The
relationship
between
guanxi
and
the
legal
system
has
been
commonly
described
as
substitutive
or
complementary,
but
the
negative
side
of
personal
guanxi
needs
further
examination.
This
paper
provides
an
opportunity
to
examine
how
guanxi
distorts
and
subverts
the
Chinese
legal
system;
it
also
explores
the
new
feature
of
guanxi
that
functions
as
extra-legal
governance
protecting
corrupt
transactions
between
government
officials
and
locally-based
criminals
in
contemporary
China.
Third,
past
research
examines
multi-dimensional
nature
of
Chinese
organized
crime
in
China
and
beyond.
Three
aspects
have
been
emphasized.
From
the
global
perspective,
human
smuggling
and
drug
trafficking
have
been
thoroughly
explored,
and
counterfeiting,
sex
trafficking
and
loan
sharking
have
gained
increased
attention.
From
the
regional
perspective,
cross-border
crime
between
Mainland
China,
Hong
Kong
and
Taiwan
and
the
mainlandisation
of
Hong
Kong-
and
Taiwan-based
criminal
groups
have
been
deeply
20
examined
in
recent
years.
From
the
national
perspective,
past
research
focuses
on
various
aspects
of
Chinese
organized
crime,
such
as
drug
trafficking
and
distribution,
prostitution,
robbery,
stolen
children,
cigarette
counterfeiting,
and
the
relationship
between
politics
and
organized
crime.
Criminal
protection
or
quasi
law
enforcement,
however,
has
received
surprisingly
little
attention
in
discussions
of
organized
crime
in
China.
The
authors
research
complements
the
existing
research
by
examining
the
involvement
of
criminal
groups
in
the
private
protection
business.
To
sum
up,
guanxi
in
contemporary
China
is
a
double-edged
sword.
On
the
one
hand,
guanxi
provides
a
complement
to
the
formal
institutional
framework.
On
the
other
hand,
the
transaction
cost
advantage
of
guanxi-based
governance
stimulates
individuals
and
government
officials
to
employ
guanxi
networks
to
get
things
done,
which
undermines
the
legal
system.
When
a
basic
socialist
legal
system
with
Chinese
characteristics
has
been
established,
the
negative
effects
of
guanxi
become
more
obvious.
This
paper
suggests
that
guanxi
has
been
closely
associated
with
corruption,
bribery,
and
organized
crime,
threatening
the
ruling
status
of
the
Chinese
government
and
the
rule
of
law.
It
is
thus
fundamentally
important
for
China
to
provide
clear
formal
rules
governing
the
behaviour
of
law
enforcers
and
government
officials
and
to
protect
them
from
the
demands
of
guanxi
networks.
The
incorporation
of
guanxi
theories
in
examining
corruption
and
organized
crime
provides
a
new
research
perspective.
To
what
extent
guanxi
negatively
affects
the
performance
of
Chinas
socialist
legal
system
and
to
what
extent
it
safeguards
organized
crime
groups
and
their
illegal
businesses
are
issues
that
deserve
further
research.
Both
yakuza
groups
in
Japan
and
outlaw
motorcycle
gangs
(OMCGs)
in
Australia
engage
in
serious
organised
crime.
Both
are
highly
visible
and
legal
organizations,
existing
in
a
twilight
zone
somewhere
between
the
dark
networks
and
bright
networks
theorized
by
Raab
and
Milward
(2003).
Other
similarities
include
hierarchical
structures,
the
use
of
symbols
for
identification,
a
propensity
for
using
both
hard
and
soft
violence,
and
an
ambiguous
social
status.
These
and
other
commonalities
suggest
that
there
may
be
merit
in
considering
the
distinct
responses
of
authorities
to
the
groups
of
each
country,
with
a
view
to
seeing
what,
if
any,
lessons
could
be
learnt
or
shared.
The
paper
also
concentrates
on
significant
criminal
groups
in
each
country.
Although
there
is
more
to
organised
crime
in
Australia
and
Japan
that
simply
the
activities
of
outlaw
motorcycle
gangs
and
the
yakuza
respectively,
legislative
responses
have
largely
been
driven
by
the
perception
that
it
is
these
groups
that
pose
the
greatest
of
organized
crime
threats.
21
In
Australia,
for
example,
long-term
public
violence
by
OMCGs
has
been
of
singular
significance.
One
recent
event,
a
particularly
brutal
murder
at
Sydney
domestic
airport
in
2009
that
occurred
during
a
brawl
between
rival
OMCGs,
catalysed
the
successive
reproduction
by
different
state
and
territory
jurisdictions
of
a
specific
model
of
legislation
based
on
anti-terrorism
laws.
While
this
swathe
of
legislation
purports
to
deal
with
organized
crime
in
general,
in
fact
it
was
introduced
specifically
and
overtly
to
target
OMCGs.
It
does
this
through
providing
for
court-issued
civil
instruments
designed
to
control
the
communications
and
associations
between
their
members,
together
with
potentially
harsh
criminal
penalties
for
breach
of
those
orders
(including
imprisonment
for
up
to
5
years).
Several
legal
challenges
to
the
constitutionality
of
this
legislation
have
stalled
its
implementation,
so
its
effectiveness
has
not
yet
been
tested.
Similarly,
two
recent
significant
pieces
of
organized
crime
legislation
in
Japan
have
been
enacted
to
deal
specifically
with
yakuza
activities.
The
Act
on
Prevention
of
Unjust
Acts
by
Boryokudan
(hereafter
the
Anti-Yakuza
Act),
enacted
in
1992,
was
designed
primarily
to
tackle
the
problem
of
minb
(a
form
of
extortion
of
ordinary
members
of
the
public
that
avoids
the
use
of
explicit
intimidation).
Because
the
Act
proved
ineffective
when
the
yakuza
responded
to
this
legal
development
by
corporatizing
and
engaging
in
more
white
collar
forms
of
crime,
such
as
corporate
fraud
and
extortion
and
the
manipulation
of
financial
markets,
a
second
wave
of
legislation,
prefectural
laws
known
as
Organised
Crime
Exclusionary
Ordinances,
was
passed
between
2009
and
2011.
These
laws
are
aimed
not
at
the
yakuza
themselves
but
at
individuals
and
companies
that
do
business
with
them
or
pay
them
off,
and
they
work
by
prohibiting
those
relations
and
characterizing
such
persons
as
accomplices
rather
than
as
victims
(Adelstein
and
Stucky
2012).
Offenders
are
subject
to
public
denunciation,
resulting
in
a
loss
of
face
and
often
a
loss
of
business.
Provision
is
also
made
for
small
fines
and
short
periods
of
imprisonment.
In
addition
to
these
strategies,
each
country
has
also
experimented
with
approaches
based
on
using
civil
and
administrative
laws.
Some
of
these
are
gentler
than
others.
Australian
authorities
have
sought
to
make
life
difficult
for
OMCG
members
with
provisions
relating
to
the
issue
and
renewal
of
licences
and
permits
that
restrict
their
choice
of
occupation
and
of
property
ownership/
management.
In
addition
they
have
used
regulatory
laws,
such
as
those
relating
to
planning,
fire
regulations
and
liquor
licensing,
to
limit
the
use
of
OMCG
clubhouses,
as
well
as
in
some
places
strictly
enforcing
traffic
laws
against
OMCG
members.
Japanese
law
has
provided
for
the
establishment
of
Centres
for
the
Eradication
of
the
Yakuza,
where
not
only
can
yakuza
victims
find
help
to
stand
up
to
yakuza
demands
for
payments
or
other
benefits
but
also
yakuza
members
can
be
given
assistance
to
leave
the
organisation.
Laws
have
also
given
citizens
the
right
to
ask
the
courts
for
injunctions
to
prevent
the
yakuza
from
using
premises
as
gang
headquarters,
to
demand
compensation
for
damage
sustained
at
the
hands
of
the
yakuza,
and
to
sue
yakuza
bosses
for
the
harmful
actions
of
their
subordinates.
Such
suits
have
proved
popular
among
members
of
the
public,
spurred
on
by
education
campaigns
concerning
the
harmfulness
of
yakuza
activities.
The
different
levels
and
types
of
criminal
activities
undertaken
by
OMCGs
and
the
yakuza
suggest
that
currently
different
approaches
are
warranted
in
the
two
countries.
However,
placing
different
jurisdictions
strategies
for
organized
crime
side
by
side
does
highlight
potential
future
threats
and
has
the
ability
to
stimulate
thinking
about
innovative
designs
for
responding
to
those
threats.
22
How
organised
crime
operates
across
countries:
The
case
of
Italian
Mafias
in
Asia
and
Pacific
Dr.
Paolo
Campana,
Department
of
Sociology
and
Nuffield
College
University
of
Oxford
This
paper
outlines
a
theoretical
framework
to
assess
organised
crime
activities
across
territories
and
their
modus
operandi.
The
framework
is
based
on
the
distinction
governing
vs.
trading.
Organised
crime
groups
are
suppliers
of
illegal
market
governance
(Varese
2010;
Schelling
1971).
When
expanding
their
operations
abroad,
Mafias
may
open
outposts
in
the
new
territories
where
some
of
the
members
have
resettled.
Two
distinct
strategies
may
obtain:
(a)
functional
diversification,
when
Mafias
do
not
move
or
expand
their
core
business
(protection)
outside
their
territory
of
origin
but
instead
diversify
their
activities
across
territories
(Campana
2011;
2013);
b)
transplantation,
when
Mafias
move/expand
their
core
business
into
the
new
territory
(Varese
2011).
In
the
first
scenario
outposts
are
set
up
to
trade
in
both
legal
and
illegal
markets;
in
the
second
scenario
outposts
are
providers
of
illegal
governance.
The
Big
Picture:
Italian
Mafias
activities
in
Asia
The
article
scrutinises
Italian
Mafias
activities
in
Asia
relying
on
a
unique
data
set
of
Mafia
activities
across
the
World.
21
cities
in
the
Asia-Pacific
region
are
included
in
the
data
set:
11
cities
in
Australia,
9
cities
in
China
and
1
city
in
Thailand.
A
pattern
of
territorial
specialisation
emerges
from
the
data.
Thailand
appears
as
a
hide-out
for
fugitives
while
China
is
an
important
trading
partner
for
the
Neapolitan
Camorra
groups
involved
in
smuggling
counterfeit
goods
into
Europe.
Australia
emerges
as
the
most
interesting
case
in
the
region
given
the
lasting
presence
of
Calabrian
Ndrangheta
members
on
its
territory.
The
Ndrangheta
in
Australia
Extortion
rackets
within
the
Italian
communities
were
rife
during
the
inter-war
period
from
late
1920s
to
1940,
i.e.
the
so-called
Black
Hand.
Black
Hand
was
not
an
organisation
but
rather
a
modus
operandi.
While
we
do
not
know
when
the
first
bona
fide
Ndrangheta
members
set
foot
in
Australia,
there
is
evidence
of
their
presence
in
the
1950s
as
part
of
a
generalised
migration
from
Southern
Italy
to
Australia
(by
1971,
about
290,000
Italian
immigrants
were
living
in
Australia,
17%
of
them
from
Calabria).
In
the
Seventies,
Ndrangheta
members
became
increasingly
involved
in
the
production
and
sale
of
drugs.
In
1995,
the
final
report
of
Operation
Cerberus
identified
the
cultivation
and
distribution
of
cannabis
as
the
main
activity
of
Ndrangheta
cells
in
Australia.
In
addition,
they
also
noted
an
increasing
involvement
in
amphetamines,
cocaine
and
heroin.
A
closer
scrutiny
of
Ndrangheta
operations
in
Australia
reveals
that
they
mostly
fall
within
the
diversification
category,
i.e.
cells
and
individual
members
are
mainly
involved
in
trading
as
opposed
to
governing
(e.g.
there
is
no
evidence
of
an
Ndrangheta
monopoly
over
the
cannabis
market).
Yet,
there
is
at
least
one
instance
of
protection
racket
run
by
the
Ndrangheta:
the
Queen
Victoria
Markets
in
Melbourne.
The
article
identifies
the
local
conditions
as
well
as
the
supply
factors
conducive
to
the
emergence
of
this
protection
racket,
and
to
its
persistence
over
time.
References
23
Campana,
P.
(2011).
Eavesdropping
on
the
Mob:
the
functional
diversification
of
Mafia
activities
across
territories.
European
Journal
of
Criminology,
8(3),
213-228.
Campana,
P.
(2013).
Understanding
Then
Responding
to
Italian
Organized
Crime
Operations
across
Territories.
Policing.
Schelling,
T.
C.
(1971).
What
is
the
business
of
organized
crime.
J.
Pub.
L.,
20,
71.
Varese,
F.
(2011).
Mafias
on
the
move:
How
organized
crime
conquers
new
territories.
Princeton
University
Press.
The
article
will
show
how
Asian
organized
crime
has
entered
the
criminal
area
in
a
number
of
EU
countries.
It
analyses
how
the
activities
of
different
Asian
criminal
groups
are
linked
to
migrant
communities
and
which
fields
are
concerned.
They
include
extortion,
human
smuggling
and
trafficking
and
money
laundering.
In
collaboration
with
other
non-Asian
criminal
groups,
Asian
organized
crime
is
also
active
in
the
production
and
trade
of
illegal
drugs,
match-fixing
and
counterfeiting
of
consumer
goods.
The
general
research
question
addressed
in
this
note
is:
What
is
the
extent
and
character
of
Asian
organized
crime
in
the
European
Union
and
what
kind
of
threat
do
these
groups
pose
to
the
European
economy
and
European
democracy?
Additional
questions
are:
Which
European
countries
are
vulnerable
to
the
activities
of
Asian
organized
crime
groups?
How
are
these
groups
embedded
in
local
migrant
communities
and
the
local
economy
of
the
host
countries?
What
is
their
modus
operandi
and
how
and
where
do
they
launder
their
criminal
profits?
The
article
is
based
on
research
which
took
place
2010-2011
and
applied
the
following
methodology:
content
analysis
of
secondary
data
available
from
the
extensive
literature
on
Asian
organized
crime
and
from
media
reports
and
semi-structured
interviews
with
experts
from
law
enforcement
and
criminologists
engaged
in
research
on
specific
aspects
of
Asian
organized
crime.
Theoretical
explanations
will
be
provided
to
these
new
developments
of
illegal
and
semi-illegal
markets
and
to
the
attractiveness
of
the
(illegal)
business
opportunities
in
Europe.
Asian
organized
crime
is
mainly
associated
with
the
historically
romanticized
Chinese
triads
and
Japanese
yakuza.
Other
Asian
crime
groups
are
less
well
known
in
Europe.
However,
rapid
economic
growth
in
many
Asian
countries,
increasing
numbers
of
migrants
and
advanced
technological
opportunities
have
resulted
in
new
forms
of
organized
crime,
bringing
these
unknown
crime
groups
closer
to
Europe.
Asian
organized
crime
manifests
itself
today
in
almost
all
European
countries
and
demands
the
attention
of
law
enforcement
agencies,
policymakers
and
academic
researchers.
This
article
includes
two
parts.
The
first
one
focuses
on
Asian
criminal
groups,
their
structure,
size
and
links
to
immigrant
communities.
The
second
part
includes
an
analysis
of
specific
criminal
activities
in
different
European
countries
and
their
cooperation
with
non-Asian
criminal
networks.
In
Western
Europe
trafficking
in
illegal
migrants
and
their
exploitation
in
legal
and
illegal
economy
by
Chinese
and
Vietnamese
organized
crime
groups
is
facilitated
24
by
the
presence
of
large
migrant
communities.
They
are
also
among
the
most
capable
in
managing
the
illicit
commodities
and
illegal
migration
to
the
European
Union.
Particularly
Chinese,
Vietnamese,
Pakistani
and
Turkish
criminal
groups
are
running
smuggling
and
trafficking
networks
from
their
countries
to
the
EU.
Proceeds
of
crime
are
mainly
invested
in
real
estate
and
businesses
in
the
countries
of
origin.
Regarding
specific
criminal
activities
the
article
will
show,
using
examples
from
the
media
and
literature
that
different
Asian
groups
develop
specialization
in
different
criminal
activities.
Vietnamese
organized
crime
are
prominent
in
the
cultivation
of
cannabis
and
cigarette
smuggling,
Pakistani
and
Afghan
hawala
bankers
facilitate
heroin
smuggling
and
money
laundering
activities.
Organized
crime
groups
from
China
and
Thailand
are
key
producers
and
suppliers
of
counterfeit
identity
documents,
fake
trademark
goods
and
counterfeited
clothes
and
medicines.
Although
no
specific
policies
were
developed
to
combat
Asian
Organized
Crime
at
the
European
level,
European
cooperation
between
law
enforcement
and
researchers
could
be
vital
to
the
effort
to
prevent
and
combat
this
relatively
new
form
of
organized
crime.
The
role
of
European
institutions,
especially
Europol
will
be
analysed.
25
I
am
using
Tokyo
as
my
primary
research
site
on
account
of
its
size,
location,
and
structural
factors.
As
the
worlds
most
populated
metropolis
it
is
a
popular
target
for
economic
migration,
especially
given
its
proximity
to
less
developed
nations
in
East
and
Southeast
Asia.
There
is
also
a
well-studied
organised
crime
presence
in
the
form
of
the
yakuza,
the
Japanese
mafia
(Kaplan
and
Dubro
2003;
Hill
2003;
Adelstein
2009).
Finally,
Tokyo
has
a
highly
developed
sex
industry,
both
concentrated
in
the
Kabukichou
red
light
district
and
diffused
throughout
the
city
in
numerous
smaller
sites.
In
addition
to
Tokyo,
I
will
also
conduct
research
in
source
countries
for
migrant
sex
workers
and
human
trafficking
victims;
these
could
include
Thailand,
the
Philippines
and
the
PRC.
My
first
source
of
information
will
be
the
available
estimates
of
financial
flows
related
to
the
international
sex
trade,
including
reports
from
IGOs
(UN-GIFT,
UNODC),
NGOs
and
governments.
However,
these
data
sets
are
limited:
government
agencies
with
responsibility
for
a
specific
problem
area
may
have
an
incentive
to
underreport
data
or
may
simply
not
have
access
to
data
themselves;
advocacy
groups
have
an
ideological
agenda
that
could
influence
their
reporting
and
for
other
groups,
budgetary
problems
could
put
pressure
on
them
to
exaggerate
a
problem
in
order
to
elicit
funding
(see
Weitzer
2007).
Because
of
these
uncertainties
and
the
illicit
nature
of
the
transactions,
actually
following
the
money
itself
may
be
impossible.
However,
by
speaking
with
sources
close
to
the
industry
in
Tokyo
as
well
as
in
source
countries
for
migrants
such
as
the
Philippines,
it
will
be
possible
to
sketch
the
broad
contours
of
some
of
these
transactions.
These
sources
can
include
current
sex
works,
human
trafficking
victims,
brothel
owners
and
managers,
agents
involved
in
moving
woman
across
international
borders,
organised
crime
figures
connected
to
the
sex
industry,
police
and
other
law
enforcement,
and
NGOs
such
as
the
Polaris
Project
and
the
Wesley
Foundation.
It
is
possible
that
many
of
these
individuals
will
prove
either
impossible
to
locate
or
unwilling
to
talk,
given
the
sensitive
nature
of
their
work.
I
will
also
need
to
work
through
third-parties
to
gain
access
to
certain
sources
(such
as
rescue
NGOs
in
the
case
of
human
trafficking
victims),
and
I
will
therefore
need
to
take
into
account
the
biases
of
these
gatekeepers.
As
such,
I
am
casting
as
wide
a
net
as
possible
so
as
to
have
sufficient
sources
to
cross-validate
this
data.
With
this
data
I
will
analyse
the
economics
of
this
industry
to
explain
how
a
demand
for
sexual
services,
an
availability
of
cheap
labour,
the
presence
of
actors
specialising
in
illicit
services
and
economies
of
scale
all
contribute
to
the
functioning
of
the
sex
industry
in
Tokyo.
I
will
also
use
criminological
theories
to
explore
how
criminal
networks
spanning
international
borders
assist
in
the
functioning
of
this
industry
(Morselli
2010;
Spapens
2010),
as
well
as
how
the
marginalisation
and
outsider
status
of
immigrants
leads
to
their
involvement
in
deviant
activities
(Becker
1963;
Goode
and
Ben-Yehuda
2010),
and
how
mafia
groups
become
involved
when
groups
falling
outside
the
law
need
protection
(Gambetta
1996;
Varese
2001;
Hill
2003).
Finally,
I
will
address
feminist
critiques
related
to
the
legitimacy
of
prostitution
as
sex
work
by
exploring
the
role
of
agency
for
sex
workers
using
a
model
of
bounded
rationality
(Simmons
and
Lloyd
2010;
Chin
and
Finckenauer
2012).
Together,
this
data
and
these
approaches
should
allow
for
a
better
understanding
of
the
workings
of
the
international
sex
industry.
26
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27